Cases on Special Contracts

8/22/2019 Cases on Special Contracts

1/52

III. SUBJECT MATTER

A. REQUISITES OF A VALID SUBJECTMATTER: Articles 1459 1465

a.

G.R. No. L-4402 July 28, 1952

CANUTO MARTIN, petitioner,

vs.

MARIA REYES and PEDRO REVILLA, respondents.

Delgado and Flores for petitioner.

Ramon Diokono and Jose W. Diokno for respondents.

BENGSON,J.:

Coming from the Court of Appeals for revision, this

litigation presents two principal question: the price

at which the respondents were entitled to

repurchase the property, and the exercise of such

right within the period of redemption. Apparently

issues of fact, they really depend upon legal points,

as will presently be seen.

According to the Court of Appeals, the respondents

Pedro Revilla and Maria Reyes obtained from the La

Previsora Filipina sometime before November 18,1939 a loan of P6,500; and with the money, they the

price of a lot, with improvements, which they paid

had previously purchased from the Archibishop of

Manila. And they mortgaged the property to La

Previsora for the purpose of guaranteeing

repayment of the debt in installments with interest

at 12 per cent per annum.

It turned out later that Monte de Piedad y Caja de

Ahorros had obtained a judgment against Pedro

Revilla for the sum of P45,000 and had levied

execution therefor upon the property and its

rentals. Apprised of this development, the La

Previsora started foreclosure proceedings, alleging

non-payment of its credit by the mortgagors. The

conflicting interests were later the object of

amicable settlement among the parties, as a result

of which the herein respondents notarized the deed

Exhibit E whereby in satisfaction of their obligations

to La Previsora (then amounting to P8,204.60) they

ceded the property to the said institutions,reserving the right to repurchase for P8,204.60

within sixty days. The deed was acknowledged on

November 3, 1941.

It seems that La Previsora at the same time, or

immediately thereafter conveyed the property by

Exhibit C to petitioner Canuto Martin, who then

executed the document Exhibit D undertaking to

allow respondents to repurchase the property

within sixty days from October 31, 1941, but at the

price of P14,000. This document Exhibit D was

signed by Maria Reyes signifying her assent. At the

trial she pleaded that the document, without

embodying their true agreement, had been

obtained thru deceit and abuse of confidence.

However, her assertions were not credited by the

Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, that court declared

the document void (Exhibit D) for the only reasons

that it had been signed by Canuto Martin before

acquiring ownership of the property by the cession

of Maria Reyes and Pedro Revilla to the La

Previsora, and from the latter to them. The Court

noted that whereas Exhibit E was acknowledged

before the notary on November 3, 1941, Exhibit

Dbore the date October 30, 1941, a few days

before.

Wherefore the Court of Appeals held that the

respondent's right to repurchase was to be found in

Exhibit E, and that they had seasonably exercised

such right.

The validity of Exhibit D is the subject-matter of

Martin's principal attack on the appellate court's

judgment.

The documents Exhibits C, D and E were

undoubtedly part of the same amicable settlement.

Acknowledgment of the document Exhibit E was

delayed on account of the necessity of securing the

approval of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros.

For that reason it bears the date November 3. The

arrangements were obviously: (a) transfer to La

Previsora with right to repurchase at P8,204.60; (b)

transfer by La Previsora to Canuto Martin and (c)

option to repurchase from Martin at P14,000.

Why at P14,00, when it is admitted that Martin got

the property at P7,000 from La Previsora the claims

of Monte de Piedad arising from the attachment

heretofore described.

The Court of Appeals pronounced Exhibit D invalidbecause at the time of its execution, Martin had no

title over the property. This is rather too technical a

viewpoint. Remembering that Exhibit D constituted

a part of the whole friendly settlement and could

be considered as simultaneous with the other

documents, specially the documents of transfer

from Maria Reyes and La Previsora, the disparity of

dates should imply no annulling consequences. At

any rate, Exhibit D may be placed in the same

category as a promise to convey land not yetowned by the vendor, obligation which may be

enforced, according to the authorities:

Property or goods which, at the time of the

sale, are not owned by the seller, but which

are thereafter to be acquired by him, cannot

be the subject of an executed sale, but may

be the subject of a contract for the future sale

and delivery thereof, and it has been held

that even though the contract is in the form

of the present sale it will not pass the title,after the goods have been acquired, until

the seller has done some act appropriating

them to the contract. Such a contract of the


2/52

future sale and delivery of goods, which the

seller has not in possession but which he

intends to acquire by producing,

manufacturing, or purchasing before the

day of delivery, is valid as an executory

contract to be fulfilled by acquiring and

delivering the goods specified in the

contract, even though the acquisition of the

goods by the seller depends upon a

contingency which may or may not happen.

(55 Corpus Juris, 65). (Emphasis ours)

It is not unusual for persons to agree to

convey by a certain time, notwithstanding

they have no title to the land at the time of

the contract, and the validity of such

agreement is upheld. In such cases, the

vendor assume the risk of acquiring the title

and making the conveyance, or respondingin damages for the vendee's loss of his

bargain, One having an option to purchase

real estate has a legal right to enter into an

executory contract to sell the property.

Afortiori, it is not necessary that the vendor

be the absolute owner of the propertyat the

time he enters into agreement of sale

because the owner of the land, is as much

the subject of sale as is the land itself, and

whenever one is so suited with reference toa tract of land that he can acquire the title

thereto, either by the voluntary act of the

parties holding the title, or by proceeding at

law or in equity, he is in a position to make

a valid agreement for the sale thereof,

without disclosing the nature of his title. (55

American Jurisprudence, 480). (Emphasis

ours)

The above principles express the same the ideas in

articles 1462 and 1459 of the New Civil Code.

Therefore erroneous is the ruling that, because

executed before Canuto Martin became the owner,

Exhibit D, was null and void. Consequently, as Reyes

voluntarily agreed under Exhibit D, to repurchase at

P14,000, she should not repurchase at any other

price.

Now, have the respondents properly exercised their

right to repurchase?

The Court of Appeals stated that in December 1941,

Maria Reyes accompanied by Marcela Mota de

Malonso went to the office of La Previsora, not for

the purpose of repurchasing the property, but to ask

for extension of the period. Nevertheless, that Court

opined that inasmuch as the complaint to compel

repurchase had been filed on January 2, 1952 within

the sixty-day period mentioned in Exhibit E, the

vendors had preserved their redemption option.

Upon a move to reconsider, the Court of Appealsamplified its decision saying,

In view of the refusal of Atty. Pete A. Revilla

who was acting in behalf of appellee Canuto

Martin, to receive any amount less than

P14,000, nor to accept in behalf of the La

Previsora Filipina, claiming that the latter's

right were already ceded to appellee Canuto

Martin, we hold that the question to the

efficiency of the amount offered at the time

is not as vital to the issue as the necessity of

making one. . . . We find that the plaintiff

Maria Reyes, accompanied to one Marcela

Mota de Malonso did make an offer to

redeem the property in the property days of

December, 1941. Whether or not the

amount they had on that occasion was

sufficient to redeem the property at

P8,204.60 or P10,204.60 is not vital to the

preservation of the rights of the plaintiff's in

view of the refusal to accept any amountless than P14,000.

Having declared that Exhibit E was valid and that

the repurchase had to be made at P14,000, we must

necessarily conclude that under the above findings

of the Court of Appeals the right to repurchase had

not been preserved.

Nevertheless, let us suppose for the moment that

the rights of Revilla and Reyes are governed byExhibit E only-not by Exhibit D.

From the findings of the Court of Appeals it is to be

deduced that in December Maria Reyes offered to

redeem for less thanP8,204.60. The decision of the

court of first instance says "all the money she had

at that time was P7,000."

Now then: the repurchase price was P8,204.60 (on

the supposition that Exhibit E governs the parties'

rights); Maria Reyes offered to repay in DecemberP7,000 only. The fact that she was told Canuto

Martin wanted P14,000, does not excuse her

obligation to offer, within the time stipulated, the

full price for the repurchase: P8,204.60. If it was her

theory and position that she had a right to redeem

from La Previsora in accordance with Exhibit E, she

would have acted in accordance therewith by

offering P8,204.60 to La Previsora entirely

disregarding the demands of any other individual.

Undoubtedly, she failed to offer that amount.

Furthermore, there is no evidenceand the Court

of Appeals did not findthat Pedro Revilla was

actually authorized by La Previsora to refuse to

repurchase at P8,204.60.

Needless to add, the date of filing of the complaint

is immaterial, so long as it is filed within the period

of limitations, its purpose being to enforce a right

which must be established within the time to

repurchase.

Wherefore with the declaration that option to

repurchase, whether under Exhibit E or under


3/52

Exhibit D, had not been asserted to the proper time,

we hereby absolve the petitioner Canuto Martin

from the complaint. Costs against respondents.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

b.

G.R. No. 74470 March 8, 1989

NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY and WILLLAM

CABAL, petitioners

vs.

THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and

LEON SORIANO, respondents.

Cordoba, Zapanta, Rola & Garcia for petitioner

National Grains Authority.

Plaridel Mar Israel for respondent Leon Soriano.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision (pp. 9-

21, Rollo) of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now

Court of Appeals) dated December 23, 1985 in A.C.

G.R. CV No. 03812 entitled, "Leon Soriano, Plaintiff-

Appellee versus National Grains Authority and

William Cabal, Defendants Appellants", which

affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance

of Cagayan, in Civil Case No. 2754 and its resolution

(p. 28, Rollo) dated April 17, 1986 which denied the

Motion for Reconsideration filed therein.

The antecedent facts of the instant case are as

follows:

Petitioner National Grains Authority (now National

Food Authority, NFA for short) is a government

agency created under Presidential Decree No. 4.

One of its incidental functions is the buying of

palay grains from qualified farmers.

On August 23, 1979, private respondent LeonSoriano offered to sell palay grains to the NFA,

through William Cabal, the Provincial Manager of

NFA stationed at Tuguegarao, Cagayan. He

submitted the documents required by the NFA for

pre-qualifying as a seller, namely: (1) Farmer's

Information Sheet accomplished by Soriano and

certified by a Bureau of Agricultural Extension

(BAEX) technician, Napoleon Callangan, (2) Xerox

copies of four (4) tax declarations of the riceland

leased to him and copies of the lease contract

between him and Judge Concepcion Salud, and (3)

his Residence Tax Certificate. Private respondent

Soriano's documents were processed and

accordingly, he was given a quota of 2,640 cavans

of palay. The quota noted in the Farmer's

Information Sheet represented the maximum

number of cavans of palay that Soriano may sell to

the NFA.

In the afternoon of August 23, 1979 and on the

following day, August 24, 1979, Soriano delivered630 cavans of palay. The palay delivered during

these two days were not rebagged, classified and

weighed. when Soriano demanded payment of the


4/52

630 cavans of palay, he was informed that its

payment will be held in abeyance since Mr. Cabal

was still investigating on an information he received

that Soriano was not a bona tide farmer and the

palay delivered by him was not produced from his

farmland but was taken from the warehouse of a

rice trader, Ben de Guzman. On August 28, 1979,

Cabal wrote Soriano advising him to withdraw from

the NFA warehouse the 630 cavans Soriano

delivered stating that NFA cannot legally accept the

said delivery on the basis of the subsequent

certification of the BAEX technician, Napoleon

Callangan that Soriano is not a bona fide farmer.

Instead of withdrawing the 630 cavans of palay,

private respondent Soriano insisted that the palay

grains delivered be paid. He then filed a complaint

for specific performance and/or collection of

money with damages on November 2, 1979,against the National Food Authority and Mr.

William Cabal, Provincial Manager of NFA with the

Court of First Instance of Tuguegarao, and

docketed as Civil Case No. 2754.

Meanwhile, by agreement of the parties and upon

order of the trial court, the 630 cavans of palay in

question were withdrawn from the warehouse of

NFA. An inventory was made by the sheriff as

representative of the Court, a representative ofSoriano and a representative of NFA (p. 13, Rollo).

On September 30, 1982, the trial court rendered

judgment ordering petitioner National Food

Authority, its officers and agents to pay respondent

Soriano (as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2754) the

amount of P 47,250.00 representing the unpaid

price of the 630 cavans of palay plus legal interest

thereof (p. 1-2, CA Decision). The dispositive

portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders

judgment in favor of the plaintiff and

against the defendants National

Grains Authority, and William Cabal

and hereby orders:

1. The National Grains Authority,

now the National Food Authority, its

officers and agents, and Mr. William

Cabal, the Provincial Manager of the

National Grains Authority at the time

of the filing of this case, assigned at

Tuguegarao, Cagayan, whomsoever

is his successors, to pay to the

plaintiff Leon T. Soriano, the amount

of P47,250.00, representing the

unpaid price of the palay deliveries

made by the plaintiff to the

defendants consisting of 630 cavans

at the rate Pl.50 per kilo of 50 kilos

per cavan of palay;

2. That the defendants National

Grains Authority, now National Food

Authority, its officer and/or agents,

and Mr. William Cabal, the Provincial

Manager of the National Grains

Authority, at the time of the filing of

this case assigned at Tuguegarao,

Cagayan or whomsoever is his

successors, are likewise ordered to

pay the plaintiff Leon T. Soriano, the

legal interest at the rate of TWELVE

(12%) percent per annum, of the

amount of P 47,250.00 from the

filing of the complaint on November

20, 1979, up to the final payment of

the price of P 47,250.00;

3. That the defendants National

Grains Authority, now National Food

Authority, or their agents and duly

authorized representatives can nowwithdraw the total number of bags

(630 bags with an excess of 13 bags)

now on deposit in the bonded

warehouse of Eng. Ben de Guzman

at Tuguegarao, Cagayan pursuant to

the order of this court, and as

appearing in the written inventory

dated October 10, 1980, (Exhibit F

for the plaintiff and Exhibit 20 for the

defendants) upon payment of theprice of P 47,250.00 and TWELVE

PERCENT (12%) legal interest to the

plaintiff,

4. That the counterclaim of the

defendants is hereby dismissed;

5. That there is no pronouncement

as to the award of moral and

exemplary damages and attorney's

fees; and

6. That there is no pronouncement

as to costs.

SO ORDERED (pp. 9-10, Rollo)

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the

decision was denied on December 6, 1982.

Petitioners' appealed the trial court's decision to

the Intermediate Appellate Court. In a decision

promulgated on December 23, 1986 (pp. 9-21,

Rollo) the then Intermediate Appellate Court

upheld the findings of the trial court and affirmed

the decision ordering NFA and its officers to pay

Soriano the price of the 630 cavans of rice plus

interest. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of

the appellate court's decision was denied in a

resolution dated April 17, 1986 (p. 28, Rollo).

Hence, this petition for review filed by the NationalFood Authority and Mr. William Cabal on May 15,

1986 assailing the decision of the Intermediate


5/52

Appellate Court on the sole issue of whether or not

there was a contract of sale in the case at bar.

Petitioners contend that the 630 cavans of palay

delivered by Soriano on August 23, 1979 was made

only for purposes of having it offered for sale.

Further, petitioners stated that the procedure then

prevailing in matters of palay procurement from

qualified farmers were: firstly, there is a rebagging

wherein the palay is transferred from a private sack

of a farmer to the NFA sack; secondly, after the

rebagging has been undertaken, classification of

the palay is made to determine its variety; thirdly,

after the determination of its variety and convinced

that it passed the quality standard, the same will be

weighed to determine the number of kilos; and

finally, it will be piled inside the warehouse after the

preparation of the Warehouse Stock Receipt (WSP)

indicating therein the number of kilos, the varietyand the number of bags. Under this procedure,

rebagging is the initial operative act signifying

acceptance, and acceptance will be considered

complete only after the preparation of the

Warehouse Stock Receipt (WSR). When the 630

cavans of palay were brought by Soriano to the

Carig warehouse of NFA they were only offered for

sale. Since the same were not rebagged, classified

and weighed in accordance with the palay

procurement program of NFA, there was noacceptance of the offer which, to petitioners' mind

is a clear case of solicitation or an unaccepted offer

to sell.

The petition is not impressed with merit.

Article 1458 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

defines sale as a contract whereby one of the

contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the

ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing,

and the other party to pay therefore a price certainin money or its equivalent. A contract, on the other

hand, is a meeting of minds between two (2)

persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to

the other, to give something or to render some

service (Art. 1305, Civil Code of the Philippines). The

essential requisites of contracts are: (1) consent of

the contracting parties, (2) object certain which is

the subject matter of the contract, and (3) cause of

the obligation which is established (Art. 1318, Civil

Code of the Philippines.

In the case at bar, Soriano initially offered to sell

palay grains produced in his farmland to NFA.

When the latter accepted the offer by noting in

Soriano's Farmer's Information Sheet a quota of

2,640 cavans, there was already a meeting of the

minds between the parties. The object of the

contract, being the palay grains produced in

Soriano's farmland and the NFA was to pay the

same depending upon its quality. The fact that the

exact number of cavans of palay to be delivered hasnot been determined does not affect the perfection

of the contract. Article 1349 of the New Civil Code

provides: ". . .. The fact that the quantity is not

determinate shall not be an obstacle to the

existence of the contract, provided it is possible to

determine the same, without the need of a new

contract between the parties." In this case, there

was no need for NFA and Soriano to enter into a

new contract to determine the exact number of

cavans of palay to be sold. Soriano can deliver so

much of his produce as long as it does not exceed

2,640 cavans.

In its memorandum (pp. 66-71, Rollo) dated

December 4, 1986, petitioners further contend that

there was no contract of sale because of the

absence of an essential requisite in contracts,

namely, consent. It cited Section 1319 of the Civil

Code which states: "Consent is manifested by the

meeting of the offer and the acceptance of the

thing and the cause which are to constitute the

contract. ... " Following this line, petitioners contendthat there was no consent because there was no

acceptance of the 630 cavans of palay in question.

The above contention of petitioner is not correct

Sale is a consensual contract, " ... , there is

perfection when there is consent upon the subject

matter and price, even if neither is delivered."

(Obana vs. C.A., L-36249, March 29, 1985, 135 SCRA

557, 560) This is provided by Article 1475 of the

Civil Code which states:

Art. 1475. The contract of sale is

perfected at the moment there is a

meeting of minds upon the thing

which is the object of the contract

and upon the price.

x x x

The acceptance referred to which determines

consent is the acceptance of the offer of one partyby the other and not of the goods delivered as

contended by petitioners.

From the moment the contract of sale is perfected,

it is incumbent upon the parties to comply with

their mutual obligations or "the parties may

reciprocally demand performance" thereof. (Article

1475, Civil Code, 2nd par.).

The reason why NFA initially refused acceptance of

the 630 cavans of palay delivered by Soriano is that

it (NFA) cannot legally accept the said delivery

because Soriano is allegedly not a bona fide farmer.

The trial court and the appellate court found that

Soriano was a bona fide farmer and therefore, he

was qualified to sell palay grains to NFA.

Both courts likewise agree that NFA's refusal to

accept was without just cause. The above factual

findings which are supported by the record should

not be disturbed on appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is

DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the then


6/52

Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of

Appeals) is affirmed. No costs.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

c.

G.R. No. 126236 January 26, 2007

DOMINGO REALTY, INC. and AYALA STEEL

MANUFACTURING CO., INC., Petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO M.

ACERO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR.,J.:

Good judgment comes from experience, and often

experience comes from bad judgment.

Rita Mae Brown

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45

of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks the reversal of

the October 31, 1995 Decision1of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 33407, entitled

Antonio M. Acero v. Hon. Sofronio G. Sayo, et al.,

which annulled the December 7, 1987 Decision

based on a Compromise Agreement among

petitioner Domingo Realty, Inc. (Domingo Realty),

respondent Antonio M. Acero, and defendant Luis

Recato Dy in Civil Case No. 9581-P before the Pasay

City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch CXI; and the

August 28, 1996 Resolution2of the CA which

denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of

its October 31, 1995 Decision.

The Facts

On November 19, 1981, petitioner Domingo Realty

filed its November 15, 1981 Complaint3

with thePasay City RTC against Antonio M. Acero, who

conducted business under the firm name A.M.

Acero Trading,4David Victorio, John Doe, and Peter

Doe, for recovery of possession of three (3) parcels

of land located in Cupang, Muntinlupa, Metro

Manila, covered by (1) Transfer Certificate of Title

(TCT) No. (75600) S-107639-Land Records of Rizal;

(2) TCT No. (67006) S-107640-Land Records of

Rizal; and (3) TCT No. (67007) S-107643-Land

Records of Rizal (the "subject properties"). The said

lots have an aggregate area of 26,705 square

meters, more or less, on a portion of which Acero

had constructed a factory building for the

manufacture of hollow blocks, as alleged by

Domingo Realty.

On January 4, 1982, defendants Acero and Victorio

filed their December 21, 1981 Answer5to the

Complaint in Civil Case No. 9581-P. Acero alleged

that he merely leased the land from his co-

defendant David Victorio, who, in turn, claimed toown the property on which the hollow blocks

factory of Acero stood. In the Answer, Victorio

assailed the validity of the TCTs of Domingo Realty,
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt1


7/52

alleging that the said TCTs emanated from spurious

deeds of sale, and claimed that he and his

predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of

the property for more than 70 years.

On December 3, 1987, Mariano Yu representing

Domingo Realty, Luis Recato Dy6, and Antonio M.

Acero, all assisted by counsels, executed a

Compromise Agreement, which contained the

following stipulations, to wit:

1. That defendants admit and recognize the

ownership of the plaintiff over the property

subject of this case, covered by TCT No. S-

107639 (75600), S-107643 (67007), and S-

107640 (67006) with a total area of 26,705

square meters;

2. That defendant Luis Recato Dy admitsand recognizes that his title covered by TCT

No. 108027 has been proven not to be

genuine and that the area indicated therein

is inside the property of the plaintiff;

3. That defendant Acero admits that the

property he is presently occupying by way

of lease is encroaching on a portion of the

property of the plaintiff and assume[s] and

undertakes to vacate, remove and clear any

and all structures erected inside the

property of the plaintiff by himself and

other third parties, duly authorized and/or

who have an existing agreement with

defendant Acero, and shall deliver said

portion of the property of the plaintiff free

and clear of any unauthorized structures,

shanties, occupants, squatters or lessees

within a period of sixty (60) days from date

of signing of this compromise agreement.

Should defendant Acero fail in hisobligation to vacate, remove and clear the

structures erected inside the property of the

plaintiff within the period of 60 days afore-

mentioned, plaintiff shall be entitled to a

writ of execution for the immediate

demolition or removal of said structure to

fully implement this agreement; and

ejectment of all squatters and occupants

and lessees, including the dependents to

fully implement this agreement;

4. That plaintiff admits and recognizes that

defendant Luis Recato Dy bought and

occupied the property in good faith and for

value whereas defendant Acero leased the

portion of said property likewise in good

faith and for value hereby waives absolutely

and unconditionally all claims including

attorneys fees against both defendants in

all cases pending in any court whether by

virtue of any judgment or under the presentcomplaint and undertake to withdraw

and/or move to dismiss the same under the

spirit of this agreement;

5. That defendants likewise waive all claims

for damages including attorneys fees

against the plaintiff;

6. That plaintiff acknowledges the benefit

done by defendant Luis Recato Dy on the

property by incurring expenses in protecting

and preserving the property by way of

construction of perimeter fence and

maintaining a caretaker therein and plaintiff

has agreed to pay Luis Recato Dy the

amount of P100,000.00 upon approval of

this agreement by this Honorable Court.7

Acting on the Compromise Agreement, the Pasay

City RTC rendered the December 7, 1987 Decision

which adopted the aforequoted six (6) stipulations

and approved the Compromise Agreement.

To implement the said Decision, Domingo Realty

filed its January 21, 1988 Motion8asking the trial

court for permission to conduct a re-survey of the

subject properties, which was granted in the

January 22, 1988 Order.9

On February 2, 1988, respondent Acero filed his

January 29, 1988 Motion to Nullify the Compromise

Agreement,10claiming that the January 22, 1988

Order authorizing the survey plan of petitioner

Domingo Realty as the basis of a resurvey would

violate the Compromise Agreement since the whole

area he occupied would be adjudged as owned by

the realty firm.

On March 18, 1988, Acero filed a Motion to

Resurvey,11whereby it was alleged that the parties

agreed to have the disputed lots re-surveyed by the

Bureau of Lands. Thus, the trial court issued the

March 21, 1988 Order12directing the Director of

Lands to conduct a re-survey of the subjectproperties.

In his June 9, 1989 Report, Elpidio T. De Lara, Chief

of the Technical Services Division of the Lands

Management Section of the National Capital

Region - Department of Environment and Natural

Resources, submitted to the trial court Verification

Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000135. In the said

Verification Survey Plan, petitioners TCTs covered

the entire land occupied by the respondents

hollow block factory.13

On April 10, 1990, petitioner Ayala Steel

Manufacturing Co., Inc. (Ayala Steel) filed its March

30, 1990 Motion for Substitution alleging that it

had purchased the subject lots, attaching to the

motion TCT Nos. 152528, 152529, and 152530 all in

its name, as proof of purchase.14

The said motion was opposed by Acero claiming

that "this case has already been terminated inaccordance with the compromise agreement of the

parties, hence, substitution will no longer be

necessary and justified under the
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt6


8/52

circumstances."15The motion was not resolved

which explains why both transferor Domingo Realty

and transferee Ayala Steel are co-petitioners in the

instant petition.

In its December 28, 1990 Order,16the trial court

directed Acero to conduct his own re-survey of the

lots based on the technical description appearing in

the TCTs of Domingo Realty and to have the re-

survey plans approved by the Bureau of Lands. The

Order resulted from Aceros contention that he

occupied only 2,000 square meters of petitioners

property.

Acero employed the services of Engr. Eligio L. Cruz

who came up with Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-

13-000185. However, when the said Verification

Survey Plan was presented to the Bureau of Lands

for approval, it was rejected because Engr. Cruzfailed to comply with the requirements of the

Bureau.17

On April 8, 1991, petitioners filed a Manifestation

with Motion praying for the denial of respondents

Motion to Nullify the Compromise Agreement and

for the approval of Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-

13-000135 prepared by Engr. Lara of the Bureau of

Lands. The Pasay City RTC issued the December 6,

1991 Order18denying respondent Aceros Motion

to Nullify the Compromise Agreement. As a

consequence, petitioners filed a Motion for

Execution on December 10, 1991.19

On January 6, 1992, respondent filed an undated

Manifestation20claiming, among others, that it was

on record that the Compromise Agreement was

only as to a portion of the land being occupied by

respondent, which is about 2,000 square meters,

more or less. He reiterated the same contentions in

his December 21, 1991 Manifestation.21

On January 13, 1992, respondent filed a Motion to

Modify Order Dated 6 December 91,22claiming

that the said Order modified the Compromise

Agreement considering that it allegedly involved

only 1,357 square meters and not the entire

lot;23and if not amended, the Order would deviate

from the principle that "no man shall enrich himself

at the expense of the other."

In its January 15, 1992 Order,24the trial court

approved the issuance of a Writ of Execution to

enforce the December 7, 1987 Decision. On

February 3, 1992, respondent Acero subsequently

filed a Motion for Reconsideration25of the January

15, 1992 Order arguing that the Order was

premature and that Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-

13-000135 violated the Compromise Agreement.

On January 18, 1992, the Pasay City Hall was gutted

by fire, destroying the records of the lower court,including those of this case. Thus, after

reconstituting the records, the trial court issued the

October 6, 1992 Order,26reiterating its January 15,

1992 Order and ordering the issuance of a Writ of

Execution.

On October 23, 1992, respondent filed a

Manifestation and Compliance,27alleging that

Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000185 had

been approved by the Regional Director of the

DENR; thus, he moved for the annulment of the

October 6, 1992 Order granting the Writ of

Execution in favor of petitioners.

Given the conflicting Verification Survey Plans of

the parties, the trial court issued the October 11,

1993 Order28requiring the Bureau of Lands Director

to determine which of the two survey plans was

correct.

Subsequently, Regional Technical Director Eriberto

V. Almazan of the Land Registration Authorityissued the November 24, 1993 Order29cancelling

Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000185,

submitted by Engineer Eligio Cruz, who was hired

by respondent Acero, and declared Verification

Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000135, submitted by

Engineer Lara of the Bureau of Lands, as the correct

Plan.

Thereafter, petitioners filed their January 12, 1994

Ex-parte Manifestation with Motion,30praying for

the implementation of the Writ of Execution against

the disputed lands, which was granted in the

January 12, 1994 Order.31

Respondents Motion for Reconsideration32of the

January 12, 1994 Order was denied in the February

1, 1994 Order33of the Pasay City RTC.

Aggrieved, respondent Acero filed before the CA

his February 23, 1994 Petition for Certiorari and

Mandamus with Urgent Prayer for Issuance of aTemporary Restraining Order,34under Rule 65 of

the Rules of Court, against petitioners and Judge

Sofronio G. Sayo as presiding judge of the lower

court. In the petition, respondent sought to nullify

and set aside the RTC Orders dated December 6,

1991, January 15, 1992, October 6, 1992, January

12, 1994, and February 1, 1994, all of which pertain

to the execution of the December 7, 1987 Decision

on the Compromise Agreement. Significantly,

respondent did not seek the annulment of said

judgment but merely reiterated the issue that under

the Compromise Agreement, he would only be

vacating a portion of the property he was

occupying.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On October 31, 1995, the CA promulgated the

assailed Decision, the fallo of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition forcertiorari is GRANTED and the Orders of

respondent court dated December 6, 1991, January

15, 1992, October 6, 1992, and January 12, 1994,
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt15


9/52

and February 1, 1994 are SET ASIDE. In the interest

of justice, and consistent with the views expressed

by this Court, the Compromise Judgment dated

December 7, 1987 of respondent court is likewise

SET ASIDE. Respondent Court is likewise directed to

proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 9581-P

on the merits and determine, once and for all, the

respective proprietary rights of the litigants thereto.

SO ORDERED.35

In discarding the December 7, 1987 Decision based

on the Compromise Agreement, the appellate court

ratiocinated that David Victorio, the alleged lessor

of Acero, was not a party to the Compromise

Agreement; thus, there would always remain the

probability that he might eventually resurface and

assail the Compromise Agreement, giving rise to

another suit. Moreover, the CA found theCompromise Agreement vague, not having

stipulated a mutually agreed upon surveyor, "who

would survey the properties using as a basis, survey

plans acceptable to both, and to thereafter submit

a report to the court."36

Likewise, the CA sustained Aceros belief that he

would only have to vacate a portion of the property

he was presently occupying, which was tantamount

to a mistake that served as basis for the nullification

of the Compromise Agreement entered into.

On January 17, 1996, petitioners filed a Motion for

Reconsideration37of the adverse Decision, which

was consequently rejected in the CAs August 28,

1996 Resolution.

Thus, the instant petition is in our hands.

The Issues

The issues as stated in the petition are as follows:

1. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in

nullifying and setting aside judgment on

Compromise Agreement and the

Compromise Agreement itself as well as the

subsequent orders of the court a quo

though there is no motion to set aside the

judgment on the Compromise Agreement

before the court a quo on the ground of

fraud, mistake or duress;


nullifying and setting aside the judgment on



subsequent Orders of the Court of quo [sic]

though in the Petition for Certiorari and

Mandamus before respondent Court of

Appeals, private respondent argued that

judgment on Compromise Agreement isfinal, executory, immutable and unalterable;


nullifying and setting aside Judgment on



subsequent Orders of the Court a quo

based on fraud or mistake though said

issues were not raised before the Court a

quo, and no evidence was introduced to

substantiate fraud or mistake before the

court a quo;

4. The respondent Court of Appeals erred

when it ruled that the non-inclusion of one

of the parties in this case, and the

vagueness of the Compromise Agreement

are grounds to nullify and set aside the

Compromise Agreement; and

5. The respondent Court of Appeals erredwhen it entertained the Petition for

Certiorari and Mandamus though it was

filed beyond reasonable time if not barred

by laches.38

Restated, the issues are:

I.

WHETHER THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT OF

APPEALS WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR BARRED BY

LACHES;

II.

WHETHER THE NON-INCLUSION OF DAVID

VICTORIO WOULD NULLIFY THE COMPROMISE

AGREEMENT;

III.

WHETHER THE JUDGMENT ON COMPROMISE

AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE ON THE

GROUND OF VAGUENESS; AND

IV.

WHETHER THE JUDGMENT ON COMPROMISE

AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE ON THE

GROUND OF MISTAKE.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The preliminary issue involves the query of what

proper remedy is available to a party who believes

that his consent in a compromise agreement was

vitiated by mistake upon which a judgment was

rendered by a court of law.

There is no question that a contract where theconsent is given through mistake, violence,

intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable

under Article 1330 of the Civil Code. If the contract
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt35


10/52

assumes the form of a Compromise Agreement

between the parties in a civil case, then a judgment

rendered on the basis of such covenant is final,

unappealable, and immediately executory. If one of

the parties claims that his consent was obtained

through fraud, mistake, or duress, he must file a

motion with the trial court that approved the

compromise agreement to reconsider the judgment

and nullify or set aside said contract on any of the

said grounds for annulment of contract within 15

days from notice of judgment. Under Rule 37, said

party can either file a motion for new trial or

reconsideration. A party can file a motion for new

trial based on fraud, accident or mistake, excusable

negligence, or newly discovered evidence.

On the other hand, a party may decide to seek the

recall or modification of the judgment by means of

a motion for reconsideration on the ground that"the decision or final order is contrary to law" if the

consent was procured through fraud, mistake, or

duress. Thus, the motion for a new trial or motion

for reconsideration is the readily available remedy

for a party to challenge a judgment if the 15-day

period from receipt of judgment for taking an

appeal has not yet expired. This motion is the most

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law to assail

a judgment based on a compromise agreement

which, even if it is immediately executory, can stillbe annulled for vices of consent or forgery.39

Prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure on July 1, 1997, an order denying a

motion for new trial or reconsideration was not

appealable since the judgment in the case is not yet

final. The remedy is to appeal from the challenged

decision and the denial of the motion for

reconsideration or new trial is assigned as an error

in the appeal.40Under the present [1997] Rules of

Civil Procedure, the same rule was maintained thatthe order denying said motion is still unappealable

and the rule is still to appeal from the judgment

and not from the order rejecting the motion for

reconsideration/new trial.

If the 15-day period for taking an appeal has

lapsed, then the aggrieved party can avail of Rule

38 by filing a petition for relief from judgment

which should be done within 60 days after the

petitioner learns of the judgment, but not morethan six (6) months after such judgment or final

order was entered. Prior to the effectivity of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in 1997, if the court

denies the petition under Rule 38, the remedy is to

appeal from the order of denial and not from the

judgment since said decision has already become

final and already unappealable.41However, in the

appeal from said order, the appellant may likewise

assail the judgment. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, the aggrieved party can no longer

appeal from the order denying the petition sincethis is proscribed under Section 1 of Rule 41. The

remedy of the party is to file a special civil action

for certiorari under Rule 65 from the order rejecting

the petition for relief from judgment.

The records of the case reveal the following:

1. December 3, 1987 the parties signed

the Compromise Agreement;

2. December 7, 1987 a decision/judgment

was rendered based on the December 3,

1987 Compromise Agreement;

3. February 2, 1988 Acero filed a Motion to

Nullify the Compromise Agreement;

4. December 6, 1991 the trial court denied

Aceros Motion to Nullify the Compromise

Agreement;

5. December 11, 1991 defendant Acero

received the December 6, 1991 Order which

denied said motion;42

6. December 26, 1991 the 15-day period

to appeal to the CA expired by the failure of

defendant Acero to file an appeal with said

appellate court;

7. January 15, 1992 the trial court issued

the Order which granted petitioners motion

for the issuance of a Writ of Execution;

8. October 6, 1992 the trial court

reiterated its January 15, 1992 Order

directing the issuance of a Writ of Execution

after the records of the case were lost in a

fire that gutted the Pasay City Hall;

9. January 12, 1994 the trial court issued

the Order which directed theimplementation of the Writ of Execution

prayed for by petitioners;

10. February 1, 1994 the trial court issued

the Order which denied respondents

Motion for Reconsideration of its January

12, 1994 Order; and

11. April 4, 1994 Acero filed with the CA a

petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.

33407 entitled Antonio M. Acero v.

Domingo Realty, Inc., et al.

In his undated Manifestation, respondent Acero

admitted having received a copy of the December

7, 1987 Decision on December 11, 1987. However, it

was only on February 2, 1988 when he filed a

Motion to Nullify the Compromise Agreement

which was discarded for lack of merit by the trial

court on December 6, 1991. If the Motion to Nullify

the Compromise Agreement is treated as a motionfor reconsideration and/or for new trial, then Acero

should have filed an appeal from the December 7,

1987 Decision and assigned as error the December
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt39


11/52

6, 1991 Order denying said motion pursuant to the

rules existing prior to the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure. He failed to file such appeal but instead

filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the

CA on April 4, 1994. This is prejudicial to

respondent Acero as the special civil action of

certiorari is not the proper remedy. If the aggrieved

party does not interpose a timely appeal from the

adverse decision, a special civil action for certiorari

is not available as a substitute for a lost appeal.43

What respondent Acero should have done was to

file a petition for relief from judgment when he

became aware that he lost his right of appeal on

December 26, 1991. Even with this approach,

defendant Acero was also remiss.

In sum, the petition for certiorari instituted by

respondent Acero with the CA is a wrong remedy; asimple appeal to the CA would have sufficed. Since

the certiorari action is an improper legal action, the

petition should have been rejected outright by the

CA.

Assuming arguendo that a petition for certiorari

with the CA is the appropriate remedy, still, said

petition was filed out of time.

The petition before the CA was filed prior to the

effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Court when there

was still no prescribed period within which to file

said petition, unlike in the present Section 4 of Rule

65 wherein a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus

must be filed within 60 days from notice of the

judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from,

or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new

trial or reconsideration after notice of judgment.

Section 4, Rule 65 previously read:

Section 4. Where petition filed.The petition may

be filed in the Supreme Court, or, if it relates to the

acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a

corporation, board or officer or person, in a Court

of First Instance having jurisdiction thereof. It may

also be filed in the Court of Appeals if it is in aid of

its appellate jurisdiction.

Petitions for certiorari under Rules 43, 44 and 45

shall be filed with the Supreme Court.

Before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure became

effective on July 1, 1997, the yardstick to determine

the timeliness of a petition for certiorari under Rule

65 was the reasonableness of the time that had

elapsed from receipt of notice of the assailed

order/s of the trial court up to the filing of the

appeal with the CA.44In a number of cases, the

Court ruled that reasonable time can be pegged at

three (3) months.45

In the present case, the Order denying the Motion

to Nullify the Compromise Agreement was issued

on December 6, 1991. The petition for certiorari was

filed on April 4, 1994. The period of two (2) years

and four (4) months cannot be considered fair and

reasonable. With respect to the January 15, 1992

Order granting the writ of execution and the

October 6, 1992 Order directing the issuance of the

writ, it is evident that the petition before the CA

was filed more than three (3) months after the

receipt by respondent Acero of said orders and the

filing of the petition is likewise unreasonably

delayed.

On the second issue, petitioners assail the ruling of

the appellate court that David Victorio who is

claimed to be the lessor of Acero, and who is

impleaded as a defendant in Civil Case No. 9581-P,

was not made a party to the Compromise

Agreement and hence, he may later "assail the

compromise agreement as not binding upon him,

thereby giving rise to another suit."46

We find merit in petitioners position.

The CA was unable to cite a law or jurisprudence

that supports the annulment of a compromise

agreement if one of the parties in a case is not

included in the settlement. The only legal effect of

the non-inclusion of a party in a compromise

agreement is that said party cannot be bound by

the terms of the agreement. The Compromise

Agreement shall however be "valid and binding as

to the parties who signed thereto."47

The issue of ownership between petitioners and

David Victorio can be threshed out by the trial court

in Civil Case No. 9581-P. The proper thing to do is

to remand the case for continuation of the

proceedings between petitioners and defendant

David Victorio but not to annul the partial

judgment between petitioners and respondent

Acero which has been pending execution for 20years.

With regard to the third issue, petitioners assail the

ruling of the CA that the Compromise Agreement is

vague as there is still a need to determine the exact

metes and bounds of the encroachment on the

petitioners lot.

The object of a contract, in order to be considered

as "certain," need not specify such object with

absolute certainty. It is enough that the object is

determinable in order for it to be considered as

"certain." Article 1349 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 1349. The object of every contract must be

determinate as to its kind. The fact that the quantity

is not determinate shall not be an obstacle to the

existence of the contract, provided it is possible to

determine the same, without the need of a new

contract between the parties.

In the instant case, the title over the subject

property contains a technical description that

provides the metes and bounds of the property of
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt46http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt46http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt46http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt47http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt47http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt47http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt47http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt46http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt43


12/52

petitioners. Such technical description is the final

determinant of the extent of the property of

petitioners. Thus, the area of petitioners property is

determinable based on the technical descriptions

contained in the TCTs.

Notably, the determination made by the Bureau of

Landsthat Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-

000135 is the correct Planis controlling and shall

prevail over Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-

000185 submitted by Acero. Findings of fact by

administrative agencies, having acquired expertise

in their field of specialization, must be given great

weight by this Court.48Even if the exact area of

encroachment is not specified in the agreement, it

can still be determined from the technical

description of the title of plaintiff which defendant

Acero admitted to be correct. Thus, the object of

the Compromise Agreement is considereddeterminate and specific.

Moreover, "vagueness" is defined in Blacks Law

Dictionary as: "indefinite, uncertain; not susceptible

of being understood."

A perusal of the entire Compromise Agreement will

negate any contention that there is vagueness in its

provisions. It must be remembered that in the

interpretation of contracts, an instrument must be

construed so as to give effect to all the provisions

of these contracts.49Thus, the Compromise

Agreement must be considered as a whole.

The alleged vagueness revolves around the term

"portion" in paragraph three (3) of the Compromise

Agreement,50taken together with paragraph one

(1) which we quote:

1. That defendants admit and recognize the

ownership of the plaintiff over the property subjectof this case, covered by TCT No. S-107639 (75600),

S-107643 (67007), and S-107640 (67006) with a

total area of 26,705 square meters;

x x x x

3. That defendant Acero admits that the property

he is presently occupying by way of lease is

encroaching on a portion of the property of the

plaintiff and assume and undertakes to vacate,

remove and clear any and all structures erected

inside the property of the plaintiff by himself and

other third parties, duly authorized and/or who

have an existing agreement with defendant Acero,

and shall deliver said portion of the property of the

plaintiff free and clear of any unauthorized

structures, shanties, occupants, squatters or lessees

within a period of sixty (60) days from date of

signing of this compromise agreement. Should

defendant Acero fail in his obligation to vacate,

remove and clear the structures erected inside theproperty of the plaintiff within the period of 60

days afore-mentioned, plaintiff shall be entitled to a

writ of execution for the immediate demolition or

removal of said structure to fully implement this

agreement; and ejectment of all squatters and

occupants and lessees, including the dependents to

fully implement this agreement. (Emphasis

supplied.)

Respondent harps on their contention that the term

"portion" in paragraph 3 of the Compromise

Agreement refers to the property which they are

occupying. Respondents interpretation of

paragraph 3 of the Compromise Agreement is

mistaken as it is anchored on his belief that the

encroachment on the property of petitioners is only

a portion and not the entire lot he is occupying.

This is apparent from his Supplement to his Petition

for Certiorari and Mandamus where he explained:

Petitioner [Acero] entered into this agreement

because of his well-founded belief and convictionthat a portion of the property he is occupying

encroaches only a portion of the property of private

respondent. In fine, only a portion of the property

petitioner is occupying (not all of it) encroaches on

a portion of the property of private respondent.51

This contention is incorrect. The agreement is clear

that respondent Acero admitted that "the property

he is presently occupying by way of lease is

encroaching on a portion of the property of the

plaintiff." Thus, whether it is only a portion or the

entire lot Acero is leasing that will be affected by

the agreement is of no importance. What controls

is the encroachment on the lot of petitioner

Domingo Realty regardless of whether the entire lot

or only a portion occupied by Acero will be covered

by the encroachment.

While it may be the honest belief of respondent

Acero that only a portion of the lot he is occupying

encroaches on the 26,705-square meter lot ofpetitioner Domingo Realty and later, Ayala Steel,

the Court finds that the true and real agreement

between the parties is that any encroachment by

respondent Acero on the lot of petitioners will be

surrendered to the latter. This is apparent from the

undertaking in paragraph 3 that defendant Acero

"undertakes to vacate, remove and clear any and all

structures erected inside the property of the

plaintiff." This prestation results from the admission

against the interest of respondent Acero that he"admits and recognizes the ownership of the

plaintiff (Domingo Realty)" over the subject lot. The

controlling word therefore is "encroachment"

whether it involves a portion of or the entire lot

claimed by defendant David Victorio. To reiterate,

the word "portion" refers to petitioners lot and not

that of Aceros. Contrary to the disposition of the

CA, we rule that the terms of the Compromise

Agreement are clear and leave no doubt upon the

intent of the parties that respondent Acero will

vacate, remove, and clear any and all structureserected inside petitioners property, the ownership

of which is not denied by him. The literal meaning

of the stipulations in the Compromise Agreement


13/52

will control under Article 1370 of the Civil Code.

Thus, the alleged vagueness in the object of the

agreement cannot be made an excuse for its

nullification.

Finally, with regard to the fourth issue, petitioners

question the finding of the CA that the compromise

judgment can be set aside on the ground of

mistake under Article 2038 of the Civil Code,

because respondent Acero gave his consent to the

Compromise Agreement in good faith that he

would only vacate a portion of his lot in favor of

petitioner Domingo Realty.

We rule otherwise.

Articles 2038 and 1330 of the Civil Code allow a

party to a contract, on the ground of mistake, to

nullify a compromise agreement, viz:

Article 2038. A compromise in which there is

mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue

influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the

provisions of Article 1330 of this Code.

Article 1330. A contract where the consent is given

through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue

influence, or fraud is voidable (emphasis supplied).

"Mistake" has been defined as a "misunderstanding

of the meaning or implication of something" or "a

wrong action or statement proceeding from a faulty

judgment x x x."52

Article 1333 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

however states that "there is no mistake if the party

alleging it knew the doubt, contingency or risk

affecting the object of the contract."

Under this provision of law, it is presumed that theparties to a contract know and understand the

import of their agreement. Thus, civil law expert

Arturo M. Tolentino opined that:

To invalidate consent, the error must be excusable.

It must be real error, and not one that could have

been avoided by the party alleging it. The error

must arise from facts unknown to him. He cannot

allege an error which refers to a fact known to him,

or which he should have known by ordinary diligent

examination of the facts. An error so patent and

obvious that nobody could have made it, or one

which could have been avoided by ordinary

prudence, cannot be invoked by the one who made

it in order to annul his contract. A mistake that is

caused by manifest negligence cannot invalidate a

juridical act.53(Emphasis supplied.)

Prior to the execution of the Compromise

Agreement, respondent Acero was already aware of

the technical description of the titled lots ofpetitioner Domingo Realty and more so, of the

boundaries and area of the lot he leased from

David Victorio. Before consenting to the agreement,

he could have simply hired a geodetic engineer to

conduct a verification survey and determine the

actual encroachment of the area he was leasing on

the titled lot of petitioner Domingo Realty. Had he

undertaken such a precautionary measure, he

would have known that the entire area he was

occupying intruded into the titled lot of petitioners

and possibly, he would not have signed the

agreement.

In this factual milieu, respondent Acero could have

easily averted the alleged mistake in the contract;

but through palpable neglect, he failed to

undertake the measures expected of a person of

ordinary prudence. Without doubt, this kind of

mistake cannot be resorted to by respondent Acero

as a ground to nullify an otherwise clear, legal, and

valid agreement, even though the document may

become adverse and even ruinous to his business.

Moreover, respondent failed to state in the

Compromise Agreement that he intended to vacate

only a portion of the property he was leasing. Such

provision being beneficial to respondent, he, in the

exercise of the proper diligence required, should

have made sure that such matter was specified in

the Compromise Agreement. Respondent Aceros

failure to have the said stipulation incorporated in

the Compromise Agreement is negligence on hispart and insufficient to abrogate said agreement.

In Torres v. Court of Appeals,54which was also cited

in LL and Company Development and Agro-

Industrial Corporation v. Huang Chao Chun,55it was

held that:

Under Article 1315 of the Civil Code, contracts bind

the parties not only to what has been expressly

stipulated, but also to all necessary consequences

thereof, as follows:

ART. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere

consent, and from that moment the parties are

bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been

expressly stipulated but also to all the

consequences which, according to their nature, may

be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.

It is undisputed that petitioners are educated and

are thus presumed to have understood the terms of

the contract they voluntarily signed. If it was not in

consonance with their expectations, they should

have objected to it and insisted on the provisions

they wanted.

Courts are not authorized to extricate parties from

the necessary consequences of their acts, and the

fact that the contractual stipulations may turn out

to be financially disadvantageous will not relieve

parties thereto of their obligations. They cannot

now disavow the relationship formed from suchagreement due to their supposed

misunderstanding of its terms.


14/52

The mere fact that the Compromise Agreement

favors one party does not render it invalid. We

ruled in Amarante v. Court of Appeals that:

Compromises are generally to be favored and

cannot be set aside if the parties acted in good

faith and made reciprocal concessions to each

other in order to terminate a case. This holds true

even if all the gains appear to be on one side and

all the sacrifices on the other (emphasis supplied).56

One final note. While the Court can commiserate

with respondent Acero in his sad plight,

nonetheless we have no power to make or alter

contracts in order to save him from the adverse

stipulations in the Compromise Agreement.

Hopefully this case will serve as a precaution to

prospective parties to a contract involving titled

lands for them to exercise the diligence of areasonably prudent person by undertaking

measures to ensure the legality of the title and the

accurate metes and bounds of the lot embraced in

the title. It is advisable that such parties (1) verify

the origin, history, authenticity, and validity of the

title with the Office of the Register of Deeds and

the Land Registration Authority; (2) engage the

services of a competent and reliable geodetic

engineer to verify the boundary, metes, and bounds

of the lot subject of said title based on the technicaldescription in the said title and the approved

survey plan in the Land Management Bureau; (3)

conduct an actual ocular inspection of the lot; (4)

inquire from the owners and possessors of

adjoining lots with respect to the true and legal

ownership of the lot in question; (5) put up signs

that said lot is being purchased, leased, or

encumbered; and (6) undertake such other

measures to make the general public aware that

said lot will be subject to alienation, lease, or

encumbrance by the parties. Respondent Acero, forall his woes, may have a legal recourse against

lessor David Victorio who inveigled him to lease the

lot which turned out to be owned by another.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and

the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA are

REVERSED. The questioned Orders of the Pasay City

RTC dated December 6, 1991, January 15, 1992,

October 6, 1992, January 12, 1994, and February 1,

1994, including the Decision dated December 7,1987, are AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the

Pasay RTC, Branch III for further proceedings with

respect to petitioner Domingo Realtys November

15, 1981 Complaint57against one of the

defendants, David Victorio. No costs.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

B. PARTICULAR KINDSa.

G.R. No. L-24732 April 30, 1968

PIO SIAN MELLIZA, petitioner,

vs.CITY OF ILOILO, UNIVERSITY OF THE

PHILIPPINES and THE COURT

APPEALS, respondents.

Cornelio P. Ravena for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

BENGZON, J.P.,J.:

Juliana Melliza during her lifetime owned, among

other properties, three parcels of residential land in

Iloilo City registered in her name under Original

Certificate of Title No. 3462. Said parcels of land

were known as Lots Nos. 2, 5 and 1214. The total

area of Lot No. 1214 was 29,073 square meters.

On November 27, 1931 she donated to the then

Municipality of Iloilo, 9,000 square meters of Lot

1214, to serve as site for the municipal hall. 1 The

donation was however revoked by the parties for

the reason that the area donated was foundinadequate to meet the requirements of the

development plan of the municipality, the so-called

"Arellano Plan". 2

Subsequently, Lot No. 1214 was divided by Certeza

Surveying Co., Inc. into Lots 1214-A and 1214-B.

And still later, Lot 1214-B was further divided into

Lots 1214-B-1, Lot 1214-B-2 and Lot 1214-B-3. As

approved by the Bureau of Lands, Lot 1214-B-1

with 4,562 square meters, became known as Lot

1214-B; Lot 1214-B-2, with 6,653 square meters,

was designated as Lot 1214-C; and Lot 1214-B-13,

with 4,135 square meters, became Lot 1214-D.

On November 15, 1932 Juliana Melliza executed an

instrument without any caption containing the

following:

Que en consideracion a la suma total de

SEIS MIL CUATRO CIENTOS VEINTIDOS

PESOS (P6,422.00), moneda filipina que porla presente declaro haber recibido a mi

entera satisfaccion del Gobierno Municipal

de Iloilo, cedo y traspaso en venta real y

difinitiva a dicho Gobierno Municipal de

Iloilo los lotes y porciones de los mismos

que a continuacion se especifican a saber: el

lote No. 5 en toda su extension; una porcion

de 7669 metros cuadrados del lote No. 2,

cuya porcion esta designada como sub-

lotes Nos. 2-B y 2-C del piano de

subdivision de dichos lotes preparado por la

Certeza Surveying Co., Inc., y una porcion de

10,788 metros cuadrados del lote No. 1214
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt56http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt56http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt56http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt57http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt57http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt57http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt57http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126236_2007.html#fnt56


15/52

cuya porcion esta designada como sub-

lotes Nos. 1214-B-2 y 1214-B-3 del mismo

plano de subdivision.

Asimismo nago constar que la cesion y

traspaso que ariba se mencionan es de

venta difinitiva, y que para la mejor

identificacion de los lotes y porciones de los

mismos que son objeto de la presente, hago

constar que dichos lotes y porciones son los

que necesita el Gobierno Municipal de Iloilo

para la construccion de avenidas, parques y

City Hall site del Municipal Government

Center de iloilo, segun el plano Arellano.

On January 14, 1938 Juliana Melliza sold her

remaining interest in Lot 1214 to Remedios Sian

Villanueva who thereafter obtained her own

registered title thereto, under Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. 18178. Remedios in turn on November 4,

1946 transferred her rights to said portion

Date post:	08-Aug-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	bentot031279
View:	214 times
Download:	0 times

Cases on Special Contracts

Documents