Cases in Legal Ethics[1]

5/24/2018 Cases in Legal Ethics[1]

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI,plaintiff-appellee,vs.ANTONIO MA. CUI,defendant-appellant,ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.

Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofilea for defendant-appellant.Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.

MAKALINTAL, J .:

This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu.The office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili.Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, andappealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui andDoa Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigentinvalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by

legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925) andendowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations,principally the deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926.

Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, incase of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate,in the order prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:

Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nossustituyan nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte oincapacidad se hallare residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino

politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuvieseresidiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestrootro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamenteel HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estosdos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILIpasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que desciendalegitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui,Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o medico,


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o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estadomayor impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida elvaron de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion.Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas cualificaciones, laadministracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al senor Obispo

de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica,Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en sudefecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio untilher death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and DionisioJakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter,beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning theposition of administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case,reference will be made later in this decision.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons ofMariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui.On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned infavor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them andembodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took hisoath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or ofhis brother's assumption of the position.

Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote aletter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13

September 1960, the demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed thecomplaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the sameoffice, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by thefounders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualificationsto the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equalcircumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation.However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one,among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo deabogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que

pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."

The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma.Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify himas one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and althoughdisbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated


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by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumedthe position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.

The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulode abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the

deed of donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it shouldnot be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degreeor diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by thedefendant and by the intervenor.

We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo deabogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws butmembership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice oflaw. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado paraejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Espaola, Real

Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en

el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, losderechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones opuntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by alaw school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle itsholder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer orattorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference tothat class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear,prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities aredevolved by law as a consequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority

of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Barexaminations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk ofCourt, this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic degreeof Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except asevidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has"successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university,officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however,possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribedcourses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularlyunder the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone throughany formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to

qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessaryqualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that suchpersons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degreeof Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoingtest advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administratorshould be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these,


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should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. Alawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees ofthe Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b);shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitutepersons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and

conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act;and shall administer properties of considerable value for all of which work, it is to bepresumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the professionwould be a distinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against thedefendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is amember of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deedof donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground,among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moralcharacter. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court

on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however,that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office ofadministrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proofno less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts beadmitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the partiesadducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation offacts.1wph1.t

Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the

sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking,on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartialadministration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation thereinin the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like acandidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of goodmoral character a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take intoconsideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, thenature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conductsubsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between thedisbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement,notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, andthe requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the same as for originaladmission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proofthan in an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)

The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicantis "of good moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when


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applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with theprivileges of the office of an attorney, and whether his mental qualifications aresuch as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the moralattributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from his mentalqualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).

As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seekingreinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied inparagraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in thiscase. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions anddisabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of timeamounting the prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16,Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one(1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold the office arose.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as1932. On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr.Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. MarianoCui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The case wasdismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to thecomplaint and complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from theorder of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil.37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in the decision ofthis Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued asadministrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui

accepted a position as assistant administrator.

Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicialmaneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention ofoccupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up with anotherletter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office before a notary public onlyon 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from theSocial Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the positionas stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was

referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effectruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration ofthe Hospicio.

Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March1950, the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in theCourt of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen


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the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then filed a third-party complaint againstherein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath asadministrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by the opinionof the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the groundthat he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of the Hospicio.

The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he wasable to take another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay, andsoon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. PresidentMagsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court, stated in atelegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court maydisregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and theother parties in the case filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. Theplaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trialCourt again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereuponinstituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which wasdecided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the

appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion ofthe parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ...should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbentby whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbentadministrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo warranto was filed against himby plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal.

On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court asmember of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned asadministrator in his favor, pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the

same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.

The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided thefirst case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for furtherproceedings; his acceptance instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowingDr. Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator and his failure to file an action in quowarranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that theconflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an action all thesecircumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule that anaction in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold

the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. TeodoroCui after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of thestatutory period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant'sassumption of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any better,for the basis of the action is his own right to the office and it is from the time such rightarose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the incumbentbegan to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs.Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.


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Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer,grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentionedby them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant

Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. Thedeed of donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those

appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor deedad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimosMariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... Enigualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente dequien tenia ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant thanRomulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when thecircumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of thefounders was to confer the administration by line and successively to the descendantsof the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, sincethe last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, thenext administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor

belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed ofdonation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from isreversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention aredismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Regala, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. L-31429 December 19, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.ROSCOE DABAN y GANZON, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

Roscoe Daban appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, findinghim guilty of murder, sentencing him to death and ordering him to pay the heirs ofConrado de la Cruz an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 11863).

According to the prosecution's evidence, at about four o'clock in the afternoon of July17, 1967 Roscoe Daban, Angel Balasote, Jr. and three unidentified persons were riding


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in a 1965 Chevrolet Malibu red car with white top (Plate No. L-19604, Quezon City,1967) which stopped beside a jeep parked in front of the Philippine National BankBuilding near Plaza Libertad in Iloilo City.

Right after the car stopped, Daban, who was in the front seat of the car, pulled his pistol

and fired three or four times at Conrado de la Cruz who was leaning against the jeep.After the shooting, the driver drove the car in the direction of the Colegio del SagradoCorazon de Jesus. On reaching the corner of P. Burgos and J. Rizal Streets, it abruptlyturned to the right, causing its tires to screech, and then it disappeared from view.

De la Cruz, on being shot, staggered and fell face down on the pavement behind theparked jeep. Two Constabulary soldiers arrived at the scene of the shooting, placed Dela Cruz in their jeep and took him to the Polyclinic Hospital where he died. LieutenantColonel Lauro T. Margate, the Constabulary provincial commander, and his men startedlooking for Daban sometime after the shooting. They could not find him.

The autopsy disclosed that De la Cruz, 42, had an entrance gunshot wound in thechest. The bullet perforated his left lung and exited at the inner scapular region. He hadalso an entrance gunshot wound in the abdomen. The bullet perforated his colon andtwo loops of the ilium and exited at the left lateral lumbar region. Another bullet hit hisleft forearm and exited below his left elbow (Exh. A). The victim was a forklift driver offormer Congressman Pascual Espinosa and later of the Negros Navigation Company.

Shortly after eight o'clock in the morning of the following day, July 18, LieutenantColonel Margate received two telephone cause from Congressman Espinosa apprisinghim that the car used by Daban (a nephew of Senator Rodolfo Ganzon) was beinghastily repainted in Mendoza's Auto Painting Shop located near Senator Ganzon's

residence on Timawa Avenue, Molo.

Margate and his men went to the shop and found that the Chevrolet Malibu car had justbeen repainted black and that the top still retained its white color. The black paint wasfresh and the red paint was still discernible. Margate got the car plates with No. L-19604from Jaime Mendoza, the owner of the shop.

The peace officers were informed by Mendoza that the car was brought to the shopbefore seven o'clock on that same morning by a certain Burton, a factotum of EdwinDaban, the brother of accused Roscoe Daban, with the request that the car berepainted black "right away". The car was impounded and towed to the Constabulary

headquarters.

Found inside its glove compartment was a statement of account of the Philippine LongDistance Telephone Company mailed to Roscoe Daban together with the toll chargesfor the long distance phone calls made through Roscoe's phone number 62-11 (Exh. Lto 0-4).


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Investigation disclosed that the car was shipped from Manila on the M/S Elcano by D. L.Teruel Tobacco Co., Inc. and was consigned to Roscoe Daban as shown in the bill oflading dated July 8, 1967 (Exh. D). The bill of lading revealed that the plate number ofthe car when it was shipped to Iloilo nine days before the killing was L-7914 '66.

About a month after the shooting, Senator Rodolfo Ganzon broadcasted over the radiothat he was responsible for the arrest of the accused in Manila in connection with thekilling of De la Cruz.

Daban escaped from the national penitentiary on June 15, 1971 (See People vs.Daban, 43 SCRA 185, 189; 68 O.G. 2945). He was recaptured. But on June 13, 1976,while confined in the Philippine General Hospital, he again escaped. Up to this time, hiswhereabouts are unknown. (Note that while at large, Daban was charged with murder inCriminal Case No. 5655 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal for having killed AntolinFerrer on April 25, 1972 in Makati, Rizal in conspiracy with two other persons.)

In this case, an amended information for murder was filed against Daban, EdgardoAlfonten, Angel Balasote, Jr., Rafael Velasco and an unidentified person. Only Dabanand Balasote were brought to trial. Daban did not testify. Three witnesses declared thaton the day of the shooting Daban was in Bacolod City.

His two other witnesses testified that the killer was tall, dark and slender and has nomole on the left cheek. (Daban has a mole on the left cheek). As rhetorically asked bythe trial Court: how did they know that the killer was tall when he was sitting at the timehe shot De la Cruz? The testimonies of the defense witnesses evoked disbelief insteadof generating credence.

The trial court did not believe Daban's alibi. It gave credence to the testimony of VicenteFelisario, 38, a bystander who claimed to be an eyewitness to the shooting. He surfacedas a witness more than six months after the shooting or on February 3, 1968 when hegave his statement to the constabulary investigator (Exh. GG). The trial court regardedFelisario's testimony as sufficient for the conviction of Daban. It acquitted Balasote.

Appellant Daban, in order to show that Felisario was mistaken and that the trial courterred in assuming that the repainted car was the one used in the killing, tried to provethat the said car was a red and blackcar because its white top was covered bya detachable black vinyl material (Exh. 2).

Edwin Daban, 29 (the elder brother of the accused), who allegedly got the car fromthe M/S Elcanowhen it arrived in Iloilo City, testified that the black vinyl materialconcealed the white top of the car. Mendoza declared that after placing black paint onthe red body of the car, it took him about ninety minutes to remove the black vinyl coverof the top, thus exposing its original white color. At that juncture, the Constabulary menarrived in his shop and informed him that the car was used in shooting De la Cruz. So,Mendoza was not able to complete the repainting of the car.


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We hold that even if it were assumed that Felisario was mistaken in testifying that thecar had a white top, that error would not be sufficient to cast doubt as to RoscoeDaban's guilt. Felisario correctly Identified the car as having a red body and twoantennas at the rear and as bearing the plate number which is the number found in thetwo plates surrendered by Mendoza to the Constabulary officers (Exh. HH).

That car was consigned to Roscoe Daban nine days before the shooting (Exh. D) andits glove compartment contained the telephone bills sent to Roscoe by the PLDT (Exh. Lto 0-4).

Appellant's counsel contends that the trial court erred in finding that Roscoe shot De laCruz. That finding was based mainly on the eyewitness-testimony of Felisario, a Koreanwar veteran familiar with firearms, who after his discharge from the army became ataxicab driver. He testified that he was only about six or seven meters from theChevrolet car when Roscoe at a distance of about two to two and a half meters fired atDe la Cruz.

He even testified that immediately after the shooting, when Balasote, who was in theback seat, saw Felisario looking at him, Balasote or Dagol instinctively sought cover bysinking on his seat.

Felisario recognized Roscoe as the assailant because the latter is well-known in IloiloCity, having been linked to the killing of a man nicknamed "Sweetheart" and a lawyernamed Garin. Felisario had seen Roscoe on several occasions and had heard Roscoe'scompanions call him by that name (No. 6, Exh. GG).

In spite of a rigorous cross-examination, Felisario did not waver in his Identification of

Roscoe as the gunwielder.

Appellant's last contention is that the trial court erred in using his failure to testify in hisbehalf as an indication of guilt. The trial court conceded that the neglect or refusal of theaccused to be a witness should not in any manner prejudice or be used against him(Sec. 1 [d], Rule 115, Rules of Court). At the same time, it observed that Roscoe couldnot escape the unfavorable inferences arising from his failure to deny incriminating facts(p. 838, Record).

The trial court erred if it based the judgment of conviction on Roscoe's failure to testify,a negative fact which cannot be conclusive as to his guilt. The truth is that it convicted

Roscoe on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution which points to him as the killerwho used a Chevrolet car as his shield and coign of vantage for consummating thekilling with impunity and as a means for making a fast getaway. (See People vs. UpaoMoro, 101 Phil. 1226, unpublished and Pendleton vs. U.S., 216 U.S. 305, 54 L. ed. 491,40 Phil. 1033).

The record does not show the motive for the killing Notwithstanding that deficiency inthe prosecution's evidence, the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable


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doubt. He was positively Identified by Felisario as the killer. Any lingering doubt as to hisguilt was dissipated by his becoming a fugitive from justice and by the overtures foramicable settlement of the case for P3,000 made in his behalf by his father, VictorDaban, Gerson Espinosa and Pascual Espinosa and the assistant provincial warden(391-394, tsn, April 10, 1969).

The killing was correctly characterized by the fiscal and the trial court as murder, a cold-blooded assassination perpetrated in a public place in daytime in the view of severalpersons. The manner of its perpetration reveals the high degree of perversity anddangerousness of the culprit.

The killing is qualified by treachery and aggravated by the use of a motor vehicle. Themeans employed by the accused were intended to surprise the victim and prevent himfrom making any retaliation and at the same time to facilitate the malefactor's escapefrom the scene of the crime. Evident premeditation cannot be considered aggravating.

There being no mitigating circumstances, the capital punishment has to be imposed onthe accused (Art. 64[3] and 248, Revised Penal Code).

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro,Melencio-Herrera Ericta, Plana and Escolin JJ., concur.

Barredo and Concepcion Jr., JJ., is on leave.

Fernando, CJ., took no part.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SOPHIA ALAWI, com plainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'aDistrict Court, Marawi City, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

NARVASA, C.J.:


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Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) ofE. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company.

Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'aDistrict in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on

installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentionedfirm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan wasalso granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed aletter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract withthe company. He wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate

the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by yourSales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan

de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit,fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contractvoid ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized actswhich made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the"grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closedwith the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, evenas I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. Ihope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated

contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent,hence the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at SanPedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually wentthrough the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the descriptionof the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga,Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage FinanceCorporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent andvoid his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in

connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rateof P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:

" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind andvoided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.,

Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and

fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan

without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab


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initioin view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation,

fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds

between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the

anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21,

1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons alreadycited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance ofdeductions from his salary on account thereof.aHe also wrote on January 18, 1996 toMs. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to theChief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relationto the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he wasallegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court

requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," andbegan negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and** the refund of ** (his) payments."c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, SophiaAlawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which sheappended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing thetypewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1]In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifestignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar

may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger,manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with theessence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies,baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that

all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closedwith the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined(sic) ** "

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably withestablished usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office ofthe Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P.Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.

[2]
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Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3]in which he questioned theauthority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining,according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an ExecutiveClerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the ChiefJustice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link"

between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint hadno factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk ofcourt and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a RoyalFamily **."

[4]

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive,even obsequious tones,[5]Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of thecomplaint in order that he might comment thereon.

[6]He stated that his acts as clerk of

court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawias sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound himto a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauyacontended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleeplessnights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months,a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7]He declared that there wasno basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely actedin defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that hegave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with themailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten onthe envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of

Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself,and attached to the comment as Annex J);[8]and as far as he knew, his subordinate

mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if thoseletters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurredinadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9]

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexicallysynonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightfulclaim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is oftenmistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a locallegislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of anyman unduly prejudiced and injured."[10]He claims he was manipulated into reposing his

trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend.

[11]

He was induced to sign a blank contract onAlawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later forcorrection, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" hestill does not know where the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi'sprincipal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;

[12]He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy

from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do sountil after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract withVillarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those
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regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salarydeduction, none of which he ever saw.

[13]

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays forthe dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious andbaseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean

hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of CourtMarasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters bothdated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in hisComment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU

ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,report and recommendation.[14]

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made

"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifestignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing herhonor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit,fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial

to ** (his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit,

fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and

unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his)will," and "concealed the real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merelyacting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man undulyprejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, woundedfeelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a totalof P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15]

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA6713) interaliaenunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics andutmost responsibility in the public service.

[16]Section 4 of the Code commands that

"(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrainfrom doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,public safety and public interest."

[17]More than once has this Court emphasized that

"the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in theadministration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
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circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times becharacterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keepthe respect of the public for the judiciary."

[18]

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs orpublic policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed

-- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessivelyintemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has aright of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right withpropriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a mannerconsistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; orotherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honestyand good faith."

[19]Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to

vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar andan officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than formost other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language whichis abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.

[20]As a judicial

employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others atall times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence,restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms mightperhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that hehad been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already hadoccasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged membersof the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.

[21]While one

who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to thePhilippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give

counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the studyof law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it isthey only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law,"because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusinglysimilar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment.His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title ofattorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, therecord contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the useof excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a

judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar orother impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
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Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, andPanganiban, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

January 9, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration1submitted its Report datedNovember 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of thesaid Reportand the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526

2of the Court, and

"consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board ofConsultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Benchand Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar assoon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration ofthe Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible andpracticable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962,arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expoundedbefore the Court. Written oppositions were admitted,

3and all parties were thereafter

granted leave to file written memoranda. 4


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Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developmentsrelative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.

In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwidesentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar

Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.

In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providingfor the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Themeasure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 andtook effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the SupremeCourt may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the PhilippineBar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standardsof the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable

the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated,out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, tocarry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may benecessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annualappropriations for the Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The Reportof the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar

integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability(practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views,opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippinelawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration CourtRule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Barplebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Courtmay decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.

The following are the pertinent issues:

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Barintegration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by theCommission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:


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Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entirelawyer population of the Philippines. Thisrequires membershipand financial support(in reasonable amount) ofevery attorney as conditions sine qua nonto the practice of law and theretention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose namesappear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforcemust include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity withpower to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the settingup by Government authority of a national organization of the legalprofession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of thecourt.

Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justiceand the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, andensures, through their own organized action and participation, thepromotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to theprinciple of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision andregulation by the Supreme Court.

The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity,learning, professional competence, public service and conduct;

(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform,pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to theBench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive andadjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and

(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.


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Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for thelegal profession to:

(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;

(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges andprosecuting officers;

(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/orremoval of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself exceptwithin its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest maylevel at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality andindependence;

(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecutingofficers;

(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopolyof local practice maintained through influence or position;

(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;

(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set uplawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may notlack competent legal service;

(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult toobtain in many of our provinces;

(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education forpractising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the professionthroughout the country;

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum feesschedules;

(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;

(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights andobligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on thefunctions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and


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(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wideinvolvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifariousproblems that afflict the nation.

Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in

the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgaterules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission tothe practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court'sconstitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adoptrules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neitherconfers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislativedeclaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, morespecifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administrationof justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Resolution of the second issuewhether the unification of the Bar would be

constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutionalrights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the duesexacted from him.

The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by theCommission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:

Constitutionality of Bar Integration

Judicial Pronouncements.

In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put inissue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice oflaw.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege,moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties notonly to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,

and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions ofthe State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.

Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it isfar and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assurecompliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.


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These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collectiveaction; but there can be no collective action without an organized body; noorganized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses;therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute tothe support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions,

the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through arule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the IntegratedBar.

1. Freedom of Association.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative ofhis constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not toassociate).

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is

not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passedthe Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide anofficial national organization for the well-defined but unorganized andincohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. Heis free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapteror vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The bodycompulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to

pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question ofcompelled financial support of group activities, not involuntarymembership in any other aspect.

The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevatingthe educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improvingthe quality of the legal service available to the people. The SupremeCourt, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating thequality of professional services, may require that the cost of improving theprofession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries ofthe regulatory program the lawyers.

Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member ofthe Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of thepolice power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded asa proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, theinherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes theauthority to integrate the Bar.


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2. Regulatory Fee.

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not meanthat the Court levies a tax.

A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, whilethe purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power toregulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may imposea membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to pushthrough an Integrated Bar program without means to defray theconcomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarilyincludes the power to impose such an exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that theregulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interestpromoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential

inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment ofannual dues.

3. Freedom of Speech.

A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subjectin any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed topositions taken by the Unified Bar.

For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures towhich said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his

freedom of speech.

Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law uponmembership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it shouldbecome unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill thevery purposes for which it was established.

The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a"free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objectionwould carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. Theconscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might

refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other endcondemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right ofprivate judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and thecompulsion of the agencies of Government.

4. Fair to All Lawyers.


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Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising becausealthough the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it willgive the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have nothad and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits theyhave not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in

a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past.Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatorypower by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young andold, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a newregulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is notunequal, it is not unfair.

To resolve the third and final issuewhether the Court should ordain the integration ofthe Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity aswell as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.

In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Barintegration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among themembers of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better andmore meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the IntegratedBar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6)avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status forthe Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge bythe Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to thepublic. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expectedfrom the unification of the Philippine Bar.

Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration,Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened;cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar willbecome an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.

It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Barintegration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience inEngland, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Barhas been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it hasrestored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energizedthe Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.

How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statisticscompiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national pollrecentlyconducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of atotal of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individualresponses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378(or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. Inaddition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the


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Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualifiedendorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar associationor lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802individual lawyers who cast theirplebiscite ballotson the proposed integration CourtRule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662

(or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal.

5

Allthese clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at thistime.

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all thearguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the massof factual data contained in the exhaustive Reportof the Commission on BarIntegration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional andlegally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in thePhilippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legalprofession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its

public responsibility fully and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of ArticleVIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines inaccordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Created by Supreme Court Resolution of October 5, 1970 "for thepurpose of ascertaining the advisability of the integration of the Bar in thisjurisdiction," the Commission is composed of Supreme Court AssociateJustice Fred Ruiz Castro (Chairman), Senator Jose J. Roy, retiredSupreme Court Associate Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, Supreme Court

Associate Justice (then Court of Appeals Presiding Justice) Salvador V.Esguerra, U. P. Law Center Director Crisolito Pascual, Ex-Senator TeclaSan Andres Ziga, and San Beda Law Dean and Constitutional ConventionDelegate Feliciano Jover Ledesma (Members).

2 Filed on July 11, 1962 (by a Committee composed of Jose W. Diokno,

Roman Ozaeta, Jose P. Carag, Eugenio Villanueva, Jr. and Leo A.Panuncialman), the petition represented the unanimous consensus of 53Bar Associations (from all over the Philippines) reached in convention atthe Far Eastern University Auditorium in Manila on June 23, 1962.

3 Written oppositions were submitted by Attys. Cesar Fajardo and VicenteL. Arcega, the Camarines Norte Lawyers League, Atty. Fructuoso S.


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Villarin, the Camarines Sur Bar Association and the Manila BarAssociation.

4 The Petitioners and the Negros Occidental Bar Association submittedmemoranda in favor of Bar integration, while the Manila Bar Association

submitted a memoranda opposing Bar integration.

5 All figures are as of January 8, 1973.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of UnsuccessfulCandidates of 1946 to 1953;ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL.,petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton forpetitioners.Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J .:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and

concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953."Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (foradmission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully,he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without fallingbelow 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless,considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 andthe varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, thiscourt passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of


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only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered andpassed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See

Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages ofa few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, andsecured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced thepassing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. ThePresident requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request,seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adversethereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override theveto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions ofthe vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views onthe matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without hissignature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as

follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONSFROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO ANDINCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of thePhilippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numberedone hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtaineda general average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth,nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-onebar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two barexaminations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-threebar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-fourbar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five barexaminations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in anysubject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of officeas member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this

Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one andincluded as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in anysubject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-sixshall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade orgrades shall be included in computing the passing general average that saidcandidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.


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SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for

admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revisionof their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as anadditional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply thereconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoidinjustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, thecourt has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, itmust be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be appliedequally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of thepetitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailedaccount of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as

Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the followingstatistical data are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of RepublicAct No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43

1947 749 340 0

1948 899 409 11

1949 1,218 532 164

1950 1,316 893 26

1951 2,068 879 196

1952 2,738 1,033 426

1953 2,555 968 284

TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere

motions for reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2of said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five differentexaminations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating,however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with theirlatest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for byRepublic Act No. 972.


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(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied,while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similarmotions, which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic

Act No. 972, although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficientreasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of thelegal profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have beenexpressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions foradmission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the

members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspectsin which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. VoltaireGarcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor ofthe validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General,Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A.Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and RomanOzaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. JoseM. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitionersCabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. Thelegal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American

jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation

for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of themajority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly aspossible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar,those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequatepreparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its authorHonorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is thetremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the

Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of readingmaterials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up lawsoon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed.And now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of"inadequacy of preparation."


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By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of theprofession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. Thepublic interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An

adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law thatshould be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the

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