LOURDES B. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ,

         Complainants,                    -versus -   JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila,

             Respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580[Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1608-MTJ] Present: CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,BRION,BERSAMIN,VILLARAMA, JR., andSERENO, JJ. Promulgated: October 6, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x 

D E C I S I O N  

BERSAMIN, J.:  

          This administrative case charges Hon. Romeo A. Rabaca, then the Presiding Judge of Branch 25 of

the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), with ignorance of the law, disregard of the law,

dereliction of duty, knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order, and violation of the Code of

Conduct for Government Officials.

 

The complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the plaintiff in Civil Case No.

176394-CV of the MeTC, an ejectment suit entitled Young Women’s Christian Association, Inc. v.

Conrado Cano.  After trial, Civil Case No. 176394-CV was decided on June 22, 2004 by respondent

Judge,[1] who disposed as follows:

 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter as follows: (a)  to vacate the premises located at Ground Floor, YMCA, 1144 Gen. Luna St.,

Ermita, Manila; and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff;  (b) to pay plaintiff the sum of Php45,211.80 representing his arrears in rentals

from February 2003 to July 2003 at Php7,535.30 a month plus the further sum of Php7,535.30 a month as reasonable value for the continued use and occupation of the premises starting August 2003 until the same is finally vacated and possession thereof is turn-over to plaintiff;

 (c) to pay the plaintiff the sum of Php20,000 as attorney’s fees; and

 (d)  to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

 

On July 12, 2004, the plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for immediate execution, praying that a

writ of execution be issued “for the immediate execution of the aforesaid Judgment.”  The plaintiff cited

Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court as basis for its motion.[2] 

 

In his order dated July 14, 2004, however, respondent Judge denied the motion for immediate

execution,[3] stating:

          A Notice of Appeal dated July 9, 2004, having been seasonably filed by counsel for the defendant, let the records of the above-captioned case be, as it is hereby ordered, elevated to the Regional Trial Court of Manila for appropriate proceedings and disposition.          In view thereof, no more action shall be taken on the Motion for Execution dated July 8, 2004 filed by the plaintiff thru counsel.          SO ORDERED.

 

          According to the complainants, their counsel talked with respondent Judge about the matter.

Allegedly, respondent Judge told their counsel that “if you think the court is wrong, file a motion for

reconsideration.” With that, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent Judge

nonetheless denied in his order dated July 28, 2004,[4]thuswise:

        Considering that the Court has already given due course to the appeal of the defendant which was perfected within the reglementary period, no more action will be taken on the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2004 filed by the plaintiff thru counsel.          The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to immediately forward the records of this case to the Regional Trial Court, Manila.          SO ORDERED.

 

          The complainants averred that respondent Judge’s denial of their motions had rendered their victory

inutile, and had unfairly deprived the plaintiff of the possession of the premises. They further averred that

respondent Judge’s refusal to perform an act mandated by the Rules of Court had given undue advantage

to the defendant to the plaintiff’s damage and prejudice. 

 

          The Court required respondent Judge to comment on the administrative complaint against him.

 

In his comment dated September 16, 2004,[5] respondent Judge denied the charges. He explained

that he had honestly thought that his court had lost jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the provision of

Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (which provides that “in appeals by notice of appeal, the court

loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of

the time to appeal of the other parties”) once he had given due course to the defendant’s  notice of

appeal. He claimed that he had issued the orders in good faith and with no malice after a fair and

impartial evaluation of the facts, applicable rules, and jurisprudence; and that if he had thereby committed

lapses in the issuance of the orders, his doing so should be considered as error of judgment on his part.

 

          He lastly insisted that he did not know personally the parties in Civil Case No. 176394-CV, and had

absolutely no reason to give undue favor or advantage to the defendant; that the complainants did not

submit evidence to show that the orders had been issued for a consideration, material or otherwise, or that

his issuance of the orders had been motivated by ill-will or bad faith.

 

          In their reply dated September 22, 2004,[6] the complainants contended that respondent Judge

exhibited his ignorance of the law and procedure in relying on Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of

Court which referred to appeals from the Regional Trial Court; that Rule 40, which contained provisions

on appeal from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts, and which provided in its Section

4 that the perfection of the appeal and the effect of such perfection should be governed by the provisions

of Section 9 of Rule 41, concerned appeals by notice of appeal in general; and that instead, the applicable

rule should be Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

 

          The complainants pointed out that respondent Judge apparently did not know that appeal in forcible

entry and detainer cases was not perfected by the mere filing of a notice of appeal (as in ordinary actions)

but by filing of a notice of appeal and a sufficient supersedeas bond approved by the trial judge executed

to the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed

from. They asserted that respondent Judge’s invocation of good faith and error of judgment did not

absolve him of liability, because he had grossly neglected his duties mandated by law by failing and

refusing to act on their motion for immediate execution and motion for reconsideration and by giving due

course to the appeal despite no supersedeas bond having been filed and approved by the trial court.

 

          In his memorandum dated January 13, 2005,[7] then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,

now Associate Justice of the Court, recommended that the administrative complaint against respondent

Judge be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and that respondent Judge be fined in the amount

of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely,

based on an evaluation of the charges, as follows:

        EVALUATION:  We agree with the complainants that respondent erred when he did not act on complainants’ motion for immediate execution.          Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides: 

“SEC. 19.  If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. XXXX  XXXX  XXXX.”

          It is clear from the foregoing that the perfection of an appeal by itself is not sufficient to stay the execution of the judgment in an ejectment case.  The losing party should likewise file a supersedeas bond executed in favor of the plaintiff to answer for rents, damages and costs, and, if the judgment of the court requires it, he should likewise deposit the amount of the rent before the appellate court from the time during the pendency of the appeal.  Otherwise, execution becomes ministerial and imperative.  (Philippine Holding Corporation vs. Valenzuela, 104 SCRA 401 as cited in Hualam Construction and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 612, 626).          In the case at bar, defendant seasonably filed his Notice of Appeal dated 9 July 2004 on 13 July 2004; he however failed to file any supersedeas bond.  Prior to the filing of such notice of appeal, more specifically on 12 July 2004, complainants have already filed their Motion for Execution dated 8 July 2004.  Instead of acting on the Motion for Execution, respondent Judge Rabaca gave due course to the appeal in an Order dated 14 July 2004 and directed his Branch Clerk of Court to elevate the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).  The Branch Clerk of Court however failed to forward the records to the RTC.  This fact is clear from Judge Rabaca’s Order dated 28 July 2004 wherein he directed the Branch Clerk of Court to forward the records of the case to the Manila Regional Trial Court immediately.          From the foregoing, it is clear that when the complainant moved for the immediate execution of Judge Rabaca’s decision, the latter still had jurisdiction over the case.  He therefore clearly erred when he refused to act on the Motion for Execution.  The relevant question that we should resolve however is whether such error is an error of judgment or an error amounting to incompetence that calls for administrative discipline.          Judge Rabaca claims that he refused to act on the complainant’s Motion for execution because he honestly thought that when he gave due course to the defendant’s appeal which was seasonably filed, and ordered the elevation of the records to the

appellate court, his court already lost jurisdiction over the case..  In making his ruling, respondent asserts he relied on the provisions of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.  This provision reads as follows: 

In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. He likewise allegedly relied on the ruling of the Court in Administrative Matter

OCA IPI No. 03-1513-MTJ: Susana Joaquin Vda. De Agregado vs. Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina, MeTJ wherein the Court said that-

 Respondent Judge is correct in saying that she had lost jurisdiction to

entertain the motion for execution after the perfection of the appeal and after she issued an order to transmit the records of the case to the appellate court for review.

 The facts of the case against Judge Bunyi-Medina are however different from those

prevailing in the instant case.  In the Medina case, the fifteen (15) day period within which to perfect the appeal had already lapsed before the complainant therein moved for the execution of the execution judgment.  Clearly therefore, appeal had already been perfected.  In the instant case, although the defendant had filed his appeal, the period to appeal had not yet lapsed since the plaintiff still had his own period to appeal from the judgment and such period had not yet lapsed.  The provision relied upon by judge Rabaca, more specifically, Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, clearly states that, “In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon perfection of the appeals filed on due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.”  Moreover and more importantly, the herein complainants filed their Motion for Execution even before the defendant had filed his Notice of Appeal. Such motion was therefore still well within the jurisdiction of the lower court.

 It is basic rule in ejectment cases that the execution of judgment in favor of the

plaintiff is a matter of right and mandatory.  This has been the consistent ruling of the Court in a number of cases involving the same issue posed before the respondent judge.  Respondent Judge is expected to know this and his justification of erroneous application of the law, although mitigating, could not exculpate him from liability.

 

          We agree with and adopt the evaluation of the Court Administrator.

 

          Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiff’s motion for immediate

execution considering that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond despite having

appealed. Granting the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution became his ministerial duty upon the

defendant’s failure to file the sufficient supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of

Court clearly imposes such duty, viz:

 Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. — If judgment is

rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion,

unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.

xxx

 

          Respondent Judge’s excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the defendant’s

appeal, was unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of the aforequoted rule . To begin with, the

perfection of the appeal by the defendant did not forbid the favorable action on the plaintiff’s  motion for

immediate execution. The execution of the decision could not be stayed by the mere taking of the appeal.

Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit with the appellate court of the amount

of rent due from time to time, coupled with the perfection of the appeal, could stay the execution.

Secondly, he could not also credibly justify his omission to act according to the provision by claiming

good faith or honest belief, or by asserting lack of malice or bad faith. A rule as clear and explicit as

Section 19 could not be misread or misapplied, but should be implemented without evasion or hesitation.

To us, good faith, or honest belief, or lack of malice, or lack of bad faith justifies a non-compliance only

when there is an as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or applicability of a rule or legal provision. It was

not so herein. And, thirdly, given that his court, being vested with original exclusive jurisdiction over

cases similar to Civil Case No. 176394-CV, had been assigned many such cases, he was not a trial judge

bereft of the pertinent prior experience to act on the issue of immediate execution, a fact that further

exposed the abject inanity of his excuses.

 

          We agree with the complainants’ insistence, therefore, that respondent Judge’s omission to apply

Section 19 was inexcusable. He had ignored the urging to follow the clear and explicit provision of the

rule made in the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution. Had he any genuine doubt about his authority

to grant the motion for immediate execution, as he would have us believe, he could have easily and

correctly resolved the doubt by a resort to the Rules of Court, which he well knew was the repository of

the guidelines he was seeking for his judicial action. Neither was it relevant that he did not know any of

the parties, or that he did not corruptly favor the defendant by his omission. His mere failure to perform a

duty enjoined by the Rules of Court sufficed to render him administratively accountable.

 

          This case is an opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to adhere always to the

mandate under Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court to issue writs of execution upon motion of the

plaintiffs in actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer when the defendant has appealed but has not

filed a sufficient supersedeas bond. The summary nature of the special civil action under Rule 70 and the

purpose underlying the mandate for an immediate execution, which is to prevent the plaintiffs from being

further deprived of their rightful possession, should always be borne in mind.

 

          The recommended penalty of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act

would be dealt with more severely is also correct. The Court Administrator rationalized the

recommendation of the penalty thuswise:

 Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, ‘Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure’ is

classified as serious offense for which the imposable penalty ranges from a fine to dismissal. However, we find respondent’s acts not ingrained with malice or bad faith. It is a matter of public policy that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corrupt motive, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. In Domingo vs. Judge Pagayatan, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1751, 10 June 2003, the penalty of fine in the amount of five thousand pesos was deemed sufficient where it was held that respondent’s lack of malice or bad faith frees him from administrative liability but not for gross ignorance of the law.

 

We concur with the rationalization of the Court Administrator. Verily, even

if  respondent  Judge’s omission  would have  easily amounted to gross

ignorance of the law and procedure, a serious offense under Section 8,[8] Rule

140, of the Rules of Court, as amended, the fact that the complainants did not establish that malice or bad

faith impelled his omission to act, or that fraud, dishonesty, or a corrupt motive attended his omission to

act demands a downgrading of the liability. In the absence of any showing that he had been held guilty of

any other administrative offense,[9]  and without our attention being called to other circumstances that

might demonstrate respondent Judge’s dark motives for his inaction, we should find and consider the

recommended penalty of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be

dealt with more severely to be commensurate to the offense.[10]

 

          WHEREFORE, we find respondent JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Presiding Judge of Branch

25, Metropolitan Trial Court, in Manila guilty of ignorance of the law and procedure, and, accordingly,

impose upon him a fine of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be

dealt with more severely.

         

          SO  ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157604 October 19, 2005

GEORGE V. BENEDICTO, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. CHUA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul the Resolution,1 dated March 21, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73919 for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Petitioner George V. Benedicto is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 736 square meters located in Carlos Hilado Highway, Bacolod City. He entered into a contract of lease with private respondent Romeo G. Chua on October 15, 2000. Under the contract, the lease was to start on November 15, 2000. The contract also stipulated that the rent would be P7,000 monthly.

Chua immediately started constructing a hollow-block fence, conformably with paragraph 6 of their contract, to wit:

6. … the Lessee may introduce any improvements and additions on the land, and at the termination of the lease, he may remove the same, except the fence surrounding and enclosing the property, the cost of which shall be equally divided into twenty-four (24) months and the amount thereof be deducted from the rent until the same shall have been completely set-off.…2

On November 13, 2000, Chua paid Benedicto P28,000 representing deposit for one month and advance rent for three months. Thereafter, Chua failed to pay the rent prompting Benedicto to send a demand letter after a fruitless amicable settlement at the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa.

Chua did not pay. Hence, Benedicto filed a case against Chua for unlawful detainer and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 26881, with the Municipal Trial Court in Bacolod City, Branch 3. In turn, Chua filed with the same court a petition for consignation docketed as Civil Case No. 26911.

The MTCC dismissed the consignation case for lack of jurisdiction as the said case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. The MTCC found merit in the complaint for unlawful detainer and damages. It ordered Romeo G. Chua and all persons acting for and under him or on his behalf, (1) to immediately vacate or surrender possession of the leased premises to therein plaintiff; (2) to pay plaintiff P19,500, covering the period from March 15, 2001 to August 14, 2001, and thereafter, the additional or further amount of P4,500 only per month until said premises was vacated and until the P2,500 monthly credit in favor of the defendant was exhausted reckoned from February 15, 2001 to January 14, 2003 whichever comes first; and (3) to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000 as attorney’s fee and P5,000 for costs and other expenses.3

Chua appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 43. In its Decision,4 dated August 30, 2002, the RTC modified the MTCC judgment. It dismissed the case for consignation, for lack of tender of payment and prior notice; ordered Chua to immediately vacate or peacefully surrender possession to Benedicto; ordered the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court in the City of Bacolod to turn over to Benedicto P46,500 and P18,000 upon presentation of the original receipts; ordered Benedicto to pay Chua P6,136.39 representing the remaining value of the improvement constructed by the former, which is the perimeter hollow block fence, and deliver to Chua P4,672.64 deposited by the latter with the aforementioned judicial authorities in the excess of the rental of the property as computed by the Court; and ordered Chua to pay Benedicto the P10,000, attorney’s fees and P5,000 for cost and other expenses. The RTC also denied all other claims and counterclaims of the parties.5

On November 19, 2002, Chua filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review with prayer for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.

Meanwhile, on November 22, 2002, in Civil Case No. 02-11643, the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 43 issued a Writ of Execution.6

However, in view of the aforesaid petition for review, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order on December 23, 2002, enjoining the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 43, from enforcing its Decision in Civil Case No. 02-11643.

Upon receipt of the said TRO, Presiding Judge Philadelfa B. Pagapong-Agraviador replied in a letter dated January 2, 2003 as follows:

Pertinent to your telegram dated December 23, 2002 received by the undersigned on the same date, please be informed that returns were made by Mr. Leoncio Yongque, Jr., Deputy Sheriff of this branch, on the partial execution of the Court’s Decision dated August 30, 2002 in the aforementioned case. Attached for your ready reference are the following annexes:

A – Sheriff’s return dated December 5, 2002;

B – Sheriff’s return dated December 16, 2002;

C – Sheriff’s return dated December 23, 2002.

Also attached is the undersigned’s Memorandum to the branch sheriff enjoining him from fully implementing the Writ of Execution dated November 22, 2002.

[Concomitant] to your resolution granting defendant’s application for a Temporary Restraining Order, there being no complete execution of the assailed decision, undersigned undertakes that no further execution shall be implemented until further order from your court.7

On April 4, 2003, Benedicto filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Dissolve/Quash Temporary Restraining Order8 on the ground that the TRO had already become moot and academic.

In his Comment9 to the said Manifestation and Motion, Chua replied that the writ of execution issued by the RTC had not been fully implemented because his properties and the improvements were still within the subject premises.

The Court of Appeals ruled on the said Manifestation and Motion, in its assailed Resolution of March 21, 2003, as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, let the writ of preliminary injunction be issued in this case upon the posting of a P100,000.00 injunction bond restraining the respondents from prohibiting the petitioner from entering the subject premises and/or from conducting business thereon just like before the controversy between the parties had arisen. For this purpose, respondent is hereby ordered to remove anything that was placed to block the display room of the petitioner and to remove the padlock and to open the gate so that petitioner may resume his usual business in the premises, all pending resolution of the instant petition for review.

. . .

SO ORDERED.10

Clearly, the sole issue in this case is: Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned writ of preliminary injunction, despite the immediately executory character of RTC judgments in ejectment cases?

Herein petitioner Benedicto contends that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction even if it was not prayed for. Granting arguendo that said provisional remedy was prayed for, Benedicto insists preliminary injunction does not lie as judgments of the RTC against the defendant in ejectment suits are immediately executory even pending appeal. Benedicto also argues that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, in effect, disposed of the main case without trial. Benedicto further points out that the act sought to be enjoined by the preliminary injunction was already fait accompli.

For his part, Chua counters that the present petition cannot be resorted to without a prior motion for reconsideration to allow public respondent Court of Appeals to correct the error imputed to it. He also maintains that there was only partial delivery of possession to Benedicto; hence, the acts sought to be enjoined had not yet become fait accompli. Finally, Chua stresses that despite the executory character of the RTC judgment against the defendant in ejectment cases, injunctive relief may still be granted.

We find petitioner’s arguments without sufficient basis.

First, a preliminary injunction may be granted even if not prayed for as long as the requisites therefor are present. More so if it is prayed for. Second, contrary to petitioner’s contention, the questioned writ of preliminary injunction did not dispose of the main case without trial. The writ merely suspended the execution of the RTC judgment pending appeal. It bears stressing that the main case, subject of the petition for review, is still yet to be resolved by the Court of Appeals. Lastly, it is evident from Judge Pagapong-Agraviador’s letter11 that the impugned judgment is not yet fully executed. Thus, the acts sought to be enjoined by the assailed writ of preliminary injunction are not yet fait accompli.

Rule 70, Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Court on Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer states:

Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. – The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.

This section presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and decides to appeal to a superior court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course.12 It is our opinion that on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances so require.

In the case of Amagan v. Marayag,13 we reiterated our pronouncement in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño14 that the proceedings in an ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found. We further drew a fine line between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, thus:

Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.15

Patently, even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted. There need only be clear showing that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate said right.16

In this case, we note that the petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals raises substantial issues meriting serious consideration. Chua’s putative right to continued possession of the premises stands to be violated if the adverse judgment of the RTC were to be fully executed. Hence, the complete execution of the RTC judgment could be held in abeyance, through a writ of preliminary injunction, until final resolution of the main controversy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution, dated March 21, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73919 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1206 October 22, 1999

NORTHCASTLE PROPERTIES And ESTATE CORPORATION represented by JENNYLYN L. CHUA., complainants, vs. Acting Presiding Judge ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, MeTC, Branch 45, Pasay City, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

PARDO, J.:

Competence is a mark of a good judge. All judges must be competent and, of course, possessed of the highest degree of integrity.

The present complaint arose from a judge's interpretation of Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, involving an ejectment case.

In a complaint dated December 4, 1997, Northcastle Properties and Estate Corporation (hereafter Northcastle) represented by Jennylyn Chua charge Acting Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas with gross ignorance of the law and/or grave abuse of discretion in relation to her acts in Civil Case No. 546-96 entitled "Northcastle Properties and Estate Corporation vs. Sajjan Thadani, et al." for unlawful detainer.

Judge Paas denied a motion for execution despite the decision of the Regional Trial Court affirming the Metropolitan Trial Court's decision ordering the ejectment of the lessees from the subject premises.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Northcastle is the owner of a townhouse unit located at No. 229 Roxas Seafront Garden, Pasay City, leased to Sajjan Thadani, Lavina Thadani, a.k.a. Lavi S. Pamani in April 1992.

Before the expiration of the lease contract on April 28, 1996, complainants notified the Thadanis that it would no longer renew the lease and that they had to vacate the premises on April 28, 1996. Complainants later on gave them an extension until June 30, 1996 but the occupants still failed to vacate the premises.

Thus complainants filed an unlawful detainer case 1 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 45.

On November 21, 1996, Presiding Judge Manuel G. Garcia rendered a decision ordering the Thadanis to vacate the premises.

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, 2 Presiding Judge Lilia C. Lopez affirmed the decision of the trial court with some modification as to the rentals to be paid by defendants.

On June 25, 1997 Northcastle moved for execution of the decision 3 in accordance with Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. On September 11, 1997, however, Judge Paas denied the motion. Complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial but Judge Paas likewise denied it without any explanation as to why she considered the motion not meritorious.

Hence, this complaint.

After investigation, on June 4, 1999, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo submitted the following recommendation:

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are the following recommendations.

1. that the instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as an administrative matter; and

2. A FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 be imposed against respondent Judge Estrellita M. Paas for Gross Ignorance of the Law with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. 4

In her answer, 5 Judge Paas contended that Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules on Civil Procedure allows the stay of execution of judgment if the defendant files sufficient supersedeas bond and deposits to the appellate court from time to time the amount of rent due under the contract. Since Thadanis deposited sufficient supersedeas bond and are up to date in depositing the monthly rental of P17,000.00 including 20% rental increase, Judge Paas stayed execution of the judgment. She cited the case of Heirs of J.B.L. Reyes vs. Metro Manila Builders, Inc., 6 where the Court of Appeals granted a temporary restraining order restraining the court of origin from enforcing the execution until final disposition of the case.

Northcastle on the other hand argued that the word "shall" in Section 21, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure means that it is the ministerial duty of the court to immediately execute the decision. Such interpretation, according to complainants, is consistent with the summary nature of ejectment proceedings.

A careful perusal of the two provisions reveals the applicability of Section 19 only to ejectment cases pending appeal with the Regional Trial Court, and Section 21 to those decided by the Regional Trial Court.

Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provides:

Sec. 19.Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. — If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.

All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the

payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.

After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the Court by the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.

On the other hand, Section 21, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provides:

Sec. 21.Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court — The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. (Emphasis supplied)

We agree with the complainants.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court in an ejectment case is immediately executory without prejudice to a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.

Judge Paas based her decision on her personal experience in an ejectment case, where the Court of Appeals restrained the execution of the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court. However, she missed one point — the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals in that case had in no way amended the law. It was just an isolated incident which ought not to restrain her from applying the correct legal provision in the absence of any TRO or injunction issued by a superior court.

Judge Paas' application of Section 19 showed her utter lack of familiarity with the Rules, which undermines the public confidence in the competence of our courts. Such act constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

The serious nature of the tasks of judges requires them to be mindful in rendering their decisions lest a party be unjustly deprived of his rights. We cannot over-emphasize the fact that as an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected to be abreast with and proficient in the interpretation of our laws. A judge should be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with the statutes and procedural rules. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence, which goes against Canon 3, specifically Rule 3.01, of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, respondent judge owes the public and the court she sits in to be proficient in the law. She must have the basic rules at the palm of her hand as she is expected to maintain professional competence at all times. 9

WHEREFORE, we resolve to impose on JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.1âwphi1.nêt

G.R. No. 197124 March 19, 2012

ALPA-PCM, INC., Petitioner, vs. VINCENT BULASAO, JULIET BULASAO and SUSANA BULASAO, HONORABLE JUDGE DANILO F. CAMACHO, and THE DEPUTY SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LA TRINIDAD, BENGUET, Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

BRION, J.:

The petitioner, ALPA-PCM, Inc. (ALPA-PCM), filed with the Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for the reversal of the decision1 dated January 6, 2011 and the resolution2 dated May 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 102417. On July 6, 2011, the Court denied the petition for failure to find any reversible error in the assailed CA rulings.3 ALPA-PCM filed the present motion seeking a reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In 2004, the private respondents, Vincent, Juliet and Susana, all surnamed Bulasao (the Bulasaos) filed an action for unlawful detainer against ALPA-PCM before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.4 The MTC ruled in favor of the Bulasaos and ordered ALPA-PCM to vacate the subject property in a decision dated May 31, 2006.5 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 62, affirmed the MTC’s ruling in a decision dated July 31, 2007.6

On August 13, 2007, the Bulasaos filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Three days after or on August 16, 2007, ALPA-PCM filed its motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision dismissing its appeal, which the RTC denied on October 25, 2007. Intending to seek recourse against the RTC rulings via an appeal, ALPA-PCM initially filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition/Appeal on November 13, 2007.

In the meantime, the RTC granted the Bulasaos’ motion for execution through an order dated November 21, 2007. ALPA-PCM sought reconsideration of the November 21, 2007 order, but the RTC denied the motion in an order dated February 5, 2008. The RTC subsequently issued a writ of execution on February 12, 2008. ALPA-PCM questioned the RTC orders granting execution of the decision, as well as the writ of execution itself, before the CA by filing a separate certiorari petition. ALPA-PCM alleged that the RTC’s orders authorizing the execution of the decision in favor of the Bulasaos are null and void, since the filing of its appeal with the CA deprived the RTC of jurisdiction to issue the orders.

In a decision dated January 6, 2011, the CA dismissed ALPA-PCM’s petition,8 finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in granting the Bulasaos’ motion for execution. The CA declared that the RTC had power to grant execution pending appeal as part of its residual jurisdiction under Section 8, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

As stated earlier, ALPA-PCM took exception from the CA’s ruling by filing a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. It argued that there must be good reasons to justify execution pending appeal and cited as basis Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. It pointed out that the RTC failed to state good

reasons that justified the writ of execution. We denied ALPA-PCM’s petition in our Resolution of July 6, 2011.

In support of its motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution, ALPA-PCM reiterated the above arguments and added that the RTC acted with undue haste in granting the Bulasaos’ motion for writ of execution. It alleged that the filing of a motion for execution by the Bulasaos (August 13, 2007) preceded its filing of a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision (August 16, 2007); hence, the motion for execution was premature since the decision sought to be executed was still for further review by the RTC. It cited the Court’s ruling in JP Latex Technology, Inc. v. Ballons Granger Balloons, Inc.,9 which said that "[w]here there is a pending motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision, an order execution (sic) pending appeal is improper and premature."

THE COURT’S RULING

The Court fails to find any substantial argument raised by ALPA-PCM that merits a reconsideration of our earlier Resolution.

Execution pending appeal of decisions in ejectment cases

Rule 42 of the Rules of Court governs the appeal of a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; the appeal is made by filing a petition for review with the CA.10 Despite the filing of a petition with the CA, however, Rule 42 grants the RTC residual jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal, so long as (1) the CA has not yet given due course to the petition, and (2) the requirements of Section 2, Rule 39 are observed. The relevant portion of Section 8, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 8. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof — (a) x x x

However, before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the petition, the Regional Trial Court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.

Under Section 6, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, the CA can give due course to a petition for review when it finds prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the appealed decision.11 This initial determination by the CA can take place only when the proper pleadings have actually been filed before the CA, enabling it to study the facts of the case and the alleged errors of the assailed ruling. In other words, the CA can give due course to an appeal of the RTC decision only (1) after the filing of a petition for review, and (2) upon the filing of the comment or other pleading required by the CA, or the expiration of the period for the filing thereof without such comment or pleading having been submitted.

When the RTC granted the Bulasaos’ motion for execution pending appeal on November 21, 2007, ALPA-PCM has not yet filed its petition for review with the CA; what ALPA-PCM filed on November 13, 2007 was only a motion for extension of time to file its petition. In the absence of any petition for review actually filed with the CA, the CA could clearly not have given due course to ALPA-PCM’s

appeal. The RTC, thus, retained its residual jurisdiction over the case to authorize execution of the decision.

The Court also fails to find anything irregular in the filing by the Bulasaos of a motion for execution ahead of the filing by ALPA-PCM of its motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision. ALPA-PCM misconstrues our ruling in JP Latex Technology, Inc. v. Ballons Granger Balloons, Inc.12 The ruling does not prevent the prevailing party from filing a motion for execution until after the adverse party has filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment. The RTC, however, is precluded from acting on the motion for execution until it has resolved the motion for reconsideration. In the present case, the RTC heeded this rule, as it granted the Bulasaos’ motion for execution only after it has resolved to deny ALPA-PCM’s motion for reconsideration of its decision.

Immediate execution of the RTC decision on appeal to CA or SC

After affirming the RTC’s power to allow execution, we now consider ALPA-PCM’s claim that the RTC must nonetheless cite good reasons justifying execution, citing as basis Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

The Court reminds ALPA-PCM, particularly its counsel, Atty. Guillermo R. Bandonil, Jr., that this case originated from the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the Bulasaos against it. Actions for unlawful detainer are governed primarily by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure13 and suppletorily by the Rules of Court.14 Section 21 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure states that:

Sec. 21. Appeal. — The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate regional trial court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the regional trial court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed.

The above rule, without any qualification whatsoever, has decreed the immediately executory nature of decisions of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, involving cases falling under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. It requires no further justification or even "good reasons" for the RTC to authorize execution, even if an appeal has already been filed before the CA. Indeed, the provision does not even require a bond to be filed by the prevailing party to allow execution to proceed.15 The rationale for this is the objective of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases governed by it. This objective provides the "good reason" that justifies immediate execution of the decision, if the standards of Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on execution pending appeal, as what ALPA-PCM insists, are considered.

Notwithstanding the rule’s objective and clear mandate, losing litigants and their lawyers are determined to stall execution by misusing judicial remedies, putting forth arguments that, by simple logic, can easily be resolved by a basic reading of the applicable laws and rules. When judicial remedies are misused to delay the resolution of cases, the Rules of Court authorizes the imposition of sanctions. Section 3, Rule 142 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 3. Costs when appeal frivolous.—Where an action or an appeal is found to be frivolous, double or treble costs may be imposed on the plaintiff or appellant, which shall be paid by his attorney, if so ordered by the court.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DENY the ALPA-PCM, Inc.’s motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated July 6, 2011. For instituting a frivolous appeal manifestly intended for delay, the Court imposes treble costs against ALPA-PCM, Inc., to be paid by its counsel, Atty. Guillermo R. Bandonil, Jr.

SO ORDERED.