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Caution: Red LightCameras Ahead

The Risks of Privatizing Traffic Law

Enforcement and How to Protect the Public

Travis Madsen,Frontier Group

Phineas Baxandall, Ph.D.,U.S. PIRG Education Fund

October 2011


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Acknowledgments

The authors thank Jeffrey Shaw, Intersections Program Manager for the Office of Safety at theFederal Highway Administration; Mildred E. Warner, Professor of City and Regional Planningat Cornell University; Ellen Dannin, Fannie Weiss Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Professorof Law, Penn State Dickinson School of Law; Roland Zullo, Research Scientist, Institute forLabor and Industrial Relations, University of Michigan; and Aubrey Jewett, Associate Profes-sor of Political Science at the University of Central Florida for their thoughtful review of thisreport. Additional thanks to Redflex Traffic Systems and American Traffic Solutions (ATS)for sharing lists of which jurisdictions use their photo traffic law enforcement systems. Furtherthanks to TheNewspaper.com for providing court documents and other evidence related to theirblog postings. Ryan Pierannunzi at U.S. PIRG Education Fund provided research assistance.Tony Dutzik of Frontier Group and Carolyn Kramer provided editorial support.

U.S. PIRG Education Fund thanks the Ford Foundation for making this report possible.The authors bear responsibility for any factual errors. The recommendations are those of U.S.PIRG Education Fund. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do notnecessarily reflect the views of our funders or those who provided review.

Copyright 2011 U.S. PIRG Education Fund

With public debate around important issues often dominated by special interests pursuingtheir own narrow agendas, U.S. PIRG Education Fund offers an independent voice that workson behalf of the public interest. U.S. PIRG Education Fund, a 501(c)(3) organization, works toprotect consumers and promote good government. We investigate problems, craft solutions,educate the public, and offer Americans meaningful opportunities for civ ic participation. Formore information about U.S.PIRG Education Fund or for additional copies of this report,

please visit www.uspirg.org/edfund.

Frontier Group conducts independent research and policy analysis to support a cleaner, healthierand more democratic society. Our mission is to inject accurate information and compellingideas into public policy debates at the local, state and federal levels. For more information aboutFrontier Group, please visit www.frontiergroup.org.

Cover Photo: Paule858 PhotographyDesign and Layout: Harriet Eckstein Graphic Design


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Table of Contents

Executive Summary 1

Introduction 5

Privatized Traffic Law Enforcement:A Nationwide Trend 7

Red-Light and Speed Cameras Automate Traffic Law Enforcement 7

Camera Systems are Spreading Nationwide 8

Leading Camera Vendors 11

Pitfalls in Privatized Traffic Law Enforcement Deals 13Contract Incentives Can Create Conflicts of Interest 13Contract Terms Can Limit Government Discretionto Set Transportation Policy 17

Contracts Can Penalize Communities for Early Termination 22

The Privatized Traffic Law Enforcement Industry HasSignificant Political Clout 26

Protecting the Public in PrivatizedTraffic Law Enforcement Deals 30

Appendix: Communities Outsourcing Aspects

of Traffic Law Enforcement 33

Notes 45


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Executive Summary 1

Executive Summary

Privatized traffic law enforcement sys-tems are spreading rapidly across theUnited States. As many as 700 local

jurisdict ions have entered into deals withfor-profit companies to install camera sys-tems at intersections and along roadwaysto encourage drivers to obey traffic signalsand follow speed limits.

Local contracting for automated traf-fic enforcement systems may sometimes

be a useful tool for keeping drivers andpedestrians safe. But when private firmsand municipalities consider revenues first,and safety second, the public interest isthreatened.

Before pursuing a camera system con-tract, local governments should heed theadvice of the Federal Highway Administra-tion and first investigate traffic engineer-ing solutions for problem intersections orroadways. If officials decide that privateenforcement systems are appropriate, they

should avoid deals that constrain futuredecisions related to protecting safety.Privatized traffic law enforcement shouldbe used solely as a tool for enhancing trafficsafetynot as a cash cow for municipalitiesor private firms.

Privatized traffic law enforcementsystems are spreading rapidly acrossthe United States.

According to the Insurance Institutefor Highway Safety, about half ofU.S. states have authorized the use ofred-light cameras. Our compilation ofindustry listings shows that approxi-mately 693 local governments and

authorities have active red-light cam-eras, or are in the process of installingthem, as of September 2011. Another92 have contracts for automated speedlimit enforcement cameras. Alto-gether, these jurisdictions are home tomore than 60 million people, or aboutone in five Americans.

These camera systems automaticallydetect violations of traffic laws, takephotos of the offending vehicles,

and identify license plates. Typically,vendors issue tickets, which must beapproved by local authorities, anddeliver them by mail to the registeredowner of the vehicle.


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2 Caution: Red Light Cameras Ahead

Privatized traffic enforcement is partof a larger trend of local governmentsoutsourcing the management of tollroads, parking meters, water and sew-er assets, and sometimes even publicsafety services such as fire protection

to private firms.

Contracts between private cameravendors and cities can include paymentincentives that put profit above trafficsafety.

The most problematic contracts re-quire cities to share revenue with thecamera vendor on a per-ticket basis orthrough other formulas as a percent-age of revenue. In other words, themore tickets a camera system issues,the more profit the vendor collects.For example, Suffolk County, NewYork, diverts half of the revenuefrom its red-light camera program tocamera vendor Affiliated ComputerServices.

Conditional cost-neutral contractsalso contain provisions that link pay-ments to the number of tickets issued,

although payments are capped. Underthese contracts, cities pay a monthlyfee to a camera vendor. In the eventthat ticket revenues fail to cover thevendor fee in any given month, how-ever, cities may delay paymentgiv-ing vendors an incentive to ensure aminimum level of citations are issued.

Privatized traffic enforcement sys-tem contracts that limit governmentdiscretion to set and enforce traffic

regulations put the public at risk. Forexample:

Yellow Light Duration.When trafficengineers lengthen a yellow signal, itgives drivers more time to react to thesignal change, which tends to reduce

the number of red-light violations.However, some contracts, includingthose in the California cities of BellGardens, Citrus Heights, Coronaand Hawthorne, potentially imposefinancial penalties on the city if traf-

fic engineers extend the length ofthe yellow light at intersections withred-light cameras, which would reducethe number of tickets the systems canissue.

Right on Red Enforcement. Law en-forcement agencies in different citieschoose which types of violations toprioritize in the name of public safety,including whether or not to ticketmotorists who make a rolling stoprather than a complete stop behindthe line before turning right on ared light. However, some contractsrequire municipalities to strictly is-sue tickets on all right turns that donot first come to a complete stop, orenable vendors to impose financialpenalties on cities that choose to altertheir enforcement standardsinclud-ing the contracts that Ventura andNapa Valley, California have with

camera vendor Redflex.

Ticket Quotas. Some contracts includelanguage that could penalize munici-palities if they do not approve enoughticketseffectively setting a ticketquota and undermining the authorityof local officials to decide which viola-tions warrant citations. For example,Walnut, California signed a contractwith Redflex that raises the possibilityof a financial penalty if the city waives

more than 10 percent of the potentialviolations identified by the privatecamera system. Other contracts givecamera vendors the ability to vetoproposed camera locations, sometimesreferring to a minimum ticket numberor revenue requirement.


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Executive Summary 3

Contracts between camera vendorsand cities can include penalties for earlyterminationor fail to provide provi-sions for early terminationleavingtaxpayers on the hook even if the cam-era program fails to meet its objectives.

For example:

After voters in Houston elected toshut off the citys red-light cameraprogram in November 2010, Ameri-can Traffic Solutions claimed thatthe city would owe the company $25million for withdrawing from thecontract before it expired in 2014.

After San Bernardino, California, de-cided to terminate its red-light cameraprogram in March 2011, AmericanTraffic Solutions threatened to imposea $1.8 million penalty on the city.

The city council in Victorville, Cali-fornia, considered shutting down thelocal red-light camera program, butdiscovered that their new contractwith Redflex did not contain a clauseaddressing early termination. Thecouncil estimated that pulling out of

the contract before its 2015 expirationdate would only be possible throughlitigation.

The city of Baytown, Texas, signed acontract through 2019 for a red-lightcamera system with American Traf-fic Solutions. However, after votersdecided that red-light tickets could notbe issued unless a uniformed officerwas present at an intersection, the citybegan waiving many of the citations

issued by the system. In response,American Traffic Solutions filed a law-suit, alleging that the city was failingto meet its contractual obligation toissue tickets. In August 2011, Baytownsettled the dispute by authorizing a $1million payment to American Traffic

Solutions in exchange for early cameraremoval.

The privatized traffic law enforce-ment industry has amassed significantpolitical clout that it uses to shape traf-fic safety nationwide.

Camera vendors are aggressively lob-bying to expand authorization for pri-vate traffic law enforcement to morestates and are marketing enforcementsystems to more communities. Localgovernments are likely to encountertraffic law enforcement privatization

campaigns in the near future, if theyhave not already.

In 2011, camera vendors employednearly 40 lobbyists in Florida, whoseagenda included killing a bill thatwould have required municipalities toadopt longer yellow light times to in-crease intersection safety, and killinga separate bill that would have bannedred-light camera systems.

Some red-light camera vendors havecreated and bankrolled organizations,such as the National Coalition forSafer Roads, that pose as grassrootscivic groups while presenting only theupsides of camera systems and failingto discuss alternatives.

Privatized traffic enforcement system contracts thatlimit government discretion to set and enforce traf-fic regulations put the public at risk.Credit: GaryBrown


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As local governments consider initiat-ing or renewing contracts for privatizedtraffic law enforcement, officials shouldprotect the public by adhering to thefollowing principles:

Put public safety first in decisionsregarding enforcement of trafficlawsthis includes evaluating priva-tized law enforcement camera systemsagainst alternative safety options with-out regard to potential revenues.

Ensure that contract language is freefrom potential conflicts of interest.

Avoid direct or indirect incentives forvendors that are based on the volumeof tickets or fines.

Retain complete public control overall transportation policy decisions.

Retain the option to withdraw from

a contract early if dissatisfied withservice or its effects.

Ensure that the process of contractingwith vendors is completely open, withample opportunity for meaningful

public participation.

Make information about the opera-tion of privatized traffic law enforce-ment fully transparent and accessibleonline.

Do not permit information about in-dividual vehicles and drivers gatheredby camera vendors to be used for anypurpose other than the enforcementof traffic laws.

Consider establishing state standardsto help cities avoid contracting forautomated enforcement systems thatare not justified or when alternativesmake more sense.


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Introduction 5

In the aftermath of the worst economiccrisis since the Great Depression, localgovernments across America face gaping

deficits. Total tax receipts remain belowtheir 2008 levels. Closing the gap wouldrequire state and local governments tocut spending by an average of more than12 percent a year, or raise revenue by anequivalent amount.1

Facing the prospect of laying off essen-

tial public employees, including teachers,firefighters, and police officers, it is nowonder that government officials listen re-ceptively to anyone who can promise a newrevenue source, a way to reduce expenses,or an option to reallocate scarce govern-ment resources. Better yet if these ideas canserve a public good in a new and better way,at no cost to the government.

A group of companies have come upwith a way to set up set up camera systemsto identify vehicles or drivers who run red

lights at intersections or break speed limitsalong roadways. These vendors markettheir systems as increasing road safety andfreeing up police officers to do more im-portant workall while having a neutral,or even positive, impact on governmentfinances.

With such selling points, it is easy tosee why local officials have been receptiveto proposals to outsource aspects of trafficenforcement to private firms. As many as700 government authorities have signedcontracts for camera systems to date.

These systems have not arrived with-out controversy, however. While the vastmajority of citizens support the enforce-ment of traffic laws to make roadways safe,

citizens grow concerned if they perceivethat a privatized traffic law enforcementsystem is unjust, or that its main purposeis to generate revenue.

In this report, U.S. PIRG EducationFund evaluates deals that cities have struckwith private companies for traffic law en-forcement systems. These deals sometimesprevent local governments from acting inthe best interests of their citizens, espe-cially when the terms of the deal prioritizedelivering profits for the shareholders or

owners of the private firm.This report does not evaluate the proper

role of camera systems in improving publicsafety. Ultimately, it is up to local govern-ment officials to determine how best toguarantee the safety of walkers, bikers andmotorists in their communityand to

Introduction


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Privatized Traffic Law Enforcement 7

Privatized traffic law enforcementsystems are spreading rapidly acrossthe United States. As many as 700

American municipalities have entered intodeals with for-profit companies to installcameras at intersections and along road-ways to encourage drivers to obey trafficsignals and follow speed limits.

Contracting with private companies forautomated traffic enforcement is part of a

larger trend of local governments outsourc-ing the management of toll roads, parkingmeters, water and sewer services, garbagecollection, and even public safety servicessuch as fire protection to private firms.

Red-Light and Speed

Cameras Automate TrafficLaw EnforcementThe enforcement of traffic laws was oncecarried out only by police agencies, withofficers acting in person upon witnessinga violation or responding to an accident.However, with high-powered computer

technology and internet communications,private firms have developed automatedsystems that can substitute for a policeofficer on a roadside or at an intersection.These systems are capable of detectingtraffic law violations, identifying vehicles,capturing photographic evidence, andtransmitting the information to a centraloffice, which can then issue tickets.

Red-light enforcement systems consist

of sensors tied to a traffic signal, plus

Privatized Traffic Law Enforcement:A Nationwide Trend

Red-light camera systems consist of a camera and strobelight set up to capture evidence of a violation and animage of a vehicles license plate, a wireless sensor orvideo camera set up to detect when a vehicle crosses intothe intersection, and a computer system that integratesall of the information and transmits proposed viola-tions to a central office through a network connection.Credit: Gary Brown, Creative Commons


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also make clear that a photographic recordalone is sufficient evidence for a citation.Some laws presume that the registeredowner is the driver at the time of violation,but provide a means for owners to identifythe driver if it was another person; other

laws treat these violations like parkingtickets, in which the registered owner isresponsible no matter who was driving.18

Laws that target the driver of the ve-hicle typically classify offenses as movingviolations. Consequences can include fines,points against a drivers license, and a likely

increase in insurance premiums. Laws thattreat offenses as a civil matter like parkingtickets typically require only fines.

In some areas, citizens have discoveredthat state authorization laws for privatizedtraffic enforcement systems leave cities

unable to effectively enforce violationscaptured by camera systems, leading manyto simply ignore the tickets. Los Angelesrecently decided to cancel its photo en-forcement program largely for this reason.19Other laws, such as in Florida, automati-cally convert unpaid tickets from civil fines

Traffic Safety in the United States:Focusing on Intersections

While traffic safety has steadily improved since the 1970s, driving accidents remaina serious problem. Every year in the United States, more than 30,000 peopledie in automobile crashes.5Speeding is a root cause of about a third of these deaths,and crashes at intersections are responsible for about 20 percent. Other fatalities arecaused by vehicles leaving roadways, or by accidents involving pedestrians.6

Almost half of crashes causing injuries occur at intersections.7Within the UnitedStates:

There are about 3 million roadway intersections. About one in 10 of theseintersections are governed by traffic signals.8

About a third of all fatal accidents at intersections occur where there are traffic

signals. The remaining two thirds occur where no signal is present.9

Red-light running is responsible for about 2 percent of all fatal accidentstracked by the Federal Highway Administration, or about 676 deaths per year,nationwide.10

Fatal crashes at intersections most frequently involve right-angle collisions (45percent), followed by collisions involving pedestrians or bicyclists (17 percent),head-on collisions (14 percent), single vehicles hitting an object (13 percent),and rear-end collisions (6 percent).11

One 1999 survey, sponsored by DaimlerChrysler, the American Trauma Soci-

ety and the Federal Highway Administration, found that 56 percent of Ameri-can drivers admitted to having ever run a red light.12


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to moving violations and then refer themto a collection agency to prevent citizensfrom ignoring tickets.20

According to the Insurance Institute forHighway Safety, 13 states and Washington,D.C. have specifically authorized the use of

automated traffic law enforcement systemsstatewide.21In another 11 states, local orstate government has authorized morelimited deployment of the systems.22Alto-gether, 42 state legislatures have consideredmore than 400 bills addressing privatizedtraffic law enforcement.23

Does Anyone Know How Many Communities HaveAutomated Traffic Enforcement Contracts?

There is no official count of how many communities have contracted for red-lightcamera systems or other automated traffic enforcement. A lack of national regula-tory standards means that no governmental body makes such a tally.

The most common number used as an estimate is from the Insurance Inst itutefor Highway Safety (IIHS), a trade group composed of insurance providers, whichclaimed on its website in September 2011 that, In the U.S., red-light cameras areused in approximately 553 communities and speed cameras are used in more than103 jurisdictions.13

The actual number is likely higher, based on industry records. The two largestred-light camera operators, Redflex and American Traffic Solutions (ATS), providedtheir own list of jurisdictions under contract in response to our request. Othermajor companies did not respond to our inquiries or, in the case of the companyAffiliated Computer Services, refused to provide information. ATS reports work-ing with 275 governmental bodies and Redflex with 249 communities. Adding theATS and Redflex lists to the IIHS total and eliminating duplicates yields a tally of693 communities.

It is not clear, however, exactly how many communities are contracted for red-lightcameras as opposed to speed cameras or other technology. Further complicating anyclear count of communities is the fact that media accounts sometimes contradict thelistings provided by vendors or the IIHS.14

Many communities require s igns to be posted before camera-equippedintersections, helping to deter violations of traffic laws. Credit:GaryBrown, Creative Commons


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Use of privatized traffic law enforce-ment systems appears likely to continueto spread. Camera vendors are beginningto deploy new applications for the technol-ogy, including catching drivers who failto stop at stop signs, drive past stoppedschool buses, or leave their cars parked instreet sweeping zones. Vendors are alsoexpanding the application of the systemsto catch drivers who fail to pay tolls ordisobey railroad crossing signals. In 2011,

the U.S. Conference of Mayors endorseda resolution in support of using photoenforcement systems nationwide.25 Andcamera vendors continue to aggressivelymarket the systems to municipalities acrossthe country.26

Leading Camera VendorsThree companies supply most of the pri-vate traffic law enforcement systems in theUnited States.

Redflex Traffic Systems and AmericanTraffic Solutions are the largest suppliers ofautomated traffic law enforcement systems,each capturing more than 40 percent ofthe market. Redflex Traffic Systems is adivision of Redflex Holdings Limited, anAustralian company. It holds more than

250 contracts with American cities in 23states.27The company holds the largestsingle contract, with the city of Chicago,which involves 380 cameras.28Overall, thecompany operates on the order of 2,000camera systems.29Redflex brought in nearly

Population in Jurisdiction

300,000 to 1 million

100,000 to 300,000

0 to 100,000

1 million to 3 million

3 million to 10 million

Figure 1: Jurisdictions with Privatized Traffic Law Enforcement Systems24

More than 60 million people live in jurisdictions that have chosen to deploy camera traffic lawenforcement systemsabout one in five Americans.


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$150 million in gross revenue during fiscalyear 2011, about three-quarters of whichderived from its U.S. operations.30

American Traffic Solutions, based inScottsdale, Arizona, has contracts withnearly 300 municipalities in 21 states.31The

company manages more than 3,000 cam-eras, covering regions home to about 30million people.32The company is privatelyheld, and its overall revenue informationis not publicly available, but is likely in the

range of hundreds of millions of dollarsannually.

The third-largest provider of trafficenforcement camera systems in the UnitedStates is Xerox-owned Affiliated ComputerServices, based in Dallas, Texas. This com-

pany controls a little more than 10 percentof the U.S. market.33Other, smaller playersinclude LaserCraft, based in the UnitedKingdom; Traffipax, based in Germany;and Redspeed, based in Illinois.

The Ongoing Debate over Red-Light Cameras and Safety

There appears to be no well-accepted consensus on whether red-light camera sys-tems are effective at improving safety at intersections. Some researchers suggestthat camera systems increase accidents, while others find that the systems offerbenefits.

While this report does not evaluate the proper role of camera systems in improvingpublic safety, the documents referenced in the following footnote provide resourcesaddressing the efficacy of camera systems.34

Ultimately, it is up to local government officials to determine how best to guar-antee the safety of walkers, bikers and motorists in their communityand to assesswhether automated traffic enforcement is a useful tool in meeting that goal.


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Pitfalls in Privatized Traffic Law Enforcement Deals 13

Privatized traffic law enforcement sys-tems may be useful in keeping driversand pedestrians safe. However, when

private firms or municipalities considerrevenue first and safety second, the publicinterest will be threatened.

Pitfalls can arise when contracts en-courage vendors to treat automated traffic

enforcement systems as a profit center: bymaximizing the number of tickets written,regardless of the impact on public safety;by limiting the ability of governmentsto set traffic safety policies according tocommunity needs; or by constraining theability of cities to terminate contracts earlyin the event that automated enforcementsystems are rejected by the electorate orfail to meet safety goals.

The budget crises many governmentsfacecoupled with the significant political

and marketing clout that camera vendorsdeploy to expand their marketmake itmore likely that communities will signbad deals that favor profit and revenue oversafety or other public interests.

Contract Incentives CanCreate Conflicts of InterestThe primary interest of private cameravendors is to maximize profits by earningmore revenue and reducing costs. The pri-vate owners of American Traffic Solutionsexpect business decisions to produce prof-

itable returns. The executives of Redflexand Affiliated Computer Services similarlyanswer to a board and stockholders whopresumably demand quarterly returns.

This focus on profit can be clearly seenin Redflexs annual report to shareholders,where executives describe how tightercontract language and more aggressivecollection efforts in key markets are im-portant tactics the company will deployto increase return for its investors in thecoming year.35It also appears prominently

in the contract that Tallahassee, Florida,originally negotiated with Affiliated Com-puter Services in 2009, which states: Onlysites [for camera system placement] thatvalidate out to a mutually agreed number

Pitfalls in Privatized TrafficLaw Enforcement Deals


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of violations per day to meet the requiredfinancial obligations to pay the capital-ized investment of the Vendorwill beselected unless otherwise mutually agreedby the City and Vendor.36 (Emphasisadded.)

These goals often conflict with the pri-mary interest of municipalities in prevent-ing accidents and protecting their citizenshealth and property.

Contracts between cities and camerasystem vendors can be written in waysthat put revenue first, and put the publicinterest at risk. The most problematiccontracts require cities to divert revenue tothe camera vendor on a per-ticket basis. Insuch contracts, the more tickets a camerasystem issues, the more profit the vendorcollects. So-called cost-neutral contractsalso contain provisions that link paymentsto the number of tickets issued, althoughpayments are capped. Both of these pay-ment models can encourage private vendorsand public officials to take actions designedprimarily to increase the number of cita-tions issued, regardless of the impact onpublic safety.

Per-Ticket Revenue Formulas

Contracts that link the compensation aprivate vendor receives with the numberof citations issued are inherently prob-lematiccreating a built-in incentive tomaximize the issuance of violations, whilemaking public safety a less direct consider-ation. These types of contracts ultimatelyweaken the publics trust in the motivationfor introducing automated traffic enforce-ment.

The Federal Highway Administrationcautions that if a locality contracts with

an outside contractor, The vendor shouldnot be responsible for selecting the sites orshould not be paid on a per-ticket basis dueto potential conflict of interest issues thatmay arise from this arrangement.37

These types of contracts are less com-mon now than a decade ago, and a handful

of states have passed legislation banningthis payment method outright. However,contracts directly linking revenue andcitations continue to persist in severalforms.

For example:

Some localities divert a set share ofpublic revenue to the camera vendor.For instance, Suffolk County, NewYork, awards half the revenue from itsred-light camera program to cameravendor Affiliated Computer Services.38The city of Clive, Iowa, has not pub-licly disclosed the proportion, but alsoshares the revenue generated by eachticket from its red-light camera systemwith camera vendor Redflex.39

Some localities divert revenue basedon formulas. For instance, BatonRouge, Louisiana, diverts a variableportion of revenue generated by tick-ets from its photo enforcement systemto camera vendor American TrafficSolutions, depending on how quicklycitizens respond to fines. For eachticket, the city receives 65 percent offine collections from the first notice of

violation the vendor sends out, and 55percent if collection requires a secondnotice.40

Washington, D.C., added new kindsof volume payments after initiallybanning such incentives. The cityamended its photo enforcementcontract with Affiliated ComputerServices in 2002 away from a revenuesharing model to a flat fee after crit-ics complained that the program was

motivated by profit rather than safety.However, in 2005, while consideringthe addition of more speed cameras,the city extended its contract andadded a provision that granted thevendor extra compensation of roughly$20,000 for each bundle of 2,500


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tickets above 53,750 per month thatthe citys system issued.41The con-tract justifies the fee structureanovel variant of the per-ticket com-pensation schemebecause changesin camera deployment were anticipat-

ed to create a potentially significantincrease in volume of tickets.42

Tempe, Arizona, may find itselfdiverting surcharges from trafficschool. The city signed a contractwith Redflex in 2007 based on a per-ticket revenue model. The city al-lows ticketed drivers to avoid fines byattending traffic school, for which itlevies a surcharge. As a result, driv-ers have paid less than a third of thecitations issued by its red-light camerasystem.43In December 2010, Redflexfiled a lawsuit against the city for $1.3million, plus attorney fees and costs,alleging that the surcharge for trafficschool is covered under the revenue-sharing terms of the contract, and thatthe city should have considered thosefees as part of the automated red-lightenforcement system, and thus sharedthe money with Redflex.44

Fee-For-Service ContractsThe least problematic revenue model froma public-interest standpoint is the straightfee-for-service contract. In these contracts,municipalities agree to pay a vendor anup-front charge or a flat monthly fee thatcovers camera installation, maintenance,violation processing, and any other servicesthe vendor offers, without regard to thenumber of tickets the system issues.

These revenue models have the advan-

tage of removing any incentive to maximizerevenue from the self-interest calculation ofthe camera vendor. The contractor still hasan incentive to perform well because erranttickets, lost billing or technical problemswith the equipment would displease themunicipality, which would then be more

likely to contract with another companyat the end of the term.

Fee-for-service contracts also givemunicipalities a clear picture of the costof applying the system as part of an overalltraffic safety management plan. They bet-

ter enable municipalities to weigh whetherred-light cameras, or other options to re-duce crashes at intersections, are the mostcost-effective way to enhance safety.

One example of a fee-for-service ar-rangement is the Redflex contract withthe city of Sacramento, California. In thiscontract, Redflex charges monthly feesranging from $3,750 to $4,200 per direc-tion of approach for each of an initial set of20 intersections, depending on the numberof lanes and the type of violation enforced,and then $4,750 to $5,050 for each addi-tional approach at new intersections.45Thecontract requires all prices to remain fixedfor the duration of the contract (through2012).46

Conditional Cost-NeutralContractsIn straight fee-for-service deals, the mu-nicipality takes on all of the risk that theprivatized enforcement system might not

generate enough revenue to pay for itself.Because of the potentially negative impacton already stressed government finances,municipalities may hesitate to enter intoa deal like this without assurance that theprogram will not be too expensive.

In responseespecially in areas whereper-ticket revenue formulas are out-lawedcamera vendors often use a newcontract model, containing assurancesthat the contract will be cost-neutral forcustomers. These types of contracts allow

camera vendors to market their product asrisk-free for the city budget.

These cost-neutral contracts sharefeatures of both per-ticket and straightfee-for-service deals. Under these con-tracts, cities pay a monthly fee to a cameravendor. However, in the event that ticket


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Payment Terms in Cost-Neutral Deals Can Vary

Cost-neutral contracts come in a variety of forms.

Some variants allow the city to collect a minimum amount of revenue beforeany earnings are owed to the camera vendor. For example, the city of CitrusHeights, California signed a contract with Redflex which specifies that Beforeany payment is due to Redflex, Customer shall be entitled to recover the sumof $8,500 per month from the gross cash received from automated red-lightviolations [] based on anticipated city expenses. Any amount above that levelcan be applied to Redflex invoices, up to the amount that the city has managedto collect by that point.

Other variants of these contracts require any revenues collected to first beapplied to vendor invoices before being directed to any other purpose. For

example, Affiliated Computer Services contract with Tallahassee, Florida,specifies that any revenues must first be applied to the vendor invoice, includ-ing any balance carried over from previous months, before being depositedin city coffers. Specifically, the contract states, [w]hen Program Revenues inany given month exceed the total monthly fixed fees owed ACS in such month,then the excess Program Revenues shall be applied first to any cumulative defi-cit or balances due to ACS until all shortfall deficits or balances due are paid infull.48

Some contracts require any accumulated deficits to be paid at the end of thecontract period. For example, the contract that Ventura, California, signedwith camera vendor Redflex, states, In the event that the contract ends or is

terminated and an invoiced balance is still owed to Redflex, all subsequent re-ceipts from automated red-light violations for a period of 12 months from dateof termination will be applied to such balance and paid to Redflex, which shallfully satisfy Customers payment obligations under the contract.49

Others, such as the contract Tallahassee, Florida, has signed with AffiliatedComputer Services, allow any payment deficits to expire at the end of the con-tract period.

Whether cost-neutral contracts are legal or not in states that have bannedper-ticket revenue arrangements is a matter of active legal challenges. For example,several lower-level courts in California have ruled that cost neutral contracts are

illegal, but the decisions have not been published, and therefore cannot serve asprecedent for other court decisions.50


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revenues fail to cover the vendor fee in anygiven month, cities may delay payment tothe vendor.

Because vendor compensation belowthe defined monthly cap is linked to thenumber of tickets issued, these types of

contracts create incentives for cameravendors to ensure that the camera systemsdeliver a minimum amount of monthlyrevenue. This pressure can lead vendors toinclude contract conditions that threatenthe public interest.

For example, when the city of Roseville,California signed an agreement with Red-flex in 2008 for a red-light camera system,the contract contained language that gaveRedflex veto power over proposed cameraplacement to limit its exposure to financialrisk. Roseville suggested a set of intersec-tions to the company, but as RosevillePolice Spokeswoman Dee Dee Gunthertold the Roseville Press Tribune, Redflexcame back and basically said we cant findany intersections that would be financiallyfeasible for us to do this and still guaranteecost-neutrality, unless the city agreed toenforce regulations against rolling rightturns. The city chose not to do so, and thecontract was terminated without breaking

ground on any camera installations.47

Inother words, the private camera vendordetermined that it was not in its financialinterest to install cameras to best supportRosevilles safety goals.

Other cities have not been as diligentas Roseville in negotiating deals withoutterms that undermine the public interest.

Contract Terms Can LimitGovernment Discretion toSet Transportation PolicyContracts for automated traffic law en-forcement systems can include conditionsthat limit public control over how to set

and enforce traffic regulations.For example, some contracts impose

financial penalties on cities that undertakesafety engineering modifications at inter-sections governed by camera systemses-pecially when those modifications have an

effect on the volume of citations a systemcan issue, and thus the amount of revenueit can generate. Contracts can also requirecommunities to enforce right-on-red viola-tions, rather than giving local authoritiesthe discretion to decide how to prioritizethe enforcement of these infractions in thecontext of its overall traffic safety goals.

Limiting government authority to set itsown safety standards puts the public at riskand diverts traffic law enforcement towardmaintaining revenues rather than achiev-ing transportation and safety goals.

Safety-Oriented IntersectionEngineering ChangesAt intersections with high rates of crashescaused by red-light running, traffic engi-neers can make engineering changes toreduce collisions. The Federal HighwayAdministration (FHWA) considers engi-neering, education and enforcement thethree pillars of an effective program to

address red-light running.Education can help drivers learn how

to better respond to signals and becomemore aware of the consequences of reck-less driving decisions. Enforcement canprovide incentives for drivers to behavecautiously, incentives which become stron-ger as the fines become higher and morecertain. These two tools are well suited forinfluencing driver behavior.

However, deficiencies with the inter-section itself that contribute to red-light

running can only be addressed throughengineering. FHWA recommends that atraffic engineer be called upon to reviewthe intersection and approach geometry,signal timing details, and other relevantengineering features to ensure that thered-light-running problem [at a given in-


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tersection] is behavioral and not the resultof an engineering shortcoming. Camerasshould be considered/installed only afterengineering solutions have been provenineffective where there is a red-light-run-ning problem.51

Possible engineering measures that mayreduce accident frequency at intersectionsinclude:53

Increasing signal and intersectionvisibility so that traffic lights can beseen more clearly and from a greaterdistance;

Adding intersect ion warning sig-nals, painting more visible pavementmarkings, or reducing the speed limitapproaching the intersection;

Providing sufficient yellow signalduration to give drivers enough timeto react to the signal change, based onthe speed of traffic, the road grade,the intersection width, and otherfactors;

Adding an all-red signal interval to

give traffic time to clear before releas-ing cross-traffic;

Coordinating signals to improvetraffic flow;

Adding turn lanes and/or exclusiveturn signal phases to reduce driverexposure;

Transforming the intersection into aroundabout, or otherwise altering thegeometry of the intersection.

Contracts for automated traffic law en-forcement systems that limit local authori-ties ability to implement safety changes arenot in the publics best interest.

Yellow Light DurationWhen traffic engineers lengthen a yel-low signal at an intersection, drivers havemore time to react to a signal change. Thistends to reduce the number of accidentalred-light violations. For example, the TexasTransportation Institute studied threeyears worth of police reports at more than180 intersections in Texas. The organiza-tion found that when yellow light durationwas one second shorter than internationalguidelines, red-light violations doubled.When yellow light duration was extended

one second beyond guidelines, red-lightviolations fell by half.54

Resources for Increasing Intersection Safety

The Federal Highway Administration maintains a wealth of resources onlinedescribing different traffic engineering solutionssuch as making signals morevisible, improving driver awareness of an upcoming intersection, altering intersection

design, or improving the operation of signalsthat communities can use to increaseintersection safety. Improving driver compliance with red lights is just one amonga number of possible actions to reduce crashes. For further information, includingsample intersection safety action plans that provide guidance on how to identify anddeploy cost-effective and publicly acceptable safety strategies, see the Federal High-way Administrations Office of Safety website at safety.fhwa.dot.gov/intersection.


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Intersection SafetyIntersection Safety

Increasing Visibility

22

One s igna l head pe r lane

Backp la tes

12 Lenses

Intersection SafetyIntersection Safety

Improving Design

25

New alignment

New alignment

Roundabouts

Reduce skew Turn lanes

Photo credits: Federal Highway Administration


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documents for approval by the City.68And Citrus Heights, California,signed a contract that gives Redflexthe responsibility to Develop theRedlight Violation Criteria in consul-tation with the Customer.69

Ticket QuotasContracts for photo enforcement systemstypically do not give camera vendors theauthority to issue citations. Contracts oftencontain, in all-capital letters, the text:

[Vendor] hereby acknowledges andagrees that the decision to issue a citationshall be the sole, unilateral and exclusivedecision of the authorized officer and

shall be made in such authorized officerssole discretion (a citation decision),and in no event shall [Vendor] have theability or authorization to make a cita-tion decision.

Law-enforcement decisions about whento ticket remain, at least formally, in thehands of police officers. Citizens mayregard this as important because theywant decisions about when the force oflaw should be applied against individuals

to remain in the hands of public officerswho are accountable to democrat icallyelected representatives. However, whencontracts penalize municipalities that donot approve enough tickets, then policepolicies and discretion will likely be tiltedto avoid those penalties. One way this canhappen is to effectively set a ticket quota,which undermines the authority of localofficials to decide which violations warrantcitations.

For example, the contract between Wal-

nut, California and Redflex states that thecity could pay a financial penalty if theCity or Police waives more than 10 percentof valid violations forwarded to the Policefor acceptance. 70Roseville, Californiasigned a contract with Redflex in 2008 thatcontained the same provision.71

Contracts Can PenalizeCommunities for EarlyTerminationAn important issue concerning the priva-tization of municipal services is whetherit creates new risks for municipalities bylocking them into arrangements that willbe painful to undo if unexpected problemsarise or results are worse than expected.

In other activities where municipali-ties have more traditionally outsourcedservices such as garbage collection andbuilding maintenance, communities veryoften decide to bring functions back in-house after experimenting with privatiza-tion. In fact, research by Mildred Warner

at Cornell University and others examinesregular surveys of local governmentsthat have been conducted since 1982.The research shows that since 1997 localgovernments have brought activities backinto government provision more oftenthan outsourced new activities.72 Someof the areas where contracting back inoutpaces the rate of outsourcing includetraffic-related activities such as trafficsigns, street signs, street plowing andstreet cleaning.73According to surveys of

government managers, the most commonreason given for reversals are problemswith service quality followed by lack ofcost savings, improvements to governmentefficiency, problems with monitoring con-tractors, and citizen support for bringingthe work back in-house.74The surveysalso show that city managers who moni-tor outsourcing contracts more closelyare more likely to reverse the outsourcingsubsequently.75

These concerns are likely to apply with

deals outsourcing aspects of traffic lawenforcement as well. In dozens of loca-tions, citizens groups dissatisfied with theservice have brought up ballot measures toeliminate camera systems. Other jurisdic-tions have encountered unexpected costs,including increased courtroom traffic.


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For example, Miami-Dade traffic courtshandled 20,000 red-light citation cases inAugust 2011, virtually filling up all avail-able courtroom space.76

The point is not that municipa lit iesshould not consider privatizing certain ser-

vices or experiment with outsourcing. But acommon experience of other municipalitiesacross a variety of activities is that it oftendoes not work out. Transition costs cantherefore be very important. Contracts thatstipulate high costs and rigid conditions forbringing activities back in-house imposerisks on municipalities and can leave com-munities locked into arrangements theydo not want.

Many automated traffic law enforce-ment contracts create risk by penalizingmunicipalities or leaving them exposed tocostly and disruptive lawsuits in the case ofearly termination of the contract, leavingtaxpayers on the hook even if the camerasystem fails to meet community objectives.Contract terms that keep municipalitieslocked in with heavy cancellation fees orthreaten them with expensive litigation ifthey change their minds are not in the bestinterests of the public.

Some contracts specify that if thecity terminates the contract early thecity will owe the vendor cancellationfees. For example, under Belmont,Californias contract with Redflex, thecity would owe as much as $80,000per approach (with up to 4 approachesper intersection) if it chose to with-draw from the contract before itexpired.77In Tallahassee, Florida, ifthe city cancels its contract with ACSfor reasons of convenience, it will owe

a cancellation fee of $100,000, in addi-tion to any unpaid balances, no matterhow much revenue the program hascollected over time.78

Other unexpected risks, as previ-ously mentioned, can take the form

of vendors suspending protections oncost-neutral contracts. For example,Ventura, Californias cost-neutralcontract with Redflex stipulates that,should there be a balance remainingin the invoice due Redflex at the end

of the contract term, revenues from anadditional 12 months of camera opera-tion will be applied to pay the deficit.Many cost-neutral contracts specifythat cities will no longer be able to de-fer monthly payments If systems aredeactivated due to customer require-ment. 79Moreover, many contractsstate that If a system is deactivated atthe Customers request, the monthlyfee will continue.80

These contracts have created real prob-lems for cities that moved to cancel theirphoto enforcement programs when theyfailed to meet safety goals, when they costmore than anticipated, or when citizensreacted angrily to the introduction ofcamera systems.

Houston, TexasIn 2006, Houston signed a contract withvendor American Traffic Solutions for a

photo red-light enforcement program.Over the next four years, the system col-lected more than $44 million in fines.81

A group of citizens launched a ballot ini-tiative to eliminate the camera program.82The group managed to place the initiativeon the November 2010 ballot, and wonconvincingly, despite the fact that a groupcalled Keep Houston Safe, largely fundedby American Traffic Solutions, spent on theorder of $1.5 million on a legal and publicrelations effort to defend the contract.83

After the vote, American Traffic Solu-tions filed suit in federal court to keep thecameras in place.

Houston had renegotiated its contractin 2009, eliminating the provision thatgave the city the option to terminate thecontract for convenience without penalty.


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Instead, the city agreed to a new contractthat clearly stated that the agreementremains in effect until May 27, 2014,without option to terminate.84The newcontract was an attempt by the city tokeep its photo enforcement program in

place, even if the state legislature passeda bill that would ban new contracts orcontract extensions for privatized trafficlaw enforcement.85

In June 2011, a federal judge decidedthat the results of the election were in-valid. The city, under budgetary pressure,decided to restart the camera enforce-ment program. Houston Mayor AnniseParker said in a statement: The Cityjust went through a very painful budgetprocess in which nearly 750 employeeswere laid off and park, library and healthservices were cut back. We simply donthave the millions they claim we wouldowe for violating the court decision andour contractual obligation to AmericanTraffic Solutions (ATS). Therefore, I havedecided the fiscally-prudent path to takeis to turn the cameras back on while alsoseeking a second chance for the voters inthe courts.86

During ongoing talks, American

Traffic Solutions asked the city for $18million to settle the contract dispute. Inresponse, Mayor Parker declared that thecompany was out of bounds and asked thecity council to vote on a resolution to shutoff the cameras and ban them outright.The council obliged in August 2011, andcity officials again deactivated the cameraprogram.87

In response, American Traffic Solutionsupped its demand for early terminationto $25 million. Andy Taylor, lawyer for

the company, told the Houston Chronicle,Houston has always enjoyed for decadesa great business reputation where a dealis a deal. In the courthouse they call thatthe sanctity of contract. Today, the CityCouncil tarnished the reputation of the cityby throwing out a valid agreement with our

company. [] As a result of throwing it out,its going to make the streets of Houstonless safe, and its also going to open up, Imsad to say, the taxpayers to liability to thetune of millions of dollars.

As of the publication of this report, this

dispute remains unsettled.

Baytown, TexasThe city of Baytown, Texas, signed a fiveyear contract in 2008 for a red-light camerasystem with American Traffic Solutions. InMay 2009, the city amended the agreementto extend for 15 years. Under the paymentterms of the contract, the city shared apercentage of the revenue from each ticketwith the camera vendor.88

However, in November 2010, citizensvoted to end the program. Citizens op-posed to the camera program collected sig-natures for a ballot initiative that requiredthe physical presence of a uniformed officerat an intersection before a red-light ticketcould be issued. The ballot initiative passedwith 58 percent of the vote.89

In order to comply with the results of theelection, the city drastically reduced thenumber of approvals of potential violationscaptured by the American Traffic Solutions

system, since it did not have the personnelto ensure the presence of an officer at everycamera location all the time.In December2010, the city only approved 21 percent ofcitations, and in the first week of January2011, it approved none.90

In response, in February 2011, AmericanTraffic Solutions filed a lawsuit againstBaytown, alleging breach of contract be-cause the city was not approving enoughtickets.91The company also discontinuedoperation of the system.

Andy Taylor, lawyer for the vendor,wrote to Baytown off icials, the entirepurpose of the program is to automate thedetection of red-light runners without thenecessity of relying upon personal obser-vation by a peace officer. By changing theprogram to require personal observation


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of red-light running by a peace officer, thecity has unilaterally breached the materialterms of the agreement.92

City lawyers countered that the vendorwas responsible for complying with all locallaws and regulations under the contract,

and that the new law created by the citizenvote was no different.93

In August 2011, Baytown settled thedispute by authorizing a $1 million pay-ment to American Traffic Solutions andnullifying the ballot initiative in exchangefor early camera removal.94

San Bernardino, CaliforniaSan Bernardino began a contract for photored-light enforcement with Nestor Sys-tems in 2005. American Traffic Solutionstook over the company and the contractin 2009. The contract term extendedthrough 2014 for the last authorizedcamera system.

In January 2011, the San Bernardinochief of police recommended to the citycouncil that the city extend the contractand add cameras. However, based on tes-timony over the proposal, the city councildecided that the City has lost businessbecause of the red-light cameras and

theyre not making the City any safer.95

In other words, the council decided thatthe program was not meeting its objectives.Council members instructed the city man-ager to develop a set of recommendationsfor exiting the contract early.96

In March 2011, the chief of police toldthe city council that exiting the contractwould trigger about $110,000 in fees toAmerican Traffic Solutions. Judging thefee acceptable, the council voted to exit thecontract early.

However, the citys estimate was flawed.American Traffic Solutions came back tothe city, saying that in fact, the terminationfee would approach $1.9 million.97The citybalked at the high cost, and allowed thetraffic cameras to continue operating.98The city attorney and the police chief

began a public disagreement, and the policechief decided to resign.99

The city eventually gave up on its effortto abort the red-light camera contract. InSeptember 2011, the city council votedto extend the operation of its camera

system through July 2014, upgradingsome cameras and moving some to newintersections. American Traffic Solutionsexpects to earn $2.4 million in revenuefrom the deal.100

Victorville, CaliforniaIn March 2011, activists gathered at theVictorville, California, city council meet-ing and urged council members to endthe citys photo red-light enforcementprogram. At the meeting, city managerJim Cox told the city council that whenasked about the possibility of terminatingtheir contract early, Redflex responded,There is no provision in the contract forthe City to buy their way out of the exist-ing contract.101

He concluded that, unless Redflex re-lented, the only way that we can cancel thecontract is to not live by the terms, whichwould cause litigation.102

Victorville had originally signed a con-

tract with Redflex in 2007. This contractallowed the city to terminate the agreementfor any reason, but only within one yearafter the date of camera installation.103InJuly 2010, the city negotiated with Redflexto remove six cameras while extending thecontract for the remaining 10 cameras to2014. This contract did not add any newearly termination language, leaving Vic-torville with no option to end service if itso chose.104

The city hired a lawyer to investigate

its options, who concluded that Redflexis unfortunately not so reasonable. Theyare only interested in making as muchmoney as possible before the cameras areremoved.105

As of the publication of this report, Vic-torville has yet to reach a solution.


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The Sun Sentinel report concluded: Thecompanies hired a legion of lobbyists towork politicians from local city halls to thestate Capitol.111American Traffic Solutionsalone hired as many as 17 lobbyists to workin the state capitol, and nearly another two

dozen to work at the city and county levels,especially in heavily populated areas ofsouthern Florida.112

The lobbying effort yielded victory forcamera vendors in May 2010, when thelegislature authorized the use of priva-tized traffic law enforcement systems.113More vic tories followed in 2011, whenthe legislature defeated an effort to banred-light camera systems and killed a billthat would have required municipalities toadopt longer yellow light times to increaseintersection safetyreducing the revenuepotential of camera systems.114

In its 2010 annual report to investors,Redflex boasted that During FY2011, all ef-forts to ban Redflexs programs through statelegislation were defeated.115Redflex noted inthe report that it would continue to work toimprove the legislative environment by:116

proactively seeking to enable andimprove the statutory basis for road

safety systems as well as defendagainst adverse developments;

using its network of advisors andmunicipal customers to defeat theseefforts [to limit or remove road safetyenforcement technologies];

promot[ing] new laws or amend-ments to existing law that enhance theefficiency and stability of road safetyenforcement programs; and

working proactively to seek legisla-tive approvals in new states.

From 2006 to 2011, Redflex employedmore than 100 registered lobbyists, whoworked in 18 different states.117

Influencing Local Government OfficialsAt the local government level, camera ven-dors work to sell communities on the needfor red-light camera systems, promotingthe concept of cost neutrality to cash-strapped local governments and working to

renew existing contracts. Lobbying tacticsto increase revenues from local govern-ments and citizens have included regularcontact with elected city officials and con-ferences sponsored by camera vendors forassociations of city and county officials.118

Camera vendors also employ legal teamsto defend existing contracts against mu-nicipalities, which often struggle to affordthe corresponding legal fees. For example,American Traffic Solutions successfullyfiled a lawsuit to prevent activists in Bell-ingham, Washington from advancing a2011 ballot initiative that would give votersthe opportunity to force city officials toremove the camera systems.119

Some local officials or their familymembers have even become lobbyists forcamera vendors. For example,

In Chicago, Alderman Mark Fary leftthe city council in 1995. In 2010, hereported making $45,000 as a lobbyist

for clients including Redflex TrafficSystems, the major camera vendorserving Chicago, with two contractstogether worth $84 million.120

In Miami-Dade County, Florida, Car-los Gimenez Jr., son of Mayor CarlosGimenez, is a registered lobbyist forAmerican Traffic Solutions, the lead-ing camera vendor in South Florida.Miami-Dade County is in the processof developing a red-light camera

program.121

After four terms in the Florida Houseof Representatives, Ron Regan re-cently left the legislature and becamethe director of National Advocacyand Outreach for the National


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Coalition for Safer Roads, a groupcreated and funded by AmericanTraffic Solutions (see CreatingGrassroots Support below). Reganwas speaker pro tempore in 2010and played a key role in passing the

bill that authorized red-light camerasystems in Florida.122

Campaign ContributionsCamera vendors also give donations tocandidates for elected office and engage inballot measure campaigns.

American Traffic Solutions gavenearly $240,000 to state candidates foroffice from 2006 to 2011, with morethan $143,000 to candidates in Florida

during the 2010 elections, when a billto legalize cameras was up for consid-eration.123

From 2003 to 2010, Affiliated Com-puter Services contributed more than$1 million toward state elections. Atthe federal level, the company main-tains a Political Action Committeethat spends on the order of $100,000influencing elections in every two-year federal election cycle.124In 2010,

the company spent $900,000 lobbyingthe federal government.125

Influencing Public Opinion andCreating Grassroots SupportAt the same time, private traffic law en-forcement companies are working to buildpublic acceptance for photo enforcementsystems, as well as defend against threatsfrom the citizen initiative process, usingwell-funded public relations campaigns.

Many contracts between camera vendorsand communities also specify that someof the revenue of the program be used forpublic awareness campaigns. To the extentthat these efforts increase awareness oftraffic safety and promote good drivinghabits, they can surely be helpful. However,

Houstons contract with American TrafficSolutions directs up to $120,000 per yearfor public awareness, with the specific ob-jective to limit antagonism, opposition orconcerns about the program.126

In its 2010 annual report, Redflex gives

a fairly clear description of how its publicrelations campaigns works:127

In Arizona an opposition group at-tempted to get an all-out road safetycamera ban on the ballot for November2010. We undertook an extensive grass-roots and media effort including the sup-port of the creation of the Safer ArizonaRoads Alliance. The ban initiative failedto gain sufficient support to be placed onthe November ballot.

We continue to work in each of thestates in which we do business at agrassroot s level to add supporters ofour programs in both the public andprivate sectors, primarily with policeand firefighters associations, health careprofessionals and with government af-fairs officials.

Many of the groups and individuals thatjoin these coalitions have real concerns

about traffic safety and have legitimatelycome to back the use of camera systemswith due considerat ion. However, thefact that self-interested companies drivethe formation of these groups and fundthemoften outside of public viewraisesthe question of how much of this activitywould occur without the companys in-volvement and direction.

In Florida, American Traffic Solu-tions circulated letters of support and

op-ed articles signed by police chiefs.However, the articles failed to men-tion that American Traffic Solutionswas involved in writing or circulatingthem.128The articles might not haveexisted without the public relationseffort of the camera vendor.


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In Arizona, Washington, Missouri,New Mexico, and other locations,camera vendors have created astroturforganizations designed to create theappearance of grassroots support. Forexample, American Traffic Solutions

created the National Coalition forSafer Roads, run by public relationsfirm Storm King Strategies, LLC.129

American Traffic Solutions createdthe group Missouri Families for SaferRoads, and recruited HazelwoodPolice Chief Carl Wolf as the spokes-person for the group to effectivelypromote ATS and red-light cameras.130

In New Mexico, a city council mem-ber placed an advisory question onthe ballot in October 2011, askingcitizens for their opinion on whetherto continue the citys red-light cam-era program or not. Leading up tothe vote, registered voters receivedflyers in the mail from a group calledSafe Roads Albuquerque, advocat-ing for the continuance of the camerasystem. The flyers did not mentionthat Redflex supported the organiza-

tion. In the months leading up to theelection, Redflex contributed morethan $140,000 to fund mailings andadvertising designed to influence theoutcome of the vote.131

In Washington, activists in Mukilteoworked to bring a ballot initiativeopposing cameras to vote in 2010.

In response, American Traffic Solu-tions filed suit. According to emailsbetween the mayor of Mukilteo andBill Kroske, an executive at AmericanTraffic Solutions, obtained by lo-cal newspaper The Heraldthrough a

public records request, Kroske wrote,We would like to get the Eymaninitiative stopped before it goes tovote. [] We have hired a strongSeattle attorney firm ... but they needa Mukilteo resident to use for thefiling. The e-mail further suggestedthat the mayor could serve that role,but a resident might look better.132

The law firm ended up representinga client organization called MukilteoCitizens for Simple Government,which apparent ly consists of onlyone local member, who does notrespond to media requests for in-terviews.133

Bill Kroske was indefinitely sus-pended from American TrafficSolutions after The Heraldrevealedthat he had been falsely represent-ing himself as a disinterested local

Snohomish County resident onits website who supported camerasystems and attacked camera detrac-torsand not revealing that he wasin fact an executive of the companythat was working to defend its con-tracts by preventing citizen votesover camera systems.134


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The experience of cities that haveprivatized aspects of their traffic lawenforcement duties in recent years

shows major risks involved in privatizationdeals. Bad deals can erode a citys authorityto set its own traffic safety goals and leavetaxpayers saddled with millions of dollarsin unanticipated costs.

To prevent bad dea ls, governmentsshould avoid deals with private firms that

constrain their discretion about how toprotect public safety. Automated trafficenforcement should be used solely as a toolfor enhancing traffic safetynot a cashcow for municipalities or private firms.Instead, local governments across theUnited States should embrace some basicprinciples governing traffic enforcementprivatization deals.

1. Cities should put public safety firstin decisions regarding enforce-

ment of traffic laws. Safety, not thepotential to generate revenue, shouldguide local governments decisionson outsourcing traffic enforcement.Local governments should base deci-sions about these systems only froma safety standpoint and continue to

evaluate system performance overtime. For example, a bipartisan billconsidered in California would haveprohibited a governmental agencythat proposes to install or operate anautomated traffic enforcement systemfrom considering revenue generation,beyond recovering its actual costsof operating the system, as a factorwhen considering whether or not to

install or operate a system within itslocal jurisdiction.135

2. Evaluate automated traffic enforce-ment against alternative options.Local governments should evaluateautomated traffic enforcement along-side other options for improving traf-fic safety based on a thorough safetyperformance assessment. For example,re-engineering intersections or chang-ing the timing of yellow lights may,

in some circumstances, be a more ef-fective way of reducing accidents thaninstalling red-light cameras. Similarly,traffic calming measures and/orimproved facilities for pedestriansand bicyclists may be more effectivesolutions to protect the public from

Protecting the Public in PrivatizedTraffic Law Enforcement Deals


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Protecting the Public 31

speeding or careless drivers than morevigorous enforcement of traffic lawson poorly designed roads.

3. Local governments should ensurethat contract language is free of

conflicts of interest. Governmentsshould obtain the resources neces-saryincluding experienced legalcounselto negotiate agreementswith companies, rather than relyingon stock language drafted by cameravendors. Governments should notassume that the language from othermunicipalities contracts is a goodbasis for their own contracts.

4. Avoid incentives for vendors thatare based on the volume of ticketsor fines. Governments should en-sure that contract payment terms donot include arrangements that sharerevenue on a per-ticket basis, whetherthey are capped or not. Recogniz-ing the potential for abuse with thesetypes of contracts, several states haveoutlawed fee-per-ticket arrangements,including California in 2004, Texas in2007, Maryland in 2006, and Florida

in 2010. Other states that have autho-rized or are considering authorizingprivatized traffic law enforcementshould also ban per-ticket paymentschemes.

5. Public officials should retain com-plete control over all transportationpolicy decisions. Local govern-ments should not sign contracts thatstipulate the duration of yellow trafficsignals, the enforcement of right turn

violations, the placement of camerasystems, or that proscribe the use ofalternative methods to increase safetyon any public road. Communitiesshould not face steep financial penal-ties as a price to exercise this right ofself-determination.

6. Local governments should alwaysretain the ability to withdraw froma contract early if dissatisfied withthe service or its effects. Contractsshould include language allowingpenalty-free early termination in the

event that a camera system fails toachieve community goals. This createsa risk for vendors, but it also creates anincentive for vendors to avoid issuingviolations that citizens will see as un-fair. Vendors must rely on the excel-lence of their service to keep localitiesinterested in retaining their business.Communities ability to decide howlaw-enforcement decisions get imple-mented is not a right that a contractshould be able to trade away.

7. The process of contracting withvendors must be completely openwith ample opportunity for em-powered public participation.Governments considering automatictraffic enforcement systems shouldannounce those intentions and explainthe rationale on safety grounds beforesoliciting bids. Governments shouldensure that citizens are involved with

any decision about traffic law enforce-ment privatization from the earlieststages. Public officials should publiclyacknowledge any gifts or campaigncontributions from vendors well be-fore signing any contracts. Contractsabout automated traffic enforcementshould not be insulated from the bal-lot question or referendum process,where it exists.

8. The outcome of traffic enforce-

ment contracts should be fullytransparent and accessible online.Information about the number of cita-tions, the number of rejected citations,the number of fines, and the amountof fine revenue going to the city andthe vendor should be provided online


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and broken down for every approachor intersection, including past infor-mation. Contractors already track thisinformation. Citizens should be em-powered to scrutinize these outcomesand to pose questions based on the

data that will be promptly addressedby the vendor. Vendors should listthis information on a website whoseaddress is listed on every ticket. Thosewebsites should also detail the criteriathe company uses to decide which carsreceive infractions and which infrac-tions to reject. Local governmentsshould evaluate the effectiveness ofcamera systems on safety and publishthe results.

9. Information gathered by trafficenforcement vendors about indi-

vidual vehicles and drivers shouldnot be permitted for other uses.In the course of operating a trafficenforcement system, vendors maygather substantial information aboutindividual drivers, vehicle owners andtheir whereabouts. Generally, con-tracts limit the ability of companiesto use the information they obtain

during the course of operating cam-era systems. However, governmentsmust remain vigilant in preventingintentional or unintentional misuse

of this information. Contractors whoparticipate in law-enforcement shouldnot use this position to profit fromexposure to confidential informationabout individuals and their vehicles.These photos and other informa-

tion should not be used for any otherpurpose than enforcement of safetyrules, and must not be sold or leasedto other parties. Vendors must havea plan to regularly attest compliancewith requirements to eliminate thisinformation as it becomes possible,and they should be held responsible ifpersonal data is stolen, distributed ormade available to other privateparties.

10.States should consider establish-ing standards to help cities avoidcontracting for automated enforce-ment systems that are not justifiedor when alternatives make moresense. States already maintain a hostof rules for best practices, such asminimum traffic signal times and visi-bility standards. Following the FederalHighway Administrations guidance,states should consider creating rules

to ensure that localities thoroughlyconsider other ways to improve safetybefore introducing automated trafficenforcement.

Privatization and Transparency

Privatizing traffic law enforcement should not compromise transparency, but shouldbe operated as openly as if the service were provided by a public entity. Arguably, thefact that decisions are made by companies that are not under normal public oversight

makes the need for extraordinary transparency even greater. Unlike a public entity, aprivate operator is not subject to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests fromthe public. It may also seek to prevent public scrutiny by declaring certain informa-tion to be a proprietary business secret. This should not be allowed.


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Appendix 33

The following lists were compiled from lists of clients provided by the two largestcamera vendors, Redflex and American Traffic Solutions, supplemented by a listingdeveloped by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. See Does Anyone Know

How Many Communities Have Automated Traffic Enforcement Contracts? on page 10for more details. The tables begin on the following page.

Appendix:Communities Outsourcing Aspects

of Traffic Law Enforcement


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Appendix 35

State Jurisdiction

Alabama Center Point

Clay

Montgomery

Opelika

Selma

Arizona Ahwatukee Foothills

Avondale

Chandler

El Mirage

Eloy

Globe

Marysville

Mesa

Paradise Valley

Peoria

Phoenix

Prescott Valley

Scottsdale

Show Low

Sierra Vista

Star Valley

Superior

Surprise

Tempe

Tucson

Pima County

California Arleta

Bakersfield

Appendix Table 2: List of Jurisdictions with Traffic Law Enforcement Deals

State Jurisdiction

CA (contd) Baldwin Park

Bell Gardens

Belmont

Berkeley

Beverly Hills

Capitola

Cathedral City

Cerritos

Citrus Heights

Commerce

Compton

Corona

Costa Mesa

Covina

Culver City

Cupertino

Daly City

Davis

Del Mar

El Cajon

El Monte

Elk Grove

Emeryville

Encinitas

Escondido

Fairfield

Fremont

Fresno

Note on Appendix Table 2:

Each listed community does not necessarily issue automated traffic tickets currently. Thedata is based on insurance agency lists of communities where red-light camera systems areused, plus company lists of automated traffic system client communities. Further discus-sion of the limitations of this data can be found in the text box Does Anyone Know HowMany Communities Have Automated Traffic Enforcement Contracts? on page 10, and

its footnotes. The data does not include contracting that began after September 2011.


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State Jurisdiction

CA (contd) Fullerton

Garden Grove

Gardena

Glendale

Grand Terrace

Hawthorne

Hayward

Highland

Huntington Beach

Indian Wells

Inglewood

Laguna Woods

Lancaster

Long Beach

Los Alamitos

Lynwood

Manteca

Marysville

Maywood

Menlo Park

Millbrae

Modesto

Montclair

Montebello Moreno Valley

Murrieta

Napa

Newark

Oakland

Oceanside

Oroville

Oxnard

Pasadena

Poway Rancho Cordova

Rancho Cucamonga

Redding

Redlands

State Jurisdiction

CA (contd) Redwood City

Rio Vista

Riverside

Rocklin

Roseville

Sacramento

San Bruno

San Carlos

San Diego

San Francisco

San Juan Capistrano

San Leandro

San Mateo

San Rafael

Santa Ana

Santa Clarita

Santa Fe Springs

Santa Maria

Solana Beach

South Gate

South San Francisco

Stockton

Union City

Upland Ventura

Victorville

Vista

Walnut

West Hollywood

Yuba City

Yucaipa

Los Angeles County

Sacramento County

San Bernardino CountyColorado Aurora

Boulder

Cherry Hills Village


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Appendix 39

State Jurisdiction

IL (contid) Des Plaines

East Dundee

East Saint Louis

Elgin

Elmwood Park

Evergreen Park

Forest Park

Fox Lake

Franklin Park

Geneva

Glendale Heights

Granite City

Gurnee

Highland Park Hoffman Estates

Hometown

Homewood

Justice

Lake in the Hills

Lake Zurich

Libertyville

Lincolnwood

Lisle

Lyons Markham

Maywood

Melrose Park

Morton Grove

Naperville

New Lenox

North Chicago

North Riverside

Northfield

Northlake

Oak Forest

Oak Lawn

Olympia Fields

Orland Park

Palatine

State Jurisdiction

IL (contid) Palos Heights

Plainfield

Richton Park

Roselle

Schiller Park

Skokie

South Chicago Heights

South Elgin

South Holland

Statewide work zones

Saint Charles

Stickney

Streamwood

Summit Tinley Park

Villa Park

Warrenville

Wauconda

Waukegan

Westchester

Western Springs

Wheeling

Willowbrook

Winfield Worth

Cook County

Iowa Cedar Rapids

Clive

Council Bluffs

Davenport

Des Moines

Fort Dodge

Muscatine

Sioux City

Louisiana Ascension Parish

Baker

Baton Rouge

Broussard

Denham Springs


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State Jurisdiction

LA (contd) Gretna

Jefferson Parish

Lafayette

Livingston Parish

New Orleans

Westwego

Zachary

Maryland Annapolis

Anne Arundel

Baltimore

Bel Air

Berwyn Heights

Bladensburg

Bowie Brentwood

Chestertown

Cheverly

Chevy Chase

College Park

Colmar Manor

Cottage City

Edmonton

Forest Heights

Frederick Gaithersburg

Greenbelt

Hyattsville

Landover Hills

Laurel

Morningside

Mt. Rainier

New Carrollton

Princess Anne

Riverdale Park

Rockville

Salisbury

Silver Spring

Statewide work zones

Takoma Park

State Jurisdiction

MD (contd) Trappe

University Park

Westminster

Anne Arundel County

Baltimore County

Charles County

Howard County

Montgomery County

Prince Georges County

Wicomico County

Massachusetts Blackstone

Pittsfield

Salem

SaugusMinnesota Minneapolis

Missouri Arnold

Bellerive

Bel-Nor

Berkeley

Beverly Hills

Brentwood

Bridgeton

Calverton Park

Charlack Clayton

Columbia

Cool Valley

Country Club Hills

Creve Coeur

Dellwood

Edmundson

Ellisville

Excelsior Springs

Festus

Florissant

Ferguson

Gladstone

Grandview

Hannibal


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Appendix 41

State Jurisdiction

MO (contd) Hazelwood

Kansas City

Moline Acres

Northwoods

Oak Grove

Richmond Heights

Springfield

Saint Ann

Saint Charles

Saint John

Saint Joseph

Saint Louis

Saint Peters

State roads Sugar Creek

Uplands Park

Vinita Park

Webster Groves

Wentzville

New Jersey Berlin

Brick

Bridgeton

Bound Brook

Burlington Cherry Hill

Cinnaminson

Collingswood

Deptford

East Brunswick

Windsor

Edison

Englewood Cliffs

Glassboro

Gloucester City

Haddon Heights

Hamilton

Hasbrouck Heights

Hillside

Jersey City

State Jurisdiction

NJ (contd) Lawrence

Linden

Little Falls

Manalapan

Middle

Monroe

Morristown

New Brunswick

Newark

Ocean

Palisades Park

Passaic

Paterson

Pennsauken Perth Amboy

Phillipsburg

Piscataway

Pohatcong

Rahway

Roseland

Roselle Park

New Brunswick

Springfield

Stratford Union City

Union

Wayne

Woodbridge

Woodland Park

New Mexico Albuquerque

Las Cruces

Rio Rancho

Santa Fe

New York Buffalo

New York

Port Jefferson Station

Rochester

Yonkers

Nassau County


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State Jurisdiction

NY (contd) Suffolk County

North Carolina Cary

Knightdale

Raleigh

Wilmington

Ohio Akron

Ashtabula

Cleveland

Columbus

Dayton

East Cleveland

Hamilton

Middletown

Northwood Parma

Parma Heights

South Euclid

Springfield

Toledo

Trotwood

West Carrollton City

Oregon Albany

Beaverton

Hillsboro Medford

Milwaukie

Newberg

Portland

Roseburg

Salem

Sherwood

Saint Helens

Tualatin

Pennsylvania Philadelphia

Rhode Island Providence

South Dakota Sioux Falls

Tennessee Bluff City

Chattanooga

Clarksville

State Jurisdiction

TN (contd) Cleveland

Farragut

Gallatin

Germantown

Huntingdon

Jackson

Johnson City

Jonesborough

Kingsport

Knoxville

McKenzie

Medina

Memphis

Millington Morristown

Mount Carmel

Mount Juliet

Murfreesboro

Oak Ridge

Red Bank

Selmer

Union City

Shelby County

Texas Allen Amarillo

Arlington

Austin

Balch Springs

Balcones Heights

Bastrop

Baytown

Beaumont

Bedford

Burleson

Carrollton

Cedar Hill

Cleveland

Conroe

Coppell


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Appendix 43

State Jurisdiction

TX (contd) Corpus Christi

Dallas

Dalworthington Gardens

Denton

Diboll

Duncanville

El Paso

Elgin

Farmers Branch

Forney

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