Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen

8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen

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89/18483

5.5 AUCTIONED

OR GRANTED

5.6 SHARES RECEIVED

5.7 AVAILABLE DATA

Granted 100% catch historybased on the best 5o 7 years (halibut)or 5 o 6 years(sable sh) rom

quali ying period

Reported landingsdata

Granted Various ormulasbased on licensecategory

Catch history andvessel length duringspeci ed time period,catch history only, orequal shares

Reported landingsdata and licensingin ormation

Granted One TURF perapplication

Organizationsdetermine allocationwithin group via equalsharing o catch limit,equal sharing o pro ts,or competition, etc.

Veri cation viaNational Register o

Artisanal Fishermen

Granted Formula based onweighted catchhistory rom 2003,2004, and 2005

Weights used were20%, 30% and 50%,respectively

Vessel catch history


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6 Develop Administrative Systems


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K E Y P R I N C I P L E S

Administrative systems are an important component o a catch share program.

By developing and implementing e ective administrative systems, you will

ensure that participants can success ully participate in the program and are

held accountable or their privileges.

6.1 How will trading occur? | 86

6.2 How will catch accounting work? | 88

6.3 How will shery in ormation required or science, catch accounting and en orcement be collected? | 89

6.4 Who covers the program cost? | 92 S U B - S

T E P S

Fishery In ormation Strategies: Data Collection Techniques | 91

Paying or the Program: Namibian Rights-based Management System | 93

Catch Shares in Practice: Step 6 - Develop Administrative Systems | 94

Encourage cost-e ective, transparent trading that is easy or all participants. | 87

Employ transparent catch accounting completed regularly enough to ensure the catch limit isnot exceeded. | 88

Design and implement a shery in ormation system that keeps costs low and is e ective orconducting catch accounting, collecting scienti c data and en orcing the law. | 90

S E A S A L TAccountable

S P E C I A L F E A T U R E S

At a Glance


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6 As with any shery management system, the catch share program must be implemented and administered. Most jurisdictions

have existing systems in place to track shing participants, monitor and en orce shing activity, conduct science and more.

Managers should determine how a catch share program will work within existing systems and what administrative changes may

be necessary or bene cial or creating an easier, more cost-e ective system.

Because this Design Manual is ocused on the design o catch share programs, it will not provide a ull treatment o shery

administration and en orcement. Instead, this Step will highlight some o the necessary administrative systems or catch

share programs and some o the key issues that arise during catch share program development. The our components

outlined here are integral to the design o a catch share and should be considered during the design phase and prior to system

implementation.

Just like any shery management program, per ormance o catch share programs will depend on good in ormation, compliance

and the ability or the program to be cost-e ective. When participants have a secure, long-term stake in the shery, as in a well-

designed catch share program, the potential or improved in ormation, compliance and cost-e ectiveness is increased. Tracking

the per ormance o a catch share over time, just as managers would or any management approach, will help improve systems.

By developing and implementing e ective administrative systems, you will ensure that participants are Accountable to the

program and their allocations.

Appendix A: Monitoring and Data Collection Approaches has additional in ormation on speci c monitoring approaches.

Monitoring o catch is an important aspect o sheries management and o ten discussed in the creation o a catch share

program. It will be bene cial to develop a monitoring program that can support all the in ormation requirements or the shery

in a cohesive way.

Most catch share sheries allow trading o shares, either

through permanent or temporary trans ers, in order to

achieve biological and economic goals (Anderson andHolliday, 2007). When a catch share is trans erable, there

must be a mechanism or trades to occur. Di erent

approaches may be employed or permanent trans ers than

or temporary trans ers.

The purpose o trading is generally to create a system that

allows participants to adjust to management changes, such

as increases or decreases in the catch limit. There ore, the

success o the management system is inextricably linked

to the success o the trading system. A good trading system will give participants access to reliable in ormation about

availability and prices o shares and will allow shares to be

reely traded. These concepts should in orm the development

o an appropriate trading system.

The trading system must also connect to the catch accounting

system (described in Step 6.2 below) to accurately track catch

Develop Administrative Systems6

HOW WILL TRADING OCCUR?.1


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and landings against share holdings. Note also that it is not

necessary or the government to develop and administer

the system. There may be places that require government

oversight, but o ten third party service providers have ul lled

this unction.

Catch share sheries have used a number o di erent

approaches to acilitate trades:

Sel -identifed

It may be possible or participants to generate their own

methods o identi ying others interested in trades. This may

be a natural extension o a tight-knit community or a shery

in which shermen are continually in contact. The Internet

may provide good opportunities or shermen to converse

as well.

Brokerages

In many instances, communication among shermen

has not been su cient and pro essional share brokers

and brokerages have emerged to provide these services

(Sanchirico and Newell, 2003). Share brokers match up

willing buyers and sellers and conduct trades or a ee.

Trading plat orms

Many sheries have created open trading plat orms, either

government-run or privately-run, or participants to connect.For example, NMFS records, monitors and approves all share

transactions or the Gul o Mexico Red Snapper Individual

Fishing Quota Program. In other sheries, private companies

have stepped into the roles. For example, participants in the

New Zealand Quota Management System use FishServe, which

is owned by the national shing organization, or administrative

trading support. Competition within the private sector has

o ten yielded highly e ective companies that are adding

signi cant value to privilege holders and their businesses(see Catch Shares in Practice: British Columbia Integrated

Groundfsh Program ). In programs with eligibility standards

or participating in the trading o shares, there needs to be some

way to ensure that buyers are eligible to purchase shares.

Trading plat orms help participants know the market price o

shares and may make the system more fexible. This is especially

important or multi-species programs where participants may

need to regularly trade shares to cover their catch.

Additional considerations

Most o the experience with trading systems is in the context

o individually-allocated systems. There ore, these trading

approaches have developed to connect individuals who may

be separated and not know each other. In the case o group-

allocated catch shares, trading may also be desirable, either

between groups or within a group. Groups may be able to more

easily identi y other shareholders or trades, but still may nd it

use ul and bene cial to employ one or more o the approachesdescribed above.

Encourage cost-e ective, transparent trading that is easy or all participants.

P R I N C I P L E

1 0

STEP 6 | DEVELOP ADMINISTRATIVE SYST


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linked to catch accounting to give the holder an accurate

understanding o their holdings.

Timing o accounting

Catch accounting systems can require real-time accounting

o trades and landings, or they can use retrospective

balancing at various set points throughout the season. For

example, under the British Columbia Integrated Ground sh

Program, catch accounting takes place upon the landing o a

vessel and participants must account or any overages prior

to engaging in any urther shing activity. Many shareholders

conduct trades at-sea in order to e ectively balance their

catch against shareholdings. This system ensures that the

catch limit is never exceeded and has proven especially use ul

in multi-species sheries where certain species have low

catch limits. Real-time catch accounting does require more

technologically advanced systems.

Other catch share sheries employ retrospective balancing

in which they must balance their catch and holdings on a

monthly or quarterly basis. Many Australian sheries require

quarterly balancing. The bene t o this approach is that it

requires less technologically advanced systems and provides

a lag time or participants to obtain shares. This fexibility

may be especially help ul or participants in a multi-species

shery where it is di cult to predict the exact species ratio

o the catch. There are also drawbacks. When shareholders

are not required to track their catch in real-time it is more

likely that the feet could exceed catch limits. Also, some

shareholders may choose to manipulate the market by

holding shares or sale or lease until the end o the balancing

period when participants are required to balance their catch,thereby driving up prices.

Accountability o shareholders to their allocated share is one

o the most important aspects o a catch share. Importantly,

catch share sheries consistently stay within their catchlimits and rarely exceed limits (NMFS Southeast Regional

O ce, 2009; NMFS Alaska Regional O ce, 2009a; NMFS

Alaska Regional O ce, 2009b; NMFS Alaska Regional O ce,

2009c). One o the keys to catch share management is to

continually track shermens catch, including landings

and discards, against their share holdings. This is called

catch accounting, catch balancing or share balancing.

Essentially, this requires deducting catch (including landings

and other mortality such as discards) rom the holders

available shares.

Similar to a bank account, catch accounting systems

must track the shareholders initial balance, i.e., their

annual allocation, against their catch and landings, and

in the case o a trans erable system, any increases or

decreases in shares due to trades. Some orm o catch

accounting system is necessary or all catch shares.

Group-allocated catch shares may do the accounting

internally and report back to the government, but

they still need a mechanism to track all participants.

Territorial Use Rights or Fishing (TURFs) may require less

sophisticated systems because they tend to be small.

Catch accounting systems will be linked to shery

in ormation and monitoring systems. Appendix A:

Monitoring and Data Collection Approaches identi es some

o these options in uller detail. Generally, catch accounting

is completed through sel -reporting, reporting by authorized

buyers or processors, or by independent third parties. Inaddition, share sales, leases and purchases must also be

HOW WILL CATCH ACCOUNTING WORK?.2

Employ transparent catch accounting completed regularly enough to ensure

the catch limit is not exceeded.

P R I N C I P L E

1 1


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this and consider whether there are certain stocks, such as

highly vulnerable stocks, that should not employ deemed

values as an approach.

Weight or tags

As discussed in Step 4 Defne the Privilege , it is possible to

create a weight-based system or a tag-based system. I using

a weight-based system, catch must be weighed and veri ed

either on the vessel, at the delivery point, or both. O ten the

sherman and the dealer weigh the catch and these reports

are checked against each other to veri y the correct amount.

Tag-based systems work similarly to hunting tags. A certain

number o tags are allocated in the beginning o the

year based on an individuals holdings and every sh or

standardized delivery weight must be tagged to be accepted

or delivery. For example, the sur clam and ocean quahog

shareholders are allocated a certain number o cage tags

at the beginning o each year, based on the size o the cage

and an individuals holdings. Each cage that is delivered is

required to have one o these tags (McCay, 2001). Tag-based

systems are o ten lower cost, but they may be in easible

depending on how the product is caught and delivered.

Deemed values

Fees may be another component o a catch accounting

system. New Zealand has a system o deemed values in

which shermen who land species or which they do not

have shares pay a ee to the government. The goal is to make

the ee high enough that people are not encouraged to sh

or that species but low enough that they do not dump sh

overboard or otherwise sh illegally. And importantly, the

ee is re unded i they subsequently buy or lease shares to

cover their catch. The deemed values system has proven

particularly use ul or multi-species sheries in which it

has been challenging or shareholders to always have the

right mix o shares or their catch (Newell, 2004). However,

it does require additional administrative work to gather

enough in ormation to set and adjust deemed values and

then collect the ees, especially because deemed value could

vary as much as daily due to changing market conditions. It

can also be di cult to set deemed values at levels that both

discourage shing or that stock by those who do not have

shares and discourage discarding. Furthermore, by allowing

participants to land catch or a ee rather than based on their

annual allocation holdings, it becomes more likely that the

feet will exceed its catch limit. Managers must care ully track

The key to sustainability or any shery is to ensure the catch

does not exceed the appropriate science-based catch limit.

As with all sheries management, catch share programs

also require good in ormation to unction well. In ormation

systems should be designed and used to conduct catch

accounting, collect scienti c data and en orce the laws.

Many jurisdictions use the implementation o a catch share

program as a time to implement more comprehensive

shery in ormation and monitoring approaches. This o ten

leads to the perception that catch shares require more

monitoring. In act, any catch limit-based management

system will require a certain amount o monitoring to

track catch and landings. There are numerous bene ts to a

robust in ormation system, irrespective o the management

approach. Strong in ormation systems build trust among

shery participants and between managers and shermen,

improve science and knowledge o the stocks, and can lead

to a higher level o compliance.

Fishery in ormation is important or both individually-

allocated and group-allocated systems, but the way in which

it is reported or each might be di erent. In an individually-

allocated system, each participant will be required to

report in ormation to the management authority, whereas

a group-allocated system will require each group to report

in ormation to the management authority. The group must

HOW WILL FISHERY INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR SCIENCE, CATCH ACCOUNTING AND

ENFORCEMENT BE COLLECTED?6.3



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employ a system that will provide an accurate representation

o its members activities. TURFs are likely to employ di erent

approaches o ten ocused on a system o sel -monitoring to

veri y landings and protect their borders rom non-members.

Fishery in ormation can be collected through a broad array

o methods, rom at-sea to dockside data collection and sel -

reported to independently-collected methods. See Figure 6.1

or more detail. The sherys resource, feet, operational andmarket characteristics are important determinants in your

choice o approach or gathering and veri ying in ormation.

Furthermore, the appropriate systems will depend on

your program goals. Some programs will require spatial or

temporal in ormation, while others may require in ormation

on prohibited species or bycatch. In general, the least cost,

most e ective approach should be used or a shery.

Credibility o in ormation systems is important; i the system

is credible, the ocus will be on the meaning o the data,

whereas i the in ormation system is not credible, the ocus

will be on the collection o the data. Many sheries rely

on sel -reported in ormation systems, such as shermen

logbooks and dealer reports. Sel -reported systems are

low cost but may have lower-quality, inconsistent data.

There ore, accuracy and authenticity are o ten a key concern

and additional incentives, such as random checks and

strong penalties or misreporting data, will help improve

data. Independent monitoring systems, such as 100%

observer coverage or non-tamperable camera systems tend

to be more objective and better trusted. They generally

have higher data quality, and are deemed more credible,

especially when the data collection is independent rom the

business operations o the shery and data collectors are

speci cally trained or their role.

It may be possible to combine sel -reported and independent

in ormation systems via a veri cation approach based on

sampling, in which only a percentage o in ormation is

collected, veri ed, or both. A sampling approach will provide

less robust data (Babcock et al., 2003), but it can be designed to

have a high level o con dence or monitoring, veri cation and

scienti c purposes. One such method is to pair sel -reporting

with partial observer coverage or electronic monitoring with

audits. I inaccuracy is detected or speci c shareholders, then you can increase auditing and/or onboard observer requency.

Importantly, you can charge shareholders or the cost o

additional monitoring as an incentive to increase accuracy o

sel -reporting.

The British Columbia Integrated Ground sh Program has

achieved a good balance between ull coverage and the time

and cost savings o random sampling. Each vessel has 100%

electronic monitoring and ootage is randomly sampled rom

each vessel trip or review against participants logbooks. I

cheating behavior is detected all the ootage is reviewed. In any

system, when a high degree o uncertainty around data exists,

then a more precautionary approach to setting caps should

be employed. See Catch Shares in Practice: British Columbia

Integrated Groundfsh Program or more in ormation.

Furthermore, developing a good chain o custody system so

that products can be tracked rom vessel through processing

and wholesaling should be a key part o the overall compliance

system and can reduce costs o at-sea and dockside

monitoring. This will not work as well or products that are

sold into local markets.

For a urther discussion o speci c monitoring and

in ormation approaches and how they might work or

your shery, please see Appendix A: Monitoring and Data

Collection Approaches .

Design and implement a shery in ormation system that keeps costs low and

is e ective or conducting catch accounting, collecting scienti c data and

en orcing the law. P R I N C I P L E

1 2


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DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES

AT-SEA DATA COLLECTION

Sel -Reported Independent Collection Sel -Reported Independent Collection

In ormation about:

All catch

Discard amounts and conditions

Protected species interactions

Fishing location and e ort

Unsorted catch samples

Hails

Fishing Logs

Industry collected samples

Technology Options:

Electronic Hails

Electronic Logs

Aerial Surveys

At-sea Observers

Fishing Log Audit

Technology Options:

Electronic Monitoring

Vessel Monitoring System

(VMS)

Hails

Fish Tickets

Technology Options:

Electronic Hails

Electronic Fish Tickets

Credit Card System

Dockside Monitors

Port Samplers

Plant Audits

Technology Options:

Electronic Landing Reports

DOCKSIDE DATA COLLECTION

In ormation about:

Landings only

Veri ed weights

Collected samples

FIGURE 6.1 | Fishery In ormation Strategies



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Financing the transition

Some governments have made the public policy decision

to provide nancial aid to shing feets in order to undthe transition to catch shares. Catch shares are o ten

implemented in sheries that are overcapitalized and

over shed, generally as a result o ine ective management.

Providing some transition unding can help move a shery

more easily toward a catch share program. For example,

New Zealand nanced the transition by buying back catch

history (which was the basis or share allocation) and by

injecting capital and ongoing operating money into the

management authority. The rationale or this investment

was based on the expected long-term stock and nancial

bene ts o the catch share program (Sissenwine and Mace,

1992). In act, most New Zealand sheries now cover their

own management costs.

Cost recovery

Cost recovery re ers to a variety o mechanisms by which

shing participants pay or some or all o the costs o

management. Costs may include science or setting catch

limits, monitoring costs, administrative costs and more.Cost recovery ees can be collected in a variety o di erent

ways including direct payment to the government through a

ee or tax on the annual landings and/or direct contracting

by shareholders with service providers.

Fishery participants and the government will o ten split

costs according to which are traditional government

services and which are better suited or industry to pay.

For example, the government may pay or maintenance o

administrative systems, while participants may cover the

costs o monitoring systems.

Catch share sheries have taken a variety o di erent

approaches to this. For example, all Australian sheries

are required (or are transitioning) to pay 100% o the

Fish are public resources held in common by all citizens and

managed on their behal by the government. By accessing

and selling sh, shermen are inherently bene tting roma public good. There are management costs to this activity

that must be paid or somehow. This is true or any shery,

whether it is open access, limited access or a catch share

program. O ten, governments have underwritten the

costs o management, essentially providing a subsidy to

shing feets. Governments are increasingly interested in

limiting subsidies and shi ting the cost o management

to the participants who bene t. When participants

and government share the costs, there is an incentive

or participants to work with the regulators to improve

management and cut costs (Gislason, 1999; Yandle, 2003).

Fisheries under catch shares are generally more pro table

than traditionally managed sheries (Fujita et al., 2004;

World Bank and FAO, 2008) and thus better able to a ord at

least some cost o management. Furthermore, even though

all shery management programs should achieve robust

monitoring or compliance, management authorities o ten

use the transition to catch shares as an opportunity toimplement more sophisticated, and potentially more costly,

monitoring and/or scienti c approaches. The bene ts o this

investment include more accurate in ormation and a level

playing eld or participants. However, there is a question

o how to pay or science, monitoring and compliance.

Fishermen under catch share programs have an increased

incentive to invest in monitoring and science in order to

have better in ormation that may lead to more sustainable

stocks and higher catch limits (Festa et al., 2008).

There are two general cost-related issues to consider: how

the transition will be paid or and whether the ongoing cost

will be recovered rom industry. In addition, you should

consider whether to collect rents rom industry or their use

o a public resource.

WHO COVERS THE PROGRAM COST?.4


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rents are not as common as cost-recovery ees, some

governments do collect rents on behal o the public.

It is possible to collect resource rents rom a shery either

via auctioning o the allocation or through charging

royalties. In some countries, rent recovery is o prime

importance to national economies, and the opportunity

cost o ailing to extract rent is very high. For example,

income rom shing royalties accounts or over 40% o the

Falkland Islands gross domestic product, and provides the

government with over hal its annual income (Harte and

Barton, 2007). A resource rent will impact the catch share.

I it is set too high, then it may hamper the fexibility o

the system or reduce participants conservation incentives

(Libecap and Anderson, 2009). On the other hand, setting

a low ee may not return as much value to the public.

Appropriate analysis will help determine the best level.

Catch share sheries tend to be more pro table than tra-

ditionally managed sheries and better equipped to cover

all or a portion o the costs o management. Achieving the

transition to catch shares may require an up- ront invest-

ment by the government, but as the shery becomes more

e cient under a catch share program and as stocks recover,

those costs can com ortably be shi ted to industry.

attributable costs o the shery. Shareholders pay a yearly

levy based on each years budget and each individual

shermans share holdings. New Zealand recovers costs

rom participants to pay or research and compliance.

In addition, New Zealand shareholders have purchased

additional science services directly rom third party vendors

to improve the understanding o their stocks and the

accuracy o the catch limits (Lock and Leslie, 2007).

In the U.S., the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation

and Management Act requires that catch share participants

pay up to 3% o the ex-vessel value o the shery to cover

additional management costs incurred as a result o shi ting

rom conventional management to catch shares (16 U.S.C.

1854). While some U.S. catch share programs use revenues

rom cost recovery ees to pay or monitoring, it is not

required or programs to do so. Monitoring costs generally

all outside o the 3% cost recovery ee and have historically

been paid or by the government or by industry.

Resource rents

Resource rent is the value o extracting the resource in

excess o the costs o extraction (including management).

Resource rents are a ee charged to shareholders or the

bene t o accessing a public resource. While resource

The Namibian government provides an interesting case o both categories o ees in catch shares: cost recovery and

rent capture (i.e., resource rents). Cost recovery re ers to the cost o managing the shery, while resource rents attempt

to capture some o the value shermen receive rom using the public shery resource. Namibia recovers all the manage-ment costs by charging catch share holders cost recovery ees, which are established by taking into account the value

o landings, operating costs and the pro tability o industry. On average, these ees total 5% 15% o the total landed

value in Namibia (Namibian Ministry o Fisheries and Marine Resources [MFMR], 2004). In addition, the government col-

lects a portion o economic rents through charging resource rents.

SNAPSHOT 6.1 | Paying or the Program

Namibian Rights-based Management System



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catch shares in practice

6.1TRADING MECHANISM

6.2 CATCH ACCOUNTING

6.3 FISHERY

INFORMATION

6.4 WHO PAYS

ALASKA HALIBUT &SABLEFISH FIXEDGEAR INDIVIDUALFISHING QUOTAPROGRAM

Government-maintained, web-based tradingplat orm

Independent brokers

Shareholders anddealers reportlandings or eachtrip via web-basedsystem maintained bygovernment

Logbooks

Dockside monitoring:100% at main ports,random checks atsmaller ports

Onboard observercoverage: 30% orcertain vessel classes,100% or certain vesselclasses

Participants payincremental costso catch sharemanagement via costrecovery

~1% - 2% o ex-vesselrevenues

BRITISH COLUMBIAINTEGRATEDGROUNDFISHPROGRAM

Mostly throughindependent brokers

Catch and landingsreported or every tripand deducted romIVQ pounds

Any overage must be

covered by next trip

Logbooks

100% at-seamonitoring (onboardobservers orelectronic monitoring)

100% docksidemonitoring

Participants payall direct costs omonitoring

~5% o shery value

CHILEAN NATIONALBENTHIC RESOURCESTERRITORIALUSE RIGHTS FORFISHING PROGRAMME

Trading not authorized Each group collects,aggregates andreports landings datato government

Veri ed with samplingdata

Landings datareported togovernment bygroups

For some species,also record harvestername and depth o

harvest

Groups pay orapplication ees,baseline studies,stock assessmentand some monitoringand en orcement

Also pay tax based on

hectares

DANISH PELAGIC &DEMERSAL INDIVIDUALTRANSFERABLEQUOTA PROGRAMS

Primarily via voluntarycooperatives that usean online trans ersystem

Independent brokers

All landings arereported andmanaged via onlinetrans er system

Pilot program onreporting all catch

Dockside monitoring

At-sea monitoringusing EM

Participants pay orat-sea monitoring(currently a voluntaryprogram)

This chart provides a brie summary o the Step 6 design decisions or the our case studies eatured in this Design Manual. For an

in-depth discussion o each shery, please see the ull case studies in the Catch Shares in Practice section starting on page 103.

Step 6 Develop Administrative Systems


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102/18496

7 Assess Per ormanceand Innovate


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K E Y P R I N C I P L E S

The nal Step o catch share design is to ensure the program is unctioning well and achieving

the identi ed program goals. You should conduct regular assessments and modi y the

program as necessary to meet existing and new goals. In addition to ormal program changes,

participants should also be encouraged to innovate in order to improve the program.

7.1 Conduct regular program reviews. | 98

7.2 Assess per ormance against goals. | 98

7.3 Encourage innovation. | 99

Innovations to Enhance Per ormance: Japans Community-based Cooperatives | 99

Combinations o Catch Share Design Features: In Order o Most Commonly Used Worldwide | 101

S P E C I A L F E A T U R E S

Assess per ormance against goals and encourage innovation to improve the programover time. | 100

S E A S A L TSecureAll sourcesScaled

LimitedAccountable

S U B - S T

E P S

At a Glance


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As you will recall, the purpose o Step 1 Defne Program

Goals was to identi y the biological/ecological, economicand social goals or the catch share program. Steps 2 6

ocused on designing the program to meet those goals.

Once the catch share is underway, it is important to assess

program per ormance against the originally de ned goals.

Some goals may be easier to assess than others due to

available data. As you plan the program, you may needto collect baseline data, especially economic and social

data, in order to provide a meaning ul re erence point.

Assessing per ormance is a regular practice o most catch

share sheries. Program design should be modi ed as

needed based on per ormance against goals and changing

conditions in the shery.

As with any shery management program, regular

reviews o the catch share program will provide important

in ormation. It may be help ul during the design process to

identi y a review schedule, as well as the speci c topics to

include in a regular review. In the U.S., the LAPP provision

o the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and

Management Act requires new programs to be reviewed ve

years a ter implementation and then at least every seven

years therea ter.

Reviews should include an assessment o biological

conditions, especially in regard to ending over shing and

restoring and maintaining healthy stocks. Assessing other

conditions, such as the economic status o the shery may

also be important. Remember that it may take a ew years

or the ull e ects o the catch share program to be evident.

7

The nal Step o catch share design and implementation is to assess program per ormance and innovate to address emerging

opportunities and challenges. Flexibility is a key aspect o catch shares and programs must be dynamic in order to meet the

changing needs and conditions o the shery.

Completing this Step is a key part o ensuring all key attributes o the catch share program are being met. In particular,

program assessment can determine whether privileges are Secure enough to realize bene ts and i the Scale o the program

is working well biologically and socially. In addition, in ormation and eedback over time can help track whether All sources

o mortality are included in the program and i catch is appropriately Limited . Finally, regular review can assess whether the

program is Accountable .

6 Assess Per ormance and Innovate7

CONDUCT REGULAR PROGRAM REVIEWS

ASSESS PERFORMANCE AGAINST GOALS

.1

.2


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Flexibility and innovation are key aspects o catch share

programs. Under catch shares, shermen are allowed

fexibility while being held accountable or their share o the catch, which o ten leads to new, innovative solutions to

challenges that may arise. For example, shermen in many

catch share programs have substantially reduced bycatch

and habitat impacts by reducing and modi ying the gear

used, care ully planning shing activities, cooperating with

other shermen and more.

Many catch share programs have also undergone expansion

or integration o existing programs. The British Columbia

Integrated Ground sh Program began as separate gear

and species-speci c catch share programs and is now

Community-based Cooperative catch share programs are the oundation o nearshore coastal sheries in Japan and

have evolved rom traditional organizations dating back to the eudal era. These exclusive shing rights are available

only to community members, and there are over 1,600 cooperatives in Japan with exclusive shing rights recognized

by the Japanese government (Uchida and Makino, 2008).

The sheries are co-managed by two types o organizations: Fishery Cooperative Associations (FCAs) and Fishery

Management Organizations (FMOs). FCAs are comprised o all the communities that partake in shing in the coastal

sheries and have been granted exclusive access by the government. The FCA management areas are de ned by

geo-political backgrounds rather than stock boundaries (Uchida and Makino, 2008). An FCA is comprised o speci c

communities and all o the sheries within those boundaries; there ore FCAs manage multiple species, gears and

sectors at once (Uchida and Makino, 2008). Additionally, FCAs are required to maintain catch records o all members.

Fishery management organizations (FMOs) are an innovative program organized by shermen. They are speci c to

a single shery and/or species and are comprised o shermen who sh at the same shing grounds, sh the same

species stocks and/or employ the same type o shing gear (Uchida and Makino, 2008). Fishermen have ormed

FMOs in order to coordinate harvest and manage resources on mutually agreed rules. The responsibilities o a

FMO can include shery resource management, shing ground management, and shing e ort control. FMOs are

legitimately recognized by the FCAs, and together they help manage Japans coastal shing grounds.

SNAPSHOT 7.1 | Innovations to Enhance Per ormance

Japans Community-based Cooperatives

ENCOURAGE INNOVATION7.3

STEP 7 | ASSESS PERFORMANCE AND INNOVA


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TransferableIndividually-allocated

Transferable

Non-transferableIndividually-allocated

Non-transferable


Individually-allocated



Non-transferableGroup-allocated

Group-allocated

TransferableGroup-allocated






Transferable

Non-transferable


Group-allocated


Non-transferable

Transferable

Group-allocated

Single-species

Multi-species

Multi-species

Single-species

Single-species

Multi-species

Multi-species

Single-species

Multi-species

Single-species

Multi-species

Multi-species

Multi-species

Single-species

Single-species

Single-species

Multi-species

Single-species

FIGURE 7.1 | Combinations of Catch Share Design Features

IN ORDER OF MOST COMMONLY USED WORLDWIDE

SCALE OF MOST COMMON

Most Common Least Common

Species-based

Species-based

Species & area-based

Species-based








Species-based

Species-based

Species-based

Species-based

Species-based


Species-based

STEP 7 | ASSESS PERFORMANCE AND INNOVA


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109/184103


110/184104

Keith Bell and Buck Laukitis pull aboard a paci c

halibut while commercial longline shing in the

Aleutian Islands, Alaska. PHOTO: SCOTT DICKERSON


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Alaska Halibut and Sablefsh Fixed GearIndividual Fishing Quota Program


The Alaska Halibut and Sable sh Fixed Gear Individual Fishing Quota Program (IFQ Program) was one

o the rst to include a variety o design elements to meet key social goals while also contributing to

decreasing overcapitalization and increasing the value o the shery. Some o the key design elements

include low concentration limits, restrictions on trading, strict shareholder eligibility requirements and

more. The program also allocates a percentage o the shares to the Community Development Quota

(CDQ) program, which includes 65 eligible communities organized into six groups and was designed to

ensure shing access, support economic development, alleviate poverty, and provide economic and social

bene ts to residents o western Alaska communities (North Paci c Fishery Management Council, n.d, A).

S Y N OP S I S

S P E C I A L D E S I G N

F E A T U R E S

MULTI-SPECIES, INDIVIDUALLY-ALLOCATED AND GROUP-ALLOCATED,

SPECIES-BASED, TRANSFERABLE

S E A S A L TSecureExclusive

AccountableLimited

Scaled

Trans erable

In 1995, managers implemented an IFQ Program or the Alaska halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) and

sable sh (Anoplopoma mbria) xed gear shery. The IFQ Program has received signi cant attention as

it was among the rst catch share programs to design or explicit social goals in addition to biological and

economic goals. Fi teen years a ter implementation, the catch share program is meeting its goals.

The shery occurs in ederal waters o Alaska in the Bering Sea, Aleutian Islands and Gul o Alaska.

Fishermen use xed gear vessels ranging in length rom less than 35 eet to over 60 eet, including longline

catcher vessels and catcher-processor vessels. In 2008, shermen landed approximately 74 million

pounds worth U.S. $245 million (NOAA Fisheries Service, 2009 ).

The shery is managed by the National Marine Fishery Service (NMFS), with consultation by the North

Paci c Fishery Management Council (NPFMC), and the International Paci c Halibut Commission (IPHC),

which sets the catch limit and coordinates the management o the Paci c halibut sh stocks or Canada

and the U.S. (Hartley and Fina, 2001).


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Road to a Catch Share

The commercial hook and line shery or halibut began on a small scale in the 1880s. It grew greatly in the 1920s

with the introduction o diesel-powered engines and mechanical longline equipment (Hartley and Fina, 2001),

and soon a ter landings increased and stocks began to decline. From the 1920s through the 1980s, more andmore vessels entered the shery (many vessels entering part-time due to declining crab and salmon stocks)

and e ort continued to increase. Managers responded with various regulations and Canada and the U.S.

coordinated e orts through the International Paci c Halibut Commission.

By the 1980s, overcapitalization had hit an extreme. The high number o vessels in the shery led managers

to implement stricter and stricter regulations causing an Olympic race or sh. In the nal years be ore the

catch share program, the halibut season was only open or a ew days out o the calendar year, in which the

commercial sector landed their entire catch limit, approximately 43 million pounds o sh (Pautzke and Oliver,

1997). While the stocks were not over shed, shermen consistently exceeded the catch limits. Gear conficts,

ghost shing (due to gear that is cut loose during the race or sh and le t in the water continuing to kill sh),

concerns regarding sa ety including deaths at-sea, low catch per unit o e ort, declining product quality, and

low ex-vessel prices were the norm (NOAA Fisheries Service, 2009 ). In addition, regulations prohibited sable sh

shermen rom landing halibut and vice versa, leading to signi cant discards o marketable sh.

In response to the severe ailures o traditional management, managers and shermen implemented a catch

share program. The British Columbia halibut and sable sh sheries had recently implemented a success ul

IVQ Program that provided a model or Alaska (see Catch Shares in Practice: British Columbia Integrated

Groundfsh Program ). Alaska shermen and managers identi ed a variety o goals that were important or

their shery, including biological goals outlined in the National Standards o the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery

Conservation and Management Act and additional economic and social goals.

Per ormance

Fi teen years later, the program is success ully meeting its goals. Since shing under the IFQ Program, shermen

rarely exceed their catch limits: No stocks are over shed and over shing is not occurring. Bycatch has declined

and ghost shing has decreased substantially. Due to longline gear, seabird bycatch (including short-tailed

albatross, Laysan albatross, northern ulmars, and shearwaters) had historically been a big problem in the

shery. However, with the slower seasons shermen have been able to innovate, and the introduction o seabird

excluder devices, such as streamer lines, has signi cantly improved the rate o seabird bycatch.

Dockside revenues have also increased under the IFQ Program. Under race conditions, shermen would deliver

the entire years catch in very short windows o time, creating a glut and requiring processors to reeze most

o the sh. Under the IFQ Program, sh are now landed over eight months and processors can deliver a resh

product to customers. By avoiding a glut and delivering a higher quality product, shermens dockside revenues

have increased. In combination with decreased costs, shermen now have more stable, pro table jobs.


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Sa ety has also improved substantially since shermen have more fexibility around when to go shing. Just

prior to the catch share program, search and rescue cases numbered in the 20s and 30s. By 2007, there were only

ve search and rescue cases, and in 2008, only three cases occurred (NOAA Fisheries Service, 2009 ).

While some shermen and crew have le t the shery ollowing the IFQ Program, this outcome was expected

due to the extreme overcapitalization under traditional management. Importantly, overcapitalization has been

reduced while still meeting the programs goals in regard to maintaining historic feet and participant structure

(NOAA Fisheries Service, 2009 ). Low concentration limits have prevented corporate ownership o the feet and

owner-on-board provisions or new participants have encouraged owner-operators (NOAA Fisheries Service,

2009 ). Short-term, unstable, o ten low-paying jobs have been replaced with more stable, long-term, better-

paying jobs. And, i the shery had not transitioned to a catch share, it would have continued to ace shorter and

shorter seasons and potentially closures.

STEP 1 IN PRACTICEDefne Program Goals

Alaska shermen and managers identi ed a variety o catch share program goals. These included meeting

legal requirements o the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act regarding stock

sustainability and additional ecological, economic and social goals.

Biological goals prescribed in the National Standards (NS) One, Three and Nine o the Magnuson Stevens

Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1851):

1. Conservation and management measures shall prevent over shing while achieving, on a continuing

basis, the optimum yield rom each shery or the United States shing industry.

2. To the extent practicable, an individual stock o sh shall be managed as a unit throughout its range,

and interrelated stocks o sh shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination.

3. Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (A) minimize bycatch and (B)

to the extent bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the mortality o such bycatch.

The nal ruling on the program said The IFQ program is intended to resolve various conservation and

management problems that stem rom the current open access regulatory regime, which allows ree access tothe common property shery resources and has resulted in excess capital investment in the sheries (National

Marine Fisheries Service, 1992). Additional goals o the IFQ Program were to keep the historic feet structure

o the shery, limit and discourage corporate ownership, limit wind all pro ts to participants granted quota,

discourage speculative entry, and reward participants who invested in the shery (long-time participants and

active participants) (Hartley and Fina, 2001). Furthermore, the NPFMC wanted to prevent quota rom being

owned strictly by large vessels that could possibly harm the smaller communities dominated by small boats

(Pautzke and Oliver, 1997).

NS1 -

NS3 -

NS9 -


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STEP 2 IN PRACTICE

Defne and Quanti y the Available Resource

De ning and quanti ying the available resource was largely driven by pre-existing management structures, as laid

out by the International Paci c Halibut Commission and the previously established Fishery Management Plan.

Halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) and sable sh (Anoplopoma mbria) are the target species o this multi-species

program. Both o the species are long lived (50 years or halibut and 90 years or sable sh), demersal species that

live near the seafoor. Fishermen tend to target either halibut or sable sh in a trip, but can requently encounter

both species. Prior to the IFQ Program, shermen targeting halibut were not allowed to land sable sh and vice

versa. Since the species habitats do overlap, shermen were discarding signi cant amounts o each species. In

particular, halibut was the main discard species or sable sh shermen. Grenadier, spiny dog sh and skates are

also caught as bycatch in the sable sh shery (Danner, 2008). What little bycatch there is in the halibut shery consists mostly o ground sh species.

Managers designed the multi-species IFQ Program with an eye toward reducing bycatch. Most importantly,

sable sh shermen are permitted to hold halibut shares and keep the halibut they encounter; halibut discards

have been substantially reduced under the IFQ Program (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997). In both sheries, participants

are allowed to retain certain amounts o ground sh species as bycatch (Smith, 2004). Community Development

Quota (CDQ) shermen are required to keep all sable sh and legal-sized halibut that they catch. Catcher-

processor vessels may discard halibut i they do not have quota shares or it, however the proportion o halibut

discarded to sable sh quota shares caught is relatively small and there ore bycatch rates have not been a concern.

The Fishery Management Plan identi es eight halibut zones and six sable sh zones based on biological stocks.

Managers set a separate catch limit or each zone based on scienti c advice, and the IFQ Program identi ed

and allocated shares based on each zone. Fishermen are only allowed to use stock-speci c shares to cover their

landed catch in that area (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997).

STEP 3 IN PRACTICE

Defne Eligible ParticipantsDe ning eligible participants was an important part o meeting the program goals, including retaining the

historical character o the feet. There are many detailed provisions about who is permitted to participate in

the program, and these stipulations in ormed initial allocation (discussed in more detail below), as well as

requirements or new participants.


115/184109

The program allocates privileges to both individuals and groups. The majority o shares are individually-

allocated, but a portion o both halibut and sable sh shares were allocated to groups via the CDQ program, which

was established in 1992 to provide western Alaska communities the opportunity to participate in the Bering Sea

and Aleutian Islands sheries. There are six regional organizations o CDQs comprising 65 communities. Every

ederal catch share program in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands is required to allocate shares to the CDQs.

One hallmark o the IFQ Program is the owner-on-board provision that requires shareholders to be aboard the

vessel during shing operations. It was designed to promote the owner-operator model prevalent in the shery

prior to the IFQ Program. Recognizing the di erent business models that existed at the time o implementation,

initial shareholders are exempted rom the provision and exempted owners may hire skippers to sh the IFQ

shares i the skipper owns 20% o the vessel. Individual share owners are also required to be a U.S. citizen and sign

the sh ticket (documentation o landings) upon landing (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997).

There are speci c rules pertaining to corporations and partnerships. Notably, they can purchase catcher vessel

shares only i they received shares during the initial allocation (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997). I new owners join acorporation or partnership, the entity must separate rom its catcher vessel quota shares and sell those shares to a

eligible individual (Smith, 2004).

Concentration limits are also an important design eature o this program. Many catch share sheries use

concentration limits, but the IFQ Program has identi ed particularly low caps. Vessels are subject to two di erent

caps: the vessel IFQ cap, which limits how many pounds a vessel may land in a season, and the quota share use

cap, which limits how many long-term shares a participant may hold. Some shares are designated as blocked,

meaning they cannot be subdivided or trading. Participants are not permitted to hold more than two blocked

quota shares in a single management area (Smith, 2004).

Each management zone has limits on how much quota an individual is permitted to own, ranging rom 0.5%

1.5% o the total quota shares. Participants who exceeded the concentration cap at the time o implementation

were grand athered in at the levels indicated by their landing history during the eligible years (Pautzke and

Oliver, 1997).

New participants can enter the shery by buying or leasing shares. To be eligible to purchase shares, new

participants must apply or and obtain a Trans erable Eligibility Certi cate issued by the North Paci c Region o

National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). An applicant must be a U.S. citizen and show documentation o 150

days o commercial shing experience in the U.S.

There are currently two special programs in support o new entrants: The North Paci c Loan Program, which

helps nance new participants and shareholders with low quota holdings (Hartley and Fina, 2001, NOAA

Fisheries Service, 2009 ), and the Community Quota Entity (CQE) program, which helps select communities

acquire shares.


116/184110

STEP 4 IN PRACTICE

Defne the Privilege

The privilege was de ned largely to maintain the relative structure o the feet at the time o program

implementation. The program includes numerous classes o shares, each with speci ed uses. The privilege is

species-based, meaning participants are allocated secure shares o the catch limit or halibut and sable sh.

The long-term privileges, quota shares, were granted inde nitely to initial shareholders and can be sold to

eligible participants. Quota shares may be revoked as a penalty or non-compliance with regulations, and as with

any management program, managers may change or end the program through the normal processes set out or

management changes. I this occurs, shareholders will receive no compensation.

Participants annual allocations are calculated at the beginning o each season. For each zone, the catch limit

is multiplied by the participants quota shares (both permanent and temporary holdings) and then divided by the total amount o quota shares held by all participants (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997). From this, shareholders are

alerted o the IFQ permit weight, the annual allocation unit, that they are allowed to land during the season.

There are two main types o vessels in the shery: catcher-processor vessels (also called reezer longliners) and

catcher vessels, each with speci ed quota share categories (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997). Catcher vessels are urther

divided into size categories.

There are our vessel categories or halibut, including:

1. Catcher vessels less than 35 eet in length

2. Catcher vessels between 35 and 60 eet in length

3. Catcher vessels greater than 60 eet in length

4. Catcher-processor vessels

There are three vessel categories or sable sh, including:

1. Catcher vessels less than 60 eet in length

2. Catcher vessels greater than 60 eet in length

3. Catcher-processor vessels

The catch share program allows both permanent and temporary trans er o shares, but leasing in the shery has

been very restricted (NOAA Fisheries Service, 2009 ). Quota shares can only be traded within their respective

vessel class size, vessel operation mode and region. Each vessel class has particular rules on trading:

Catcher vessels can only permanently trans er (i.e., sell) quota to eligible buyers, which includes

participants who received quota shares during initial allocation or people who obtain a Trans erable


117/184111

Eligibility Certi cate by documentation o 150 days o commercial shing experience in the U.S. Temporary

leasing is not allowed in the catcher vessel class. Corporations and partnerships can buy catcher boat shares

only i they received shares during the initial allocation (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997).

Catcher-processor vessel quota shares can be temporarily leased and permanently trans erred to any U.S.

citizen. CDQ quota is not trans erable; however CDQ quota holders can hire shermen to sh their quota.

All quota can be inherited by heirs upon the passing o the owner.

Furthermore, some shares are blocked, meaning they cannot be subdivided during trans ers. Blocked quota

was developed, in part, to keep the price lower and more a ordable or smaller shareholders and new entrants,

and 15 years a ter the program, price per unit o blocked quota is slightly lower than unblocked quota (Dock

Street Brokers, 2010).

Minimal inter-season trading is also permitted. Participants are not allowed to carry over unused quota, but in

the event o overage, they are allowed to borrow up to 10% o the ollowing years share.

During the rst three years o the program, catcher vessel shareholders were only allowed to lease 10% o

their shares per year, and were not allowed to permanently sell shares (Pautzke and Oliver 1997). This was

intended to prevent major changes to the feet characteristics while participants began to understand how

the program worked.

STEP 5 IN PRACTICE

Assign the Privilege

Initial allocation is o ten one o the most contentious parts o the catch share design process and requires care ul

attention. Following a thought ul design process, in 1991 the North Paci c Fishery Management Council voted

to implement the IFQ Program or the Alaska halibut and sable sh shery. Upon approval, NMFS created the

Restricted Access Management Division (RAM), comprised o approximately nine sta members, to determine

the initial allocations or eligible participants and to administer the IFQ Program (Hartley and Fina, 2001). The al-

location process took about one year to complete and occurred in 1994, a year prior to program implementation.

Vessel owners or leaseholders who made at least one commercial landing in 1988, 1989 or 1990 were eligible

to receive initial share allocations (multiple years were chosen to accommodate disruption due to the Exxon

Valdez oil spill). Eligible participants were granted shares based on catch history. Halibut share allocations

were calculated based on participants highest landings in ve o seven years rom 1984 to 1990; sable sh share

allocations were calculated based on the best ve o six years rom 1985 to 1990.


118/184112

RAM used landings data rom existing NMFS records to calculate each eligible participants share and mailed

eligible recipients his/her estimated initial allocation and a quota application. The eligible participants were

required to con rm the recorded data, complete the application, and send it back to RAM.

Eligible participants were allowed to appeal their estimated quota allocations by supplying RAM with proper

documentation o the data in question. Acceptable documentation included sh tickets, leases or ownershippapers (Hartley and Fina, 2001). Once RAM received the documentation, it went under technical review and

the owner would be alerted o any changes in quota allocation within 45 days. I the RAM technical review did

not result in any changes, participants could request a hearing with a NOAA o cer in which they presented

documentation in support o their cause. I the participant was still dissatis ed with the NOAA decision, they had

the option to appeal to the ederal court within 30 days.

Out o 9,000 applications or quota, about 8,000 were allocated shares (Hartley and Fina, 2001). Six hundred and

ty appealed their allocation calculation citing errors such as improper vessel category determination, basic

eligibility to receive quota, size o allocation, etc. (Hartley and Fina, 2001). Following the technical review by RAM,

179 urther appealed their cases and ultimately only 10 cases went to the ederal court system or a nal decision.

STEP 6 IN PRACTICE

Develop Administrative Systems

The RAM Division o NMFS administers the IFQ Program. RAM responsibilities include: determining eligibility

and issuing permits, processing trans ers, collecting landing ees and related activities. The systems used to

administer the catch share program have evolved over time, especially as technology and access to the internethave improved.

Participants are held accountable or their landings and shery in ormation is largely collected via dockside

monitoring. Shareholders are required to hail in/out and complete logbooks or each trip. At 16 main ports,

NMFS agents per orm comprehensive dockside monitoring o all landings, checking the actual landings against

the shareholders logbooks. At smaller ports, NMFS agents per orm random checks. Fish buyers are required to

have a permit and to report all purchases made rom IFQ and CDQ vessels.

On average, the monitoring program requires 30% onboard observer coverage. Vessels smaller than 60 eet and

halibut vessels do not require observer coverage. Coverage levels or other vessels vary by vessel size, type and

gear. Vessels larger than 125 eet are required to have observer coverage 100% o the time (North Paci c Fishery

Management Council, n.d., B.)

Participants use eLandings (landings.alaska.gov), an interagency electronic reporting system or all commercial

shery landings in Alaska, to record and track halibut and sable sh landings. The website is the pre erred system

or administration and will soon replace the landing reporting unction on the NMFS web application. The

website is managed by Alaska Department o Fish and Game, the International Paci c Halibut Commission


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and NOAA sheries. Access to both o the systems is ree and available to any vessel owner with an IFQ permit.

Websites are housed in the NMFS Alaska Regional O ce website.

Throughout the year, participants enter in ormation on the NMFS web application, which deducts the trip

landings rom their annual quota pounds. The system is also used to track vessel quota balances, print receipts

or past landings, create an ex-vessel value and volume report, renew buyer permits, check permit balances, pay cost recovery ees, review IFQ landing ledger reports, review registered buyer landing ledger reports, and produce

a quota share holdings report (NMFS Alaska Regional O ce, n.d.B).

I a participant exceeds his/her shares by 10% or less, they may borrow shares rom the ollowing year to cover

their overage. I a shareholder exceeds his/her quota by more than 10% on the last trip o the season, they may be

subject to nes and suspensions. In severe cases, the government may revoke a participants shares.

Design and implementation o the IFQ Program cost approximately $2 million and was paid or by the NMFS

budget (Hartley and Fina, 2001). In 2001, a cost recovery ee program was implemented as authorized by the

Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. The program requires shareholders to pay a

maximum o 3% o the ex-vessel value o IFQ landings to cover the incremental administrative management costs

due to the catch share program, such as acilitating trans ers, enhanced en orcement, etc. Cost recovery ees are

calculated annually, and shermen have never paid more than 2% o the ex-vessel value o the landings. En orce-

ment or the shery costs about $2.3 million per year and in 2008, $1.1 million was spent on administration o

the shery (NOAA Fisheries Service, 2009 ; Hartley and Fina 2001). When the cost recovery program was initially

implemented, some collected revenues unded the North Paci c Loan Program; however, all collected ees now

pay or management costs. Fishermen who are required to have an onboard observer pay those costs directly.

STEP 7 IN PRACTICE

Assess Per ormance and Innovate

The program has gone through numerous innovations over the years. In act, the program has been o cially

modi ed 39 times since initial implementation (NMFS Alaska Regional O ce, 2010b). These have included

modi cations to trading restrictions, eligibility rules, administrative catch accounting systems and more.

One notable innovation occurred in 2004, 13 years a ter program implementation. The Council created the

Community Quota Entity (CQE) program, which authorizes non-pro t organizations to purchase and use annual

IFQ or a council-approved list o 42 communities, including Old Harbor, Craig, and Sand Point (Smith, 2004).

This program is designed to provide these communities with secure access to the shery and a valuable asset

(North Paci c Fishery Management Council, 2010). CQEs must comply with speci c rules including restrictions

on concentration. For example, CQE is not subject to vessel class sizes, but there are limitations on how much

quota they can hold. Each CQE is responsible or determining the use o their quota shares including eligible

shing participants. It is still too early to assess the per ormance o this special program, but it shows how

managers and shermen were able to innovate over time.


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PHOTO: WES ERIKSON


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British Columbia IntegratedGroundfsh Program


The British Columbia Integrated Ground sh Program (Integrated Program) is one o the most

comprehensive catch share programs in the world. The multi-species program includes over 70 species,

30 o which are managed via quota, and includes all commercial shermen targeting ground sh,

regardless o gear type. The program includes a number o innovative design eatures such as quota

set-asides, which are meant to encourage community development and incentivize positive treatment

o crew. Additionally, the program requires 100% individual accountability o all catch and uses an

innovative monitoring and catch accounting system to support accountability.

The British Columbia ground sh shery has a 20-year history with catch shares: The rst catch share

program was implemented in 1990 or the sable sh (Anoplopoma mbria) shery, ollowed one year later

by the halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) shery. In 1997, the ground sh trawl shery implemented an IVQ

Program, and in 2006, managers implemented the Integrated Ground sh Pilot Program that combined

the halibut, sable sh and ground sh trawl programs and incorporated all commercial hook and line

caught rock sh, lingcod (Ophiodon elongates) and dog sh (Squalus acanthias) into one overarching

program. The overarching program was made permanent at the start o the 2010/2011 season and is what

we re er to in this case study as the Integrated Program.

The shery occurs o Canadas west coast and is managed by Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), with

joint management o halibut stocks by the International Paci c Fisheries Commission. Fishermen use

hook and line, traps and trawls to harvest over 60 stocks o ground sh. The total value o ground sh

landings was $124 million in 2007 (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2009a).

S Y N OP S I S

S P E C I A L D E S I G N

F E A T U R E S

MULTI-SPECIES, INDIVIDUALLY-ALLOCATED, SPECIES-BASED, TRANSFERABLE

S E A S A L TSecureExclusive

Accountable

Trans erable

All sourcesScaled

Limited


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Road to a Catch Share

Until the late 1970s, there was little management o marine resources in the waters o British Columbia. The

ground sh shery was open to domestic and oreign feets, and by the mid-70s, stocks had started to decline

(e.g., in 1974 halibut landings were just one third o the averages in the 1960s). In response, managers beganimplementing a variety o traditional management measures including limited entry licensing, annual catch

limits, shery closures, and gear and vessel restrictions.

Fishing licenses were largely based on the vessels target species. For example, shermen targeting halibut

were required to have a halibut license while shermen targeting sable sh were required to have a sable sh

license. Fishermen who did not hold the appropriate license were not permitted to land those species. In

actuality, shermen were encountering multiple species and were there ore required to discard large amounts o

marketable species.

From 1980 to the early 1990s, the capacity and ability o the feet to catch sh increased dramatically. In 1980,

the commercial halibut feet harvested 5.7 million pounds o halibut in 65 days; in 1990, shermen harvested

8.5 million pounds in six days (Sporer, 2001). In every year rom 1979 to 1990 (except 1980), the halibut catch

limit was exceeded and a race or sh resulted in shorter seasons, unsa e shing conditions, large quantities o

discards, poor quality o sh and inconsistent supply o resh sh (and corresponding low dockside prices).

The experience was similar in the sable sh and ground sh trawl sheries. In act, the ground sh trawl shery

was closed in 1995 due to severe overharvesting o the catch limit and the inability o managers to ensure

compliance with catch limits (Sporer, 2001). The system ailed to ensure sustainability leading to depletion o

sh stocks, and the economic viability o the feets and communities that depended upon them was decreasing.

The 1990s marked a time o widespread change. In response to the ailures o traditional management,

and o ten upon request o the shermen, catch share programs were implemented in the sable sh, halibut

and ground sh sheries in 1990, 1991 and 1997, respectively. The halibut and sable sh programs were

initially implemented as trial programs, but they were ormalized shortly therea ter, upon meeting identi ed

conservation and economic goals (Sporer, 2001). In 2006, the remaining ground sh feet (mostly hook and line

vessels) were introduced into the program and all commercial sherman targeting ground sh (including halibut

and sable sh) were integrated into a single catch share program.

Conservation and protection o sh and sh habitat is the rst goal o Canadas shery management. Following this mandate, additional goals include compliance with regulations, secure and stable access or shermen,

airness to individuals and groups, promotion o historical participation, economic viability, best use o the sh

or economics, social and cultural needs, and assuring public access.


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Per ormance

The catch share program is success ully meeting its goals. Fleet-wide catch limits are rarely exceeded, bycatch

rates have been substantially reduced, revenues and pro ts have increased, season length has increased and

jobs are more stable (Munro et al., 2009; GSGislason and Associates, Ltd., 2008). The catch share program has arobust system o individual accountability which has ensured catch limits are not exceeded and stocks are doing

well. No species in the ground sh complex are designated under the Species at Risk Act, meaning no species

require special management attention (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2009a).

Bycatch had previously been a substantial problem in the ground sh shery, especially because shermen

were o ten required to discard per ectly marketable species that were caught as bycatch, i.e., directed

sable sh shermen discarded halibut due to regulations. One primary impetus or integrating all ground sh

species under one management plan was to reduce discards, and the system has been largely success ul in

accomplishing this goal.

As o 2007, there were over 300 active licenses in the British Columbia Ground sh sheries. Close to 200 o these

were used to operate in the halibut shery with the remainder spread out airly evenly over the other sheries

(Turris, 2009). Most vessels are multi-licensed and can participate in several sheries (i.e., a vessel will have all

the necessary licenses to sh halibut, sable sh, rock sh, lingcod and dog sh by hook and line gear).

STEP 1 IN PRACTICE

Defne Program GoalsGeneral objectives o management or the ground sh shery are to ensure sustainability, economic

development and equity. More speci c objectives have been outlined or the management o some ground sh

species in each management plan.

Overarching goals or the Integrated Program included conservation o sh stocks, increased bene ts rom

the ground sh shery, and a air distribution o bene ts arising rom the Integrated Program. Speci cally, the

management objectives outlined prior to development o the Integrated Program are:

Maintain the existing processing capacity

Stabilize employment in the shery

Encourage economic development in coastal communities

Ensure the air treatment o crew

Allow or controlled rationalization o the feet

Minimize the negative consequences associated with the leasing and concentration o quota shares

(Sporer, 2001)


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DFO developed ve additional objectives prior to the integration o all stocks into IVQs in 2006 (Fraser, 2008):

1. Account or all rock sh catch

2. Manage rock sh catch according to established rock sh management areas

3. Require sh harvesters to be individually accountable or their catch

4. Implement new monitoring to ensure above objectives

5. Examine species and stocks o concern and take action or precautionary management

STEP 2 IN PRACTICE

Defne and Quanti y the Available Resource

One important design eature o the Integrated Program is the coordinated management o all species and

shermen. There are over 70 marine species under management in the ground

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Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen

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