cases for consti 1 class

8/7/2019 cases for consti 1 class

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cases-for-consti-1-class 1/45

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008]

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 178628]

PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These consolidated petitions[1]

seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of theCommission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district

of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.[2]

The Facts

The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for theProvince of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight

municipalities.[3] Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao(ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by

Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).[4] Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms partof Maguindanao's first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having

voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.

On 28 August 2006, the ARMM's legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,[5] enacted Muslim Mindanao

Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composedof the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:

Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog,Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from the Province of

Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is hereby created,to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

x x x x

Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by the

Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority of the regular members of theSangguniang Panlalawigan.

The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to

serve their unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or where they areresidents: Provided, that where an elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a

consequence of the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall have preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and

for the time being be appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified in the next local elections; Provided, further,

that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance with law. Provided, furthermore,

that there shall be no diminution in the number of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan



of the mother province.

Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includesCotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.

Later, three new municipalities[6]

were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting

Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City,although part of Maguindanao's first legislative district, is not part of the Province of

Maguindanao.

The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan's creation in a plebiscite held on 29October 2006.

On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999

requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of theFirst District of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act 201.

In answer to Cotabato City's query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March

2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the FirstLegislative District of Maguindanao." Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the

recommendation of the COMELEC's Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February2007,

[7]provides in pertinent parts:

Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt therecommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law

by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in theFirst Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)

However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao's first legislative district is composed

only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.[8]

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions,amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as "Shariff

Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with CotabatoCity)."[9]

In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative

of "Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City," prayed for the nullification of COMELECResolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for

that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congressunder Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution[10] and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to

the Constitution.[11]

Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanao's

first legislative district despite the COMELEC's earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845designating Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanao's reapportioned first

legislative district.[12]

Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELECusurped Congress' power to create or reapportion legislative districts.

In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), chose not to

reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in

the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and (2) Sema's prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P.

Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.

In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning

COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007,



Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan includingCotabato City." Respondent Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is

constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanao's first

legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not

reapportion Maguindanao's first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole componentunit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not tomention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under Section 5

(3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city.[13]

Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents' Comments andreiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902.

In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No. 177597 to

comment on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of

Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province. The parties submitted their compliance as follows:

(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the Court in Felwa

v. Salas[14]

stated that "when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representativedistrict comes into existence neither by authority of that statute â¼´ which cannot provide

otherwise â¼´ nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without areapportionment"; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) "affirms" the

apportionment of a legislative district incident to the creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3),Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution

mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces.

(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its earlier stance onthe propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema,

contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is "self-executing." Thus, every new province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in

the House of Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and

(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following grounds: (a) the"province" contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that is created by

an act of Congress taking into account the provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b)Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to

enact measures relating to national elections, which encompasses the apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative

district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to thedisproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as the Regional

Assembly can create provinces without regard to the requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160;and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than 250,000, is not entitled to a

representative in the House of Representatives.

On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral arguments on thefollowing issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM

Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative,whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one

representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating alegislative district for such new province.

[15]

In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No. 177597

filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral arguments.[16]

On the questionof the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597

adopted the following positions:



(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a valid

delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9),Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through their organic acts,

legislative powers over "other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the

general welfare of the people of the region" and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.

[17]

However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to "prescribe standards lower than those

mandated" in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of theConstitution.

[18]Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 "should be construed as prohibiting the

Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not comply with the minimumcriteria" under RA 7160.

[19]

(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional

on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not among those granted to theautonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution and (b) the grant under

Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribestandards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces

contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and

(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen (thuseffectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the

Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 isunconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and Section 6,[20] Article X of the

Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces was withheld from the autonomous regionsunder Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.

On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is

entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national lawcreating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent Dilangalen reiterated

in their Memoranda the positions they adopted in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its position on this issue

considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional.

The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the Court ordered G.R. No.

178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R. No. 178628 echoed Sema'scontention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the

voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of Representatives. In its Comment tothe petition in G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of

COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the "appropriate law."

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

I. In G.R. No. 177597:

(A) Preliminarily -

(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test theconstitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and

(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan

Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.



(B) On the merits -

(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assemblythe power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and

(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative inthe House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for

such province.

II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is validfor maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as "Shariff

Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with CotabatoCity]"), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding

Cotabato City).

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is

unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and

(3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.

On the Preliminary Matters

The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate

to Test the Constitutionality of

Election Laws, Rules and Regulations

The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by "any tribunal,

board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."[21]

On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an

act "which the law specifically enjoins as a duty."[22]

True, the COMELEC did not issueResolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

[23]Nor is there a

law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes cast inCotabato City for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City." These,

however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Semaalso prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as

proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.[24]

Respondent Dilangalen's Proclamation

Does Not Moot the Petition

There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen's proclamation as winner in the 14

May 2007 elections for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City"mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalen's election. Rather, it

involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as theconstitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the

outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato Cityfor representative of the district of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City" will be

included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for usnot to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Court's ruling in these

petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other succeedingelections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to

create in the future additional provinces.

On the Main Issues



Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly

Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan

The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,

which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolishedor its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the localgovernment code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the

political units directly affected.Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units - province, city, municipality or

barangay - must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit mustfollow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict

with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political unitsaffected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for

Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local governmentunits. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative

bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and providedno conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to

provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,

[25]subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,

and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under theLocal Government Code, "only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or

municipalities.[26]

Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assemblythe power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress

made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create localgovernment units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to

regional legislative bodies.[27]

In the present case, the question arises whether the delegation tothe ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and

barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the

Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a population of at

least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" in theHouse of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution

provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population mayhereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately

following election to at least one Member x x x."

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the

Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also becreated without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a

population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even thecreation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative

district because once the city's population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomesentitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of

the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city

inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly

delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is,



can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislativedistricts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the negative.

Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned

Only by an Act of Congress

Under the present Constitution, as well as in past[28] Constitutions, the power to increase theallowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is

vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two

hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected fromlegislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in

accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system

of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

x x x x

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, andadjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each

province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a

reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

(Emphasis supplied)Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a

law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowersCongress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts

necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congressexercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that

regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only

through a national law passed by Congress. In M ontejo v. CO MELE C ,[29]

we held that the"power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make

laws," and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.

This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislativedistricts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable

membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must beembodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for

regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a nationallegislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body,

cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.

The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts.

This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20,Article X of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitutionand national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers

over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;



(4) Personal, family, and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of

the people of the region.

Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions,

expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.

On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, "The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the

following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x." Since the ARMM Regional Assemblyhas no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative

district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a lawcreating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the "next national

elections" from the effectivity of the law.[30]

Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and itsoccupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official.

[31]It would be

incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create anational office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a

district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or

regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it cannever create a national office.

To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative

powers to operate outside the ARMM's territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article

X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assembly's

legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x."

The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusivenature of Congress' power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from

creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that:Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes

Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied)However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the

Constitution mandates that "each province shall have at least one representative." Thus, thecreation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional.

Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution,

which provides:Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent

territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each

province, shall have at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied)

and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:

Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter

increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately

following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled

to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in



paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Membersapportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city,

whose population has so increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and

twenty days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)

serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on 29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the House of Representatives in the 14 May2007 elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that

"when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes intoexistence neither by authority of that statute â¼´ which cannot provide otherwise â¼´ nor by

apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment."

The contention has no merit.

First . The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695),creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and

providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for "creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution." The

Court answered in the negative, thus:The Constitution ordains:

"The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twentyMembers who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according

to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member.The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every

enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National

Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts.Each representative district shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous and compact

territory."

Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly,

through the creation of a province â¼´ for "each province shall have at least one member"

in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several representative districts

within a province. The requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districtsand the territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts,

and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This isdeducible, not only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact

that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative

district, comes into existence neither by authority of that statute â¼´ which cannot provide

otherwise â¼´ nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a

reapportionment.

There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other conditions under which a province may be created, except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed the

maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been created or

subdivided into other provinces, with the consequent creation of additional representativedistricts, without complying with the aforementioned requirements.

[32](Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly createdlegislative districts "indirectly" through a special law enacted by Congress creating a

province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximumnumber of legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the

present case because in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by

Congress itself . Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the

ARMM Regional Assembly.

What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate





Justice Carpio:

Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new provinces, theremay be x x x [only] one hundred thousand (100,000) [population], x x x, and they will

each have one representative x x x to Congress without any national law, is that what you

are saying?Atty. Vistan II:

Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying.x x x x

Justice Carpio:

So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one thousand

(1000) representatives to the House of Representatives without a national law[,] that

is legally possible, correct?Atty. Vistan II:

Yes, Your Honor.[36]

(Emphasis supplied)

Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regionalautonomy,

[37]nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous

consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated

by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assemblyrecognizes this.

The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the

regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, "[A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following

election to at least one Member," refers to a province created by Congress itself through anational law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual membership of the

House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present14

thCongress, there are 219

[38]district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the

House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of totalmembership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election

in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for districtrepresentatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need

now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even beforeCongress can create new provinces.

It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the

Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to

the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x." The Preamble of the ARMMOrganic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established "within the

framework of the Constitution." This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution whichmandates that the ARMM "shall be created x x x within the f ramework of this Constitution

and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of thePhilippines."

The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves also

the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of thecreation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with the criteria established in

Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because thecreation of such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative

districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an appropriate case.

In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM



Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the

Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities becausethe creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a

power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3

of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every provinceshall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law

creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because thelegislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial

jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMAAct 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff

Kabunsuan, is void.

Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution

Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic andlegislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely

complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well asSection 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054

UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the AutonomousRegion in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID

Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of

Representatives.

SO ORDERED.



EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18684 September 14, 1961

LAMBERTO MACIAS, LORENZO TEVES, FAUSTO DUGENIO, ROGACIANO

MERCADO and MARIANO PERDICES, petitioners,vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE GELLA in his Capacity as

National Treasurer, respondents.

Crispin D. Baizas for petitioners.

Barrios, Garcia and Apostol for respondent Commission on E lections.Office of the Solicitor General for respondent Vicente Gella.

BENGZON, C.J.:

Statement of the case. ² Petitioners request that respondent officials be prevented fromimplementing Republic Act 3040 that apportions representative districts in this country. It is

unconstitutional and void, they allege, because: (a) it was passed by the House of Representatives without printed final copies of the bill having been furnished the Members at

least three calendar days prior to its passage; (b) it was approved more than three years after thereturn of the last census of our population; and (c) it apportioned districts without regard to the

number of inhabitants of the several provinces.

Admitting some allegations but denying others, the respondents aver they were merely

complying with their duties under the statute, which they presume and allege to be constitutional.The respondent National Treasurer further avers that petitioners have no personality to bring thisaction; that a duly certified copy of the law creates the presumption of its having been passed in

accordance with the requirements of the Constitution (distribution of printed bills included); thatthe Director of the Census submitted an official report on the population of the Philippines in

November, 1960, which report became the basis of the bill; and that the Act complies with the principle of proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution..

After hearing the parties and considering their memoranda, this Court reached the

conclusion that the statute be declared invalid, and, aware of the need of prompt action, issued its brief resolution of August 23, partly in the following language:

Whereas such Republic Act 3040 clearly violates the said constitutional provisionin several ways namely, (a) it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger

number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it gave Manila four members, while Cotabatowith a bigger population got three only; . . .;

Whereas such violation of the Constitutional mandate renders the law void;

Therefore, without prejudice to the writing of a more extended opinion passingadditionally on other issues raised in the case, the Court resolved, without any dissent,

forthwith to issue the injunction prayed for by the petitioners. No bond is needed.

What with the reservation announced in the resolution, and what with the motion for reconsideration, this is now written fully to explain the premises on which our conclusion rested.

Personality of the petitioners. ² Petitioners are four members of the House of

Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis Oriental, and Bulacan, and the provincialgovernor of Negros Oriental. They bring this action in behalf of themselves and of other

residents of their provinces. They allege, and this Court finds, that their provinces had been



discriminated against by Republic Act 3040, because they were given less representative districtsthan the number of their inhabitants required or justified: Misamis Oriental having 387,839

inhabitants, was given one district only, whereas Cavite with 379,902 inhabitants, was given twodistricts; Negros Oriental and Bulacan with 598,783 and 557,691 respectively, were allotted 2

representative districts each, whereas Albay with 515,961 was assigned 3 districts.

The authorities hold that "citizens who are deprived of as full and effective an electivefranchise as they are entitled to under the Constitution by an apportionment act, have a sufficient

interest to proceed in a court to test the statute. (18 Am. Jur. 199.)

Therefore, petitioners as voters and as congressmen and governor of the aggrieved provinces have personality to sue.

In Stiglitz vs. Schardien (Ky) 40 S.W. (2d) 315, the right of a citizen to question thevalidity of a redistricting statute was upheld. The same right was recognized in Jones vs.

Freeman (Okla.) 146 P. (2d) 564, the court saying that each citizen has the right to have the State

apportioned in accordance with the Constitution and to be governed by a Legislative fairlyrepresenting the whole body of electorate and elected as required by the Constitution.

Colegrove vs. Green, 328 .U.S. 549, on which respondents rely, appear to be inconclusive:three against three. The seventh justice concurred in the result even supposing the contrary was

justiciable."

T he printed-form, three-day requirement . ² The Constitution provides that "no bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form

furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the Presidentshall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment."

Petitioners presented certificates of the Secretary of the House of Representatives to showthat no printed copy had been distributed three days before passage of the bill (on May 10, 1961)

and that no certificate of urgency by the President had been received in the House.

The respondents claim in their defense that a statute may not be nullified upon evidence of failure to print, because "it is conclusively presumed that the details of legislative procedure

leading to the enrollment that are prescribed by the Constitution have been complied with by theLegislature." They further claim that the certificates of the Secretary of the House are

inadmissible, in view of the conclusive (enrolled-bill) presumption, which in several instanceshave been applied by the courts. In further support of their contention, Sec. 313(2) of Act 190

might be cited.1

On the other hand, it may be said for the petitioners, that such printed bill requirement hada fundamental purpose to serve

2and was inserted in the Constitution not as a mere procedural

step; and that the enrolled-bill theory, if adopted, would preclude the courts from enforcing suchrequirement in proper cases.

We do not deem it necessary to make a definite pronouncement on the question, becausethe controversy may be decided upon the issue of districts-in-proportion-to-

inhabitants.1awphîl.nèt

Population Census. ² According to the Constitution, "the Congress shall by law, make anapportionment (of Members of the House) within three years after the return of every

enumeration, and not otherwise." It is admitted that the bill, which later became Republic Act3040, was based upon a report submitted to the President by the Director of the Census on

November 23, 1960. It reads:

I have the honor to submit herewith a preliminary count of the population of the

Philippines as a result of the population enumeration which has just been completed. This



is a report on the total number of inhabitants in this country and does not include the population characteristics. It is the result of a hand tally and may be subject to revision

when all the population schedules shall have been processed mechanically.

The Census of Population is the first of a series of four censuses which include

housing, agriculture and economics in addition to population. These four censusestogether constitute what is known as the Census of 1960. Like population, the housingand agricultural censuses are undergoing processing, while the economic census is now

under preparation.

Until the final report is made, these figures should be considered as official for all purposes.

Petitioners maintain that the apportionment could not legally rest on this report since it ismerely "preliminary" and "may be subject to revision." On the other hand, respondents point out

that the above letter says the report should be considered "official for all purposes." They also

point out that the ascertainment of what constitutes a return of an enumeration is a matter for Congress action. This issue does not clearly favor petitioners, because there are authoritiessustaining the view that although not final, and still subject to correction, a census enumeration

may be considered official, in the sense that Governmental action may be based thereon even inmatters of apportionment of legislative districts (Cahill vs. Leopold [Conn.] 108 Atl. 2d 818).

(See also Elliott vs. State, 1 Pac. 2d 370; Ervin vs. State, 44 S.W. 2d 380; Herndon vs. ExciseBoard, 295 Pac. 223; Holcomb vs. Spikes, 232 S.W. 891.)

Apportionment of M embers. ² The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty

Members of the House of Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several provinces asnearly as may be according to the member of their respective inhabitants." In our resolution on

August 23, we held that this provision was violated by Republic Act 3040 because (a) it gaveCebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it gave

Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; (c) Pangasinanwith less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato got more than both, five members having

been assigned to it; (d) Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members while Davao with903,224 got three only; (e) Bulacan with 557,691 got two only, while Albay with less inhabitants

(515,691) got three, and (f) Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one member only, whileCavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got two. These were not the only instances of unequal

apportionment. We see that Mountain Province has 3 whereas Isabela, Laguna and Cagayan withmore inhabitants have 2 each. And then, Capiz, La Union and Ilocos Norte got 2 each, whereas

Sulu that has more inhabitants got 1 only. And Leyte with 967,323 inhabitants got 4 only,whereas Iloilo with less inhabitants (966,145) was given 5.

Such disproportion of representation has been held sufficient to avoid apportionment lawsenacted in States having Constitutional provisions similar to ours. For instance, in Massachusetts,

the Constitution required division "into representative district . . . equally, as nearly as may be,according to the relative number of legal voters in the several districts." The Supreme Judicial

Court of that state found this provision violated by an allotment that gave 3 representatives to7,946 voters and only 2 representatives to 8,618 voters, and further gave two representatives to

4,854 voters and one representative to 5,598 voters. Justice Rugg said:

It is not an approximation to equality to allot three representatives to 7,946 voters,and only two representatives to 8,618 voters, and to allot two representatives to 4,854

voters, and one representative to 5,596 voters. . . .

Whenever this kind of inequality of apportionment has been before the courts, ithas been held to be contrary to the Constitution. It has been said to be "arbitrary and

capricious and against the vital principle of equality." Houghton County v. Blacker, 92Mich. 638, 647, 653; 16 LRA 432, 52 N.W. 951; Giddings vs. Blacken, 93 Mich. 1, 13,



16 LRA 402, 52 N.W. 944; Barker v. State, 133 Ind. 178, 197, 18 LRA 567, 32 NE 836,33 NE 119; Denney v. State, 144 Ind. 503, 535, 31 LRA 726, 42 N. E. 929.

Other cases along the same line upholding the same view are these:

1. Stiglitz v. Schardien , supra, wherein twelve districts entitled to but six were giventwelve representatives, and twelve districts given twelve only were actually entitled totwenty-two.

2. Jones v. Freeman , supra, wherein districts entitled to only 3 senators were given 7, anddistricts entitled to 15 were assigned seven only.

It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040 improves existing

conditions, this Court could perhaps, in the exercise of judicial statesmanship, consider thequestion involved as purely political and therefore non-justiciable. The overwhelming weight of

authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts.

The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, andnot one which the court cannot consider on the ground that it is a political question.

(Parker v. State ex rel. Powell, 18 L.R.A. 567, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N.E. 836; State ex rel.Morris v. Wrightson, 22 L.R.A. 548, 56 N.J.L. 126, 28 Atl. 56; Harmison v. Ballot

Comrs. 42 L.R.A. 591, 45 W. Va. 179, 31 S. E. 394)

It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within

the political power of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it. (Indiana-Parker v.

Powell (1882) 133 Ind. 178, 18 L.R.A. 567, 32 N. E. 836, 33 N. E. 119; Denney v. State

(1896) 144 Ind. 503; 31 L.R.A. 726, 42 N. E. 929; Marion County v. Jewett (1915) 184Ind. 63, 110 N. E. 553.) (Kentucky-Ragland v. Anderson (1907) 125 Ky 141, 128 Am. St.Rep. 242, 100 S. W. 865.) (Massachusetts-Atty. Gen. v. Suffolk County Apportionment

Comrs., etc.)

It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the politicalsituation does not render it political instead of judicial. (Lamb v. Cunningham, 17 L.R.A. 145, 83

Wis. 90.) .

The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes noexcuse for approving a transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end does not

justify the means. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the existing inequalityof representation, and impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will opportunely approve remedial

legislation in accord with the precepts of the Constitution.

Needless to say, equality of representation3

in the Legislature being such an essential

feature of republican institutions, and affecting so many lives, the judiciary may not with a clear conscience stand by to give free hand to the discretion of the political departments of the

Government. Cases are numerous wherein courts intervened upon proof of violation of theconstitutional principle of equality of representation.

An injunction to prevent the secretary of state from issuing notices of election

under an unconstitutional apportionment act gerry-mandering the state is not a usurpationof authority by the court, on the ground that the question is a political one, but the

constitutionality of the act is purely a judicial question. (State ex rel. Adams County v.Cunningham, 15 L.R.A. 561, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724.)

The fact that the action may have a political effect, and in that sense effect a political object, does not make the questions involved in a suit to declare the



unconstitutionality of an apportionment act political instead of judicial. (State ex rel.Lamb v. Cunningham, 17 L.R.A. 145, 83 Wis. 90, 53 N.W. 48.)

An unconstitutional apportionment law may be declared void by the courts,

notwithstanding the fact that such statute is an exercise of political power. (Denney vs.

State ex rel. Basler, 31 L.R.A. 726, 144 Ind. 503, 42 N.E. 929.)

The constitutionality of a statute forming a delegate district or apportioning

delegates for the house of delegates is a judicial question for the courts, although thestatute is an exercise of political power. (Harmison v. Ballot Comrs. 42 L.R.A. 591, 45 W.

Va. 179, 31 S. E. 394.) [3 L.R.A. Digest, p. 2737.)

Conclusion. ² For all the foregoing, we hereby reiterate our resolution declaring that

Republic Act 3040 infringed the provisions of the Constitution and is therefore void.



EN BANC

G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986

PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO GASTON,CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA,ALBERTO LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND CECILIAMAGSAYSAY, petitioners,vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NEGROSOCCIDENTAL, respondents.

Gamboa & Hofileña Law Office for petitioners.

ALAMPAY, J.:

Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province inthe Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, which took effect onDecember 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental,in the various cities and municipalities therein, on December 23, 1985, filed with this Court acase for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents Commission on Elections fromconducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, wasscheduled for January 3, 1986. Said law provides:

SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; andSalvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby

separated from the province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.

SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of theCity of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carloson the south and the territorial limits of the northern portion to the Island of Negros on the west, north and east, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 squarekilometers more or less.

SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the City of Cadiz.

SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which arethe areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the

approval of this Act. After the ratification of the creation of the Province of Negrosdel Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President of thePhilippines shall appoint the first officials of the province.

SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the plebisciteherein provided, the expenses for which shall be charged to local funds.

SEC. 6. This Act shall takeeffect upon its approval.(Rollo, pp. 23-24)

Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and it is notin complete accord with the Local Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution, it is expressly mandated that²

See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with thecriteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval bya majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.



Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which must exist toprovide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and these requisites are:

SEC. 197. R equisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territoryof at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at leastfive hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual income, as

certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the lastthree consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population andincome of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to lessthan the minimum requirements under this section. The territory need not becontiguous if it comprises two or more islands.

The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for boththe general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers andnonrecurring income. (Rollo, p. 6)

Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas holidays during which theCourt was in recess and unable to timely consider the petition, a supplemental pleading wasfiled by petitioners on January 4, 1986, averring therein that the plebiscite sought to berestrained by them was held on January 3, 1986 as scheduled but that there are still seriousissues raised in the instant case affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of suchexercise which should properly be passed upon and resolved by this Court.

The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Nrte, namely:the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso,Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto. Because of the exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of Negros Occidental, petitioners foundneed to change the prayer of their petition "to the end that the constitutional issues which theyhave raised in the action will be ventilated and given final resolution.'"At the same time, theyasked that the effects of the plebiscite which they sought to stop be suspended until theSupreme Court shall have rendered its decision on the very fundamental and far-reachingquestions that petitioners have brought out.

Acknowledging in their supplemental petition that supervening events rendered moot the prayer in their initial petition that the plebiscite scheduled for January 3, 1986, be enjoined, petitionersplead, nevertheless, that-

... a writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to Respondent Commission onElections to desist from issuing official proclamation of the results of theplebiscite held on January 3, 1986.

Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of the voters of theP

rovince of Negros Occidental other than those living within the territory of the new provinceof Negros del Norte to be not in accordance with the Constitution, that a writ of mandamus be issued, directed to the respondent Commission on Elections, toschedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of theentire Province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate, at thesame time making pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986has no legal effect, being a patent legal nullity;

And that a similar writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to the respondentProvincial Treasurer, to desist from ordering the release of any local funds toanswer for expenses incurred in the holding of such plebiscite until ordered by

the Court. (Rollo pp. 9-10).

Petitioners further prayed that the respondent COMELEC hold in abeyance theissuance of any official proclamation of the results of the aforestated plebiscite.

During the pendency of this case, a motion that he be allowed to appear as amicus curiae in thiscase (dated December 27, 1985 and filed with the Court on January 2, 1986) was submitted byformer Senator Ambrosio Padilla. Said motion was granted in Our resolution of January 2, 1986.



Acting on the petition, as well as on the supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminaryinjunction with prayer for restraining order, the Court, on January 7, 1986 resolved, withoutgiving due course to the same, to require respondents to comment, not to file a motion todismiss. Complying with said resolution, public respondents, represented by the Office of theSolicitor General, on January 14, 1986, filed their Comment, arguing therein that the challengedstatute.-BatasPambansa 885, should be accorded the presumption of legality. They submit that

the said law is not void on its face and that the petition does not show a clear, categorical andundeniable demonstration of the supposed infringement of the Constitution. Respondents statethat the powers of the Batasang-Pambansa to enact the assailed law is beyond question. Theyclaim that Batas Pambansa Big. 885 does not infringe the Constitution because the requisites of the Local Government Code have been complied with. Furthermore, they submit that this casehas now become moot and academic with the proclamation of the new Province of Negros delNorte.

Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of NegrosOccidental not included in the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, de not fall withinthe meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art. XIof our Constitution. On this reasoning, respondents maintain that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885

does not violate the Constitution, invoking and citing the case of Governor Zosimo Paredesversus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al. (G.R. No. 55628, March 2,

1984 (128 SCRA 61), particularly the pronouncements therein, hereunder quoted:

1. Admittedly,this is one of those cases where the discretion of the Court isallowed considerable leeway. There is indeed an element of ambiguity in the useof the expression 'unit or units affected'. It is plausible to assert as petitioners dothat when certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form anew one, all the voters therein are affected. It is much more persuasive, however,to contend as respondents do that the acceptable construction is for those voters,who are not from the barangays to be separated, should be excluded in theplebiscite.

2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between twopossible constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save, not thatwhich will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basicpresumption all these years is one of validity. ...

3. ... Adherence to such philosophy compels the conclusion that when there areindications that the inhabitants of several barangays are inclined to separate froma parent municipality they should be allowed to do so. What is more logical thanto ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that purpose. It is they, and theyalone, who shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be assumed.

New burdens will be imposed. A new municipal corporation will come intoexistence. Its birth will be a matter of choice-their choice. They should be leftalone then to decide for themselves. To allow other voters to participate will notyield a true expression of their will. They may even frustrate it, That certainly willbe so if they vote against it for selfish reasons, and they constitute the majority.That is not to abide by the fundamental principle of the Constitution to promotelocal autonomy, the preference being for smaller units. To rule as this Tribunaldoes is to follow an accepted principle of constitutional construction, that inascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts,the intent of the framers and of the people may be gleaned from provisions in

pari materia.

Respondents submit that said ruling in the aforecited case applies equally with force in the caseat bar. Respondents also maintain that the requisites under the Local Government Code (P.D.337) for the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte have all been duly complied with,Respondents discredit petitioners' allegations that the requisite area of 3,500 square kilometersas so prescribed in the Local Government Code for a new province to be created has not beensatisfied. Petitioners insist that the area which would comprise the new province of Negros delNorte, would only be about 2,856.56 square kilometers and which evidently would be lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute. Respondents, in this regard, point



out and stress that Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new province plainlydeclares that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte comprise an area of 4,019.95 squarekilometers, more or less.

As a final argument, respondents insist that instant petition has been rendered moot andacademic considering that a plebiscite has been already conducted on January 3, 1986; that as

a result thereof, the corresponding certificate of canvass indicated that out of 195,134 totalvotes cast in said plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation of Negros del Norte and30,400 were against it; and because "the affirmative votes cast represented a majority of thetotal votes cast in said plebiscite, the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers proclaimed the newprovince which shall be known as "Negros del Norte". Thus, respondents stress the fact thatfollowing the proclamation of Negros del Norte province, the appointments of the officials of saidprovince created were announced. On these considerations, respondents urge that this caseshould be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic as the creation of the newprovince is now a "fait accompli."

In resolving this case, it will be useful to note and emphasize the facts which appear to beagreed to by the parties herein or stand unchallenged.

Firstly, there is no disagreement that the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of NegrosOccidental has not disbursed, nor was required to disburse any public funds in connection withthe plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as so disclosed in the Comment to the Petition filed bythe respondent Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental dated January 20, 1986 (Rollo, pp.36-37). Thus, the prayer of the petitioners that said Provincial Treasurer be directed by thisCourt to desist from ordering the release of any public funds on account of such plebisciteshould not longer deserve further consideration.

Secondly, in Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which led to the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg.885 and the creation of the new Province of Negros del Norte, it expressly declared in Sec. 2 of the aforementioned Parliamentary Bill, the following:

SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of theCity of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carloson the South and the natural boundaries of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West, North and East, containing an area of 285,656 hectaresmore or less. (Emphasis supplied).

However, when said Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was very quickly enacted into BatasPambansa Blg. 885, the boundaries of the new Province of Negros del Norte were definedtherein and its boundaries then stated to be as follows:

SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Toboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; andSalvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are herebyseparated from the Province of Negros Occidental and constituted into a newprovince to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.

SEC. 1. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of theCity of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carloson the south and the territorial limits of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West, North and East, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 squarekilometers more or less.

Equally accepted by the parties is the fact that under the certification issued by ProvincialTreasurer Julian L. Ramirez of the Province of Negros Occidental, dated July 16, 1985, it wastherein certified as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

This is to certify that the following cities and municipalities of Negros Occidentalhave the land area as indicated hereunder based on the Special Report No. 3,



Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 bythe National Census and Statistics Office, Manila.

Land Area

(Sq. Km.)

1. Silay City ...................................................................214.8

2. E.B. Magalona............................................................113.3

3. Victorias.....................................................................133.9

4. Manapla......................................................................112.9

5. Cadiz City ..................................................................516.5

6. Sagay .........................................................................389.6

7. Escalante ....................................................................124.0

8. Toboso.......................................................................123.4

9. Calatrava.....................................................................504.5

10. San Carlos City...........................................................451.3

11. Don Salvador Benedicto.................................... (not available)

This certification is issued upon the request of Dr. Patricio Y. Tan for whatever purpose it may serve him.

(SGD.) JULIAN L. RAMIREZ

Provincial Treasurer (Exh. "C" of

Petition, Rollo, p. 90).

Although in the above certification it is stated that the land area of the relatively new municipalityof Don Salvador Benedicto is not available, it is an uncontradicted fact that the area comprisingDon Salvador municipality, one of the component units of the new province, was derived fromthe City of San Carlos and from the Municipality of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and addedthereto was a portion of about one-fourth the land area of the town of Murcia, Negros Occidental.It is significant to note the uncontroverted submission of petitioners that the total land area of theentire municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental is only 322.9 square kilometers (Exh. "D", Rollo,p. 91). One-fourth of this total land area of Murcia that was added to the portions derived fromthe land area of Calatrava, Negros Occidental and San Carlos City (Negros Occidental) wouldconstitute, therefore, only 80.2 square kilometers. This area of 80.2 square kilometers if then

added to 2,685.2 square kilometers, representing the total land area of the Cities of Silay, SanCarlos and Cadiz and the Municipalities of E.R. Magalona, Victorias, Manapla, Sagay,Escalante, Taboso and Calatrava, will result in approximately an area of only 2,765.4 squarekilometers using as basis the Special Report, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area andDensity: 1970, 1975 and 1980 of the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila (see Exhibit"C", Rollo, p. 90).

No controversion has been made by respondent with respect to the allegations of petitionersthat the original provision in the draft legislation, Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, reads:

SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification

of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes castin such plebiscite, the President shall appoint the first officials of the newprovince.

However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 was enacted, there was a significant change in theabove provision. The statute, as modified, provides that the requisite plebiscite "shall beconducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected."



It is this legislative determination limiting the plebiscite exclusively to the cities and towns whichwould comprise the new province that is assailed by the petitioners as violative of the provisionsof our Constitution. Petitioners submit that Sec. 3, ART XI thereof, contemplates a plebiscitethat would be held in the unit or units affected by the creation of the new province as a result of the consequent division of and substantial alteration of the boundaries of the existing province.In this instance, the voters in the remaining areas of the province of Negros Occidental should

have been allowed to participate in the questioned plebiscite.

Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance withconstitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new provinceproclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as alreadymoot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province whichpetitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by thisTribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error shouldnot provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For this Court to yield to therespondents' urging that, as there has been fait accompli then this Court should passivelyaccept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of theinstant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents'

submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its dutyof interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those whostrut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divideand/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident thatthis Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bringabout a fait accompli.

In the light of the facts and circumstances alluded to by petitioners as attending to the unusuallyrapid creation of the instant province of Negros del Norte after a swiftly scheduled plebiscite,this Tribunal has the duty to repudiate and discourage the commission of acts which run counter to the mandate of our fundamental law, done by whatever branch of our government. This Courtgives notice that it will not look with favor upon those who may be hereafter inclined to ram

through all sorts of legislative measures and then implement the same with indecent haste,even if such acts would violate the Constitution and the prevailing statutes of our land. It isillogical to ask that this Tribunal be blind and deaf to protests on the ground that what is alreadydone is done. To such untenable argument the reply would be that, be this so, the Court,nevertheless, still has the duty and right to correct and rectify the wrong brought to its attention.

On the merits of the case.

Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new province of Negros delNorte, the more significant and pivotal issue in the present case revolves around in theinterpretation and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution, whichbeing brief and for convenience, We again quote:

SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, mergedabolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with thecriteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval bya majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that therebe first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected"whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of theboundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existingboundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte.Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The firstwould be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would besubstantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the areasubtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.

We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutionalrequirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units. No



amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the parent province in the plebiscitebecause of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the challengedstatute to carry out what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units. The alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinalprecept that what our Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirementmust first be observed, respected and complied with. No one should be allowed to pay homage

to a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of localgovernment units but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the Constitutioncommands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be no different from one whohurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the Idol therein.

We find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the petition should be dismissedbecause the motive and wisdom in enacting the law may not be challenged by petitioners. Theprincipal point raised by the petitioners is not the wisdom and motive in enacting the law but theinfringement of the Constitution which is a proper subject of judicial inquiry.

Petitioners' discussion regarding the motives behind the enactment of B.P. Blg. 885 to say theleast, are most enlightening and provoking but are factual issues the Court cannot properly pass

upon in this case. Mention by petitioners of the unexplained changes or differences in theproposed Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 and the enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 885; the swift andsurreptitious manner of passage and approval of said law; the abrupt scheduling of theplebiscite; the reference to news articles regarding the questionable conduct of the saidplebiscite held on January 3, 1986; all serve as interesting reading but are not the decisivematters which should be reckoned in the resolution of this case.

What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little support torespondents' case is their reliance on the rulings and pronouncements made by this Court in thecase of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus The Honorable Executive Secretary to the President,et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6). In said case relating to a plebiscite held toratify the creation of a new municipality from existing barangays, this Court upheld the legality of

the plebiscite which was participated in exclusively by the people of the barangay that wouldconstitute the new municipality.

This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by respondents. What is, however,highly significant are the prefatory statements therein stating that said case is "one of thosecases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable leeway" and that "there isindeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression unit or units affected." The rulingrendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then to exercise itsdiscretion on the matter. It did not resolve the question of how the pertinent provision of theConstitution should be correctly interpreted.

The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et al.(supra) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is acknowledgedtherein that "it is plausible to assert, as petitioners do, that when certain Barangays areseparated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected."

It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case of Paredes vs. ExecutiveSecretary, invoked by respondents, We find very lucidly expressed the strong dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, a distinguished member of this Court, as he therein voiced hisopinion, which We hereunder quote:

2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the

case at bar or an of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision.

This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the² forerunner of the ruling whichWe now consider applicable to the case at bar, In the analogous case of Emilio C. Lopez, Jr.,versus the Honorable Commission on Elections, L-56022, May 31, 1985, 136 SC RA 6 33, thisdissent was reiterated by Justice Abad Santos as he therein assailed as suffering from aconstitutional infirmity a referendum which did not include all the people of Bulacan and Rizal,



when such referendum was intended to ascertain if the people of said provinces were willing togive up some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. His dissenting opinion served as a usefulguideline in the instant case.

Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is now afforded the presentCourt. The reasons in the mentioned cases invoked by respondents herein were formerly

considered acceptable because of the views then taken that local autonomy would be better promoted However, even this consideration no longer retains persuasive value.

The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that the subject matter under consideration is of greater magnitude with concomitant multifarious complicated problems. Inthe earlier case, what was involved was a division of a barangay which is the smallest politicalunit in the Local Government Code. Understandably, few and lesser problems are involved. Inthe case at bar, creation of a new province relates to the largest political unit contemplated inSection 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less thanthree cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of NegrosOccidental. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from theland area of an existing province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It

becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects cf the division of the parent provincenecessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and theproposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever bethe case, either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the unitor units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which must be included in theplebiscite contemplated therein.

It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may giverise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the provisionsin pari materia." Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that "the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas

affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act." As thisdraft legislation speaks of "areas," what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areas toparticipate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would be thepeople living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province.This assumption will be consistent with the requirements set forth in the Constitution.

We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No.3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said enabling lawthat the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areasaffected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the unit or units affectedreferred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa tocities and municipalities comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that

there are other people necessarily affected.

In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the enactment of BatasPambansa Blg. 885 betrays their own misgivings. They must have entertained apprehensionsthat by holding the plebiscite only in the areas of the new proposed province, this tactic will betainted with illegality. In anticipation of a possible strong challenge to the legality of such aplebiscite there was, therefore, deliberately added in the enacted statute a self-serving phrasethat the new province constitutes the area affected. Such additional statement serves no usefulpurpose for the same is misleading, erroneous and far from truth. The remaining portion of theparent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of theparent province, not to mention the other adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquentlyargue the points raised by the petitioners.

Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros del Norte, theprovince of Negros Occidental would be deprived of the long established Cities of Silay, Cadiz,and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No controversion has been maderegarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the Province of Negros Occidental will bediminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills whichcontribute to the economy of the whole province. In the language of petitioners, "to create



Negros del Norte, the existing territory and political subdivision known as Negros Occidental hasto be partitioned and dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." Weagree with the petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involved was a division, aseparation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, asubstantial alteration of boundary.

As contended by petitioners,²

Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as used in theconstitutional provision do not contemplate distinct situation isolated from themutually exclusive to each other. A Province maybe created where an existingprovince is divided or two provinces merged. Such cases necessarily will involveexisting unit or units abolished and definitely the boundary being substantiallyaltered.

It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is dividedor its boundary substantially altered, as the Constitution provides, only some andnot all the voters in the whole unit which suffers dismemberment or substantialalteration of its boundary are affected. Rather, the contrary is true.

It is also Our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the merits of this case candepend on the mere discretion that this Court may exercise, nevertheless, it is the petitioners'case that deserve to be favored.

It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive pronouncements inthe adverted case of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra). For thereasons already here express, We now state that the ruling in the two mentioned casessanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging to an existing political unit from which the newpolitical unit will be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of determining the formation of another new political unit, is hereby abandoned.

In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by petitioners that a writ of mandamus be issued, directing the respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule theholding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire province of NegrosOccidental as now existing shall participate and that this Court make a pronouncement that theplebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and voidand violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is not, however,disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so.With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Big. 885 and also because

the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with the criteriaestablished in the Local Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of suchnew province which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does not exist.

Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been gained by the new provinceof Negros del Norte because of the appointment of the officials thereof, must now be erased.That Negros del Norte is but a legal fiction should be announced. Its existence should be put toan end as quickly as possible, if only to settle the complications currently attending to itscreation. As has been manifested, the parent province of Negros del Norte has been impleadedas the defendant in a suit filed by the new Province of Negros del Norte, before the RegionalTrial Court of Negros (del Norte), docketed as Civil Case No. 169-C, for the immediateallocation, distribution and transfer of funds by the parent province to the new province, in an

amount claimed to be at leastP

10,000,000.00.

The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the province of Negros del Norte is the significant fact that this created province does not even satisfy the arearequirement prescribed in Section 197 of the Local Government Code, as earlier discussed.

It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the exhibits submitted by thepetitioners (Exhs. C and D, Rollo, pp. 19 and 91), that the new province has a territory of



4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This assertion is made to negate the proofs submitted,disclosing that the land area of the new province cannot be more than 3,500 square kilometersbecause its land area would, at most, be only about 2,856 square kilometers, taking intoaccount government statistics relative to the total area of the cities and municipalitiesconstituting Negros del Norte. Respondents insist that when Section 197 of the LocalGovernment Code speaks of the territory of the province to be created and requires that such

territory be at least 3,500 square kilometers, what is contemplated is not only the land area butalso the land and water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. It is even thesubmission of the respondents that in this regard the marginal sea within the three mile limitshould be considered in determining the extent of the territory of the new province. Such aninterpretation is strained, incorrect, and fallacious.

The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated thereinthe " territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands. " The use of the wordterritory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentencethereof, clearly reflects that " territory " as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land

area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.

Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) inphysical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent (Webster'sNew World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as inthe above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained byreference to words associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs.

Assessors, 138 A.L.R. p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need notbe "contiguous" is the "territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embracenot only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that the word territory inthe first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only. The wordsand phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature (82

C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction (In reWinton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).

The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are arrestedfrom their plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an entirely different meaning to justifyan absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statute is the safest guide tofollow in construing the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of itswords and out of harmony of the statutory scheme is not to be favored (Helvering vs. Hutchings,85 L. Ed., p. 909).

It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a small land area but which has

a long, narrow, extended coast line, (such as La Union province) can be said to have a larger territory than a land-locked province (such as Ifugao or Benguet) whose land area manifestlyexceeds the province first mentioned.

Allegations have been made that the enactment of the questioned state was marred by "dirtytricks", in the introduction and passing of Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 "in secret haste" pursuantto sinister designs to achieve "pure and simple gerrymandering; "that recent happenings morethan amply demonstrate that far from guaranteeing its autonomy it (Negros del Norte) hasbecome the fiefdom of a local strongman" (Rollo, p. 43; emphasis supplied).

It is not for this Court to affirm or reject such matters not only because the merits of this casecan be resolved without need of ascertaining the real motives and wisdom in the making of thequestioned law. No proper challenge on those grounds can also be made by petitioners in thisproceeding. Neither may this Court venture to guess the motives or wisdom in the exercise of legislative powers. Repudiation of improper or unwise actions taken by tools of a politicalmachinery rests ultimately, as recent events have shown, on the electorate and the power of avigilant people.



Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the people of the Province of Negros Occidental and even by our Nation. Commendable is the patriotism displayed by themin daring to institute this case in order to preserve the continued existence of their historicprovince. They were inspired undoubtedly by their faithful commitment to our Constitution whichthey wish to be respected and obeyed. Despite the setbacks and the hardships whichpetitioners aver confronted them, they valiantly and unfalteringly pursued a worthy cause. A

happy destiny for our Nation is assured as long as among our people there would be exemplarycitizens such as the petitioners herein.

WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. Theproclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officialsthereof are also declared null and void.

SO ORDERED.



EN BANC

[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA

MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN ATKILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, andLUZON FARMERS PARTY , petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA,

SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA,MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN,

AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE,4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA,

MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTEKA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B.

VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.

[G.R. No. 136786. October 6, 2000]

AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG

ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), andASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC), petitioners, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESrepresented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON,

PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER

INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP,ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-

LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.

[G.R. No. 136795. October 6, 2000]

ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION

OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZONFARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR

CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA,OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG

LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU,PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,

AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KAPILIPINAS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J .:*

Prologue

To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and RepublicAct (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:

First , the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shallnot exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including

those elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are ³qualified´ to have a seat in the House of

Representatives;



T hird, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actuallyobtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one ³qualifying´ and two additional

seats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to

shall be computed ³in proportion to their total number of votes.´

Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck

down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforceand administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Neither does

it have authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.

Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws -

- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.

In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of parliamentary

democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions, which demand innovative legalsolutions convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested

jurisprudence.

The Case

Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the

issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of theRules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution of the Commission on Elections

(Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065; and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution

of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to complete the fullcomplement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI

of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.´

The Facts and the Antecedents

Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government --the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party

or organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of

Representatives as regular members. In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- onefor a district congressman and another for a party-list representative.

Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of theConstitution, which provides:

³Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and

fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districtsapportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with

the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,

regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of

representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after theratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall

be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by

law, except the religious sector.´



Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the ³selection or election´ of party-listrepresentatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statute¶s policy

declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,

regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino

citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, andwho lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation andenactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members

of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,

sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances tocompete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.´

(italics ours.)

The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA7941) in this wise:

³Sec. 11. Number of Party- List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute

twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representativesincluding those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the

Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall beobserved:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based

on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total

votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That thosegarnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in

proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847,

prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives throughthe party-list system.

E lection of the Fourteen Party- List Representatives

On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with thenational elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions

participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-listrepresentatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two

percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimedrepresentatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The

proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as follows:

Party/Organization/ Number of Percentage of NomineesCoalition Votes Obtained Total Votes

1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. SilosMelvyn D. Eballe

2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Montemayor 3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel



4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. PilapilFEDERATION

5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga

7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde

8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P. Rosales10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz

11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez

After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the

Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters¶ Federation,Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent

to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S.Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People¶s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government

Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition toProclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It

alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in theHouse of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed

that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners,

short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.

Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed their respective Motions for Intervention,

seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise,PAG-ASA¶s Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on

August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON,PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL,

MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care,Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.

On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution

granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, inaddition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all

times, the total number of congressional seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent districtrepresentatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it

disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly

determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable themarginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives."

Second , "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." T hird, "itshould encourage [the] multi-party system.´ (Boldface in the original.) Considering these

elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one representative.´ It thus

disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election

Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission (SecondDivision) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition and motions for intervention, to include

those similarly situated.

ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of names submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as

party-list representatives, to wit:



1. SENIOR CITIZENS

2. AKAP

3. AKSYON

4. PINATUBO

5. NUPA

6. PRP

7. AMIN

8. PAG-ASA

9. MAHARLIKA

10. OCW-UNIFIL

11. FCL

12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN

13. KAMPIL

14. BANTAY BAYAN

15. AFW

16. ANG LAKAS OCW

17. WOMENPOWER, INC.

18. FEJODAP

19. CUP

20. VETERANS CARE

21. 4L

22. AWATU

23. PMP

24. ATUCP

25. NCWP

26. ALU

27. BIGAS

28. COPRA



29. GREEN

30. ANAKBAYAN

31. ARBA

32. MINFA

33. AYOS

34. ALL COOP

35. PDP-LABAN

36. KATIPUNAN

37. ONEWAY PRINT

38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS

to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in

Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.´

The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In itsResolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a

set of ³Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List RepresentativesThrough the Party-List System.´ Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be

given for every two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex ³A.´ Itapparently relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for

APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, itabandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three ³elements,´ the ³Group

of 38´ private respondents.

The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the

basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objectedto the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They

contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitionsgarnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the

House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should beallocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of

votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.

Ruling of the Comelec E n Banc

Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percentmembership of party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up,´ the Comelec en banc

resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. Inother words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons

be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the

total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had not passedthe two percent threshold?

The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two

percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two

political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x xx. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the



Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system inorder to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the

House of Representatives x x x.´ Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission fromcomplying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose

20% of the House of Representatives.´

Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority --with three commissioners concurring and two members dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of

its Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st

party(AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest

errors.´

Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirementimposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application,

holding that there were more important considerations than this statutory threshold.

Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for theissuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before thisCourt by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes

cast for the party-list system. In the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise

entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of

which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.

On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec ³to CEASEand DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on

any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations andcoalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7

January 1999 Resolution, until further orders from this Court.´

On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR

No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. RicardoBlancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for

Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae.

Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court.

Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective Memoranda

in amplification of their verbal arguments.

The Issues

The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of the

subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following issues:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the

twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b)of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?



The Court¶s Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailedResolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.

First Issue:W

hether theT

wenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is M

andatory

The pertinent provision of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representativesreads as follows:

³Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and

fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districtsapportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with

the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,

regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the

ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,

indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided bylaw, except the religious sector.´

Determination of the T otal Number of Party- List Lawmakers

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving

at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centumof the total number of representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate thislegal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:

No. of district representatives

---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list.80 representatives

This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list

seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during

the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:

208

-------- x .20 = 52.80

The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic

question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up allthe time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is ³No.´

T wenty Percent Allocation a M ere Ceiling

The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.´

According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled uphas been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by

which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election



must obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seatin the House of Representatives.

Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this

legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or

coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled upcompletely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters

themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and howmany should represent them.

On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that

the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent voterequirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it

mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.

We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys theequally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribethe mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down

only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.

In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier,

Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and

underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed itnecessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at

least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to

their total number of votes.´ Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can havemore than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b)

of the law provides:

³(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the totalvotes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those

garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or

coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.´

Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2),

Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats inCongress.

On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a

³mathematical impossibility,´ suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjustor change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. Our task now, as should have been the

Comelec¶s, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable,

implement it within the context of the actual election process.

Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies,

is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declaredunconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute

remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This isthe essence of the rule of law.

Second Issue: T he Statutory Requirement and Limitation



T he T wo Percent T hreshold

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of

representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the

deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:

³SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that

was raised by, I think, Senator Osmeña when he said that a political party must have obtained atleast a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the

party-list system.

They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5

percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for

them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through

the backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr. President."

A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives,

as the following shows:

³MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arrivingat a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats among the different

sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of the other parliaments or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany.´

Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the

specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:

³MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes.Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are

about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in

the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. Theaverage vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that

there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them havememberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What

we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it isour job to open up the system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We

think that people should organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats within thatsystem.´

The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitutionand the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative

state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representativeschosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the

mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-listsystem, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing

significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus,even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants,

and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise andcrystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation

or circumvention.



T he T hree-Seat-Per-Party Limit

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage amultiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:

³MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the partylist system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through amultiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the

implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be

there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representativesfrom any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way,

we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seatsamong the fifty. x x x.´

Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to

three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled thetwo percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership,

would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.

We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriouslychallenged in these consolidated cases.

Third Issue: M ethod of Allocating Additional Seats

Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld

the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on

this - is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectivelyreferred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their

respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is thendetermined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or

guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of

votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind thethree-seat limit further imposed by the law.

One Additional Seat Per T wo Percent Increment

One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the

votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat. Translated infigures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats;another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent

will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for

example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and PartyC, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to

5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the partieswill each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering

two or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same number of seatsas the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional representation will be

contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Courtdiscarded it.

T he Niemeyer Formula



Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list

seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be

allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total

number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting productwill be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:

No. of remaining seatsto be allocated No. of additional

--------------------------- x No. of votes of = seats of partyTotal no. of votes of party concerned concerned

qualified parties (Integer.decimal)

The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending

order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the

distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as follows:

Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total

Votes Seats Seats Seats1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7

2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 53. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4

4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4FEDERATION

5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 46. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4

7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 48. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4

9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 1 410. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3

11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 312. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3

13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52

However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those

obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total

of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of "proportional representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system.

The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in thePhilippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty

percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements --two percent for us and five for them. There are marked differences between the two models,

however. As ably pointed out by private respondents, one half of the German Parliament is filledup by party-list members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because German law

discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned,imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major

statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.

Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be

transplanted in toto here because of essential variances between the two party-list models.

T he Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines



It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demandsan equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the

number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parametersof the Filipino party-list system.

As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:

First , the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall

not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, includingthose elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are ³qualified´ to have a seat in the House of

Representatives;

T hird, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually

obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one ³qualifying´ and two additionalseats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled toshall be computed ³in proportion to their total number of votes.´

The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate ³proportional representation´ into amathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned

parameters.

After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.

Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, aswell as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties,

organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes theyeach received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes

cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the totalvotes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of

additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred toas the ³first´ party.

Step T wo. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order

to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportionalrepresentation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed thatto which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.

For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two

additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to thesame number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party.

Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seatshas already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first

one is entitled.

The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two

reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2)the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a

fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not

necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.



The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales that a fractional membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's

fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportionalrepresentation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x.´

In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature.Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The SupremeCourt does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.

Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basisgiven by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to

one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore,

for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:

Number of votesof first party Proportion of votes of

-------------------- = first party relative toTotal votes for total votes for party-list system

party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six

percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be

entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes withouta rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first

party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.

We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to themaximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the

total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for thehighest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to

which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved inthe House of Representatives.

Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to

one additional seat or a total of two seats.

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additionalseats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of

the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all wouldcontravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would

be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first partyreceived a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same

number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportionalrepresentation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of

representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant thefirst party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion

to those of the first party.

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties



Step T hree The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the

following complex fraction:

No. of votes of

concerned party------------------Total no. of votes

Additional seats for party-list system No. of additionalfor concerned = ----------------------- x seats allocated to

party No. of votes of the first partyfirst party

------------------Total no. of votes

for party list system

In simplified form, it is written as follows:

No. of votes of

Additional seats concerned party No. of additionalfor concerned = ------------------ x seats allocated to

party No. of votes of the first partyfirst party

Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is computed as

follows:

No. of votes of Additional seats ABA No. of additional

for concerned = -------------------- x seats allocated to party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party

first party (APEC)

Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:

Additional seats 321,646

for concerned = ----------- x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat, since party (ABA) 503,487 rounding off is not to be applied

Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as follows:

Organization Votes %age of Initial No. Additional TotalGarnered Total Votes of Seats Seats

1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 22. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64 1

3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62 14. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61 1

FEDERATION5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51 1

6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 17. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1

8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1PINAY

9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46 110. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1

11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39 112. COOP- 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38 1



NATCCO13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37 1

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of

votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be

zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.

The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of

additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact wholenumber is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers

and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result inthe awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining

absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximumof two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party

may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.

The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides withthe present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the

twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and methodology.

In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say, however,

that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical equation,no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it ³less strict,´

then the formula will also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.

E

pilogue

In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38)

herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and

proportional representation.

In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectivelyarrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the

power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdomand the propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.

Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents - havefailed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such

requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws, cannotsimply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere

implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourseis to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.

Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by

the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions asunconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution

prohibits, the statute permits.



Neither can we grant petitioners¶ prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the ³proportional

representation´ mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.

The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a

total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeatedthe implementation of the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already

popular in parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We shouldallow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our

tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should notdespair.

Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should

serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be moreactive and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should

also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.

With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we areconfident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience,

perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRAN T E D. The assailed Resolutions of the

Comelec are S E T ASID E and NU LL IFI E D. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties -

are AFFIR ME

D. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Date post:	09-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	arianmarketing
View:	219 times
Download:	0 times

cases for consti 1 class

Documents