Cases 5 - Election Laws

7/30/2019 Cases 5 - Election Laws

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ELECTION LAWS SET 5 1

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS vs. HON. TOMAS B. NOYNAY G.R. No. 132365, July 9,1998....................................................................................................................................2

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS v. HON. DOLORES L. ESPAOL G.R. No. 149164-73,December 10, 2003............................................................................................................4

EUGENIO JING-JING FAELNAR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.140850-51, May 4, 2000.....................................................................................................9

HERMAN TIU LAUREL vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE G.R. No. 131778,January 28, 2000..............................................................................................................11

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS vs. HON. LORENZO R. SILVA, JR. February 10, 1998,G.R. No. 129417..........................................................................................................................................14

KILOSBAYAN, INC., FERNANDO A. SANTIAGO, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, EMILIO C.CAPULONG JR., RAFAEL G. FERNANDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R.No. 128054, October 16, 1997..........................................................................................16

ANTONIO M. BERNARDO, ERNESTO A. DOMINGO, JR. and JESUS C. CRUZv. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., BENJAMIN "BENHUR" D. ABALOS, JR., DR. EDEN C.DIAZ, ROMEO F. ZAPANTA, ARCADIO S. DE VERA and THE COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, G.R. No. 137266 - December 5, 2001........................................................26

ANTONIO V.A. TAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 112093 October 4,1994..................................................................................................................................28

Those who look to him for help will be radiant with joy;

no shadow of shame will darken their faces. Psalm34:5 NLT \(^w^)/


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COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS vs. HON. TOMAS B. NOYNAY G.R. No. 132365, July9, 1998

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action forcertiorariwith mandamus is whetherR.A. No. 76911 has divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses,which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years.

The antecedents are not disputed.

In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996, the Commission on Elections(COMELEC) resolved to file an information for violation of Section 261(i) of the OmnibusElection Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a public school principal, andEsbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for having engaged inpartisan political activities. The COMELEC authorized its Regional Director in Region VIII

to handle the prosecution of the cases.

Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election werefiled with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Allen, Northern Samar, and docketedtherein as follows:

a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against private respondents Diosdada Amor,Esbel Chua, and Ruben Magluyoan.

b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private respondents Esbel Chua and RubenMagluyoan.

c) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against private respondent Esbel Chua only;

d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against private respondent Diosdada Amoronly.

In an Order2issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, aspresiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprioordered the records of the cases to bewithdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with theappropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg.129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691,3 the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over thecases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed sixyears of imprisonment. Pertinent portions of the Order read as follows:

[I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly charged for[sic]Violation ofSec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which under Sec. 264 of the same Codecarries a penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of

imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus disqualification to hold public office ordeprivation of the right of suffrage.

Sec. 31 [sic]of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.) Blg. 129 as Amended byRep. Act. 6691 [sic](Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction MetropolitanTrial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Criminal CasesExcept [in] cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional TrialCourts and the Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and

the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinancecommitted within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with an imprisonment of notexceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount or fine and regardless of otherimposable accessory and other penalties including the civil liability arising from suchoffenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of time [sic], nature, value and amountthereof, Provided, However, that in offenses including damages to property throughcriminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no jurisdiction over the cases filed

considering that the maximum penalty imposable did not exceed six (6) years.

The two motions4 for reconsideration separately filed by the COMELEC Regional Directorof Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through its Legal Department having beendenied by the public respondent in the Order of 17 October 1997,5the petitioner filed thisspecial civil action. It contends that public respondent has erroneously misconstrued theprovisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction to try and decide election offenses because pursuant to Section 268of the Omnibus Election Code and this Courts ruling in Alberto [sic]vs. Judge JuanLavilles, Jr.,Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over electionoffenses.

On 17 February 1998, we required the respondents and the Office of the Solicitor

General to comment on the petition.

In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General informs us that itis adopting the instant petition on the ground that the challenged orders of publicrespondent are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence.

In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public respondent avers that it is the duty ofcounsel for private respondents interested in sustaining the challenged orders to appearfor and defend him.

In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested theRegional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty is notmore than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws,

decrees, and orders inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed or modifiedaccordingly. They then conclude that since the election offense in question is punishablewith imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.
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We resolved to give due course to the petition.

Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of theCode except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote.6It readsas follows:

SEC. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. - The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original

jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code,except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall beunder the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision ofthe courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.

Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are those enumerated in Section261 thereof. The offense allegedly committed by private respondents is covered byparagraph (i) of said Section, thus:

SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(i) Intervention of public officers and employees.Any officer or employee in the civilservice, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the

Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police forces, special forces, home defenseforces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units that now exist orwhich may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any electioncampaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve publicorder, if he is a peace officer.

Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election offense under the Code,except that of failure to register or failure to vote, is imprisonment of not less than oneyear but not more than six years and the offender shall not be subject to probation andshall suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage.

Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, provides asfollows:

SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and MunicipalCircuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.Except in cases falling within the exclusive originaljurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan TrialCourts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinancescommitted within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment notexceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of otherimposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from suchoffenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount

thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property throughcriminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals7 that by virtue of the exceptionprovided for in the opening sentence of Section 32, the exclusive original jurisdiction ofMetropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts doesnot cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of thepenalty prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases arepunishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e.,prision correccional,arresto mayor, orarresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial

Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.

Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the exception provided for in theopening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2)Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on IntellectualProperty;8and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,9 as amended.

Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election offensesalso fall within the exception.

As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by Congress.Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congresshas the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various

courts. Congress may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should beexclusively heard and determined by one court. Such law would be a special law andmust be construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely,the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it ismerely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the JudiciaryReorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of repealinglaws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive originaljurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified. That Congress never intendedthat R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from thefact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129providing for the exception.

It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as wellas other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law, 10to administer hisoffice with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,11 to be faithful to thelaw, and to maintain professional competence.12

Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of petitioners Law Department,must also be admonished for his utter carelessness in his reference to the case againstJudge Juan Lavilles, Jr. In the motion for Reconsideration13 he filed with the court below,Atty. Balbuena stated:

As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court has exclusivejurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled issue in the case ofAlbertoNaldeza vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996, where the

Supreme Court succinctly held:
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A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that pursuant to Sec. 265 and 267of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, has the exclusive power to conductpreliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Code andthe RTCshall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action orproceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan, or MTC, by way of exceptionexercises jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting thatthese provisions stand together with the provisions that any election offense under thecode shall be punishable with imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not

be subject to probation (Sec. 263, Omnibus Election Code), we submit that it is thespecial intention of the Code to vest upon the RTC jurisdiction over election cases as amatter of exception to the general provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases foundunder B.P. 129 by RA 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminalelection offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction. (Underscoring ours)

Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:

16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of Alberto -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.,245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue of jurisdiction between the lower courts andRegional Trial Court on election offenses, has ruled, thus:

With respect to the other charges, a review of the Pertinent Provision of Law would show

that pursuant to Section 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code the Comelec has theexclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations all election offenses punishableunder the code and the Regional Trial Court shall have the exclusive original jurisdictionto try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. TheMetropolitan Trial Court, by way of exception exercise jurisdiction only on offensesrelating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stands together withthe provision that any election offense under the code shall be punishable withimprisonment for one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation(Section 264, Omnibus Election Code). We submit that it is the special intention of thecode to vest upon the Regional Trial Court jurisdiction over election cases as matter ofexemption to the provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. Reg.129, as amended. Consequently, the amendment of B.P. Reg. 129 by Republic Act No.7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite itsexpanded jurisdiction.

If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the correct name of thecomplainant in the case referred to is neitherAlberto Naldeza as indicated in the motionfor reconsideration norAlberto alone as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA.Moreover, the case was not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme Court ReportsAnnotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but involume 254 of the SCRA.

Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberatelymade it appear that the quoted portions were our findings or rulings, or, put a littledifferently, our own words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of thememorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision.

Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 14 mandates that alawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challengedorders of public respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25 August 1997 and 17 October1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET ASIDE. RespondentJudge is DIRECTED to try and decide said cases with purposeful dispatch and, further,ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethicsand Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Atty. Jose P. Balbuena isADMONISHED to be more careful in the discharge of his duty

to the court as a lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS v. HON. DOLORES L. ESPAOL G.R. No. 149164-73,December 10, 2003

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition forcertiorariand mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, asamended, filed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for the nullification of theOrder of the respondent judge dated February 20, 2001, denying the Omnibus Motion toDismiss filed by the petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 7960-00 to 7969-00, and the Orderdated May 16, 2001, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedents

During the elections on May 11, 1998, Florentino A. Bautista was the official candidate ofthe Lakas for the position of Municipal Mayor of Kawit, Cavite. He executed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the incumbent Municipal Mayor Atty. Federico Hit Poblete, Vice-Mayor Reynaldo Aguinaldo, Bienvenido Pobre, Arturo Ganibe, Leonardo Llave, Diosdadodel Rosario, Manuel Ubod, Angelito Peregrino, Mario Espiritu, Salvador Olaes and PedroPaterno, Jr. of violation of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of the Omnibus ElectionCode (vote buying) and filed the same with the Law Department of the COMELEC. Thecomplaint was entitledFlorentino A. Bautista vs. Federico A. Poblete, et al., and docketedas EO Case No. 98-219. Of the 77 persons offered by the complainant to prove thecharges, 44 executed their respective affidavits and swore and subscribed to the truththereof, on the vote-buying of the respondents. The Law Department of the petitionerconducted the requisite preliminary investigation, after which it submitted its commentsand recommendations to the COMELEC En Banc. On February 25, 1999, theCOMELEC En Bancissued Resolution No. 99-0346, the dispositive portion of which

reads:
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RESOLVED: (a) to file the necessary information against respondents Federico A.Poblete, Bienvenido C. Pobre, Reynaldo B. Aguinaldo, Leonardo Llave, Diosdado delRosario, Angelito Peregrino, Mario Espiritu, Salvador Olaes, Pedro Paterno, Jr., ArturoGanibe and Manuel Ubod, before the proper Regional Trial Court of Cavite for violation ofSection 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code; and to authorize the Director IV ofthe Law Department to designate a COMELEC prosecutor to handle the prosecution ofthe case until termination thereof, with the duty to submit periodic report after everyhearing of the case; and (b) to file a Motion before the Court for the preventivesuspension for a period of ninety (90) days of respondents Mayor Bienvenido Pobre,Vice-Mayor Reynaldo Aguinaldo and Sangguniang Bayan members Leonardo Llave,Diosdado del Rosario, Angelito Peregrino, Mario Espiritu, Salvador Olaes and PedroPaterno, Jr., while the case is pending pursuant to Section 60 Chapter IV of Republic ActNo. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 specifically on theground of commission of an offense involving moral turpitude.[1

The petitioner, through its Law Department, filed an Information against the respondentswith the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99, raffled toBranch 90, presided by the respondent judge. On May 10, 1999, the court issued anorder directing the Law Department of the petitioner to conduct a reinvestigation of thecase, citing the ruling of this Court in Lozano vs. Yorac[2andNolasco vs. Commissionon Elections.[3

In the meantime, Gerardo Macapagal and Inocencio Rodelas filed a criminal complaintfor violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code (vote selling) against thewitnesses of Florentino A. Bautista in Criminal Case No. 7034-99. The complaint wasdocketed as I.S. No. 1-99-1080. The Office of the Cavite Provincial Prosecutor conducteda preliminary investigation of the complaint, in his capacity as a deputy of the petitioner.On April 10, 2000, the Office of the Cavite Provincial Prosecutor issued a resolution inI.S. No. 1-99-1080 finding probable cause against the respondents for violations ofSection 261(a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code, and filed separate Informationsagainst them with the RTC of Cavite. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the preceding premises, let separate Informations for vote-selling penalized under Section 261 (a) (b) of the Omnibus Election Code be immediatelyfiled against all respondents, thirteen of whom were deemed to have waived their right to

present evidence in their behalf during the preliminary investigation.[4

The cases were raffled and assigned to the RTC branches as follows:

Criminal Case No. Branch Number

7940-00 to 7949-00 and 7981-00 Branch 22

7973-00 to 7979-00 and 7970-00 Branch 21

7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 Branch 20

7960-00 to 7969-00 Branch 90

On June 15, 2000, the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 received copies of theResolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, and on June 23, 2000 appealed the same to thepetitioner, contending that:

Violation of Section 261 (a)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code is an election offense underArticle XXII of the same code. Under Section 265 of the Code, it is this HonorableCommission which has the exclusive power to conduct (the) preliminary investigationthereof, and to prosecute the same. As such, it is also this Honorable Commission which

has the exclusive power to review, motu proprio or through an appeal, therecommendation or resolution of investigating officers in the preliminary investigation.

This appeal is, therefore, made pursuant to this Honorable Commissions exclusive powerto conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses xxx and to prosecute thesame and to review the recommendation or resolution of investigating officers, like thechief state prosecutor and/or provincial/city prosecutors in preliminary investigationsthereof under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 10, Rule 34 of theCOMELEC Rules of Procedure.[5

On July 6, 2000, the petitioner came out with Minute Resolution No. 00-1378 denying theappeal of the respondents-appellants therein for lack of jurisdiction. But on the same day,the respondents-appellants filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw or Revoke the Delegated

Authority of the Law Department to Direct the Said Office to Suspend or Move for theSuspension of the Prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. 7940-00 to 7981-00. Therespondents-appellants also filed a Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Set for HearingRe: Appeal from the Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor of Resolution No. I.S. No. 1-99-1080. OnSeptember 7, 2000, the COMELEC approved Resolution No. 00-1826, thus:

The Commission, after due deliberation, RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to deferaction on the aforesaid matter. Meanwhile, to refer the same to the Law Department forcomment and recommendation.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution.[6

On October 24, 2000, the Law Department of the petitioner filed a motion before

Branches 20, 21, 22 and 90, praying for the suspension of the proceedings against all theaccused until the petitioner shall have resolved the incidents before it. The publicprosecutor did not object to the motion. On October 25, 2000, RTC, Branch 22, issued anOrder granting the motion in the criminal cases before it.

Meanwhile, acting on the appeal of the respondents-appellants in I.S. No. 1-99-1080,Atty. Michael L. Valdez submitted his recommendation in behalf of the COMELECs LawDepartment, Investigation and Prosecution Division on November 13, 2000. It wasrecommended that the petitioner nullify the Resolution of the Office of the CaviteProvincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, for the reason that the respondents-appellants are exempt, under Section 28(4) of Republic Act No. 6646, from prosecutionfor violation of Section 261(a)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law Department RECOMMENDS to declare asnull and void the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal (Prosecutor) of Cavite inI.S. No. 1-99-1080, entitled Gerardo Macapagal, et al. vs. Celerino Villarosa, et al.,
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finding the existence of a probable cause against the respondents for being a violation ofSection 28 (4) of Rep. Act No. 6646, and to exempt them from criminal prosecution,accused: Celerino Villarosa, Felisa Villarosa, Leonardo Collano, Azucena Collano,Jonathan Francisco, Berna Francisco, David Zablan, Teresita Zablan, Rowel DelRosario, Reynaldo Morales, Lolita Morales, Sherlita Borejon, Leonardo Mabiliran, VirgilioDuco, Marina Duco, Bencio Planzar, Rudy Solomon, Nenita Viajador, Antonio De la Cruz,Guinata Agarao, Luis Cantiza, Ramilo Pinote, Miriam Pinote, Wilfredo/Fredo Rodriguez,Marlene/Marlyn Rodriguez, Rodelio Pinote, Saludia Pinote, Ronel Escalante, AlejandrinoDuco, Dominga Duco, Joel De la Rosa, Shirley De la Rosa, Ernesto Del Rosario, NildaDel Rosario, Rodger Pinote, Ma. Theresa Pinote, Wilfredo Del Rosario, Roberto Pinote,Jocelyn Pinote, Norma De la Rosa, Lita Montad and Nacy Daiz, whose cases arepending before Branches Nos. 20, 21, 22, and 90, Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite,and who are witnesses of the prosecution in Crim. Case No. 7034-99, Regional TrialCourt, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, and to direct the Law Department to file the necessarymotion before the court to dismiss their cases, by citing Section 28 (4) of Rep. Act No.6646.[7

During the regular meeting of the COMELEC En Bancon November 23, 2000, theChairman and two other commissioners were on official leave. The remaining fourcommissioners met and issued Resolution No. 00-2453 approving the foregoingrecommendation, to wit:

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the recommendationof the Law Department as follows:

1. to declare the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite in I.S. No.1-99-1080 (Gerardo Macapagal, et al. vs. Celerino Villarosa, et al.) as null and void, andto exempt the aforementioned accused from criminal prosecution pursuant to Section 28(4) of R.A. No. 6646; and

2. to direct the Law Department to file the necessary motion to dismiss before the propercourt the cases against the herein-named accused.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.[8

In compliance with the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, its Law Department,through Attys. Jose P. Balbuena and Michael Valdez, filed with the RTC, Branch 90, anOmnibus Motion (1) Motion for Reconsideration Re: Order of this Court dated November22, 2000; (2) Motion for Leave to Reiterate Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings; and(3) Motion to Dismiss filed on January 8, 2001. The Public Prosecutor opposed thepetitioners motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (a) the exemption under the lastparagraph of Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6646 applies only to the offense of vote-buying, as the accused in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 in which the respondents-appellants gave their sworn statements was for vote-buying; this exemption will not applyto the charge for vote-selling which was the crime charged in I.S. No. 1-99-1080; (b) theJuly 6, 2000 Resolution No. 00-1378 of the petitioner had become final and executory;hence, it is no longer subject to review by the petitioner; and (c) the review of the

Provincial Prosecutors resolution made by the petitioner was a re-investigation of thecase, and was done without prior authority of the Court.

On February 20, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying the Omnibus Motion of thepetitioner. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order on March 31,2000. The Provincial Prosecutor opposed the motion. On May 16, 2001, the trial courtissued an Order denying the said motion holding that the petitioner had no absolutepower to grant exemptions under Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6648. The trial court

also held that the issue of whether or not the accused are exempt from prosecution andconsequent conviction for vote-buying is a matter addressed to the Court and not to thepetitioner.

In its petition at bar, the petitioner raises the following issues for resolution, viz:

(1) WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONPURSUANT TO SECTION 28 (4) OF R.A. No. 6646.

(2) WHETHER THERE IS NO NEED FOR AN EN BANC RESOLUTION REVOKINGTHE AUTHORITY OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR FROM HANDLING THECASES FILED IN COURT SINCE THE COMELEC EN BANC ALREADY DIRECTEDTHE LAW DEPARTMENT TO FILE A MOTION TO DISMISS THESE CASES; [9

On the first issue, the petitioner contends that the complainants-appellees in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 failed to file any motion for the reconsideration of the petitioners Resolution No.00-2453 reversing Resolution No. 00-1378 which, in turn, dismissed the respondents-appellants appeal. Neither did the said complainants-appellees file a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court from its Resolution No. 00-2453. Consequently,Resolution No. 00-2453 has become final and executory; hence, is binding andconclusive on the complainants-appellees, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and theherein respondent judge. The petitioner further asserts that the respondents-appellantsmotion for reconsideration in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 of COMELEC Resolution No. 00-1378 isnot a prohibited pleading under Rule 13, Section 1, paragraph (d) of the COMELECRules of Procedure.

According to the petitioner, the prosecution of election offenses is under its sole control.Any delegation of its authority to the Provincial or City Prosecutor to prosecute electioncases may be revoked or withdrawn by it, expressly or impliedly, at any stage of theproceedings in the RTC. The petitioner, through Atty. Michael Valdez of its LawDepartment, had already entered his appearance for the petitioner as public prosecutorbefore the respondent judge. The Provincial Prosecutor was, thus, ipso factodivested ofhis authority, as deputized prosecutor, to represent the petitioner on the motion todismiss and to prosecute the cases before the respondent judge.

The respondent judge, for her part, avers that COMELEC Resolution No. 00-2453 wasapproved only by four of the seven members of the petitioner sitting en banc, and assuch, could not have validly revoked Resolution No. 00-1378 which was, in turn,approved by unanimous vote of the Commission Members sitting en banc. It behoovedthe petitioner to conduct a joint reinvestigation in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 and EO No. 98-219to ascertain whether the respondents-appellants in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 were exempt fromprosecution for vote-selling.
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Finally, according to the respondent judge, Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules ofProcedure is contrary to Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, which does not allowthe petitioner to withdraw its deputation of Provincial or City Prosecutors.

We agree with the petitioner.

Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution,[10the petitioner is empowered toinvestigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses. The grant by the

Constitution to the petitioner of the express power to investigate and prosecute electionoffenses is intended to enable the petitioner to assure the people of a fine, orderly,honest, peaceful and credible election.[11 Under Section 265 of the Omnibus ElectionCode, the petitioner, through its duly authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power toconduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the OmnibusElection Code, and to prosecute the same. The petitioner may avail of the assistance ofthe prosecuting arms of the government.[12 In Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELECRules of Procedure, all Provincial and City Prosecutors and/or their respective assistantsare given continuing authority as its deputies to conduct preliminary investigation ofcomplaints involving election offenses under election laws and to prosecute the same.The complaints may be filed directly with them or may be indorsed to them by thepetitioner or its duly authorized representatives.[13 The respondents assertion thatSection 2, Rule 34, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is a violation of Section 265 ofthe Omnibus Election Code has been laid to rest by this Court in Margarejo vs. Escoses,[14wherein this Court ruled that until revoked, the continuing authority of the Provincial orCity Prosecutors stays.

The deputation of the Provincial and City Prosecutors is necessitated by the need forprompt investigation and dispensation of election cases as an indispensable part of thetask of securing fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Enfeebled by lackof funds and the magnitude of its workload, the petitioner does not have a sufficientnumber of legal officers to conduct such investigation and to prosecute such cases. Theprosecutors deputized by the petitioner are subject to its authority, control andsupervision in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts ofsuch deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legalcontemplation, the acts of the petitioner itself. [15Such authority may be revoked orwithdrawn any time by the petitioner, either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment

such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process topromote the common good, or where it believes that successful prosecution of the casecan be done by the petitioner. Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of the petitioner,provincial or city prosecutors deputized by the petitioner are expected to act in accordwith and not contrary to or in derogation of the resolutions, directives or orders of thepetitioner in relation to election cases such prosecutors are deputized to investigate andprosecute. Otherwise, the only option of such provincial or city prosecutor is to seek relieffrom the petitioner as its deputy.

The withdrawal by the petitioner of its deputation of the provincial or city prosecutors maynot be interfered with or overruled by the trial court. In this case, the petitioner hadresolved to approve the recommendation of its Law Department and nullified theResolution of the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, and directed its Law

Department, not the Provincial Prosecutor, to implement the said resolution and file thenecessary motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7960-00 to 7969-00 pending with therespondent judge. The Law Department did file before the respondent a Motion to

Dismiss the said cases and a motion for the respondent to, in the meantime, suspend theproceedings. Atty. Michael L. Valdez, a legal officer of the petitioners Law Department,entered his appearance for the petitioner. The Provincial Prosecutor was thereby relievedof his deputation to represent the petitioner in connection with the said motion. However,the Provincial Prosecutor refused to give way to the Legal Officer of the petitioner andeven opposed the said motion. The act of the Provincial Prosecutor constituted adefiance of the resolution of the petitioner and should have been ignored by therespondent judge.

It bears stressing that when the Provincial Prosecutor conducted the preliminaryinvestigation of I.S. No. 1-99-1080, and filed the Information in Criminal Cases Nos.7960-00 to 7969-00, he did so because he had been duly deputized by the petitioner. Hedid not do so under the sole authority of his office. [16 The resolution of the ProvincialProsecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 was subject to appeal by the aggrieved party to thepetitioner and may be reversed by the petitioner in the exercise of its supervision andcontrol of its deputies/subordinates.[17

While it is the true that the petitioner initially dismissed the appeal of the respondents-appellants from the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, thepetitioner later gave due course and granted the appeal, and nullified the resolution of theProvincial Prosecutor. Contrary to the latters claim, the petitioner did not conduct areinvestigation of I.S. No. 1-99-1080. It merely acted on the appeal of the respondents-appellants.

The respondent has failed to cite any COMELEC rule which requires the unanimousvotes of all its Commissioners sitting en bancfor the reversal or revocation of a priorresolution approved by unanimous vote. On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 2 of theCOMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that:

SEC. 5. Quorum; Votes Required. (a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of theCommission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting business. Theconcurrence of a majority of the Members of the Commission shall be necessary for thepronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling.

In this case, COMELEC Resolution No. 00-2453 was approved by four of the sevenCommissioners of the petitioner, three of whom were on official leave. Irrefragably, thesaid resolution of the petitioner giving due course to the appeal of the respondents-appellants in I.S. No. 1-99-1087 was a valid reversal of COMELEC Resolution No. 00-1378 which initially denied the said appeal of the respondents-appellants.

The conduct of a preliminary investigation of election offenses for the purpose ofdetermining whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty ofthe offense charged and, therefore, should be subjected to trial is the function of thepetitioner.[18 The Court will not even interfere with the finding of the petitioner absent aclear showing of grave abuse of discretion. Neither should the respondent. This principleemanates from the COMELECs exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation ofall election offenses and to prosecute the same except as may otherwise be provided bylaw. While it is the duty of the petitioner to prosecute those committing election offenses,

it is equally its duty not to prosecute those offenses where no probable cause exists. Theexclusion and inclusion of persons in Informations for election offenses is a prerogative
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granted by the law and the Constitution to the petitioner. [19 The petitioner may not becompelled to charge a person or include the latter in an Information when it believes thatunder the law and on the basis of the evidence in its possession, such person should notbe charged at all.

On the second issue, the petitioner contends that respondents-appellants in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, who were its witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99, had been grantedexemptions from prosecution and punishment for the offense of vote-buying, pursuant to

Section 28(4) of Republic Act No. 6848. The petitioner avers that the respondents-appellants in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, are also exempt from criminal liability for the offense ofvote-selling; hence, should not be charged with the latter offense. Thus, Criminal CasesNos. 7960-00 to 7969-00 should be dismissed. The petitioner avers that the witnesseshad executed their respective affidavits as to where and how the accused in CriminalCase No. 7034-99 committed the crimes of vote-buying. The petitioner also contends thatthe charges of vote-selling filed against the said witnesses in Criminal Cases Nos. 7960-00 to 7969-00 were designed to frighten and discourage them from testifying against thevote buyers, who are the accused in Criminal Case No. 7034-99. The respondent, thus,committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction indenying its motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7960-00 to 7969-00 grounded on theexemption of the accused therein.

For her part, the respondent avers that under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code,both the vote-buyer and the vote-seller must be charged, investigated and prosecuted bythe petitioner for violation of Section 261(a)(b) of Republic Act No. 6648, as provided forin Section 28 of Rep. Act No. 6698. She cites the ruling of the Court in Lozano vs. Yorac,et al.,[20 to support her stand. She contends that vote-buyers cannot be exempt fromcriminal liability for vote-buying because there can be no vote-buying without someoneselling his vote. Preliminary investigations of the charges for vote-buying and vote-sellingmust be jointly conducted. This is to enable the COMELECs Law Department todetermine whether the witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 had voluntarily presentedthemselves to give information on the vote-buying of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.7960-00 to 7969-00. Based on the records, the witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99executed their sworn statements only after the preliminary investigation of EO No. 98-219; hence, the Law Department of the petitioner could not have intelligently determinedwhether the said witnesses were exempt from prosecution or not.

We agree with the petitioner.

Section 261(a)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code penalizes vote-buying and vote-sellingand conspiracy to bribe voters.

(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money oranything of value, gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, publicor private, or makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause anexpenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity, or community inorder to induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or against any candidate orwithhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nominationor choice of a candidate in a convention or similar election process of a political party.

. . .

(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. Two or more persons, whether candidates or not, whocome to an agreement concerning the commission of any violation of paragraph (a) ofthis section and decide to commit it.

Not only principals but also accomplices and accessories are criminally liable for electionoffenses.[21 Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6648 governs the prosecution of the crimesof vote-buying and vote-selling, thus:

SECTION 28. Prosecution of Vote-buying and Vote-selling. The presentation of acomplaint for violations of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg.881 supported by affidavits of complaining witnesses attesting to the offer or promise byor of the voters acceptance of money or other consideration from the relatives, leaders orsympathizers of a candidate, shall be sufficient basis for an investigation to beimmediately conducted by the Commission, directly or through its duly authorized legalofficers, under Section 68 or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

Under the last paragraph of the said provision, any person guilty of vote-buying and vote-selling who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on violations of paragraphs(a) and (b) of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be exempt fromprosecution and punishment for the offense with reference to which their informationand testimony were given, without prejudice to their liability for perjury and falsetestimony, thus:

SEC. 265. Prosecution. . . .

. . .

The giver, offerer, and promisor as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient andconspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg.881 shall be liable as principals: Provided, That any person, otherwise guilty under saidparagraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on any violationthereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution andpunishment for the offenses with reference to which his information and and testimonywere given: Provided, further, That nothing herein shall exempt such person from criminal

prosecution for perjury or false testimony.Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner is mandated to conducta preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same. Thegeneral rule is that the petitioner must investigate, charge and prosecute all thosecommitting election offenses without any discrimination to ensure a clean, orderly andspeedy elections. A joint preliminary investigation thereof must be conducted and theappropriate Information filed in court against all the offenders. To enable the petitioner tocomply with its mandate to investigate and prosecute those committing election offenses,it has been vested with authority under the last paragraph of Section 28 of Republic ActNo. 6648 to exempt those who have committed election offenses under Section 261 (a)and (b) but volunteer to give informations and testify on any violation of said law in anyofficial investigation or proceeding with reference to which his information and testimonyis given. The law is an immunity statute which grants transactional immunity to volunteers

from investigation and prosecution for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the OmnibusElection Code.[22The immunity statute seeks a rational accommodation between the
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imperatives of the privilege against self-incrimination and the legitimate demands ofgovernment to encourage citizens, including law violators themselves, to testify againstlaw violators. The statute operates as a complete pardon for the offenses to which theinformation was given. The execution of those statutes reflects the importance of thetestimony therefor, and the fact that many offenses are of such character that the onlypersons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crimes. Indeed,their origins were in the context of such offenses and their primary use has been toinvestigate and prosecute such offenses.[23 Immunity from suit is the only consequenceflowing from a violation of ones constitutional right to be protected from unreasonablesearch and seizure, his right to counsel and his right not to be coerced into confessing.[24By voluntarily offering to give information on violations of Section 261(a) and (b) andtestify against the culprits, one opens himself to investigation and prosecution if hehimself is a party to any violation of the law. In exchange for his testimony, the law giveshim immunity from investigation and prosecution for any offense in Section 261(a) and (b)with reference to which his information is given. He is, therefore, assured that histestimony cannot be used by the prosecutors and any authorities in any respect, and thathis testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on him. [25The testimonyof a voluntary witness in accord with his sworn statement operates as a pardon for thecriminal charges to which it relates.[26

It bears stressing that one may voluntarily give information on violations of Section 261(a)and (b) and execute an affidavit before a complaint is filed with the petitioner, or any

provincial or city prosecutor. This may be done even during the preliminary investigationor even after an Information is filed, on the condition that his testimony must be in accordwith or based on his affidavit. If such witness later refuses to testify or testifies butcontrary to his affidavit, he loses his immunity from suit, and may be prosecuted forviolations of Section 261(a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code, perjury under Article183 of the Revised Penal Code, or false testimony under Article 180 of the same Code.

The power to grant exemptions is vested solely on the petitioner. This power isconcomitant with its authority to enforce election laws, investigate election offenses andprosecute those committing the same. The exercise of such power should not beinterfered with by the trial court. Neither may this Court interfere with the petitionersexercise of its discretion in denying or granting exemptions under the law, unless thepetitioner commits a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of

jurisdiction.

There is no showing in the record that the petitioner committed abuse of discretion ingranting immunity to the witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 and in nullifying theResolution of the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080.

It cannot be over-emphasized that the authority given to the petitioner to grantexemptions should be used to achieve and further its mandate to insure clean, honest,peaceful and orderly elections.

The respondents reliance on the ruling of this Court in Lozano v. Yoracis misplaced. Theissue of the application of the immunity statute was not raised in that case.

In sum then, the Court finds that the respondent committed a grave abuse of discretionamounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying the petitioners motion to dismiss

Criminal Cases Nos. 7960-00 to 7969-00 before it and the motion for reconsideration ofthe said denial.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Ordersdated February 20, 2001 and May 16, 2001are SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge DoloresEspaol, RTC, Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, is directed to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7960-00 to 7969-00. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EUGENIO JING-JING FAELNAR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.140850-51, May 4, 2000

MENDOZA, J.:

Mendoza (Vicente), J.:

This is a petition forcertiorarito set aside the order, dated July 29, 1999, of the RegionalTrial Court, Branch 19, Cebu City, denying petitioners motion to quash in Criminal CasesNos. CBU-49941 1 and 49942, 2 and the order, dated October 4, 1999, denying

petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

On April 8, 1997, petitioner Eugenio Faelnar filed a certificate of candidacy for theposition of Barangay Chairman of Barangay Guadalupe, Cebu City in the May 12, 1997barangay elections. The following day, on April 9, 1997, a basketball tournament, dubbedthe 2nd JING-JING FAELNARS CUP, opened at the Guadalupe Sports Complex andlasted up to April 30, 1997. This gave rise to a complaint for electioneering filed againstpetitioner and Cecilio Gillamac by Antonio Luy. The complaint alleged that the basketballtournament was actually a campaign gimmick staged outside the campaign period whichofficially started on May 1, 1997, in violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Luy allegedthat: (1) during the tournament, a streamer bearing petitioners name was placed on the

facade of the Guadalupe Sports Complex; (2) petitioners name was repeatedlymentioned over the microphone during the games; (3) the tournament was widelypublished in the local newspaper; and (4) a raffle sponsored by Cecilio Gillamac was heldwith home appliances given away as prizes.

Petitioner denied participation in the tournament and claimed that its major sponsor wasGillamac Marketing, Inc. He contended that the same was purely a sporting event for thebenefit of the youth.

The complaint was investigated by Atty. Edwin Cadungog, election officer of Cebu City,who later recommended the dismissal of the charges against petitioner and Gillamac. Onthe other hand, the Law Department of the COMELEC recommended the filing of a caseagainst petitioner and Gillamac for violation of 80, 3 in relation to 262, 4 of the

Omnibus Election Code, and 50 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2888, in relation to12 of Republic Act No. 6679. 5
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In its Resolution No. 97-3040, dated September 16, 1997, the COMELEC enbancresolved to dismiss the case. However, on motion of Antonio Luy, the COMELECreconsidered its action and ordered the filing of the necessary Informations againstpetitioner and Gillamac.

Accordingly, petitioner and Gil lamac were formally charged in the Regional Trial Court,Cebu City under two Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-49941 and CBU-49942.

Petitioner moved to quash the information or, in the alternative, for reinvestigation of thecase, contending that Resolution No. 97-3040, which dismissed the complaint againsthim, was immediately executory and could no longer be reconsidered.

Petitioners motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated July 29, 1999. Hemoved for reconsideration, but his motion was likewise denied by the court in its order,dated October 4, 1999. Hence this petition.

Petitioner reiterates his argument in the trial court that COMELEC Resolution No. 97-3040, which dismissed the complaint against him, can no longer be reconsidered by theCOMELEC. He contends that under the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC, thedismissal of the complaint was immediately final and executory. Additionally, he aversthat Antonio Luys Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No. 97-3040 is a prohibited

pleading under the Commissions Rules of Procedure. He avers that since the resolutionin question was immediately final and executory, it was no longer within the power of theCOMELEC to reconsider. Consequently, Resolution No. 98-2914, in directing the filing ofcharges in court, was ultra-vires, and the Informations filed against him should havebeen quashed. 6

The petition is without merit.

First. While the instant petition challenges the trial courts orders denying petitionersmotion to quash the complaints in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-49941 and 49942, thegrounds relied upon by petitioner are directed at the validity of Resolution No. 98-2914 ofthe COMELEC. Thus, petitioner prays that said resolution be declared null and void. 7

This petition is nothing but an attempt to circumvent a final resolution of the COMELEC.

Resolution No. 98-2914 was promulgated by the COMELEC en bancon October 29,1998. Petitioners remedy was to seek its annulment by way of a special civil actionofcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Rule 64, 2 provides:

Sec. 2. Mode of Review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission onElections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to theSupreme Court on certiorariunder Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.

Sec. 3 of said Rule provides that such petition shall be filed within 30 days from notice ofthe resolution sought to be reviewed. No such petition was ever filed. The present petitionto set aside the orders of the trial court denying its motion to quash and motion for

reconsideration was filed only on November 12, 1999, more than a year after ResolutionNo. 98-2194 was promulgated on October 29, 1998. Consequently, the resolution is nowfinal and binding upon the parties.

Even if said resolution is erroneous for being contrary to the provisions of the Rules ofProcedure of the COMELEC, the same is not void. Since it has become final andexecutory, it is already binding and effective. 8

Second. The above discussion should be enough to dispose of this petition. However, wethink there is an important question of law that must not be left undecided, i.e., is theresolution of the COMELEC dismissing the criminal complaint for violation of the electionlaws immediately final and executory, as petitioner contends?

The contention is untenable. In support of his claims, petitioner cites Rule 13, 1(d) ofthe Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC which provides:

Sec. 1. What pleadings are not allowed. The following pleadings are not allowed:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) motion for reconsideration of an en bancruling, resolution, order or decision; . . . .

The above quoted provision, however, is taken from the 1988 COMELEC Rules ofProcedure which has already been amended. The 1993 Rules of Procedure, nowprovides:

Rule 13. Prohibited Pleadings.

Sec. 1. What pleadings are not allowed. The following pleadings are not allowed:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) motion for reconsideration of an en bancruling, resolution, order or decision except inelection offense cases; . . . (Emphasis added).

Under the present rule, therefore, a motion for reconsideration of a ruling, resolution ordecision of the COMELEC en bancis allowed in cases involving election offenses.

Here, there is no question that what is involved is a resolution of the COMELEC enbancin an election offense. Hence, a motion for reconsideration of such resolution isallowed under the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC.

Petitioner likewise invokes Rule 34, 10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure whichprovides that -

Sec. 10. Appeals from the Action of the State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal. Appeals from the resolution of the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal on therecommendation or resolution of investigating officers may be made only to theCommission within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution of said officials, provided,however that this shall not divest the Commission of its power to motu proprio review,revise, modify or reverse the resolution of the chief state prosecutor and/or provincial/cityprosecutors. The decision of the Commission on said appeals shall be immediatelyexecutory and final. (Emphasis added)


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Even a cursory reading of the above rule, however, will show that it governs appeals fromthe action of the State Prosecutor or Provincial or City Fiscal on the recommendation orresolution of investigating officers. The present case does not involve such an appeal buta resolution of the COMELEC itself in the exercise of its exclusive power to conductpreliminary investigation of election offense cases. 9 Such distinction can be easilyexplained.

In cases where the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal exercises the delegated

power 10 to conduct preliminary investigation of election offense cases, after theinvestigating officer submits his recommendation, said officers already resolve the issueof probable cause. From such resolution, appeal to the COMELEC lies. As the exerciseby the Commission of its review powers would, at this point, already constitute a secondlook on the issue of probable cause, the COMELECs ruling on the appeal would beimmediately final and executory.

On the other hand, if the preliminary investigation of a complaint for election offense isconducted by the COMELEC itself, its investigating officer prepares a report upon whichthe Commissions Law Department makes its recommendation to the COMELEC enbancon whether there is probable cause to prosecute. It is thus the COMELEC enbancwhich determines the existence of probable cause. 11 Consequently, an appeal tothe Commission is unavailing. Under the present Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC,however, a motion for reconsideration of such resolution is allowed. This effectivelyallows for a review of the original resolution, in the same manner that the COMELEC, onappeal ormotu proprio, may review the resolution of the State Prosecutor, or Provincialor City Fiscal.

Reliance by petitioner upon Rule 34, 10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is thuswithout any basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition forcertiorariis DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

HERMAN TIU LAUREL vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE G.R. No. 131778,January 28, 2000

QUISUMBING, J.:Petitioner seeks to annul the Court of Appeals decision, as well as its resolution denyingreconsideration, in C.A. G.R. SP No. 42618, which upheld the trial courts denial of hismotion to quash the charges against him for falsification of public documents andviolation of the Omnibus Election Code.

, J.:

Petitioner seeks to annul the Court of Appeals decision, as well as its resolution denyingreconsideration, in C.A. G.R. SP No. 42618, which upheld the trial courts denial of his

motion to quash the charges against him for falsification of public documents andviolation of the Omnibus Election Code.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On 13 December 1995, the Hon. Bernardo P. Pardo, Chairman of respondentCOMELEC1 sent a verified letter-complaint to Jose P. Balbuena, Director of the LawDepartment of the said respondent, charging petitioner with Falsification of Public

Documents and violation of [Section 74] of the Omnibus Election Code, stating in thesame letter the facts on which he relies upon to support his accusations, which are, interalia, that petitioner was born in Manila on October 8, 1951 . . . (and) (a)t the time of hisbirth, both his father and mother were Chinese citizens. . . . On February 20, 1995,Herman Tiu Laurel filed a certificate of candidacy with the Law Department . . . for theposition of Senator, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen . . . This statement . . .is false and constitutes not only a falsification of public documents but also a violation ofthe Omnibus Election Code.

On the basis of the said Complaint, an investigation was conducted by the COMELECLaw Department, docketed as EO Case No. 95-843 entitled The Hon. Bernardo P. Pardo,Complainant, versus Herman Tiu Laurel, Respondent. Thereafter, or on 18 January1996, a Report was made by the said Department recommending the filing of anInformation against petitioner for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, as well as forFalsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code. During an enbancmeeting of the COMELEC held on 25 January 1997, the said Report wasdeliberated upon, after which COMELEC resolved:

1. To file the necessary information against respondent Herman Tiu Laurel with theappropriate court for violation of Section 74, in relation to Section 262 of the OmnibusElection Code, the prosecution of which shall be handled by a lawyer to be designated bythe Director IV of the Law Department with the duty to render periodic report after everyhearing.

2. To file a criminal complaint with the appropriate court against the same respondent forfalsification defined and penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171, in relation toparagraph 1, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.

Pursuant thereto, on 05 February 1995, an information for Violation of Section 74, inrelation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code was filed by Director Jose F.Balbuena against petitioner, which was raffled to respondent court, docketed as Crim.Case No. 96-147550.

On 14 February 1996, or after the filing of the Information, plaintiff filed a Motion forInhibition in EO Case No. 95-843, seeking the inhibition of the entire COMELEC, allegingthat (r)espondent (petitioner herein) is not confident that this present forum is capable offairly and impartially rendering a resolution on the merits of the above-captionedcomplaint, [stating] his reasons therefor. In a Minute Resolution, the COMELECinformed petitioner that the Commission has lost jurisdiction over the case as it is nowbefore the Regional Trial Court of Manila . . . . With respect to the Information, plaintiff in

turn filed on 07 May 1996 a Motion to Quash the same, alleging lack of jurisdiction andlack of authority on the part of Director Balbuena to file the information. On 16 May 1996,


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respondent COMELEC, through Director Aliodem D. Dalaig of the Law Department, filedan Opposition thereto. On 20 May 1996, plaintiff filed his Reply.

On 11 September 1996, respondent court issued the first questioned order, the decretalportion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion to Quash together with theAlternative Motions contained therein is hereby denied.

To this, petitioner duly excepted on 09 October 1996 by filing a Motion forReconsideration, which respondent court denied in its second questioned order dated 29October 1996.2

From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner then filed a petitionforcertioraribefore the Court of Appeals. He alleged, in essence, that the COMELECviolated its own rules of procedure on the initiation of the preliminary investigation and theconsequent filing of a criminal complaint against him.3 The Court of Appeals upheld thetrial court and ruled that the proper procedure was followed by the COMELEC.

According to the Court of Appeals, the complaint signed by Pardo was in the nature ofa motu proprio complaint filed by the COMELEC and signed by the Chairman, pursuant

to Rule 34, Section 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Pardos referral of thecomplaint to the COMELECs Law Department and the subsequent preliminaryinvestigation were likewise done in accordance with the rules.

The complaint being an official act, it bears the presumption of having been regularlyperformed.

The Court of Appeals added that even if the complaint were to be considered as acomplaint filed by a private citizen, still, Pardo as head of the COMELEC had theauthority to direct commencement of a preliminary investigation in connection therewith.

At the same time, however, the Court of Appeals also directed the trial court to remandthe case to the COMELEC for reception of petitioners motion for reconsideration of the

COMELEC resolution dated January 25, 1996,4 which approved the filing of a criminalcomplaint against petitioner. Petitioner claimed that he failed to receive copy of thisresolution and, consequently, failed to move for its reconsideration.5

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of its decision.Hence, the present petition, in which petitioner raises the following issues:

A. It was error for the Court of Appeals to hold there was no flaw in the procedurefollowed by the COMELEC in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.

B. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners protestations on COMELECshaving acted as complainant, investigator, prosecutor, judge and executioner in theconduct of the preliminary investigation ring hollow.6

Petitioner asserts that the preliminary investigation was defective since the complaint wasnot initiated in accordance with applicable law and rules. He alleges that the informationfiled with the trial court was void and respondent judge could not have acquiredjurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner cites Section 3, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Initiation of complaint. Initiation of complaint for election offenses may be

done motu proprio by the Commission, or upon written complaint by any citizen . . . .(Emphasis by petitioner)

Petitioner contends that the complaint filed by Pardo was not in the nature of a motuproprio complaint filed by the COMELEC since Pardo, by himself alone, was not theCOMELEC. If the complaint were to be considered as one filed by a private citizen, thenPardo as a citizen did not have the requisite authority to file his complaint directly with theCOMELECs Law Department. Petitioner contends that only the COMELEC has thecapacity to do so, under Section 5 of said Rule 34.

Sec. 5. Referral Preliminary Investigation. If the complaint is initiated motu proprio bythe Commission, or is filed with the Commission by any aggrieved party, it shall bereferred to the Law Department for investigation. . . .

Petitioner argues that a resolution of the COMELEC en bancis necessary for the referralof a complaint to the Law Department. He asserts that Pardo did not have the authority,as a private citizen, to directly file his complaint with the Law Department. According topetitioner, Pardo should have filed his complaint with the COMELEC and the latter shouldhave passed a resolution en bancreferring the matter to the Law Department.7 Petitionerinsists that only the COMELEC, through an en bancresolution, may direct the LawDepartment to conduct an investigation. Thus, it was wrong for Pardo to direct the LawDepartment to conduct a preliminary investigation, as he did in his complaint, and thelatter could and should not have acted pursuant to Chairman Pardos complaint.8

Moreover, petitioner avers that the resolution of the COMELEC en bancdated January25, 1996, issued after the preliminary investigation and which recommended the filing ofcharges against him, did not cure the irregularities present during the preliminaryinvestigation.

Lastly, petitioner contends he could no longer expect impartiality and fairness from theCOMELEC. In his Memorandum, petitioner declared,

This was the then COMELEC boss, personally and by himself, (who) gathered theevidence in an attempt to nail down petitioner. The then COMELEC Chairman was thecomplainant as well. And, as his letter-complaint incontrovertibly shows, it was also thethen COMELEC Chairman who directed that a preliminary investigation be conductedand completed within 30 days.9

Petitioner concludes that the COMELEC could not but be partial in this case, hence theproceedings are fatally biased against him.


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On the other hand, the COMELEC in its Memorandum10 contends that the complaintwas properly filed since Section 4(b), Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedurespecifically states that the complaint shall be filed with the Law Department. It is of nomoment that the complainant was, at that time, the chairman of the COMELEC himself.This should not preclude him from filing a complaint with the COMELEC for allegedviolations of election laws, provided he does not participate in the discussions regardingthe case. The COMELEC points out that, indeed, Pardo did not participate in thedeliberation of his own complaint.

On the charge that there can he no fairness in the investigation of the complaint filed bythe COMELEC chairman, the COMELEC points out that the Commission is a collegiatebody. It is the entire membership of the Commission that deliberates and decides oncases brought before it and not just the chairman. To disallow the COMELEC in this casefrom conducting a preliminary investigation would be to tie the hands of the Commissionand prevent it from performing its constitutional mandate. It could also cause a deluge inthe number of election law violators.

In addition, the COMELEC asserts that petitioner was given the opportunity to presentevidence in his defense while Pardos complaint was being investigated by theCommission.

The Constitution gives the COMELEC the power to investigate and, where appropriate, toprosecute cases of violations of election laws.11 This power is an exclusive prerogativeof the COMELEC.12

There are two ways through which a complaint for election offenses may be initiated. Itmay be filed by the COMELEC motu proprio, or it may be filed via written complaint byany citizen of the Philippines, candidate, registered political party, coalition of politicalparties or organizations under the partylist system or any accredited citizens arms of theCommission.13

Motu proprio complaints may be signed by the Chairman of the COMELEC and neednot be verified.14

On the other hand, complaints filed by parties other than the COMELEC must be verifiedand supported by affidavits and other evidence.15

The complaint shall be filed with the COMELEC Law Department or with the offices ofelection registrars, provincial election supervisors or regional election directors, or of thestate prosecutor, provincial or city fiscal.16

Whether initiated motu propio or filed with the COMELEC by any other party, thecomplaint shall be referred to the COMELEC Law Department for investigation. Upondirection of the Chairman, the preliminary investigation may be delegated to any lawyerof the Department, any Regional Election Director or Provincial Election Supervisor, orany COMELEC layer.17

The complaint subject of this case was filed by then COMELEC Chairman Bernardo P.Pardo. It was addressed to Jose P. Balbuena, director of the COMELEC LawDepartment. It starts with the following statement:

I hereby charge former senatorial candidate Herman Tiu Laurel with falsification of publicdocuments and violation of the Omnibus Election Code.18

In the same complaint, Pardo directed the conduct of a preliminary investigation of thecharges he leveled against Tiu Laurel, to be completed within 30 days. In the verificationat the end of the complaint, he stated that, I am the complainant in the . . . lettercomplaint. . .19

Was the complaint one initiated by the COMELEC motu proprio?

To our mind, the complaint in question in this case is one filed by Pardo in his personalcapacity and not as chairman of the COMELEC. This is obvious from the openingsentence of the complaint, which starts with I hereby charge. . . It is also manifest in theverification of the complaint in which Pardo stated that he is the complainant therein. Thefact that the complaint was verified is another indication that it was filed by a privatecitizen, for only such complaints require verification. Pardo must have known this.

Besides, the COMELEC itself, in its Comment filed before this Court, admitted that thecomplaint was initiated in Pardos individual capacity.20

Could Pardo then have, in his personal capacity, filed his complaint directly with the

COMELECs Law Department? We believe he could, under Rule 34, Section 4 of theCOMELEC Rules of Procedure, which clearly provides:

Sec. 4. Form of Complaint and Where to File. . . .

(b) The complaint shall be filed with the Law Department of the Commission; or with theoffices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional ElectionDirectors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal. . . (Emphasissupplied.)

But petitioner insists, and this is the crux of his arguments, that absent an enbancresolution directing the Law Department to conduct a preliminary investigation, therecould be no valid investigation. Without a valid preliminary investigation, no valid

information could be filed against him. He cites Rule 34, Section 5 of the COMELECRules of Procedure in support of his claim.

Sec. 5. Referral for Preliminary Investigation. If the complaint is initiated motuproprio by the Commission, or is filed with the Commission by any aggrieved party, itshall be referred to the Law Department for investigation. Upon direction of the Chairmanof the Commission, the preliminary investigation may be delegated to any lawyer of saidDepartment, or to any of the Regional Election Directors or Provincial ElectionSupervisors, or any lawyer of the Commission.

However, we fail to see from Section 5 the requirement that only the COMELEC enbancmay refer a complaint to the Law Department for investigation. What Section 5states only is that it is the Law Department, not another office, of the COMELEC which

may conduct an investigation into the allegations in the complaint. There is no specificrequirement as to how referral to the department shall be made. We cannot read into therules what simply is not there.


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Sec. 5 refers to two situations, one of which is where a complaint filed by a party otherthan the COMELEC is addressed to the Commission itself. Since it is not the entireCommission that conducts the preliminary investigation, the complaint must necessarilybe referred to its Law Department. Under the rules, this department is tasked withconducting preliminary investigations of complaints filed before the COMELEC.21 Where,as in this case, the complaint was directly filed with the Law Department under Section 4of Rule 34, obviously there is no need to refer such complaint to the same LawDepartment.

There is likewise no rule against the COMELEC chairman directing the conduct of apreliminary investigation, even if he himself were the complainant in his private capacity.In fact, under Section 5, the preliminary investigation may be delegated to any of thoseofficials specified in the rule, upon the direction of the COMELEC chairman. We agreewith the Court of Appeals observation that,

[E]ven if we regard the complaint to have been filed by Chairman Pardo as a privatecitizen, there is no rhyme nor reason why he cannot direct the Law Department toperform an investigation and delegate the conduct of preliminary investigation to anylawyer of said Department in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.The justification is, in so doing, he was merely acting pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 34 ofthe COMELEC Rules of Procedure. No clash or conflict could be attributed in hisperformance of the said acts, one as a private citizen, and the other as Chairman of

COMELEC, as it would not be him but another lawyer in the Legal Department that wouldactually be carrying but the preliminary investigation. The outcome of the inquiry,therefore, could not,per se, be considered as sullied with bias.22

Clearly, the applicable rules were followed in the conduct of the preliminary investigationof Pardos complaint against petitioner, contrary to the latters assertion.

Anent petitioners contention that bias tainted the preliminary investigation, we againquote with approval from the ruling of the Court of Appeals:

There may be evidence that the relations between petitioner and Chairman Pardo are notexactly cordial. However, this should not detract from the validity of the preliminaryinvest

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