cases leg ethics

8/12/2019 cases leg ethics

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VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDADNORDISTA,complainants,vs.ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.

DAVIDE JR.,J.:

In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray

that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may bediscovered during the actual investigation of this complaint." They attached thereto an Affidavitof Merit wherein they specifically allege:

1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No.CA-G.N. CV No. 38153 of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily theaforesaid Petition [sic]. A close perusal of the case reveals the seriousmisconduct of our attorney on record, Atty. Amado Fojas tantamount tomalpractice and negligence in the performance of his duty obligation to us, todefend us in the aforesaid case. That the said attorney without informing usthe reason why and riding high on the trust and confidence we repose on himeither abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously neglected to answerthe civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge Teresita Capulong Case No.3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in default.

2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was inorder. That he had already answered the complaint so that in spite of theincessant demand for him to give us a copy he continued to deny same to us.Only to disclose later that he never answered it after all because according tohim he was a very busy man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision datedAugust 17, 1993.

3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of law we lostthe Judge Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it isonly proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and disbarred in the practice of hisprofession.

In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the complainants' answerin Civil Case No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion forreconsideration, which was unfortunately denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No.

3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the complainants because it was based on the expulsion ofthe plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which wasdeclared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he unfavorablejudgment in the Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable tothe merits of the case,i.e.,the decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants (complainantsherein) illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. . . ." Hefurther claims that the complainants filed this case to harass him because he refused to sharehis attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The respondent then praysfor the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer wascured and, even granting for the sake of argument that such failure amounted to negligence, itcannot warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law profession.

The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.

Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were willing tosubmit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In their separatecompliance, both manifested in the affirmative.

The facts in this case are not disputed.

Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and TrinidadNordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA.They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with theDepartment of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declareillegal his expulsion from the union.

In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal Salvador'sexpulsion and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll ofunion members with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution wasaffirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, MetroManila, Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein for actual, moral, andexemplary damages and attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. Thecase was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.

As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on groundsof (1) res judicataby virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and(2) lack of jurisdiction, since what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the

DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to dismiss.

The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered thedismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered theorder of dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the complainants herein to file their answerwithin a nonextendible period of fifteen days from notice.

Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal ofthe case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petitionfor certiorari, which was later referred to the Court of Appeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R.SP No. 25834.

Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, therespondent still did not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, uponplaintiff Salvador's motion, the complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was

authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.

The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the ex-partereception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.

Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointlyand severally, plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 asexemplary damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.

The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.


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WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be,henceforth, more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.

SO ORDERED.pangasinan electric cooperative vs ayarD E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

Before us is an administrative complaint filed by Pangasinan Electric Cooperative I(PANELCO I) charging Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor with negligence in handling the cases

assigned to him which caused unwarranted financial losses to the complainant, approximately inthe total amount of sixteen million pesos (PhP 16,000,000).

Records show that for several years, PANELCO I, a rural electric cooperative withprincipal office address at Brgy. San Jose, Bani, Pangasinan, retained the services of Atty. JuanAyar Montemayor as its counsel.

In its July 22, 2002 Complaint, PANELCO I stated that while acting as counsel for thecooperative, respondent was negligent in handling its cases, alleging the following:

4. One of the cases assigned to Atty. Montemayor was Civil CaseNo. 17315 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,Branch 68, entitled Rural Power Corporation vs. PANELCO I. Afterthe trial court rendered a Decision adverse to PANELCO I, it wasdecided that the case be appealed to the Court of Appeals;

5. However, the Court of Appeals ordered the Dismissal of theappeal for the failure of Atty. Montemayor to serve and file therequired number of copies within the time provided by the Rules ofCourt. (copy of the Writ of Execution in Civil Case No. 1715 attachedas Annex A);

6. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, the Decision of the trialcourt became final and executory, and the judgment award in theamount of Two Million One Hundred Seventy Nine Thousand TwoHundred Nine and 18/100 Pesos (P2,179,209.18) was paid by thecomplainant;

7. Another case assigned to Atty. Montemayor was the case ofEngineering and Construction Corporation ofAsia (ECCO-ASIA) vs.PANELCO I, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,Branch 83 as Civil Case No. Q-89-4242. Again, the decision wasappealed by PANELCO I to the Court of Appeals, through Atty.Montemayor;

8. In a Resolution dated May 31, 2001, the Court of Appealsconsidered the appeal Abandoned due to the failure of Atty.Montemayor to serve and file the required Appellant's Brief despitethe lapse of the two extensions of time granted. A copy of the saidResolution in C.A.-G.R. CV67614 is attached as Annex B, as well asthe Notice of Garnishment (Annex B-1) and Writ of Execution(Annex "B-2");

9. Thus, the funds of PANELCO I deposited in banks weregarnished until the judgment award was paid to the Plaintiff ECCO-ASIA, in the amount of Thirteen Million Eight Hundred Thirty SixThousand Six Hundred Seventy Six and 25/100 Pesos(P13,836,676.25);

10. Sometime last year, Atty. Montemayor informed theundersigned (complainant) of the judgment of the Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City, and that he had filed his appeal;

11. Upon receipt of the Notice of Garnishments on March 11,2002, I (complainant) confronted Atty. Montemayor on the matter,and he uttered napabayaan ko itong kaso...ano ang gagawin natin;

12. As a consequence of the negligence of Atty. Montemayor,the complainant was forced to settle with the Plaintiffs without thebenefit of an approved time-table, and is presently in a dire financialsituation, which has caused difficulty in meeting its monthly powerbills with the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR).[1]

In a Resolution dated September 4, 2002, the respondent was required to file hisComment on the administrative charges within ten (10) days from notice. He subsequently filedwith this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File his Comment; however, despite anextension of fifteen (15) days from the expiration of the original period given by the Court,respondent failed to file his Comment.

Thus, the Court, in its April 12, 2004 Resolution, declared respondent to have WAIVEDthe filing of Comment on the Complaint. The Court also referred the case to the Integrated Barof the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision.[2]

At the mandatory conference held before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,respondent admitted all the allegations in the Complaint, particularly the fact that he failed toattend to the appeal of complainant's cases.[3]

On November 11, 2004, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her Report andRecommendation finding respondent guilty of Violation of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, and recommending his disbarment from law practice. The salient portion of theReport reads:

The records also show that respondent Atty. Juan AyarMontemayor did not even bother to answer the complaint nor presenthis defense, we are now constrained to impose sanctions on his gross

negligence as counsel for complainant which resulted [in] the damageof PANELCO I. Considering further that the charges remainuncontroverted, it is recommended that Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayorbe DISBARRED from the practice of law for Violation of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility.

On March 12, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed CBD Resolution No. XVI-2005-68adopting with modification the aforequoted Investigating Commissioners Report andRecommendation, thus:
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RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTEDand APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendationof the Investigating Commissioner of the above-titled case, hereinmade part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding therecommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and theapplicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents grossnegligence, as counsel for complainant which resulted [in] thedamage of PANELCO I, Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor ishereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law.[4]

The only issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not respondent committed

gross negligence or misconduct in mishandling complainants cases on appeal, which eventuallyled to their dismissal, to the prejudice of the complainant.

After a careful consideration of the records of the instant case, the Court agrees with theIBP in its findings and conclusion that respondent has been remiss in his responsibilities.

The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibilityprovide:

CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT ANDCONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENTADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

x x x x

Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions oftime to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse

without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failureto do so.

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HISCLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST ANDCONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITHCOMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

x x x x

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrustedto him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render himliable.

x x x x

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITHZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

Manifestly, respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of everymember of the Bar in relation to his client. As counsel for complainant, respondent had the dutyto present every remedy or defense authorized by law to protect his client. When he undertookhis clients cause, he made a covenant that he will exert all efforts for its prosecution until itsfinal conclusion. He should undertake the task with dedication and care, and if he should do noless, then he is not true to his lawyer's oath.[5]

The records of this case clearly show that respondent failed to live up to his duties andresponsibilities as a member of the legal profession. The appeals of his client, the petitioner,were dismissed due to his improper way of filing the appeal in Civil Case No. 17315 and his non-filing of the appellants brief in Civil Case No. Q-89-4242. Respondent did not offer a plausibleexplanation for not doing his level best in representing his clients cause on appeal; thus,making complainant suffer serious losses.

There is no doubt that it was part of respondents obligation to complainant, as thelatters counsel of record in the civil cases, to prosecute with assiduousness said cases on appealin order to safeguard complainant's rights, but it was respondents negligence or omission whichhas caused damage to such interests.

As held inAromin v. Atty. Boncavil:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owesfidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust andconfidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competenceand diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholeheartedfidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotionto the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance anddefense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learningand ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from hisclient, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply meansthat his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy anddefense that is authorized by the law of the land he may expect hislawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded

from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice lawcarries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also tothe court, to the bar, and to the public . A lawyer who performs hisduty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of hisclient; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, andhelps maintain the respect of the community to the legalprofession.

[6]

In Redentor S. Jardin v. Atty. Deogracias Villar, Jr.,[7]the Court also held that:

[T]he trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clientsrequires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his dutyto his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. Every case alawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and

competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts itfor a fee or free. Certainly, a member of the Bar who is worth his titlecannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical fashion. Alawyers lethargy from the perspective of the Canons is bo thunprofessional and unethical.

Thus, for inexcusable neglect of his professional obligations to the prejudice of his clientsinterests, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of respondent fromthe practice of law. The IBP Board of Governors, however, recommended that Atty. Juan AyarMontemayor be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
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It is settled that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clearcase of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officerof the Court and as a member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.[8]

In the case ofJardin v. Villar, Jr.,[9]the Court cited several cases where lawyers weresuspended for a period of six (6) months from the practice of law for their failure to file briefs orother pleadings for their respective clients.[10]

The case of Atty. Montemayor is however different. He is guilty not only of his unjustifiedfailure to file the appellants brief of his client not only once but twice. Moreover the Court noteswith dismay the huge losses suffered by complainant PANELCO I in the total amount of sixteenmillion pesos (PhP 16,000,000). Lastly, Atty. Montemayor demonstrated an utter lack of regard

for the very serious charges against him and a gross disrespect for the Court when he failed tofile his comment after being required to file his response to the said charges. Respondent couldhave presented sufficient justification for his inability to file the appellants briefs but failed to doso.

In view of the forgoing circumstances, we find that Atty. Montemayor does not deserveanymore to remain as an active member of the legal profession. The breaches of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility and the palpable sloth and irresponsibility he has demonstrated inhandling the cases of his client undeniably reveal that he has become more of a liability than anasset to the legal profession. He cannot be entrusted anymore with the sacred duty andresponsibility to protect the interests of any prospective client. If he is then allowed to resumehis law practice after suspension, this will surely subvert the ends of justice, dishonor the bar,and lose the respect of society for the profession of law. The Court will not allow this affront topass.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor is DISBARRED from the practice of law.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,vs.PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.

Jose M. Luison for respondents.

CASTRO,J.:

The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for morethan a decade.

In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit againstPastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return themachineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court,inAgo vs. Castaeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on

August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay ofexecution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located inQuezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago movedto stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court ofAppeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 thisCourt, inAgo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attemptedto obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ ofexecution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold thehouse and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson.Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favorof the vendees Castaeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First InstanceofManila issued a writ of possession to the properties.

However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff,filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City(civil case Q-7986) to annul thesheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was renderedagainst him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-halfshare in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriffcould not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaintthat wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and thewrit of execution was issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a partyto her husband's venture in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suitand which did not benefit the conjugal partnership.

The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunctionrestraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registeringthe latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing

new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arosewhere what the Manilacourt had ordered to be done, the Quezon City court countermanded. OnNovember 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previouslyissued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of titleand issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession wasagain thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which itlater lifted but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, liftedthe restraining order.

While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was beingfought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with thisCourt under date of May 26, 1966, docketed asL-26116, praying for a writ of preliminaryinjunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no meritin the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration wasdenied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition forcertiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the samepreliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents thenappealed to this Court (L-27140).1wph1.t We dismissed the petition in a minute resolutionon February 8, 1967.

The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petitionfor certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gavedue course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendereddecision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ ofpossession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties
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involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is madepermanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 andordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986on the merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to costs.

Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed the present petitionfor review of the aforesaid decision.

1.We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equalcourt can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ ofpossession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of First Instance

of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against theenforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, inpart, the enforcement of the writ.

2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,1where the wife was a party in one case and thehusband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, thepetitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against herhusband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at parwith the present case. In Comilangthe actions were admittedly instituted for the protection ofthe common interest of the spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that their conjugalpartnership benefited from the husband's business venture.

3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ ofpossession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property isadversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger"

or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besidesliving with her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business that failed, of therelevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of theirconjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may notissue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that the writ of possessionbeing a complement of the writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also hasjurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuanceof the writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. Theruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case, for, here, there has been no changein the ownership of the properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of executionwas issued up to the time writ of possession was issued, and even up to the present.

4.We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is muchtoo late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the property isunleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is normally privy toher husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4) her husband had moved to stop theauction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thriceattempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ ofexecution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed toredeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon byhis pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it wasonly on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's saleupon the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground thatshe was not a party to the logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spousesAgo had every opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussedbut did not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable andunexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to asserta right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the partyentitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2

5.The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.

(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-halfshare in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse, butis merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither legal nor equitable

estate, and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to beassets of the community.3The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction doesnot issue to protect a right not in esseand which may never arise.4

(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its enforcement. TheAgo spouses admittedly live together in the same house5which is conjugal property. By theManila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the decision underreview would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacatedby Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here;the decision would actually separate husband and wife, prevent them from living together, andin effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of theconjugal union.

6.Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale(civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of

their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted bytheir lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process tothwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. Therespondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedlyresist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 timesin the Supreme Court).

We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,

far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have triedto use them to subvert the very ends of justice.6

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer ofthe court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and apredator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, avirtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy oftruth and moral justice.

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client'scause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not andcannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of hisclient's position, as in the case at bar.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to theintricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. Ifhe finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to


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plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had previouslybought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio Castaeda andNicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo(40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject ofa pending litigation.

Discussion on The Causes of Actionof The Supplemental Complaint AndThe Amended Supplemental Complaint

Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the supplemental

complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause of action woulddepend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint, for, the Agoswould suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of the properties byreason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castaedas and their lawyer if thesheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalidon the ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the transactionswould perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in the firstcause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow thatthe first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplementalcomplaint is also barred.

For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in thesupplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986

of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing ofthe petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are assessed againstthe spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M.Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in thecustody of the Clerk of Court.CASTANEDA V AGOCASTRO; July 30, 1975(glaisa po)NATURE- Petition for review of the decision of the Court of AppealsFACTS- 1955 Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Agoin the CFI of Manila to recover certain machineries.-1957 judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson- 1961 SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ ofexecution; Agos motion denied, levy was made on Agos house

and lots; sheriff advertised the sale, Ago moved to stop theauction; CA dismissed the petition; SC affirmed dismissal- Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction torestrain sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; his motionswere denied- 1963 sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda andHenson; Ago failed to redeem- 1964 sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ ofpossession to the properties- 1964 Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment renderedagainst him in the replevin suit saying it was his personalobligation and that his wife share in their conjugal house couldnot legally be reached by the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of

preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda the Registed ofDeeds and the sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; thebattle on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining ordercontinued- 1966 Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition toenjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it;Agos filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed thepetition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition- Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition withthe CA which gave due course to the petition and grantedpreliminary injunction.ISSUEWON the Agos lawyer, encourage his clients to avoidcontroversyHELD- No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint forthe annulment of the sheriffs sale, justice demands that thepetitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevinsuit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos abetted bytheir lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal remedies andprostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of thejudgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.- Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and hisexalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison hasallowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and apredator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and aconciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in theconduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of

truth and moral justice.- A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor andhonesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is to becommended; what the SC does not and cannot countenance is alawyers insistence despite the patent futility of his clientsposition.It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit orlack of his case. If he finds his clients cause as defenseless,then he is his duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submitrather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of hisclient, and temper his clientspropensity to litigate.

ANTONIO CABALLERO and CONCORDIA CABALLERO, plaintiffs-appellants,vs.

ALMA DEIPARINE, TOMAS RAGA, OLIMPIO RAGA, ADRIANO RAGA, and MAGDALENA RAGA,defendant-appellees.

Porfiro D. Ellescas for plaintiff-appellants.

Hilario G. Davide, Jr. for defendant-appellees.

ESGUERRA,J.:p


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This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified it to this Court byresolution of its Fifth Division, dated June 14, 1974, for the reason that it involves purely legalquestions which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate. The two legalquestions raised are (1) whether the written stipulation of facts entered into by the counsel forboth parties without the signature of the latter is valid and binding and (2) whether a motion fornew trial and to amend the complaint may be granted after a decision is rendered by the trialcourt on the basis of said stipulation of facts.

I. Statement of the Case

On March 21, 1967, plaintiffs Antonio Caballero and Concordia Caballero filed a complaint

against defendants Alma Deiparine, Tomas Raga, Olimpio Raga, Adriano Raga and MagdalenaRaga alleging, among other things:

1. That plaintiffs Antonio Caballero and Concordia Caballero are the children by the firstmarriage, and the defendants, Tomas Raga, Olimpio Raga, Adriano Raga and Magdalena Raga,are the children by second marriage of Vicenta Bucao, now deceased, who died sometime inFebruary, 1943 in Tabunoc, Talisay, Cebu;

2. That Vicenta Bucao in her lifetime and Tomas Raga acquired by joint purchase a parcel ofland from the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate identified as Lot 2072 situated in Tabunoc,Talisay, Cebu and now more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. Rt-2485 (T-17232) of the Registry of Deeds of Cebu and further declared for taxation purposes under TaxDeclaration No. 15954 and at P100.00;

3. That sometime in 1932, defendant Tomas Raga and Vicenta Bucao jointly sold 1/4 of said Lot2072 to plaintiff Antonio Caballero, which sale was evidenced by a deed of sale; and since thetitle to said lot at the time of the conveyance to him had not as yet been issued to them theyheld the subject portion in trust for said Antonio Caballero until its title could be delivered to thelatter;

4. That plaintiff Antonio Caballero had been paying the yearly land tax for the subject portionthru his mother Vicenta Bucao, from the time of his acquisition thereof until Vicenta's death in1943;

5. That long before the death of Vicenta Bucao in 1943, plaintiff Antonio Caballero had been,asking the former to deliver the title to the portion sold to him, but he was told by his mother towait, as after all, according to her, he (plaintiff) was already in possession thereof and, besides,his mother was then still living;

6. That after the death of Vicenta Bucao in 1943, plaintiff Antonio Caballero asked defendantTomas Raga to deliver the title to the portion sold to him from Lot 2072, but he (Tomas Raga)told him to wait until it could be segregated and that there was no hurry since he (Antonio) wasalready in possession thereof, and, being his brother, he would protect him (Antonio) from anyclaim of third persons thereto, should the occasion arise;

7. That plaintiff Antonio Caballero had been in the continuous, open, peaceful and adversepossession of the subject portion and had built a house thereon way back in 1941 which is stillexisting up to the present and used as his dwelling;

8. That the share of Vicenta Bucao to Lot 2072 consisting of 207 square meters, more or less, inwhich the plaintiffs Antonio Caballero and Concordia Caballero own an undivided 1/6 share each,had not been partitioned among her heirs by the first and second marriages, respectively;

9. That sometime on May 11, 1965, plaintiff Antonio Caballero received from defendant AlmaDeiparine a letter demanding that he vacate the portion of Lot 2072 which he was holding forshe had bought it from defendant Tomas Raga, and as the new owner she would like toconstruct a house thereon and would further improve said lot;

10. That upon refusal of the plaintiff to vacate the portion in question defendant Alma Deiparinebrought an action for ejectment against him in the Municipal Court of Talisay, and after trial said

Court rendered judgment in favor of Antonio Caballero, the plaintiff herein;

11. That defendant Alma Deiparine appealed the decision of the Municipal Court in theejectment case to the Court of First Instance of Cebu where she again lost but she elevated thedecision of the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals where it is pending;

12. That in the light of the foregoing facts Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9934 is fraudulent andquestionable for having deliberately included in the sale made by defendant Tomas Raga todefendant Alma Deiparine the portion previously sold to herein plaintiff Antonio Caballero as wellas the plaintiffs' share inherited from their deceased mother, Vicente Bucao;

13. That the defendants Tomas Raga, Olimpio Raga, Adriano Raga and Magdalena Raga havewillfully and falsely misrepresented themselves by declaring in the instrument of declaration ofheirs and confirmation of sale they executed on March 18, 1963, that they are the sole heirs of

Vicenta Bucao, thereby deliberately and willfully excluding the plaintiffs herein from succeedingto the share of their mother, Vicenta Bucao, in Lot 2072;

14. That defendant Tomas Raga, Olimpio Raga, Adriano Raga and Magdalena Raga have willfullyand with deliberate falsehood misrepresented themselves when they stated in the instrument ofdeclaration of heirs and confirmation of sale that Vicenta Bucao's share in Lot 2072 was sold toTomas Raga, for there was in fact no such sale between them, the truth of the matter being thatlong before Vicenta Bucao's death in the early part of 1943 the said defendants had earlierevacuated from Tabunoc in the later part of 1942 and were in hiding when the Japanese forcesoccupied Talisay, leaving behind the herein plaintiff to minister alone to their sickly mother,Vicenta Bucao, during the last days of her life until her death in 1943 and she died without thepresence of even one of her children by the second marriage;

15. That the deed of sale executed by defendant Tomas Raga over Lot 2072 in favor ofdefendant Alma Deiparine has been delivered to the latter but the possession of the property inquestion has not been delivered and still remains in the possession of the herein plaintiffs;

16. That the plaintiffs herein discovered the fraudulent conveyance of Lot 2072 to defendantAlma Deiparine only upon the receipt of the latter's letter dated May 11, 1965.

Defendant Alma Deiparine answered the complaint alleging, among other things:

1. That the alleged sale between Antonio Caballero on one hand and Vicenta Bucao anddefendant Tomas Raga on the other hand was only made known to her after she had alreadyfiled an action for ejectment against Antonio Caballero; at the time she purchased the lot inquestion on March 28, 1963, the certificate of title to the land was free of any encumbrance andshe purchased it in good faith for a valuable consideration without any knowledge or information


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about the alleged sale to plaintiff Caballero of a portion thereof; the office of the register ofdeeds does not show that said deed of sale was registered and from the time she purchased theland on the date aforesaid until Antonio Caballero filed his answer to the ejectment case shefiled, Antonio Caballero never made mention of said deed of sale although he had alreadyreceived a letter of ejectment as well as oral demands to vacate; hence, the deed of sale in hisfavor is fictitious as confirmed by Antonio's conduct in keeping the same in secrecy for morethan 30 years;

2. That the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9934 issued to her is valid, legal, enforceable andregular, no fraud having committed in its issuance.

Defendants Tomas Raga, Olimpio Raga, Adriano Raga and Magdalena Raga also answeredplaintiffs, complaint alleging, among other things:

1. hat it is not true that Tomas Raga and Vicente Bucao sold 1/4 of the land in question toAntonio Caballero;

2. hat before the 1/2 of the land in question was sold by Vicenta Bucao to Tomas Raga it wasVicenta and Tomas who were paying the taxes and after the sale it was Tomas alone who paidthe same;

3. That Antonio Caballero never made demands because he know and still knows that he is notthe owner of any portion of the land in question; while it is true that he is occupying a portion ofthe subject land where his house now stands, the same is by mere tolerance by Vicenta andTomas for they took pity upon him when he needed a place where to build his house;

4. That the land in question was sold by Tomas Raga in good faith to defendant Alma Deiparine;

5. That the sale in favor of defendant Alma Deiparine is valid and did not prejudice AntonioCaballero since he has no right whatsoever in and over the land in question or in any portionthereof;

6. That the declaration of heirs and confirmation of sale speaks the truth and was not intendedto prejudice any person;

7. That a sale was made by Vicenta Bucao in favor of Tomas Raga of her 1/2 participation in theland in question;

8. That it cannot be true that the sale to Alma Deiparine was only discovered by Antonio

Caballero on May 11, 1965, because even before the actual sale was made, plaintiff Antonioknow that there were negotiations for the sale of the land and after the sale the plaintiffs werealso informed that the land has a new owner.

II. Facts of the Case

Before the case was called for hearing, the parties through counsel entered into a stipulation offacts on March 13, 1968, which provides as follows:

STIPULATION OF FACTS

The PLAINTIFFS and the DEFENDANTS in the above-entitled case dulyassisted by their respective counsels, unto this Honorable Court herebyrespectfully submit the following stipulation of facts:

1. That the parties are all of legal ages and residents of Talisay, Cebu;

2. That Plaintiffs Antonio and Concordia, all surnamed Caballero, andDefendant Tomas, Olimpio, Adriano and Magdalena, all surnamed Raga, arethe children of Vicenta Bucao now deceased, the first two named being thechildren by the first marriage and the last four named being the children bythe second marriage;

3. That during the lifetime of Vicenta Bucao she with her second husbandCasimero Raga and her son Tomas Raga acquired by joint purchase a parcelof land from the Talisay-Minglanilla Estate identified as Lot No. 2072 anddescribed in TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. RT-2485 (T-17232)issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on October 12, 1936, a certified truecopy of which is identified as Annex "A" in the Complaint and Tomas Raga isthe owner of undivided one-half thereof;

4. That in 1932 Vicenta Bucao and Tomas Raga before Annex "A" mentionedin the next preceding paragraph had been issued, executed jointly a notarialinstrument identified as Annex "B" wherein they acknowledged that AntonioCaballero had contributed the amount therein stated for the purchase of theproperty and they sold 1/4 of the lot to him; when the title to said lot wasissued, Vicenta Bucao and Tomas Raga held it in trust for their co-owner;

5. That the portion mentioned as sold to plaintiff Antonio Caballero remainedunsegregated from Lot 2072 and the deed of sale, Annex "B" of theComplaint; nor had it been registered in the Register of Deeds; but he, hadbeen in occupation of a portion of this lot peacefully until the present;

6. That the Tax Declaration of the property remained in the name of VicentaBucao;

7. That during the lifetime of Vicenta Bucao, she, with the conformity of herhusband, sold her undivided 1/2 of the above parcel to her co-owner, TomasRaga;

8. That on March 18, 1963 defendants Olimpio Raga, Adriano Raga,

Magdalena Raga and Tomas Raga executed an instrument known as"Declaration and confirmation of sale" without the participation of plaintiffsAntonio Caballero and Concordia Caballero, wherein they stated that they arethe heirs of Vicenta Bucao of the 1/2 of the property to Tomas Raga, acertified true copy of which document is identified as Annex "E" in theComplaint;

9. That on March 28, 1963 Alma Deiparine acquired in good faith, with a justtitle and for a valuable consideration, the whole of Lot 2072 from TomasRaga as per deed of absolute sale identified as Annex "C" in the complaintwhich cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-2482 (T-17232) and theissuance in her name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9934 on April 1,


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actual participation in the formulation of said stipulation of facts. But the same stipulation offacts shows that plaintiffs-appellants, particularly principal plaintiff Antonio Caballero, neversigned the same. As to why their counsel, particularly Atty. Melecio C. Guba for the plaintiffs,did not require his clients to affix their signatures so as to show their conformity and assentthereto, when he even required the same principal plaintiff, Antonio Caballero, to verify thecomplaint has not been explained and remains quite puzzling. The conduct of then counsel forplaintiffs-appellants in entering into a compromise agreement or stipulation of facts whichpractically confesses judgment, without the consent and conformity of his clients, is not inkeeping with the sworn duty of a lawyer to protect the interest of his clients. It is a grooslyreprehensible act which amounts to fraud. The stipulation of facts should not have beentolerated by the trial court by giving its seal of approval thereto.

And to top it all, plaintiffs-appellants' counsel made the unauthorized admission therein thatprincipal defendant Alma Deiparine acquired in good faith with a just title and for a valuableconsideration the whole of Lot 2072. Their counsel even admitted also in said document thatduring the lifetime of Vicenta Bucao, she, with the conformity of her husband, sold herundivided of Lot 2072 to her co-owner Tomas Raga. No document was ever shown to him bythe Ragas in support of this claim and the record do not disclose that there was such document.On the contrary it is replete with implications that no such sale was ever made.

Plaintiffs-appellants maintain that if given a chance they can prove that principal defendantAlma Deiparine is a purchaser in bad faith and her registration of the deed of sale executed bythe Ragas did not confer upon her any right under the law. The stipulation of facts which wasmade the basis of the decision appealed from was null and void as it contained seriousunauthorized admissions against the interest and claims of plaintiffs-appellants who had nohand in its preparation and formulation. Hence the lower court should have set aside thedecision and admit the amended complaint so as to have the issues properly ventilated.

Appellees on the other hand contend that the stipulation of facts was entered into with fullknowledge, consent and authority of all the parties; that the same was executed after theparties through their respective counsel had manifested at the pre-trial hearing on February 3,1968, that they were submitting a stipulation of facts; that at the pre-trial all the parties werepresent and the stipulation of facts was signed by counsel for and in behalf of their clients andstrictly within their authority to do so; and that it was entered into in good faith on the basis ofthe true facts which could be established at the trial.

The stipulation of facts in question appellees further continue, is a matter of ordinary judicialProcedure as it relates to admission; that no one is in a better position than the counsel todetermine what facts are to be established in a given case to support the theory of the case;that he alone knows what facts he cannot established by the evidence and what facts can beadmitted without trial either because it to be true as borne out by oral or documentary evidencehe himself has on hand or because he has no evidence to refute it; that it was within his

authority to make the stipulation for and in behalf of his client; that in the instant cases, thecomplaint itself is barren of any allegation that appellee Alma Deiparine is buyer in bad faith;that the allegations in the complaint are directed only against the alleged falsemisrepresentations of the defendants Tomas Raga, Olimpio Raga, Adriano Raga and MagdalenaRaga in the declaration of heirs; that the complaint was prepared by Atty. Melecio C. Guba andas a lawyer of good standing he is presumed to know the case and the nature of his evidence,and his failure to allege such a material fact simply shows lack of evidence to prove bad faith onthe part of appellee Alma Deiparine that no error nor mistake, much less, bad faith, attendedthe admission made in the stipulation of facts that said appellee Alma Deiparine purchase theproperty in good faith and for a valuable consideration; that it was not necessary that theparties litigant should sign the stipulation of facts which is nothing more than a pleadingcontaining judicial admission which the lawyer himself can make.

Finally, appellees argue that the stipulation of facts clearly show that Atty. Guba acted for and inbehalf of his clients; that there is no showing at all of absence of such authority, and that aclient is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and he cannot be heard tocomplain that the result might have been different had he proceeded differently; that a client isbound by the mistakes of his lawyer; that if such grounds were to be admitted as reasons forreopening of cases, there would never be an end to a suit for as long as new counsel could beemployed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligentorexperienced or learned; that even granting that Atty. Guba committed a mistake, such amistake is no ground for the reversal of the decision or re-opening of the case; that plaintiffs'remedy is to proceed against his counsel Atty. Guba, and that the lower court, therefore, did noterr in rendering the decision on the basis thereof and in denying the motions for reconsiderationand for amendment of the complaint.

After weighing the conflicting claims of the parties, We find merit in the contention of plaintiffs-appellants. Antonio Caballero and Concordia Caballero. A reading of the stipulation of factsconvinces Us that it is a compromise agreement of the parties. The stipulation concludes withthis prayer: "WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the foregoing Stipulation of Factsbe approved and that a decision be handed down on the legal issues submitted on the basis ofsaid Stipulation of Facts." Apparently it is intended to terminate the case. Rule 138, Section 23of the Rules of Court specifically provides that:

Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority to bindtheir clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made inwriting, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicialprocedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise theirclient's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but thefull amount in cash. (Emphasis supplied)

It may be true that during the pre-trial hearing held on February 3, 1968, the parties concernedagreed to execute a stipulation of facts but it does not mean that the respective counsels of thecontending parties can prepare a stipulation of facts the contents of which is prejudicial to theinterest of their clients and sign it themselves without the intervention of their clients. In thecase at bar, the then counsel for plaintiffs-appellants, Atty. Melecio C. Guba, agreed thatdefendant-appellee Alma Deiparine bought the land in question in good faith and for a valuableconsideration; that during the lifetime of their mother Vicenta Bucao, she, with the conformity ofher husband, sold her undivided of the land in question to her co-owner and son, TomasRaga. All these adverse facts were made the basis of the appealed decision against theplaintiffs. No further evidence was presented as there was no hearing. The attorney for theplaintiffs in making such admission went beyond the scope of his authority as counsel andpractically gave away the plaintiffs' case. The admission does not refer to a matter of judicialprocedure related to the enforcement of the remedy. It related to the very subject matter of thecause of action, or to a matter on which the client alone can make the admission binding onhim. In Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., Inc. , L-6869, May 27, 1955; 97 Phil. 100,

104, 105, it was held that:

The broad implied or apparent powers of an attorney with respect to theconduct or control of litigation are, however, limited to matters which relateonly to the procedure or remedy. The employment of itself confers upon theattorney no implied or power or authority over the subject matter of thecause of action or defense; and, unless the attorney has expressly beengranted authority with respect thereto, the power to deal with or surrenderthese matters is regarded as remaining exlusively in the client.


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The line of demarcation between the respective rights and powers of anattorney and his client is clearly defined. The cause of action, the claim ordemand sued upon, and the subject matter of the litigation are all within theexclusive control of a client, and an attorney may not impair, compromise,settle, surrender, or destroy them without his client's consent. But all theproceedings in court to enforce the remedy, to bring the claim, demand,cause of action, or subject matter of the suit to hearing, trial, determination,judgment, and execution, are within the exclusive control of the attorney.(Emphasis supplied)

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and this case shall be

remanded to the court a quofor further proceedings in consonance with the opinion above setforth, and to admit the amended complaint submitted by the plaintiffs.

Costs against appellees.96. Caballero vs. Deiparine, 60 SCRA 136Facts:-Plaintiffs are the children by the first marriageVicenta Bucao. Defendants (Ragas) are thechildren by Bucao's secondmarriage.-Vicenta Bucao and Tomas Raga acquired land inCebu. of this land was sold to Antonio Caballero(one of theplaintiffs). Land was never transferredthru title. Vicenta dies, but no partition of her estatewas made between her heirs-Lateron, Deiparine acquired the whole lot throughpurchase from Tomas Raga. TCT was issued toDeiparine, who institutedejectment proceedingsagainst the plaintiff -Plaintiffs assailed said sale, alleging said land waspreviously sold to him and isalso forms part of theshare inherited from Vicenta-During pre-trial hearing, parties allegedly executeda stipulation of facts-The stipulation was only signed by Atty. Guba(for plaintiffs) and Atty. Hilario Davide (for respondents).-From the stipulationof facts, the CFI rendereddecision in favor of the defendants (that Deiparineowns the whole lot).-Plaintiffs filed forreconsideration saying that theywere never made to participate in the preparationand formation of the stipulation of factsIssue:

WON the stipulation of facts is validRatio:No.-Court found it puzzling that petitioners signatureswere not affixed in the stipulation of facts even ifAtty. Gubarequired said stipulation to be verified bythe plaintiff (despite the fact that by itsnature/subject matter thecomplaint did not requireverification)-said stipulation of facts entered into by partiesconstituted acompromise agreement(whichpracticallyconfesses judgement), without theconsent or conformity of his clients-Guba, as counsel for plaintiffs, agreed to factsadverse to his client's interestin the compromiseagreement i.e.agreeing that Deiparine was a buyer ingood faith (despite plaintiff's claim that theycan prove that Deiparine was apurchaser in bad faith)that during her lifetime, Vicenta Bucao, withconformity of her husband, sold her undivided half of said land to TomasRaga(despite the fact that no evidence wasadduced in support of this claim)-admission of such facts prejudicial to his

client'sinterests was beyond the scope of his authority ascounsel and practically gave away the case-The conduct of Atty.Guba in entering into acompromise agreement without the knowledge andconsent of his clients is not inkeeping with thesworn duty of a lawyer to protect the interest of hisclients. It amounts to fraud.-The stipulation of factswhich was made the basisof the decision was null and void as it containedserious unauthorized admissions againsttheinterest of the plaintiffs who had no hand in itspreparation.-Attorneys cannot, without special authority,compromise theirclients litigation.-The case is remanded to court of origin for further proceedings and the amended complaint submittedbyplaintiffs should be accepted.Note:No agency related provision was cited in thedecision, but Rule 138, Section 23 of the Rules of Court was cited providingthat: Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority to bind their clients inanycase by any agreement in relation theretomade in writing, and in taking appeals, and in allmatters of ordinary judicialprocedure.But they cannot, without special authority, compromisetheir client's litigation

, or receive anything indischarge of a client's claim but the full amount incash.Whence we can infer that the relevantprovisionmay be Art. 1878 (3) which provides that: Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney arenecessary in thefollowing cases:(3)To compromise, to submit questions toarbitration, to renounce the right to appeal froma judgment, to waive objections tothe venue of an action or to abandon a prescription alreadyacquired;

EDUARDO J. BERENGUER, complainant,vs.PEDRO B. CARRANZA, respondent.

FERNANDO,J.:

The law is an exacting taskmaster. Membership in the bar, as so appropriately put, is aprivilege burdened with conditions.1 A lawyer is called upon by virtue of his oath of office to "dono falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; ... [and to] conduct (himself) as a lawyeraccording to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity ... to the courts..."2 The question, one that has an element of novelty, is whether respondent Pedro B.Carranza, duly admitted to the practice of the law, did get entangled in the complexity of thestrands in the web of obligation such an oath imposes? More specifically, did he manifest theutmost fealty to the trust reposed in him as an officer of the Court by taking all necessarymeasures to avoid the court being misled, even if such were the result not of design but ofinadvertence?

A complaint against respondent Pedro B. Carranza was filed on July 15, 1966, for deception

practiced on the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, in that aware of the falsity of an Affidavit ofAdjudication and Transfer executed by the mother of his client to the effect that her own motherleft no legitimate ascendants or descendants or any other heirs except herself, when, as amatter of fact, the deceased was survived by four other daughters and one son, father of thecomplainant, he introduced the same in evidence. 3

Respondent Carranza was required in our resolution of July 22, 1966, to file an answer.Thereafter, on August 17, 1966, he did so, alleging as the truth of the matter that the aforesaidAffidavit of Adjudication and Transfer was introduced in evidence only to prove the fact of suchtransfer of the property in question to his client, respondent having "no hand in the making ofsaid affidavit nor of the petition, both of which were prepared in Pasay City." 4

On September 1, 1966, the matter was referred by us to the Solicitor General for investigation,report and recommendation. Such investigation was had wherein both complainant andrespondent were duly heard. The issue in the opinion of the then Solicitor General, the

Honorable Antonio Barredo, now a member of this Court, as set forth in his report of March 18,1968, is whether respondent "consented in violation of his oath, to the doing of any falsehood incourt."

It was admitted in said report: "If respondent had anything to do with the preparation of thePetition or of the Affidavit of Adjudication, his participation does not appear from the evidencepresented in this case. The Petition was subscribed and sworn to in Pasay City before one Atty.A. Mendoza, while the Affidavit was subscribed under oath in Pasay before Notary Public ErnestoV. Ventura. The foregoing documents were posted from Pasay to the Clerk of Court,Sorsogon...." 5


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It was likewise noted that respondent testified as to his being "not "very meticulous about thepetition" because there was neither private nor government opposition thereto; that if he hadintended to deceive the court by virtue of the documents, he could have told his client to answerhis questions at the cadastral hearing to conform to the controverted paragraph in the Affidavitof Adjudication concerning the statement reproduced from the tax declaration that the decedentleft no legitimate ascendants or descendants or any other heirs except the affiant...." 6

There is this admission in the aforesaid report. Thus: "As the evidence stands, there is noapparent causal link between the falsehood and the fact that respondent is the lawyer handlingthe cadastral case at the Sorsogon end."7 Nonetheless, while recognizing the absence ofevidence that such falsehood in the Affidavit of Adjudication could be traced to respondent, the

report would hold him liable for discretionary action as the circumstance that various estates areinvolved "certainly warranted a greater exercise of diligence on respondent's part." 8

Moreover, as likewise stated therein, the fact "that he did not even bother to read the entiretyof the affidavit runs counter to respondent's inescapable duty to clear up doubts andinconsistencies."9 For he could have been aware of the family litigations between his client andcomplainant which are rooted in successional rights...." 10 If only for the above fact then, asstated in the report, "he should precisely have taken the bother to read the entirety of theAffidavit of Adjudication when the cadastral case was heard on January 17, 1966...." 11

From which, in the light of the above, it was the conclusion of the then Solicitor GeneralAntonio Barredo, assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Frine Zaballero: "If he did not, hecannot be relieved from the consequences of his acts as a lawyer, and disclaim responsibilitytherefor. To allow respondent relief from his duty is to ignore what is obvious from the nature ofthe litigations in which he entered his appearance.... Actually, respondent's failure to read theaffidavit proves that he did not properly inform himself of the evidence he was going to presentin court, thereby exhibiting an indifference to proof inconsistent with facts he definitely knows.Thus, respondent has contributed to confusion and the prolongation of the cadastral suit, whichpends as a petition for Relief...." 12

It was the recommendation that the corresponding complaint for the violation of his oathagainst respondent be instituted. Such complaint was filed by the two above officials on March18, 1968. Respondent was charged with "violation of his oath of office, [having] causedconfusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit for presenting evidence therein containing afalse statement inconsistent with facts he definitely knows by reason of the family litigationsbetween his client and complainant herein, which are rooted in successional rights [and that]respondent's failure to discharge his duties as a lawyer consistent with his oath of office findssanction in Rule 138, Section 27, Revised Rules of Court." 13

Respondent in his answer, dated May 16, 1968, raised no issue as to the facts. He would allegein justification however "that while it is true that the ... respondent was the counsel who

appeared for the petitioner in Cadastral Case No. 2, LRC Cadastral Record No. 869 of SorsogonCadastre, yet he had nothing to do with the making of the petition and the annexes theretoattached; for the same were made in Pasay City and that when (he) accepted to represent thepetitioner in the Cadastral Case mentioned above, there was no opposition from anybody ... noteven from the Bureau of Lands nor from the Honorable Solicitor General, making, therefore, thehearing therein a mere formality. Such being the case, the [respondent] presented thepetitioner's case on January 17, 1966, without meticulously going over the documents, and thealleged Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer was presented to show the fact of transfer of theland described therein from the affiant to her son. The stenographic notes in that proceeding willbear this matter out. [Respondent's] failure to notice the existence of an incorrect statement inthe said affidavit was a mere oversight. It was not [wilful], for he has not consented to the

doing of the falsity therein made, since the same was prepared by petitioner's lawyer in PasayCity; nor did [respondent] willingly do falsehood in the hearing mentioned above; ..." 14

There is something unique in this proceeding then. With the finding of the then SolicitorGeneral Barredo that there was nothing wilful in the conduct pursued by respondent in thusintroducing in evidence the Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer which turned out to be false, inthe preparation of which, however, he had nothing to do, the charge of deliberate deceptionobviously cannot be sustained.1awphil.t

Would that of itself entirely exculpate him from any responsibility? The answer must be in thenegative. As was correctly pointed out in the complaint, his failure to exercise greater care did

result in the "confusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit." Under the circumstances, itwould be to err on, the side of undue leniency if he would be held blameless. He had incurredliability. His fidelity to his oath as attorney was less than entire.

Every member of the bar must be on his guard, lest through oversight or inadvertence, theway he conducts his case or the evidence he presents could conceivably result in a failure ofjustice. Time and time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they are officersof the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the utmostdiligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty towardsthe court is concerned.

Even if there be no intent to deceive, therefore, a lawyer whose conduct, as in this case,betrays inattention or carelessness should not be allowed to free himself from a chargethereafter instituted against him by the mere plea that his conduct was not wilful and that hehas not consented to the doing of the falsity.

A lawyer's oath is one impressed with the utmost seriousness; it must not be taken lightly.Every lawyer must do his best to live up to it. There would be a failure of justice if courts cannotrely on the submission as well as the representations made by lawyers, insofar as thepresentation of evidence, whether oral or documentary, is concerned. If, as unfortunatelyhappened in this case, even without any intent on the part of a member of the bar to misleadthe court, such deplorable event did occur, he must not be allowed to escape the responsibilitythat justly attaches to a conduct far from impeccable.

WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro B. Carranza is reprimanded and warned that a repetition of anoffense of this character would be much more severely dealt with. The Court of First Instance ofSorsogon, through any of the district judges, is hereby directed to administer in public thereprimand thus imposed on respondent Pedro B. Carranza. The complainant, Eduardo J.Berenguer, must be duly informed of the date when such reprimand is to be administered.

RCBI vs ATTY. James FLORIDO

The Case

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of the Board of Director s[1]of theRural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol against respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido(respondent) for acts constituting grave coercion and threats when he, as counsel for the

minority stockholders of RBCI, led his clients in physically taking over the management andoperation of the bank through force, violence and intimidation.

The Facts
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On 18 April 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent .[2] RBCIalleged that respondent violated his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and his clients, Dr. DomecianoNazareno, Dr. Remedios Relampagos, Dr. Manuel Relampagos, and Felix Rengel (Nazareno-Relampagos group), through force and intimidation, with the use of armed men, forcibly tookover the management and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay(Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the banks vault, and installed their own staffto run thebank.

In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegations. Respondent explained that heacted in accordance with the authority granted upon him by the Nazareno-Relampagos group,

the lawfully and validly elected Board of Directors of RBCI. Respondent said he was merelyeffecting a lawful and valid change of management. Respondent alleged that a terminationnotice was sent to Garay but he refused to comply. On 1 April 2002, to ensure a smoothtransition of managerial operations, respondent and the Nazareno-Relampagos group went tothe bank to ask Garay to step down. However, Garay reacted violently and grappled with thesecurity guards long firearm. Respondent then directed the security guards to prevent entryinto the bank premises of individuals who had no transaction with the bank. Respondent,through the orders of the Nazareno-Relampagos group, also changed the locks of the banksvault.

Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against him byRBCI was already dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered suspendedbecause of the existence of a prejudicial question. Respondent said that the disbarmentcomplaint was filed against him in retaliation for the administrative cases he filed against RBCIscounsel and the trial court judges of Bohol.

Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove theirallegations. Respondent added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were neveridentified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the documentary exhibitswere originals or certified true copies.

The Ruling of the IBP

On 28 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (CommissionerVilladolid, Jr.) submitted his report and declared that respondent failed to live up to the exactingstandards expected of him as vanguard of law and justice.[3] Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of suspension from the practice of lawfor six months to one year with a warning that the repetition of similar conduct in the future willwarrant a more severe penalty.

According to Commissioner Villadolid, Jr., respondent knew or ought to have known thathis clients could not just forcibly take over the management and premises of RBCI without a

valid court order. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. noted that the right to manage and gain majoritycontrol over RBCI was one of the issues pending before the trial court in Civil Case No.6628. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. said that respondent had no legal basis to implement thetake over of RBCI and that it was a naked power grab without any semblance of legalitywhatsoever.

Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. added that the administrative complaint against respondentbefore the IBP is independent of the dismissal and suspension of the criminal cases againstrespondent. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. also noted that RBCI complied with the IBP Rules ofProcedure when they filed a verified complaint and submitted duly notarizedaffidavits. Moreover, both RBCI and respondent agreed to dispense with the mandatoryconference hearing and, instead, simultaneously submit their position papers.

On 20 March 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-120which declared that respondent dismally failed to live up to the exacting standards of the lawprofession and suspended respondent from the practice of law for one year with a warning thatrepetition of similar conduct will warrant a more severe penalty.[4]

On 5 July 2006, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 December 2008Resolution, the IBP denied respondents motion.[5]

The Ruling of the Court

We affirm the IBP Board of Governors resolution.

The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of thePhilippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.[6] Likewise, it is the lawyersduty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed atdefiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legal system.[7]

Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within thebounds of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer to impress uponhis client compliance with the law and principles of fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair andhonest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client.[8] It is his duty to counsel his clientsto use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing an intentionalwrong to their adversaries.[9]

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.s conclusion:

Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upontaking their professional oath, they become guardians of truth and the

rule of law. Verily, when they appear before a tribunal, they act not merelyas representatives of a party but, first and foremost, as officers of thecourt. Thus, their duty to protect their clients interests is secondary to theirobligation to assist in the speedy and efficient administration ofjustice. While they are obliged to present every available legal remedy ordefense, their fidelity to their clients must always be made within theparameters of law and ethics, never at the expense of truth, the law, and thefair administration of justice.[10]

A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, hisclients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulouslyobservant of the law and ethics.[11] Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resortedto by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is cond emnable andunethical.[12]

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of violating

Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of thisDecision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended torespondents personal record as attorney.Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the IntegratedBar of the Philippines and in all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

RBCI v FLORIDOA.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010CARPIO,J.:FACTS:Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent.
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