Causal Explantion of Social Action

8/10/2019 Causal Explantion of Social Action

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Causal Explanation of Social Action: The Contribution of Max Weber and of Critical Realismto a Generative View of Causal Explanation in Social ScienceAuthor(s): Mats EkstrmSource: Acta Sociologica, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1992), pp. 107-122Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4194762

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Acta Sociologica (1992) 35:107-122

Causal Explanation of Social ActionThe Contribution of Max Weber and of Critical

Realism to a Generative View of CausalExplanation in Social Science

Mats Ekstr6mDepartment of Sociology, University of Orebro, Sweden

Causal explanations f social actions are central o modern as well as to classic ociology.Even in its revised form. the most influential ausal theory the covering aw theoryhas not proved particularly ruitful or the study of social action. But there are alternativeand potentially more fruitful heories. This article presents Weber's methodology andcritical realism as two different contributions o a generative view of causality n socialscience which both try to transcend he protracted ontroversy between a hermeneuticinterpretive ociology and a positivistic ausal-explanatory ociology. From he generativestandpoint. causal explanations are directed not towards the production of empiricalcorrelations between variables or towards the making of predictions on the basis ofempirical laws. but towards the uncovering of causal properties and the processeswhereby social actions arise out of the complex interaction f internally elated mentaldispositions. meanings. ntentions. social contexts and structures.

MatsEkstr6m.

Universitv f Orebro, Department fSociology.

Box 923, S-70130Orebro.Sweden.

1. IntroductionCommon o a great deal of modern as wellas classical ociological heorizing s a focuson explanations f social actions. In a recentarticle in Acta Sociologica, Therbornwrites: 'Sociological theorizing s likely tochange dramatically in the near future,moving rom focusing on conceptualization

onto explanation' (1991:177). That thebasic aim of sociological theorization andconceptualization) hould be to contributeto an explanatory science is a notion whichTherbom would appear to share with themajority of modem theorists. Giddens(1984:346, my emphasis), for example,writes: 'Now, it can be accepted that allabstract generalizations in the socialsciences are, explicitly or implicitly, causalstatements'. In an article about sociologicalanalytical heorizing, Turner (1987) arguesthat sociological heorization must focus oncausality in terms of abstract processes

and operative mechanisms. ConcerningBourdieu's habitus theory, Broady writes(1990:232, translation and emphasis myoWn): Its purpose s to push in an explana-tory link between the social circumstancesand the behaviour of individuals.'

But what are the scientific-theoreticaland methodological foundations of acausally xplanatory ociology? The importand applicability f causal explanation, andits relation to other types of explanationand to understanding Verstehen) - theseare among the most central topics when itcomes to the discussion of the methodologyof social science in general, and the studyof social intentional actions in particular.One can thereby distinguish at least fourdifferent positions that have been takenup with regard to these topics (cf. Lloyd1986:8). First, there is the idea that, unlikein natural cience, the endeavour n socialscience should not be directed towardscausal explanation but towards the under-standing and/or rationalization of socialScandinavian Sociological Association, 1992

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actions in relation to intentions, meanings.and socio-cultural contexts. Second, thereis the idea that social science should ndeedstrive for causal explanation, but that suchexplanation should have a particular truc-ture and should be arrived at by way ofparticular methods. Third. there is a pos-itivist naturalism that asserts the generalapplicability of the empiricist concept ofcausality n both natural and social science(albeit in a somewhat modified orm in thecase of the latter). Fourth. and last, there isan anti-positivist naturalism hat questionsthe empiricist concept of causality andadvocates a unified science of causal expla-nation resting on another foundation. Inthe debate about explanation of socialaction, there has long been recurrentcontroversy between, chiefly. the first andthird of the above positions.

The most widely accepted specificationof causality - the empiricist theory - wasoriginally formulated by David Hume(Hume 1966; see also e.g. Stroud 1977).Causality s regarded as a matter of empiri-cal regularities. Causal conclusions areassumed to be based on the observation ofhow a certain event is followed again andagain by a certain other event, not onknowledge of causal mechanisms and thegenerative properties of things. To theempiricist view the relation between causeand effect is an external one. Cause andeffect are regarded as separate and inde-pendent objects, i.e. objects that do notdepend on one another for their consti-tution. This relation of independencebecomes a central criterion of causality.

Characteristic of the deductive-nomo-logical explanatory model (or the covering

law model') that has been developed withinmodern positivism is that explanations ofindividual events or actions are derivedfrom one or more laws (or law-like for-mulations). These laws express universalempirical correlations, usually formulatedin terms of probability. Thus, according othis notion the validity of causal expla-nations depends on their capacity o predictempirical courses of events (see e.g.Hempel (1965) and, for a brief survey, e.g..Johansson & Liedman 1987), Keat & Urry

(1975)). The fact that empiricism nd posi-tivism have exerted such a strong nfluence

has meant that the matter of causality andsocial actions has primarily ecome a ques-tion, first, of whether ntentions and actionscan be regarded as independent, .e. exter-nally related, and, second, of whether ocialactions can be explained and predicted withthe aid of empirical aws see e.g. the debateconcerning 'the philosophy of action',Marc-Wogau 1980; von Wright 1971; seefurthermore the debate in Scandinaviansocial science. e.g. Osterberg 1989). A cen-tral aspect of the latter question is. third,whether explanations are to be derivedfrom directly observable patterns of eventsand of action, or whether - and if so. how -a science of social actions shall seek toexpose not directly observable causalmechanisms.

It is unlikely that many present-dayScandinavian sociologists would describethemselves as adherents of the out-and-out empiricist notion of causality, or asadherents f the positivist overing aw the-ory. In practice, however. the type of vari-able-oriented research that seeks causalexplanations chiefly through studyingempirical orrelations etween a few exter-nally related variables is anything butuncommon. Partly n controversy with thismode of research. many have becomeadherents of an interpretive ociology thatquestions the very possibility of findingcausal explanations or social actions. Therepresentatives f this attitude often equatecausality with the empiricist and positivisttheory. as can be illustrated ythe followingquotation from Osterberg:

. I shall be arguing . . that the principaltask of sociology is to interpret what happensbetween people in this field of action. Inter-

pretation is to be understood here as somethingelse than causal explanation and/or causal-functional xplanation.... What happens nsocial life cannot be causally xplained on thebasis of sociological laws ... which wouldenable us also to deduce what will happenin the future./ . . ./ Descriptions f reasons.motives and intentions have the purpose ofmaking our understanding f the behaviourboth of others and of ourselves as deep as isdesirable or requisite n the situation (Oster-berg 1989:9 and 23; translation nd emphasismy own).

In modern sociological theorizing this pol-arizing starting-point seems at the same

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time to be regarded as unfruitful (see e.g.Giddens 1984; Turner 1987). The dismissalof the empiricist and positivist notion doesnot necessarily imply a questioning of thecausal-explanatory ambition in itself- quitethe opposite. Giddens, for example. startsfrom the following:

That there are no known universal laws insocial science is not just happenstance. f it iscorrect o say. as I have argued. that the causalmechanisms n social scientific generalizationsdepend upon actors' reasons. n the context ofa 'mesh' of intended and unintended con-sequences of actions. we can readily see why

such generalizations do not have a universalform. ... I propose simply to declare thatreasons are causes. accepting hat this no doubtimplies a non-Humean account of causality(Giddens 1984:345).

The purpose of the present article is to bringto the fore, and to indicate the contrastbetween, Weber's perspective on causalityand that of the critical realists. Weber rep-resents the second of the above positions.

while the critical realists - or at least certainof them - represent the fourth. It may bequestioned whether it is fruitful to presentthese two side by side. Certainly the con-tributions of (on the one hand) Weber and(on the other) the critical realists are ofdifferent character, were produced in dif-ferent contexts and had different intentionsbehind them.2 It is not, though, my inten-tion in this article to carry out a comparativeanalysis in terms of the philosophy ofscience or the history of ideas, or to presenta unique interpretation of the scholars. Theintention is instead to bring to the foreWeber and critical realism as represen-tatives of important (and at least in Scandi-navian sociology underestimated) per-spectives regarding causal explanations ofsocial action. At the same time as there area number of essential differences betweenthese perspectives, they have in commonthat they develop generative views of caus-ality, explicitly as attempts to overcome the

contemporary polarization between posi-tivism and hermeneutics.3

2. Weber's contribution to acausal-explanatory ocialscience4

2.1. Verstehen and causal explanationan integrated approachThe interpretation and presentation ofWeber's methodology has to a large extentbeen affected by the tendency towardspolarization n the discussion concerningmethodology n the social sciences. Manyhave regarded him chiefly as a represen-tative of the anti-positivist side in thecontroversies between understanding andcausal explanation. and between qualitative

and quantitative methods. By and large,Weber is most often presented as a 'ver-stehen sociologist', at the same time as hisdevelopment of the concept of causality seither ignored or just mentioned n passing(see e.g. Herva 1988). He has been used -as Eliaeson (1982) puts it - as a 'stick withwhich o beat opponents' n 'the verstehen/erklaren debate' (p. 22. translation myown). In Swedish sociology the picture ofWeber has been in part coloured by thelong drawn-out soft data debate', where he

has been cited as a representative f a 'softdata sociology' (Johansson 1966) or a'qualitative ociology' (Hughes & Mansson1988).

Sociology (in the sense in which this highlyambiguous word is used here) is a scienceconcerning itself with the interpretive under-standting of social action and thereby with acausal explanationi of its course and con-sequences Weber 1978:4. my emphasis).

This oft-quoted ntroduction o the first partof Economy and Society a part devoted to

a methodological nd ontological definitionof the object of sociological nvestigationsillustrates the fact that Weber did notregard understanding and causal expla-nation as distinct or opposed activities, butas two essential and integrated parts ofone and the same methodology. The for-mulation of a Verstehende Soziologiinvolved he conviction hat all meaningfulhuman actions can be causally explained(Hekman 1979; Keat & Urry 1975;Salomon 1934; Turner 1986). This comes

out both in the explicitly methodologicalwritings and in the empirical tudies.

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The integrated perspective involvesinterpretive understanding s a crucial pre-requisite for causal explanation n historyand social science: it is required on the one

hand for elucidating he social and culturalmeaning of what s to be causally xplained,and on the other hand for attaining knowl-edge of the processes that connect causeand effect. At the same time causal analysisis a prerequisite for the understanding fthe cultural ignificance, distinctive harac-ter, interrelationship and historical foun-dation of different phenomena. A furtherexpression of the integrated perspective sthe fact that Weber in certain cases treatsthe concepts of understanding nd expla-

nation as virtually synonymous (see e.g.Weber 1949:72, 77 & 79; 1975:149; ee alsoAron 1974; Giddens 1977; Salomon 1934).

In the light of this there would seem tobe little point in attempting - as othershave done - to determine whether it is tounderstanding r to explanation hat Weberassigns priority. In two Swedish theses wefind conflicting conclusions regardingWeber's position. Eliaeson writes: But hisinterpretation to the effect that under-standing has pride of place would seem

less plausible than its opposite: that oneexplains through understanding. which isto say that the act of understanding s anindispensable but insufficient step on thepath to explanation' (Eliaeson 1982:101;my translation). Coniavitis, on the otherhand, writes: 'The conviction that -mean-ing has priority over -cause remainedwith Weber throughout his life. Causalityis for him a stage in the interpretive rocess'(Coniavitis 1977:100; my translation). Theway I understand t, the important part of

Weber's contribution s that he (as we shallsee) looks upon meanings as causes.

2.2. Causality and intentionalityWeber's chief interest, both as a historianand as a sociologist, is persons who act andwho give reality content and meaning bysetting themselves into relation with otherpersons and with specific social and culturalcontexts. In such a science it is principallyby interpreting the intentions behindactions, and by relating actions to various

complexes of meaning, that we can identifythe causal mechanisms hat produce actions

and patterns of action. Weber does notregard intentional explanation as distinctfrom causal explanation, but rather as oneform of it. Causal explanation s a matter

of understanding oncrete human action interms of its mo:ives (Weber 1949:52, 72;1975:186, 197. 216; 1978:4; see alsoGoodman 1975; Hekman 1979; Keat &Urry 1975; Oakes 1975; Turner & Factor1981).

Those who view the painstaking labor ofcausally understanding istorical reality as ofsecondary mportance an disregard t. but itis impossible to supplant t by any type of'teleology'. From our viewpoint. purpose' sthe conception of an effect which becomes a

cause of an action. Since we take into accountevery cause which produces or can produce asignificant effect. we also consider this one(Weber 1949:83).

The question whether motives can beregarded as externally related to actions -a question that has been at the centre ofthe debate concerning the applicability ofcausal explanation in social science, andthat has led certain researchers to advocatean intentional explanatory model basicallydiverging rom the causal one - does not

appear o constitute any sort of problem orWeber. Intentionality s regarded as one ofvarious causal processes jointly contribu-ting to the production of a certain actionand its effects (Weber 1978:11 and1949:83).

2.3. Causality as quantifiable regularitiesor qualitative connections and processesWeber, like for instance Hume and also thecritical realists, discusses the concept ofcausality in relation to two ideas regarding

its import: (1) 'the idea of an effect. the ideaof a dynamic bond . . . between pheno-mena qualitatively different from oneanother', and (2) 'the idea of subordinationto rules' (Weber 1975:195; cf. e.g. Hume1966; Harre 1986). The purpose of causalexplanation is to identify particular con-crete causal relationships between indi-vidual affected and effective phenomena(Weber 1949, 1975:196). Weber focuseschiefly on the import of these relations, onhow and throuigh which processes a certain

influence comes about, and on how con-crete phenomena have been produced out

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of the past. Generalizations in terms ofstatistical correlations cannot replace aninterpretive understanding of the causalproperties hat explain a certain action:

Suppose hat somehow an empirical-statisticaldemonstration f the strictest ort is produced.showing that all men everywhere who havebeen placed in a certain situation haveinvariably reacted in the same way and tothe same extent. Suppose that whenever thissituation is experimentally reproduced. thesame reaction nvariably ollows. Which s tosay: suppose that this reaction s. in the mostliteral sense of the word. 'calculable'. Such ademonstration would not bring us a single stepcloser to the 'interpretation' f this reaction.Bv itself. such a demonstration would colt-tribute absolutelv nothing to the project of.understanding' 'whv' this reaction everoccurred and, *noreover. 'whv' it invariablvoccurs n the same wav (Weber 1975:128. myemphasis).

This view of causal explanation of socialaction implies a criticism of the tendencywithin positivism o regard causality as pri-marily a question of empirical correlationsbetween quantified variables, and the ideathat the goal of science is to establishgeneralization/laws. Causality s a question

of properties/qualities which bind the effectto the cause, i.e. what Hume, through hisnotion of empirical regularity, denied thatwe can arrive at knowledge of (Hume1966:63). and which is all too often ignoredin positivist variable-oriented research(Outhwaite 1987:102). As Manicas (1987:130) points out: 'For Weber the scientificinvestigation begins only after thesecorrelations have been established.' Quan-tified correlations can be a starting-pointfor a causal analysis in the sense that they

bring nto focus the processes that are thento be investigated.Concurrently with the shift in Weber's

focus from economic. social and culturalhistory to what can be described as morepurely sociology, there occurs a certainchange n his evaluation of empirical regu-larities as a goal of causal-explanatoryscience. Assuredly, sociology is largelybased on the same concrete processes,intentional actions and cultural meaningsas history, but sociology is concerned with

'typical action', and 'seeks to formulatetype concepts and generalized uniformities

of empirical process' (Weber 1978:19). InEconomy and Society Weber differentiatesbetween adequate on the level of meaningand causally adequate. The first of theserefers to the content of the relationsbetween the specific context of meaning nwhich an action is embedded, the importthat the actor ascribes to this context, theactor's motive and the act itself. Causallyadequate, on the other hand, refers to theprobability hat a certain specific event willalways be followed by a certain otherspecific event. These two types of adequacyrepresent wo types of Sociological knowl-edge which presuppose and fructify eachother.

2.4. Contextuality, abstraction andempirical generalizationWeber's methodological reasoning rep-resents he taking of a particular ttitude tothe question of the relationship betweencontextuality, abstraction and empiricalgeneralization, a question that permeatesboth the methodological conflicts n whichWeber was involved and the similar con-flicts that have taken place during thepresent century. The starting-point or hispositions as they are formulated n. prin-cipally, the early methodological writingsis a notion of reality as consisting of aninfinitely manifold and nexhaustible ourseof empirical and individual phenomena.The standpoint Weber develops - a stand-point influenced by neo-Kantianism -involves a repudiation f a number of poss-ible ways of handling his complex context.First, there is a rejection of the radicalcontextualism where the aim is to capturea part of reality in its total manifoldness

without the aid of any conceptual frame-work: '. . . an exhaustive causal inves-tigation of any concrete phenomenon n itsfull reality is not only practically mpos-sible - it is simply nonsense' (Weber1949:78). Second, there is a rejection of thenomological approach, of the endeavour oformulate eneral aws on the basis of whichit would be possible to deduce the concretecausal relations, this chiefly because theuniversal oncepts will be devoid of contentand meaning, without roots in concrete

reality. Third, by taking as the goal ofcausal-explanatory cience the achievement

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of knowledge of the individual concreteconfiguration of reality, Weber is rejectinga science that through concept formationseeks to uncover abstract non-observableessential structures and processes whichoperate behind the stream of events inreality (Weber 1975:56. 64, 66; see alsoOuthwaite 1983; Manicas 1987).

Influenced by Rickert and the concept ofWertbeziehung, Weber asserts hat it is theresearcher's socially and culturally deter-mined values, notions of what is of import-ance, that constitute the necessary criteriafor the selection from the unstructuredempirical eality. This neo-Kantian ositionleads to a repudiation of the idea of value-neutral knowledge. However, explicitlydefined and justified criteria or focusing onpartial causal relationships orm at the sametime the basis for objectivity - or ratherintersubjectivity- n science. With a certainfixed and common perspective regardingthe object of investigation, researchers ancompare and evaluate their results see e.g.Weber 1975:124 and 1949:81; ee also e.g.Eliaeson 1982 and 1990b; Turner & Factor1981; Turner 1990).

The core of the method that Weber advo-cates for arriving at causal explanations ofsocial actions is rational interpretation,which in brief is a matter of reconstructinga context of meaning for the purpose ofunderstanding why persons act as they do.Meaningful actions are explained by beingset in relation to the categories ends andmeans, and at the same time to the mean-ings they have for the agent. meanings nthe form of socially and culturally deter-mined motives for action. Such under-standing and explanation is not to beattained by way of introspection r empathybut first and foremost by way of analysis ofthe social and cultural contexts in whichpeople act (Weber 1949:69, 72. 83;1975:181, 194 and 1978:4; ee also Hekman1979; Jacobs 1990; Oakes 1975). Weber'smethodology s much more sensitive to theprocesses of interpretation, nd to differentcausally significant properties of socio-cul-tural contexts, than the mainstream vari-able-oriented sociology (cf. Blumer 1956;Ragin 1987), but transcends at the sametime the intuitionist and psychologizingunderstanding represented by Dilthey

(Eliaeson 1982, 1990a; Jacobs 1990; Good-man 1975).? He repudiates he tendency tosubjectivism hat s to be found n a methodgeared to empathy and the reproduction fimmediate experience, and he emphasizesthat also interpretations of contexts ofmeaning have to be verified, have to bevalid and objective, or rather intersub-jective in the sense that others understandthe specific circumstances n the same way(see e.g. Weber 1975:148. 179; see alsoTurner 1986:180). This is at the same timea point with regard o which here has beena great deal of misunderstanding ofWeber.'

Concept formation (abstraction) has acentral role in Weber's causal explanatorymethodology. If we are to be able to dif-ferentiate between what s causally relevantand what is not, then our interpretationmust be conceptually articulated. Sincecausal explanations concern substantialrelations, meanings and qualities, and notcorrelations between quantifiable pheno-mena, the concepts must also be rich inmeaning. and thereby relatively imited inextension (Weber 1975:56-65. see alsoManicas 1987).

Through the concept of the ideal typeWeber indicates the importance of con-structing idealized abstract contexts ofmeaning. This ideal type is an expressionof how persons would act if they were toact rationally n relation o a certain goal ina certain ituation. Not that this means thatWeber took it that persons do always actrationally quite the contrary. The idealtype is a heuristic artificial construction,an aid (and not a goal in itself) in thediscovering of causal relations. The chieffunction of concepts is to make clear thedistinctive concrete empirical character ofactions, partly by directing attentiontowards deviations rom the idealized pat-tern of action (Weber 1975:189, 1949:90,1978:9. 21; see also e.g. Eliaeson 1982;Jacobs 1990). This view of conceptualiz-ation rejects empiricism, nomological posi-tivism and conceptual ealism n favour of anominalism nfluenced by neo-Kantianism.

At the same time as Weber clearly pointsout that knowledge of quantitative cor-relations and empirical generalizations snot the goal of causal explanations, he

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emphasizes he importance of such knowl-edge as a means for determining he causalsignificance f a concrete relation, and as ameans in concept formation (Weber1975:63, 195 and 1977; see also Salomon1934). Rational nterpretation, dequate onthe level of meaning and causally adequate,is based on knowledge of the result thatwe generally expect a meaningful action tohave. It is not, though, a matter of nomo-logical regularities, but of either common-sense expectations or formalized proba-bilistic regularities (Weber 1977:127 and1975:171; ee also Turner 1986; Turner &Factor 1981). However, the fundamentalproblem of distinguishing ausal relationsfrom statistical correlations cannot be sol-ved by replacing deterministic/nomologicalregularities with probabilistic regularities.Instead it demands knowledge about thecontent of the relations and generative pro-cesses. Perhaps his conviction is the mostimportant ifference between Weber's viewof causality and the one held by many ofhis contemporaries.

Weber's view of causality nvolves him ina position regarding one of the centralissues in the German Methodenstreit theissue of the relation between natural andsocial science (Oakes 1975:19) which div-erges both from the unified science of thepositivists and from the intuitionists' e.g.Dilthey's) emphasis on a specific non-causally-explanatory ocial-scientific meth-odology. Weber's view of the relationshipbetween social science and natural scienceis complicated and is capable of being nter-preted in several ways. Here I shall bedevoting attention only to a number of waysin which t diverges from common present-

day notions.More or less directly aiming at theintuitionists of the time, who maintainedthat social science could not be causallyexplanatory nasmuch as it had to do withcomplex and non-calculable unpredictablehuman actions, Weber maintains the fol-lowing: The explanation of intentionalaction diverges rom explanations n naturalscience, but not in such a way as to makethe processes of nature generally easier toexplain or more predictable. Since inter-

pretive understanding makes it possible toidentify he motives behind actions and the

specific context of meaning in which theactions are embedded, the social scientistcan identify the processes that link causeand effect. In Weber's view this has noequivalent n natural cience, a science thatis obliged to have recourse to empiricalgeneralizations. Another thing in this con-nection. says Weber, is that actions are ifanything more calculable than events innature and that nature s at least as manifoldand complex as social reality. The repudi-ation of a nomological social science is aconsequence of the interest in meaningfulactions and substantial ausal relations, andnot a consequence of people's actions beingin principle more difficult o capture n gen-eral laws than inanimate nature (Weber1975:96, 120-127, 191. 216; see also Hek-man 1979; Goodman 1975; Manicas 1987).Hekman catches Weber's position well inthe following words:

The modern critics claim that causal analysisis inappropriate o the social sciences becausethese sciences must deal with human actionas meaningful. Weber's theory of causality,however. s rooted in the assumption hat thesocial sciences are distinct from the naturalsciences precisely because heir subject matter

is meaningful ction (Hekman 1979:67).

2.5. The application of causal explanationin The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit ofCapitalismA number of researchers have argued thatthere is crucial disparity between Weber'sexplicitly ormulated methodology and hisapplied methodology (see Kolko 1959;Lloyd 1986; Turner 1981). When it comes,however, o the treatment of the concept ofcausality n one of his best-known mpirical

studies. The Protestant Ethic and the Spiritof Capitalism. what strikes one is in fact thecontinuity and agreement between for-mulated and applied methodology. Hereare applied the principles that were for-mulated n the methodological writings hatwere penned at about the same time (1903-6). Just as the methodological ormulationschange over time, so also does the directionof his applied research, but this we shallnot go into here.

In The Protestant Ethic Weber takes as

his starting-point ertain general patternscorrelations between occupation and

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religion, and between high economic dev-elopment and the breakthrough of Prot-estantism. These quantitative correlationsare not used for giving explanations but forformulating he problem on which the studyis then to focus, namely what causal pro-cesses what effective orces - lie behind thecorrelations Weber 1976:35, 68).

A distinctive feature of Weber's pro-cedure is that he does not seek the causalexplanations - the effective forces - bybreaking down the original variables inorder to find new correlations, nor throughempathy or introspection. Instead he per-forms a contextual interpretive analysis,and constructs abstract deal types. for thepurpose of reconstructing certain com-plexes of meanings and motives. Inten-tional action is the core of causalexplanation n The Protestant Ethic. Prot-estantism acted as a causal force in that itinfluenced the context of meanings affect-ing the motives of workers, businessmenand entrepreneurs motives which in turngave rise to patterns of action, a life-style.fostering the rise of capitalism (Weber1976, e.g. pp. 153, 170; see also e.g. Keat& Urry 1975:149).

When it comes to Weber's repudiationof the empiricist concept of causality it isimportant to note that the causal expla-nations in The Protestant Ethic focus onsubstantial internal relations. It is notrelations between distinct and independentobjects that are studied, but how onephenomenon comes out of another, howcertain motives, certain ideas concerningwork and wealth, grow up out of a certainsocio-cultural context (Weber 1976:68.180).

There has been extensive discussion on-cerning to what extent Weber employs amonocausal deterministic perspectivelooks upon the Protestant thic as the causalfactor - and thereby repudiates any effectof other factors on the specific developmentof capitalism see e.g. Kolko 1959; Warner1973). Weber at more than one point rejectsthe idea (Weber 1976:89, 183). Whilst it istrue that Weber lays the main emphasison identifying he causal properties of theProtestant thic, at the same time he asserts

the important role played by the legalsystem, the accumulation of capital, the

division of labour, etc., in the developmentof the specific form of capitalism and ofthe economic rationality that appears inWestern society. A reasonable interpret-ation is that Weber. on the basis of hisontological view, saw various conditions(cultural, ocial, political, material and psy-chological) as effective tendencies thatreinforced or neutralized ne another in acomplex interplay (see Weber 1976, e.g.pp. 26, 91, 174). It is also important toremember he fact that abstraction n termsof isolation s one of the central aspects ofWeber's causal explanatory methodology.

Furthermore and this s also completelycentral with regard o the import and direc-tion of a causal-explanatory ocial scienceWeber's principal mbition was in any casenot to determine how large a significanceProtestantism had for the development ofcapitalism, how arge a proportion in quan-titative terms) of the causal influence wasto be ascribed o this particular actor. Hisambition was instead to, on the one hand,demonstrate that it had been of crucialimportance in respect of the emergence ofthe specific orm of rationality n questionto demonstrate. that is, that this part ofhistory would here have taken anothershape if what he designates he Protestantethic had not had an influence on the waypersons acted - and, on the other hand(and perhaps chiefly). to identify how thisinfluence came about, i.e. to arrive atknowledge of the content of the causalprocesses (see Weber 1976:183; Turner1986:201).

3. Critical realism and thedevelopment of a generativeconcept of causality

The most mportant cientific-philosophicalcontributions o critical ealism, and to thegenerative view of causality that hasemerged within this tradition, have comefrom Rom Harre and Roy Bhaskar (seee.g. Bhaskar 1978a, b, 1979, 1989, 1990;Harre 1979, 1986; Harre & Secord 1972;Harre & Madden 1975). During the 1970sand 1980s the generative view has been

developed and applied by philosophers ofscience, sociologists, psychologists, econ-

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omic and social historians and geographers(see e.g. Keat & Urry 1975; Layder 1990;Lloyd 1986; Manicas 1987; Outhwaite 1987,1990; Sayer 1984, 1989; Shotter 1973; Urry1985). In the following account I shall notbe going into the internal debate in criticalrealism, but shall concentrate instead onthe overall contribution of a number ofcentral figures to an anti-positivist causaltheory.7

The interest in explaining social actionsis common to the critical realists. A coreconcept is causal powers, focusing on thestructuration f capacities to act and bringabout change in reality. The theories andperspectives that have been developedinclude underlying processes on differentlevels: the development of personality. elf-consciousness and habits (Harr6 1979;Harre, Clarke & De Carlo 1985: Shotter1973). intentionality and the processeswhereby human beings reflect on theirsituation and develop ambitions andmotives for action (Bhaskar 1978a. b; Isaac1990; Outhwaite 1987), and the relationsbetween social actions and properties ofsocial situational contexts (Layder 1990).of social orders (Harre 1979; Harr,. Clarke& De Carlo 1985), and of relatively endur-ing social structures Bhaskar 1978a. 1979;Layder 1990; Patomaki 1991). In relationto the concept of causal powers a numberof theorists have attempted to clarify therelation between social structure nd inten-tional action (see e.g. Layder 1985; Pato-maki 1991). Bhaskar, for example. whosephilosophy of science and view of socialscience are strongly rooted in the Marxisttradition, argues in favour of a trans-formational model of social activity. Social

actions are regarded as the reproductionand transformation of practices and struc-tures that are relatively enduring andalready exist for the individual. But indi-viduals are not passive conveyors of rolesand structures. They possess causal powers,capacities for bringing about change inreality, this through conscious and inten-tional activities (Bhaskar 1978a).

These theoretical starting-points re notin themselves particularly riginal. What snew and fruitful is that they are set in

relation to a theory of causality that caninclude this research object.

3.1. A dialectical perspectiveThe basic standpoint of critical realism canto a large extent be regarded as rep-resenting aspects of a dielectical philosophyof science. The dialectic perspective, whichis perhaps expressed n its clearest form inthe works of Bhaskar, nfluences both thenotion of what objects of study are properto social science and the epistemologicaland methodological guidelines.

Social reality, like nature, s regarded asa changeable. complex and open system,consisting of causally efficacious mech-anisms n interaction Bhaskar 1978a, 1989;Outhwaite 1987). There s a sharp rejectionof, on the one hand, the Humean mech-anical and atomistic ontology, and the viewof society as a 'mass of separable events', aview on which positivism s considered torest, and, on the other hand, the notion ofreality as constituted by subjective inter-pretations and meanings (Bhaskar 1978a,b; Harr* & Madden 1975; Sayer 1984).

The generative theory of causalityimplies a fundamental riticism of the suc-cession view of causality, .e. causality as aquestion of events following one anotherwith a certain regularity, and of the idea

that causal explanations can be expressedin the form of general empirical aws. Theessence of causal analysis is instead theelucidation of the processes that generatethe objects, events and actions we seek toexplain. Things. mental processes, socialrelations and structures are taken to havecausal power. a potential or bringing boutchange; not that this is a question, though.of some mystical independently existentpower- it resides n properties f the thingsand relations themselves. Causes are

neither events nor objects but properties.These properties are effective/productiveand lie behind the sequences of events andconstant changes that can be observed inthe real world (Bhaskar 1978b, 1989; Harre& Madden 1975; Keat & Urry 1975;Outhwaite 1987; Sayer 1984).

A central feature of the dialectical per-spective is the notion of reality as stratified.Concrete events and abstract ausal powersare looked upon as two levels of reality -related, but not reducible, to each other.

The abstract level is not associated withheuristic concepts but is taken as capturing

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actually existing causal powers relativelyautonomous in relation to the concretecomplex context they operate in (Bhaskar1989 and 1978b; Outhwaite 1987; Sayer1984). Bhaskar goes a step further and saysthat empiricism's concentration on obser-vations of sequences of events in fact rep-resents a double reduction which bringstogether - mixes up - three levels: the real(properties and mechanisms), the actual(the events that are produced) and theempirical observations of events).

The difference in level, the 'ontologicalgap'. is also formulated as the differencebetween 'natural necessity' and 'contingentrelations'. The operative properties thatcausal analysis attempts to uncover existby necessity relatively ndependent of theireffects, but the relations between theseproperties and the observable effects arecontingent nasmuch as they are dependenton the specific context that we are studying(Bhaskar 1978b: Keat & Urry 1975; Outh-waite 1987; Sayer 1984).

This being the perspective, causality hasto be analysed n terms of tendencies. Thesetendencies are always manifested in opensystems, n a complex nteraction with othertendencies. On the concrete evel the causalpowers are never to be found expressedin their purity but are always reinforced,modified or neutralized by other powers,and it is the context in which they operatethat determines the specific effects. Theforce of gravity is assumed to exist eventhough we cannot observe its effect on thestationary bjects that surround us in space(Outhwaite 1987), and certain social normstructures exist even though we mayobserve actions that infringe them.

The dialectical generative concept ofcausality implies a crucial distinctionbetween causal explanation and empiricalprediction. Prediction has to do withempirical regularities which - no matterhow general they are - constitute con-textually dependent patterns of events andnot causal powers (Keat & Urry 1975:5;Manicas 1989:187, 191). Bhaskar (1978b,1989) and Sayer (1984) argue that regu-larities are neither a necessary nor a suf-ficient condition of causality.

Most critical realists regard motives andintentions as central causal mechanisms n

social-scientific esearch: ntentions, devel-oped within a socio-cultural framework,have a productive power that plays its partin causing he persons o act as they do (seee.g. Bhaskar 1989; Outhwaite 1987, 1990;Sayer 1984). That motives and actions areinternally elated, and that thus the empiri-cist requirement of logical independenceremains unfulfilled, does not constitutefor the realists the problem that it hasconstituted for the positivists and in-tentionalists. On the contrary, the causal-explanatory research has to take intoconsideration he internally elated natureof social actions Layder 1990; Sayer 1984).

Internal relatedness is defined in thefollowing illuminating way by Patomaki(1991:224, based on Bhaskar 1979): 'Arelation RAil is internal if and only if Awould not be what it essentially s unless Bis related o it in the way that it is'. Internalrelatedness s more than a question of for-mal logical definitions. The reconstructionof the mechanisms nd structures wherebysocial entities are interwoven of how theyare constituted n relation to one anothercan in fact be seen as the very essence ofa causal-explanatory ocial science. Howcausal properties bring about changes s notin the first place a question of how distinctand separate objects or phenomena nflu-ence the relative occurrence f one another,but of how the effect issues from the cause(cf. Harre 1986; Outhwaite 1987: Pawson1988; Sayer 1984).

3.2. Methodological implicationsIt seems to me that there are certain overallmethodological but on the other hand notconcretely methodical) mplications of thegenerative and realistic view of causalityones of the utmost importance or socialscience. Let me conclude with a few all-round comments on this.

A causal analysis of social action shouldstrive for a methodology permeated by acontinuous nterplay of conceptualization/theory construction and contextualization.These two fructify each other but also leadto two completely different ypes of knowl-edge, each a goal for science. Concep-tualization nd theory construction efer to

a process whereby we abstract from con-text-dependent data in an endeavour to

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capture the not-directly-observable ausalmechanisms and structures that generateobservable phenomena and events. Thesearch for hidden causes is nothing meta-physical or less than scientific but a fun-damental aspect of causal analysis of socialactions, which calls for constructions f con-cepts and theories (Bhaskar 1978a). The-ories are seen here neither as orderingframeworks in the form of models ofrelations between independent and depen-dent variables, nor as empirical gener-alizations. As Keat & Urry (1975:35) putit, the making of generalizations goingfrom some to all - is 'not a move fromobservables o unobservable tructures ndmechanisms which explain them' (see alsoManicas 1989; Sayer 1984).

The concrete import and effects of causalmechanisms are always related to the opencomplex context in which they operate.whereby it becomes of central importancein social science to reconstruct he relevantsocial, temporal and spatial context, and tostudy - guided by concepts and theories -how certain causal mechanisms areexpressed in such a context, and further-more to compare the import and effectsof the mechanisms in different contexts.Empirical generalizations are always con-ditional, and dependent on how generallyoccurring he context in question is. It isbecause social contexts are so various, com-plex and changeable that it is difficult tomake exact predictions, not because of lackof causality.

Causal-explanatory research calls forquantitative and qualitative strategies thatare much more sensitive to complex andchangeable contexts than mainstream ari-able-oriented esearch cf. Lieberson 1985;Ragin 1987; Pawson 1988; Sayer 1984).8Instead of there being an attempt to emu-late the perfect quasi-experimental itua-tion by statistically controlling traditionalsociological variables (sex, age, income,etc.), research has to be directed towardsconstructing through deep knowledge ofcontexts - relevant objects of comparison,thereby creating a basis for counterfactualargument Pawson 1988; Sayer 1984).

Interpretive analysis and causal analysisappear here not as opposed but as inter-dependent Outhwaite 1987:60; Sayer 1984:

37. 104, 115). Hermeneutically orientedresearch practice has much o offer a contex-tualizing approach. It is a question of aprocess whereby we can constantly deepen,develop and revise our knowledge ofdifferent social contexts - which pre-supposes openness and sensitivity in theface of new aspects and meanings. Theinterpretation and understanding of themeaning with which persons invest differ-ent situations and actions becomes of cen-tral significance to causal explanations ofsocial actions. Variable-oriented/extensiveresearch characterized ythe study, understatistical control, of correlations betweena limited number of variables withunequivocal, unchangeable and predefinedproperties in the form of variable values) -provides important knowledge ofdescriptive general empirical correlations.Sayer (1984) emphasizes, however, thatknowledge regarding substantial internalrelations, regarding he meanings of socialproperties and regarding how these proper-ties change over time and in different con-texts, calls for more intensive comparativeresearch trategies. These strategies are ofcourse not new - quite the contrary (seee.g. Glaser & Strauss 1967; Layder 1982).Paradoxically nough, however, they havebeen developed and practised chiefly inresearch hat has not been directed owardscausal explanation.

4. Concluding remarksThe covering law theory (likewise the suc-cession theory) of causality has not beensuccessful when it comes to causal expla-nations of social actions (see e.g. Bhaskar1978a; Giddens 1984; Turner 1987). I havehere taken up what I regard as two fruitfulalternatives to this very influential notionof causality. The fact that the discussionwithin Scandinavian ocial science has beenstrongly influenced by the polarizationbetween positivism and hermeneutics hasmeant that such contributions haveremained n the background r have beeninterpreted in the light of polarizingperspective on understanding andexplanation.9 Hellenius (1990). for in-

stance. looks upon critical realism as anexpression of 'impure crossing' and an

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example of how 'the positivism debate' hasbeen 'muddied' pp. 36 and 68, translationmy own).

Some of the control components of thecontributions rom Weber and critical real-ism are set out - in such a way as to drawattention to similarities and differencesbetween them - in Table 1.

I think many social scientists oday wouldagree that social reality must n principle beregarded as a constantly changing complextotality made up of interwoven, and partlynon-observable, effective and affectedsocial properties and processes on differentlevels. Yet there is often a disregard ofthis in concrete causal-explanatory esearchpractice. Even though. for instance, themixing up of analysis of variations withcausal analysis has long been criticized, acrucial proportion of the work in socialscience directed owards ausal explanationstill has to do with precisely he productionof statistical correlations between observ-able and externally related phenomena(Lieberson 1985; Manicas 1989; Turner1987).

Weber and the critical realists show theway to a generative view of causality. Thecausal explanation of social action is to befound in social properties and meaningsoperating n different contexts, and in theprocesses whereby social phenomena areproduced out of pre-existing onditions, butnot in conjunction of events. They alsoshow the way to methodologies where con-textualization and conceptualization arecentral, indispensable and interrelatedparts of the search for causal explanations.It is at the same time in the view of conceptformation that we find the perhaps mostessential difference between Weber andcritical realism. With the latter comes amethodology geared to attempting touncover real existing structures and causalmechanisms by going behind what isdirectly observable, this through empiri-cally based abstraction and generation oftheory. In the Weberian methodology, onthe other hand, concept formation rep-resents idealizations, artificial construc-tions, whose purpose is to lead the way tothe discovery of causal relations between

concrete empirical and individual phenom-ena.

AcknowledgementsI am grateful o Mats Franzen. nd two anony-

mous referees. for commenting on earlier ver-sions of this article. I also thank Malcolm Forbes

for generous help with the language.

Received November 1991Final version accepted February 1992

Notes' Here I am consciously avoiding going into

the protracted and wide-ranging debate con-cerning he notion of causality held by the pos-itivists, and all the variants and modificationsthat have been set forth. I content myself nsteadwith formulating hese - as I see it - fundamentalstarting-points or the debate.

2Weber's writings concerning methodologywere prompted argely by the current first andforemost German debate on the subject Eliae-son 1990a); hey are polemical ssays rather hansystematic scientific-philosophical orks. andthey contain certain assertions and argumentsthat are neither consistent over time nor givenprecise definition and subjected to systematicdiscussion (Outhwaite 1983: Tenbruck 1980;Turner 1986). But what in the first place thecritical realists represent s precisely a scientific-philosophical current. one which was to befurther developed about 70 years ater n Britainand the USA.

- It goes without aying hat Weber and criticalrealism do not offer the only examples. Forinstance Ricoeur 1988). from within he frame-work of the hermeneutic radition, has criticizedfor example Dilthey and has argued for a dia-lectical perspective eliminating he dualism ofunderstanding/explanation. unge (1959) hasformulated ome important but not very influ-ential ontological and methodological tarting-points for a generative causal-explanatoryscience. first and foremost directed owards he

uncovering f the processes and causal powerswhereby hings n reality are produced.' The account below is chiefly based on three

works that are completely central in respect ofWeber's xplicit discussion f methodology: heessay Objectivity n Social Science and SocialPolicy, which came out in 1904: Roscher andKnies: The Logical Problems f Historical Econ-omics, which was published n parts during theperiod 1903-6 in Jahrbuch ar Gesetzgebung,Verwaltung nd Volkswirtschaft; nd the firstpart of Economy and Societv. which was areworking f the essay Uber einige Kalegoriender Verstehenden oziologie rom 1913. In orderto illustrate Weber's methodology n its appli-cation I also focus on The Protestant Ethic and

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Table 1. Weber and critical realism two contributtors o a causal-explanatorv ocial science.

Weber Critical realism

Ontological defini- Social reality as comprising n infinite Social reality as a complex changeabletion of the object of quantity of complex and manifold totality comprising causally activesocial science empirical phenomena properties of interaction

Culture-bound. ulture-creating nd The structuration f causal powers. ofvaluing ndividuals capacities or bringing bout change in

reality. The relation between socialstructure and conscious, intentionalactivities

Internal relations Internal relations

Causal explanation A generative view of causality A generative view of causality

Repudiation of the Humean defi- Repudiation f the Humean definitionnition of causality. and of 'covering of causality. and of 'covering law'law' theory. Causality as concrete theory. Causality as transactive ausalpartial relations powers and generative mechanismsCausal analysis ocusing primarily n Causality as a question of qualities/qualities/properties and substantial properties/effective owers. not of pat-relations terns of events formulated by way of

statistical orrelationsAbstraction. Conceptual dealism Conceptual realismcontextualization Theory and concept formation incl. Abstractions s properties n realityand generalization the ideal type) as artificial heuristic Concept formation and theory con-

aids n uncovering oncrete empirical struction as central goals of science inmeanings and relations this the goal themselvesof science)

Theories as related o - but not reduc-ible to - empirical reality

General regularities s an important Radical criticism f the succession he-aid in establishing causal explana- ory. Regularities say nothing abouttions causalityLaws as empirical generalizations Causal laws are abstractions fromthat can be means but not goal for reality and an important goal forscience science

Contextualizing pproach Contextualizing pproachScientific-historical Nominalism nfluenced by neo-Kan- Realism nfluenced ydialectical Marx-roots tianism ismNatural vs social Indicates both basic similarities and Anti-positivist aturalism. Criticism ofscience basic differences. Criticism of posi- positivism and the succession theory

tivism does not apply to natural applies to all sciencescience

Relationship Integrated in one and the same Integrated n one and the same causal-between causal-explanatory ocial science explanatory ocial scienceunderstanding,intentional xplana-tion and causality nsocial science

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the Spirit of Capitalism. the first part of whichcame out in 1904 i.e. the same year as the above-mentioned essay on objectivity). In addition heinterpretations f these works are set in relationto relevant secondary literature. For a pres-entation of Weber's writings on methodology.see e.g. Eliaeson (1982) and Hughes (1977).

1 According o Outhwaite 1975) Dilthey orig-inally employed an individualistic and psy-chological perspective. where the focus was onmental processes. but then moved increasinglyfurther away from this perspective n favour of(as Outhwaite puts it) 'the hermeneutic nter-pretation of cultural products and conceptualstructures' p. 26).

6 Oakes writes: It would be difficult o exag-gerate the extent to which Weber has been

misunderstood on this point. Weber's metho-dology - so the conventional scholarly wisdomgoes - rests upon a commitment to somemysterious, unobservable. unverifiable peciesof intuition r empathy which he sees as a reliablemethod for establishing onclusions and solvingproblems in sociocultural science' (Oakes1975:29). A tendency to such a dubious inter-pretation of the Verstehen methodology s to befound n Hughes & Mansson 1988). who regardVerstehen as: a form of analysis emphasisingempathetic understanding'. They write further:'Weber's methodology means quite simply that

the social scientist hould become involved n theacting ndividuals, nd through ntrospection ndempathy attempt to understand he contexts ofmeaning that serve as driving forces for theirindividual actions when they orient themselvesin respect of other individuals' pp. 141and 143.my translation).

' Critical realism is not in the first place atradition associated with a certain perspectiveregarding he old ontological and epistemologicaldiscussion about realism vs nominalism. but ischaracterized hiefly by its development of thegenerative view of causality n opposition o the

empiricist nd positivist concept of it (Outhwaite1987). This concept of causality implies at thesame time a realist ontology and epistemologybased on the conviction that science shall seekto uncover processes and mechanisms hat areactually existing but not directly observable.Regarding he debate within critical realism, eee.g. the discussion hat has been going on for twodecades in the Journal for the Theory of SocialBehaviour.

x Sayer (1984) argues for the importance ofthe intensive/qualitative methods in respect ofcausal-explanatory research, whilst Pawson(1988) has chiefly contributed to the dev-elopment of a more quantifying esearch, argelyinspired by critical realism.

' Critical ealism has or nstance been touchedupon only by a few social scientists n Sweden(Gullberg 1984: Karlsson et al. 1991). Finnishsocial scientists. on the other hand. have alsotaken part in the international discussion (seee.g. Patomaki 1991).

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