G.R. No. 131482 July 3, 2002 REGALADO P. SAMARTINO, petitioner, vs. LEONOR B. RAON, AGUSTIN G. CRISOSTOMO, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF NOVELETA, CAVITE, HON. MANUEL A. MAYO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, CAVITE CITY, HON. ROLANDO D. DIAZ, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 17, CAVITE CITY, SHERIFF DANILO G. LAPUZ, CAVITE CITY and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 131898 in the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo. On January 25, 1996, respondents instituted against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 744 of the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta, Cavite.1 They alleged that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo, she leased her share in the property to petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor. Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner.2 At the time of service of summons at petitioner’s house, he was not at home as he was then confined at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center (NBI- TRC), Tagaytay City since January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee.3 The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, granted respondents’ motion to declare petitioner in default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents as follows: FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant ordering the latter and other person/s claiming rights under him: 1. To vacate immediately the land in question after the finality of the decision. 2. For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 monthly from January, 1992 up to the time he surrenders the premises considered as damages for the use of the subject land. 3. For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs P 10,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees with an additional P800.00 as appearance fees. 4. To pay the plaintiffs P 100.00 as filing fee. SO ORDERED.4 After learning of the adverse decision against him, petitioner’s counsel filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 16, a motion to set aside judgment. The motion was treated as an appeal and docketed as Civil Case No. N- 6281. On July 18, 1996, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.5 The aforesaid decision became final. Accordingly, the court of origin issued on
Transcript
G.R. No. 131482 July 3, 2002
REGALADO P. SAMARTINO, petitioner, vs.LEONOR B. RAON, AGUSTIN G. CRISOSTOMO, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF NOVELETA, CAVITE, HON. MANUEL A. MAYO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, CAVITE CITY, HON. ROLANDO D. DIAZ, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 17, CAVITE CITY, SHERIFF DANILO G. LAPUZ, CAVITE CITY and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 131898 in the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo.
On January 25, 1996, respondents instituted against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 744 of the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta, Cavite.1 They alleged that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo, she leased her share in the property to petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor.
Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner.2 At the time of service of summons at petitioner’s house, he was not at home as he was then confined at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC), Tagaytay City since January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee.3
The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, granted respondents’ motion to declare petitioner in default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents as follows:
FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant ordering the latter and other person/s claiming rights under him:
1. To vacate immediately the land in question after the finality of the decision.
2. For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 monthly from January, 1992 up to the time he surrenders the premises considered as damages for the use of the subject land.
3. For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs P 10,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees with an additional P800.00 as appearance fees.
4. To pay the plaintiffs P 100.00 as filing fee.
SO ORDERED.4
After learning of the adverse decision against him, petitioner’s counsel filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 16, a motion to set aside judgment. The motion was treated as an appeal and docketed as Civil Case No. N-6281. On July 18, 1996, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.5
The aforesaid decision became final. Accordingly, the court of origin issued on September 17, 1996 a writ of execution.6 Petitioner was given a grace period of one month within which to vacate the premises. His real property situated in Noveleta, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-283572, was levied and sold at public auction to respondents in full satisfaction of the monetary award.7
On November 25, 1996, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, a petition for relief from judgment, docketed as Civil Case No. N-6393.8 In support thereof, petitioner submitted an affidavit of merit,9 alleging in fine that the parcel of land from which he was being evicted had been sold to him by Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1988.10
The following day, November 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the petition for relief from judgment.11 Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied on December 12, 1996. A second Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied on January 14, 1997.12 On the same day, a writ of demolition was issued commanding the sheriff to remove the building and improvements made by petitioner on the subject premises and to deliver the possession thereof to respondents.13
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 432O2.14 On August 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.15 Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied on November 14, 1997.16 Hence this petition for review.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons personally to defendant is impossible, service may be effected by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Otherwise stated, service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of.17
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
We have long held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It is only under exceptional terms that the circumstances warranting substituted service of summons may be proved by evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.18
In this connection, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 59 was issued on November 19, 1989 to stress the importance of strict compliance with the requisites for a valid substituted service, to wit:
Delays in court proceedings have been caused by faulty and erroneous implementation of Section 8, Rule 14, Rules of Court on Substituted Service of Summons.
The Trial Judges of all lower courts, as well as the Clerks of Court in their capacity as Ex-Officio Sheriffs together with the Deputy Sheriffs are reminded of the provision of Section 8, Rule 14, Rules of Court on substituted service as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The manner of effecting substituted service as prescribed in Venturanza vs. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 305, must be strictly complied with, thus:
"The substituted service should be availed only when the defendant cannot be served promptly in person. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.
Substituted service is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed in the circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and any substituted service other than authorized by the statute is considered ineffective."
For immediate compliance.
In the case at bar, the sheriff’s Return of Summons simply states:
This is to certify that on this date: 26th day of January I have caused the service of summons, together with the attached complaint and its annexes issued in the above entitled case upon defendant REGALADO SAMARTINO thru ROBERTO SAMARTINO, Brother of the defendant acknowledge receipt of said court processes by affixing his signature at the lower left portion of the original summons hereto attached.
WHEREFORE, the attached original summons is hereby respectfully returned to the court of origin duly served for information and record purposes.
Noveleta, Cavite, February 9, 1996.19
Clearly, the above return failed to show the reason why personal service could not be made. It failed to state that prompt and personal service on the defendant was rendered impossible. It was not shown that efforts were made to find the defendant personally and that said efforts failed; hence the resort to substituted service. As stated above, these requirements are indispensable because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another whom law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. For this reason, failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective.20
Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that petitioner’s brother, on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing at petitioner’s residence.
There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. It should be emphasized that the service of summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him. Thus, compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should first be informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised.21
By reason of the ineffective service of summons, petitioner was not duly apprised of the action against him. Consequently, he was prevented from answering the claims against him. He was not given a chance to be heard on his defenses. What made matters worse was that the trial court had actual knowledge that petitioner was then indisposed and unable to file his answer to the complaint, as he was then confined at the NBI-TRC. The trial court’s failure to give petitioner a reasonable opportunity to file his answer violated his right to due process. Perforce, the judgment rendered against petitioner is nugatory and without effect.
The trial court should not have been too rash in declaring petitioner in default, considering it had actual notice of valid reasons that prevented him from answering. Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for default judgments are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. The issuance of orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.22
Suits should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. In this regard, we have often admonished courts to be liberal in setting aside orders of default as default judgments are frowned upon and not looked upon with favor for they may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set aside. Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized that this Court is empowered to suspend its operation, or except a particular case from its operation, when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. We are not unmindful of the fact that during the pendency of the instant petition, the trial court has rendered judgment against petitioners. However, being the court of last resort, we deem it in the best interest that liberality and relaxation of the Rules be extended to petitioners by setting aside the order of default issued by the trial court and the consequent default
judgment; otherwise, great injustice would result if petitioners are not afforded an opportunity to prove their claims.23
In addition, the Regional Trial Court committed reversible error in dismissing the petition for relief from judgment for having been filed out of time. According to the Regional Trial Court, the petition for relief, filed on November 25, 1996, was late because petitioner had actual knowledge of the judgment in the ejectment case since March 1996. The period within which to file a petition for relief should have been reckoned from the date petitioner learned of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. It should not have been counted from the date of the Municipal Trial Court’s decision because, precisely, petitioner appealed the same. It was the Regional Trial Court’s decision that became final and, hence, was the proper subject of the petition for relief from judgment. It is axiomatic that a petition for relief is only available against a final and executory judgment.24
Section 3, Rule 38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a verified petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order has been entered or such proceeding has been taken. It must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense.25
It is not clear from the records of the case at bar when petitioner learned of the decision of the Regional Trial Court affirming the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. What appears is that the said decision became final only on August 15, 1996, and must have been entered sometime thereafter. Hence, the petition for relief filed on November 25, 1996 was well within the six-month period prescribed by the Rules.
Finally, the records show that petitioner raised a meritorious defense in his affidavit of merit. He alleged therein that the property from which he was being ejected had been sold to him by its registered owner. Ownership is a valid defense in unlawful detainer cases. While possession is the main issue in ejectment, it is also one of the essential attributes of ownership. It follows that an owner of real property is entitled to possession of the same. Petitioner can, therefore, properly plead his right of possession to defeat that of respondents. Indeed, an owner who cannot exercise the seven "juses" or attributes of ownership - the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits - is a crippled owner.26
All told, the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta and the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City did not have jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Hence, all proceedings had as regards petitioner were null and void. Necessarily, the enforcement of the writ of execution as well as the sale at
public auction of petitioner’s real property to satisfy the void judgment must also be declared of no legal effect.
There is a real need to resolve the issue of ownership over the premises in order to determine who, as between petitioner and respondents, has a better right to possess the property in dispute. This can only be done in the proper proceeding before the trial court wherein petitioner will be afforded every right to present evidence in his behalf.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43202 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta, Cavite, which is directed to continue proceedings in Civil Case No. 744 by affording petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a chance to file his answer and present evidence in his defense, and thereafter to hear and decide the case. The Writ of Execution dated September 17, 1996, the Writ of Demolition dated January 14, 1997, and the certificate of sale over Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-283572, as well as all acts and deeds incidental to the judgment in Civil Case No. 744, are declared NULL AND VOID.
G.R. No. 160025 April 23, 2014
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO CITY, Petitioner, vs.JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 163052
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.MAYOR BERNARDO M. VERGARA, CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO, VICE MAYOR BETTY LOURDES F. TABANDA, VICE MAYOR OF BAGUIO, COUNCILOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, COUNCILOR ELMER O. DATUIN, COUNCILOR ANTONIO R. TABORA, JR., COUNCILOR GALO D. WEYGAN, COUNCILOR EDILBERTO B. TENEFRANCIA, COUNCILOR FEDERICO J. MANDAPAT, JR., COUNCILOR RICHARD A. CARINO, COUNCILOR FAUSTINO A. OLOWAN, COUNCILOR DELFIN V. BALAJADIA, COUNCILOR RUFINO M. PANAGAN, CITY SECRETARY RONALDO B. PEREZ, SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 164107
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 165564
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 172215
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 3 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BAGUIO CITY, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, PATERNO AQUINO, RICHARD LABERINTO, ROLANDO ABELLERA, FERNANDO SANGALANG, ALLAN ATOS, ANGELINO SANGALANG, CITY OF BAGUIO, AND CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 172216
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 03 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BAGUIO CITY, Respondent.
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G.R. No. 173043
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 174879
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.ACTING CITY MAYOR AND FORMERLY VICE MAYOR AND PRESIDING OFFICER OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO, REINALDO A. BAUTISTA, JR., MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO, LEONARDO B. YANGOT, JR., ROCKY THOMAS A. BALISONG, EDILBERTO B. TENEFRANCIA, FAUSTINO A. OLOWAN, GALO P. WEYGAN, FEDERICO J. MANDAP AT, PERLITA L. CHAN-RONDEZ, ANTONIO R. TABORA, JOSE M. MOLINTAS AND RUFINO M. PANAGAN AND CITY LEGAL OFFICER MELCHOR CARLOS R. RABANES, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 181488
CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Petitioner, vs.JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, ACTING BY AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT, AND HON. RONALDO V. PUNO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court are nine (9) Petitions involving essentially the same parties - officials of the City Government of Baguio and Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell). The only party here that is neither
an official of the City Government of Baguio nor an officer of Jadewell is former Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan.
The two principal parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on 26 June 2000, whereby the City of Baguio authorized Jadewell to regulate and collect parking fees for on-street parking in the city, as well as to implement the installation of modern parking meters.
The legal disputes embodied in the nine Petitions began when the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City (Sanggunian) revoked the MOA through City Resolution No. 037, Series of 2002 (Resolution 37), alleging substantial breach of the MOA on the part of Jadewell. Then Mayor Alfredo Vergara vetoed the Resolution. The Sanggunian Panlungsod overrode the veto through an unnumbered Resolution dated 17 April 2002. These twin Resolutions constitute what we call here as the first act of Rescission1 of the MOA by the city officials of Baguio. Jadewell denied the breach and commenced an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio,2 questioning the validity of the MOA’s revocation and the Sanggunian’s capacity to pass a resolution revoking the MOA.
There was a second act of rescission that the city officials of Baguio performed in 2006, the circumstances of which will be narrated later on.
While the main case was under litigation, and then under appeal, the parties filed contempt charges against each other. Six of these cases are part of the consolidated Petitions before us.
These nine highly-voluminous cases, however, all boil down essentially to just these five sets of legal questions requiring resolution:
(a) The validity or invalidity and legal efficacy of Saggunian’s two distinct acts of rescission of the MOA;
(b) The duty of a trial judge to dismiss a case assailing the validity of the MOA and the city resolution approving it in view of the pendency of the various petitions before this Court;
(c) the liability of : (i) respondent city officials of Baguio, for various counts of indirect contempt of this court, (ii) some respondents, who are lawyers at the same time, for acts that require the disciplinary action of disbarment, (iii) respondent Judge Pamintuan, for taking cognizance of a civil case allegedly in defiance of this Court’s authority;
(d) the validity of the administrative suspension of one of the respondents herein, former Mayor Braulio Yaranon, by the Office of the President in relation to his acts of non-recognition of the MOA; and
(e) the nullification of certain acts of officials of Baguio City directed against Jadewell pursuant to their belief that the latter had no authority to continue implementing the terms of the MOA.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
On 1 March 1999, Jadewell proposed the privatization3 of the administration of on-street parking in Baguio City using Schlumberger’s DG4S Pay and Display Parking Meter (hereinafter "DG4S P&D"), which it touted as "technologically advanced, up to the level of more progressive countries and which would make the city as the first and only city in the Philippines, if not in Asia, to have metered parking as an important part of its traffic and parking system."4
Respondent Sanggunian acted favorably on the proposal.5 On 31 May 2000, it passed Resolution No. 159, Series of 1999, authorizing the City Mayor of Baguio to negotiate and enter into a Memorandum of Agreement with Jadewell for the installation of its proposed DG4S parking technology.6
On 16 July 1999, the City Mayor of Baguio wrote to Jadewell, transmitting to it the finalized draft of the MOA, with amendments emanating from his office. The City Mayor informed Jadewell that the finalization of the MOA would be subject to the appropriate action of the Sanggunian and the passage of an enabling ordinance.7
On 27 March 2000, respondent Sanggunian enacted City Ordinance No. 003, Series of 2000 (Ordinance No. 003-2000) amending Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1983, outlining the rules and policy on the privatization of the administration of on-street parking in the city streets of Baguio.8 For this purpose, the City of Baguio authorized the intervention of a private operator for the regulation, charging and collection of parking fees and the installation of modern parking meters, among others.
On 10 April 2000, the City Legal Officer of Baguio City advised the City Mayor that the project for the regulation of on-street parking and installation of parking meters was not an infrastructure. Hence, the project was not covered by the Build-Operate-Transfer Law9 and did not require publication of a notice for its validity.10
Nevertheless, for the sake of transparency, the City Legal Officer recommended the publication of the appropriate notice on the project and an invitation to bid. An invitation to bid for the proposed regulation of on-street parking and installation of parking meters on Baguio City’s streets was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on 8, 9 and 10 May 2000. Four interested bidders submitted their proposals, but three were disqualified. The bid of Jadewell was the only one not disqualified; hence, it was awarded the project.11
On 26 June 2000, the MOA was finally executed between Jadewell and the City of Baguio – through its then City Mayor, Mauricio G. Domogan – for the installation, management and operation of the DG4S P&D parking meters.12
On 17 July 2000, the Sanggunian confirmed the MOA through its Resolution No. 205-2000.13
On 31 August 2000, the parties executed a supplemental MOA to include the Ganza/Burnham parking space, owned by the Philippine Tourism Authority and managed by the City of Baguio, in the project.14 This supplemental agreement was neither confirmed nor ratified by the Sanggunian.
In September of 2000, Jadewell began to mobilize and take over the parking facilities at the Ganza/Burnham Park area.15 Around this time, questions arose regarding the compliance by Jadewell with the provisions of the MOA, notably on matters such as obtaining the recommendation from the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for the installation of the parking meters and the legality of the collection of parking fees being done by its parking attendants prior to the installation of the parking meters at Burnham Park.16
On 20 December 2000, Jadewell wrote then Vice-Mayor Daniel T. Fariñas to inform him of the progress of the deputization by the Department of Transportation and Communications–Land Transportation Office (DOTC-LTO) of parking attendants required for the implementation of the MOA. Jadewell explained that they were still working on the required deputization of Jadewell’s parking attendants. Nevertheless, it claimed that its parking attendants were authorized to collect parking fees pending the actual installation of the parking meters. It also claimed that the parking meters had not yet been installed because the necessary civil works were yet to be completed.17
Shortly thereafter, a case was filed by Edgar M. Avila, et al. with the RTC-Baguio City (Branch 61), assailing Ordinance No. 003-2000 as unconstitutional and seeking to restrain the City Government of Baguio from implementing the provisions of the MOA. It further alleged that the City Government could not delegate the designation of pay parking zones to Jadewell, that the parking attendants deployed by Jadewell were not deputized, and that the questioned ordinance creates class legislation as the designated taxi and jeepney stands were discriminatorily removed. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4892-R.18 This was dismissed on motion by Jadewell joined by the City Government of Baguio. The lower court declared that Ordinance No. 003-2000 is constitutional and that all acts emanating from it are deemed "reasonable and non-discriminatory...having been enacted in accordance with the powers granted to Baguio City by law."19 Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration (MR) was denied.
On 24 August 2001, Edgar Avila, et al., filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the Supreme Court assailing the RTC’s dismissal of their Complaint. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 149642. On 10 October 2001, this Court issued a Resolution dismissing the petition of Avila, et al. for failure to state in their petition the material dates when they received the appealed resolution and order, and to append the original
or certified true copies of the questioned resolution and order subject of their petition.20 There was no resolution on the merits. The Resolution became final and executory on 2 April 2002.21
A case was also filed by Nelia G. Cid against then Mayor Bernardo Vergara, et al. when her vehicle was clamped, towed away, and impounded by Jadewell after the latter found her car to be illegally parked. She refused to pay the corresponding fees to Jadewell and as a result, the latter refused to release her vehicle.22 Cid filed a case for replevin and questioned the validity of Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA, as well as the authority of Jadewell to clamp down/tow away vehicles whose owners refuse to pay parking fees. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5165-R and was assigned to Branch 7 of RTC-Baguio. On 24 May 2002, an Omnibus Order was issued by this RTC that addressed several pending incidents related to the authority of Jadewell to clamp down/tow away vehicles. The Omnibus Order upheld Jadewell’s authority to retain the vehicle of petitioner Nelia G. Cid pending her payment of the parking and towage fees to Jadewell, and held that the authority of Jadewell was lawfully provided in Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA. Also, the RTC-Baguio took cognizance of the ruling by this Court in G.R. No. 149642 which, in its mistaken view, upheld the validity of the questioned ordinance and the MOA.23
Ultimately, Jadewell was able to install no more than 14 parking meters in three (3) areas of Baguio City: six (6) on Session Road, five (5) on Harrison Road and three (3) on Lake Drive.24 At the time that these meters were installed, there were already verbal complaints being raised against Jadewell by the Sanggunian for the following alleged violations:
a. Failure to install parking meters for each parking space as specified in Section 3-F of Ordinance No. 003-2000;25
b. Failure to install a convenient and technologically advanced parking device that is solar-powered and can measure the time a vehicle stays in a parking slot;26
c. Failure to give the City of Baguio the latter's share of the collected parking fee;27
d. Failure to post a performance bond in the amount of P1 million after its previous bond expired.28
The Sanggunian passed Resolution No. 395, Series of 2000, directing Jadewell to comply with its obligations under the MOA for the installation of the necessary number of parking meters.29
On 15 March 2001, Jadewell wrote to the City Mayor in response to the mentioned Resolution, informing the said office that the former had started operation of the off-street parking on 2 December 2000 and of the on-street parking on 15 December 2000.30 On 27 January 2001, Jadewell also wrote the City Treasurer that the former had completed installation of the parking meters.31
In response to the letter of Jadewell, the City Treasurer demanded the remittance of Baguio’s share of the parking fees collected by Jadewell since it started operations. Jadewell responded by saying that it had complied with this obligation.32
On 19 February 2002, the Sanggunian passed Resolution 37,33 expressing its intent to rescind the MOA with Jadewell. The said Resolution enumerated in the "Whereas" clauses the alleged violations of Jadewell prompting it to rescind the MOA. It reads:
x x x x
WHEREAS, it now appears from verified facts that:
1. contrary to its commitment to install a technologically based P & D parking system, at no cost to the City, including "such equipment and paraphernalia to meter the length of usage of the affected parking spaces for purposes of payment of the parking fees", Jadewell has installed only fourteen (14) parking meters (only 12 of which are working) in only three (3) streets, and Jadewell does not intend to install anymore [sic]; instead it has resorted as a rule to an exceptional circumstance of manual collection of parking fees by parking attendants who, despite express provisions of the Ordinance, are not duly deputized by the DOTC-LTO. Despite assurances to the Honorable City Mayor that Jadewell would stop collection of parking fees until the parking meters have been duly installed, Jadewell continues to collect parking fees manually by using undeputized parking attendants to do the collection;
2. contrary to its commitment to install a technologically based P & D parking system, at no cost to the City, Jadewell has charged the cost of such and similar equipment as direct costs, thus substantially eroding the share of the City in the parking fees;
3. contrary to its obligation to post a performance bond, Jadewell has not fully complied, and when required to update its performance bond Jadewell refused to do so rationalizing its non-compliance by the assertion that they are already performing and therefore are no longer obligated to post a performance bond;
4. contrary to its obligation to remit the share of the City within the first ten (10) days of the following month, Jadewell had initially resisted making payments to the City on the pretext that the profits cannot be determined until after the end of the fiscal year and initially failed to have their tickets pre-numbered and registered with the Office of the City Treasurer;
5. contrary to its promise that the City would derive substantial revenue from the on-street pay parking system, Jadewell has not paid a single centavo of the City share in on-street parking operation; whatever Jadewell has remitted to the City are properly chargeable against the share of the City in the MOA on off-street parking (the
Burnham Parking Area near Ganza), and it appears less than what the City is entitled thereto; and
6. contrary to its representations that the P & D System which it proposed would eliminate fraud in the collection of parking fees, Jadewell has perpetrated fraud on the City by, according to the affidavit of its former bookkeeper, Mr. Adonis Cabungan, doctoring the financial statements before the same are submitted to City authorities.34
WHEREAS, there has been no substantial improvement of the traffic situation in the City even with the introduction of the P & D Parking System and thus it increasingly appears that the system introduced by Jadewell is more for revenue raising than for regulatory purposes. As a consequence the legal principle applies that the collection of taxes cannot be let to any person. In other words, government cannot allow private persons to collect public funds for themselves with the agreement that part thereof or as it turned out in this case no part thereof is shared with the City;
WHEREAS, in its financial reports to the City showing substantial loses [sic] and in its statement to other persons that it is losing money on the project, the kindest thing that the City can do for Jadewell is to prevent Jadewell from incurring anymore [sic] loses.
NOW THEREFORE, on motion of Hon. Bautista, and Hon. Cariño, seconded by Hon. Yaranon, Hon. Weygan and Hon. Tabora, be it RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to rescind the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed between the City of Baguio and Jadewell Parking System Corporation dated 26 June 2000 on the basis of the foregoing premises and exercising its rights under Section 12 of the MOA on the subject of On-Street Parking executed between the City of Baguio and Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation dated 26 June 2000 and, more importantly, performing its duty to protect and promote the general welfare of the people of Baguio City.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to direct the City Legal Officer to cause the proper notice of rescission to Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation forthwith and to take all appropriate steps to implement and enforce the intent of this Resolution.
RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, to inform all City officials and employees and all other persons concerned to be guided accordingly.35
On 1 March 2002, the then City Mayor of Baguio, Bernardo M. Vergara, vetoed Resolution 37, through a letter dated 1 March 2002 addressed to the Vice-Mayor, as Presiding Officer of the Sanggunian, and its members. Mayor Vergara reasoned that it was premature for the Sangguniang Panlungsod to rescind the MOA, because the latter provides for a minimum period of five years before the right of rescission can be exercised; and, that the right of Jadewell to due process was violated due to the lack of opportunity to hear the latter’s side. The City
Mayor proposed a re-negotiation of the MOA with Jadewell as a solution to the problem.36
Meanwhile, on 13 March 2002, the DOTC–Cordillera Autonomous Region (DOTC-CAR) issued a cease and desist order to Jadewell prohibiting it from clamping down and/or towing away vehicles in Baguio City for violation of traffic rules and regulations.37
On 17 April 2002, the Sanggunian resolved through a Resolution of the same date, to override the veto of the City Mayor, worded thus:
NOW THEREFORE, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (City Council) in Regular Session assembled, by twelve affirmative votes constituting more that [sic] a two-thirds vote of all its Members, has resolved to override, as it hereby overrides, the veto of His Honor, Mayor Bernardo M. Vergara, of City Resolution Numbered 037, Series of 2002, entitled "Rescinding the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) Executed Between the City of Baguio and Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation Dated 26 June 2000."38
Also at this time, Braulio D. Yaranon, who was then a member of the Sanggunian, requested a special audit from the Commission on Audit–Cordillera Autonomous Region (COA-CAR) on the operations of Jadewell as regards the pay parking project embodied in the MOA.
On 27 May 2002, Jadewell filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, assailing the validity of Resolution No. 037-2002, which rescinded the MOA between the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Jadewell.39 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5285-R and was raffled off to RTC-Baguio (Branch 61).
On 8 October 2002, the RTC Br. 61 promulgated its Decision40 finding the Sanggunian’s rescission of the MOA unlawful. The Sanggunian then filed an appeal assailing the RTC’s decision with the Court of Appeals; the case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74756.
Meanwhile, pending resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 74756 before the CA, the Sanggunian passed Resolution No. 089, Series of 2003. The resolution sought the assistance of the DOTC-CAR specifically, for it to take immediate action against the officers and personnel of Jadewell for defying the 13 March 2002 cease-and-desist Order it issued prohibiting the latter from clamping down and/or towing away vehicles.41 On 27 May 2003, City Mayor Vergara approved and signed Resolution No. 089-2003. In response, Jadewell filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt with the CA against Mayor Vergara, the Sanggunian and other local government officers. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77341. The original petition was followed by three (3) supplemental petitions filed by Jadewell in the same case.
On 7 July 2003, the CA rendered a Decision42 in CA G.R. SP No. 74756, affirming the assailed Decision of the trial
court which declared as invalid the Sanggunian’s rescission of the MOA. The Sanggunian filed a Motion For Reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA through a Resolution dated 4 September 2003.43 Aggrieved by the denial of their appeal, the Sanggunian filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the 7 July 2003 Decision and its Resolution dated 04 September 2003 of the CA. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 160025, the first of the consolidated petitions herein.44
In CA-G.R. SP No. 77341, the CA dismissed in a Decision45 promulgated on 28 July 2004 the contempt petitions filed by Jadewell for lack of merit. The latter’s Motion For Reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.46 Jadewell elevated the dismissal of its contempt petitions to this Court on 8 December 2004 by filing a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 166094. This is not among the consolidated petitions herein.
On 13 July 2003, the COA-CAR promulgated the requested Report.47 The Report’s objective was to ascertain compliance by the contracting parties – the City of Baguio and Jadewell – with Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA. The COA-CAR Report has 12 findings, essentially as follows:
1) The provisions of the MOA and its Supplement as regards the sharing of the fees are contradicting, hence the share of the City Government cannot be determined;48
2) There was no proper segregation by area of the parking fees collected, hence the proper share of Baguio City cannot be determined;49
3) The City Government did not strictly implement the collection of penalties arising from the late remittances of Jadewell, hence additional revenues were not collected;50
4) The City Treasurer did not conduct an audit of the books and accounts of Jadewell, thus the City Government’s share from parking fees cannot be ascertained;51
5) The use of the P&D parking meters were [sic] not maximized due to Jadewell’s non-compliance with Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA, resulting in the collection of meager income from its use;52
6) The MOA does not specify the guidelines for determining the economic viability of installing the parking meters and the period within which to install it [sic];53
7) The Supplemental MOA was not confirmed by the City Council of Baguio in violation of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code);54
8) The coverage of the parking operations contained in Annex "A" of the MOA was not confirmed by the City Council in violation of R.A. No. 7160;55
9) The City Government failed to ensure proper compliance by Jadewell with the MOA provisions;56
10) The pay parking project was awarded to a bidder who did not have all the qualifications as stated in the "Invitation to Bid" in violation of R.A. No. 7160 and Audit Circular No. 92-386;57
11) The provisions on deputization in Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA are contrary to R.A. No. 4136 (the Land Transportation and Traffic Code), thus rendering it invalid;58
12) The monthly minimum amount to be remitted to the City Government is doubtful due to the discrepancy in the amounts collected and expenses for the year 1999 provided by the City Government to Jadewell as against the amount certified by the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent-Burnham Parks Office for the City Government overseeing the Ganza-Burnham parking spaces.59
On 11 February 2004, after G.R. No. 160025 was filed and pending resolution by this Court, the Sangguniang Panlungsod adopted Resolution No. 056, Series of 2004. The said Resolution informs the general public that Jadewell had neither the authority nor the police power to clamp, tow, or impound vehicles at any place in the City of Baguio.60 Also, on the same date, the Sangguniang Panlungsod passed Resolution No. 059, Series of 2004, in which it made a formal demand upon Jadewell to restore to it possession of the Ganza Parking Area.61
With these developments, Jadewell filed directly with this Court its first indirect contempt case against Bernardo M. Vergara (then City Mayor of Baguio), its Vice-Mayor, and the entire City Council for enacting Resolution Nos. 056 & 059, Series of 2004 pending resolution by this Court of G.R. 160025. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 163052.
On 23 June 2004, this Court through its First Division, ordered G.R. No. 163052 consolidated with G.R. No. 160025.62
On 1 July 2004, then Baguio City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon issued Executive Order No. 001-04,63 the decretal portion of which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned City Mayor, pursuant to his authority to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the City, and to issue executive orders for the faithful and appropriate enforcement and execution of such laws and ordinances (Sec. 455 (b) (2) and (iii), R.A. 7160) hereby affirms and gives protection to the right of the citizenry, particularly affected motor vehicle owners, operators, and drivers, to refuse to submit to the enforcement of Ordinance 003-2000, by the Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation, and further to refuse to pay public revenue in the form of fees, charges, impositions, fines, and penalties provided for in
the said ordinance, to the said entity, such acts being patently illegal and prohibited by law; this Executive Order shall be in force and effect until the City Council, as the legislative arm of the City of Baguio, shall have adopted appropriate remedial or corrective measures on the matters and concerns specified hereinabove.
On 8 July 2004, Mayor Yaranon issued a Memorandum64 to the City Director of the Baguio City Police Department, directing the department to stop and prevent Jadewell from clamping, towing, and impounding vehicles; to arrest and file criminal charges against Jadewell personnel who would execute the proscribed acts specified in the said Memorandum; and to confiscate the equipment used by Jadewell to clamp, tow, or impound vehicles under the authority of the rescinded MOA.
On 12 July 2004, Jadewell filed its second Petition for indirect contempt again with this Court, this time against Mayor Yaranon for having issued the above-cited Order also for the same reasons given in its first contempt petition with this Court. The Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 164107.
Furthermore, on 15 July 2004, Jadewell filed an administrative case against Mayor Yaranon before the Office of the President (OP). Docketed as Case No. OP 04-G-294, it sought the mayor’s suspension and removal from office. The case against Mayor Yaranon was for his issuance of the following: (1) Executive Order No. 001-04 dated 1 July 2004; (2) the Memorandum dated 7 July 2004 limiting the pay parking business of Jadewell to certain parts of Baguio City;; and (3) Memorandum dated 8 July 2004 directing the Baguio City Police Department to prevent Jadewell from apprehending, towing and impounding vehicles. A supplemental petition filed by Jadewell on 19 January 2005, complaining of Executive Order No. 005-2004, which was issued on 15 October 2004, was also included in administrative case OP 04-G-294.
On the following day, 16 July 2004, Jadewell filed a Supplemental Petition with Motion for Leave of this Court65 in the second contempt petition before this Court, G.R. No. 164107, alleging as a supplemental fact, Mayor Yaranon’s Memorandum of 08 July 2004.
On 15 October 2004, Mayor Yaranon issued Executive Order No. 005-2004.66 This was a cease and desist order against Jadewell to prevent it from performing the following acts: (1) charging and collecting from motorists, parking fees without their consent;67 (2) seizing and detaining vehicles of motorists who refuse to pay parking fees to Jadewell;68 and (3) using yellow-colored heavy wreckers or tow trucks bearing the name "City of Baguio".69
In addition to Executive Order No. 005-2004, Mayor Yaranon issued Executive Order No. 005-2004-A, which is essentially a rehash of Executive Order No. 005-2004.70
On 25 October 2004, Jadewell filed a third Petition with this Court, praying that Mayor Yaranon be cited for contempt and that Executive Order No. 005-2004 be nullified.71 This case was docketed as G.R. No. 165564. On 16 November 2004, Jadewell filed a Supplemental Petition to this Petition alleging as a supplemental ground the issuance of Executive Order No. 005-2004-A.72
On 20 December 2004, Mayor Yaranon issued Administrative Order No. 622, Series of 2004, which declared that Jadewell exceeded its area of operations for the administration of on-street parking and was thus required to show lawful cause why its business permit should not be revoked. In response to this Order, Jadewell filed a Second Supplemental Petition for contempt against Mayor Yaranon in G.R. No. 165564 on 25 January 2005.
On 10 January 2005, this Court through a Resolution73 ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 160025 with G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, and 165564.
On 17 January 2005, this Court denied Jadewell’s petition in G.R. No. 166094 for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the CA in dismissing its petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 77341.74 Its Motion For Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality.75
In the beginning of the year 2005, Jadewell attempted to renew its business permit from the City of Baguio and tendered the fees required. However, the Office of the City Mayor refused to renew the business permit and returned the amount tendered.76 Because of these actions of Mayor Yaranon, Jadewell filed on 15 April 2005 its Third Supplemental Petition in G.R. No. 164107, which had been consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, and 165564. Aside from its main prayer to cite the mayor for contempt, Jadewell also prayed that Mayor Yaranon, a lawyer, be disbarred.77 On 25 April 2005, this Court, through its Third Division, admitted the Third Supplemental Petition of Jadewell.78
On 9 February 2005, this Court, in G.R. No. 160025, issued a Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering Mayor Yaranon to immediately reopen the streets and premises occupied and/or operated by Jadewell. The Court also required Jadewell to post a cash or surety bond in the amount of P100,000 within five days from receipt of the order.79
The order, in part, reads:
Acting on the urgent motion dated January 26, 2005 of respondent Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation for the issuance of a temporary mandatory/preventive order and/or for writ of preliminary mandatory/prohibitory injunction pending appeal in G.R. No. 160025, alleging that the effects of the acts of City Mayor Yaranon, unless stayed, would also make effective what the petitioner Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Baguio failed to obtain in the instant case, the net effect of which would not only be grave damage and injury to the respondent but also to the City of Baguio, the Court further Resolved:
(a) to ISSUE, the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION prayed for, effective immediately, commanding City Mayor Yaranon to immediately reopen the streets and/or premises operated and/or occupied by the respondent and to let them remain open, until further orders of this Court; and
(b) to require petitioner to POST a CASH BOND or a SURETY BOND from a reputable bonding company of indubitable solvency in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), with terms and conditions to be approved by the Court, within five (5) days from notice, otherwise, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction herein issued shall AUTOMATICALLY be lifted.
NOW THEREFORE, You, [City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon], your agents, representatives and/or any person or persons acting upon your orders or in your place or stead, are hereby DIRECTED to IMMEDIATELY REOPEN the streets and/or premises operated and/or occupied by the respondents and to let the said streets and premises remain OPEN, until further orders from this Court.
On 8 April 2005, Mayor Yaranon issued a Memorandum80 directing Col. Isagani Nerez, Director of the Baguio City Police District, to create a special task force to stop Jadewell from clamping, towing, and impounding vehicles in violation of parking rules in Baguio City; to impound the wrecker/tow trucks used by Jadewell.
On 20 April 2005, this Court promulgated a Resolution in G.R. No. 160025, finding Mayor Yaranon guilty of direct and indirect contempt. He was cited for direct contempt when it was proven that he had submitted pleadings before this Court containing falsehoods. Mayor Yaranon had stated in his Compliance that the streets were opened for Jadewell to resume operations, but upon inspection these were found to be closed.81 He was also cited for indirect contempt, for having continuously refused to carry out the writ issued by this Court to reopen the streets so Jadewell could resume operations.82 This Court likewise fined Mayor Yaranon the amount of P10,000, which he paid. The Court further ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to immediately arrest and detain Mayor Yaranon pending his compliance with the 9 February 2005 writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by this Court, which ordered the reopening of some streets so Jadewell could continue its operations.83
On 10 August 2005, Benedicto Balajadia, et al. filed Civil Case No. 6089-R against Jadewell before the RTC–Baguio City. The case was subsequently raffled to Branch 3 of the RTC presided by Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan.84 Balajadia, et al. sought to nullify the MOA between Jadewell and the City Government of Baguio and its enabling ordinance, Ordinance No. 003-2000. The complainants also prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and for a writ of preliminary injunction against Jadewell.
On 19 April 2006, Judge Pamintuan issued an Order in Civil Case No. 6089-R granting the prayer of complainants Balajadia et al. for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction. The injunction was meant to restrain Jadewell from proceeding with the supervision and collection of parking, towing, and impounding fees on the streets of Baguio City. Further, Judge Pamintuan ordered the holding in abeyance of the implementation of City Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA.85
On 27 April 2006, Jadewell filed with this Court a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus against Judge Pamintuan86 for refusing to dismiss Civil Case No. 6089-R. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 172215. On the same day, Jadewell filed a Petition asking this Court to cite Judge Pamintuan for contempt. This fourth contempt case, albeit primarily against a member of the judiciary, was docketed as G.R. No. 172216.
On 19 June 2006, G.R. No. 172215 was ordered consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, 164107, and 165564.87
On 23 June 2006, Mayor Yaranon wrote Jadewell a letter demanding that it desist from operating the pay parking system in Baguio City. Simultaneously, he wrote the Sanggunian, requesting it to cancel Ordinance No. 003-2000, the enabling ordinance for the MOA.
On 26 June 2006, Jadewell filed a Supplemental Petition88 in G.R. No. 172215 complaining of Judge Pamintuan’s issuance of the following Orders in Civil Case No. 6089-R: (a) Order dated 24 April 200689 directing the parties to file a pre-trial brief and setting the pre-trial of the case; (b) Order dated 01 June 200690 informing Jadewell that public respondent was not suspending the proceedings, because he believed he was not covered by the writ issued by this Court; (c) Order dated 14 June 200691 upholding the writ he issued in the civil case despite his receipt of a copy of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court; and (d) Order dated 16 June 200692 directing Jadewell to comply with the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction under pain of direct contempt.
On the same day, 26 June 2006, the Office of the President (OP) rendered a Decision in OP 04-G-294, the administrative case Jadewell had filed against Mayor Yaranon, finding him guilty of grave misconduct, abuse of authority, and oppression. Mayor Yaranon was meted out a penalty totalling 12 months suspension from office.93 This suspension was implemented by the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Aggrieved by his suspension, Mayor Yaranon filed his Motion For Reconsideration, which was denied on 22 August 2006 by the OP.
On 29 June 2006, in response to Mayor Yaranon’s letters of 23 June 2006, Jadewell filed before this Court yet another case for contempt – its fifth contempt case, and the third one specifically against Mayor Yaranon. In
addition to its prayer to cite the mayor for contempt, Jadewell also prayed that Mayor Yaranon, a lawyer, be disbarred.94 The case was docketed as G.R. No. 173043.
On 31 July 2006, G.R. No. 173043 was ordered consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, 164107, 165564, and 172215.95 On 27 September 2006, G.R. No. 172216 was consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, 164107, 165564.96
On 23 August 2006, while the consolidated cases were pending resolution before this Court, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 204, Series of 2006. The Resolution directed the City Legal Officer to notify Jadewell of the Baguio City Government’s intention to rescind the MOA, and to inform Jadewell to stop its operations under the MOA 60 days after receipt of the Notice.97
On 28 August 2006, the legal counsel for Jadewell wrote to Baguio City Vice-Mayor Bautista, Jr., informing him that the OP had denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Mayor Yaranon assailing the OP resolution ordering the latter’s suspension as City Mayor of Baguio City.98 The counsel for Jadewell likewise stated in his letter that they were aware that the Sanggunian was planning to issue a resolution to repeal Ordinance No. 003-2000 and rescind the MOA. The letter requested the Vice-Mayor to veto the measure in light of the pending petitions with the Supreme Court.99 The said counsel likewise sent a similar letter to the Sanggunian, urging it to desist from implementing the repeal of Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the rescission of the MOA pending the resolution of the cases with the Supreme Court.100
On 13 September 2006, Mayor Yaranon appealed to the CA, in a case docketed as CA G.R. CV SP No. 96116, praying for the lifting of the penalty of suspension meted him in OP 04-G-294, but this appeal was denied. Mayor Yaranon moved for reconsideration.101
On 22 September 2006, City Legal Officer Rabanes wrote a letter to Jadewell, through its President, Mr. Rogelio Tan, informing Jadewell of Resolution No. 204, Series of 2006, which rescinded the MOA, and ordering it to stop operations within 60 days from notice.102 This letter was received on the same day it was issued;103 hence, the 60-day period lapsed on 22 November 2006. This notice, together with the resolution, constitute the second act of rescission of the MOA by the city officials of Baguio.
On 19 October 2006, Jadewell filed the sixth contempt case with this Court against the acting City Mayor of Baguio, Reinaldo A. Bautista, Jr., and the members of the Sanggunian, including City Legal Officer Melchor Carlos R. Rabanes, for the second act of rescission of the MOA.104 The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174879.
On 9 October 2007, the CA dismissed Mayor Yaranon’s Petition in CA G.R. CV SP No. 96116 on the ground that it had become moot and academic due to Mayor Yaranon’s failure to be re-elected in the 17 May 2007 elections.
Mayor Yaranon filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 07 November 2007, but this was also denied by the CA on 24 January 2008. Thus, on 17 March 2008, Mayor Yaranon filed a Rule 45 Petition before this Court seeking to reverse and set aside the CA Decision and Resolution. It was docketed as G.R. No. 181488.
On 12 November 2008, G.R. No. 181488 was ordered consolidated with the cases already mentioned.105
THE ISSUES
1. On G.R. No. 160025 and on theclaim in G.R. No. 174879 that the secondact of rescission was a valid act ofrescission.
Whilst the issues are spread out among the nine cases, we have grouped these according to what are common to the specific cases.
In our effort to simplify the issues and provide forms of relief to the parties that are not purely academic, it is necessary to examine the operative effects that may result from any resolution of this Court. Such examination may also help guide the parties in their future actions, and perhaps the overly-litigated matters brought before us in the consolidated petitions may finally be put to rest.
We note at the outset that on 22 November 2006, 60 days had lapsed from receipt of the letter dated 22 September 2006, informing Jadewell of the decision of the City of Baguio to rescind the MOA under Section 12 thereof. It may be recalled that Section 12 requires that notice of the intention to rescind be given 60 days prior to the effectivity of the rescission. Jadewell has not questioned the legal efficacy of this notice. It has brought this matter of a second rescission to the Court’s attention only as a matter of contumacious behavior on the part of the respondents in G.R. No. 174879, in the same way that it brought various actions of the public respondents before the Court in its other contempt petitions. Since the legal efficacy of the rescission in 2006 has not been contested by Jadewell in any of the petitions before us, we thus consider this notice of rescission to have taken legal effect and therefore, at the latest, the MOA between the City of Baguio and Jadewell has ceased to legally exist as of 22 November 2006.
Parenthetically, we note that while the validity of the second act of rescission described in G.R. No. 174879 is not principally determinative of the respondents’ liability for indirect contempt therein, a conclusion that the second act of rescission was undertaken competently and appropriately will to a certain degree impact our appreciation of such possible liability. We will discuss this issue in our subsequent discussion on the charges of contempt.
Inasmuch as there is no longer any existing MOA, no order of this Court can have the effect of directing the City of Baguio to enforce any of the terms of the MOA, which
brings us to the matter of G.R. No. 160025. In whatever direction we rule on the question of the validity of the first act of rescission, such ruling will only have the effect of either providing Jadewell a basis to seek damages from the City of Baguio for the wrongful termination of the MOA, should we find wrongful termination to have taken place, or, deny Jadewell that right. The possible susceptibility of the City of Baguio and its officials to an action for damages on a finding of wrongful termination is why we do not consider G.R. No. 160025 as having been rendered moot by the lawful rescission of the MOA on 22 November 2006. Thus, we will proceed to rule on the issues in G.R. No. 160025.
The fallo of the RTC Decision upheld by the CA, which affirmance is the lis mota in G.R. No. 160025, reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring both Sangguniang Panlungsod Resolution No. 037, Series of 2002 and the April 17, 2002 Resolution overriding the Mayor’s veto as NULL and VOID. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier issued by this Court is made PERMANENT, with costs against respondents.106
The RTC did not order the respondents therein to comply with the MOA. An order to perform a contract is not necessarily subsumed in an order not to terminate the same.
Contrast this legal point with the fact that the prayer of Jadewell in its original petition asked the RTC, in relevant part:
...that the writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent and the writs applied for be issued against the respondents nullifying and voiding Resolution No. 037, series of 2002 and the resolution over-riding the veto … and instead, directing them to perform what the memorandum of agreement requires them to do. (Emphasis supplied)107
This latter part, which is effectively a prayer for a permanent mandatory injunction against respondents therein to perform the terms of the MOA, are not in the fallo of the RTC decision. We consider therefore that the RTC deliberately withheld granting the specific prayer to order Baguio City to perform the MOA. No motion to correct or clarify the said fallo having been filed by Jadewell, the prayer to order the city officials of Baguio to perform the MOA is hereby deemed abandoned.
We further note three things:
1. Jadewell has not questioned - in its Petition, Reply to Comment, and Memorandum before this Court - the implication of the RTC and CA Decisions to the effect that the Sanggunian had the authority to perform acts of contractual rescission on behalf of the City of Baguio when both these courts ignored the issue raised by Jadewell in its Petition before the RTC, and we therefore do not
consider this to be a genuine issue in this Petition before us;
2. While the Sangguniang Panlungsod has insinuated that there was fraud and excess of authority on the part of the mayor in the execution108 of the MOA - because the latter provided for a smaller sharing of "20 % from the gross profit of the operation or 50% of the net profit whichever is higher" instead of the intended "20% of gross receipts,"109- petitioners in G.R. No. 160025 conceded even at the RTC level that they are not assailing the MOA for being defective but for having been breached in the performance. We thus disregard all arguments in G.R. No. 160025 regarding the validity of the execution of the MOA, for being a non-issue in this case;110
3. We also immediately set aside claims of Jadewell in its Petition before the RTC that an alternative relief should be provided by the courts in the form of compensation for terminated Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts under the BOT Law (Republic Act No. 6957) as there is not the slightest basis on record that the administration of on-street parking can be classified as an infrastructure contract, a basic element that must be present for any contract to come within the terms of the BOT Law.
Having preliminarily screened out the non-issues in this case, we proceed to examine the rulings of the courts a quo in G.R. 160025.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto, along the following points:
1. On the sole procedural issue. - The RTC was correct in treating the Petition as one for permanent injunction with a prayer for a preliminary injunction, instead of treating it by its formal title: "Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction." It was correct in holding that if the Petition had been treated by its formal denomination, then it would have been dismissed for failing to satisfy the requirement that the act sought to be nullified was rendered in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity by the respondents, but then this formal denomination could be disregarded and the nature of the Petition should be determined by its allegations and prayers. Since there was a prayer to permanently enjoin respondents from enforcing the questioned resolutions, the RTC was correct in treating it as one for permanent injunction.
2. On the substantive issues:
a. On the lack of due process afforded Jadewell. – The RTC was correct in ruling that Jadewell was denied the right to be heard before the Sanggunian rescinded the MOA. There is no evidence on record that the Sanggunian afforded Jadewell an opportunity to present its side or refute the charges of the latter’s violation committed under the MOA.111
b. On the authority of the RTC to consider the effect of Section 9 of the MOA112 when Jadewell never raised the
matter of Section 9 in any of its pleadings. – The RTC correctly considered Jadewell’s letter dated 24 November 2001, addressed to the Sanggunian and offered during the trial, which introduced the subject matter of the five (5) year guarantee against rescission provided in Section 9 of the MOA. The CA regarded the RTC’s consideration of said letter as judicious and added that even without it, the MOA, and its provisions, form part of the case records.113
c. On the failure to observe the 60-day notice requirement. – The RTC correctly found that the Sanggunian cannot validly and unilaterally rescind the MOA without observing the provisions in Section 12 of the MOA requiring that a 60-day notice be given before rescission can take place. To allow the Sanggunian to unilaterally rescind the MOA without giving Jadewell an opportunity to present its side is to render the right to rescission provided in the MOA legally vulnerable.114
d. On the lack of substantiveness of the alleged breach of performance of the MOA by Jadewell. – The CA reviewed the records of the case and upheld the findings of the RTC that the violations of Jadewell were not substantial to merit the consequence of rescission under the MOA.115
We elucidate on the arguments of the parties, the RTC, and the CA.
In its Petition before the RTC, Jadewell argues that the rescission of the MOA was not valid, on due process grounds, and also because there was no substantial breach on its part to justify a rescission of the MOA.116 It also asserts that the Sanggunian had no authority to rescind the MOA, because the latter was not a party thereto.117
Jadewell sought a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of the questioned Resolution, and prayed that after hearing, the preliminary injunction be made permanent. It further prayed for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to nullify the assailed Resolution; and for a mandatory injunction to compel the City Government to perform the latter’s obligations under the MOA.118 Jadewell alternatively invoked the provisions of Section 18 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the BOT Law,119 in the event the RTC would uphold the validity of the questioned Resolution.
The trial court ruled that the rescission violated the due process clause of the Constitution and failed to meet the requirements for rescission under the Civil Code and the MOA itself. In the Sanggunian’s Memorandum, on appeal before the CA, the Sanggunian assigned three errors to the Decision of the trial court: (1) the RTC ignored the evidence on record and the requirements of Rule 65 when it declared the subject Resolution void; (2) Jadewell was not denied due process when the MOA was rescinded; and (3) by ruling that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had no right of rescission for the first 5 years of the MOA – an issue not raised in the pleadings – the trial court improperly took up the cudgels for Jadewell in the case.120
As earlier stated, the CA upheld the RTC’s Decision in toto.
The Sanggunian filed its Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the CA had erred as follows: (1) treating Jadewell’s petition as an original action for injunction;121 (2) ruling that Jadewell was deprived of due process122 when it rescinded the MOA; and (3) finding that the MOA stipulated for a five-year minimum guarantee against rescission.123 This was denied, and this denial and the CA Decision are the subjects of G. R. 160025.
2. G.R. No. 172215 – Certiorari,Prohibition and Mandamus, filed byJadewell against Judge Pamintuanfor not dismissing Civil Case No. 6089-R
Jadewell directly filed the instant Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari before this Court to nullify the denial by the trial court of its Motion to Dismiss and its Motion for Reconsideration of the same order,124 and for ordering Jadewell to cease collecting parking fees, and from towing and impounding vehicles on the streets of Baguio City. It also seeks to nullify the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6089-R, invoking both res judicata and litis pendentia.125 It contends that, since the issue on the validity of the questioned city ordinance and the MOA was favorably ruled upon previously by RTC Branches 7 and 61 of Baguio City in separate cases, Branch 3 of the same RTC presided by Judge Pamintuan is bound by the rulings of the other branches.126 Litis pendentia is being invoked in relation to the petitions already before this Court.
Mayor Yaranon is impleaded in this case on the basis of the order of Judge Pamintuan to the city mayor to perform his duty to supervise the roads, streets and park of Baguio City, in coordination with the police and the LTO during the validity of the Writ of Injunction that Judge Pamintuan issued.127
The main issue to be resolved in Jadewell’s Petition for certiorari is whether Judge Pamintuan’s rulings in Civil Case No. 6089-R violated the res judicata/litis pendentia doctrines.
3. G.R. No. 181488 – TheCertiorari petition filed by Yaranonseeking to reverse Resolutions dated9 October 2008 and 24 January 2008in CA-G.R. SP No. 96116 whichupheld the validity of his suspensionas City Mayor of Baguio.
Mayor Yaranon’s instant Petition before this Court raises the following issues: (1) that his failed re-election bid was not a supervening event in the final determination by the CA of whether he was guilty of grave misconduct, abuse of authority, and oppression; and (2) that the CA should rule on the substantive validity of his suspension.
4. The Petitions for Contempt
a. G.R. No. 163052 – This is the first contempt petition filed by Jadewell directly with this Court against City Mayor Vergara, the Vice Mayor, and the entire Sanggunian, for enacting Resolution Nos. 056 & 059, Series of 2004. To recall, Resolution No. 056, Series of 2004 informs the general public that Jadewell had neither the authority nor the police power to clamp, tow or impound vehicles at any place in the City of Baguio.128 In Resolution No. 059, Series of 2004, the City of Baguio made a formal demand upon Jadewell to surrender the Ganza and Burnham Park Parking Areas within thirty days. In the same Resolution, the City of Baguio also directed the City Legal Officer to file the appropriate legal actions necessary to recover the said parking areas and to ask for damages against Jadewell.129
The core issue to be resolved in this case is whether the Sanggunian Panlungsod is guilty of indirect contempt for enacting the above resolutions, pending resolution of G.R. No. 160025.
b. G.R. No. 164107 – This contempt petition was filed directly with this Court against then Baguio City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon after he issued Executive Order No. 001-04 announcing that, as City Mayor, he would give protection to motor vehicle owners, operators, and drivers who would refuse to submit to the enforcement of traffic rules by Jadewell such as by refusing to pay the parking fees or fines the latter imposes.
Yaranon also issued a Memorandum dated 8 July 2004, ordering the arrest and filing of criminal charges against Jadewell personnel who would clamp, tow, or impound motor vehicles in defiance of Executive Order No. 001-04. This was followed by a Memorandum on 8 April 2005 directing the Baguio City Police District to create a special task force to prevent Jadewell from clamping, towing, and impounding vehicles found to be in violation of the parking rules in Baguio City.
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether Mayor Yaranon could be cited for contempt for the above, pending resolution of the issue of the validity of the rescission of the MOA in G.R. Nos. 160025 and 163052.
c. G.R. No. 165564 – Jadewell filed this third contempt petition against Mayor Yaranon for issuing Executive Order No. 005-2004 dated 15 October 2004. The order directs Jadewell to cease and desist from: (a) charging and collecting parking fees on the streets of Baguio City without the consent of the City Government;130 (b) seizing and detaining vehicles of motorists who refuse to pay the parking fees to Jadewell131 and (c) using yellow-colored tow trucks bearing the name "City of Baguio".132 Jadewell’s petition also seeks to nullify Executive Order No. 005-2004.
On 16 November 2004, Jadewell filed a Supplemental Petition. The act complained of this time was the issuance of Executive Order No. 005-2004-A which is a mere rehash of Executive Order No. 005-2004.133 On 25
January 2005, Jadewell filed a Second Supplemental Petition in connection with Mayor Yaranon’s issuance of Administrative Order No. 622, Series of 2004. The said administrative order declared that Jadewell exceeded its area of operations for the administration of on-street parking and it required to show lawful cause why its business permit should not be revoked.
Like in the earlier contempt petitions, Jadewell alleges that these issuances by Mayor Yaranon are contumacious because they were made while the main petition, G.R. No. 160025 questioning the rescission of the MOA by the Sanggunian, is still pending resolution with this Court.
d. G.R. No. 172216 – On 27 April 2006, Jadewell filed a petition for contempt against Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan, Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 3 of Baguio City, in relation to Civil Case No. 6089-R pending before his sala.134 In the said civil case, Judge Pamintuan issued an Order directing Jadewell to desist from the collection of parking fees, from towing and impounding vehicles on the streets of Baguio City and to hold in abeyance the implementation of City Ordinance 003-2000 and the MOA. The validity of the Order of Judge Pamintuan is the subject of a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus instituted by Jadewell in G.R. No. 172215.
The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether Judge Pamintuan should be cited for indirect contempt by this Court for issuing the assailed Orders.
e. G.R. No. 173043 – On 29 June 2006, Jadewell filed yet another contempt case against Mayor Yaranon. In addition to its prayer to cite him for contempt, Jadewell also prays that Mayor Yaranon, as a lawyer, be disbarred.135 Jadewell instituted this fifth contempt case after it received a letter from Mayor Yaranon demanding that it stop its business operations in Baguio City, at the same time directing the Sangguniang Panlungsod to cancel Ordinance 003-2000.
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Mayor Yaranon was guilty of indirect contempt and professional misconduct for the above acts pending resolution of G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052,164107, 165564 and 172215.136
f. G.R. No. 174879 - On 19 October 2006, Jadewell filed a contempt case against the acting City Mayor of Baguio, Reinaldo A. Bautista, Jr., and the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, including City Legal Officer Melchor Carlos R. Rabanes, in connection with the second act of rescission.137 Jadewell also asks that the respondents who are lawyers, namely: Rocky Thomas A. Balisong, Edilberto B. Tenefrancia, Faustino A. Olowan, Federico J. Mandapat, Perlita L. Chan-Rondez, and Jose M. Molintas, be disbarred.
These acts, in Jadewell’s view, are contumacious in light of the pending G.R. No. 160025 before this Court.
OUR RULINGS
1. On G.R. No. 160025
a. On the Treatment ofJadewell’s Petition as one forPermanent Injunction.
The CA sustained the position of the Sanggunian that certiorari could not prosper because when the latter enacted Resolution 37, the Sanggunian was exercising its legislative function and not its judicial or quasi-judicial function. The writ of certiorari under Rule 65 requires: (a) that it is directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) that such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.138
The CA nevertheless proceeded to treat the Petition as an original action for injunction, ruling in this wise:
x x x x
Although in the trial court, Jadewell filed said petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65, it is essentially one for Injunction under Rule 58. Said petition’s form and substance satisfied all the requirements of a civil action for Injunction, which is the proper remedy under the attendant circumstances.
The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated.
Considering the clear and patent denial of due process committed by the Sanggunian in precipitately rescinding the MOA and in the interest of substantial justice, WE deem it more prudent to treat the petition filed below as an action for Injunction under Rule 58, which is well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Consequently, the present appeal shall be considered as an appeal from the permanent injunction ordered by the trial court, which is properly appealable to this Court, as held in Casilan vs. Ybaňez.139
x x x x
We sustain the ruling of the appellate court treating Jadewell’s original action for certiorari as one for injunction based on the allegations in the latter’s pleadings.
In Ramon Jimenez, Jr. v. Juan Jose Jordana,140 the issue to be resolved was whether the nature of the action was one for specific performance or for recovery of real property. In determining that the case was one for the recovery of real property, the Court characterized the suit on the basis of the allegations in the Complaint. We restated the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. In the recent case of Reyes v. Alsons Development and Investment Corporation,141 we likewise ruled that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the pleadings.
In Lee, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,142 the controversy to be resolved was whether the appeal filed by the petitioner was one under Rule 65 or Rule 42. The determination of the issue was crucial, because the appellate court had dismissed the appeal of the petitioner, saying that the wrong mode of appeal had been used. The CA had ruled that petitioner should have filed a certiorari petition under Rule 65 – instead of a petition under Rule 42 – to appeal the assailed decision rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
We held:
Our perusal of the petition filed before the Court of Appeals clearly shows that it is a petition for review under Rule 42, and not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. We note that in the Court of Appeals’ petition, under the heading "Nature of the Petition," petitioner stated that it was a "petition for review on certiorari to set aside, invalidate and reverse the Decision dated December 14, 2001 of public respondent Judge Victor T. Llamas, Jr." Also, the reversal sought was premised on the ground that the decision was issued in gross error. The statement under the heading "Nature of the Petition" that the trial courts’ decisions were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and even the caption impleading the lower courts, would not automatically bring the petition within the coverage of Rule 65. It is hornbook doctrine that it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action. (Emphasis supplied)
In the original action filed by Jadewell before the RTC of Baguio City, although the action was clearly denominated as a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus against the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the allegations actually supported an action for injunction under Rule 58 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. As can be gleaned from its allegations and especially in its prayers, Jadewell filed the case with the trial court with the ultimate end of restraining the implementation of Resolution No. 037, Series of 2002.
We agree with the CA when it ruled that Jadewell sought permanent injunction aside from the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, thus:
An action for injunction is a recognized remedy in this jurisdiction. It is a suit for the purpose of enjoining the defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from committing or continuing to commit a specific act, or compelling the defendant to continue performing a particular act. It has an independent existence. The action for injunction is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding.143 xxxx...
In Garcia v. Adeva,144 this Court had the opportunity to clarify that while injunction can be a provisional remedy, it can also be a main case. The Court had to make this preliminary distinction in order to find out whether the SEC had the jurisdiction to prevent, on a permanent basis, the commission of certain acts by the respondents. Thus, the necessity to make the distinction between injunction as a provisional remedy and injunction as a main case. It found guidance from Garayblas v. Atienza, Jr.,145 and quoting from the latter:
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action. The Court has distinguished the main action for injunction from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, thus:
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.
We, therefore, rule that the CA did not commit any error in treating Jadewell’s Petition for Certiorari as an original action for injunction.
b. On the denial of due process.
The second issue in this Petition is the correctness of the CA’s ruling that Jadewell was deprived of due process when the Sangguniang Panlungsod rescinded the MOA. The findings of the CA are as follows:
In the instant case, evidence on record does not show that before the Sanggunian passed the disputed Resolution it gave Jadewell an opportunity to present its side. Neither did the Sanggunian convene an investigatory body to inquire into Jadewell’s alleged violations nor at least invite Jadewell to a conference to discuss the alleged violations, if only to give Jadewell the chance to refute any evidence gathered by it against the latter. As it is, the Sanggunian arrogated upon itself the role of a prosecutor, judge and executioner in rescinding the MOA, all in clear violation of Jadewell’s constitutionally embedded right to due process.146
x x x.
Both courts held that Jadewell was denied due process. When the denial of due process argument is raised, it is directed primarily against the exercise of governmental authority that "deprives life, liberty and property" without observance what is, in the circumstances, the applicable standards of "due process." It is not an argument that is relevant in situations of contractual breach between two purely private entities, nor is it available against the government when the latter is not discharging a governmental function, but merely pursuing a purely commercial activity in a proprietary capacity. In order to consider the due process argument, this Court must first determine whether the MOA was entered into by the City of Baguio in a governmental capacity, or in a purely proprietary capacity.
The regulation of on-street and off-street parking is a governmental function that can be exercised by local governments. It is important to understand the objective of the Baguio City Government in: (1) privatizing the administration of on-street and off-street parking; and (2) its execution of a MOA with Jadewell. This can be gleaned from the Explanatory Note and other provisions of the agreement, to wit:
The City of Baguio has earned the reputation of the CLEANEST AND GREENEST HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY for the previous years. This has become possible due to the collective effort of both the Citizens of Baguio and the City Government. However, the increase in population, volume of vehicles and the absence of a regulatory measure to address this concern gradually tainted what used to be a reputation we were proud of.
The ever increasing problems, specifically those relevant to the Traffic situation is at this point the biggest contributor to environmental degradation. Other Salient points we must consider relevant to this matter are the problems on OBSTRUCTION AND DOUBLE PARKING which are very rampant. We further add to these the problems on DISORGANIZED PARKING, LACK OF DEPUTIZED AGENTS to monitor, supervise and enforce traffic rules and regulations.
At this point in time, we feel the immediate need of focusing on these problems. There is an urgent need to adopt measures that would alleviate these matters. This we recommend that PARKING SPACES should be REGULATED in such a manner that it would bring advantage both to the City Government and the Citizens of Baguio. We further propose the collection of REGULATORY FEES that would be used in maintaining our roads and to hire people that would de deputized to help ease the problems as stated above.
Finally, we believe that our roads are beyond the Commerce of Man. To convert our roads into PAY PARKING SPACES, would be violative of this principle. However to REGULATE its use and its eventual effect would redound to the GENERAL WELFARE will be an appreciated gesture to help preserve our image as the
CLEANEST AND GREENEST HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY.
x x x x
SECTION 4. Parking spaces. A parking place may be divided into parking spaces and for the purposes of this Ordinance, each space or for a number of spaces as determined by the private parking operator in consultation with the concerned Official of the City of Baguio.
x x x x
SECTION 5. Prohibitions against parking outside the parking spaces. No spaces shall park any motor vehicle on the sidewalk or cause or permit any motor vehicle to wait to any road or length of road on which in any place in which or adjacent to or in close proximity to which there is a parking place.
x x x x
SECTION 7. Payment of Prescribed Charges. (1) No person shall park any motor vehicle in a parking place or parking space during the times specified in this Ordinance without paying the prescribed charge for the required parking period; (2) The prescribed charge payable in respect to the parking of a motor vehicle in a parking space shall be paid by the insertion into the parking meter provided for that parking space a coin/coins of Philippine Currency or by using cards in order to obtain the payment ticket to evidence the payment of the prescribed charge; (3) The payment ticket shall be displayed at a conspicuous part of a motor vehicle in a parking place or parking space; (4) The payment ticket shall be valid to be used on any parking space within the authorized period indicated in the payment ticket.
x x x x
SECTION 22. Rules. The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be entered into by the City Mayor shall be governed by this Ordinance.
From the above, the following are clear: (1) that the City of Baguio decided on the privatization of the administration of parking for environmental and peace and safety reasons, both of which are within its powers under Section 458(A)(5)(v) and (vi) of the Local Government Code; and (2) that the terms of agreement between the City of Baguio and Jadewell involve the delegation of governmental functions in terms of regulating the designation and use of parking spaces as well as the collection of fees for such use. These are indicators that any privatization contract pursuant to the above Resolution takes the essential character of a franchise because what is being privatized is a government-monopolized function.
It would thus be relevant to ask if there is a provision in the applicable laws or the franchise (MOA) that grants the City of Baguio the right to revoke the latter either at will, or upon the satisfaction of certain conditions, such that
ordinary due process protection can be considered to have been waived by the franchisee. We must caution that when we refer to revocation at will here, we are referring to the revocation of resolutory, not suspensive, obligations.147
We have looked closely at Resolution No. 003-2000 and the MOA and have additionally reflected on the applicable provision under the Civil Code. We have come to the conclusion that:
(a) There is only one provision that allows for unilateral revocation of the MOA, which can be found in Section 9 thereof:
9. Minimum Guaranty – The FIRST PARTY guaranties (sic) a minimum period of five (5) years against rescission; provided that after such period, the parties may agree to increase to a reasonable rate the parking fees and the share of the city from the parking fees collected as provided for in the guidelines, (Annex "B");
(b) This Section 9 requires that five years must have lapsed – presumably from the date of execution of the MOA – before the unilateral right to revoke the MOA can be exercised;
(c) Therefore, before the five year period has lapsed, the right to revoke the MOA arises only under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
From the above, it appears that in order to effect a valid revocation of the MOA prior to the lapse of the 5-year period provided for in Section 9, the City of Baguio had to approach the problem from one or both of two perspectives: one, negotiate the termination of the MOA with Jadewell, or two, exercise its option under Article 1191 of the Civil Code.
The first option, a negotiated pretermination of the contract, is an inherent right of every party in a contract. This can be inferred from the freedom of the parties to contract and modify their previous covenants provided it would not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.148 Despite the provision on the
minimum warranty against rescission stipulated in the MOA, the parties were not constrained to mutually modify such restriction. The Sanggunian could have proposed to Jadewell the possibility of lifting the warranty against rescission subject to the condition that the latter will comply with its obligations under the MOA.
This scenario could have impressed upon Jadewell that its contractual relations with the city government of Baguio were less than ideal. The suggested approach for the Sanggunian could have been legally sound and practical. Obviously, this was not done in this case; thus, Jadewell’s Complaint before the RTC of Baguio City.
The second option is the exercise of the unilateral right to rescind a bilateral contract on the part of a party who believes that it has been injured by a breach substantial enough to warrant revocation. Where one party allegedly failed to comply with his obligations under a contract, the injured party may rescind the obligation if the other does not perform or is not ready and willing to perform.149 We will examine the acts of Baguio City in relation to what is allowed under Article 1191.
Rescission under Article 1191 takes place through either of two modes: (1) through an extrajudicial declaration of rescission; or (2) upon the grant of a judicial decree of rescission.
Extrajudicial declaration of rescission is recognized as a power which does not require judicial intervention.150 If the rescission is not opposed, extrajudicial declaration of rescission produces legal effect151 such that the injured party is already relieved from performing the undertaking.152
However, the power of declaring extrajudicial rescission conferred upon the injured party is regulated by the Civil Code. If the extrajudicial rescission is impugned by the other party, it shall be subject to a judicial determination153 where court action must be taken, and the function of the court is to declare the rescission as having been properly or improperly made, or to give a period within which the debtor must perform the obligation alleged to be breached.154 A unilateral cancellation of a contract may be questioned in courts by the affected party to determine whether or not cancellation is warranted.155 Thus, in an extrajudicial decree of rescission, revocation cannot be completely exercised solely on a party’s own judgment that the other has committed a breach of the obligation156 but always subject to the right of the other party to judicially impugn such decision.
It is important to contextualize that the agreement entered into by the City of Baguio with Jadewell is the embodiment of a grant of franchise imbued with public interest and is not merely an agreement between two private parties.
It is our view that the first act of rescission by the City of Baguio may be valid even if there is a stipulation against it within the first five years of the MOA’s existence. Article 1191 of the New Civil Code provides a party the right to
rescind the agreement and clearly overrides any stipulation to the contrary. However, the grounds that would serve as basis to the application of the said article must be clearly established.
In the exercise of this option under Article 1191, was it necessary for the City of Baguio to provide Jadewell an opportunity to air its side on the matter before the former implemented the rescission of the MOA? In the instant case, was Jadewell deprived of procedural due process?
We answer in the negative. We disagree with the rulings of the RTC and the CA that Jadewell was deprived of due process. In Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v. The Board of Transportation,157 we confronted the issue of whether the petitioners were denied procedural due process when the respondent Board of Transportation issued a circular ordering the phasing out of old vehicles to be used as taxicabs. In the said case, the phase-out was embodied in a circular that was promulgated without holding a public hearing or at least requiring those affected to submit their position papers on the policy to be implemented. We held for the respondent Board, and ruled in this wise:
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):
Previous notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise.
In the instant case, the assailed act by the Sanggunian Panlungsod in rescinding the MOA – be it first or second act of rescission – was clearly in the exercise of its legislative or administrative functions and was not an exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. The Sanggunian Panlungsod does not possess any judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The preamble of the MOA lends support to this view. Evidently, the foremost reason why the agreement was entered into by the parties was to provide order, given Baguio City’s parking problems in identified areas, as well as to generate income.
The objectives of the Sanggunian Panlungsod, as well as its intention to rescind the MOA; because it deems to no longer serve the interest of the City of Baguio, are clearly an exercise of its legislative or administrative function. However, it is another matter as to whether the City of Baguio was able to clearly establish the grounds as basis for the exercise of its right to rescind.
c. On the allegation of Jadewell’s
substantial breach of the MOA.
The Baguio City government has repeatedly mentioned that Jadewell had so far installed only 14 parking meters, with only 12 functioning. The COA-CAR Report dated 13 July 2003 enumerated 12 findings,158 a majority of which indicates that Jadewell was remiss in the fulfilment of its obligations under the MOA. While Finding Nos. (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (8) and (12) of the COA-CAR Report state that Jadewell collected parking fees, Jadewell failed to properly remit the same. Finding No. (11) of the COA-CAR Report states that Jadewell failed to have its parking attendants deputized,159 a condition under the MOA that is also important to the overall objective of the endeavor.
The MOA does not specifically provide for the exact number of parking meters to be installed by Jadewell pursuant to the parties’ objective in regulating parking in the city. Nevertheless, 100 parking spaces were allotted as mentioned in Annex A of the MOA.160 The agreement also obligates Jadewell to have its parking attendants deputized by the DOTC-LTO so that they shall have the authority to enforce traffic rules and regulations in the regulated areas.161 To the Court’s mind, these are two of the most important obligations that Jadewell had to comply with, considering the nature and objective of the agreement it had entered into.
Despite the enumeration of the above-mentioned faults of Jadewell, we do not make a categorical finding that there was substantial breach committed by Jadewell to justify a unilateral rescission of the MOA. We find, however, that the RTC had not properly received evidence that would allow it to determine the extent of the claimed violations of the MOA. Had these violations by Jadewell been proven in a proper hearing, the finding of a substantial breach of the MOA would have been a distinct probability.
Unfortunately, neither the RTC nor the CA provided a clear basis for their rulings on the extent of the breach of the MOA by Jadewell. Save from reiterating the Sanggunian’s litany of violations said to be committed by Jadewell, there was no testimony on record to prove such facts and no indication as to whether the RTC or CA dismissed them or took them at face value.
Whatever the extent of breach of contract that Jadewell may have committed – and the enumeration of Jadewell’s alleged faults in Resolution 37 is quite extensive – the City of Baguio was still duty-bound to establish the alleged breach.
Matters became complicated when the RTC and the CA lumped the issues on the due process violation of Baguio City with Jadewell’s alleged substantial breaches under the MOA, instead of making a clear finding on the existence and extent of such breach. The facts and legal issues were thus muddled.
We find fault in the lower and appellate court’s lapse in examining the issue on Jadewell’s alleged substantial breach. Evidence-taking had to be undertaken by these
courts before they could arrive at a judicial conclusion on the presence of substantial breach.
We thus DENY the Petition of the Sanggunian Panlungsod in G.R. No. 160025 and AFFIRM the questioned CA Decision. However, we reject the ruling made by the appellate court that the violations of Jadewell under the MOA were not substantial. We hold that there is no sufficient evidence on record to make such determination.
While Jadewell prays for damages against the public respondent, and while ordinarily we could grant the same, the context of this case prevents us from giving any form of recompense to Jadewell even if the rescission of the MOA did not follow the required legal procedure. This is because it would be appalling to grant Jadewell any award of damages, considering (1) it installed only 14 out of the apparently 100 contemplated parking meters; (2) its employees, private citizens who did not possess any authority from the LTO, were manually collecting parking fees from the public, and (3) it did not, apparently properly remit any significant amount of money to the City of Baguio. These three facts are uncontested, these omissions are offensive to the concept of public service that the residents of Baguio were promised through Jadewell. From its ambiguous responses extant in the records, it is clear that Jadewell does not appear to be an investor who has lost in its investments in the Baguio City project. Thus, we do not award any damages to Jadewell.
2. On G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107,165564, 172216, 173043 and 174879(The Contempt Petitions)
Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure enumerates the acts constituting indirect contempt, thus:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.
The rule alerts us to three possible situations, wherein, in the context of the facts of these petitions, contumacious behaviour could have been committed by public respondents. First, disobedience or resistance to a lawful order of this Court under paragraph (b). Second, unlawful interference with the proceedings of this Court under paragraph (c). Third, improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impeded, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice by this Court under paragraph (d).
Jadewell, in G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, 165564, 172216, 173043, and 174879, bases its charges of indirect contempt against public respondents on a claim that any action that tends to stop the implementation of the MOA is contumacious. Such actions include desistance orders to desist against Jadewell itself, the second act of unilateral rescission of the MOA; orders to other public officers to prevent Jadewell from exercising its authority under the MOA; and the official encouragement for motorists to resist attempts of Jadewell to collect parking fees or clamp/tow vehicles that do not observe the parking regulations.
We find scant jurisprudence to guide us on this matter. The closest situation is that presented in Southern Broadcasting Network v. Davao Light and Power,162 penned by Justice Felix Makasiar. In that case, petitioner’s representative, Carmen Pacquing, wrote a letter to President Marcos asking for his intervention so that her Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the resolution of this Court denying her Petition could be favorably granted. Respondent Davao Light asked that petitioner Pacquing be cited for contempt, arguing that her act in writing to the President asking him to intervene in the case showed disrespect to and disregard for the authority of this Court as the final arbiter of all cases. We found petitioner Pacquing guilty of contempt, thus:
x x x. WE hold that such actuation of herein petitioner’s representative only bespeaks more of her contumacious attempt to trifle with the orderly administration of justice because if she know that this Court will ultimately decide the case "regardless of the President’s intervention," then she should have desisted from writing to the President.
In the light of the foregoing, there is no doubt that Mrs. Pacquing committed an "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice" (Section 3, par. [d] Rule 71, Rules of Court) and impair the respect due to the courts of justice in general, and the Supreme Court, in particular.
In the above case, respondent Carmen Pacquing was clearly asking the President to commit an improper act – to influence the Supreme Court – that obstructs the orderly administration of justice, as the Court is constitutionally required to act independently free from the promptings of the President. Pacquing clearly violated both Sections (c) and (d) of Section 3, Rule 71.
No such similar situation occurred here. Public respondents never asked anyone to employ pressure or influence on this Court for the former’s benefit.
Instead, the acts that have been allegedly committed by public respondents are acts done pursuant to their belief that: (a) the MOA has been validly voided, and more importantly, (b) that Jadewell’s personnel do not have the legal authority to perform the governmental function of administering the regulation of on-street and off-street parking, of towing or clamping vehicles that violate such regulation, and of collecting parking fees from motorists.
It is important to note that the Court never gave a mandatory injunction that is couched in a way that requires public respondents to fully comply with the terms of the MOA. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI) issued on 9 February 2005 is directed to Mayor Yaranon only, and it directs him to perform only one specific act: to reopen, and maintain open, the street and premises then being occupied and operated by Jadewell.
Mayor Yaranon did not immediately comply with this WPMI. Thus, this Court fined him P10,000 on 20 April 2005, and ordered the NBI to arrest him if he further failed to comply with the WPMI. Subsequently, Mayor Yaranon paid the fine, and there is nothing on record to show that he has, since April of 2005, further defied this Court on that score.
The Court did not issue a WPMI specifically ordering the parties to observe the terms of the MOA. Thus, public respondents were not expressly prohibited to act on their beliefs regarding the validity or invalidity of the MOA, or, the authority or lack of authority of Jadewell personnel to perform governmental functions in the streets of Baguio.
This is an important result, because to hold otherwise is to effectively grant one of the parties a mandatory injunction even without an express resolution to this effect from the Court. Without an express order, the pendency of a suit before the Supreme Court is not a prima facie entitlement of provisional relief to either party.
Public respondents therefore were, at liberty to question and inform the public of their belief regarding the lack of authority of Jadewell and its personnel to regulate public parking in Baguio. They were certainly free to formally write Jadewell on their beliefs and pass the corresponding resolutions to this effect. The mayor was also not under legal compulsion to renew Jadewell’s business permit in view of his opinion that Jadewell was exceeding its allowable area of operation, which Jadewell was not able to fully disprove. This is especially true for two important
reasons: (1) there is an uncontested cease and desist order that was issued by the DOTC-CAR on 13 March 2002 which Jadewell defied well into 2005, and (2) public respondents are city officials of Baguio who have the legal duty to ensure the laws are being followed, including laws that define who may enforce regulations on public parking.
That Jadewell personnel do not have the legal authority to enforce regulations on public parking is categorical from the Letter dated 1 February 2001 by the Regional Director of the DOTC-CAR denying the request of Jadewell for the deputation of its personnel.163
We therefore do not find any of the public respondents who were then officials of the City of Baguio, liable for indirect contempt, and thereby dismiss G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, 165564, 173043 and 174879. In G.R. 174879, we have already pronounced that the Sanggunian was within its full right to perform the second act of rescission, and thus, it is even with more reason, that its members and the City Legal Officer cannot be held in contempt therefor. We deny the prayer in the petitions to disbar the respondents therein who are lawyers.
We also do not find Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan liable for contempt in G.R. No. 172216.
Jadewell wants this Court to cite Judge Pamintuan for contempt for issuing a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction ordering Jadewell to stop collecting parking fees; to refrain from supervising the parking in Baguio City; as well as to hold in abeyance the implementation of the MOA and its enabling ordinance.164
It was only on 5 June 2006 that this Court, in G.R. No. 172215, issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)165 directing the trial court to discontinue the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6089-R. Upon receipt by Judge Pamintuan of the TRO, he immediately ordered the cancellation of the 29 June 2006 hearing.166
We do not consider the promulgation of the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction against Jadewell as a defiance of our writ issued on 9 February 2005, considering, it was directed against Mayor Yaranon only. We have held in Leonidas v. Supnet that "a party cannot be held in indirect contempt for disobeying a court order which is not addressed to him."167 We note that Judge Pamintuan observed deference to the Orders of this Court when he immediately suspended the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6089-R upon receipt of the TRO.
G.R. No. 172215
In this Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Jadewell assails the Orders of RTC-Branch 3 (Baguio City) denying its motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. 6089-R.
We deny the petition of Jadewell in this case.
In Manuel Camacho v. Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr.,168 we described the nature of special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as follows:
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an extraordinary remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. To invoke the Court’s power of judicial review under this Rule, it must first be shown that respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi- judicial functions has indeed acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Conversely, absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the acts of the respondents may not be subjected to our review under Rule 65.
In Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education,169 this Court ruled thus:
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts -- acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the court.
In East Asia Traders, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, et al.,170 we decreed:
The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals is not the proper remedy to assail the denial by the RTC of the motion to dismiss. The Order of the RTC denying the motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory. An interlocutory order does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. It is always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. This proceeds from the court’s inherent power to control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. The only limitation is that the judge cannot act with grave abuse of discretion, or that no injustice results thereby.
East Asia Trader also reiterated our ruling in Indiana Aerospace. Further, in Bonifacio Construction Management Corporation v. Hon. Perlas Bernabe,171 we reiterated our rulings in East Asia Traders and Indiana Aerospace. We had ruled in these earlier cases that an order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order, and to use a writ of certiorari to assail it is improper.
The procedural policy in the cited cases was again referred to in Bernas v. Sovereign Ventures, Inc.,172 highlighting the following:
Let it be stressed at this point the basic rule that when a motion to dismiss is denied by the trial court, the remedy is not to file a petition for certiorari, but to appeal after a decision has been rendered. (Emphasis supplied)
G.R. No. 181488
The question of law raised by petitioner Yaranon in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is whether the CA correctly dismissed his appeal questioning the validity of his suspension from office as City Mayor, on the ground that his suit had become moot and academic due to his non-re-election to office. The CA cited Crespo v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija173 as basis for the dismissal.
For his part, Mayor Yaranon contends that the appellate court should have ruled on the validity of his suspension from office despite his failure to get re-elected as City Mayor. He argues that he has the right to know whether his suspension was valid or not and, in the event his suspension is declared invalid, Mayor Yaranon believes he is entitled to the salaries and benefits accruing during the period he was suspended.
We deny the Petition of Mayor Yaranon.
The appeal of Mayor Yaranon has been rendered moot and academic. We hold that the resolution of the issue raised herein would serve no practical purpose.
In Miriam College v. Court of Appeals,174 we ruled that a case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties, or when no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Further, courts will not determine a moot question in which no practical relief can be granted.175
Mayor Yaranon has already served his suspension. We find no practical value in remanding his case to the appellate court for the determination of the factual basis and legal issues of his appeal pertaining to the validity of his suspension as then City Mayor of Baguio City.
We have held in Nicart, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division),176 that an issue becomes moot when a petitioner is not entitled to substantial relief:
x x x [T]he propriety of the preventive suspension of petitioner effected through the assailed Resolution of February 15, 2001 has become a moot issue, it appearing that he has already served his suspension. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy so that a determination thereof would be of no practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
We cannot sustain Mayor Yaranon’s argument that his appeal should not have been dismissed because, in the event that the finding of the Office of the President to suspend him is reversed, he is still entitled to the salaries accruing during the period he was suspended. We take note of the cases cited by Mayor Yaranon such as Crespo v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,177 Baquerfo v. Sanchez178 and Reyes v. Cristi,179 among others. These cases involve substantial issues – such as denial of due process and procedural irregularities – other than a mere claim for entitlement to salaries. The factual background and the legal issues for resolution in the cases mentioned are not similar to the case at bar.
In Triste v. Leyte State College Board of Trustees180 the Court elucidated on the nature of the salary of a public official:
Mechem states that "(l)ike the requirement of an oath, the fact of the payment of a salary and/or fees may aid in determining the nature of a position, but it is not conclusive, for while a salary or fees are usually annexed to the office, it is not necessarily so. As in the case of the oath, the salary or fees are mere incidents and form no part of the office. Where a salary or fees are annexed, the office is often said to be ‘coupled with an interest’; where neither is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good." (Emphasis supplied)
Given the circumstances of this case, we find that Mayor Yaranon’s claim for unpaid salaries, in case of exoneration, does not constitute such substantial relief that would justify the revival of his appeal. Even if we did sustain his Petition, we nevertheless find that it has been mooted by our resolution in the main petition.
WHEREFORE, we hereby rule as follows:
a.) In G.R. No. 160025, the Petition of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City is DENIED. The CA Decision dated 7 July 2003 in CA G.R. SP No. 74756 is hereby AFFIRMED with modification. There is not enough evidence on record to conclude that Jadewell’s violations were sufficient to justify the unilateral cancellation of the MOA by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City; at the same time, neither the RTC nor the CA provided a clear finding whether the breach of the MOA by Jadewell was substantial. We affirm the CA as to the rest of its dispositions in its assailed Decision. Nevertheless, no award of damages is hereby made in favour of Jadewell and neither is there any pronouncement as to costs.
b.) G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, 165564, 172216, 173043 and 174879, the Petitions of Jadewell to cite Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon, Mayor Bernardo M. Vergara, Acting City Mayor Reinaldo A. Bautista, Vice Mayor Betty Lourdes F. Tabanda, the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City namely: Elmer O. Datuin, Antonio R. Tabora, Edilberto B. Tenefrancia, Federico J. Mandapat, Jr., Richard A. Carino, Faustino A. Olowan, Rufino M. Panagan, Leonardo B. Yangot, Jr., Rocky
Thomas A. Balisong, Galo P. Weygan, Perlita L. Chan-Rondez, Jose M. Molintas, and Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan for indirect contempt and to disbar Sangguniang Panlungsod members Rocky Thomas A. Balisong, Edilberto B. Tenefrancia, Faustino A. Olowan, Federico J. Mandapat, Perlita L. Chan-Rondez, Jose M. Molintas, Melchor Carlos B. Rabanes and Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon are all hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
c.) We DENY the Petition of Jadewell for lack of merit in G.R. No. 172215. We likewise DENY its prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction for being moot and academic. No pronouncement as to costs.
d.) We DENY the Petition of Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon in G.R. No. 181488, for lack of merit and AFFIRM the CA Decision CA-G.R. SP No. 96116. No pronouncement as to costs.
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing G.R. No. 133640business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and style, MOTHER SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLES BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., doing business under the name and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA, M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN, doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD TRANSFUSION SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name and style, RECORD BLOOD BANK, in their individual capacities and for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS,Petitioners, - versus THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH,Respondent. x ------------------------------------------------ x
DOCTORS BLOOD CENTER, G.R. No. 133661Petitioner, - versus DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH.Respondent. x --------------------------------------------- x RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing G.R. No. 139147business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA BLOODBANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing Present:business under the name and style,MOTHER SEATON BLOOD BANK; DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,PEOPLES BLOOD BANK, INC.; PUNO,MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., PANGANIBAN,doing business under the name and QUISUMBING,style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; YNARES-SANTIAGO,JESUS M. GARCIA, M.D., doing SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,business under the name and style, CARPIO,HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,ALBERT L. LAPITAN, doing CORONA,business under the name and style, CARPIO-MORALES,BLUE CROSS BLOOD CALLEJO, SR.,TRANSFUSION SERVICES; AZCUNA,EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing TINGA,business under the name and style, CHIZO-NAZARIO,* andRECORD BLOOD BANK, in their GARCIA, JJ.Individual capacities and forand in behalf of PHILIPPINE Promulgated:ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS,
Petitioners, November 25, 2005- versus THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH,Respondent. x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION AZCUNA, J.: Before this Court are petitions assailing primarily the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the National Blood Services Act of 1994, and the validity of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. G.R. No. 133640,[1] entitled Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health and G.R. No. 133661,[2] entitled Doctors Blood Bank Center vs. Department of Health are petitions for certiorari and mandamus, respectively, seeking the annulment of the following: (1) Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719; and, (2) Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995. Both petitions likewise pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction enjoining the Secretary of Health from implementing and enforcing the aforementioned law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations; and, for a mandatory injunction ordering and commanding the Secretary of Health to grant, issue or renew petitioners license to operate free standing blood banks (FSBB). The above cases were consolidated in a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 2, 1998.[3] G.R. No. 139147,[4] entitled Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health, on the other hand, is a petition to show cause why respondent Secretary of Health should not be held in contempt of court.This case was originally assigned to the Third Division of this Court and later consolidated with G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661 in a resolution dated August 4, 1999.[5]Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a duly registered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks. Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official directly involved and charged with the enforcement and implementation of the law in question. The facts of the case are as follows:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide
an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).[6] Section 7 of R.A. 7719 [7] provides: Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary. Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides: Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.[8] Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the country have been arranged in four (4) categories: blood centers run by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), government-run blood services, private hospital blood banks, and commercial blood services. Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories. The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories. The Bureau of Research and Laboratories (BRL) was created in 1958 and was given the power to regulate clinical laboratories in 1966 under Republic Act No. 4688. In 1971, the Licensure Section was created within the BRL. It was given the duty to enforce the licensure requirements for blood banks as well as clinical laboratories. Due to this development, Administrative Order No. 156, Series of 1971, was issued. The new rules and regulations triggered a stricter enforcement of the Blood Banking Law, which was characterized by frequent spot checks, immediate suspension and communication of such suspensions to hospitals, a more systematic record-
keeping and frequent communication with blood banks through monthly information bulletins. Unfortunately, by the 1980s, financial difficulties constrained the BRL to reduce the frequency of its supervisory visits to the blood banks.[9] Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the safety of blood and blood products intensified when the dreaded disease Acute Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was first described in 1979. In 1980, the International Society of Blood Transfusion (ISBT) formulated the Code of Ethics for Blood Donation and Transfusion. In 1982, the first case of transfusion-associated AIDS was described in an infant. Hence, the ISBT drafted in 1984, a model for a national blood policy outlining certain principles that should be taken into consideration. By 1985, the ISBT had disseminated guidelines requiring AIDS testing of blood and blood products for transfusion.[10] In 1989, another revision of the Blood Banking Guidelines was made. The DOH issued Administrative Order No. 57, Series of 1989, which classified banks into primary, secondary and tertiary depending on the services they provided. The standards were adjusted according to this classification. For instance, floor area requirements varied according to classification level. The new guidelines likewise required Hepatitis B and HIV testing, and that the blood bank be headed by a pathologist or a hematologist.[11] In 1992, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 118-A institutionalizing the National Blood Services Program (NBSP). The BRL was designated as the central office primarily responsible for the NBSP. The program paved the way for the creation of a committee that will implement the policies of the program and the formation of the Regional Blood Councils. In August 1992, Senate Bill No. 1011, entitled An Act Promoting Voluntary Blood Donation, Providing for an Adequate Supply of Safe Blood, Regulating Blood Banks and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for other Purposes was introduced in the Senate.[12]Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, House Bills No. 384, 546, 780 and 1978 were being deliberated to address the issue of safety of the Philippine blood bank system. Subsequently, the Senate and House Bills were referred to the appropriate committees and subsequently consolidated.[13]In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood banking system entitled Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System. It was revealed that of the blood units collected in 1992, 64.4 % were supplied by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood banks. During the time the study was made, there were only twenty-four (24) registered or licensed free-standing or commercial blood
banks in the country. Hence, with these numbers in mind, the study deduced that each commercial blood bank produces five times more blood than the Red Cross and fifteen times more than the government-run blood banks. The study, therefore, showed that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources of blood. The study likewise revealed that 99.6% of the donors of commercial blood banks and 77.0% of the donors of private-hospital based blood banks are paid donors. Paid donors are those who receive remuneration for donating their blood. Blood donors of the PNRC and government-run hospitals, on the other hand, are mostly voluntary.[14] It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three times more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC.[15]Commercial blood banks give paid donors varying rates around P50 to P150, and because of this arrangement, many of these donors are poor, and often they are students, who need cash immediately. Since they need the money, these donors are not usually honest about their medical or social history. Thus, blood from healthy, voluntary donors who give their true medical and social history are about three times much safer than blood from paid donors.[16] What the study also found alarming is that many Filipino doctors are not yet fully trained on the specific indications for blood component transfusion. They are not aware of the lack of blood supply and do not feel the need to adjust their practices and use of blood and blood products. It also does not matter to them where the blood comes from.[17]On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of commercial blood banks took effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH. The phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Pursuant to said Act, all commercial blood banks should have been phased out by May 28, 1998. Hence, petitioners were granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses to open and operate a blood bank only until May 27, 1998. On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The case was entitled Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, docketed as G.R. No. 133640.
On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or status quo ante order.[18]In the aforementioned petition, petitioners assail the constitutionality of the questioned legal provisions, namely, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, on the following grounds: [19] 1. The questioned legal provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules violate the equal protection clause for irrationally discriminating against free standing blood banks in a manner which is not germane to the purpose of the law;2. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules represent undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the state; and, 3. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules are unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty. On May 22, 1998, the Doctors Blood Center filed a similar petition for mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction before this Court entitled Doctors Blood Center vs. Department of Health, docketed as G.R. No. 133661. [20] This was consolidated with G.R. No. 133640.[21] Similarly, the petition attacked the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules and regulations, thus, praying for the issuance of a license to operate commercial blood banks beyond May 27, 1998. Specifically, with regard to Republic Act No. 7719, the petition submitted the following questions[22] for resolution: 1. Was it passed in the exercise of police power, and was it a valid exercise of such power? 2. Does it not amount to deprivation of property without due process? 3. Does it not unlawfully impair the obligation of contracts? 4. With the commercial blood banks being abolished and with no ready machinery to deliver the same supply and services, does R.A. 7719 truly serve the public welfare? On June 2, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution directing respondent DOH to file a consolidated comment. In the same Resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) for respondent to cease and desist from implementing and enforcing Section 7 of Republic Act No.
7719 and its implementing rules and regulations until further orders from the Court.[23] On August 26, 1998, respondent Secretary of Health filed a Consolidated Comment on the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, with opposition to the issuance of a temporary restraining order.[24] In the Consolidated Comment, respondent Secretary of Health submitted that blood from commercial blood banks is unsafe and therefore the State, in the exercise of its police power, can close down commercial blood banks to protect the public. He cited the record of deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1101 which later became Republic Act No. 7719, and the sponsorship speech of Senator Orlando Mercado. The rationale for the closure of these commercial blood banks can be found in the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 1011, excerpts of which are quoted below: Senator Mercado: I am providing over a period of two years to phase out all commercial blood banks. So that in the end, the new section would have a provision that states: ALL COMMERCIAL BLOOD BANKS SHALL BE PHASED OUT OVER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT. BLOOD SHALL BE COLLECTED FROM VOLUNTARY DONORS ONLY AND THE SERVICE FEE TO BE CHARGED FOR EVERY BLOOD PRODUCT ISSUED SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE NECESSARY EXPENSES ENTAILED IN COLLECTING AND PROCESSING OF BLOOD. THE SERVICE FEE SHALL BE MADE UNIFORM THROUGH GUIDELINES TO BE SET BY THE DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH.I am supporting Mr. President, the finding of a study called Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System. This has been taken note of. This is a study done with the assistance of the USAID by doctors under the New Tropical Medicine Foundation in Alabang.Part of the long-term measures proposed by this particular study is to improve laws, outlaw buying and selling of blood and legally define good manufacturing processes for blood. This goes to the very heart of my amendment which seeks to put into law the principle that blood should not be subject of commerce of man.The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: What does the sponsor say?Senator Webb: Mr. President, just for clarity, I would like to find out how the Gentleman defines a commercial blood bank. I am at a loss at times what a commercial blood bank really is.Senator Mercado: We have a definition, I believe, in the measure, Mr. President.The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: It is a business where profit is considered. Senator Mercado: If the Chairman of the Committee would accept it, we can put a provision on Section 3, a definition of a commercial blood bank, which, as defined in this law,
exists for profit and engages in the buying and selling of blood or its components. Senator Webb: That is a good description, Mr. President. Senator Mercado: I refer, Mr. President, to a letter written by Dr. Jaime Galvez-Tan, the Chief of Staff, Undersecretary of Health, to the good Chairperson of the Committee on Health.In recommendation No. 4, he says:The need to phase out all commercial blood banks within a two-year period will give the Department of Health enough time to build up governments capability to provide an adequate supply of blood for the needs of the nation...the use of blood for transfusion is a medical service and not a sale of commodity.Taking into consideration the experience of the National Kidney Institute, which has succeeded in making the hospital 100 percent dependent on voluntary blood donation, here is a success story of a hospital that does not buy blood. All those who are operated on and need blood have to convince their relatives or have to get volunteers who would donate bloodIf we give the responsibility of the testing of blood to those commercial blood banks, they will cut corners because it will protect their profit.In the first place, the people who sell their blood are the people who are normally in the high-risk category. So we should stop the system of selling and buying blood so that we can go into a national voluntary blood program.It has been said here in this report, and I quote:Why is buying and selling of blood not safe? This is not safe because a donor who expects payment for his blood will not tell the truth about his illnesses and will deny any risky social behavior such as sexual promiscuity which increases the risk of having syphilis or AIDS or abuse of intravenous addictive drugs. Laboratory tests are of limited value and will not detect early infections. Laboratory tests are required only for four diseases in the Philippines. There are other blood transmissible diseases we do not yet screen for and there could be others where there are no tests available yet.A blood bank owner expecting to gain profit from selling blood will also try his best to limit his expenses. Usually he tries to increase his profit by buying cheaper reagents or test kits, hiring cheaper manpower or skipping some tests altogether. He may also try to sell blood even though these have infections in them. Because there is no existing system of counterchecking these, the blood bank owner can usually get away with many unethical practices.The experience of Germany, Mr. President is illustrative of this issue. The reason why contaminated blood was sold was that there were corners cut by commercial blood banks in the testing process. They were protecting their profits.[25] The sponsorship speech of Senator Mercado further elucidated his stand on the issue: Senator Mercado: Today, across the country, hundreds of poverty-stricken, sickly and weak Filipinos, who,
unemployed, without hope and without money to buy the next meal, will walk into a commercial blood bank, extend their arms and plead that their blood be bought. They will lie about their age, their medical history. They will lie about when they last sold their blood. For doing this, they will receive close to a hundred pesos. This may tide them over for the next few days. Of course, until the next bloodletting. This same blood will travel to the posh city hospitals and urbane medical centers. This same blood will now be bought by the rich at a price over 500% of the value for which it was sold. Between this buying and selling, obviously, someone has made a very fast buck. Every doctor has handled at least one transfusion-related disease in an otherwise normal patient. Patients come in for minor surgery of the hand or whatever and they leave with hepatitis B. A patient comes in for an appendectomy and he leaves with malaria. The worst nightmare: A patient comes in for a Caesarian section and leaves with AIDS. We do not expect good blood from donors who sell their blood because of poverty. The humane dimension of blood transfusion is not in the act of receiving blood, but in the act of giving it For years, our people have been at the mercy of commercial blood banks that lobby their interests among medical technologists, hospital administrators and sometimes even physicians so that a proactive system for collection of blood from healthy donors becomes difficult, tedious and unrewarding. The Department of Health has never institutionalized a comprehensive national program for safe blood and for voluntary blood donation even if this is a serious public health concern and has fallen for the linen of commercial blood bankers, hook, line and sinker because it is more convenient to tell the patient to buy blood. Commercial blood banks hold us hostage to their threat that if we are to close them down, there will be no blood supply. This is true if the Government does not step in to ensure that safe supply of blood. We cannot allow commercial interest groups to dictate policy on what is and what should be a humanitarian effort. This cannot and will never work because their interest in blood donation is merely monetary. We cannot expect commercial blood banks to take the lead in voluntary blood donation. Only the Government can do it, and the Government must do it.[26]On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Expanded Temporary Restraining Order for the Court to order respondent Secretary of Health to cease and desist from announcing the closure of commercial blood banks, compelling the public to source the needed blood from voluntary donors only, and committing similar acts that will ultimately cause the shutdown of petitioners blood banks.[27]
On July 8, 1999, respondent Secretary filed his Comment and/or Opposition to the above motion stating that he has not ordered the closure of commercial blood banks on account of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued on June 2, 1998 by the Court. In compliance with the TRO, DOH had likewise ceased to distribute the health advisory leaflets, posters and flyers to the public which state that blood banks are closed or will be closed. According to respondent Secretary, the same were printed and circulated in anticipation of the closure of the commercial blood banks in accordance with R.A. No. 7719, and were printed and circulated prior to the issuance of the TRO.[28] On July 15, 1999, petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 filed a Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should Not be Held in Contempt of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 139147, citing public respondents willful disobedience of or resistance to the restraining order issued by the Court in the said case. Petitioners alleged that respondents act constitutes circumvention of the temporary restraining order and a mockery of the authority of the Court and the orderly administration of justice.[29] Petitioners added that despite the issuance of the temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 133640, respondent, in his effort to strike down the existence of commercial blood banks, disseminated misleading information under the guise of health advisories, press releases, leaflets, brochures and flyers stating, among others, that this year [1998] all commercial blood banks will be closed by 27 May. Those who need blood will have to rely on government blood banks.[30] Petitioners further claimed that respondent Secretary of Health announced in a press conference during the Blood Donors Week that commercial blood banks are illegal and dangerous and that they are at the moment protected by a restraining order on the basis that their commercial interest is more important than the lives of the people. These were all posted in bulletin boards and other conspicuous places in all government hospitals as well as other medical and health centers.[31] In respondent Secretarys Comment to the Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should Not Be Held in Contempt of Court, dated January 3, 2000, it was explained that nothing was issued by the department ordering the closure of commercial blood banks. The subject health advisory leaflets pertaining to said closure pursuant to Republic Act No. 7719 were printed and circulated prior to the Courts issuance of a temporary restraining order on June 21, 1998.[32]Public respondent further claimed that the primary purpose of the information campaign was to promote the importance and safety of voluntary blood donation and to educate the public about the hazards of patronizing blood supplies from commercial blood banks.[33] In doing so, he was merely performing his regular functions and duties as the Secretary of Health to protect the health and welfare of the public. Moreover, the DOH is the main proponent of the voluntary blood donation program espoused by Republic Act No. 7719, particularly Section 4 thereof which provides that, in order to ensure the adequate supply of human blood, voluntary blood donation shall be
promoted through public education, promotion in schools, professional education, establishment of blood services network, and walking blood donors.Hence, by authority of the law, respondent Secretary contends that he has the duty to promote the program of voluntary blood donation. Certainly, his act of encouraging the public to donate blood voluntarily and educating the people on the risks associated with blood coming from a paid donor promotes general health and welfare and which should be given more importance than the commercial businesses of petitioners.[34] On July 29, 1999, interposing personal and substantial interest in the case as taxpayers and citizens, a Petition-in-Intervention was filed interjecting the same arguments and issues as laid down by petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661, namely, the unconstitutionality of the Acts, and, the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction. The intervenors are the immediate relatives of individuals who had died allegedly because of shortage of blood supply at a critical time.[35]The intervenors contended that Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers and unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty.[36]In a resolution, dated September 7, 1999, and without giving due course to the aforementioned petition, the Court granted the Motion for Intervention that was filed by the above intervenors on August 9, 1999. In his Comment to the petition-in-intervention, respondent Secretary of Health stated that the sale of blood is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Act that blood donation is a humanitarian act and blood transfusion is a professional medical service and not a sale of commodity (Section 2[a] and [b] of Republic Act No. 7719). The act of selling blood or charging fees other than those allowed by law is even penalized under Section 12.[37] Thus, in view of these, the Court is now tasked to pass upon the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.In resolving the controversy, this Court deems it necessary to address the issues and/or questions raised by petitioners concerning the constitutionality of the aforesaid Act in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661 as summarized hereunder: IWHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; IIWHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; IIIWHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE;
IVWHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS CONSTITUTE DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY; VWHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; and, VIWHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS TRULY SERVE PUBLIC WELFARE. As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the Act is being challenged, it is the contention of petitioners that the phase out of commercial or free standing blood banks is unconstitutional because it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension period that may be granted by the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power.In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature.[38] Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.[39]Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.[40] The Secretary of Health has been given, under
Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. Section 11 of the Act states: SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations. The implementation of the provisions of the Act shall be in accordance with the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary, within sixty (60) days from the approval hereof This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH, by virtue of the administrative bodys authority and expertise in the matter, came out with Administrative Order No.9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. Administrative Order. No. 9 effectively filled in the details of the law for its proper implementation. Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety. This power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.[41] In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when said phase-out period was extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2 thereof:SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy In order to promote public health, it is hereby declared the policy of the state: a) to promote and encourage voluntary blood donation by the citizenry and to instill public consciousness of the principle that blood donation is a humanitarian act; b) to lay down the legal principle that the provision of blood for transfusion is a medical service and not a sale of commodity;c) to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and equitable distribution of blood supply and blood products; d) to inform the public of the need for voluntary blood donation to curb the hazards caused by the commercial sale of blood; e) to teach the benefits and rationale of voluntary blood donation in the existing health subjects of the formal education system in all public and private schools as well as the non-formal system;
f) to mobilize all sectors of the community to participate in mechanisms for voluntary and non-profit collection of blood; g) to mandate the Department of Health to establish and organize a National Blood Transfusion Service Network in order to rationalize and improve the provision of adequate and safe supply of blood; h) to provide for adequate assistance to institutions promoting voluntary blood donation and providing non-profit blood services, either through a system of reimbursement for costs from patients who can afford to pay, or donations from governmental and non-governmental entities; i) to require all blood collection units and blood banks/centers to operate on a non-profit basis; j) to establish scientific and professional standards for the operation of blood collection units and blood banks/centers in the Philippines; k) to regulate and ensure the safety of all activities related to the collection, storage and banking of blood; and, l) to require upgrading of blood banks/centers to include preventive services and education to control spread of blood transfusion transmissible diseases. Petitioners also assert that the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution because it unduly discriminates against commercial or free standing blood banks in a manner that is not germane to the purpose of the law.[42] What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.[43]Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the promotion of public health and welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, it was revealed that the Philippine blood banking system is disturbingly primitive and unsafe, and with its current condition, the spread of infectious diseases such as malaria, AIDS, Hepatitis B and syphilis chiefly from blood transfusion is unavoidable. The situation becomes more distressing as the study showed that almost 70% of the blood supply in the country is sourced from paid blood donors who are three times riskier than voluntary blood donors because
they are unlikely to disclose their medical or social history during the blood screening.[44]The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No. 7719, to instill public consciousness of the importance and benefits of voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply and proper blood collection from healthy donors. To do this, the Legislature decided to order the phase out of commercial blood banks to improve the Philippine blood banking system, to regulate the supply and proper collection of safe blood, and so as not to derail the implementation of the voluntary blood donation program of the government. In lieu of commercial blood banks, non-profit blood banks or blood centers, in strict adherence to professional and scientific standards to be established by the DOH, shall be set in place.[45]Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/centers and commercial blood banks. We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons:One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity.Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system.Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions.Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to whether or not Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes a valid exercise of police power.The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the States police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.[46]In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of the law for the protection of public health by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective requires the interference of the State given the disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking system.In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. This action may seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public. The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the States police power. Therefore, the Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is both necessary and reasonable for the common good. Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.[47]It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues raised by petitioners, namely, deprivation of personal liberty and property, and violation of the non-impairment clause, to be unmeritorious.Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional and void because it infringes on the freedom of choice of an individual in connection to what he wants to do with his blood which should be outside the domain of State intervention. Additionally, and in relation to the issue of classification, petitioners asseverate that, indeed, under the Civil Code, the human body and its organs like the heart, the kidney and the liver are outside the commerce of man but this cannot be made to apply to human blood because the latter can be replenished by the body. To treat human blood equally as the human organs would constitute invalid classification. [48]Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the commercial blood banks will be disadvantageous to them as it will affect their businesses and existing contracts with hospitals and other health institutions, hence Section 7 of the Act should be struck down because it violates the non-impairment clause provided by the Constitution.As stated above, the State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated.[49] Moreover, in the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,[50] settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. The right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the States power of regulation. While the Court understands the grave implications of Section 7 of the law in question, the concern of the Government in this
case, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of government regulation.Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.[51] This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court of Agrarian Relations[52] where the Court held that individual rights to contract and to property have to give way to police power exercised for public welfare. As for determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will truly serve the general public considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as proffered by petitioners, we maintain that the wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be inquired into by the Court. Doing so would be in derogation of the principle of separation of powers.[53] That, under the circumstances, proper regulation of all blood banks without distinction in order to achieve the objective of the law as contended by petitioners is, of course, possible; but, this would be arguing on what the law may be or should be and not what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for this Court to pass upon.[54] Finally, with regard to the petition for contempt in G.R. No. 139147, on the other hand, the Court finds respondent Secretary of Healths explanation satisfactory. The statements in the flyers and posters were not aimed at influencing or threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the law. Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the court.[55] There is nothing contemptuous about the statements and information contained in the health advisory that were distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by this Court ordering the former to cease and desist from distributing the same. In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.[56] Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail.
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine.[57] WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment as follows: 1. In G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, the Court UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the National Blood Services Act of 1994, and Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. The petitions are DISMISSED. Consequently, the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on June 2, 1998, is LIFTED. 2. In G.R. No. 139147, the petition seeking to cite the Secretary of Health in contempt of court is DENIED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 197293 April 21, 2014
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole function of the. prosecutor, the trial court may, in the protection of one's fundamental right to liberty, dismiss the case if, upon a personal assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals' decision2 dated January 14, 2011, which reversed the Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the complaint against petitioner Alfredo C. Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa.
This case stems from a complaint-affidavit filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its representative, Raul C. Evangelista, on January 8, 2008 for qualified theft and estafa against Alfredo.3
In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged that on June 2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. On November 19, 2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia, conducted a partial audit of the used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without Rolando’s or the finance manager’s permission.4
The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the payments totalling P886,000.00. It was further alleged that while there were 20 cars under Alfredo’s custody, only 18 were accounted for. Further investigation revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the files of a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged that taking into account the unremitted amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of P1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and damage.5
In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among others, Juno Cars’ supposed failure to prove ownership over the five (5) cars or its right to possess them with the purported unremitted payments. Hence, it could not have suffered damage.6
On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a Resolution7 finding probable cause and recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.8 He then filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice on May 16, 2008.9
While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft10 and estafa11 were filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City. On March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for determination of probable cause12 before the trial court. On April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to defer arraignment.
Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not conducted.13 On February 4, 2009, the parties agreed to submit all pending incidents, including the clarificatory hearing, for resolution.14
On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali, issued an order15 dismissing the complaint, stating that:
After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on record which includes the assailed Resolution dated 04 March 2008, the court holds that the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. x x x.16
Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on July 3, 2009.17
Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the complaint. It argued that "the determination of probable cause and the decision whether or not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor."18
On January 14, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,19 reversed the trial court, and reinstated the case. In its decision, the appellate court ruled that the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction "in supplanting the public prosecutor’s findings of probable cause with her own findings of insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable cause."20
Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before this court. In essence, he argued that the trial court was correct in finding that there was no probable cause as shown by the evidence on record. He argued that "judicial determination of probable cause is broader than [the] executive determination of probable cause"21 and that "[i]t is not correct to say that the determination of probable cause is exclusively vested on the prosecutor x x x."22
In its comment,23 Juno Cars argued that Alfredo presented questions, issues, and arguments that were a mere rehash of those already considered and passed upon by the appellate court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent, stated in its comment24 that the appellate court correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his findings of probable cause against Alfredo. Since there
was no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado, the trial court should respect his determination of probable cause.
In his reply,25 Alfredo reiterated that "judicial determination of probable cause[,] while not a superior faculty[,] covers a broader encompassing perspective in the disposition of the issue on the existence of probable cause."26 He argued that the findings of the trial court should be accorded greater weight than the appellate court’s. It merely reviewed the findings of the trial court.
The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.
Time and again, this court has been confronted with the issue of the difference between the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor on one hand and the determination of probable cause by the judge on the other. We examine these two concepts again.
Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified theft27 and estafa under Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c)28 of the Revised Penal Code. Since qualified theft is punishable by reclusion perpetua, a preliminary investigation must first be conducted "to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial," in accordance with Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor.29 If upon evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of the information with the court.
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence"30 to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,31 this court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of
probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.32
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. In People v. Inting:33
x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial—is the function of the Prosecutor.34 (Emphasis supplied)
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding.
People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo35 discussed the rationale. In that case, Jonathan Cerbo allegedly shot Rosalinda Dy in the presence of his father, Billy Cerbo. An information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo. The daughter of Rosalinda Dy, as private complainant, executed a complaint-affidavit charging Billy Cerbo with conspiracy. The prosecutor then filed a motion to amend the information, which was granted by the court. The information was then amended to include Billy Cerbo as one of the accused, and a warrant of arrest was issued against him.
Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant arguing that it was issued without probable cause. The trial court granted this motion, recalled the warrant, and dismissed the case against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal. This court, however, reversed the Court of
Appeals and ordered the reinstatement of the amended information against Billy Cerbo, stating that:
In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case or the guilt or innocence of Private Respondent Billy Cerbo. We are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for ‘want of evidence,’ because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in "the proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should be clearly understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an "oppressive" exercise of government prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so require. But just as we recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a public prosecutor’s duties, courts ought to refrain from interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the public prosecutor’s finding of probable cause, the accused can appeal such finding to the justice secretary and move for the deferment or suspension of the proceedings until such appeal is resolved.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado found that the facts and evidence were "sufficient to warrant the indictment of [petitioner] x x x."37 There was nothing in his resolution which showed that he issued it beyond the discretion granted to him by law and jurisprudence.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali still had the discretion to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with trial.
Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served. Absent this, the court cannot hold the accused for arraignment and trial.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the judge has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase "upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" allows a determination of probable cause by the judge ex parte.
For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates the judge to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to establish probable cause." Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 reads:
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.
In People v. Hon. Yadao:38
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory.1âwphi1 The court’s first option under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.39 (Emphasis supplied)
It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court."40
In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence on record and concluded that "the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa."41 Specifically, she found that Juno Cars "failed to prove by competent evidence"42 that the vehicles alleged to have been pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully possessed
or owned by them, or that these vehicles were received by Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the charge of qualified theft. She also found that the complaint "[did] not state with particularity the exact value of the alleged office files or their valuation purportedly have been removed, concealed or destroyed by the accused,"43 which she found crucial to the prosecution of the crime of estafa under Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c) of the Revised Penal Code. She also noted that:
x x x As a matter of fact, this court had even ordered that this case be set for clarificatory hearing to clear out essential matters pertinent to the offense charged and even directed the private complainant to bring documents relative to the same/payment as well as affidavit of witnesses/buyers with the end view of satisfying itself that indeed probable cause exists to commit the present case which private complainant failed to do.44
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco-Umali correctly dismissed the case against Alfredo.
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. MC08-11604-05 against Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee, v. VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
The mantle of protection upon one’s person and one’s effects through Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of their right to privacy. The alleged compromise with the battle against dangerous drugs is more apparent than real. Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers neglect to perform what could have been done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this scourge of society.
Squarely raised in this appeal1 is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a warrantless arrest. The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that were not based on their personal knowledge. The information as to the accused’s whereabouts was sent through a text message. The accused who never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly contained the contraband was required to be opened under intimidating circumstances and without the accused having been fully apprised of his rights.
This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of the Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate “stop and frisk” action. The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly, and without improper pressure or coercion.
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent with Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no possible admissible evidence, the accused should be acquitted.
I
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel, La Union, “received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer”2 that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) “[would] be transporting marijuana”3 from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.4cralawred
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order “to intercept the suspect.”5 PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.6cralawred
A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint.7 The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified as Victor Romana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao.9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.10cralawred
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags.11 Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomate named Marvin.12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana.13 Cogaed then muttered, “nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoy met gayam ti nagyanna,” which translates to “Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag.”14 “SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police station.”15 Cogaed and Dayao “were still carrying their respective bags”16 inside the station.17cralawred
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.18 Inside Cogaed’s sack was “four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,”19 and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.20cralawred
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing.21 PSI Bayan personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory.22 Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects obtained were indeed marijuana.23 The marijuana collected from Cogaed’s blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5 grams.24 The marijuana from Cogaed’s sack weighed 4,246.1 grams.25 The marijuana collected from Dayao’s bag weighed 5,092 grams.26 A total of 17,429.6 grams were collected from Cogaed’s and Dayao’s bags.27cralawred
According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, “waiting for a jeepney to take him”28 to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide.29 He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger brother’s friend.30 Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney.31 Dayao allegedly “asked for [Cogaed’s] help in carrying his things, which included a travelling bag and a sack.”32 Cogaed agreed because they were both going to the market.33 This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not know.34 SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation.35 Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police station.36 These facts were corroborated by an eyewitness, Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across
the parking lot where Cogaed was apprehended.37cralawred
At the police station, Cogaed said that “SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head.”38 The bags were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside.39cralawred
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165.40 The information against them states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN DOE, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in their control, custody and possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of seventeen thousand, four hundred twenty-nine and six-tenths (17, 429.6) grams.
CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”).41
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La Union.42 Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty.43 The case was dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt from criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344.44 Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a decision45 dated May 21, 2008, the Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”) and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).46chanrobleslaw
The trial court judge initially found Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that “Cogaed at that time was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that he was about to do so or that had just done so. He just alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.”47 Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should also be considered illegal.48 However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed “waived his right to object to such irregularity” 49 when “he did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag.”50cralawred
Cogaed appealed51 the trial court’s decision. However, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.52 The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against warrantless searches when “[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his bag.”53 Hence, this appeal was filed.
The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellant’s brief:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.54
For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and (3) whether there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to the requirements on the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.55cralawred
We find for the accused.
II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches and seizures are “reasonable.” As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.56 The existence of probable cause must be established by the judge after asking searching questions and answers.57 Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and the things to be searched.58cralawred
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless.59 In the Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant.60 This court has taken into account the “uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.”61 The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest . . . ;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” . . . ;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Exigent and emergency circumstances.62 (Citations omitted)
III
One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is “stop and frisk”. “Stop and frisk” searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under
the Rules of Court.63 Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.64cralawred
On the other hand, “stop and frisk” searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals65 was similar “to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information.”66 This court stated that the “stop and frisk” search should be used “[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant.”67cralawred
The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches68) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were initially informed about a place frequented by people abusing drugs.70 When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a man with “reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying manner.”71 The suspicion increased when the man avoided the police officers.72 These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on drugs.73 These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers “to stop [the] petitioner [and] investigate.”74cralawred
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk.76 This man was also “wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.”77 Upon seeing the police, the man fled.78 His flight added to the suspicion.79 After stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed “homemade firearm”80 in his possession.81 This court ruled that “[u]nder the circumstances, the
government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first.”82 This was also a valid search.
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was “suspicious.”
This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
COURT:QSo you don’t know what was the content while it was still being carried by him in the passenger jeep?WITNESS:ANot yet, Your Honor.83
COURT:QIf the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have reason to believe that the accused were carrying marijuana?WITNESS:ANo, Your Honor.84
The jeepney driver had to point to Cogaed. He would not have been identified by the police officers otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched.85 Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.
IV
Normally, “stop and frisk” searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals,86 one of the earliest cases adopting the “stop and frisk” doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.87 (Emphasis supplied)chanrobleslaw
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as “a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.”88cralawred
Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion.90 It has to be a “genuine reason”91to serve the purposes of the “stop and frisk” exception:92cralawred
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a “stop and frisk,” it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop and frisk.” A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance.95 There should be “presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity.”96 The Constitution prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.”97 Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search.98cralawred
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
V
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is compliance with the “genuine reason” requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[A] “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.99 (Emphasis supplied)
The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.100 As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows “stop and frisk” for cases involving dangerous drugs.
The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta.102 In that case, an informant told the police that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus.103 At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves.104 The informant pointed at a woman crossing the street105 and identified her as “Aling Rosa.”106 The police apprehended “Aling Rosa,” and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag.107 The bag contained marijuana leaves.108cralawred
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal.109 There were no suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest and the subsequent search and seizure.110 It was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her.111 The evidence obtained was not admissible because of the illegal search.112 Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.113cralawred
Aruta is almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the police’s informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was “suspicious.”
The facts in Aruta are also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin.114 Here, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs.115 The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat.116 Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin’s bag and found bundles of what turned out to be marijuana leaves.117 The court declared that the search and seizure was illegal.118 Aminnudin was acquitted.119cralawred
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had been receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in “different karaoke bars in Angeles City.”121 One night, the police received information that this drug dealer would be dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout.122 A car “arrived and parked”123 at the hotel.124 The informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs.125 The man alighted from his car.126 He was carrying a juice box.127 The police immediately apprehended him and discovered
live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was holding.128cralawred
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua’s situation when the police apprehended him and ruled that “[t]here was no valid ‘stop-and-frisk’.”129cralawred
VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be admissible. The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;(b)When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and(c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made.
At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, “two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.”130 Both elements were missing when Cogaed was arrested.131 There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
VII
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.132 (Citations omitted)chanrobleslaw
Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be discerned again from the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ATTY. BINWAG:QNow, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the contents of their bags, is it not?WITNESS:AYes, ma’am.QAnd then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it not?AYes, ma’am.QSo that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?ANone, ma’am.QNow, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the contents of the bag, you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?AIt seems they were frightened, ma’am.QBut you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in opening the bags, is it not?AYes, ma’am but when I went near them it seems that they were surprised.133 (Emphasis supplied)
The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatac’s responses to Judge Florendo’s questions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
COURT:. . . .QDid you have eye contact with Cogaed?AWhen I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he was somewhat frightened. He was a little apprehensive and when he was already stepping down and he put down the bag I asked him, “what’s that,” and he answered, “I don’t know because Marvin only asked me to carry.”134
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer. The police officer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be an assurance given to the police officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
VIII
The Constitution provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.135
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno.136 This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.”137 It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourge to our society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties better. However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we will be seen as slowly dismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to protect.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama, Jr.,* and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
O R D E R O F R E L E A S E
TO: The Director Bureau of Corrections 1770 Muntinlupa City
G R E E T I N G S:
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court on July 30, 2014 promulgated a Decision in the above-entitled case, the dispositive portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is held for some other legal ground. No costs.
SO ORDERED."
ELENITA C. FAJARDO,Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent. G.R. No. 190889 Present: CARPIO, J.,Chairperson,NACHURA,PERALTA,ABAD, andMENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: January 10, 2011 x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION NACHURA, J.: At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the February 10, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the August 29, 2006 decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, finding petitioner guilty of violating Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended.
The facts: Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended, before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, committed as follows: That on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in the morning, in Barangay Andagao, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, permit or license, did then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in their possession, custody and control two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial number, two (2) pieces short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition, which items were confiscated and recovered from their possession during a search conducted by members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operation Group, Aklan Police Provincial Office, Kalibo, Aklan, by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 issued by OIC Executive Judge Dean Telan of the Regional Trial Court of Aklan.[3] When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[4] During pre-trial, they agreed to the following stipulation of facts: 1. The search warrant subject of this case exists; 2. Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same person subject of the search warrant in this case who is a resident of Sampaguita Road, Park Homes, Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan; 3. Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of Elenita Fajardo in the evening of August 27, 2002 but does not live therein; 4. Both accused were not duly licensed firearm holders; 5. The search warrant was served in the house of accused Elenita Fajardo in the morning of August 28, 2002; and 6. The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio were not arrested immediately upon the arrival of the military personnel despite the fact that the latter allegedly saw them in possession of a firearm in the evening of August 27, 2002.[5] As culled from the similar factual findings of the RTC and the CA,[6] these are the chain of events that led to the filing of the information: In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operations Group (PISOG) were instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of concerned citizens residing on Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision, Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at the residence of petitioner were indiscriminately firing guns. Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial Office, the elements of the PISOG proceeded to the area. Upon arrival thereat, they noticed that several persons scampered and ran in different directions. The responding team saw Valerio holding two .45 caliber pistols. He fired shots at the policemen before entering the house of petitioner.
Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and the waistband of her shorts, after which, she entered the house and locked the main door.To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted from entering petitioners house but, in order to deter Valerio from evading apprehension, they cordoned the perimeter of the house as they waited for further instructions from P/Supt. Mendoza. A few minutes later, petitioner went out of the house and negotiated for the pull-out of the police troops. No agreement materialized. At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio Nava (SPO2 Nava), who was posted at the back portion of the house, saw Valerio emerge twice on top of the house and throw something. The discarded objects landed near the wall of petitioners house and inside the compound of a neighboring residence. SPO2 Nava, together with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega), radio announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as witness, recovered the discarded objects, which turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with serial number (SN) 763025, and model no. M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number. The recovered items were then surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1 Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them in applying for and obtaining a search warrant. The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with a barangay captain, barangay kagawad, and members of the media, as witnesses, the police team proceeded to search petitioners house. The team found and was able to confiscate the following: 1. Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle;2. Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and3. Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol. Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority to possess the confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal information for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against them. For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance of the search warrant was defective because the allegation contained in the application filed and signed by SPO1 Tan was not based on his personal knowledge. They quoted this pertinent portion of the application: That this application was founded on confidential information received by the Provincial Director, Police Supt. Edgardo Mendoza.[7] They further asserted that the execution of the search warrant was infirm since petitioner, who was inside the house at the time of the search, was not asked to
accompany the policemen as they explored the place, but was instead ordered to remain in the living room (sala). Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to sign the inventory/receipt prepared by the raiding team, because the items allegedly belonged to her brother, Benito Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the Philippine Army.Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol tucked in her waistband when the raiding team arrived. She averred that such situation was implausible because she was wearing garterized shorts and a spaghetti-strapped hanging blouse.[8]
Ruling of the RTCThe RTC rejected the defenses advanced by accused, holding that the same were already denied in the Orders dated December 31, 2002 and April 20, 2005, respectively denying the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Demurrer to Evidence. The said Orders were not appealed and have thus attained finality. The RTC also ruled that petitioner and Valerio were estopped from assailing the legality of their arrest since they participated in the trial by presenting evidence for their defense. Likewise, by applying for bail, they have effectively waived such irregularities and defects. In finding the accused liable for illegal possession of firearms, the RTC explained: Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita Fajardo, is a former soldier, having served with the Philippine Army prior to his separation from his service for going on absence without leave (AWOL). With his military background, it is safe to conclude that Zaldy Valerio is familiar with and knowledgeable about different types of firearms and ammunitions. As a former soldier, undoubtedly, he can assemble and disassemble firearms.It must not be de-emphasize[d] that the residence of Elenita Fajardo is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for firearms, explosives and ammunition. Granting arguendo that those firearms and ammunition were left behind by Benito Fajardo, a member of the Philippine army, the fact remains that it is a government property. If it is so, the residence of Elenita Fajardo is not the proper place to store those items. The logical explanation is that those items are stolen property.
x x x x The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to ones control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this
law[,] the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever. x x x x x x x. [I]n order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent. x x x x To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosive under P.D. 1866, as amended, two (2) essential elements must be indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm ammunition or explosive which may be proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that the accused has no license or permit to own or possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive which fact may be established by the testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive (Exhibit G). The judicial admission of the accused that they do not have permit or license on the two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, model M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and model M1911A1 of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition, 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition confiscated and recovered from their possession during the search conducted by members of the PISOG, Aklan Police Provincial Office by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 fall under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.[9] Consequently, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of firearms and explosives, punishable under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, which provides: The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested. Both were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
On September 1, 2006, only petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated October 25, 2006. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA. Ruling of the CAThe CA concurred with the factual findings of the RTC, but disagreed with its conclusions of law, and held that the search warrant was void based on the following observations: [A]t the time of applying for a search warrant, SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan did not have personal knowledge of the fact that appellants had no license to possess firearms as required by law. For one, he failed to make a categorical statement on that point during the application. Also, he failed to attach to the application a certification to that effect from the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police. x x x, this certification is the best evidence obtainable to prove that appellant indeed has no license or permit to possess a firearm. There was also no explanation given why said certification was not presented, or even deemed no longer necessary, during the application for the warrant. Such vital evidence was simply ignored.[10] Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside petitioners residence were declared inadmissible in evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the policemen outside the house of petitioner before the warrant was served were admitted as evidence, pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of a part of a firearm, punishable under paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. They were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days to five (5) years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[11] but the motion was denied in the CA Resolution dated December 3, 2009.[12] Hence, the present recourse. At the onset, it must be emphasized that the information filed against petitioner and Valerio charged duplicitous offenses contrary to Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz.: Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. A reading of the information clearly shows that possession of the enumerated articles confiscated from Valerio and petitioner are punishable under separate provisions of Section 1, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294.[13] Illegal possession of two (2) pieces of short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces of live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber, and fourteen (14) pieces of live
caliber .45 ammunition is punishable under paragraph 2 of the said section, viz.: The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, 41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.[14] On the other hand, illegal possession of the two (2) receivers of a .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with SN 763025, and Model M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number, is penalized under paragraph 1, which states: Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms or ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.[15] This is the necessary consequence of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8294, which categorized the kinds of firearms proscribed from being possessed without a license, according to their firing power and caliber. R.A. No. 8294 likewise mandated different penalties for illegal possession of firearm according to the above classification, unlike in the old P.D. No. 1866 which set a standard penalty for the illegal possession of any kind of firearm. Section 1 of the old law reads: Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. (Emphasis ours.) By virtue of such changes, an information for illegal possession of firearm should now particularly refer to the paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized firearm is
classified, and should there be numerous guns confiscated, each must be sorted and then grouped according to the categories stated in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866. It will no longer suffice to lump all of the seized firearms in one information, and state Section 1, P.D. No. 1866 as the violated provision, as in the instant case,[16] because different penalties are imposed by the law, depending on the caliber of the weapon. To do so would result in duplicitous charges. Ordinarily, an information that charges multiple offenses merits a quashal, but petitioner and Valerio failed to raise this issue during arraignment. Their failure constitutes a waiver, and they could be convicted of as many offenses as there were charged in the information.[17] This accords propriety to the diverse convictions handed down by the courts a quo.Further, the charge of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, including the validity of the search warrant that led to their confiscation, is now beyond the province of our review since, by virtue of the CAs Decision, petitioner and Valerio have been effectively acquitted from the said charges. The present review is consequently only with regard to the conviction for illegal possession of a part of a firearm. The Issues Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the discovery of the two (2) receivers does not come within the purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no valid intrusion was attendant and that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was with Valerio when he threw the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive showing that any of the two receivers recovered by the policemen matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts when the police elements arrived. Neither is there any proof that petitioner had knowledge of or consented to the alleged throwing of the receivers. Our Ruling We find merit in the petition. First, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers. We hold that the receivers were seized in plain view, hence, admissible. No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, which states: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same article (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence obtained through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under any of the following circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[18]Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.[19] It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.[20] Tested against these standards, we find that the seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol outside petitioners house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine. First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law enforcers around the premises was justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure and sought refuge. The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio when the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to believe that a crime was being committed. There was thus sufficient probable cause for the policemen to cordon off the house as they waited for daybreak to apply for a search warrant. Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different instances, Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects. Lastly, considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown might be contraband items, or evidence of the offense they were then suspected of committing.
Indeed, when subsequently recovered, they turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol. The pertinent portions of SPO2 Navas testimony are elucidating: Q When you arrived in that place, you saw policemen?A Yes, sir. Q What were they doing?A They were cordoning the house. Q You said that you asked your assistant team leader Deluso about that incident. What did he tell you?A Deluso told me that a person ran inside the house carrying with him a gun. Q And this house you are referring to is the house which you mentioned is the police officers were surrounding?A Yes, sir. Q Now, how long did you stay in that place, Mr. Witness?A I stayed there when I arrived at past 10:00 oclock up to 12:00 oclock the following day. Q At about 2:00 oclock in the early morning of August 28, 2002, can you recall where were you?A Yes, sir. Q Where were you?A I was at the back of the house that is being cordoned by the police. Q While you were at the back of this house, do you recall any unusual incident?A Yes, sir. Q Can you tell the Honorable Court what was that incident?A Yes, sir. A person went out at the top of the house and threw something. Q And did you see the person who threw something out of this house?A Yes, sir. x x x x Q Can you tell the Honorable Court who was that person who threw that something outside the house?A It was Zaldy Valerio. COURT: (to witness)Q Before the incident, you know this person Zaldy Valerio?A Yes, sir. Q Why do you know him?A Because we were formerly members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. x x x x
PROS. PERALTA:Q When you saw something thrown out at the top of the house, did you do something if any?A I shouted to seek cover. x x x x
Q So, what else did you do if any after you shouted, take cover?A I took hold of a flashlight after five minutes and focused the beam of the flashlight on the place where something was thrown. Q What did you see if any?A I saw there the lower [part] of the receiver of cal. 45. x x x x Q Mr. Witness, at around 4:00 oclock that early morning of August 28, 2002, do you recall another unusual incident?A Yes, sir. Q And can you tell us what was that incident?A I saw a person throwing something there and the one that was thrown fell on top of the roof of another house. Q And you saw that person who again threw something from the rooftop of the house?A Yes, sir. Q Did you recognize him?A Yes, sir. Q Who was that person?A Zaldy Valerio again. x x x x Q Where were you when you saw this Zaldy Valerio thr[o]w something out of the house?A I was on the road in front of the house. Q Where was Zaldy Valerio when you saw him thr[o]w something out of the house?A He was on top of the house. x x x x Q Later on, were you able to know what was that something thrown out?A Yes, sir. Q What was that?A Another lower receiver of a cal. 45. x x x xQ And what did he tell you?A It [was] on the wall of another house and it [could] be seen right away.
x x x x
Q What did you do if any?A We waited for the owner of the house to wake up. x x x x Q Who opened the fence for you?A It was a lady who is the owner of the house. Q When you entered the premises of the house of the lady, what did you find?A We saw the lower receiver of this .45 cal. (sic)[21] The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial discovery was indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the seized contraband be identified and known to be so. The law merely requires that the law enforcer observes that the seized item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two receivers were admissible as evidence. The liability for their possession, however, should fall only on Valerio and not on petitioner. The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that petitioner is not liable for illegal possession of part of a firearm.In dissecting how and when liability for illegal possession of firearms attaches, the following disquisitions in People v. De Gracia[22] are instructive: The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first
(intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.[23] Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm, is committed when the holder thereof:
(1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof(2) lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm.[24] We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the house when the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the receivers, before or during their disposal. At the very least, petitioners possession of the receivers was merely incidental because Valerio, the one in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioners house. Absent any evidence pointing to petitioners participation, knowledge or consent in Valerios actions, she cannot be held liable for illegal possession of the receivers. Petitioners apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only proceed from the assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert such assumption into concrete evidence. Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
which are mala in se, or in crimes, which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law.[25] The quantum of proof required by law was not adequately met in this case in so far as petitioner is concerned. The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioners waistband was not identified with sufficient particularity; as such, it is impossible to match the same with any of the seized receivers. Moreover, SPO1 Tan categorically stated that he saw Valerio holding two guns when he and the rest of the PISOG arrived in petitioners house. It is not unlikely then that the receivers later on discarded were components of the two (2) pistols seen with Valerio. These findings also debunk the allegation in the information that petitioner conspired with Valerio in committing illegal possession of part of a firearm. There is no evidence indubitably proving that petitioner participated in the decision to commit the criminal act committed by Valerio. Hence, this Court is constrained to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence in her favor was not adequately overcome by the evidence adduced by the prosecution. The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal possession of part of a firearm. In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed the same does not have the corresponding license for it.[26] By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal possession of part of a firearm must yield these requisites: (a) the existence of the part of the firearm; and(b) the accused who possessed the same does not have the license for the firearm to which the seized part/component corresponds. In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt theelements of the crime. The subject receivers - one with the markings United States Property and the other bearing Serial No. 763025 - were duly presented to the court as Exhibits E and E-1, respectively. They were also identified by SPO2 Nava as the firearm parts he retrieved af ter Valerio discarded them.[27] His testimony was corroborated by DYKR radio announcer Vega, who witnessed the recovery of the receivers.[28] Anent the lack of authority, SPO1 Tan testified that, upon verification, it was ascertained that Valerio is not a duly licensed/registered firearm holder of any type, kind, or caliber of firearms.[29] To substantiate his statement, he submitted a certification[30] to that effect and identified the same in court.[31] The testimony of SPO1 Tan, or the certification, would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element.[32]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 10, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED with respect to petitioner Elenita Fajardo y Castro, who is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.SO ORDERED.
ELISEO F. SORIANO,Petitioner,- versus - MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO,Respondents.x-------------------------------------------x
ELISEO F. SORIANO,Petitioner, - versus - MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, ZOSIMO G. ALEGRE, JACKIE AQUINO-GAVINO, NOEL R. DEL PRADO, EMMANUEL BORLAZA, JOSE E. ROMERO IV, and FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in their capacity as members of the Hearing and Adjudication Committee of the MTRCB, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, in their capacity as complainants beforethe MTRCB,Respondents. G.R. No. 164785 Present: Present: PUNO, C.J.,CARPIO,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BRION,PERALTA,BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,PEREZ, andMENDOZA, JJ. G.R. No. 165636 Promulgated: March 15, 2010x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x R E S O L U T I O NVELASCO, JR., J.: Before us is this motion of petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court dated April 29, 2009, modifying that of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) by imposing the penalty of three-month suspension on the television show Ang Dating Daan, instead of on petitioner Soriano, as host of that program. Petitioner seeks reconsideration on the following grounds or issues: (1) the suspension thus meted out to the program constitutes prior restraint; (2) the Court erred in ruling that his utterances[1] did not constitute exercise of religion; (3) the Court erred in finding the language used as offensive and obscene; (4) the Court should have applied its policy of non-interference in cases of conflict between religious groups; and (5) the Court erred in penalizing the television program for the acts of petitioner. The motion has no merit. Petitioners threshold posture that the suspension thus imposed constitutes prior restraint and an abridgement of his exercise of religion and freedom of expression is a mere rehash of the position he articulated in the underlying petitions for certiorari and expounded in his
memorandum.[2] So are the supportive arguments and some of the citations of decisional law, Philippine and American, holding it together. They have been considered, sufficiently discussed in some detail, and found to be without merit in our Decision. It would, thus, make little sense to embark on another lengthy discussion of the same issues and arguments. Suffice it to reiterate that the sanction imposed on the TV program in question does not, under the factual milieu of the case, constitute prior restraint, but partakes of the nature of subsequent punishment for past violation committed by petitioner in the course of the broadcast of the program on August 10, 2004. To be sure, petitioner has not contested the fact of his having made statements on the air that were contextually violative of the programs G rating. To merit a G rating, the program must be suitable for all ages, which, in turn, means that the material for television [does not], in the judgment of the [MTRCB], x x x contain anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision.[3] As previously discussed by the Court, the vulgar language petitioner used on prime-time television can in no way be characterized as suitable for all ages, and is wholly inappropriate for children. Petitioner next harps on the primacy of his freedoms, referring particularly to the exercise of his religious beliefs and profession, as presiding minister of his flock, over the right and duty of the state as parens patriae. Petitioners position may be accorded some cogency, but for the fact that it fails to consider that the medium he used to make his statements was a television broadcast, which is accessible to children of virtually all ages. As already laid down in the Decision subject of this recourse, the interest of the government in protecting children who may be subjected to petitioners invectives must take precedence over his desire to air publicly his dirty laundry. The public soapbox that is television must be guarded by the state, which purpose the MTRCB serves, and has served, in suspending Ang Dating Daan for petitioners statements. As emphasized in Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak,[4] the freedom of broadcast media is, in terms of degree of protection it deserves, lesser in scope, especially as regards television, which reaches every home where there is a set, and where children will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs shown. The same case also laid the basis for the classification system of the MTRCB when it stated, It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.[5] The penalty of suspension imposed on petitioner has driven him to liken the Court to a blind man who was asked to describe an elephant, and by his description he stubbornly believed that an elephant is just the same as a Meralco post after touching one if its legs.[6] Petitioner makes this comparison with the view that the factual backdrop against which his statements were made was purportedly not considered by the Court. As he presently argues:
The Honorable Court should have rendered its decision in light of the surrounding circumstances why and what prompted herein petitioner to utter those words. Clearly, he was provoked because of the malicious and blatant splicing by the INC ministers of his recorded voice. Verily, Petitioner submits that the choice of words he used has been harsh but strongly maintains that the same was consistent with his constitutional right of freedom of speech and religion. Contrary to petitioners impression, the Court has, in fact, considered the factual antecedents of and his motive in making his utterances, and has found those circumstances wanting as defense for violating the programs G rating. Consider the following excerpts from the Courts Decision: There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road. And just to set things straight, the penalty imposed is on the program, not on petitioner. Petitioner would next have the Court adopt a hands-off approach to the conflict between him and the Iglesia Ni Cristo. In support of his urging, he cites Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals.[7] Petitioners invocation of Iglesia ni Cristo to support his hands-off thesis is erroneous. Obviously, he fails to appreciate what the Court stated in that particular case when it rejected the argument that a religious program is beyond MTRCBs review and regulatory authority. We reproduce what the Court pertinently wrote in Iglesia ni Cristo: We thus reject petitioners postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent [MTRCB]. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief.
Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e. serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this stultifying strife considering our warring religious beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. x x x For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.[8] (Emphasis added.) Lastly, petitioner claims that there was violation of due process of law, alleging that the registered producer of the program is not a party to the proceedings. Hence, the program cannot, so petitioner asserts, be penalized. We will let the records speak for themselves to refute that argument. As per petitioners admission in his petition for certiorari filed with the Court, he is the Executive Producer of Ang Dating Daan, a televised bible exposition program produced by the Philippine-based religious organization, Church of God International.[9] It is unclear, then, which producer the movant is referring to in claiming that there was no representation before the MTRCB. He was and is the representative of Ang Dating Daan, and the claim that there was no due process of law is simply bereft of merit. Even as the foregoing disquisitions would suffice to write finis to the instant motion, certain relevant issues have been raised by some members of the Court that ought to be addressed if only to put things in their proper perspective. We refer to the matter of obscenity.As stressed at every possible turn in the challenged Courts Decision, the defining standards to be employed in judging the harmful effects of the statements petitioner used would be those for the average child, not those for the average adult. We note that the ratings and regulation of television broadcasts take into account the protection of the child, and it is from the childs narrow viewpoint that the utterances must be considered, if not measured. The ratings G, PG (parental guidance), PG-13, and R (restricted or for adults only) suggest as much. The concern was then, as now, that the program petitioner hosted and produced would reach an unintended audience, the average child, and so it is how this audience would view his words that matters. The average child would not be concerned with colorful speech, but, instead, focus on the literal, everyday meaning of words used. It was this literal approach that rendered petitioners utterances obscene.
The Court has taken stock of Action for Childrens Television v. FCC,[10] but finds this U.S. case not to be of governing application to this jurisdiction under the present state of things. The so-called safe harbor of 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., adverted to in Action for Childrens Television as the time wherein broadcast of indecent material may be permitted, is believed inapplicable here. As it were, there is no legislative enactment or executive issuance setting a similar period in the Philippines wherein indecent material may be broadcast. Rather than fix a period for allowing indecent programming, what is used in this jurisdiction is the system of classification of television programs, which the petitioner violated. His program was rated G, purported to be suitable for all ages. We cannot lose sight of the violation of his programs classification that carried with it the producers implied assurance that the program did not contain anything unsuitable for children and minors. The hour at which it was broadcasted was of little moment in light of the guarantee that the program was safe for childrens viewing. The suspension of the program has not been arrived at lightly. Taking into account all the factors involved and the arguments pressed on the Court, the suspension of the program is a sufficiently limited disciplinary action, both to address the violation and to serve as an object lesson for the future. The likelihood is great that any disciplinary action imposed on petitioner would be met with an equally energetic defense as has been put up here. The simple but stubborn fact is that there has been a violation of government regulations that have been put in place with a laudable purpose, and this violation must accordingly be dealt with. We are not unmindful of the concerns on the restriction of freedoms that may occur in imposing sanctions upon erring individuals and institutions, but it cannot be over-emphasized that the freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights are far from absolute. Each has its own limits, responsibilities, and obligations. Everyone is expected to bear the burden implicit in the exercise of these freedoms. So it must be here. WHEREFORE, petitioners motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case. Let entry of judgment be made in due course. SO ORDERED.
