Castells - An Introduction to the Information Age

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An introduction to the information ageManuel Castells

a

aProfessor of Sociology and Planning, and Chair of the Centre for Western

European Studies, University of Californ. Berkeley

To cite this Article: Manuel Castells , 'An introduction to the information age', City,

2:7, 6 - 16To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/13604819708900050URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13604819708900050

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based on what I have perceived, rightly orwrongly, already atwork inour societies. I willorganize my lecture in onedisclaimer, ninehypotheses, and one conclusion.DisclaimerI shall focus on the structure/dynam ics of the net-work society, not on its historical genesis, that ishow and why it came about, although in my bookI propose a few hints about it. For the record: inmy view, it resulted from the historical conver-gence of three independent processes, fromwhose interaction emerged the network society: The Information Technology Revolution, con-

stituted as aparadigm inthe 1970s. The restructuring ofcapitalism and ofstatismin the 1980s, aimed atsuperseding their con-tradictions, with sharply different outcom es.

The cultural social movements of the 1960s,and their 1970s aftermath (particularly femi-nism and ecologism).The Information Technology Revolution D ID

NOT create thenetwork society. ButwithoutInformation Technology, theNetwork Societywould not exist.

Rather than providing an abstract categoriza-tion of w hat this Network Society is, let me sum-marize itsmain features andprocesses, beforeattempting a synthesis of itsembedded logic inthe diversity of its cultural/institutional varia-tions. There is no implicit hierarchy in thesequence ofpresentation ofthese features. Theyall interact in, guess what, anetwork.1. An informational economyIt is an econom y in which sources ofproductivityand competitiveness for firms, regions, countries,depend, m ore than ever, on knowledge, informa-tion, and the technology of their processing,including thetechnology of management, andthe management of technology. This isnot thesame as a service economy. There is informa-tional agriculture, informational manufacturing,and different types of informational services,while alarge number ofservice activities, e.g.inthe developing world, are not informational at all.

The informational economy opens up anextraordinary potential for solving our problems,but, because ofits dynamism and creativity, it ispotentially more exclusionary than the industrialeconomy if social controls do not check trieforces ofunfettered market logic.

The informational economy ispotentially more exclusionarythan the industrial economy ifsocial contro ls donot checkthe forces ofunfetteredmarket logic.

2. Aglobal economyThis isnot the same as aworld economy. Thathas existed, in theWest, at least since the six-teenth century. Theglobal economy is a newreality: itis an econom y w hose core, strategicallydom inan t activities have the potential of workingas aunit in real time on aplanetary scale. Thisisso for financial and currency markets, advancedbusiness services, technological innovation, hightechnology manufacturing, media communica-tion.

Most economic activity in theworld, andmost employment are not only national butregional or local. But,except for subsistenceeconom ies, the fate ofthese activities, and of theirjobs, depend ultimately onthe dynamics of theglobal economy, towhich they are connectedthrough networks and markets. Indeed, if labortends to be local, capital is by and large globalized not asmall detail in acapitalist economy. Th isglobalization hasdeveloped as a fully fledgedsystem only inthe last two decades, on the basisof information/communication technologies thatwere previously not available.The global economy reaches ou t to the wholeplanet, but it isnot planetary, itdoes not includethe whole p lanet. Infact, it excludes probably amajority ofthe po pulation. Itis characterized by

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an extremely uneven geography. It scans thewhole world, an d links up valuable inputs, mar-kets, and individuals, while switching offunskilled labour an d poor m arkets. For a signifi-cant part ofpeople around the world, there is ashift, from thepoint of view of dominant sys-temic interests, from exploitation to structuralirrelevance.

I propose the notion oftheemergence ofa FourthW o r l d ofexclusion, made upno t only ofmost ofAfrica,and rura l Asia, and ofLatinAmerican shanties, but also ofthe South Bronx,LaCourneuve, Kamagasaki,orTower Hamlets ofthis w o rld .A fourth wor ld that ispredominantly populated bywo men and children.This is different from the traditional First

World/Third World opposition, because theThird World hasbecome increasingly diversi-fied, internally, and the F irst World has generatedsocial exclusion, albeit in lesser proportion, withinits own boundaries. Thus, Ipropose the notion ofthe emergence of aFourth W orld of exclusion,made up notonly ofmost ofAfrica, and ruralAsia, and ofLatin A merican shanties, but also ofthe South Bronx, La Courneuve, Kamagasaki, orTower Hamlets of this world. A fourth worldthat, as Idocument extensively in volume three, ispredominantly populated by women andchildren.3 . The network enterpriseAt theheart of theconnectivity of theglobaleconomy and of the flexibility of informationalcapitalism, there is anew form of organization,characteristic ofeconom ic activity, but gradually

extending its logic toother domains and organi-zations: the network enterprise. This isnot thesame as anetwork ofenterprises. Itis anetworkma de either from firms orsegments offirms,orfrom internal segmentation of firms. Multina-tiona l corporations, with their internal decentral-ization, and their links with aweb ofsubsidiariesand suppliers through out the world, are bu t oneof the forms of this network enterprise. Butothers include strategic alliances between corpo -rations, networks of small andmedium busi-nesses (such as in No rther n Italy or H ong K ong),and link-ups between corporations and networksof small businesses through subcontracting andoutsourcing.So, the network enterprise is the specific set oflinkages between different firms or segments,organized adhoc for a specific project, and dis-solving/reform ing after the task is completed, e.g.IBM, Siemens, Toshiba. This ephemeral unit,The Project, around which anetwork ofpartnersis built, is the actual operating unit of oureconomy, the one th at generates profits o r losses,the one that received rewards or goes bust, and theone that hires and lays off,via its mem ber orga-nizations.

W it h the exception, and animportant one, ofWesternEurope, the re is nomajorsurge ofunemployment in theworld after two decades ofdiffusion in informationtechnology.

4 . The transformation ofwork andemployment: the fled-workersWork is atthe heart of all historical transforma-tions. An d there is noexception tothis. But thecoming of the Information Age isfull ofmythsabou t the fate ofwork and employment.

With the exception, and animportant one, of8 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INFORMATION AGE CITY 7


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Western Europe, there is no major surge of unem -ployment in the w orld after two decades of diffu-sion ininformation technology. Indeed, there ismuch higher unemployment in technologicallylaggard countries, regions, and sectors.

All evidence and analysis points to the variableimpact of technology onjobs depending on amuch broader set offactors, mainly firms' strate-gies and governments' policies. Indeed, the twomost technologically advanced economies, theUS and Japan, both display alow rate ofunem-ployment. In the US in the last four years there isa net balance of 10 million new jobs, and theireducational content for these new jobs issignifi-cantly higher than that of the pre-existing socialstructure: many more information-intensive jobsthan hamburger flippers jobs have been created.Even m anufacturing jobs are at anall time highon aglobal perspective: between 1970 and 1989,manufacturing jobs inthe world increased by 72per cent, even ifOEC D countries, particularly theUS and the UK, have indeed de-industrialized.

There is certainly a major unemploymentproblem inthe European Union , as aresult of acombination ofrigidities in the institutional envi-ronment, strategies of global redeployment byfirms and,more importantly, the restrictivemacroeconomic policies induced by an insaneobsession with fitting in theMaastricht criteriathat nobody, and particularly not Germany, willbe able to qualify for, inan incredible example ofcollective alienation inpaying respect to godsofeconomic orthodoxy that have taken existenceindependently from us.

There is indeed a serious unemploymentproblem in the inne r cities ofAmerica, England,or France, among the uneducated and switchedoff populations, or inlow technology countriesaround the world, particularly inthe rural areas.

For themajority of people inAmerica, forinstance, unemploym ent is not aproblem. An dyet, there is tremendous anxiety and discontentabout work. There is areal base for this concern:

(a) There isthe transformation ofpower rela-tionships between capital and labour in favour ofcapital,through theprocess of socio-economic

restructuring that took place in the 1980s, both i na conservative environment (Reagan, Thatcher),and, to alesser but real extent, in aless conserva-tive environment (Spain, France). Inthis sense,new technologies allowed business to either auto-mate or offshore production or ou tsource supplie sor to subcontract to smaller firms or to obtain con-cessions from labo r or all the above.

(b) The development ofthe network enterprisetranslates into downsizing, subcontracting, andnetworking oflabour, induc ing flexibility of bothbusiness andlabour, and individualization ofcontractual arrangements between managementand labour. So, instead of layoffs what we oftenhave are layoffs followed by subcontracting ofser-vices on an ad hoc, consulting basis, for the timeand task to be performed, without job tenure andwith out social benefits prov ided by the firm.

The 'organization man' isout,the 'flexible woman' is in. Theindividualization ofw or k, andtherefore of labour'sbargaining power, is themajor feature characterizingemployment inthe networksociety.

This is indeed the general trend, exemplifiedby the rapid growth in all countries of self-employment, temporary work, andpart-time,particularly for w om en. InEngland, between 40and 45 per cent of the labour force seems to baalready in these categories, as opposed to fulltime, regularly salaried employment, and isgrowing. Some studies in G ermany project that in2015, about 50 per cent ofthe labour force w ouldbe out of stable employment. And in themostdynamic region in theworld, Silicon Valley, arecent study w e have just completed show s thai:,in the midst ofa job creation explosion, in the lastten years, between 50 per cent atleast and 90 percent ofnew jobs, most ofthem highly paid, are of

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this kind ofnon-standard labour arrangements.The most significant change inwork in the

information age isthe reversal of the socializa-tion/salarization oflabour tha t characterized theindustrial age. The 'organization m an' isout, the'flexible woman' is in.The individualization ofwork, and therefore of labour's bargaining power,is the major feature characterizing employm ent inthe network society.

The Information Age doesnot have tobe the ageofstepped-up inequality,polarization and socialexclusion. But forthemoment it is.

5. Social pola rization and social exclusionThe processes of globalization, business net-working, and individualization oflabour weakensocial organizations and institutions that repre-sented/protected workers in the information age,particularly labour unions and the welfare state.Accordingly, workers areincreasingly left tothemselves in their differential relationship tomanagement, a nd to the market place.

Skills and education, in aconstant redefinitionof these skills, become critical invalorizing ordevaluing people in their work. B ut even valuableworkers may fall down for reasons ofhealth, age,gender discrimination, or lack of capacity toadapt to agiven task or position.

As a result ofthese trends, most societies in theworld, and certainly OECD countries, with theUS and the UK at the top of the scale, presentpowerful trends towards increasing inequality,social polarization an d social exclusion. There isincreasing accumulation ofwealth at the top, andof poverty atthe bottom.

In the US inequality has regressed tothe pre-19205 period. In the limit, social exclusion createspockets ofdereliction with various entry points,

but hardly any exits. Itmay be long-term u nem -ployment, illness, functional illiteracy, illegalstatus, poverty, family disruption, psychologicalcrisis, homelessness, drugs, crime, incarceration,etc. Once in this underworld, processes ofexclu-sion reinforce each other, requiring ahero ic effortto pull outfrom what I call theblack holes ofinformational capitalism, that often have aterri-torial expression. Theproportion of people inthese black holes arestaggering, andrapidlygrowing. Inthe US, it may reach above 10 percent of the population, ifyou consider that simplythe number ofadults unde r the control ofthe jus-tice system in 1966 was 5.4 million, that is almost3 per cent ofthe population, while the proportionof people below the poverty line is 15 per cent.

The Information A ge does no t have to be theage of stepped-up inequality, polarization andsocial exclusion. But for the mo m ent it is .6. The culture ofreal virtualityShifting tothe cultural realm, wesee theemer-gence of a similar pattern of networking, flexi-bility, and ephemeral symbolic comm unication,in aculture organized around electronic m edia,including in this comm unication system the com-puter-mediated communication networks. Cul-tural expressions of all kinds are increasinglyenclosed inor shaped by this world ofelectronicmed ia. But the new media system isnot charac-terized by the one-way, undifferentiated messagesthrough alimited number of channels that con-stituted the world ofmass media. An d itis not aglobal village.

Media areextraordinarily diverse, andsendtargeted messages tospecific segments of audi-ences and to specific moods of theaudiences.They are increasingly inclusive, bridging from oneto another, from network TV tocable or satelliteTV, radio, VCR, m usical video, wa lkm an type ofdevices, connected throughout the globe, and yetdiversified bycultures, constituting a hypertextwith extraordinary inclusive capacity. Further-more, slowly bu t surely, this new media systemismoving towards interactivity, particularly if weinclude C MC networks, and their access totext,

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images, and sounds, that will eventually link upwith the current media system.

Instead of a global village we are movingtowards mass production of customized cottages.While there is oligopolistic concentration of mul-timedia groups around the world, there is at thesame time, market segm entation, and increasinginteraction by and among the individuals thatbreak up the uniformity of a mass audience.These processes induce the formation of what Icall the culture o f real virtuality. It is so, and notvirtual reality, because when our symbolic envi-ronment is, by and large, structured in this inclu-sive, flexible, diversified hypertext, in which wenavigate every day, the virtuality of this text is infact our reality, the symbols from which we liveand com municate.

When our symbolicenvironment is, by and large,structured in this inclusive,flexible, diversified hypertext,in which we navigate everyday, the virtuality of this textis in fact our reality.

7. PoliticsThis enclosure of com munication in the space offlexible media does not only concern culture. Ithas a fundamental effect on politics. In all coun-tries, the media have become the essential space ofpolitics. Not all politics takes place through themedia, and imagemaking still needs to relate toreal issues and real conflicts. But without signifi-cant presence in the space of media, actors andideas are reduced to political marginality. Thispresence does not concern only, or even pri-marily, the moments of political campaigns, butthe day-to-day messages that people receive byand from the media.

I propose the following analysis:To an overwhelming extent people receive

their information, on the basis of which theyform their political opinion, and structuretheir behaviour, through the media, particu-larly television and radio.Media politics needs to simplify the mes-sage/proposals.The simplest message is an image. The sim-plest image is a person. Political competitionrevolves around personalization of politics.The most effective political weapons are neg-ative messages. The most effective negativemessage is character assassination of oppo-nents' personalities. The politics of scandal, inthe US, in Europe, in Japan, in Latin Am ericaetc. is the predominant form of politicalstruggle.

Those who survive in thisworld become politicallysuccessful, for a while . Butwhat certainly does notsurvive, after a few rounds ofthese tricks, is politicallegitimacy, not to speak ofcitizens' hope.Political marketing is the essential means towin political competition in democratic poli-tics. In the information age it involves mediaadvertising, telephone banks, targeted mailing,image making, image unm aking, image con-trol, presence in the media, staging of publicappearances etc. This makes it an excessivelyexpensive business, way beyond th at of tradi-tional party politics, so that mechanisms ofpolitical financing are obsolete, and parties useaccess to power as a way to generate resourcesto stay in power or to prepare to return to it.This is the fundamental source of political cor-ruption, to which intermediaries add a littlepersonal twist. This is also at the source of sys-temic corruption, that feeds scandal politics.The use of scandal as a weapon leads to

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increased expense and activity in intelligence,damage control, andaccess to themedia.Once a market is created, intermediariesappear toretrieve, obtain, or fabricate infor-mation, offering it tothe h ighest bidder. Poli-tics becom es ahorse race, and a soap operamotivated bygreed, backstage manoeuvres,betrayals, and, often, sex and violence,becoming hardly distinguishable from TVscripts.Those who survive in this world become polit-ically successful, for a while. Butwhatcer-tainly does not survive, after a few roundsofthese tricks, is political legitimacy, no t to speakof citizens' hope.

8. Timeless timeAs with all historical transformations, the emer-gence of a newsocial structure is necessarilylinked to the redefinition ofthe material founda-tions oflife, time and space. Tim e and space arerelated, insociety as innature. Their meaning,and manifestations in social practice, evolvethroughout histories and across cultures, asGid-dens, Thrift, Harvey, Adams, Lash, andUrry,among others, have show n.

I propose thehypothesis that the networksociety, as the dom inan t social structure emergingin the Information Age, is organized around newforms oftime and space: timeless time, the spaceof flows. These are the dom inant forms, and no tthe forms in w hich m ost people live, but throughtheir domination, they affect everybody. Let meexplain, starting with time, then with somegreater detail on space, given the specific interestsof m any in this conference.

In contrast to the rhythm of biological time ofmost ofhuman existence, and tothe dock timecharacterizing the industrial age, anew form oftime characterizes the dom inant logic ofthe net-work society: timeless time. It isdefined by theuse of new information/communication tech-nologies in arelentless effort to annihilate tim e,tocompress years inseconds, seconds insplit sec-onds. Furthermore, the m ost fundamental aim isto eliminate sequencing oftime, indu ding past,

present and future in thesame hypertext, thuseliminating the 'succession of things ' that ,according to Leibniz, characterizes time, so thatwithout things and their sequential ordering thereis nolonger time insotiety. We live, as in therecurrent circuits ofthe com puter networks in theencydopedia of historical experience, all ourtenses at thesame time, being able to reorderthem in acomposite created by ou r fantasy or ourinterests.

David Harvey has shown therdentless ten-dency ofcapitalism to d im ina te barriers of time.But I think inthe network soriety, that is indeeda capitalist soriety, but something else at thesame time, all dominant processes tend to be con-structed around timdess time. I find such a ten-dency in the w hole realm ofhu m an activity. I findit certainly inthe split second financial transac-tions of global financial markets, bu t Ialso find it,for instance, in instant wars, built around thenotion of a surgical strike that devastates theenemy in afew h ours, or minutes, toavoid polit-ically unpopular, costly w ars. Or in the b lurring ofthe life cyde by newreproductive techniques,allowing people a wide range ofoptions in the ageand conditions of parenting, even storing theirembryos to eventually produce babies later eitherby themsdves, or through surrogate mothers,even after their procreators are dead. I find it inthe twisting of working life by the variablechronology of labour trajectories and time sched-ules in increasingly diverse labour m arkets. And Ifind it inthe vigorous effort touse m edical tech-nology, indu ding genetic engineering, and com-puter-based medical care toexile d eath from life,to bring a substantial proportion of the popula-tion to ahigh level oflife-expectancy, and to dif-fuse the belief that, after all, we areeternal, atleast for some time .

As with space, timeless time characterizesdom inant functions and social groups, while mostpeople inthe world are still submitted to biolog-ical time and todock time. Thus, while instantwars characterize the technological powers, atro-cious, lingering wars go on and on foryears,around the planet, in a slow-motion destruction



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process, quasi-ignored by the w orld until they arediscovered by some television program me.

I propose the notion that a fundamentalstruggle in our society is around th e redefinitionof time, between its annihilation or desequencingby networks, on one hand, and, on the otherhand , the consciousness of glacial time, the slow-motion, inter-generational evolution of ourspecies in our cosmological environment, a con-cept suggested by Lash and Urry, and a battleundertaken, in my view, by the environmentalmovement.

A fundamental struggle in oursociety is around theredefinition of time, betweenits annihilation ordesequencing by networks,on one hand, and, on theother hand, theconsciousness of glacial time,the slow-motion, inter-generational evolution of ourspecies in our cosmologicalenvironment and a battleundertaken, in my view, bythe environmentalmovement.

9. The Space of FlowsMany years ago (or at least it seems to me asmany) I proposed the concept of Space of Flowsto make sense of a body of empirical observation:dominant functions were increasingly operatingon the basis of exchanges between electronic cir-cuits linking up information systems in distantlocations. Financial markets, global media,advanced business services, technology, informa-tion. In addition, electronically-based, fast trans-portation systems reinforced this pattern of

distant interaction by following up with move-ments of people and goods. Furthermore, newlocation patterns for most activities follow asimultaneous logic of territorial concentra-tion/decentralization, reinstating the unity oftheir operation by electronic links, e.g. the analysisproposed in the 1980s on location patterns ofhigh tech manufacturing; or the networked artic-ulation of advanced services throughout theworld, unde r the system labeled as 'global city'.

W hy keep the term of space under these con-ditions? Reasons: (1) These electronic circuits donot operate in the territorial vacuum. They link upterritorially based complexes of production, man-agement and information, even though themeaning and functions of these complexesdepend on their connection in these networks offlows. (2) These technological linkages are m ate-rial, e.g. depend on specific telecommunica-tion/transpo rtation facilities, and on the existenceand quality of information systems, in a highlyuneven geography. (3) The meaning of spaceevolves as the m eaning of time. Thus, insteadof indulging in futurological statements such asthe vanishing of space, and th e end of cities, weshould be able to reconceptualize new forms ofspatial arrangements und er the new technologicalparadigm.

Instead of indulging infuturological statements suchas the vanishing of space, andthe end of cities, we shouldbe able to reconceptualizenew forms of spatialarrangements under the newtechnological paradigm.To proceed with this conceptualization I buil don a long intellectual tradition, from Leibniz to

Harold Innis, connecting space and time, aroundthe notion of space as coexistence of time. Thus,my definition: space is the material support of

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time-sharing social practices.*W hat happens when the time-sharing ofprac-

tices (be it synchronous or asynchronous) doesnot imply contiguity? 'Things' still exist together,they share time, but thematerial arrangementsthat allow this coexistence are inter-territorial ortransterritorial: the space offlows is the materialorganization of time-sharing social practicesthat work through flows. What concretely thismaterial organization is depends o n the goals andcharacteristics of the networks of flows, forinstance Ican tell you w hat it is in the case ofhightechnology manufacturing or in the case ofglobalnetworks ofdrug traffic. However, Idid proposein myanalysis some elements that appear tocharacterize the space offlows in all kinds ofnet-works: electronic circuits connection informa-tion systems; territorial nodes and hubs; locales ofsupport and social cohesion for dominant socialactors in thenetwork (e.g. thesystem of VIPspaces throughout the world).

Dominant functions tend toarticulate them-selves around the space of flows. But this isno tthe only space The space ofplaces continues tobe thepredominant space of experience, ofeveryday life, and ofsocial and political control.Places root culture and transmit history. (A placeis a locale whose form, function, and meaning,from the point ofview ofthe social actor, are con-tained within the boundaries of physical conti-guity.)

In the network society, afundamental form ofsocial domination isthe prevalence ofthe logicof the space of flows over the space ofplaces.The space of flows structures andshapes thespace ofplaces, as when the differential fortunesof capital accumulation inglobalfinancialmar-kets reward orpunish specific regions, orwhentelecom systems link upCBDs tooutlying sub-* Leibniz: 'Space is something purely relative, like time;spacebeing an order of coexistences as time is an orderof successions. For space denotes interms ofpossi-bility and order of things that exist at the same time, inso far as they exist together. ...When we see severalthings together we perceive this order of things amongthemselves.'

urbs innew office development, bypassing/mar-ginalizing poor urban neighbourhoods. The dom -ination of the space of flows over the space ofplaces induces intra-metropolitan dualism as amost important form of social/territorial exclu-sion, that has become assignificant asregionaluneven development. The simultaneous growthand decline ofeconomies and societies within thesame metropolitan area is a most fundamentaltrend of territorial organization, and akey chal-lenge to urban management no wadays.

As information/communication networksdiffuse insociety, and astechnology isappropriated bya variety ofsocial actors,segments ofthe space offlows are penetrated byforces of resistance to

dom ination, andbyexpressions ofpersonalexperience.But there is still something else in the new spa-

tial dynamics. Beyond the opposition between thespace offlows and the space ofplaces. As infor-mation/communication networks diffuse insociety, and astechnology is appropriated by avariety ofsocial actors, segments of the space offlows arepenetrated by forces of resistance todomination, an d by expressions ofpersonal expe-rience. Examples:

(a) Social movements. Zapatistas and theInternet (but from the Lacandona forest). But alsoAm erican Militia.

(b) Local governments, key agents of citizenrepresentation inour society, linking up throughelectronic networks, particularly inEurope (seeresearch by Stephen G raham ).

(c) Expressions of experience inthe spaceofflows.



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Thus, we do witness an increasing penetration,and subversion, of the space of flows, originallyset up for the functions ofpower, by the power ofexperience, inducing aset ofcontradictory powerrelationships. Yes, itis still an elitist mean ofcom-munication, but it is changing rapidly. Theproblem is to integrate these observations in sometheory, but for this we still lack research, inspiteof some insightful elaborations, such as theoneby Sherry Turkle at MIT.

The new frontier ofspatial research is in exam -ining the interaction between the space of flows,the space ofplaces, function, meaning, domina-tion, and challenge to dom ination, in increasinglycomplex and contradictory patterns. Home-steading in this frontier is already taking place, asshown in the pioneering research by G raham andMarvin, or in the reflections ofBill Mitchell, bu twe are clearly atthe beginning of anew field ofstudy that should help us tounderstand and tochange the currently prevailing logic in the spaceof flows.

Conclusion: The Network SocietySo, what isthe Network Society? It is asocietythat is structured in itsdominant functions andprocesses around networks. In itscurrent mani-festation it is acapitalist society. Indeed, we livemore than ever in acapitalist world, and thusananalysis interms of capitalism isnecessary andcomplementary to the theory of the networksociety. But this particular form of capitalism isvery different from industrial capitalism, as Ihave tried to show.

The Network Society is not produced by infor-mation technology. But without the informationtechnology revolution itcould not be such acom-prehensive, pervasive social form, able to link up,or de-link, the entire realm ofhuman activity.

So, isthat all? Just amorphological transfor-mation? Well, historically, transformation ofsocial forms has always been fundamental, bo thas expressions and sources of major socialprocesses, e.g.standardized mass production inthe large factory ascharacteristic of the so-calledfordism, as amajor form ofcapitalist social orga-

nization; or the rational bureaucracy as the foun-dation of modern society, inthe Weberian con-ception.

But this morpholog ical transformation is evenmore significant because the network architectureis particularly dynamic, open-ended, flexible,potentially able to expand endlessly, without rup-ture, bypassing/disconnecting undesirable com-ponents following instructions of the networks'dominant nodes. Indeed, the February 1997Davos m eeting titled thegeneral programme ofi ts annual meeting 'Building the NetworkSociety'.

This networking logic is atthe roots of majoreffects inour societies. Using it: capital flows can bypass controls workers areindividualized, outsourced, sub-

contracted communication becomes at the same time

global and customized valuable peop le andterritories are switched

on, devalued ones are switched off.The dynamics of networks push society

towards an endless escape from its own con-straints and controls, towards anendless supers-ession and reconstruction of its values andinstitutions, towards a meta-social, constantrearrangement ofhu m an institutions and organi-zations.

Networks transform power relationships.Pow er in the traditional sense still exists: capital-ists over workers, men over wo men, state appara-tuses still torture bodies and silence minds aroundthe world.

Yet, there is a higher order of power: thepower of flows inthe networks prevails over theflows of power. Capitalists aredependent uponuncon trollable financial flow s; many workers areat the same time investors (often unwillinglythrough their pension funds) inthis whirlwind ofcapital; networkers are inter-related in the logic ofthe network enterprise, so that their jobs andincome depend ontheir positioning rather thanon their work. States are bypassed by global flowsof wealth, information, and crime. Thus, tosur-vive, they band together inmultilateral ventures,

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such asthe European Union. It follows the cre-ation of aweb ofpolitical institutions: nation al,supranational, international, regional, and local,that becomes the new operating unit ofthe infor-mation age: the network state.

The challenges to socialdomination inthe networksociety revolve around theredefinition ofcultural codes,proposing alternative meaningand changing the rules ofthegame. This iswhy theaffirmation of IDENTITY is soessential, because it fixesmeaning autonomously vis-a-vis the abstract, instrumentallogic ofnetworks.

In this complexity, the communicat ionbetween networks andsocial actors dependsincreasingly on shared CULTURAL CODES. Ifwe accept certain values, certain categories thatframe the m eaning of experience, then the net-works will process them efficiently, andwillreturn to each one ofus the outcome oftheir pro-cessing, according to the rules ofdomination anddistribution inscripted in the network.

Thus, thechallenges tosocial domination inthe network society revolve arou nd the redefini-tion of cultural codes, proposing alternativemeaning and changing the rules ofthe game. Thisis why the affirmation ofIDE NT ITY is so essen-tial, because itfixes meaning autonomously vis-a-vis the abstract, instrum ental logic ofnetworks. Iam, thus I exist. Inmy empirical investigation Ihave found identity-based social movementsaimed at changing thecultural foundations ofsociety to be the essential sources ofsocial changein the information age, albeit often informs andwith goals that we do not usually associate withpositive social change. Some movements, that

appear to be themost fruitful and positive, areproactive, such as feminism andenvironmen-talism. Some arereactive, as in thecommunalresistances to globalization built aro und religion,nation, territory, or ethnicity. But in all cases theyaffirm the preeminence ofexperience over instru-mentality, ofmeaning over function, and, Iwoulddare tosay, of use value of life over exchangevalue inthe networks.

The implicit logic oftheNetwork Society appears toend history, byenclosing itinto the c ircularity ofrecurrent patterns off lows.Ye t, as w ith any oth er socialform, infact it opens up anew realm of contradictionand conflict.

The implicit logic of theNetwork Societyappears to end history, by enclosing it into th e cir-cularity of recurrent patterns of flows. Yet, aswith any other social form, infact itopens up anew realm of contradiction andconflict, aspeople around theworld refuse to becomeshadows ofglobal flows and project their dreams,and sometimes their nightmares, into the light ofnew history m aking.Manuel Castells isProfessorof Sociology andPlanning, andChair of the Centre for WesternEuropean Studiesatthe University of California,Berkeley.Hehas published 17books, includingThe City and the Grassroots and The Infor-mational City.

16 B AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INFORMATION AGE CITY 7

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Castells - An Introduction to the Information Age

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