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sub jec t New submission

~ i t l e : M r F i r s t Name: Liam surname: sheahan organ isa t ion : Email: - Postal Address 1: - Postal Address 2: suburb: Broadford postcode: 3658 s ta te : VIC Telephone: - Main Topics:

Towns 1: Towns 2: Towns 3: Acknowledgements: * I acknowled e t h a t my submission w i l l be t r e a t e d as a p u b l i c document

and mav be oubyished. auoted o r summarised bv t h e 2009 V i c t o r i a n Bushf i res . . Royal Commission. * I understand t h a t I can be contacted bv t h e Roval commission i n

r e l a t i o n t o my submission. I would l i k e t o receive f u t u r e updates about t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e Royal

Commission.

Submission to the 2009 Bushfire Royal Commission From: Liam Paul Sheahan of -

Reedy Creek, Victoria 3658

To The Honourable Bernard George Teague A 0 Ronald Neville McLeod AM Susan Mary Pascoe AM

Dear Commissioners, The following is my submission relating to the bushfire

event of Saturday 7th February 2009. I will start with some relevant background information, make submissions relating to points one, two and five of the terms of reference of the Royal Commission and attach as an addendum a report done on our property in 2004 by Dr. Kevin Tolhurst in relation to achieving a moderate level of risk (down from extreme) from attack to our dwelling by bushfire. (Dr. Tolhurst has made a subsequent inspection of our property since the bushfire of 7th February and you may wish to question him yourselves when he appears before you.)

BACKGROUND:

In 2002 my wife Dale and I cleared approximately 247 trees around our dwelling to make it safer from attack by wildfire. (To put the number of trees in perspective prior to February the events of February 7th 2009 there would have been between 30,000 and 40,000 trees on our property) Our property is 105 acres in size and the area we cleared is our house yard.

At the time we cleared the trees we were unaware that we were breaking any planning laws and thought we were doing the right and responsible thing in making our property safe. Dale had previously asked a planning officer of the local Mitchell Shire if we could clear around our home and had been told verbally we could clear out to 100 metres, unfortunately Dale only had verbal advice and the planning officer concerned denied in court that the conversation had occurred. (A costly lesson here: Get all advice in writing and do not trust local authorities).

The Shire of Mitchell, led by then CEO Garry Cecil launched a campaign of attrition against us that is now history. For reasons best known to himself, he continually used the local media feeding them information about us. We actually found out we were being taken to Court by the Shire from a journalist a couple of days before we got the official notification from the Shire. This journalist told us that CEO Cecil had told her to call him personally every two weeks for updates.

We were taken to Court, were convicted of four criminal offences each, almost emotionally and fmancially destroyed by the process and have had to suffer the public spread of lies and misinformation about us and our case by Mitchell Shire Officers and others which continue to this day, however the events of "Black Saturday" February Seventh 2009 have been a complete vindication of our actions in 2002 to protect our property because our buildings are the only

ones left standing in our area. ALL OUR NEIGHBOURS WERE BURNT OUT, 100 percent of them!!!!!

We are obviously not happy with the way we were treated by the local Mitchell Shire and the outcome of their actions and some of the statements that are still being put out by their representatives however we will deal with that later after the Royal Commission process has concluded. It would be nice if they came to us with an apology etc. for what they put us through before we have to go looking for them, but we think that is highly unlikely. In the interim we have some of the fmest minds in the country looking at the situation in preparation for any course of action that we may choose to take!

THE EVENTS OF "BLACK SATURDAY" FEBRUARY 7th 2009:

On Feb 7th we had been going about our normal business. We were obviously aware that it was a very hot and therefore potentially dangerous day for bushfires, but this is Australia and bushfires are one of the things that Australia does best. What we do as a family that lives in the Australian bush is to be aware of our surroundings and act appropriately. You cannot stop living life and doing what needs to be done just because it is a bit hot, however it is essential that you maintain an adequate awareness of your environment and be prepared to act accordingly as circumstances change.

Our property was burnt by the Kilmore East fire. The Fire started several kilometres to the West of us in the afternoon. We maintain a listening watch on the local CFA frequency and were aware that a fire had started and its location. As we are on top of the Dividing Range we can see many kilometres out towards the West and Southwest and we could see the smoke rising. Fire behaviour in South Eastern Australia is a "pretty standard" thing.

If a fire starts on a hot day (generally a day withnortherly winds) and it gets away from the responding Fire Services it will burn towards the South. If it happens to be the last day of the typical hot weather patterns there will end up being a wind shift usually later in the day to the Southwest and if the fire has not been contained it will turn the Eastern flank into the front and burn ferociously out towards the Northeast if fuel is available. This is Standard fire behaviour, this is to be expected and this is not unusual. This is what happened on February 7th with the Kilmore East Fire and at approximately the same time with the Murrindindi Mill fire. The source of ignition and what was done about the fire are really irrelevant to the process. A fire needs three things to burn, Heat, Oxygen and Fuel. If there is a source of ignition together with heat, oxygen and fuel a fire will result. We cannot do anything about the heat, it does not matter whether you are a believer in climate change or a climate change sceptic at some time there will be hot days. We like the oxygen levels to stay about the same all the time and the only thing we have any control over is the amount of fuel that is left around for the fire to feed on. If you reduce the amount of any of the components of this "Fire Triangle" you reduce the intensity of the fire.

Once we heard that the fire had "gotten away" from the fire services we looked at the weather information to see if there was going to be a wind change

later in the day. There was one predicted and at that time we knew that after the change we would eventually "wear it9'(the Bushfire) later that day. We telephoned our neighbours told them of the situation and advised them to implement their fire plans. Most of our neighbours opted to leave and some brought their animals to our place. We opted to stay as we had prepared for it. (I will say at this point we are supporters of the current policy of "leave early or stay and defend", however this decision needs to be made from a suitable knowledge base. I believe that people who choose to live in any environment have a duty to themselves and their families to fmd out the required knowledge to adequately survive in that environment.) Wildfire events such as this do not occur in Hawthorn or South Melbourne, they are however a regular occurrence in the bush and the severity of any given incident will mainly be affected by the availability of the three components of the fire triangle, HEAT, OXYGEN and FUEL!

As I said above, once we knew that a South Westerly wind change was predicted we knew we were going to be in the front of the fire. I won't go into it here about facing the fire, suffice to say it was probably the most horrific experience that we have ever faced. I have been a CFA fire fighter for many years and my daughter and son are also CFA fire fighters, when we fight fires safety dictates that you attackit from the flanks however on February 7th 2009 we were left with no choice but to face it "front on" or lose our home. We were adequately prepared for it but all the things you may have heard about the roar and horror of it are true.

After the front had passed we went outside and extinguished what we could and prevented anything else from being destroyed. We lost several vehicles and a couple of sheds and during the most severe part of the passage of the fire front our house ignited internally several times from ember attack which we extinguished.

At about 6:45 am on Sunday February 7th my Daughter Kirsten and I went for a walk along the road to check for any trees that may be blocking access to our area. We walked because we were not in a hurry and because with everything being destroyed there would be no need to hurry for a while! About one kilometre from our house we found our elderly neighbours wandering in a distressed and dazed condition. These neighbours had also opted to stay and defend their home however they were not successful but did escape with their lives. At the place where we found our neighbours there were trees fallen across the road blocking it. I was just at the point of calling my wife to come up in the car and take the neighbours back to the safety of our place when two other neighbours who opted to leave early returned to the other side of the fallen trees and I asked one of them to take the elderly couple to Kilmore hospital. My Son Rowan then came up with a chainsaw and we cleared the road

Whilst this event is probably the most distressing thing we have ever faced, with the possible exception of Mitchell Shire Council trying to destroy us, this event was not unexpected, it was not unprecedented, and it practically makes me physically sick when I see the backside covering statements of Politicians trying to distance themselves from their responsibility and culpability

and the heads of the emergency services who would know better are just toeing the government line. I am assuming that these people are not fools otherwise they would not be in these positions of responsibility so there must be some other reason for them not stating the obvious!

PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT CONCERNS:

As is obvious from what I have written above we have grave concerns with the current planning laws and regulations and also with the Government management (or maybe that should be mismanagement) of our environment. We have been victimised and ahnost had our lives destroyed by power mad bureaucrats and their overzealous application of planning laws against us and I am sure that during the course of this commission you will fmd situations where people have been killed because of the end result of the application of planning and environmental laws and regulations.

It is my opinion that this problem stems directly from our government and their actions or inactions in certain areas, also in their tendency to overregulate everybody because they think people are too stupid (especially country people) to make decisions about anything and these people need to be told what to do and forced to comply with their government edicts.

In our system of government with the preferential system of voting major parties (in our particular case the ALP for the last three terms, so the problems rest with them) rely on preferences from minor political groups such as the Greens to obtain and retain power. Once they are in power it is payback time and some of the paybackis to "give legs" to some of these dangerous and stupid environmental polices such as not doing sufficient controlled burning or letting the habitat build up on the roadsides to provide wildlife corridors." Don't worry about it". "It will only effect some country people and they won't vote for us anyway" "It's better to keep these City based people that keep us in power onside" "stuff the country people" etc. etc. etc!!!

Well as I am sure that you have heard elsewhere in this Royal Commission, typically in the bush of South Eastern Australia (including unmanaged roadside corridors) HABITAT falls from the trees at the rate of about a tonne per hectare per year. When this habitat accumulates on the ground it changes its name to GROUND FUEL. Any amount of ground fuel over the amount of five tonne per hectare is considered dangerous and should be reduced by a controlled burn (which will not destroy the environment and all the little creatures as green groups would have you believe). If this ground fuel is not removed and fifteen or twenty years go by without a fire the amount of fuel available to feed a fire on a bad day (Heat, Oxygen and Fuel) will lead to catastrophic events such as occurred on February 7th 2009 and ahnost total destruction of the environment.

By letting these "lunatic" policies and practices become the normal practice everyone and everything has become the losers! The greens have lost their precious environment, Country people have lost their lives and livelihoods and everyone has had to pay the price! Australia does bushfires very well, it has

done for a long time and will continue to do so into the future. These fires were not unprecedented. They were not unexpected and they should not have been a shock to anyone with more than half a brain. This is Australia, This is what happens.

A large proportion of the blame for the scale of the devastation caused by the "Black Saturday" Bushfires must lie with the Government of the day because they are ultimately responsible for the Planning and Environment policies and to a lesser extent the local government authorities that implement these polices. I am also sure that some local government authorities will be found more culpable than others.

IGNORANCE:

It is my opinion that complacency, ignorance and a total lack of awareness of the dangers involved led to many of the unfortunate outcomes of February 7th. As I stated above the occurrence of this fire was not unexpected, it was not a shock It was not an unusual event. What is sad is the total devastation and the loss of life that could have been avoided if people had taken a bit of time to arm themselves with a bit of relevant knowledge. We knew several hours before we got burnt when the fire was burning away from us towards Wandong that it was going to get us that day. This is not because we have some marvellous gift of clairvoyance or such, it is simply that we understand our environment and checked the weather report!

Too many people do not make a basic effort to arm themselves with knowledge. The CFA and probably other organisations go to great lengths to make information available to people but few ever avail themselves of it. Many people are unaware of what is involved with the "leave early or stay and defend" policy and I would suggest it is a bit late to try and fmd out about it when you are under ember attack Ignorant people panic. Cause problems for the emergency services by taking their focus off doing their job and in many cases get themselves and others hurt or killed.

Too many people move from an urban environment to a bush environment and take their ignorance and city values with them. Many have an ideal of what their bush environment should be like and set about achieving it without realising what they are doing may be dangerous in a wildfire situation. Many would think that this would never happen to them but unfortunately it often does. As I have stated previously this sort of wildfire behaviour is pretty standard stuff, admittedly the severity of i t was pretty well off the scale on the day but the actual event was not unexpected.

CONCLUSIONS:

Fire behaviour in South Eastern Australia at any given time is a standard sort of thing. Only the severity of it will change from incident to incident because of the conditions prevailing at the time.

There needs to be serious revision of the planning laws, particularly relating to the removal of native vegetation. More credence should be given to local knowledge and landholders should be able to manage their own property without being bullied and victimised by local government.

Government policies and inaction in the area of fuel management led to an increase in severity of the Fires.

There needs to be no "knee jerk" quick fix policy changes to building in certain areas. Every site needs to be assessed individually and appropriate recommendations made. I am sure that as you toured the effected areas you have observed wooden cottages still standing while neighbouring brick dwellings were burnt.

Local government policies and dangerous build up of fuel on roadsides caused problems. (This is probably an understatement!)

SUMMATION:

This is probably enough from me on this particular subject and I am sure that you will have many more submissions to work through. I am totally passionate about this situation not only because of the traumatic effect on us facing the fire but also because of our situation being bullied, victimised and criminally prosecuted by Mitchell Shire for protecting our house by removing dangerous trees in our house yard. We had put most of the emotional scarring caused by the prosecution behind us and were getting on with life when the fire of February 7th occurred. When we were the only house left standing in our area we obviously felt that our judgment in 2002 was vindicated but at the same time it brought all the old feelings of hurt and anger that we had tried to put behind us to the surface again. We are still totally angry at the Mitchell Shire for what they did to us and the way that they went about it and if anything at all comes out of this enquiry i t should be that no local government should ever be able to do to a landholder what Mitchell Shire did to us and that if it is found that Local government policies and actions led or contributed to the death, injury or destruction of someone's property the shire and officee concerned should be prosecuted. Maybe that would lead to some commonsense in the future.

Attached is a copy of Dr. Kevin Tolhurst's 2004 report on our property.

Yours Sincerely Liam Sheahan

Page 2

Report on Some Fire Protection Measures to Achieve a Moderate Level of Risk for the Sheahan Property at Reedy Creek

Dv. Kevin Tolhuv.~t, Univev.uty ofMelbourne

I . Background I was approached by lawyers acting for the Sheahans of Reedy Creek to provide an expert opinion on the extent of the clearing undertaken on the Sheahan property at - Reedy Creek. This engagement was confirmed by letter from the Sheahan's on 7 April 2004. The need for this opinion arose from a dispute between the Sheahans and the Mitchell S h e Council with regard to the clearing of native vegetation on the Sheahan property. The Sheahans undertook the clearing work to reduce the risk of losing their home in apossible wildfire. The extent of this clearing can be seen in Fig. 1.

This report records my observations at the property and presents a summary of some modeling work I undertook to find what type of fuel management was needed to be undertaken around the house to reduce the risk of losing their house in a wildfire.

F i ~ u r e 1. Panoramicview for the house looking in a northerly direction. The driveway from - the Thompson Spur Rd to the housecan be seen ;n the left half of the photograph A dam on the property IS just vlslble In the left of the photo Some deciduous trees planted around the house can be seen In the foreground

2. Professional Basis of My Expertise and Opinion A detailed account of my practical, academic and research experience is given in my Curriculum Vitae attached as Appendix 1. A brief summary of my expertise follows.

I am currently employed by the University of Melbourne at the School of Forestry, Creswick Campus as a Senior Lecturer in Fire Ecology and Management. I have been an employee of the University since 1997.

In 1974, I was awarded a cadetship by the Forests Commission of Victoria to study Forestry. I hold a Diploma of Forestry obtained at the School of Forestry Creswick in 1976, a Bachelor of Forest Science (Hons.) awarded by the University of Melbourne in 1980 and a Doctor of Philosophy awarded by the University of Melbourne in 1996, funded by an Australian Forestry Post-graduate Scholarship.

Sheahan Property - F~re Protechon Report

Page 3

After graduating with the Diploma of Forestry, I worked for the Forests Commission of Victoria predominantly involved in environmental and timber assessment of the mountain forests of central Victoria. In 1980, I worked for a short time in East Gippsland studying the vegetation in experimental logging areas. In 1980 and in 1981, I lectured and tutored at the School of Forestry in the University of Melbourne's Bachelor of Forest Science. In 1982 and 1983 1 was based in Alexandra in central Victoria, where I was responsible for timber harvesting planning and operations and for recreation management in that Forest District. In 1984, I took up a Fire Research position with the Forests Commission based in Creswick. Here I initiated and managed a major multidisciplinary fire research program based in the foothill forests of Central Victoria. In 1997, I resigned from the Department of Natural Resources and Environment and took up a Fire Ecology and Management teaching and research position with the University of Melbourne.

Between 1974 and 1985, I undertook a wide range of fire related roles and duties as an employee of the forestry department. My roles included being member of firefighter crews, crew leader, sector leader, communications officer, and fire controller. I have attended numerous small wildfires and anumber of large fires including fires in the north-east of Victoria in 1979 and 1985, in East Gippsland in 1977 and Central Victoria in 1983. Since that time I have attended a number of major fires in the role of a fire behaviour and fire weather technical specialist. Some recent examples of these are the Sydney busbfires in 1994, the Berringa Fire in 1995, the Moora Moora fire in the Grampians in 1995, the Creswick Fire in 1997, the Little Desert fires in 1997, the Caledonia Fire in 1998, the Mt Difficult fire in the Grampians in 1999. Sydney bushfires 2001. Big Desert Fire 2002. and SE Australian fires 2003. My duties as a field Forester and a Fire Researcher has also resulted in me attending a wide range of prescribed fires ranging from high intensity prescribed fires in logging slash to low intensity prescribed fires in foothill forests. My experimental work in the Wombat State Forest requires the repeated application of operational- scale low intensity prescribed fires for which I have had the responsibility.

Since 1979, I have published 95 scientific papers and reports related to fire management. These publications have ranged from information leaflets and articles for the general public to national and international conference papers and scientific papers in international journals. A recent publication is a book titled "Synopsis of the Knowledge Used in Prescr~bedBurning in Victoria" co-authored by Phil Cheney, CSIRO. Bushfue Research and Management. I played a key role in the development of anational fire danger rating system in South Africa where I was employed to give an international perspective and technical depth to this work. I gave extensive expert evidence to the Linton Coronial Inquiry in Victoria over the period 1999 to 2001, and have advised the ACT Government lawyers on their Coronial submission in 2003.


Page 4

3. Source Information Materials Provided to me by the Sheahans

1. Detailed feature survev of housevard (1: 1000) 2. Photocopied topographc map showing approximate boundaries of property 3. Photocopied enlargement of aerial photograph taken 24/12/89 showing

property and surrounds. 4. Photocopy of report prepared by John Nicholson, Community Safety Services

Pty Ltd, for Mitchell Shire Council: "Profess~onal Opimon on the Destruction ofNative Vegetation for Wildj?re Protection Purposes at -

Reedy Creek." 28 March 2003, 8pp.

owners

4. Scenario Methodology The objective of this exercise was to investigate the factors that will affect the chances of the house on the Sheahan property catching alight when approached by a wildfire burning in extreme fire weather. Given that the house has already been built and there is no feasible way to significantly change the general topography surrounding the house, various scenarios were investigated where the nature of the fuel around the house were managed in different ways to find which combination of fuel management strategies would provide an acceptable level of risk to the house and its inhabitants.

These scenarios do not consider the potential impact on house survival of various house design features, whether or not the house will be occupied at the time of a wildfire, whether or not the house will be actively defended by the owners or a fire brigade, or the impact of fire protection features such as fixed sprinklers, protective fences or walls around the house, etc..

On inspecting the site and looking at aerial photographs and topographic maps of the house and its environment, it is clear that the house is sited in a very hazardous position with respect to the potential impact of fire. Given the fact that the most likely direction of afire impacting on the house under extreme fire weather conditions will be from the north-west ahead of a cold front or from the south-west following a cold front, the scenarios considered the potential impact of fire from these two directions. It can be seen from the topographic map shown in Fig. 2, that the house is located on a ridge. This ridge is orientated approximately east-west so that the slope of the ground to the east and the west is relatively gentle. However, the slopes away from the house to the north and south are quite steep. Added to this is the fact that the orientation of the gullies, which are likely to help channel any approaching fire, are aligned approximately NW and SW, the direction of the likely winds during an extreme fire event. Fig. 2 shows the most likely paths of a major fire run towards the house should a fire occur. The aerial photograph shown in Fig. 3 also shows the likely path of a threatening fire towards the house. It can be seen from this photograph, that there are significant areas of forest on the slopes to the NW and to the SW and that these areas of forest extend for at least one kdometer down-slope and potentially downwind of the house.


Page 6

Figure 3. Aerlal photograph taken 24/12/89 showlng the locat~on of the Sheahan property (red clrcle) and the nature of the vegetatlon and topography In the path of a flre comlng from the NW or the SW Thls photo predates the clear~ng around Sheahan's house, but most of the other vegetatlon IS slmllar today as IS shown In I989 (Source Yea project M18, 7923, Run 8, 4305-1 62)


Page 7

The House Ignition Likelihood Index (HILI) model integrates the effects of the weather, fuel, topography and house exposure. The model is described in detail by Tolhurst and Howlett (2003). This model is based on the best available understanding of how fires behave and how houses ignite. The model was tested on an area in Mt Macedon burnt by the Ash Wednesday fires of 1983 and so is an area where the survival or destruction of houses is now known. The model gave a high level of predictability (Tolhurst and Howlett 2003) and is therefore considered to be a valid tool for this analysis.

The weather conditions used in the model are for those considered to occur in a 1 in 45 year event, such as Ash Wednesday 1983 and Black Friday 1939. The Forest Fire Danger Index (McArthur 1967, 1977) under these weather conditions was about 100 which is Extreme fire danger. Based on the Bureau of Meteorology's automatic weather station at Mangalore, Extreme rorest lire danger (FDI > 50) has occurred on 19 days in the period from 2001 to 2004 (Table 1). The maximum Forest FDI in this period was 83 which occurred in February 2004, so a Forest FDI of 100 over a longer period, in the vicinity of the Sheahan's property, is not out of the question. [Mangalore is about 35 krn to the north of the Sheahan's property and at lower elevation (1 40 rn cf 570 rn elevation), this would mean that average air temperatures at the Sheahan's would be about 2 to 3 degrees lower, but wind speeds are probably signij7cantly greater than atMangalore. On average, Mangalore is probably a reasonable guide to thej7re weather at the Sheahan's.]

Table 1. Frequency of days of Very High and Extreme Forest Fire Danger as recorded at Mangalore weather station over four fire seasons from 2001 to 2004. (Source: derived from Bureau of Meteorology data)

Month

January

February

1 June 1 0 1 0 1

Very High FDI (no. days)

44

April

1 Julv 1 0 1 0 1

Extreme FDI (no. days)

5

26 5

March

3

1 October 1 7 1 0 1

0

M aY

August

1 November 1 14 1 2 1

24

1 December 1 22 1 5 1

2

0

0

1 Total 1 144 1 19 1

0

0

September

Sheahan Propelty - F~re Protechon Report

4 0

Page 8

Table 2. Maximum Forest Fire Danger lndex recoded in a calendar month at Mangalore weather station for the period 1 July 2000 to 26 March 2004. (Source der~ved from Bureau of Meteorology data)

1 Month 1 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1

The relevant fuel and slope conditions will be given later in the presentation of the scenarios.

Given the hazardous location of the house, it was considered that a Moderate lkelihood of house ignition under Extreme fire weather conditions would be the acceptable limit, rather than a Low level of risk.

The House Ignition Likelihood Index (HILI) is anumber based on the combined ratings of the likely impact on ignition from radiation, direct flame contact, convective heating and ember attack. This index is then classified into a four-level rating of Low, Moderate, High and Extreme which relates to the probability of a house igniting. The rating classification of the index is shown in Table 3. The rating is interpreted as meaning "a [Low, Moderate, High, or Extreme] likelihood of house ignition".

Table 3. Rating classification of the House Ignition Likelihood lndex (Tolhurst and Howlett 2003).

1 HIL Index I Rating 1 1 0 to 0.50 1 Low 1 1 0 51 to 1 80 1 Moderate 1


1 81 to 2 80 H~gh

> 2 80 Extreme

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5. Scenarios of some fuel management options. The House Ignition Likelihood Index was calculated for the house at -

Reedy Creek. These scenarios did not consider the impact of specific house design or the owners' decision or ability to be present to defend the house in the event of a wildfire, both factors being very significant to house survival (Wilson & Ferguson 1986, Ramsay et al. 1986, Wilson 1988, Ramsay & McArthur 1995, Leonard & McArthur 1999). Neither did they consider the likely outcome should firefighters be present at the house at the time of a wildfire. This analysis is carried out to investigate the changes in the likelihood of the house being & if it should be in the path of a wildfire. A house will survive if it is not ignited, but it will not necessarily be destroyed if it is ignited -this is where suppression actions are important.

The two most threatening wildfire scenarios for this house are that a fire approaches the house from the northwest having started its run low down in the valley or a fire coming from the southwest and similarly having come from low down in the valley. From either direction, a fire could run a kilometre or more uphill before arriving at the house.

5.1 Scenario 1 (Before tree clearing) - Fire coming from NW Situational Conditions -

Fuel Suite 1: Gravel and non-flammable material lor 3 m around the house. Surlace fine fuel "Low': elevated FF "Low", bark FF "Low", Overall FF "Low", equivalent fuel load of 0 tlha (Fig.4).

Fuel Suite 2: Mown, but dry grass under scattered deciduous trees from 3 m out to 10 m from the house. Surface FF "Moderate", elevated FF "Low", bark FF "Low", Overall FF "Moderate", equivalent fine fuel load of 6 tlha (Fig.5).

Fuel Suite 3: Native forest extending from 10 m to over 700 m from the house Surface FF "Very High", elevated FF "High, bark FF "VH, Overall FF "Extreme", equivalent fine fuel load of 22 tlha (Fig.6).

House height is 6 m above natural ground level

Average slope to NW leading up to house is 13 degrees.


Page 10

Figure 4. R~ght s~de of photo shows Fuel Su~te 1 Low surface fuel, Low elevated fuel and Low bark fuel

Figure 5. Foreground of photo shows Fuel Sulte 2 Dec~duous trees wth a grass understorey Moderate surface fuel, Low elevated fuel and Low bark fuel


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House Ignition Likelihood Index (HILI) values - HILI value is 8.38 which is arating of Extreme.

Table 4. House Ignition Likelihood Index for Scenario 1.

Ember Attack 3 3 8 1 Extreme, from nat~ve forest Rad~ant Heat 2 1 from nat~ve forest HlLl 1 8.38 1 Extreme (house ignition likelihood)

Maximum fire intensity of 76,000 kW/m coming from the native forest

The house has been built on an area dug and flattened out on the ridge, therefore the visible height of the house above the slope is closer to 4 m than to 6 m (Fig. 7). If this site-levelling factor is incorporated into the calculations, then the HILI is 7.38 (still Extreme). This reduction of "one" is due to the convective heat component of the HILI being reduced from two to one. This is the House Ignition Likelihood Index value relevant to the house before the tree clearing took place.

Figure 7. View of house from the north showing how site leveling works have resulted in only about 4 m of the house being exposed above the slope.

5.2 Scenario 2 (With Tree Clearing alone) - Fire coming from NW This scenario is similar to scenario 1, except that the extent of the grass and deciduous trees will be extended into the area previously occupied by the native forest. In scenario 1, it was found that the fuel close to the house contributed to the convective heating of the house. A clearing of all fuels for 10 was found to be necessary to remove this effect, so it is assumed here that there is a clearing of 10 m of non- flammable material (gravel) extending from the house walls. The house height is taken to be 4 m above the slope level.


Page 12

Table 5. House Ignition Likelihood Indices for Scenario 2. Shaded cells indicate a change point.

HlLl component 1 Extent of deciduous trees and grass 1 10m 20m 30m 40m 50m 75m 100m

It can be seen from Table 5, that there is a significant reduction in the House Ignition Likelihood Index with the clearing of the native forest and replacement with deciduous trees and grass. The main benefit in replacing the native forest with deciduous trees has been to reduce the ember attack. However, there was an elimination of flame contact once the native forest was cleared more than 30 m from the house, a reduction in the radiant heat load once the trees were removed beyond 40 m, and no significant radiation once the trees are cleared 75 m from the house. Clearing of the native forest and replacing it with a deciduous woodland with a grassy understorey for a distance of 75 m from the house has reduced the house ignition llkclihood from cxdrcmc to Modcratc providcd it is combincd with a fucl-frcc zonc within 10 m ofthe house.

Convect~ve Heat Flame Contact Ember Attack Rad~ant Heat HlLl HlLl Rating

5.3 Scenario 3 (Other Options) - Fire coming from NW If a wider range of fire protection options were considered than just tree clearing, then the level of house ignition risk could be reduced further. To achieve this lower level of risk, the bark hazard in the forest will have to be kept to High by either regular burning or by selectively removing the stringybark trees. The results of these two measures in conjunction with the replacement of the native forest with deciduous trees and grass would be to reduce the extent of native forest clearing to 50 m in order to achieve a Moderate level of house ignition risk in an extreme fire event.

5.4 Conclusions about a fire approaching the house from the NW

0 1

3 38 2

7.38 Extreme

This house is located high on a hill so that any fire approaching it is likely to come from below it. The two most likely directions that a serious fire may come from are h e norlhwesl and the soulhwesl. The hillsides in both these direclions have a significant covering of native forest which include the extremely hazardous bark types of Messmate (Eucalyptus oblzqua) and Red-stringybark (E. macroryncha). The steepness of these slopes range generally from 10 to 25 degrees. Fires running up a 10 degree slope will have at least twice the intensity of a fire in similar vegetation type on flat ground, fires burning up a 20 degree slope will have at least a four-fold increase in intensity compared with flat ground. These slopes are also quite long, being about 1000 m. This provides ample opportunity for a fire burning near the base of these slopes to reach its potential intensity before it reaches the house. The slope steepness, slope length and the nature of the fuels located on these slopes mean that the size of the area to be managed for fuels is much greater than it would be in more undulating topography.


0 1

2 63 2

5.63 Extreme

0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0

2 17 84 1 59 116 2 1 rn

4.17 284 2.59 1.16 Extreme Extreme High Moderate

0 0

0 88 0

0.88 Moderate

Page 14

Trees to the south of the house had been cleared previously to a distance of about 30 m. Some tree establishment has taken place in this area and the surface fuels largely consist of grass. This area will therefore be treated as being of deciduous trees with a grassy understorey.

Fuel factors, other than those just described, will be assumed to be the same as those used in Scenario 1.

Table 6. House Ignition Likelihood lndex for Scenario 4.

There has been no recent clearing to the SW of the house. In the current situation, the House Ignition Likelihood rating is Extreme due to the combination of radiant heating and embers coming from the native forest to the SW of the house. Previous clearing has reduced the impact of convective heating and flame contact on the house.

HlLl component Convective Heat Flame Contact Ember Attack Radlant Heat HlLl

5.6 Scenario 5 (With Tree Clearing alone) - Fire coming from SW If further tree clearing of the native forest was undertaken to the SW of the house and replaced by deciduous trees with a grassy understorey, then the House Ignition Lkelihood would be reduced as shown in Table 8. As already discussed in Scenario 4, a non-flammable area already extends for 15 m to the SW of the house and deciduous trees with a grassy understorey is being established for a distance of about 30 m to the SW of the house.

The last row in Table 7 has been added to show the effect of considering less than extreme weather conditions. As was shown in Table 1, in the four years between 2001 and 2004, there have been 19 Extreme Fire Danger days and 144 Very High Fire Danger days in the region of this house. Even though the intensity of fires may be less on Very High Fire Danger days, reducing the amount of radiant heat, there is an increased ember attack due to the longer period of time embers will be released from the slope below the house. Hence there is no significant reduction in the House Ignition Lkelihood Index under these conditions.

Value 0 0 3 04 2 5.04

Table 7. House lgnition Likelihood Indices for Scenario 5. Shaded cells indicate a change point. The last line indicates the HlLl if the Forest Fire Danger lndex was only Very High instead of Extreme.

Comment Hot gases should rlse over house No dlrect flame contact Extreme, from nat~ve forest from natlve forest Extreme (house ignition likelihood)


Page 15

Steep slopes and extreme fuel hazard levels on the slopes to the SW of the house could result in potential fire intensities exceeding 100,000 kW/m and flame heights several times the tree height. However, the existing clearing and earthworks have reduced the potential House Ignition Likelihood from what it would have been.

In this scenario, there was no convective heating effect and this significantly reduced the house ignition likelihood. Again, the probability of flame contact contributing to house ignition significantly reduced when the native vegetation was more than 30 m away, but the radiant heat effect did not reduce until the native vegetation was more than 75 m away. With the native vegetation 75 m away, the house ignition likelihood was reduced from Extreme to High, but clearing to 100 m was needed to achieve a Moderate level of risk.

5.7 Scenario 6 (Other options) - Fire coming from SW If in addition to clearing further areas of native trees and replacing them with deciduous ones as outlined in scenario 5, the native forest for say 100 m beyond this area is burnt every 8 to 12 years, there will be a significant reduction in the bark and elevated fuel hazards. This will reduce the number of embers being produced and the intensity of the fire. With this additional fuel reduction in the native forest, the deciduous tree planting would only need to extend 75 m to the SW instead of the 100 m indicated in scenario 5, in order to achieve a Moderate level of house ignition risk in an extreme fire event.

5.8 Conclusions about a fire approaching the house from the SW The slopes to the SW are steeper and covered in more hazardous fuels. Under ex<reme weather conditions, a fire running up the hill from the south-west could exceed 100,000 kW/m. However, the existing clearing to the SW already has a significant effect in reducing the House Ignition Likelihood. However, further clearing and fuel management is required to the SW of the house if a Moderate level of risk is to be achieved.

To achieve a reduction in the house ignition hkelihood to a Moderate level when a fire approaches from the SW, the native vegetation would have to be cleared about 100 m to the SW (70 m further than at present) and replaced with deciduous trees and mown grass. Because of the steepness of the slope, the area of non-flammable vegetation immediately adjacent to the house has to be 15 m on the SW side compared to 10 m on the NW side.

A more effective option, but one requiring greater ongoing maintenance and taking on the risks associated with fuel reduction burning, is to only clear the native vegetation to a distance of 75 m from the house and periodically bum (about 8-12 yrs) the native forest for a distance of about 100 m beyond the deciduous tree planting. This represents a requirement for a fuel-managed zone 175 m to the SW of the house. This would achieve a Moderate level of house ignition risk under Extreme fire danger conditions.


Page 16

6. Access and Egress The issue of access and egress to the house needs to be briefly addressed. Currently there is only one road in and out of the propertv andthis is via the northwest corner of - the property as shown in Fig.9. This access road is whch follows the ridge to the east and west (Fig.2). have a significant distance of native forest on either side as can be seen in Fig.3. During the passage of a fire, it would be extremely unwise to try and travel along these roads. However, soon after the fire has passed, it may be safe enough to return to the house and extinguish any burning sections or conversely, if the occupants had stayed with the house during the passage of the fire front, but had been unsuccessful in extinguishing fires in the house, they wouldneed to leave the house for another safe place. Typically, houses burn down in the hours after the passage of the main fire front, so there is a good chance to save houses if they can be easily reached after the fire. In either situation, it would be important to be able to use the roads.

One major difficulty in getting access to or escaping from a house after the passage of a fire is the blocking of the road by trees or branches whch have fallen as a result of the fire. In Canberra in 2003, it took emergency services up to 48 hours to reach some house in the suburbs due to fallen powerlines blocking roads. A significant number of houses whlch survlved the mitlal passage of the fire front burnt down m the 24 to 48 hours following.

Independent of any works undertaken in the surrounding vegetation to reduce the likelihood of house ignition, there is a need to remove any trees or large branches likely to fall across the road in the event of a fire. Typically, these trees and branches can be identified as those with significant damage to the stems from previous fires, mechanical damage or termites. Such damaged trees within one tree height of a track or road would do well to be removed. In the Sheahan's case, they would be responsible to undertake such works on the access track from the public road to their house.

Having only one road into and out of the house is risky. Given the extent of the property and the topography, it would be feasible to have an alternative "emergency" access track to the northeast comer of the property on to- well.

7. Summary of Findings The Overall Fine Fuel Hazard in the native forest on and surrounding the Sheahan property is Extreme. This is due the presence of stringybark eucalypts and surface fuels which have not been burnt for a longtime.

Using the weather recorded at Mangalore airport for the past four years as a guide to the fire weather likely to be experienced at the Sheahan property, there have been 19 days when there would have been a less than 10% chance of stopping a wildfire in this area in the first 24 hours and a further 144 days when there would have been less than a 30% chance of stopping the fire while it was small (based on criteria presented by McCarthy et al. 1999). This represents a high level of risk to those living in this area.


Page 17

The location of the house exposes it to potentially extremely high intensity fires from both the northwest and from the southwest. The combination of steep slopes, long fire runs, extreme fuel hazard levels and topography orientated towards the predominant direction of severe fire runs, make the house site extremely vulnerable.

The height of the house adds to the degree of exposure to flames, radiant heat and convective heat. However, some site levelling works has reduced the effective height of the house as exposed to the slopes below it.

A fuel free zone for between 10 and 15 metres around the house is essential. Avery low fuel zone is required for a distance ranging from about 50 m to 100 m, if the risk of the house catching alight from an intense fire is to be kept to a Moderate level. Further fuel modification works beyond this zone would make a significant difference to the level of risk to which the house is exposed. To the south, it is recommended thai a regular burning program (8 to 12 years) be undertaken lor a distance 100 m beyond the low fuel zone and to the north and west, a similar regime should be followed to the boundary of the property. This fuel management strategy is diagrammatically shown as Option A in Fig.9. If it is not considered to be practically feasible to undertake the fuel management in the native forest, then Option B shown in Fig.10 becomes the necessary fuel zoning strategy to reduce the level of house ignition risk to Moderate.

Tree maintenance and selective removal of unsafe trees along the access roads are needed to provide safe access to the house or from the house after the passage of a Txe. This work should extend for one tree height from the road edge.

8. Commentary In the absence of the recent clearing to the north of the house and without further clearing to the south, the Sheahan house is extremely likely to catch fire in amajor bushfire. As the existing deciduous trees become better established, they will provide an ember and radiation shield to some extent, but not sufficient to reduce the risk of ignition under extreme conditions to a Moderate level. Given this situation, the main opportunity to save the Sheahan house from destruction during an intense wildfire, would be to have a significant fire suppression infrastructure in place, and a safe refuge for the residents to access during the passage of a fire. A building design conforming to cyclone standards would be needed to protect the roof, windows and walls from gale force winds associated with an extreme fire event. It would be extremely difficult if not impossible to retrospectively incorporate these design features into the current house. In the absence of significant fuel modification outlined in the previous scenarios, there is little chance of the Sheahan house surviving an intense bushfire without a significant amount of active fire suppression which cannot be guaranteed in the event of a major f i e event.

The extent of the clearing to the north of the house exceeds the extent needed achieve a Moderate level of ignition risk. Clearing to the north extends about 100 m, when modelling presented here indicates that 75 m (Option B, Fig. 10) would have been sufficient. However, as discussed in relation to access and egress for the property, some partial clearing may have been required beyond the zones indicated in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, along either side ofthe access track for about one tree height (about 20 m). If


Page 20

9. Conclusions The Sheahan house is exposed to a serious level of risk due to its height, location in the topography, the steepness and orientation of the slopes, the nature and extent of the native vegetation and the regularity of Very High and Extreme fire danger periods.

A significant amount of fuel modification is required to reduce the likelihood of the house catching alight in a major fire event. The fuel management strategy proposed in Option A is considered the best, but requires a significant ongoing commitment to fuel modification in the native forest, and a high level of fire management knowledge, experience and skill and significant firefighting resources to implement. Option B would be easier to maintain, but would require a greater extent of native forest clearing or thinning.

Access and egress to the house need to be ensured after the passage of the fire. This will require the removal of any trees or branches likely to fall after the passage of a fire. This work needs to be done within one tree height of the road edge. An alternative access track between the house and s h o u l d be constructed.

10. References: Leonard, J.E. and McArthur, N.A. (1999) A history of research into building

performance in Australian bushfires. Paper presented to the Australian Bushfire Conference, ' 'Bushjh '99" 7-9" July 1999, Albury, Australia. Pp. 219-225.

McArthur, A.G. (1967) Fire behaviour in eucalypt fuels. Forestry and Timber Bureau, Australia, Leaflet No. 107, 36pp.

McArtl~ur, A.G. (1977) Forest Fire Danger Rating Meter, Mk V. Forestry and Timber Bureau, Australia.

McCarthy, G.J., Tolhurst, K.G. and Chatto, K. (1999) Overall Fuel HazardGuide. 31d Edn. Fire Management, Research Report No. 47, Dept. Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria. 28pp.

Ramsay, G.C. and McArthur, N.A. (1995) Building in the urban interface; lessons from the January 1994 Sydney bushfires. Australian Bushfire Conference, 27- 30 September 1995, Hobart, Tasmania. 13pp.

Ramsay, G.C., McArthur, N.A. and Dowling, V.P. (1986) Building survival in bushfires. Fire Science '86, 4th Australian National Biennial Conference, 21-24 October, The Institute of Fire Engineers.

Tolhurst, K.G. and K.A. Howlett (2003) House Ignition Likelihood Index - An Hazard Assessment Method for Land Managers in the Wildland-Urban Interface. 3'* International Wildland Fire Conference, Sydney, Australia.

Wilson, A.A.G. (1988) A simple device for calculation the probability of a house surviving a bushfire. Australian Forestry 51(2), 119-123.

Wilson, A.A.G. and Ferguson, I.S. (1986) Predicting the probability of house survival during bushfires. Journal ofEnvironmenta1 Management 23, 259-270.


Appendix I

Curriculum Vitae - Dr Kevin G. Tolhurst (attached)

Page 21


Tolhwsf Cl' jZUOB) Page 22

CURRICULUM VITAE - Kevin Tallturst

1. Personal details

Full name. Born: Address: Forest Science Centre

University of Melbourne - Creswick Victoria, 3363 Australia ( d i r e c t telephone) - (mobile)

Natlonaltty: Australian Languages: English

2. Academic record

1996 Doctor of Philosophy, University of Melbourne (Commonwealth Forestry Post-graduate Research Award 1987-91)

1979 Bachelor of Forest Science (Hons.), University of Melbourne (Fully sponsored study leave, Forests Comrnlsszon Vzctorla)

1976 Diploma of Forestry, Creswick (Fully sponsored studentshlp, Forests Commlsslon V~ctorla) (A.L. BenallackMemorlal Cltlzenshlp Award, 1976) (Woodward Prlze for Utlllzatlon andFzeldwork, 1976)

3. Career History

2001- Senior Lecturer, Fire Ecology and Management School of Resource Management, University of Melbourne

1997-2000 LecturerIResearcher, Fire Ecology and Mar~agement Portfolio Manager, Fire Ecology and Management, Forest Science

Centre, 1999 Director, Fire Research Centre (Monash Uru./Uni.Melb. collaborative),

1999 Lecturer Level B School of Forestry, Institute of Land and Food Resources University of Melbourne

1993-1997 Principal Scientist, Fire Research and Development Centre for Forest Tree Technology Depattment of Natural Resources & Environment, Victoria

1984-93 Team Leader, Fire Effects Research Forest Research and Development Branch Depattment of Consenration and Natural Resources, Victoria

Sheahan Property - Flre Protechon Report

1982-83 Forest Officer (management, recreation, logging) Alexandra Forest District Forests Commission Victoria

1980-81 Lecturer (Botany, Ecology, Dendrology : University of Melboume) Division of Education and Research Forests Commission Victoria

1980 Forest Researcher (flora) (3 months) Division of Education and Research

Forests Commission Victoria

1978-79 Full time student (B. For. Sc., University of Melbourne) Forests Commission Victoria

Forest Assessor (timber, landscape, vegetation) Management Division, Assessment Branch Forests Commission Victoria

4. Selected Achievements

0 Initiated and coordinated the Wombat Forest fire effects multidisciplinary project and produced a major report on the study in 1992.

0 Authored or co-authored 95 reports and scientific papers covering a wide range of fire and ecology topics.

0 Was the primary author of the Australian Forestry Council's statement on "Public Land Fire Management".

0 Developed and arranged commercial production of the T-H Fine Fuel Moisture Meter. (Provisional Australian Patent PO-0193)

0 Developed a new subject for B.For.Sci., 31d year called 'landscape Ecology and Management, 211-301"

0 Redeveloped 'Tire Management 211-359" into 'Tire Ecology and Management 21 1-359"

0 Provided expert evidence to the Coronial Inquiry in the Creswick Fire of 1997 and the Linton Fire of 1998.

0 Assisting in the development of a National Fire Danger Rating System for South Africa in 199912000.

0 Co-authored and brokered submission for a 'Cooperalive Research Centre for Bushfires" in the 2000 round of applications to AusIndustry.

0 Major strategic role in the 2003 wildfres in SE Australia. r VictorianParliamentary BriefmgBusMres, Thursday 20 March 2003, 12:30 to

13:30, Victorian Legislative Council Committee Room. What we know about Bushfres and what we need to know -Prescribed Burning and Environmental Issues (Invited speaker)

5. Service to the profession

1985- Member of Research Working Group No. 6 (Fire Management) Australian Forestry Council Chairman from December 1992 - September 1995

Ongoing Scientific review of reports for Australian Forestry, International Journal

of Wddland Fzre, Forest Ecology andManagement, ANU PhD Thesis Latrobe University Botany School Honours Thesis, University of

Melboume

Forest Science 4th year Projects, University of Melbourne MEnvir.Sc Thesis

(School of Botany) CALMSclence, Bracken Blology and Management, Blologzcal Consematton, Journal ofEnvlronmenta1 Management, Austral~an Journal ofBotaq and others.

6. Membership of Scientific Societies

Institute of Foresters of Australia Victorian Field Naturalist Club International Association of Wildland Fire Ecological Society of Australia

7. Publications

Books 1 Chapters Toburst, K.G. (2004) BlackFriday, The Aftermath - The Scientists: Kevin Tolhurst. In:

Fahy, Moira (Producer) Black Fridas httu:llabc.net.au/blackfrida~/aftermath&oIhur~t.htm. Australian Broadcasting Commission - Film Victoria Multimedia Production

San-Miguel-Ayanz J., Carlson, J.D., Alexander, M, Tolhurst, K., Morgan, G., Sneeuwjagt, R, and Dudfield, M (2003) CurrentMethods toAssess Fire Danger Potential. In: Chwieco, E. (ed.) WddlandFlre Dnnger Esttmatton andMapplng The Role ofRemote Sensmg Data. Volume 4, Series in Remote Sensing. World Scientitic Publishing Co. Ry. Ltd., Singapore. Chapt.2. Pp. 21-61. ISBN 981-238-569-X. (Australian contribution, 20%)

X~Jhurst, K.G. and Cheney, N.P. (1999) Synopszs of the Knowledge Used tn Prescribed Burnlng m Victorla. Dept. Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria. 97pp. ISBN: 0 73 11 4446 5. (Senior author, 80% of contribution)

Tolhurst, K.G. (1996) Management and Ecology of Bracken (Ptendzwn esculentm) in South-eastern Australian Forests. Ph.D. Thesis, School of Foresw and Resource Conservation, University of Melbourne.

Tolhurst, KG., Flinn, D.W., Loyn, R.H., Wilson, AAG. and Foletta, I.J. (1992) Ecological effect of fuel reduction burning in a dry sclerophyll forest: a summary of principal research fmdmgs and their management implications. Dept. Conserv. and Environ., Victoria. 52pp. ISBN 0 7306 3076 5 (Senior author, 75%)

Tolhurst, K.G. (1990) Response of bracken to low intensity prescribed f r e in open eucalypt fo~est in west-centla1 Victo~ia. In Thonuon, J.A. and Smith, R.T. (eds.) Bracken Blology andManagement, Aust. Inst Ag. Science, Sydney. Pp. 53-62. ISBN 0 85856 0% 8

Pker Reviewed Papers

Culvenor, D.S., Coops, N.C., Preston, R. and Tolhurst, K.G. (1998) A spatial clustering approach to automated tree crown delineation. In: Proceedings Automated Interpretation ofHgh Spatlal Resolution Dlgltal Imagery for Forestry. Victoria, British Columbia, Pp.67-80. (Supervisor, 10%)

Tolhurst, K.G. and Chatto, K. (1996) Behaviour and threat of a plume driven bushfire in west-central Victoria, Australia. Proc. 13th Conference on Fire and Forest Meteorology, Lome, Victoria, Australia, 28 - 31 October 1996. 15pp, in press. (Senior author, 75%)

Tolhurst CV (200rl) Page 25

Tolhurst, K.G. (1995) Fire from a plant, animal and soil perspective: sensible heat measurement. CAMSclence Supplement 4,45-58. Dept. Consenration and Land Management, Western Australia.

Neumann. F.G.. Collett. N.G. and Tolhurst. K.G. (1995) Coleoptera in litter of dry sclerophyll eucalypt forest and the effects of low-intensity prescribed fire on their activity and composition in west-central Victoria. Aust For. 58(3), 83-97. (Fire component, 10%)

Tolhurst, K.G. and Burgman, M (1994) Simulation of bracken cover in forested areas in Victoria in response to seasonal, overstorey and fire conditions. Aust. J. Ecol. 19,306- 318. (Senior author, 90%)

Collett, N.G., Neumann, F.G. and Tolhurst, K.G. (1993) Effects of two short rotation prescribed fxes in spring on surface-active arthropods and earthworms in dry sclerophyll eucalypt forest of west-central Victoria. Aust. For. 56 (I), 49-60. (Fire component, 10%)

Tolhurst, K.G. and Tunrey, N.D. (1992) Effects of bracken (Pteridzum esculenhm (Forst. F.) Cockayne) on eucalypt regeneration in west-central Victoria. For. Ecol. Manage. 54, 45-67. (Senior author, 90%)

Tomkins, I.B., Kellas, J.D., Tolhurst, K.G. and Oswin, D.A. (1991) Effects of fxe intensity on soil chemistry in a eucalypt forest. Aust. J. Sod Res. 29: 25-47. (Experimental and discussion, 15%)

Neumann, F.G. and Tolhurst, K.G. (1991) Effects of fuel reduction burning on epigeal arthropods and earthworms in dry sclerophyll eucalypt forest of west-central Victoria. Aust. J. Ecol. 16: 3 15-30. (Fire component, 15%)

I.oyn, R.H., Fagg, P.C., Piggin, .IF., Morton, A.G. and Tolhursf K.G. (1983) Changes in composition of understorey after harvesting eucalypts for pulpwood and sawlogs in East Gippsland. Aust. J. Ecol. 8, 43-53. (Final assessment, data analysis, first draft, 50%)

Journal and Conference Papers

Tolhurst, K.G. and MacAulay, A.S. (2003). SAROS - A Model For Predicting The Effect of Mass Spotting On Rate of Spread of Forest Fire. 31d International Wildland Fire Conference and 10" Annual AFAC Conference, 2-6 October 2003, Sydney, Australia. 10pp. (Senior author, 80%).

Tolhurst, K.G. and Howlett, K. (2003) House Ignition Likelihood Index - An Hazard Assessment Method for Land Managers in the Wildland-Urban Interface. 31d International Wildland Fire Conference and 10" Annual AFAC Conference, 2-6 October 2003, Sydney, Australia. 10pp. (Senior author, 90%).

Shields, B.J. and Tolhurst, K.G. (2003) A Theoretical Framework for Wildfire Risk Assessment. 31d International Wildland Fire Conference and loth Annual AFAC Conference, 2-6 October 2003, Sydney, Australia. 10pp. (Technical input and review, 20%).

Tolhurst, K.G. (2003) Bushfxe Behaviour - interactions with fuels, weather, topography and the fxe itself. Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, Western Australian Division. Seminar on Living with Bushfxe in the Southwest of WA- Science, Risk Management and Community Perceptions. Pp. 12-13, abstract only. Invited Speaker.

Tolhurst, K.G. (2003) Prescribed burning in Victoria: Policy and practice. '%ushiire Prevention: Are We Doing Enough?'Conference, Institute of Public Affairs, 401 Collins St, Melbourne. Tuisday,il March 2003. 15pp. (Sole author 100%)


Tolhurst CV (20041 Page 26

Tolhurst, K.G. (2002) Guidelines for Ecological Burning in Foothill Forests of Victoria: Mt Cole Case Study. In NaturalResources and Environment, Victoria, Management of Fire for the Conservation of Biodiversity, Workshop Proceedings, Second Series, Oct-Nov 2000. Pp. 21-45.

Tolhurst, K.G. and Friend, G.R. (2001) An objective basis for ecological management Australian Bushfire Conference, 3-6 July 2001, Christchurch N.Z.. Pp. 220-228. (Principal author, 90%)).

MacAulay, A.S. and Tolhurst, K.G. (2001) Using computer simulation to determine the effects of short distance spotting on head fire rate of spread. Australian Bushfine Conference, 3-6 July 2001, Christchurch N.Z.. Pp. 334-338. (Concepts, supervision and interpretation, 20%)

McCarthy, G.C, Tolhurst, K.G. and Wouters, M. (2001) Firefighting resources for suppression conditions in Victoria. Australian Bushfire Conference, 3-6 July 2001, Christchurch N.Z.. Pp. 339. (Poster abstract) (Project design, supervision and data analysis, 25%)

Valianatos, O.D., Physick, B., Tolhurst, K.G., and Billing, P. (2001) Application of the air quality dispersion model TAPM for the dispersion of smoke: first validation trials and sensitivity analysis to input data. Australian Bushfire Conference, 3-6 July 2001, ChristchurchN.Z.. Pp. 84. (abstract only). (Project supervision, 10%)

Valianatos, O.D., Physick, B., Billing, P. and Tolhurst, K.G. (2001) Contributions of PMlO concentrations from the King Island (Tasmania) wildfire during a smoke haze episode in Melbourne. Australian Bushfire Conference, 3-6 July 2001, Christchurch N.Z.. Pp. 85. (abstract only). (Project supervision, 10%)

Tolhurst, K.G. (2000) Fire Research Needs for the Next Decade and Beyond. Paper presented to a public seminar "Ftre 7n the Hdls - Bushfire Scrence for HdlyAreas" at the Shire of Yarra Ranges council chamber, Lilydale, 5" April, 2000. Joint Monash Univ. and University of Melbourne Fire Research Centre.

Tolhurst, K.G. (2000) AReview of Fire Danger Rating Systems. Paper presented to the National Fire Danger Rating System working group workshop, Pretoria, South Africa, March 2000.

Tolhurst, K.G. (1999) Fire Investigation -the underlying science. Paper presented to a public seminar "Investlgatlng Fres -How sclence helps thefire detectives" at the Royal Society of Victoria, 18" November, 1999. Joint Monash Univ. and University of Melbourne Fire Research Centre.

Tolhurst, K.G. and McCarthy, G.J. (1999) Effective and efficient fuel assessment in rural environments -the quiet revolution. Paper presented to 6" Annual Conference, Australasian Fire Authorities Council 15"-17th October 1999, Melboume. 7pp. (Senior author, 90%)

Tolhurst, K.G. (1999) Towards ecologically Sustainable Fire Management. Poster presented to the National Academies Forum, "Flrei The Australran Experience". University of Adelaide, 30 Sept - l October 1999.

Tolhurst, K.G. (1999) Using Complexity Theory to Simplify Bushfire Fuel Assessment. Poster presented to the National Academies Forum, "Flrei The Australian Experience". University of Adelaide, 30 Sept - 1 October 1999.

Tolhurst, K.G. and McCaw, L. W. (1999) Fire Management Systems -Forests for Wood Water and Biodiversity. Paper presented to the Australian Bushfiie Conference, "Bushfire '9F 7-9" July 1999, Albury, Australia. (Senior author, 85%)

Sheahan P r o p e r t Fue Protechon Report

Tolhurst CV (2004) Page 27

Tolhurst, K.G. (1999) Fire Danger Rating Systems in Australia -Development, Strengths and Weaknesses. Paper presented to the South African Fire Danger Rating Conference, Pretoria, South Africa, April 1999.

Tolhurst. K.G. (1999) Towards the implementation of ecologically based fire regimes in the Grampians National Park In: Friend, G., Leonard, M., MacLean, A., and Sieler, I. (eds) "Management ofF1re for the Conservatzon of Blodzverszty". Workshop Proceedings, May 1999, Dept. Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria and Parks Victoria. Pp.30-38.

Tolhurst, K.G. (1999) The Fire Effects Research Program: Wombat State Forest. In: Friend, G., Leonard, M., MacLean, A, and Sieler, I. (eds) 'Management ofFzre for the Conservatton ofBtod~verszty". Workshop Proceedings, May 1999, Dept. Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria and Parks Victoria. Pp.22-28.

Tolhurst, K.G. (1999) Development of ecologically based fire regimes. In: Friend, G., Leonard, M., MacLean, A,, and Sieler, I. (eds) 'Management ofFzre for the Conservatlon ofBzodwerszty". Workshop Proceedings, May 1999, Dept. Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria and Parks Victoria. P.29.

Tolhurst, K.G. (1998) Effects of repeated low-intensity prescribed fire on the understorey of dry sclerophyll forest in south-eastern Australia. In ForestFzre Research Vol.11, Viegas, D.X. (ed.) Proceedings of the 3'd International Conference on Forest Fire Research I 14& Firc and Forcst Mctcorology Confcrcncc, 16-20 Novcmbcr 1998, Luso, Portugal. Pp. 1767-1776.

Tolhurst, K.G. (1997) Use of plant species vital attributes and fire history to manage fire in the Grampians National Park Victoria. Paper presented to Ecological Society of Australia Conference, 1-3 October 1997, Charles Sturt University, Albury NSW. Page 91 (abstract only).

Tolhurst, K.G. (1997) Response of bracken in forest environments to spring and autumn prescribed fire. In: McKaige, B. J., Williams, R.J. and Waggitt, W.M. (compilers) Buslf~re '97, Proceedings of thc AustralianBushfirc Confcrcncc, 8-10 July 1997, Darwin. Pp. 168-173.

McCarthy, G.C. and Tolhurst, K.G. (1997) Effectiveness of firefighting first attack operations, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria, 1991192 - 1994195. In: McKaige, B.J., Williams, R.J. and Waggitt, W.M. (compilers) Bushfire '97, Proceedings of the Australian Bushfiue Conference, 8-10 July 1997, Darwin. Pp. 200 - 205. (Data analysis and interpretation, 40%)

Tolhurst, K.G. (1996) Fire management for species conservation in the Grampians - A case study. Presented to "Ftre m Conservatzon" Seminar, 14 November, 1996, Heidelberg, Victoria. Greening Auslralia, Victoria.

Meyer, C.P., Tolhurst, K.G., Galbally, I.E., Tomhs , I.B., Wang, Y-P. and Weeks, 1.k (1996) The seasonal exchange of greenhouse gases from a southern eucalypt forest. Proc. 13th International Clean Air and Environment Conference, Adelaide, 23-25 September, 1996. 8pp. (Experimental design and data interpretation, 15%)

Tolhurst, K.G. (1995) The effect of climatic factors on the recovery of vegetation after fire in a mixed species eucalypt forest in Victoria. In Proc. Bushfire '95, Australian Bushfire Conference, 27-30 September 1995, Hobart, Tasmania. Forestry Tasmania, Parks and Wildlife Service, Tasmania Fire Service.

Tolhurst, K.G. (1995) Effects of fuel reduction burning on fuel loads in a dry sclerophyll forest. Fzre and Bzodzverszty: The Effects and Effectzveness of Fzre Management. Proceedings of Conference, 8 - 9 October 1994, Footscray, Victoria. Biodiversity Series, Paper No. 8, Biodiversity Unit, Dept. Environment Sport and Territories, Canberra. Pp.

d-m Sheahan Property - Flre Protechon Report


Tolhurst, K.G. (1995) Effects of fuel reduction burning on flora in a dry sclerophyll forest. Fzre and Blodlverslty: The Effects and Effectweness ofFzre Management. Proceedings of Conference, 8 - 9 October 1994, Footscray, Victoria. Biodiversity Series, Paper No. 8, Biodiversity Unit, Dept. Environment Sport and Territories, Canberra. Pp. 97-107.

Tolhurst, K.G. (1995) Effects of fuel reduction burning on fauna in a dry sclerophyll forest. Fzre and Blodlverslty: The Effects and Effectweness ofFzre Management. Proceedings of Conference, 8 - 9 October 1994, Footscray, Victoria. Biodiversity Series, Paper No. 8, Biodiversity Unit, Dept. Environment Sport and Territories, Canberra. Pp. 113-121.

Tolhurst, K.G. (1995) Do forest fires contribute to the Greenhouse Effect? Emgana 18(2), 12-13. Victorian Association of Environmental Education.

Tolhurst, K.G. (1994) Assessment of biomass burning in Australia - 1983 to 1992. In Agriculture: Workbook for non-carbon droxlde gases from the biosphere, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Committee, Dept. Environment, Sport and Territories, Canberra. Pp. 40-65.

Tolhurst, K.G. (1992) Fire - an ecological catalyst. Trees andNatura1 Resources 34(4), 13- 16.

Griffith, D.W.T. and Tolhurst, K.G. (1992) Forest fires and greenhouse gas emissions in Victoria. Paper presented to Agriculture and Greenhouse in South-Eastern Australia, Workshop, 18-19 March 1992, CSIRO, Aspendale, Vic. 12 pp. (Fuel and fire component, 35%)

Tolhurst, K.G. (1991) Do forest fires contribute to the greenhouse effect? Research and Develovment Note. No. 20. Natural Resource Svstems Division, Dept. Consetvation and Environment, Victoria. 4 pp.

Reports in Series

Tolhurst, K.G. and McCarthy, G.J. (2003) An Anal: Severitv of the 2003 Alpine Fires in Victoria. I

ysis of the Effects of Previous Fires on th ?re Management Branch, Research

Report No. ??, Dept. Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria, 20pp. (Data analysis, writing, 80%). In prep.

Tolhurst, K.G. (2003) Ecological impacts of fuel reduction burning in a dry sclerophyll forest - Summary Report (1984-1999). Fire Management Branch, Research Report No. 57, Dept. Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria, 94pp. (Management Implications, 20%). In press.

Tolhurst, K.G. (2003) Effects of repeated low-intensity prescribed fire on the understorey of dry sclerophyll forest in South-eastern Australia. Fire Management Branch, Research Report No. 58, Dept. Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria, 43pp. In press.

Chatto, K. and Tolhurst, K.G. (2003) Areview of the relationship between fireline intensity and the ecological and economic effects of fire, and methods currently used to collect fire data. Fire Management Branch, Research Report No. 67, Dept. Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria, 23pp. (Concepts, literature, fmal writing 50%). In press.

McCarthy, G.J., Tolhurst, K.G. and Wouters, M. (2002) Prediction of firefighting resources for suppression conditions. Fire Management Branch, Research Report No. 57, Dept. Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria, 37pp. (Data analysis, discussion, conclusions, 20%) in press.

McCarthy, G.J., Tolhurst, K.G. and Chatto, K. (2002) Determination of sustainable fire regimes in the Victorian Alps using plant vital attributes. Fire Management Branch,



Research Report No. 53, Dept. Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria, 31pp (Data analysis, discussion, conclusions, 30%) in press.

McCarthy, G.J. and Tolhurst, K.G. (2001) Effectiveness of broadscale fuel reduction burning. Fire Management Branch. Research Report No. 51. Dept. Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria, 23pp. (Data analysis, discussion, conclusions, 30%)

McCarthy, G. J., Tolhurst, K.G. and Chatto, K. (1998) Overall fuel hazard guide. Fire Management Branch, Research Report No. 47, Dept Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria, 33pp. (Content, photos, 40%)

Chatto, K. and Tolhurst, K.G. (1997) The development and testing of the Wiltronics T-H Fine Fuel Moisture Meter. Fire Management ResearchReport No. 46, Department of Natural Resources and Environment. 40pp. (Intellectual content, 40%)

Tolhurst, K.G. and Chatto, K. (1997) Development, behaviour and threat of a plume-driven bushiiie in west-central Victoria. Fire Research Report No.48, Dept. Natural Resources &Environment, Victoria. 21pp. (Methods, design, discussion, conclusions, 75%)

McCarthy, G.J. and Tolhurst, K.G. (1996) Effectiveness of firefighting frst attack operations, Department of Natural Resources and Environment (Victoria), 1991192 to 1994195. Fire Management Branch, Research Report No. 45, Dept. Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria, 36pp + appendices. (Design, analysis, interpretation, 40%)

Humphries, R.K. and Tolhurst, K.G. (1992) The effects of single autumn and spring prescribed fres on Antechrnus stuartu and Rattus fusclpes in Wombat State Forest. In Forest Research Report No. 349, Dept. Con. & Env., Victoria. 21pp. (Data analysis, discussion, 35%)

Tolhurst, K.G. (1992) Climate and growing season in the Fire Effects Study Areas - Wombat State Forest. In Forest Research Report No. 349, Dept. Con. & Env., Victoria. 24pp.

Tolhurst, K.G. (1992) Fire effects study program, Wombat State Forest - Description of sites and experimental design. In Forest ResearchReportNo. 349, Dept. Con. & Env., Victoria. 15pp.

Tolhurst, K.G. and Flinn, D.W. (eds.) (1992) Ecological impacts of fuel reduction burning in dry sclerophyll forest: First progress report. Forest Research Report No. 349, Dept. Con. & Env., Victoria., 384 pp. (Senior author, 90%)

Tolhurst, K.G. and Oswin, D.A. (1992) Effects of spring and autumn low intensity f r e on understorey vegetation in open eucalypt forest in west-central Victoria. In Forest ResearchReport No. 349, Dept. Con. & Env., Victoria. 60pp. (Senior author, 90%)

Tolhurst, K.G., Kellas, J.D. and Wilson, AA. (1992) Low intensity fire behaviour and fuel dynamics in dry sclerophyll forest, Wombat State Forest. In Forest Research Report No. 349, Dept. Con. & Env., Victoria. 40pp. (Senior author, 85%)

Tomkins, I.B., Kellas, J.D., Tolhurst, K.G. and Oswin, D.A. (1992) Effects of f r e intensity on soil chemistry in a eucalypt forest. In Forest Research Report No. 349, Dept. Con. & Env., Victoria. llpp. (Experimental, analysis and interpretation, 15%)

Tolhurst, K.G. and Gullan, P. (1987) Vegetation monitoring. In F.C. Hamilton (ed.) Monitoring the Ecological Effects of Fire - Workshop. Fire Management Branch, Res. Rep. No. 30, Dept. Consenr. and Environ., Victoria. (Senior author, 70%)

Consultancy Reports

Tolhurst, K.G. (2003) Beerburrum Frre No.48, 6November 1994 -Area ofIgnzt~on, Cause and Instral Spread and the Role ofFrrebreaks and Fuel Reductron Burnrng m afecttng


the F~re 's Spread and Control. Prepared for Crown Law, Queensland Government ,Department of Justice and Attorney General. 16pp.

Tolhurst, K.G. (2003) Comments on the draft report by N.P. Cheney to the Coroner ofACT concerning the "Ongln and Development of the Bushfires that spread mto the ACT, 8-18 January 2003 ". Prepared for ACT Government Crown Law Department. 8pp.

Tolhurst, K.G. (2003) Wesley College - Chum Creek Camp. Fuel Hazard and Bnshfire Threat Survey Report prepared for Weqley College, Melhourne 8pp

Tolhurst, K.G. (2002) Fire Management for Biodiversity in Parks in South-East, South Australia. Consultancy between the Minister of Environment and Heritage, S.A. and Melbourne Enterprises International Ltd.. 105pp. (Senior author, 70%)

Tolhurst, K.G. (2002) Ecological Implications of the Messent Conservation Park Prescribed Fire, 2 May 2002. Consultancy report to Jeff Wauchope, Manager Operations Support, National Parks and Wildlife, Dept. Environment and Heritage, South Australia, South East Kegion. 17pp. (Sole author 100%)

Tolhurst, K.G. (2002) An Operational Review of the Messent Conservation Park Prescribed Fire, 2 May 2002. Consultancy report to Jeff Wauchope, Manager Operations Support, National Parks and Wildlife, Dept. Environment and Heritage, South Australia, South East Region 20pp. (Sole author 100%)

Tolhurst, K.G. (2001) Tower Hill Road Fire, Fire No.374, Fingal Forest District, Tasmania, 14" April 1997. Fire Cause, Origin, Path and Behaviour. Report commissioned by Forestry Tasmania. 33pp. (Sole author, 100%)

Burrows, N.D., Cheney, N.P., Packham, D. and Tolhurst, K.G. (2001) Areport to the Coroner of Victoria on the f ~ e behaviour, suppression and safety issues involved in the LintonFire, 2 December 1998.30pp. (Contributing author, 30%)

Tolhurst, K.G., Maughan, D. and Gilmore, M. (2000) Fire Behaviour R e p o r t Supplement. Linton Fire, Midlands ~ire'15, (2 December 1998). Fire Behaviour Report. Report Commissioned by Dept Natural Resources and Environment and Country Fire Authority, Victoria. 17pp. (Senior author, 90%)

Tolhurst, K.G., Maughan, D. and Gilmore, M. (1999) Linton Fire (Midlands Fire#15), 2 December 1998. Fire Behaviour Report: Geelong City and Geelong West Entrapment Site. Report Commissioned by Dept Natural Resources and Environment and Country Fire Authority, Victoria. 17pp. (Senior author, 80%)

Tolhurst, K.G., Maughan, D. and Gilmore, M. (1999) Linton Fire (Midlands Fire#15), 2 December 1998. Fire Behaviour Report. Report Commissioned by Dept Natural Resources and Environment and Country Fire Authority, Victoria. 32pp. (Senior author, 85%)

Chatto, K., McCarthy, G.J. and Tolhurst, K.G. (1999) Review of drought index and drought factor in relation to fuel availability and fire behaviour in Victorian Forests. Report Commissioned by Chief Fire Officer, Dept. Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria. 13pp. (Some ideas and r r iew, 10%)

Tolhurst, K.G. (1998) Assessment and Recommendations for Fzre Management of the Burton-Crees Memorral TrustInc. Land on the Banksla Penmnsula. Gluusland Lakes. A

A A

report commissioned by the Burton-Crees Memorial Trust Inc.. School of Forestty and Resource Consemation, University of Melbourne.

Tolhurst, K.G. (1998) Caledonla F~re (He$zeldFlre#31), 31 December 1997. A revlew of fire behavlour and suppresston strategy. Report Commissioned by Chief Fire Officer, Dept. Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria. 33pp + appendices.

Jk Sheahan Property - Flre Protechon Report


McCarthy, G.J., Chatto, K. and Tolhurst, K.G. (1998) DraftF~re Management Plan - Mlmosa Rocks Natzonal Park. Prepared for N.S. W. National Parks and Wildlife Service, Narooma District, New South Wales. 28pp + appendices. (Concepts and review, 10%)

Tolhurst. K.G. (1997) Assessment and Recommendations forManagement ofthe Chum Creek Campfrom a Fzre Perspectwe. A report commissioned by Wesley College, Melbourne. School of Forestq and Resource Conservation, University of Melbourne. 2 1 ~ ~ .

Hayes, G., Tolhurst, K.G. and Billing, P. (1996) Tamlnlck Gap Fzre: Operatzonal (Sajietyl Revtew. Confidential report prepared for Chief Fire Officer, Department Conservation & Natural Resources, Victoria. 20pp. (Fire component, 35%)

Cbatto, K. and Tolhurst, K.G. (1996) Inventory ofAreas Burnt and Fuels Consumed by Bushfires In Australla, 1983 to 1995. Prepared for CSIRO Division of Atmospheric Research, Aspendale. Centre for Forest Tree Technology, Heidelberg, Victoria. 14pp. (Format and review, 20%)

Meyer, C.P., Tolhurst, K.G., Galbally, I.E., Wang, Y-P. Weeks, I . k , and Tomkins, I.B. (1996) The enhanced emtsstons ofgreenhouse gases from sod followlngprescrlbed burn~ng m southern eucalypt forest. Final Report to the National Greenhouse Gas Inventoq Committee, Dept. Environment, Sports and Territories, Canberra. 60pp. (Experimental, analysis, review, 20%)

Tolhurst, K.G. (1996) Ecologically BasedFtre Regtmes for the Gramplans Natlonal Park - An Interlm Report on Spectes Consetvatton. Prepared for the National Parks Service, Victoria. Centre for Forest Tree Technology, Heidelberg, Victoria, 8pp + appendices.

Cbatto, K. and Tolhurst, K.G. (1995) MtEccles Natzonal Park Fuel HazardAssessment. Prepared for the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, South West Area. Centre for Forest Tree Technology, Kew, Victoria, 14pp. (Modelling and review, 25%)

McCarthy, G.J. and Tolhurst, K.G. (1995) An analysls of the suppresszon optlons at Chlnaman LongBeach fire, W h o n S Promontory Nutzonal Park, I 2 & I 3 February 1995. Prepared for Chief Fire Officer, Dept. Conservation & Natural Resources, Victoria. 35pp. plus appendices. Fire Research and Development Section, Centre for Forest Tree Technology, Kew Victoria. (Concepts, review, 40%)

Tolhurst, K.G. and Chatto, K. (1995) Inventory ofAreas Burnt and Fuels Consumed by Bushfires mAustraha, 1983 to 1994. Prepared for CSIRO Division of Atmospheric Research, Aspendale. Centre for Forest Tree Technology, Kew, Victoria. 17pp. (Senior author, 60%)

Tolhurst, K.G. (1994) Tree Prunlng and Growth Around Powerllnes In the Ferntree Gully Works Area. Prepared for the State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Mountain District. Centre for Forest Tree Technology, Kew, Victoria, 18pp.

8. Other Significant Professional Services

South-eastern Australian Fires 2003. Written and verbal submission to the Joint House of Representative Select Committee on Bushfires.

South-eastern Australian Fires 2003. Written and verbal submission to the Victorian Bushfiire Inquiry, Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner.

North-east Fires, JanuaqEebruary 2003. Provided strategic advice at a local, regional and state levels on fne suppression strategy and community protection. In fires that were the most extensive in 60 years, only 41 houses were lost andno lives were lost directly due the fire. Significant areas of pine plantation were also saved from destruction. Made a

significant contribution to the fire management debate on radio, television, newspapers and public fomms.

Big Desert, December 2002. Provided fire weather and fire behaviour predictions that were used as a basis for choosing the best possible suppression strategy. This advice resulted in significantly reduced use of dozed fire control lines.

Sydney Bushfires 2001102. Provided specialist fire weather and fire behaviour analysis for strategic fire suppression planning at the Bulga fires in the Wollemi National Park This support resulted in a change in strategy to contain this fire rather than to just reduce property losses.

Court proceedings of Forestry Tasmania versus Rainbow (200 1) Provided an expert report to Forestry Tasmania on the cause, origin, path and behaviour of the fire near Fingal Tasmania, Fire No. 374, 14& April 1997.

Coronial Inquiry into the Deaths of Five Firefighters at Linton, Victoria. (2001) Formed part of an four member expert panel called by the State Coroner (Graham Johnston) to report on the fire behaviour, suppression strategy, training and safety matters related to the events leading to the fatalities.

South Afiica, 2000. Invited to be part of an international review team invatigating the management and impact of the "Cape" fires in South Africa which occurred in January 2000. The review was ordered by the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry.

South Africa, 2000. By invitation, provided expert advice to the fire management agencies in South Africa implementing new fire management legislation. In particular, provided advice on the use and development of Fire Danger Rating Systems.

Mt Difficult Fire, Grampians, Victoria, Febmary 1999. As leader of a technical specialist team, provided tire weather, fire hehaviour and fire qnpprewion qtrategy advice leading to a difficult but successful backburning operation.

Linton Fire, Ballarat, Victoria, December 1998. As part of an operation review team, undertook a study of the fire behaviour and fire weather conditions leading to the death of five volunteer fire fighters and the entrapment of ten others.

Prepared a submission (as senior author) to the Tasmanian Parliamentary Inquiry into Forest Fires on behalf of the Institute of Foresters of Australia, May 1998.

Caledonia Fire, Victoria, January 1998. As leader of a technical specialist team, provided expert fire weather and fire behaviour advice to the Incident Management Team as a basis for the formulation of fire suppression strategies. Caledonia Fire was the largest wildfire in Victoria this decade. This advice resulted in a reduction in the total area burnt by a potential 20,000 ha or more.

Moora Moora Fire, Grampians, Victoria, April 1995. Provided expert fire behaviour and fire suppression strategy advice to the Incident Management Team suppressing the fire. This advice resulted in a significant cultural and environmental area not being burnt by the fire fighting team.

Sydney Bushfires, January 1994. As leader of a technical specialist team, pruvided expertfire weather and fire behaviour advice to the Incident Management Team as a basis for the formulation of fire suppression strategies in the Grose River Fire, Blue Mountains. This support resulted in over 100 km of backburning being achieved in one night which ultimately stopped the spread of the fire.


9. Forest and Fire Experience

I am currently employed by the University of Melbourne at the School of Forestty, Creswick Campus as a Senior Lecturer in Fire Ecology and Management. I have been an employee of the 1 Jniversity since 1997

In 1974, I was awarded a cadetship by the Forests Commission of Victoria to study Forestry. I hold a Diploma of Forestry obtained at the School of Forestty Creswickin 1976, a Bachelor of Forest Science (Hons.) awarded by the University of Melbourne in 1980 and a lloctor of Philosophy awarded by the University of Melbourne in 1996.

After graduating with the Diploma of Forestry, I worked for the Forests Commission of Victoria predominantly involved in environmental and timber assessment of the mountain forests of centralVictoria. In 1980, I worked for a short time inEast Gippsland studying the vegetation in experimental logging areas. In 1980 and in 1981, I lectured and tutored atthe School of Forestty in the University of Melbourne's Bachelor of Forest Science. In 1982 and 1983 I was based in Alexandra in central Victoria, where I was responsible for timber harvesting planning and operations and for recreationmanagement in that Forest District. In 1984, I took up a Fire Research position with the Forests Commission based in Creswick. Here I initiated and managed a major multidisciplinary fire research program based in the foothill forests of Central Victoria. In 1997, I resigned from the Department of Natural Resources and Environment and took up a Fire Ecology and Management teaching and research position with the University of Melbourne.

Between 1974 and 1985, I undertook a wide range of fire related roles and duties as an employee of the forestty department. My roles included being member of firefighter crews, crew leader, sector leader, communications officer, and fire controller. I have attended numerous small wildfires and a number of large fires including fires in the north-east of Victoria in 1979 and 1985, in East Gippsland in 1977 and Central Victoria in 1983. Since that time I have attended a number of major fires in the role of a fire behaviour and fire weather technical specialist. Some recent examples of these are the Sydney bushfiies in 1994, the Berringa Fire in 1995, the Moora Moora fire in the Grampians in 1995, the Mt Difficult fire in the Grampians in 1999, the Little Desert fires in 1997, the Caledonia Fire in 1998 and the Creswick Fire in 1997, Sydney bushfiires 2001, Big Desert Fire 2002, and SE Australian fires 2003. My duties as a field Forester and a Fire Researcher has also resulted in me attending a wide range of prescribed fires ranging from high intensity prescribed fires in logging slash to low intensity prescribed fires in foothill forests. My experimental work in the Wombat State Forest requires the repeated application of operational-scale low intensity prescribed fires for which I have had the responsibility.

Since 1979, I have published 95 scientific papers and reports related to fire management. These publications have ranged from information leaflets and articles for the general public to national and international conference papers and scientific papers in international journals. A recent publication is a book titled "Synopsrs ofthe Knowledge Used rn Prescrrbed Burnlng m Vrctona" co-authored by Phil Cheney, CSIRQ, Bushfire Research and Management. I played a key role in the development of a national fire danger rating system in South Afiica where I was employed to give an international perspective and technical depth to this work I gave extensive expert evidence to the Linton Coronial Inquity in Victoria over the period 1999 to 2001, and have advised the ACT Government lawyers on their Coronial submission in 2003.

Jk Sheahan Property - Flre Protechon Report

Tolhwst CV POW) Page 34

10. Contributions to Teaching

(a) Scope of participation in teaching activities

Undergraduate courses: r Coordinator of 207-307 Fire Ecology and Management inthe B.For.Sc. course * 50% contributor of 207-311 Forest Values in the B.For.Sc. course. 0 Participate in 207-363 Field Studies 2. r There are between 15 and 30 students in each subject.

Supervision of Current Postgraduate and Honours students: r Andreia de Siqueira (PhD) Assessmg andManagmg factors affect~ng of f ire Danger in

Brazd. Due in Dec 2004. r Nick Collett (PhD) Pred~ct~on of damagzng Insect outbreaks in Blue-pplanta t~ons in

V~ctorza. (Submission due mid-2002) Deferred. r Lachlan Clark (M.For.Sci.) Effect offire on sod stored carbon m dry sclerophyll forests.

Submission due early 2002, in recess. (co-supemisor). r Cheryl O'Dwyer (Ph.D) Invertebrate ecology in fragmented landscapes. Submission due

mid-2007. (Principal supervisor). * Amelia Needoha (Honours) Developmg a method to assess the level of r~sk to plant

populatzons by apart~cularfire regme. Due October 2004.

Supervision of completed projects: r Andrew Macaulay (M.For.Sci.) Effect of spott~ng on the rate of spread of bushfires m

eucalyptforests. Completed 2003. r Darius Culvenor (PhD) Automated Tree Delrneat~onfrom Hgh Resolut~on Imagery for

the Pred~ct~on oflorest Structure. Completed 2001. * Am Tolsma (PhD) The Effects o fF~re and Grazmg, w~ th Particular Emphas~s on

Phys~olog~cal Effects andImpact on Grasslands andAlpme Commun~t~es. Completed 2002.

r Alex Stubbings (Honours) The effects offire on the avadab~l~ty of logs and the17 hollows as hab~tat. Completed October 2003.

r Stephen Rymer (Honours) Regeneratzon of chamed and rolledfirebreaks in the desert heath/mallee. Completed October 2003.

r Leigh Smith (Honours) Improv~ng the ecolog~cal managementprocess forfire 192 Vzctor~a. Delivered December 2002 Brad Godson (CFA project) Understandmg the occurrence offire in plantat~ons m Vtctor~a. First report delivered February 2002. Frith Jarrod (Honours) Mon~tormg system for ecolog~cal burnzng onpubl~c land zn Vtctor~a. Completed in November 2001. Jason Laverty (Honours) Mapp~ng thepatchmess of low mtens~typrescr~bedfires in NSW. Deferred in 200 1 Kelly Howlett (Honours) Evaluat~on and development of assessment technzques for surv~val ofbuddmgs mfire-prone areas. Completed October 2000. Steve Blake (Honours) Quantlficat~on oftheprobab~l~ty and spottmgpattern ~nfront of bushfires m eucalyptforest. Completed October 2000.

r Angus McLean (Honours) Analys~s of thepsychology and modes of operat~on offorest arsonwts. Completed October 2000. Joel Mortyn (Honours) Analys~s of the effects of sprrng and autumnfire reglmes on vegetatron m the Wombat State Forest. Completed October 2000. Chris LindorfF (Honours) Towards Ecolog~cally Sustamable Fzre Reg~mes in the Gramplans Nat~onal Park: A Case Study ofHeathlands. Completed December 1999.



* Kathryn Jones (Honours) Fzne FuelAva~labtltty m Low Intenstty PrescrtbedF~res. Completed October 1999.

* Jennifer Brick (Honours) Understorey Populat~on Dynamm In the Wombat State Forest StudyArea: Poa s~eber~anu. Completed October 1999.

r Rinske Poulier (Honours) The Effectweness ofPost-fire Rehabhtat~on In Reduc~ng the Impact ofFire Suppress~on Works. Completed November 1999. Andrew Macaulay (Honours) When do Spot F~res have a SgntficantImpact on the FowardRate of Spread ofthe Fwe Front?. Complctcd Octobcr 1999. Craig Gloury (Honours) The d~stnbut~on and edaph~ch~ocl~mat~c analyses of summer- flowering E u c n l y p ~ tncarpa. Completed November 1998. Peter Murray (Honours) Quantat~ve Analys~s of Spec~es Dwers~iy and Effects of S~ te Var~abhty m the Secondary D~pterocarp Forest at Huay Som Forest Research Stat~on, Northern Thadand. Completed October 1997.

Provide specialist lectures to professional fre-fighters and fire managers, such as: Ongoing specialist lectures to Dept. Sustainability and Environment (DSE) and Park., Victoria (PV) staff in relation to fuel assessment, ecologically based prescribed burning, prescribed burning monitoring, wildfre behaviour and fire weather. Advanced f r e investigations course, coordinated by Dept. Natural Resources and Environment (NRE), attended by about 15 specialists from W.A., N.S.W., Qld., Vic., and S.A., held in Benalla, Victoria, November 1999. Advanced f r e behaviour prediction course, coordinated by the Country Fire Authority, Victoria, attended by about 40 senior professional CFA f r e officers, held at Fiskville, Victoria, September 1999. Level 2 Fire Planning Officers Course, coordinated by NRE, attended by about 25 officers, held in Creswick, Victoria. Flle Ecology Woilohops, coordinated by NRE, attended by about 50 NRE and Pallo Victoria officers at each of 5 venues (Mildura, Ballarat, Benalla, Paynesville, Melbourne), September 1998. Level 2 Fire Operations Course, coordinated by NRE, attended by about 25 officers, held in Creswick Victoria, 1998.


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