Cause or Control? The Temporal Dimension in Failure Sense-Making

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THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCEDecember 1999Cannon / FAILURE SENSE-MAKING

Cause or Control?

The Temporal Dimension in Failure Sense-Making

David R. CannonLondon Business School

Studiesof individual responseto failureoutcomes have focusedon thecognitiveprocess-

ing of proximal experiences. This study examines reactions to failure experiences

recalled from memory, employing a multimethod qualitative investigation of a diverse

sample of women and men from business, the arts, and athletics. Peoples memories of

negative outcomes were found to trigger strong emotions, affecting sense-making and

distorting reasoning. Interpreted from a personal control-avoidance theoretical frame-

work, results indicate that when time is factored in,the illusion of control over the future

proves a more compelling way of understanding our past failures than do evaluative

judgments.

The aim of this article is to illustrate a gap in our current thinking about how peoplemake sense of failure. Existing theory and empirical work have taught us a great deal

about the nature of individual response to negative outcomes. However, for the most

part, this understanding is limited to behaviors at or around the time a failure experi-

ence occurs, focusing on response to failing rather than reflection on failure. What

happens when people reexamine negative outcomes months or years after the event?

Which personal setbacks do people remember? Are response behaviors important

when a negative outcome occurs equally important later on? To address these and

related questions, the neglected factor of time needs to be considered.

Much of the research examining individual response to negative and positive out-

comes, including thebodiesof knowledgeon attribution, goal setting, and risk taking,

David R. Cannon is a research fell ow in organizational behavior at the London Business School, Sussex

Place, Regents Park, London.

THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, Vol. 35 No. 4, December 1999 416-438

1999 NTL Institute

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describe this mental link between past and present as a two-way street on which one

canmentallytravelback in time,alteringhistory tofit both present andfuture needs.

The Problem With Failure

Assuming that we occasionally reflect upon past negative outcomes, perhaps com-

pelled todoso ina meeting witha mentor, as part of a personal development course, or

in conversation about ones career with a partner or counselor, people remain surpris-

ingly unaware of how they have come to know what failure is.

Human concepts of failure are learned. On entering the world, babies have no con-

cept of failure or of success and, unlike adults, no fear of failing. On the contrary,

babies eagerly experiment withstrategies in play, learning through trial and error those

thingsthat work andthose that donot(De Geus, 1988).However, as Holt (1974)points

out in his bookHow Children Fail, it does not take long before children pick up the

message that the world puts value on right answers and that wrong answers and failedstrategies are for the most part socially unacceptable.

Childhood experiences of punishment (Kohlberg, 1964) form the foundation of an

individuals constructs of failure, which subsequently are reinforced through condi-

tioning, personality possibly influencing the type of conditioning to which a person is

most receptive. Failures link with the shame and guilt we first learned to associate

with being a bad child gives it a powerful emotional sting (Erikson, 1950; Tangney,

1995). As a result, common setbacks experienced as adults, such as failing to succeed

at a job interview, have the potential power to call ones whole self-worth into ques-

tion. School and later organizational life reinforce and modify peoples adopted con-

structs of what constitutes good and bad performances (Tsui & Ashford, 1994). As

adults, we mayescape punishment by parents andschoolteachers; however, we remain

quite capable of punishing ourselves, likely in the manner that we have been taught

(Bergner, 1995).Assuming people learn different punishment lessons, it follows that one persons

concept of what it is to do badly differs from that held by another. This creates a

dilemma for the researcher trying to compare like phenomena while at the same time

appreciating the limitations that can result from imposing a definition on a personal

construction. If failure concepts are established primarily through emotional condi-

tioning (Schein, 1993), the researcher is faced with the added problem that people

may know what a failure is (i.e., can feel the anxiety it triggers) yet possess no clear

language definition forit. Because of thesocially andpersonally constructed natureof

failure, the distortions inherent in reconstructing the past, and the absence of a clear

and commonly accepted definition, an idiographic approach was deemed more suit-

able for this exploratory study than nomothetic research.

Failure as an Adaptive Reaction

The central argument of this article is that the failures people remember, although

likely different in nature, serve the same adaptive purpose, activating a universal

418 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE December 1999



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biogenetic affectivereaction that wasestablishedvery early inhuman history. This is a

view of failure from the neuroscientific and evolutionary psychological perspective(Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Nicholson, 1997) in which response to failure

and success are asymmetrical.

At thetimewhen the human brain was evolvingmostrapidly, consequenceof fail-

ure was exceedingly high, often meaning death. It is thought the brain, to quickly

identify and hence avoid potentially life-threatening danger, developed ways to

instantly and vividly access memories of anxiety-arousing experiences (LeDoux,

1993) in case a similar situation arose again. Memory researchers (Bogen, 1975;

Brown & Kulik, 1977; Conway, 1990) and neuroscientists (Damasio, 1994;

LeDoux, 1993) hold the view that memories impinging on the durability of the self

are recalled through an emotion-based memory system linked with the limbic brain

(Zajonc, 1980).

Experimental research shows a neural link between theamygdala,a part of the lim-

bic brain, and theneo-cortex (LeDoux, 1993). This link acts as an affective alarm sys-tem commonly known as the fight-or-flight response. Although the fight side of this

reaction is associated with theemotion of anger, Zillman (1993)foundthat individuals

first experience a sense of being endangered that triggers anger regardless of whether

theperson fights or takes flight. Anger is themost effectiveemotion in terms of releas-

ing adrenal and body chemicals, evoking a state of high energy and readiness. The

strongemotions aroused in early manandwoman by unexpected events enhanced and

sustained alertness, and this alertness improved their odds of survival. Although

present-day failure is more likely an experience that threatens self-esteem, ego, and

self-concept (Kernis, Brockner, & Frankel, 1989; D. T. Miller, 1976; Nicholls, 1984)

rather than an event that threatens possible death, we may still react as if it could be

mortal. At its roots, response to threatening failure is essentially a survival response

and perhaps one of the earliest forms of human emotional intelligence (Goleman,

1995; Salovey & Mayer, 1990).

Theaimof this study is toexamine thenegativeevents peoplerecall andto compare

the quality of after-the-fact distal responses with proximal responses found to be sali-

ent in prior research to determine if they are in any way different. Causal attribution

(Weiner, 1974, 1985) and self-regulation (Bandura, 1991) behaviors were obvious

candidates forsucha proximal-distalcomparison, as thesearetwo core theoriesof out-

come sense-making that have been extensively studied.

Attributional Sense-Making

Weiner (1974, 1985; Wong & Weiner, 1981) argues that when an outcome occurs,

such as failure, an individual will want to think about why it happened. This presump-

tion is central to attribution theory, although Weiner states that the search for cause is

not indiscriminately displayed in all situations but is most evident where the outcome

is unexpected and important and where a desire remains unfulfilled.

Causal reasoning or attribution, terms used interchangeably by the theory, identi-

fies three underlying dimensions of causality: locus, stability, and controllability.

Cannon / FAILURE SENSE-MAKING 419



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Locus refers to the location of a cause, whether it is perceived as internal or external to

the actor. Stability relates to temporal duration, whether the cause is perceived tochangefrom periodto period. Controllability is thedegree to which cause is perceived

as potentially controllable. Response to recollected failure maybe influenced by these

dimensions, in particular whether onesees thecause of a failure as outside or insideof

oneself.

Self-Regulating Behavior

Self-regulation theory proposes that individuals exert self-control through a

closed-loop process, first setting a goal and then monitoring their behavior to observe

compliance with and deviation from the goal, making necessary adjustments in per-

formance (Bandura, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Kanfer & Hagerman, 1981; E. A.

Locke & Latham, 1990).

Banduras theory of self-regulation, a focus of this article, is based on the behav-ioral model of motivation that emphasizes therole of self-rewardandself-punishment

that follows behavior. Strict behaviorism dictates that stimuli can only be external;

however, Bandura argues that individuals can control the stimuli in a self-motivating

process. In this process, negative self-reaction is the label given to a self-critical

response triggered by the individuals perceived failure to attain progress toward a

goal.

Participation Versus Recollection

There are converging features in Banduras and Weiners approaches. Both place

cognitionearly on in theprocess of sense-making, with the individual makingevalua-

tive judgments about the nature of an outcome. In these established theories and in

others that focus on at the time outcomes, incoming information about ones per-formance is new, first-time information that triggers first-time judgments. However,

Schank and Abelson (1977) found that when events are accessed from long-term

memory, they maybe recalled with prior judgments that arestoredas part of the recol-

lection. In assessing these past experiences, the incoming information is likely a tan-

gled mix of new information (i.e., a mental reexperience of the failure) and old

responses either generated at the time of the event or added in subsequent reviews

(Moser, 1992).

An important distinction between participating in an event and recollecting an

eventconcerns therole of goals.Ongoing assessment of progress toward a goal is cen-

tral to Banduras portrayal of self-regulation. However, with recollection, the individ-

ualno longerhasa specific goal directly related to theoutcome of an eventbecause the

event is over, the outcome having been determined. With the passage of time, another

type of goal may come into play, a higher level goal, more global than event specific.The most promising candidate for such a metagoal, pointed to by both attribution and

self-regulation theorists, is the adaptive goal of preventing the reoccurrence of a simi-

lar negative experience.




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METHOD

Procedure

To understandin-depth howindividuals makesense of realand significant personal

experiences fromtheir past, the researcher chosean inductive andexploratory method.

Clinical case interviews plus a battery of measures were applied in a two-phase study

of a diverse sample of 42men and women who wereasked to remember setbacks from

their work and personal lives and to talk about them at length. It was intended that

minimal cues and instructions would encourage participants to use their own con-

structs rather than those of the researcher when thinking about and discussing past

experiences.

In Phase 1 of the study, 28 individuals from business, the arts, and athletics were

asked to recall two setbacks from the past and then answer a series of questions prob-

ing their feelings about the experiences, why they happened, their goals and expecta-tions, and subsequent learning. It was reasoned that variance in response might solely

be due to the content of what was being remembered, that is, the nature of the memory

determining the nature of the response. Phase 2 was designed to control for this factor

byhavinga sampleof 14accountant trainees focus ona recentfailureevent commonto

themallthe failure of theirsenior-level professional examinations.An identicalpro-

tocol was followed in both phases of the study, though the accountants were asked to

review only one experience. Seventy failure narratives (56 from Phase 1, 14 from

Phase 2) were collected, at which point interviewing was concluded as patterns of

interpretive behavior emerging from the first 50 narratives (from both phases of the

study) were replicated in the 20 narratives that followed (Yin, 1994).

The author conducted all the interviews. They lasted 2 to 3 hours and took place in

either the persons home, the office of the author, or in a private room at the persons

work location.To minimizecueing, peoplewere told that thestudywasfor research onhow people learn from experience. It was also made clear that their identities would

be disguised in any published results.

Following a brief informal conversation to help put them at ease, each participant

was asked to tell a story of a past setback, Phase 1 participants choosing their own rec-

ollections andPhase2 participantsbeingaskedto focus on their professionalexamina-

tion experience.Individuals told their stories uninterrupted, andthis wasfollowedby a

discussion in which the researcher probed to gain a clear and full picture of the event.

Each person was then asked an identical list of questions designed to explore theory-

based items, including feelings about the experience, why it happened, goals and

expectations, the involvement and influence of others, subsequent learning, effect on

behavior, and memory rehearsal patterns. Phase 1 participants repeated this protocol

twice as a result of being asked to tell two stories.

Russell (1982) and others have found that interviewers often inaccurately assess

subject assignment of attribution. To minimize this problem, participants were first

asked to explain why the failure had occurred, and then immediately afterward, they

were asked to complete the Causal Dimension Scale (Russell, 1982). Russells




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instrument claims to be an objective gauge of thenatureof thecause, examining locus

of causality (internal/external), perceived stability of cause over time, and perceivedcontrollability of cause.

At theconclusionof theinterview, peoplewereasked to take awayandcomplete, on

their own time, a locus-of-control instrument (Levenson & Miller, 1976). The Leven-

son Locus of Control Scale measures the generalized expectancy that events are con-

tingent on ones own behavior or determined by others or by chance. This is a similar

instrument to the more widely known Rotter (1966) Internal-External Control Scale

but includes twoclasses of external cause: powerfulothersand chance. The reasoning

behind this is that people who believe the world is unordered (chance) behave and

think differently from people who believe the world is ordered and that powerful oth-

ers are in control. The Levenson instrument attempts to gauge a stable tendency in

people, differing from the Russell scale, which is situation specific. Both scales were

used in their original form as found in the above cited publications.

Verbatim interview notes were taken throughout the interview, and each case waswritten up in detail immediately afterward. Eight interviews were tape-recorded and

checked by theresearcher andan independent assessor against thefield notes toensure

cases were being accurately documented. Once it was determined that the verbatim

interview notes contained few, if any, gaps, tape-recording wasceased, as participants

expressed embarrassment at having their expressions of emotion recorded on tape

(e.g., crying, anger, profanity).

By conventional criteria, there are obvious limitations to this approach. First, just

because someone recalls a past experience when asked to do so does notmean that that

person would reflect upon this event in the absence of an interviewer. Disclosure can

elicit a form of self-presentation bias in subjects selective communication (Blum-

stein, 1991). Second, how a person talks about an experience does not demonstrate

how that person would cognitively process it in private; it only provides evidence of

how peopletalkabout theseexperienceswithanother person, in this case,a researcher.

Although we cannotdirectly know what peoplethink, it is possible to argue that if a

particular recollection is readily volunteered by a participant, with minimal question-

ing, then it may be considered an accessible memory and hence available to the indi-

vidual if he or she should choose to think about it. In this vein, Diener and Dweck

(1978) and Wong and Weiner (1981) contend that talking is a reasonable reflection of

what an individual is thinking at thetime.This is impossible toprove; however, talking

is an observable behavior and reflection is not.

Memory-Eliciting Question

The failure experiences people recall depend on the nature of the question being

asked.In Phase2, theaccountant traineeswere asked tofocus on their recentexamfail-

ure througha questiondesigned tominimizedefensiveness: I am interestedin hearing

your storyabout your resulton therecent accounting exams. Canyou tell meabout it?

In Phase 1 of the study, where participants chose their own failure memories, con-

struction of a question to elicit comparable memories proved more challenging.

Because of the socially constructive nature of failure, there is no clear or widely




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accepted definition. A pilot study was conducted to field test a variety of possible

memory-eliciting questions on a sample of 18 people from business, the arts, and ath-letics. Defensivenesswas frequently encountered whenever the wordfailure wasused

(i.e., Tellme about a past failure). This encouraged theadoptionof a more tangential

approach, allowing peoples sense-making to emerge spontaneously (or not at all)

from more neutrally defined stimuli. Through numerous trials, a memory-eliciting

question was crafted and a final version arrived at: Tell me the story of a situation in

which you participated that did not turn out the way you hoped.

This simple question proved effective in generating a rich variety of failure narra-

tives (seeTable1).To assure comparability, fourcriteriawereestablished to select nar-

ratives for inclusion in Phase 1 of the study. Narratives had to (a) be reasonably

accessible from memory, that is, recalled within 5 minutes without the aid of addi-

tional questioning; (b) imply a form of judgment, that is, an event that had not turned

out as hoped; (c) have some element of agency (even if minor); that is, situations in

which people saw themselves as total victims were excluded; and (d) be deemed sig-nificant in their own view. When trivial events (e.g., My car failed to start on the first

try) were recalledthis occurred twicethese were discussedwith the individual to

see if they held some deeper significance, and if not, they were rejected.

Effort wasmade tokeep theselection criteria invisible to theparticipants, with each

story assessed as it was recounted to see if the criteria were met. When there appeared

to be a problem with one or more criteria, the researcher asked questions to gauge if

some level of the criteria existed. If a narrative did not meet the established criteria, a

suitable moment was found (sometimes at the end of the story) to ask the person for

another memory. There were only six occasions when this was necessary.

Participants

Given thesmall size, sampleselectionwascritical. Theaimwas to access individu-als from differing contexts and to observe them reflecting on diverse (Phase 1) and

similar (Phase 2) past failures in order to see if replicating patterns emerged from the

sense-making narratives. Given the socially constructed nature of failure, it was

deemed important to collect stories from people with different sets of life experiences

reflecting a wide range of perspectives.

Phase 1 Sample

An obvious way to ensure sample diversity was to choose people from a range of

occupations. A target list of occupations was drawn up to control for selection bias,

with three categories of occupation targeted: people working in the field of commer-

cial business, people in the professions, and people making their livings from artistic

andathletic pursuits.A novel aspectof this study is theinclusion of artists andathletes,groups ignored by prior research focusing primarily on samples of businesspeople or

university students.Cases were selected to maximize diversity of function andcontext

(i.e., small andlarge businesses,different industry sectors and roles)and to ensurefair

representation of gender and age range. Participants were accessed in three ways:




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1. Associations, professional bodies, and cultural institutions. For example, the

competitive swimmer in the samplewas accessed through theBritish Amateur Swim-ming Association. Cooperating organizations were informed of the sample criteria.

Thepeoplenominated were then contacted andprescreened by telephone to confirm

ageand genderand to assure that theyhadbeenworking in their fields forlonger than

2 years and that they were willing to give 2 hours of uninterrupted time to be

interviewed.

2. Personal networks. Colleagues and acquaintances of the researcher were asked

to nominate peoplewho worked in the target occupations, and these were followed up

by telephone. The actor in the sample was found through a contact who runs a com-

pany in the advertising business that employs actors. Given that the researcher was

operating within a middle-class segment of society from a business education base, it

is likely these nominees reflected a bias in favor of managerial, professional, and suc-

cessful people. With the exception of three people whom the researcher had brieflymet through colleagues prior to the research, all other participants were complete

strangers.

3. Cold calls. The priest in the sample was selected as a result of a direct call to the

London diocese, and the golf professional was accessed through a cold call to a local

school of golf instruction. These contacts were selected at random from the telephone

directory based on the occupation targets.

Each mode of access was pursued simultaneously, with potential participants fit-

ting theestablishedcriteria followedup as they were located, giving thesamplean ele-

ment of randomness due to the way it was accessed. A third of those approached

declined to participate. Twenty-two participants in Phase 1 were U.K. nationals; the

remainder included twoAmericans, oneSwiss,oneCanadian, oneSouth African, and

one New Zealander. There were 10 females and 18 males. Occupations represented in

the Phase 1 sampleare shown inTable1, which also indicates the natureof the failures

the participants recalled when interviewed.

Phase 2 Sample

All of the 14 accountant trainees who participated inPhase 2 of the study had failed

their senior-level accounting exams, 12 having failed outright and 2 having partially

failed. In contrast to Phase 1, the aim of sampling in Phase 2 was to access individuals

at the same level in a single occupation, all reflecting upon the same known failure.

Lack of success on the exams means possible unemployment, repeating training

courses,delayed promotion, financial costs, andalsoconsiderable lossof status.These

consequences make the event a significant failure for the aspirants. Ten of the 14

accountants in the study spontaneously reported their exam results to be the biggest

failure of their lives. The researcher worked with five cooperating firms to assure that

there was a balance of gender and a mix of backgrounds. Itwas hoped thatby choosing

participants from a variety of firms that the impact of organizationally specific




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influences (e.g., colleaguesreactions) would be minimized. Seven menand 7 women

accountants took part (ages 24 to27), each being interviewed3 monthsafterhearing oftheir failure.

Individualsparticipated in Phase 1 and2 as volunteers, andno onewascoerced into

participation by their employers or told who else was being interviewed. Contacts

were instructed to inform nominees that the study focused on how people learn from

experience. While Phase 2 participants were not told they were selected because they

had failed their accounting exams, there was no way of assuring they did not reason

this out for themselves. It was made clear to participants and employers that informa-

tion in any subsequent presentation to employers would in no way compromise indi-

vidual confidentiality.

RESULTS

What Do People Remember?

In response to thememory-eliciting question,peoplerecalled a varied collection of

failure experiences (see Table 1). Thirty-six of the 56 narratives (2 per participant) in

the Phase 1 sample concerned events that were part of peoples work or professional

life, whereas 20 can be categorized as non-work-related. Forty-four stories were task

related, and12 focused onrelationships between people. Therewere 13privatestories,

events known only to the person and close intimates, and 43 public stories, events

known toa wider audience.Of the56 recalled events inPhase 1, 15 hadoccurredfewer

than 6 months prior, 27 had occurred between 6 months to 3 years prior, and 14 were

more than 3 years old. The dominant pattern in Phase 1 was for each person to tell fail-

ure stories from different periods of his or her life.

Despite thevariety of events recollected, reactions to remembering them had com-mon features that were unrelated to the nature of the events. In other words, their phe-

nomenological status for the respondent bears no obvious relationship to surface

content. A numberof generalizationscan be drawn from analysis of theinterview tran-

scriptions and the researchers firsthand observations.

1. Memories of failure are accessible. Given the direct nature of the question asked

to the Phase 2 accountant trainees, it was unsurprising to discover that the memory of

the event was highly accessible. In the words of many of the accountants, it weighed

heavy on their minds. More credible evidence of the accessibility of discrete failure

events comes from the Phase 1 sample. Eighteen of the 28 participants were able to

recall their first failure memories within10 to 15 seconds of hearing theelicitingques-

tion, another 7 taking 1 to 2 minutes. Response times were similar for the second fail-

ure recollection.

2. Memories of failure are vivid. Withfew exceptions, thememories of failure were

rich in descriptive detail. The average length of time taken to tell a story unprompted

byfurther questioningwas20 minutes.Twenty-twoof the56 narratives inPhase1 took




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TABLE 1

Reported FailuresPhase 1 Sample

Lawyer, Rupert T. court case lost as a result of being misled by client

City law firm unable to sell his house to a colleague

Derivatives trader, Liz C. made mistake and found guilty of trading infraction

Investment bank failed to realize her husband was bankrupt

Team leader, Adam L. lost 1,000,000 in trading deal involving colleague

Investment bank not making it home the Christmas his father died

Airline pilot, Mark M. damaged 747 airliner in crash landing at Heathrow

International carrier misjudged contractor and lost money

Research scientist, Joan G. unable to select graduate assistant from candidates

Genetics laboratory failed to secure a prestigious research grant

Electrician, Trevor S. childhood memory of losing kite at the beach

Major contractor made mistake on job that caused serious delays

Opera singer, Barbara F. lost role to younger singer with less experience

inability to complete project for education course

Osteopath, Nigel W. failed to help patient who was experiencing pain

inability to resolve relationship with alcoholic father

Planning manager, George N. team he coached lost important tournament

Technology manufacturer failed at finding new job in Hong Kong

Personnel manager, Sabine H. important meeting she planned did not succeed

International accounting firm failure of relationship with boyfriend

Sales manager, Susanne M. mismanaged mortgage arrangements for new house

Package goods company unsuccessful in closing important client deal

Plant manager/engineer, Alan underperformed at a job interviewManufacturing firm failed to implement plan to turn around plant

Aerobics instructor, Lee B. unable to deal with emotional incident in a class

made a career choice that did not work out

Actor, David M. walked away from big part due to lack of confidence

relationship with brother failed to meet expectations

Ballet dancer, Elena D. rejected for dancing role by close colleague

strategy failed to secure childs schooling

Police detective, John J. unable to convict case he had arrested

London Metropolitan Police failed to live up to his capabilities as an athlete

Fashion designer, Christine T. business partnership with sister-in-law collapsed

failed to fit into art college she attended

Chartered accountant, James E. trusted partner who damaged his reputationInternational accounting firm only person on team to lose golf tournament

Retail store manager, Sherry F. unable to convince management team of issue

International retailer failed to cope with prestigious foreign job assignment



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more than 40 minutes to recount. Level of clarity and detail in the collection of stories

was uniformly high and exceptionally high among the exam-failing accountants.

Many participantswere able to recount minute details related to their failureexperi-

ences, such as specific locations and times and verbatim reports of conversationswith other actors in the events. When asked to describe what they had done the day

before or after the event or to recall what was going on during that same week, most

people had only a vague recollection or no recall at all of what else happened around

the time of the event.

3. Memories of failure are memories of being surprised. In 65 of the 70 recollec-

tions of failure, people reported that the event came as a big surprise to them. Four

negative outcomes were reported as only mildlysurprising, andonly onememorywas

deemed unsurprising. People said they were surprised at what had happened and sur-

prised about the behavior of other people because It didnt make sense to me.

On learning at the courtroom door that a client had lied to him, Rupert T., the law-

yer, exclaimed I was in total disbelief. A memoryof an athletic failure from decades

past recalled by police detective John J. still captures his strong sense of surprise. Iwas really pissed off about itwell even before that I felt disbelief. I felt certain I had

won the race. . . . I was surprised! I couldnt believe it.

4. Memories of failure are painful. Twelve of the 28 people in the Phase 1 sample

became tearful during the interview, as did 5 of the 14 accountants in Phase 2. This


TABLE 1 Continued

Golf professional, Richard P. unable to get insurance for car due to violation

played poorly at tournament and was eliminated

Schoolteacher, Tony C. trip to United States with friends was disappointing

unsuccessful in engaging his students in project

Movie producer, Charles L. failed project due to relations with business partner

underestimated ill wifes reaction to his absence

Olympic swimmer, Bart W. new training strategy failed to produce results

bad training session due to lack of self-discipline

Medical doctor, Claire M. unable to get the job she wanted

man she was interested in was not interested in her

Entrepreneur, Robert C. partnership and friendship collapsed

Design company after 5 years has not yet finished renovating house

Artist/painter, Gary H. failed to follow up lead for steady work

unable to convince gallery partner to show his work

Financial manager, Sophie R. two volunteers quit a charity she managed

National heath service conflict with colleague at work endangered a project

Priest , Paul G. failed to turn around a homeless boy he had helped

Church of England misread familys reaction to funeral plans



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included men and women. As past disappointments were reviewed, faces contorted,

voices cracked, and bodies shifted nervously in their seats. David M., the actor, andCharles L., the television producer, paced the floor during the last part of their inter-

views.Manyparticipantstold their stories staring off into space, rarelyreturning toeye

contact with the researcher. The intensity of expressed emotion surrounding these

memories was strong. I hurt and smart over this, said Robert C., entrepreneur, on

breakingupwith hisbusiness partner. Iwasfurious.I wasreadyto resign. I wasgutted

that a private memo had been shown to the client. I thought this was a shambles, said

James E., charteredaccountant, on learning that a memo critical of theclient hadbeen

leaked. I felt like hitting him, said Paul G., priest, on being disappointed by a rent-

boy he had helped get off the streets.

Among 95 reports of feelings, with most participants reporting 2 reactions, anger

(46 reports) and sadness (31 reports) were thepredominant emotions. Other reactions

included shame andanxiety. This confirms anger as theemotion most frequently asso-

ciated with threatening events (Zillman, 1993) and vivid memories (Nasby & Yando,1982).Ortony, Clore,andCollins (1988)distinguishbetween emotions that reflect the

impact of current events and emotions that reflect the future implications of events.

Beneath the current state of events of anger and sadness found in this study may lie the

deeper anticipatory state emotion of fear (Roseman, 1984; Stein & Levine, 1987).

Several participants, while recounting one failure story, involuntarily remembered

another event. These pop-up memories, which people claimed to never think about or

to have forgotten, caught them by surprise. The most intriguing instance of this was

Sherry F., the retail store manager. At the end of her story recounting how she had

failed to cope with a new job in Brussels, described as the most painful thing that has

happened in my life, Sherrysuddenly blurted out that shehad been held at knifepoint

as a hostage in a store robbery. The robbery event and the Brussels job were separated

by a period of 2 years. Visibly shaken and embarrassed by the strong emotion evoked

as a result of the unexpected memory popping into my head, she reported to have

totally blocked the robbery from her mind until that moment.

Connections between memories were found in experiments conducted by Reiser,

Black, and Abelson (1985), suggesting that long-term memories arenot stored as dis-

crete events but are organized in terms of contexts linking one to another. This line of

reasoning provides a possible explanation for why participants in this study were

able to recall comparable failure events with minimal guidance, adding further sup-

port to theBrown and Kulik (1977) argument thatmemories of experiences threaten-

ing the self are likely a category of memories accessed through an affect-based

neural system.

5. Memories of failure are memories of eventspeople want to prevent. When begin-

ning to research this topic, it was reasoned that peoples responses to recollected fail-

ures would be influenced by their perceptions of unattained goals. Prior work shows

type of goal and level of goal difficulty as important factors in processing outcomes.

Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), control theory (Carver & Scheier, 1981), and self-

regulation theory (Bandura, 1991; Kanfer & Hagerman, 1981) emphasize the impor-

tance of goals and expectations in relationship to success and failure. In all of these




14/23

theories, the goal acts as a standard allowing the individual to determine if he or she is

failing and how much needs to be done to achieve the hoped-for result.Recallof goals wasaccessedin both phasesof this studyby notingany spontaneous

references togoals in thenarratives. Aftereach story, participantswereaskeda number

of goal-related questionsWhat were you trying to achieve? What were your

expectations at the time? Did these goals influence the way things went? Surpris-

ingly, most people had difficulty describing what their goals were at the time of the

failure. Despite thevivid anddetailednature of thenarratives, many participantshad to

stop and take time to think about what it was they were trying to accomplish. Several

said in a confused tone, Isnt it obvious? suggesting that the goal was self-evident.

The most commonresponse wasa rationally simplistic goal, low on detail, such as the

following: To win the case and get costs, I wanted to get the job, My goal was to

land safely, and Make money. As might be expected, every participant in Phase 2

said their goal was to pass the accounting exam. Rarely did individuals use event-

related goals or expectations to explain thenegative outcome. This makes sense in thecase of past experience given that the attainment of event-related goals is no longer a

possibility, the event being over.

However, almostallof theparticipants in this study did identify a goal in thecourse

of telling their stories, thegoal of preventing a similar painful event from ever happen-

ing again. This present-timegoal (directed at the future) was expressed in direct state-

ments and implied in statements made about the utility of reviewing failures. Failure

prevention goals were found in 52 of the 56 narratives in Phase l and in all of the

accountant trainee accounts. This supports Stein and Levines (1987) argument that

negative memories tend to remind people of the circumstances they wish to avoid in

thefutureandadds to a host of studies that show that peoples memories help establish

their goals (Singer & Salovey, 1993; Trabasso & Stein, 1994).

6. Memories of failure are self-critical. Langer (1983) argues that the need for con-trol or the illusion of control is so important a factor in human life that it is experi-

enced even in situations that clearly appear to be chance-determined (p. 24). Despite

the slim chance of preventing the repetition of such setbacks as not being chosen after

an audition or job interview, a relationship souring, or a less-than-profitable financial

decision, participants statements suggest that they are highly motivated to do so.

A possiblepreconditionof believing onehas control over a particular futureevent is

the belief that one had somecontrol over this type of event in the past. This means tak-

ing on a degree of responsibility or blame for the past setback even when that setback

clearly appears to be theresultof chanceor theaction of others. On firstconsideration,

this may seem illogical. However, the narratives reveal numerous examples of the

unusual lengths towhich individualsgo to restore thebeliefthat they hadsome control

over past failure events, with people stating that they shouldhave been able to read the

minds of others, predict the behavior of people they do not know, and have prior

knowledge of when people are going to die. Given the anxiety associated with failure

recollections,perhaps facing the possibility that one lacks sufficient control to prevent

the recurrence of a similar hurtful event is simply too much for most people to bear,

hence the distorted logic.




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Stone and Stone (1993) and Beck (1976) found that significant failures and set-

backs tend to trigger particularly severe bouts of self-criticism. Self-critical commentwas found in everynarrative inPhases 1 and 2, withone exception, an accountant who

attributed his failure to being distracted by noise when writing his exam. There was

frequent evidenceof participants castigating themselves for failure that was expressed

in derogatory self-labeling and negative self-judgment. What a fool I was, said

Barbara F., opera singer. I was stupidyou hear all the stories and yet you are still

taken in, said Mark M., pilot. You dont wantto be anass but by trying not tobe you

end up being one, said Richard P., golf professional. I could have done a better

jobbut I always think that when something turns out negatively, said Joan G.,

research scientist.

Although people used various self-criticisms within and between their stories, an

examination of the interview data to understand better the nature of self-critical

response revealed three distinctive response patterns, as reported in Cannon and

Nicholson (1997).

DISCUSSION

Perceptual Control Interpretation of Failure Recollection

The evidence from this study suggests that individuals reflecting on past failures

are primarily motivated by the need to reduce anxiety resulting from review of the

painful events. As participants talked about what they had learned from their setbacks

and how this could be used to prevent the occurrence of similar events in the future, a

reduction in anxiety was visible in facial expressions, body movements, and voice

quality. People appeared to be making themselves feel better by making sense of the

experiences in a manner that enhanced their perceived mastery over the future.Self-criticism typically is thought to be an anxiety-raising behavior. However,

when makingsense of past failure, self-criticism appears tobe a necessarymiddle step

in a three-step interpretive sequence employed by almost all the participants in this

study. The first step, triggered by the stimulus question, was the recall of a failure mem-

ory and the strong negative emotions associated with it. This affective response, most

often anger or sadness, was followed by a self-critical reaction that appears to act as a

source of negative motivation, a stick used by participants to make themselves

learn. Thelast step andoverall goalof theprocesswaspreventionthroughlearning, with

adaptive strategies being developed to minimize the possibility of future occurrence.

Grays (1987) argument that different motivational systems are associated with

positive and negative outcomes lends support to this interpretation. When individuals

anticipate or fear an aversive outcome (i.e., possible reoccurrenceof a similar failure),

they try to avoidor reduce itsnegativity through a behavioral inhibition systemin con-

trast to a behavioral approach system oriented toward positive outcomes.

This three-step interpretive sequence likely varies by individual rather than being a

straightforward linear process. For example, negative affect and self-critical response




16/23

may occur simultaneously when self-criticism evoked in prior memory rehearsals is

imported into theprocess as part of therevised recollection. Reviews of a failure expe-rience may act to diminish the pain associated with it, the failure becoming resolved

over time and incorporated as a form of learning/adjustment with the strong emotions

stripped away. Zukier (1986) argues that narrative explanations offer respondents

flexibility because they require only internal validity. Storytelling allows for the

accommodation of contradictions and discontinuities, like thosefoundin the distorted

reasoning of participants in this study, and may partially explain peoples preference

for describing their failures in a narrative even when responding to questions that did

not ask for one (as tested in the pilot study).

An alternative explanation to the motivational viewpoint is the argument that peo-

ples interpretations of past setbacks are primarily post hoc rationalizations (Freud,

1917/1953; D. Locke & Pennington, 1982). To reduce anxiety, the individual inter-

prets the failure experience in a manner that makes it appear reasonable and accept-

able, explaining away theassociated anxiety through a form of justification. It is likelythat the individual interpretations examined here are in part a rationalization of the

past; however, almost all participants clearly had their eyes on the future, particularly

on future prevention. For them, interpreting the past served primarily a future need,

driven by the present need to feel safe by feeling more in control. This supports the

motivational view and adds credence to the notion that certain types of memories

remain vivid and accessible in a memory system originally evolved to keep us safe

from future danger.

Self-Regulation or Attribution?

Attribution and self-regulation theories differ in their treatment of sense-making:

Attribution theory takes a cognitive perspective on the past (seeking consistent sense-

making by reasoningabout causes); self-regulation theory takes a motivational stancetoward the future (energizing sense-making toward future goals). This exploratory

study offers more support for the latter than the former.

Logic suggests that individuals who are highly self-critical when describing an

eventare likelyto assigncause to internal (i.e., themselves)rather than externalfactors

(i.e., chance, others). Surprisingly, no such association was found. Instead of uni-

formlyhigh internal scores on theRussell locus of causality scale, results were evenly

spread across a range of 3 to 26 (minimum possible score 3, maximum possible score

27, the higher the score the more internal the cause is perceived to be). A closer look at

the narratives underscores this counterintuitive finding.

Ballet dancer Elena D. is a Catholic who describes her lack of success in trying to

getherdaughter into a Churchof England schoolby attendingthechurchandpetition-

ing the local vicar.

I havedone this wrong.Its like I have been dancing inanothers theatre.I couldhavedonethisat the

Catholicchurch andgotmy daughterintotheir school. I wasplayingintwo courtsandlying inboth. I

wasmisrepresenting myselfand didnot want it to happenthis way. I suspect in theend I went to the

wrongchurch.I shouldhave stayedwiththe Catholic churchand confessedmy wayward ways andI




17/23

(my daughter) would have got in. I should have made her father go to church. Im not forceful

enough! I should have remained a Catholic and stuck with what I knew.

The many shoulds used by Elena in her explanation and the emotion she

expressed in telling it suggest strong self-criticism, yet minutes afterward, she scored

11out ofa maximum of 27on the Russell scale (high score = internallocus, low score =

external locus, median = 15.14 for Phase 1 sample).

Mark M., a pilot who flies jumbo jets to destinations around the world for an inter-

national airline, tells his story of a crash landing in which no one was hurt but serious

damage was done to the plane.

I felt embarrassed that it happened. There are 200 or more people behind you that you have just

depositedon thegroundin a most unfriendlymanner andalsoembarrassedin frontof thecabin crew.

This reflected on my competence. I thought Oh dear I have damaged a company plane. I immedi-

atelybeganthinking Did I do itcorrectly?and ranscenarios through my head of how I might have

handled it.

As Mark continues his story, he becomes increasingly nervous and agitated.

Thetwo captains that camein after me told me notto worryabout anythingtoldme that I haddone

allthe correct things. When I gothomeI wastiredand worried aboutwhat wasgoing tohappen even

thoughI knew what wasgoingto happen. I kept fluctuating between I didthe right thingand the

worse scenario. You can worry yourself to death.

On the day of the inquiry reviewing the accident, there was good news. The trace

reports in the flight recorder had been examined by the experts, and their verdict was

an exceptionally well flown approach under difficult circumstances. Despite this

positive outcome, Mark continues anxiously to question whether he had missed

anything anddonesomethingwrong throughout the research interviewconducted

2 years after the event. One could infer from this ongoing worry and agitation that he

sees himself as thecauseof thecrash. However, this is notthe case. Marks resulton the

Russell Causal Dimension Scale was the clearest external score reported in the study

(3outof 27,3 being theminimum score). Inhisown words,It wasbasically causedby

the wind. This illuminates the subtle difference between attributionWhat caused

it?and negative self-reactionHow could I have prevented it?

There were also numerous examples in thecollection of narratives in which weaker

self-criticismwas accompanied by internal attribution scores, underscoring theappar-

ent disconnection between self-critical and attributional behavior. To further explore

this disconnection, the researcher, using the interview transcripts, chose what he

judged to be the 12 narratives in the collection that expressed the strongest level of

expressed self-criticism and the 12 he judged to express the lowest level of self-

criticism. An independent rater also reviewed the interview notes, assessing level ofself-criticism with an interrater reliability for the high and low partition of .71. Mis-

matches were discussed, and a final list was agreed on. Causal attribution scores were

found to be spread across both partitions with no pattern of meaningful association




18/23

detected (highest self-criticism casesM= 15.6, SD = 6.9; lowest self-criticism cases

M= 14.2, SD = 6.2).Although every participant in the study was able to assign cause when asked (by

verbalreport andscale), causalreasoning wasnot found tobeassalient a factoras attri-

bution theory suggests. Despite meeting Weiners criteria of being unexpected and

important events with an element of unfulfilled desire, in recounting their stories very

few people spontaneously discussed the underlying causes for the events. Responses

to the question Why did this happen? were clearly dominated by statements of self-

criticism linked with future prevention goals. As Ellis (1977) found in his psychoana-

lytic work, people are quite capable of blaming themselves for negative outcomes

regardless of whether they assign cause to themselves or to external forcesin the

words of one participant, They caused it but I am to blame.

A possible explanation for this paradox is that attribution is an adaptive sense-

making response or defense mechanismused by peopleat or near the time an outcome

takes place. In thecase of a failure outcome, causal reasoningmay offerquickreliefbyproviding an immediate way of explaining the negative surprise. Participants in

experiments that employ simulations, game-playing exercises, and hypothetical situa-

tions may not be deeply troubled by their failures. However, when an outcome is sig-

nificant andable to evokean element of real shock, ego threat, andsurprise, theurgent

need to make sense of theresultmaybe sufficiently strongto cause self-regulation and

attribution processes to engage simultaneously. As time passes, the cognitive reason-

ingof attribution fades in memory, while themore emotionalaspects of theexperience

remain. Resolution of this painful residue likelyrequiresa deeperunderstanding of the

event in the form of a more elaborate rationalization than that offered by analytical

judgments or evaluations. Participantsin this study struggled to give their recalled fail-

ures significant meaning, claiming to learn from them, gaining insights into them-

selves as a result of them, and even suggesting that these events had been sent by an

invisible hand topurposelyteachthema neededand valuablelesson. This islearning

as defensive sense-making, a process in which the narrative (spoken and perhaps

internal) serves a therapeuticrole. If,when cued by chancestimuli or questioning, an

individual explains a failure experience by telling or mentally reviewing the story of

it, he or she may eventually come to understand or resolve it. In this sense, a bad

story, such as the breakup of a marriage, can over time turn into a good story

(Zukier, 1986), at which stage the interpretive sequence proposed here would no

longer be necessary. Having been resolved, the past experience can join that collec-

tion of personal setbacks that this study didnotaccess, those that no longerseriously

threaten.

Causal reasoning, likely bringing some comfort to the individual by exercising

mind over emotion (i.e., I know thecause),ultimately maybe less effective in reduc-

ing deeper anxiety than self-regulatory processes that enhance peoples illusions ofcontrol by enhancing their illusions of efficacy (i.e., I can do something about it).

The additional attraction of self-regulation is that it allows people to convert threaten-

ing, stable, and uncontrollable causes to less threatening, unstable, and controllable

causes (Wilson & Linville, 1982), which can then be remedied through self-




19/23

motivation. This underscores the point that when time is factored in, underlying

motives cannot go ignored. To understand how people learn, it is first important tounderstand why they learn.

The Artist, the Athlete, and the Businessperson

Keeping the temporal dimension in mind, some participants reported learned

responses that appeared to allow them to face failure earlier than others. Most of the

businesspeople and more than half the professional people in the sample claimed to

try and forget about their past setbacks. As Sophie R., the financial administrator,

stated, I have to carry on, there is no time to mope. In contrast, the full-time athletes

were obsessed with failure, reportingspendinghours studying videotapes to detectthe

smallest flaws in their performances and having long discussions with coaches about

what went wrong. They describe themselves as control freaks and have the highest

average internal locus-of-control scores of all the occupational subgroups, as meas-ured by the Levenson scale (Levenson & Miller, 1976). This instrument gauges a per-

sons generalized expectancy that events are either contingent on ones own behavior

or due to chance or powerful others. Locus-of-control measures are considered rea-

sonably stable across situations and differ from Russells internal-external locus of

causality (discussed earlier), which is situation specific.

The three athletes in the study believed that through rigorous training and well-

planned strategy they could virtually eliminate the role of chance in event outcomes.

Theprofessionalgolfer, Richard P., hadthehighest locus-of-control score in thePhase 1

sample (42, maximum score 48), the average locus-of-control score for the athletes

being 39.3 (SD = 3.31, possible scores 8-48). At the opposite end of the internal-

external locus-of-control continuum were the creative artists, withconsiderably lower

internal scores (average27.1, SD = 4.00).They ratedhighlyquestions on theLevenson

scale gauging external locus such as To a great extent life is controlled by accidentalhappenings andfrequently expressedtheview that outcomes,both negative andposi-

tive, are often determined by fate or luck. Describing progress in their work as result-

ing partly from trial and error, the artistsclaim to be able to face up to failure near to

when it occursmay be assistedby this acknowledgmentof externalfactors. Perceiving

luck or fate as a determinant can take some of the sting out of negative events by pro-

viding ego-protecting excuses (Basgall & Snyder,1988). Whenpeople see themselves

as only partial agents in a failure, they may be more willing to review the experience

and to approach the outcome less defensively than those who see themselves as the

prime agent. They may also be more open to the possibility that the future might not

evolve as expected (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).

The businesspeople and professionals had a mix of internal and external locus-of-

control scores, females tending to have lower internal scores than males. Reporting

that they put off thinking about setbacks until forced to deal with them, most of the

businesspeopleand professionalsbenefitedneither fromthe obsessive needforcontrol

that drives athletes to dissect failure nor from the belief in luck or fate that may help

alleviate thepain felt by creativeartists. In this sense, they appear to be themost disad-

vantaged occupational group.




20/23

In addition to locus-of-control differences, artists and athletes describe processes

(e.g., ritualized debriefings) andbeliefs (e.g., success is only possible through failure)that are an inherent part of their working environments, encouraging them to think

about and discuss personal failures earlier on. Although it is unlikely that artists and

athletes have the secret formula to learning from failure, there is some evidence from

this study to suggest that peoplewhoself-select into certain walks of life (and perhaps

women) have useful lessons to teach the world of business. Occupational community

andgender appear twopromisingavenuesfor further inquiry regarding social andindi-

vidual difference in response to failure.

Implications for Research

If outcome experiences that threaten are remembered because they follow an

ancient adaptive mechanism, as is argued here, then much of what we have learned

about cognitive response to experimentally induced failures is unlikely to be directlyapplicable to the kind of failure experiences examined by this research. Cognitive

theorists, in their treatment of outcome sense-making,have emphasized higher mental

calculationalprocesses.Banduras careful evaluator, Weinerscausal analyst, andKel-

lys (1955) man the scientist all portray people as using their experience as historic

data in a process of rational and intelligent adaptation. In this study, the cooler ana-

lytical responses to failure such as causal reasoningandgoal evaluation appear to lack

durability in long-term memory, suggesting that they may be essentially proximal

response processes. What was found to remain well remembered years after a failure

experience is the anger, the sadness, the surprise, the self-criticismprocesses more

reactive than thoughtfully reflective.

Because research on learning from failure has focused on the proximal experience

of failing, negative affect and self-criticism have been treated essentially as suppress-

ers, acting to limit the generation of possible alternative strategies of action. Thisexploratory research hasgiven renewed emphasis to thestrongmotivational and inter-

pretive roles these responsesplay in makingsense of recollected failure.By itsnature,

motivation is a concept affectedby how people think about their past andfuture. Being

among the first to make the motivational argument, Lewin (1943) described individu-

als as pulled to behave by their conceptions of the future, in the form of goals, and

pushed to act by their recollections of past experiences. This motivational bridge

connecting the present to the future forms the basis of much psychoanalytic theory

(Kihlstrom, 1995) and to the layperson is an intuitivelyobvious concept. Despite this,

calls to further explore the role of the temporal dimension by pioneers in the field of

motivational response to outcome have essentially gone unheeded.

While concentrating most of his attentionon positive self-motivation in the flow of

ongoing experience, Bandura (1991, p. 275) states that he is uncertainabout the distal

effects of failures and calls for more effort to be made toward understanding the long-

term effects of negative outcome. This study takes an initial step toward tackling this

challenge, suggesting that differences between proximal anddistal response to failure

are greater than expected and providing evidence to encourage necessary investment

in longitudinal studies aimed at tracking failure sense-making through time.




21/23

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Cause or Control? The Temporal Dimension in Failure Sense-Making

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