CCBE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
IN THE CONTEXT OF ‘NATIONAL SECURITY’2019
Council of Bars & Law Societies of EuropeThe voice of the European legal profession
Rue Joseph II, 40/8 - 1000 BrusselsT +32 (0)2 234 65 10 - [email protected] - www.ccbe.eu
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master - that’s all.” (Lewis Carroll, “Alice in Wonderland”.)
DISCLAIMER:
The CCBE makes no warranty or representation of any kind with respect to the information included in this guide, and is not responsible for any action taken as a result of relying on, or in any way using, information contained herein. In no event shall the CCBE be liable for any damages resulting from reliance on, or use of, this information.
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CONTENTSINTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. RELEVANT UN CONVENTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62. EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6a. The lack of definition of the concept of national security by the European Court
of Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6b. National security and surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7c. Surveillance and the right to a fair trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. EUROPEANUNION–TREATIESOFTHEEUROPEANUNIONANDTHECASELAW OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9a. National security exemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9b. The absence of a clear definition of national security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
SURVEY ON THE SITUATION IN EU MEMBER STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Q1. IS THERE A LEGAL CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Q2. HOWISTHISCONCEPTDEPLOYED(FOREXAMPLE,INDEROGATION
FROMLEGALRIGHTS,EITHERINDOMESTICLAWORINRELATIONTOTHE EUROPEANCONVENTIONONHUMANRIGHTS)? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Q3. ISNATIONALSECURITYDEFINEDINLAW?IFNOT,HOWDOESYOURLAW REGARD NATIONAL SECURITY? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Q4. ISNATIONALSECURITYREFERREDTOINLEGISLATIONORCASELAW, EVEN IF IT IS NOT DEFINED? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Q5. UNDERWHATCIRCUMSTANCESISNATIONALSECURITYINVOKEDANDHOW OFTEN? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15A DEFINITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
THE CONCEPT OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201. NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202. JUDICIAL AND INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203. LEGAL REMEDIES AND SANCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214. PROFESSIONAL SECRECY AND LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Weliveintimeswherethetheatreofconflictisnolongerrestrictedtonationalarmiesfightingonabattlefield:dangersfromterroristgroupsandindividualactorsare,orareperceivedtobe,ever-presentonourstreetsandinourneighbourhoods,andconflictscanbewagedremotelyandcovertlyincyberspacebyterroristgroupsandbyindividualactors.
ThefirstdutyoftheStateistoprotectitscitizens,andnoonecandoubttheneedfortheStatetotakeexceptionalmeasuresintheinterestofnationalsecurity,but,unlessthereisaclearandpreciseunderstandingofwhatis,andisnot,understoodbytheterm‘nationalsecurity’,thereisaclearthreattothedemocraticorder.Therefore,itisimportanttocriticallyanalyseargumentsinvokingnationalsecurityasajustificationformeasureswhichlimitcitizens’fundamentalrights.
Auniversallyaccepteddefinitionofnationalsecuritydoesnotexist.Bothatinternationalandnationallevelthetermisnotadequatelydefined.Asaresult,itisdifficultforcourtseffectivelyto review infringementsof fundamental rightswhich arebasedon the claimed justificationof national security and, even among those Stateswhere domestic lawdoes provide somedefinitional clarity, theremay be radically different outcomes in different jurisdictions. Thelackofauniversallyaccepteddefinitionofnationalsecuritymeansthatactionsjustifiedontheclaimedbasisofnationalsecuritycannotbeeffectivelyreviewedincourtstoensurethattheycomplywithastricttestofwhatisnecessaryandproportionate.
This paper primarily deals with the question of how and whether the notion of ‘national security’ as a justification for surveillance measures and other intrusions upon the fundamental rights of citizens can be better embedded in national democratic systems, where effective judicial control and supervision of government actions remain essential elements of constitutionality .
This issue is of specific relevance to the protection of the confidentiality of lawyer-clientcommunicationwithinthecontextofsurveillanceactivities.Forlawyerstobeabletoeffectivelydefendtheirclients’rights,theremustbeconfidencethatcommunicationsbetweenclientsandtheirlawyersarekeptconfidential.Thisprinciple–usuallyreferredtoas‘professionalsecrecy’or‘legalprofessionalprivilege’–isrecognisedbyallEUcountriesandhasbeenupheldbytheEuropeanCourtofJusticeandtheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsinnumerouscases.InsomeEUMemberStates theviolationofprofessionalsecrecyconstitutesnotonlyaviolationofaprofessionalduty,butalsoacriminaloffence.
MaterialwhichispotentiallyprivilegedwillbenefitfromtheheightenedprotectionofArticle8oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(ECHR).Additionally,lawyer-clientcommunicationsinrelationtocontentiousproceedings(criminalorcivillitigation)alsoenjoyprotectionunderArticle6oftheECHRconcerningtherighttoafairtrial.Article6rights(unlikeArticle8rights)areabsoluteinthesensethatlimitationsorderogationscannotbeappliedtothem.
In this sense, if ‘national security’ reasons are tobe arguedas anexceptionor justificationper se for intercepting lawyer-clientcommunications, this“exception” (especially the lackofacleardefinitionofwhatinrealityconstitutes‘nationalsecurity’)wouldrenderitimpossible,forexample,forsuspectsoraccusedpersonstoeffectivelyinvoketherighttoconfidentialitycommunicationswiththeir lawyer1.Thiswould,therefore, jeopardisetherightsenshrinedinArticle6andArticle8inthesensethatthelackofabasicdefinitionoftheconceptof‘national
1 CCBE’sRecommendationsontheprotectionofclientconfidentialitywithinthecontextofsurveillanceactivities,p.11,availableontheCCBEwebsiteviathefollowinglink:https://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/SURVEILLANCE/SVL_Position_papers/EN_SVL_20160428_CCBE_recommendations_on_the_protection_of_client_confidentiality_within_the_context_of_surveillance_activities.pdf.
INTRODUCTION
security’would render the right to confidentiality of lawyer-client communications redundant, as anyrestrictiontoitcouldbejustifiedongroundsof‘nationalsecurity’withoutanyfurtherjustificationoranyproceduralsafeguards.
CCBE Recommendations 3CCBE 3
Inthecontextofthethreatsreferredtoabove,everyonewouldagreeupontheneedforeachStatetoprotectitsnationalsecurity.Almostalllegalsystemsrecognisetheconceptofnationalsecurityandamajorityconsidersathreattonationalsecurityasgroundstoallowgovernmentsto suspend rights or obligations2, despite the fact that the State has a duty to uphold theruleof lawandserveasaguarantorofhumanrightsforitscitizens.Ultimately,violationsoffundamentalrightscanonlybejustifiedbyutilitarianprinciples,i.e.theobjectiveofensuringthegreatestbenefitforthegreatestnumberofpeople,forexample,theviolationbytheStateofasuspect’srighttoprivacybysubjectinghimtosurveillanceisjustifiedbythereasonthattodosoenablestheStatetoprotectthefundamentalrightsofitscitizensasawhole.
Theparadoxisthatthereisnoconsensusonwhatconstitutesamatterofnationalsecurityininternationallaw,norevenaspecificagreementastowhatconstitutesnationalsecurityforthepurposesofdefiningStates’marginofappreciationundertheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights.
Thisisnottosaythatcertaincommonthreadscannotbedetected,but,ultimately,‘nationalsecurity’isaconceptthatisgenerallydefinedbytheStateor,itmaybe,inpracticalterms,thegovernmentofthestate.
Forexample,intheUnitedKingdom,duringthepassageoftheInvestigatoryPowersBillthroughtheHouseofLordsin2017,indecliningtoacceptanamendmenttotheBillwhichwouldhaveclearlydefined‘nationalsecurity’inlaw,EarlHowe,fortheUKGovernment,stated:
“It has been the policy of successive Governments not to define national security in statute. National security is one of the statutory purposes of the security and intelligence agencies. Threats to national security are, as we have heard, constantly evolving and difficult to predict, and it is vital that legislation does not constrain the security and intelligence agencies in their ability to protect the public from new and emerging threats... I think the key point is that to define national security in statute could have the unintended effect of constraining the ability of the security and intelligence agencies to respond to new and emerging threats to our national security.”
This statement,which is superficially plausible, raises immense issues touching on the ruleof law.The fundamentalprinciple is thatnoone isabovethe law.This,plainly, requires theconductoftheintelligenceservicestobemadethesubjectofregulation.Inthisregard,mostEuropeanStatesbasetheoperationoftheirintelligenceagenciesuponaspecificstatutoryorregulatorybasis.3
In thisway, theState seeks to regulateandconstrain interference,and itmaybenecessaryinterference,withfundamentalrightsandfreedomsthatmayresultfrommeasurestakenbytheStateinpursuitofnationalsecurity.
Such measures have the potential to threaten fundamental rights through means such assurveillance,military intervention,etc.Theessential justification is thatStatesmay interferewith individual rights in exceptional circumstances,when, for example, their independence,
2 Peers,Steve.NationalSecurityandEuropeanLawYearbookofEuropeanLaw,1996.Vol.16(1),pp.3633 See,forexample:
- UnitedKingdom,InvestigatoryPowersAct2016,Ch.25.- Netherlands,IntelligenceandSecurityServicesAct2002(Wetopdeinlichtingenenveiligheidsdiensten2002),7
February 2002.- France,IntelligenceLaw(Loirelativeaurenseignement),24July2015(completedbytheLawof30November
2015).
BACKGROUNDANDCONTEXT
sovereignty,territorialintegrity,constitutionalorderand/orpublicsafetyarethreatened.Suchthreatsareusuallyregardedasfallingwithinthescopeoftheportmanteauexpression‘nationalsecurity’orsimilarterms,buttheproblemisthat,intheabsenceofadefinition,suchtermsarevagueandopentodifferentinterpretations.4
IfonelooksagainatEarlHowe’sstatement,itwillbeseenthatthereisattherootofitaconflationoftwoquiteseparateissues.
Ontheonehand,whatconstitutesthenationalsecurityoftheStatemayseemtobeaconstant,but,ontheotherhand,themanner inwhichnationalsecurityisthreatenedisconstantlychanging.NoonewoulddisputethepropositionthattheStateshouldensurethatthesecurityservicesarenotundulyconstrained(in the context of the State’s regulation of those services) in dealing with those constantly changingthreats,butthisisaboutthenatureofthechallengetonationalsecurity,ratherthanthenatureofnationalsecurity itself. To take one example: any understanding of national securitywould include protectionagainsttheviolentoverthrowofthelawfulgovernmentoftheState.Inhistoricaltimes,thethreatmighthavebeenoneconspiracytoblowupParliamentbyplacingbarrelsofgunpowderinthecellars,plannedthroughthesendingofcodedlettersbetweentheconspirators.Inthepresentday,theconspiracymightrelateto,forexample,droppingradioactivewastefromabovebymeansofadrone,andbeplannedviaencryptedcommunicationonthedarkweb.Thesetwomodalitiesareentirelydifferent,andtheabilityofthesecurityservicestomeetthenewthreatshouldnotbeconstrained,butwhatremainsconstantisthatwhichisthreatened–thenationalsecurityoftheState.
If‘nationalsecurity’remainsentirelyundefinedinlaw,thenthereisnoclearbasisuponwhichacourtcandeterminewhetherthepurposeforwhichanintrusivesurveillancepowermighthavebeenexercisedis,orisnot,inpursuitofnationalsecurity.
Insuchasituation,theexecutiveisleftinsolechargeofthefield,thesoledeterminerofwhatconstitutesnationalsecurity,standing, ineffect,outsidetheruleof law,or,asLewisCarrollput it:“which is to be master?”
Therefore, thequestionofadefinitionofwhat constitutesnational security isnotonly the shiningofthehardlightofdefinitionalclarityuponanamorphousconcept,butalsofundamentaltoensuringtheprimacyoftheruleoflaw.
4 ReportonNationalsecurityandEuropeancase-lawpreparedbytheResearchDivisionoftheECtHR,para25,p.4
CCBE Recommendations 5
1. RELEVANT UN CONVENTIONS
The UN Human Rights Committee (OHCHR) has observed that restrictions on fundamentalrightsmaybejustifiedongroundsofnationalsecurityonlyifthoserestrictionsareprovidedforbylawandarenecessarytoachievealegitimatepurpose.Ininvokingsuchrestrictions,theStateconcernedmustspecifytheprecisenatureofthethreat5.
The UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection ofMinorities hasfurtherdevelopedthisideainitsSiracusaPrinciples.6PrincipleB(vi)defineswhenarestrictioncanbesaidtoservenationalsecurity:“National security may be invoked to justify measures limiting certain rights only when they are taken to protect the existence of the nation or its territorial integrity or political independence against force or threat of force.”Furthermore,itisstatedthat“National security cannot be invoked as a reason for imposing limitations to prevent merely local or relatively isolated threats to law and order”andneithercanitbe“used as a pretext for imposing vague or arbitrary limitations and may only be invoked when there exists adequate safeguards and effective remedies against abuse.”
It is recognised in international law that, during acute emergencies, Statesmay be unabletoperformthecarefulbalancingactnormallyrequiredto justifyarestrictiononfreedomofexpression.Article4oftheICCPRallowsthesignatoryStatestotemporarilysuspendsomeoftheirobligationsundertheCovenant,includingArticle19.
2. EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
a. The lack of definition of the concept of national security by the European Court of Human Rights
Todate,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(ECtHR)hasnotsoughttodefinenationalsecurity.7 CaselawfromtheECtHRhasfocusedinsteadontheconditionswhichjustifyaninterferencewithanindividual’srightsongroundsofnationalsecurity.TheEuropeanCommissionofHumanRightsbelievesthatnationallawsdonotrequireacompletedefinitionoftheconceptof‘theinterestsofnationalsecurity’.Itjustifieditspositionbyunderliningthefactthat“many laws,
5 ViewsoftheHumanRightsCommitteeunderArticle5,paragraph4,oftheOptionalProtocoltotheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights -Fifty-fourthsession–concerningCommunicationNo.518/1992,§10.4,availablehere:http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/html/vws518.htm
6 Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil andPoliticalRightsAnnex,UNDocE/CN.4/1984/4(1984)
7 Ibid.
RELATIONSHIPBETWEENNATIONAL SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEANLAW
which by their subject-matter require to be flexible, are inevitably couched in terms which are to a greater or lesser extent vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice”.8
Nationalsecurity ismentioned inparagraph2ofArticles8,10and11oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsasoneofthelegitimateaimsthatmayjustifytherestrictionofrights.Inparticular,theissueofsurveillanceraisesconcernsmainlywithregardtotherighttorespectforprivateandfamilylife(Art.8).
b. National security and surveillance
Interference with private life
ThecaselawoftheECtHRsuggeststhatanyinterferenceinanindividual’sprivatelifemustbeinaccordancewithlaw,justifiedbylegitimateaimsandthatitmustbenecessaryinademocraticsociety.
Themomentasurveillancemeasureisused,itcangenerallybothbeassumedtobeandinfacttobebeyonddisputethataninterferencehasoccurredinanindividual’sprivatelife,irrespectiveofanysubsequentuseoftheinformationcollectedandstored,andwhetherornottheinformationisdeemedtobesensitive9.
Compliance with the law
TheECtHRhasexplainedthat,foraninterferenceinanindividual’srighttobe“in accordance with law”,threeconditionsmustbemet:
1. theremustbeabasisinnationallawfortheinterference;2. thenationallawmustbeaccessibletoeveryone;3. andthelawmusthaveforeseeableconsequences.
Intheinterceptionofcommunications,withinthecontextofandforthepurposeofpoliceinvestigations,theECtHRhasacceptedthatanindividualdoesnotneedtobeabletoforeseetheinterceptionofthatindividual’scommunicationsbytheauthoritiesinorderfortheforeseeabilityrequirementtobefulfilledwhenassessingwhethertheinterferencewasinaccordancewiththelaw.Nevertheless,itisnecessaryforthenationallawitselftostatewithsufficientclaritythescopeofthediscretiongiventothecompetentorrelevantauthoritiesandthewayinwhichthisdiscretionistobeutilised,inordertoprovideanadequatesafeguardagainstarbitraryinterference10.
Asanexample,inthecaseofKopp v. Switzerland11,wherealawyerhadhistelephonetapped,theECtHRheldthatSwisslawdidnothavesufficientclarityontheextentoftheauthorities’discretion.TheCourtwasnotrequiredtodealspecificallywiththeissueofinterceptionofcommunicationsinwhichprivilegewasclaimed12.
Necessary in a democratic society
TheECtHRhasrecognisedthatStateshavethepowertoengageincertainformsofsecretsurveillanceovercommunications,suchastelecommunicationsorpostalcorrespondence,inordertobeabletoeffectivelycountercertainformsofespionageorterrorism13.ItisalsorecognisedthatStatesenjoyawidemarginofdiscretion whenselectingthewaysinwhichtheydecidetopreservetheirnationalsecurity14.
However,theCourthasstressedthatStatesdonotpossessunlimiteddiscretionwhensubjectingtheircitizenstosecretsurveillance inthenameof thestruggleagainstespionageandterrorism,duetothedangersthatsuchlawswouldposetodemocracy.ThecorrespondinglegalactinaState,inprotectingits
8 Esbester v. the United Kingdom,2April1993,availablehere:http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-15379 Amman v. Switzerland [GC],16February2000,§§69-70.10 Malone v. the United Kingdom,2August1984,§§67-68,availablehere:http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-5753311 Kopp v. Switzerland,25March1998,§§73-75,availablehere:http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-5814412 Concerning legal privilege in the context of surveillance activities, see the CCBE’s Recommendations on the protection of
client confidentialitywithin the context of surveillance activities, available here: https://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/SURVEILLANCE/SVL_Position_papers/EN_SVL_20160428_CCBE_recommendations_on_the_protection_of_client_confidentiality_within_the_context_of_surveillance_activities.pdf
13 Klass and Others v. Germany,cit.,§48.14 Leander v. Sweden,26March1987,§59,availablehere:http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57519
CCBE Recommendations 7CCBE 7
nationalsecurity,mustensurethatitisbalancedagainsttheseriousnessoftheinterferencewithcitizens’righttorespectfortheirprivatelives15.
Inparticular,theECtHRhasstatedthat“the judgment by the national authorities in any particular case in which national security considerations are involved is one which it is not well equipped to challenge. However, even where national security is at stake, the concepts of lawfulness and the rule of law in a democratic society require that measures affecting fundamental human rights must be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body competent to review the reasons for the decision and the relevant evidence. If there was no possibility of challenging effectively the executive’s assertion that national security was at stake, the State authorities would be able to encroach arbitrarily on rights protected by the Convention”16.
Likewise, concerning theuseof classifieddocuments to support adecision justifiedby theprotectionofnationalsecurity,theECtHRhasstatedthat“even where national security is at stake, the concepts of lawfulness and the rule of law in a democratic society require that […] measures affecting fundamental human rights be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent authority or a court competent to effectively scrutinise the reasons for them and review the relevant evidence, if need be with appropriate procedural limitations on the use of classified information. The individual must be able to challenge the executive’s assertion that national security is at stake. While the executive’s assessment of what poses a threat to national security will naturally be of significant weight, the independent authority or court must be able to react in cases where the invocation of this concept has no reasonable basis in the facts or reveals an interpretation of ‘national security’ that is unlawful or contrary to common sense and arbitrary”.17
Thisrequirementmakesclearthatadequateandeffectiveguaranteesagainstabusesmustbeinplace.Whetherornotguaranteeswillapplyorbeeffectivedependsuponthecircumstancesofanygivencase,forinstancethenatureanddurationofthemeasuresinvolved,theauthoritiescompetenttoauthorise,carryoutandsupervisethem,andtheremediesavailableundernationallaw18.
TheCourthasalsoexaminedinsomecasesthelong-termstorageofinformation,findingthatthecontinuedstorageofinformationcollectedmanyyearsearliercanconstituteadisproportionateinterferencewiththerighttorespectforprivatelife,whichisnotjustifiedbynationalsecurityconsiderations19.
c. Surveillance and the right to a fair trial
Surveillancebyauthoritiesongroundsofnational securitymayundermine theprotectionaffordedbyArticle6ECHR(righttoafairtrial),andfurthertothis,therighttoaneffectivedefenceandequalityofarms.
TheissueofsurveillanceofconfidentialcommunicationsbetweenlawyersandtheirclientsisdiscussedmorefullyintheCCBE Recommendations on the Protection of Client Confidentiality within the context of Surveillance Activities20,butsurveillancemayalsobeconductedinrelationtothirdpartycommunicationswhicharenotsubjecttolegalprofessionalprivilegeorprofessionalsecrecy.Inordertodefendhimself,anaccusedpersonmayrequireaccess to the intercepted material, but the State may refuse to allow such access on grounds of national security.
IntheECtHR’sjurisprudence,thisissuearoseintheformofaquestionastowhethertherefusaloftheauthoritiestograntaccesstocertainconfidentialinformationhaddeprivedtheapplicantofhisrighttoafairtrial.
15 Ibid.,§59.16 Janowiec and Others v. Russia[GC],21October2013,§§213-214,availablehere:http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-12768417 Ljatifiv.TheFormerYugoslavRepublicofMacedonia,cit.,§35,availablehere:https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5afd648f4.pdf18 Klass and Others v. Germany,cit.,§50;Kennedy v. the United Kingdom,18May2010,§153,availablehere:http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-9847319 Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden,6June2006,availablehere:http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-7559120 CCBE’sRecommendationsontheprotectionofclientconfidentialitywithinthecontextofsurveillanceactivities,availableonthe
CCBE’swebsitehere:https://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/SURVEILLANCE/SVL_Position_papers/EN_SVL_20160428_CCBE_recommendations_on_the_protection_of_client_confidentiality_within_the_context_of_surveillance_activities.pdf
CCBERecommendations8 CCBE8
InKennedy v. the United Kingdom, the Court accepted that “the entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence is not an absolute right. The interests of national security or the need to keep secret methods of investigation of crime must be weighed against the general right to adversarial proceedings”21.TheCourtfoundthattherestrictionsontheapplicant’srightswerenecessaryandproportionate.Thiscaserelatedinparticular tosecretsurveillancemeasures, in respectofwhich itwas important tokeepthesecretsand information confidential, taking into account aMember State’s need to keep certain surveillancemeasuressecretinthefightagainstterrorism.
3. EUROPEAN UNION – TREATIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THECASELAWOFTHECOURTOFJUSTICEOFTHEEUROPEANUNION
a. National security exemption
Asastartingpoint,itisnecessarytonotethenationalsecurityexemptionimposedbyArticle4(2)oftheTreatyoftheEuropeanUnion(TEU).Thisarticlestatesthat:
“theUnionshallrespecttheequalityofMemberStates(...)aswellastheirnationalidentities(...)Itshallrespect their essential State functions, including (...) safeguarding national security. National securityremains the sole responsibility of each Member State.”
Therefore,EUlaw,includingtheCharterofFundamentalRightsoftheEuropeanUnion22,willnotapplytoquestionsconcerningthenationalsecurityofMemberStates.23ThiscannotablybeillustratedinthetopreambletheDirectiveontherightofaccesstoalawyerwhichstatesthat“this Directive should also be without prejudice to the work that is carried out, for example, by national intelligence services to safeguard nationalsecurityinaccordancewithArticle4(2)oftheTreatyonEuropeanUnion(TEU)orthatfallswithinthe scope of Article 72 TFEU, pursuant to which Title V on an area of Freedom, Security and Justice must not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security”.24
b. The absence of a clear definition of national security
Therefore,theEUhasnocompetencetolegislateonmatterswhichinvolvethenationalsecurityofMemberStates.Furthermore,itisinterestingtonotethatthereisnounambiguousdefinitionorclearguidanceastowhatismeantby‘nationalsecurity’forthepurposesofArticle4(2).Inparticular,perhapsinhibitedbyArticle4(2),theCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion(CJEU)hasnotestablishedacleardefinitionordevelopedtheconceptofnationalsecuritybeyondstatingthat“national security […] constitutes activities of the State or of State authorities unrelated to the fields of activity of individuals”.25
Thatsaid,itisworthnotingthattheEUanditsMemberStatesusemanydifferenttermsthatencompassthenotionofnationalsecurity,butthesetermsarealsoundefined.Thesesimilarconceptsinclude,butarenotrestrictedto,internalsecurity,politicalsecurity,Statesecurity,publicsecurity,privatesecurityanddefence.Thesetermsshouldallbedistinguishedfromoneanother,buttheyarenevertheless,inacertainsense,interlinked.
21 Kennedy v. the United Kingdom,cit,§§184-187.22 OfficialJournalC364of18December200023 WP29WorkingDocumentonsurveillanceofelectroniccommunicationsforintelligenceandnationalsecuritypurposes(http://
dataprotection.govmu.org/English/Documents/wp228_en.pdf),5December2014,p22-2724 DIRECTIVE2013/48/EUOFTHEEUROPEANPARLIAMENTANDOFTHECOUNCILof22October2013ontherightofaccesstoa
lawyerincriminalproceedingsandinEuropeanarrestwarrantproceedings,andontherighttohaveathirdpartyinformedupondeprivationoflibertyandtocommunicatewiththirdpersonsandwithconsularauthoritieswhiledeprivedofliberty,Recital34,availablehere:https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013L0048&from=EN
25 ECJ,ProductoresdeMúsicadeEspaña (Promusicae) v TelefónicadeEspaña SAU (C-275/06, judgmentof 29 January2008),par.51.
CCBE Recommendations 9CCBE 9
InordertogetanoverallpictureofhowtheconceptofnationalsecurityisdeployedinEurope,theCCBEconductedasurveyofarepresentativesampleofitsmemberBarsandLawSocieties,namely,Austria,Belgium,theCzechRepublic,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Italy,Poland,SpainandtheUnitedKingdom.ThesurveyexaminedthedefinitionofnationalsecurityasalegalconceptineachoftheseStates.Theresultsofthissurveyarepublishedintabularformwhichcanbeaccessedviathefollowinglink:https://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/SURVEILLANCE/SVL_Guides_recommendations/EN_SVL_20190329_Annex-to-CCBE-Recommendations-on-the-protection-of-fundamental-rights-in-the-context-of-national-security.pdf
The survey found that all participating EUMember States have a legal concept of nationalsecurity and have diverse ways in which the concept of national security is deployed. Allrespondentshavesomeformoflegislationreferringtonationalsecurity.AnswerstoQuestion3ofthesurveydemonstratethatastraightforwarddefinitionoftheconceptofnationalsecurityisabsentinalmostalloftheMemberStatessurveyed,withtheexceptionofSpain(and,toacertainextent,Hungary).ThefewindicationsfoundinthejurisprudenceofthemajorityoftheMemberStatescoveredby thesurveyarguably fail tomeet thestandardsof legal certaintyrequiredtoensuretheproperfunctioningoftheruleoflaw.
Q1. IS THERE A LEGAL CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY?
All11ofthememberBarsandLawSocietiessurveyedstatedthattheirrespectiveStatesdohavealegalconceptofnationalsecurity.
In Austria, the Government presented a report to Parliament on a new Austrian securitystrategy26. The Austrian Parliament passed a resolution to shape Austrian security policy inaccordancewiththegeneralrecommendationsonanewsecuritystrategyforAustriaagreedintheAustrianNationalCouncilResolutionof3July201327.ThereportonthenewAustriansecuritystrategysetsoutthesecurityvalues,interestsandobjectivesofwhatisconsideredtobepartofAustria’snationalsecuritypolicy.28
IntheCzech Republic’sConstitutionalAct,Article1stipulatesthat:“It is the State’s basic duty to ensure the Czech Republic’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the protection of its democratic foundations, and the protection of lives, health and property.” Furthermore, three types ofemergencyregimescanbedeclared:
1. Astateofemergency;2. AconditionofthreattotheState;and3. Astateofwar.
TheconceptofnationalsecurityintheCzechRepublicisfurtheroutlinedinthe Security Strategy of the Czech Republic29 which defines general security risks, long-term plans andmeasuresaimedatthesecurityoftheCzechRepublicanditscitizens.
26 AustrianSecurityStrategySecurityinanewdecade—Shapingsecurity,availablehere:http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/sicherheitsstrategie_engl.pdf
27 Availaiblehere(http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/sicherheitsstrategie_engl.pdf),seep.16.§4.128 Austrian Security Strategy, Security in a new decade— Shaping security (http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/
publikationen/sicherheitsstrategie_engl.pdf),point3.29 Security Strategyof theCzechRepublic 2015, availablehere:http://www.army.cz/images/id_8001_9000/8503/
Security_Strategy_2015.pdf
SURVEY ON THE SITUATION INEUMEMBERSTATES
InGermany,bothstateand federal lawhaveaconceptofnational security.TheGermanConstitutionaddresses national security narrowly, dealing with the use of the armed forces for defence and theexceptionaluseofthearmedforcesathomeincaseof“imminent danger to the free democratic order of the Federation or a State”(Article87aGermanBasicLaw).Someactionsthatendangercertainelementsof national security are criminal actions under sections 81 ff. of theGermanCriminal Code (e.g. hightreasonagainsttheFederation,sabotage).SomeoftheseregulationsrefertothesecurityoftheFederalRepublicofGermany,whichisdefinedasexternal or internal security.Regardingstatelaws,thereisthemuchbroadergeneralstandard,“Öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung”(PublicSafetyandOrder),usedinparticularinthestatepolicelawswhichincludeelementsofnationalsecurity.
InGreece,thereisalegalconceptofnationalsecurity.However,itisnotsetouteitherintheConstitutionor in law. ‘Nationalsecurity’ isunderstoodtorefertonational integrity, theprotectionof thecountry,its territory and its independence fromexternal risks. This is confirmedby thedefinition of the term‘NationalDefence’ in law2292/1995ontheorganisationoftheMinistryofDefenceandofthearmedforces,pursuanttowhich“National Defence includes all operations and activities deployed by the State which aim at the protection of territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty, and the security of the citizens against any external offence or threat, as well as the support of national interests”.
Alistingmerelyindicativeoftheelementsfallingwithinthescopeofnationalsecurity,accordingtotheGlossary Intelligence30inItaly,includes:theindependence,integrityandsovereigntyoftheRepublic,thecommunityofwhichitisanexpression,thedemocraticinstitutionsestablishedbytheItalianConstitution,theinternationalruleoftheState,thefundamentalfreedomsandconstitutionallyguaranteedrightsofcitizensaswellasthepolitical,military,economic,scientificandindustrialinterestsofItaly.AdefinitionofnationalsecuritycanalsobefoundinsomeConstitutionalCourtjudgmentsinwhichreferenceismadetotheterritorialintegrityofthenation,toitsindependenceandtoitssurvival.Additionally,adefinitionofpublicsecuritycanbeindirectlyfoundinLaw124/2007(Articles6and7)wherenationalsecurity isgenericallydefinedas“the independence and integrity of defence against foreign threats”.
InPoland,thelegalconceptof‘statesecurity’whichismentionedintheConstitution,and‘publicsecurity’or‘commonsecurity’whicharementionedinotherstatutescanbetreatedasanequivalentof‘nationalsecurity’.Althoughtheseconceptsarenotclearlydefined,accordingtothe2014Reportonthenationalsecurity strategy of the Republic of Poland, “national interestswhich are specified in Article 5 of theConstitution of the Republic of Poland constitute a foundation of national security interests”.Thesamereportthenproceedstolistanumberoftheseinterests31.
InFrance,the‘nationalsecuritystrategy’wasdefinedforthefirsttimeinthe2008 White Paper on Defence and National Security32.In2009,alawintroducedtheconceptintoArticleL1111-1oftheDefenceCode.
Q2. HOW IS THIS CONCEPT DEPLOYED (FOR EXAMPLE, IN DEROGATIONFROMLEGALRIGHTS,EITHER INDOMESTICLAWOR INRELATIONTOTHEEUROPEANCONVENTIONONHUMANRIGHTS)?
All responding countries have diverseways of deploying national security. In theCzech Republic, theConstitutionalActontheSecurityoftheCzechRepublicstatesthatthegovernmentmustspecifywhichfundamentalrightsandbasicfreedomsaretoberestricted,andtowhatextent,andwhichdutiesshallbeimposedandtowhatextent.Furthermore,emergencyregimesmusthaveaspecificpurpose,canonlyexistforafixedperiod,andmayonlycoveradesignatedterritorialarea,asfurtherdetailedintheAnnextothispaper.
30 PresidenzadelConsigliodeiMinistri:Dipartimentodelle Informazioniper laSicurezza,«Glossario Intelligence: Il linguaggiodegliorganismiinfomativi»,2013,availablehere:https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Glossario-intelligence-2013.pdf
31 2014 Report on national security strategy of the Republic of Poland, available here.: https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/NSS_RP.pdf
32 2008WhitePaperonDefenceandNationalSecurity,availablehere:http://archives.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/2008/IMG/pdf/livre_blanc_tome1_partie1.pdf
CCBE Recommendations 11CCBE 11
InFrance,nationalsecurity isusedasajustificationfortheimplementationofextraordinarymeasuresbypublicauthorities,especiallyinareasrelatingtothepolice,defence,thefightagainstterrorism,andasa justificationof theregulationof theentryof foreigners fromoutsidetheEU. InFrench law,thereisabalancetobestruckbetweenindividualrightsandrequirementsfortheprotectionofsociety.Thisconcernsallthelegislativeprovisionsinvolvedintheimplementationofthesepolicies,suchas:
• externalsecuritythroughdiplomacyanddefenceoftheterritory;• maintenanceofpublicorder;• protectionagainstmajorthreats(terrorism,espionage,organisedcrime,violationofmajornational
economicorscientificinterests);• justice;• monetarysovereignty;• fiscalsovereignty;• publichealth;• civilsecurity.
InGermany, any action by a public authority interfering with private rights must be based on validprovisionssetoutinlaw.AnyactionbytheStateperformedwithoutbeingbasedonlawisillegal.Thisprincipleappliesevenintimesofcrisisandnoexemptionsaremadesincepublicauthoritiesarerequiredtoobeythelaw.Interferencewithprivaterightsongroundsofnationalsecuritycanthereforeonlythakeplace if it isexpresslypermittedby law.Whenauthoritiesdecidewhetherandhow toact, theymustrespecttheprincipleofproportionalitybyweighingtherelevantinterests(privaterightsandimportanceofsecurityaspects).Provisionsofinternationallaw,suchasthosesetoutintheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights,havebeenincorporatedintodomesticlawandmustthereforeberespectedassuchbyallpublicauthorities.
InGreece,Law2225/1994asamendedprovidesforaprocedureforderogatingfromtherighttoprivacy.ThisfallswithinthecompetenceoftheAppealsCourtStateAttorneyinmattersofNationalSecurity,andoftheJudicialCouncilinthecaseofveryseriouscrimes.TheprotectionofpersonaldataisguaranteedbyArticle9AoftheConstitutionandcanonlyberestrictedbylawthroughtheapplicationoftheprincipleofproportionalityprovidedforinArticle25oftheConstitution.
Article 19 of theGreek Constitution provides that: “The secrecy of letters and all other forms of free correspondence or communication shall be absolutely inviolable. The guaranties, under which the judicial authority shall not be bound by this secrecy for reasons of national security or for the purpose of investigating especially serious crimes, shall be specified by law.”Article19furtherreads:
“2. Matters relating to the constitution, the operation and the functions of the independent authority ensuring the secrecy of paragraph 1 shall be specified by law.
3. The use of evidence obtained in violation of this Article and of Articles 9 and 9A is prohibited.”
Article46oftheBasicLawofHungary requiresthatactivitiesrelatingtonationalsecuritymustbesetdownina‘cardinalact’oftheParliament.Such“a cardinal act regulates the rules of the organisation of police and national security services, their operation, and the rules on using national security tools and methods, and also the rules relating to national security activities”.InHungarianprocedurallaw,nationalsecurityappearsonlyindirectly,togetherwithsomeoftheproceduralguaranteesforsecretinformationgatheringduringthecriminalprocedurephase.MostofthedetailsareregulatedintheNationalSecurityServicesAct (ActCXXVof1995).Therefore, therearenoprovisions inprocedural lawsstatingwhenaparticularmethodofsecretinformationgatheringismadelawful,forexampleastheresultofanationalsecurity exemption. In addition to theNational Security ServicesAct, importantprovisionsof sectoralregulationsmaylaydownmorespecificrequirementsastowhatnationalsecurityservicesmayrequirefromcertainproviders:forexample,theymayrequesttelecommunicationsserviceproviderstoinstall,attheprovider’sowncost,certainmonitoringequipment.
InItaly,giventhecomplexityofthematter,noclearanswercanbegiventothequestion.Theconceptofnationalsecurity,initsvariousforms,canbeinvokedundercertainrulestoexcludeorlimittheexerciseofcertainrightsrelatingnotablytotransparencyinpublicadministrationandtoprivacy.
CCBERecommendations12 CCBE12
In Poland,thelawgivessomeexamplesofhowrightscanbederogatedfrom,andaccordingtowhichlegalprovisions.Forfulldetails,pleaserefertothePolishanswerstotheSurvey,and,inparticularQuestion2.
InSpain,theprotectionofnationalsecurityisunderstoodasbeingapublicserviceandissubjecttoStatepolicy.Theconceptisbasedondomesticlaw.
IntheUnited Kingdom,theconceptisdeployedinseveralcontexts:
• asthebasisfortheauthorisationofactivitiesbysecurityandintelligenceagencies;
• foradministrativematters,suchasdecisionsonadmissiontotheUK;
• forthedevelopmentofservicesorcapabilities,suchasthecreationandmaintenanceofprotectionofcriticalnationalinfrastructure;
• as derogations or limitations on obligations (such as Section 28 Data Protection Act 1998, orSection132CommunicationsAct2003).
Q3. ISNATIONALSECURITYDEFINEDINLAW?IFNOT,HOWDOESYOURLAWREGARD NATIONAL SECURITY?
InAustria,thereisnolegaldefinitionofnationalsecurity.InArticle229oftheAustrianCodeofCriminalProcedure(StPO),theconceptofnationalsecurityencompassestheState’sinterestinprotectingitsvaluesagainst threats and concerns, especially in thedomains of foreign affairs, security policy anddefencepolicy. Even if the conceptofnational security canbeverywideandgrant theauthorities substantialdiscretionarypower,itsboundariesmaynotbestretchedbeyonditsnaturalmeaning.
InFrance,accordingtoapossibledefinitionoftheconceptinArticleL1111-1oftheCodeofDefence:“The purpose of the national security strategy is to identify all the threats and risks that may affect the life of the Nation, particularly with regard to the protection of the population, the integrity of the territory and the permanence of institutions of the Republic, and to determine the responses that the public authorities must make. All public policies contribute to national security.”
Inaddition,theFrenchPenalCodeprotectsthe‘fundamentalinterestsoftheNation’whichisaparallelconceptofnationalsecurityandisdefinedasthe“independence [of the Nation], the integrity of its territory, its security, the republican form of its institutions, its means of defence and diplomacy, the safeguarding of its population in France and abroad, the balance of its natural surroundings and environment, and the essential elements of its scientific and economic potential and cultural heritage”(Article410-1PenalCode).
InGermany,thereisnosingledefinitionofnationalsecurity.Differentlawscontaindifferenttermsandwording.ThemostprominentdefinitionistheoneinSection4oftheBundesverfassungsschutz-Gesetz (“BVerfSchG” – Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution, i.e. the Domestic Secret Service),however thecourtswill interpretnational securitydifferentlydependingon thecontexts inwhich theissueisraised,eveniftherelevantlawsuseasimilarwording.
In Greece,theterm‘nationalsecurity’isnotspecifiedintheConstitutionorinlaw.However,thereisalegalconceptofnationalsecurity(seeanswertoQuestion1).
Hungaryhasadefinitionofthe‘interestofnationalsecurity’intheNationalSecurityServicesAct(74.§a):
a) “The protection of the independence and the lawful order of Hungary, within the framework of this:
b) detection of malicious attempts against the country’s independence and territorial integrity;
c) discovery and prevention of covert attempts that harm or threaten the political, economic and military interests of the country;
d) obtaining of information concerning foreign countries or of foreign origin that are necessary for governmental decisions;
CCBE Recommendations 13CCBE 13
e) detection and prevention of covert illegal attempts to alter or disrupt the country’s legal order, to ensure the exercise of fundamental human rights, the representative multi-party democracy system and the functioning of legal institutions;
f) detection and prevention of acts of terrorism, of illegal arms and drug trafficking, and illicit trafficking of internationally controlled products and technologies.”
InSpain,thereisasingledefinitionof‘nationalsecurity’,whichisdefinedasaStateactionaimedat:
• Protectingtheliberty,rightsandwelfareofcitizens;
• EnsuringthedefenceoftheState,itsprinciplesandconstitutionalvalue,and;
• ContributingtogetherwiththeState’salliesandpartnerstoguaranteeinginternationalsecurityincompliancewithcommitmentsmade.
IntheUnited Kingdom,thegovernmenthasresistedanyattempttocreateaclearstatutorydefinitionofnationalsecurity.However,theCourtshavesoughttograpplewiththeconcept.Inparticular,inthecaseofSecretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman[2001]UKHL47,theHouseofLordsarticulatedanumberofprinciples:
(i) “‘National security’ means the security of the United Kingdom and its people;
(ii) theinterestsofnationalsecurityarenotlimitedtoactionbyanindividualwhichcanbesaidtobetargetedattheUK,itssystemofgovernmentoritspeople;
(iii) the protection of democracy and the legal and constitutional systems of the State is a part of national security as well as military defence;
(iv)action against a foreign state may be capable indirectly of affecting the security of the United Kingdom; and
(v) reciprocal co-operation between the United Kingdom and other states in combating international terrorism is capable of promoting the United Kingdom’s national security.”
Thoughhelpfulinthemselves,thesecommentsfallalongwayshortofbeingacomprehensivedefinitionofnationalsecurity.
Q4. IS NATIONAL SECURITY REFERRED TO IN LEGISLATIONOR CASE LAW,EVEN IF IT IS NOT DEFINED?
SuchreferencesaremadeinalloftheStatesrepresentedinthesurvey(forfurtherdetails,seeAnnex).
Q5. UNDERWHATCIRCUMSTANCESISNATIONALSECURITYINVOKEDANDHOWOFTEN?
InAustria,nationalsecurityisrarelyinvokedinthecourts.Thejustificationonnationalsecurityisinvokedwhennationalsecurityisconsideredtobeindanger,forexamplewhenitcomestothepublicationofStatesecretsorissuesrelatingtothedefenceoftheState.
InFrance,ithasbeenusedonlyonce(seeQ5intheAnnex).
InGermany,thereisadifferencebetweenthebroadterm“Öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung”(PublicSafetyandOrder),usedinparticularinthestatepolicelaws,whichisinvokedpermanentlyasthelegalbasis formostactivitiesofthepolice,andthenarrowertermofnationalsecurityasused inparticularintheBundesverfassungsschutz-Gesetz:onlythelattermaybeinvokedinordertojustifyanyintrusionsuponcommunicationsbetweenlawyersandtheirclientsanditisinvokedonlyveryrarely.Inbothcases,thecitizenswhoserightsareaffectedbyactionsbasedonpublicsafetyandorderornationalsecurity
CCBERecommendations14 CCBE14
areentitledtojudicialreview.Germany’scurrentconstitutionwasbuilttopreventproceedingsinwhichasinglepersoncoulduniteallpowersoftheState.Therefore,eachactionofapublicauthoritymustbebasedonanauthorisationgrantedbylawandissubjecttojudicialreview.Thisalsoappliestosituationswhereitisallegedthatnationalsecurityisatstake.
InGreece,national securitymaybe invokedonly inconnectionwith“certain especially serious crimes against national security”33.
In Hungary,inprocedurallaw,secretdatagatheringcanbecarriedoutbycertaininstitutionswhicharedefinedinthelegislativeframeworkgoverninglawenforcementauthoritiesandnationalsecurityservices.
Aspreviouslystated,theconceptofnationalsecurityinItaly,initsvariousforms,canbeinvokedbycertainrulestoexcludeorlimittheexerciseofcertainrights.However,itisnotpossibletogiveananswerastohowoftennationalsecurityisinvokedinItalybecause,forexample,inthecaseofclassifiedinformation,itisnotpossibletounderstandhowtheaspectsofnationalsecurityareinvoked.
InSpain,nationalsecuritymaybeinvokedinareasthatareofconcerntotheState.ThiscanbedonebyfollowingtherulesspecifiedinthelawandundertheframeworkoftheNationalSecuritySystem.Itcanbeinvokedinmattersrelatingtocybersecurity,terrorism,organisedcrime,financialandeconomicsecurity,maritimesecurity,energysecurity,healthsecurityorenvironmentalpreservation.
IntheUnited Kingdom,itisnotpossibletogivealistofthecircumstancesinwhichnationalsecurityisinvoked.Consistently,thegovernmenthasdeclinedtoadoptadefinitionofnationalsecurity,onthebasisthatthethreatsagainstwhichthelegislationattemptstoprotectareevolvinganddifficulttopredict.Theconcepthasbeeninvokedin,forexample,Section94ofthe1984TelecommunicationsActasabasisforthebulkacquisitionofcommunicationsdatabyintelligenceagencies.Theprovisionsofthe2016InvestigatoryPowersActprovideanotherexample.WhiletheconceptofnationalsecurityisnotdefinedinanypieceoflegislationintheUnitedKingdom,itsmeaninghasbeenconsideredbythecourts.Asnotedabove,inSecretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman,nationalsecuritywasdefinedasthe“security of the United Kingdom and its people”.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Theseresponses illustratethattheconceptofnationalsecurity isvagueandunspecific inalmostalloftheMemberStatesthattookpartinthesurvey.However,thereissignificantoverlaprelatingtotherole,requirementandtheuseofnationalsecurityasareasonforaStatetoovercomecertainlegalrestrictions,includinglegalandjudicialoversightfromaruleof lawperspective.Consequently,citizensinsignatoryStatestotheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights, includingEUMemberStateswill, inmanycases,havetotrustthelegitimacyoftheconceptofnationalsecurityassetbytheirState.
Consideringtheabove-mentionedfindings,itappearsthattheconceptofnationalsecuritylacksprecisedefinitioninmostStates’legalsystems.Theoverviewtableshowsthatthemanyandvariedconceptualfeaturesattributedtotheconceptofnationalsecurityremainflexible.ThereareseveraldifferingconceptsofnationalsecuritywhichareusedinEUMemberStates,yetinmostofthecountriesunderexaminationthereisnocommonlyheldlegaldefinitionthatmeetsthetwintestofhavinglegalcertaintyandbeing‘inaccordancewiththelaw’.Thisambiguityleadstodeficitsandgapsintheaccountabilityoftheexecutivebranchesofeachcountry,includingtheirintelligencecommunities.
33 Article19oftheGreekConstitution.
CCBE Recommendations 15CCBE 15
In this context, can a single internationally acceptable definition of national security’ bedeveloped?
While,commonelementsinallStates’understandingofnationalsecuritycanbeidentified,forexampletheneedtoprotecttheStateanditspeoplefromthreatstoviolentlyandunlawfullyoverthrowtheConstitutionorsystemofgovernment,andthreatstothesafetyofthepeopleoftheStateasawhole,howfarcanwego?IsathreattotheeconomyoftheStateamatterofnationalsecurity?Perhaps,butwhataboutthreatsarisingfromclimatechange?Theseareimportant,butdotheythreatennationalsecurity?Perhapsnotformostcountries,butwhatiftheStateinquestionisVanuatu?
Itisthusseenasdifficulttodevelopauniversaldefinition,butthisdoesnotmeanthatitshouldnotbeattempted.
Furthermore, certain principles can be derived from the various national approaches asdiscussedaboveandlistedbelow:
• The interest of the State in protecting its values against threats and concerns in thedomainofforeignaffairs,securitypolicyanddefencepolicy(Austria);
• Sovereignty,territorialintegrity,protectionofitsdemocraticfoundations,protectionoflives,healthandproperty;inastateofemergencyorthreattotheState,basicrightsmaybelimited;nationalsecurityisinvokedinnaturalcatastrophes,orecologicalorindustrialaccidents(life-threateningcircumstances)(CzechRepublic);
• Sovereignty (including monetary and fiscal sovereignty), protection of the people,territorialintegrity,integrityoftheinstitutionsofState;basicrightsmaybelimitedbutlimitationsmustbeproportionate(France);
• Imminent danger to the free democratic order; sovereignty and territorial integrity;securityoftheinstitutionsoftheState;theintegrityoftheConstitution(Germany);
• National sovereignty, territorial integrity, security of citizens against external threats,supportofnationalinterests(Greece);
• Sovereignty and lawful order; territorial integrity; political, economic and military interests; exercise of fundamental human rights; multi-party democracy system;functioningoflegalinstitutions;protectionofcitizensagainstterrorism(Hungary);
• Independence,integrityandsovereigntyoftheState;democraticorderandbasicrightsas set out in the Constitution; political, military, economic, scientific and industrial interestsoftheState;disturbancetoforeignrelations(Italy);
• Protectionofliberty,rightsandwelfareofcitizens;defenceoftheState;principlesandconstitutionalvalue;invokedinthefieldsofcybersecurity,terrorism,organisedcrime,financial and economic security, maritime security, energy security, health securityor environmental preservation(Spain);
• SecurityoftheStateanditspeople;systemofitsgovernment;democracyandlegalandconstitutionalsecurity,militarydefence;disturbancetoforeignrelations;commitmenttopeacefulcoexistenceofnations(UnitedKingdom).
It is questionable to what extent the aspects shown in italics should be included in anyuniversallyacceptabledefinitionof‘nationalsecurity’.Termssuchas‘political,economicand
A DEFINITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
militaryinterests’,whichareonlyemployedinaminorityoftheMemberStatessurveyed,tendtosuggestaratherlowthresholdforlimitingfundamentalhumanrights.Iftheseinterestsareofsuchascalethattheymay justify the limitationofbasic rights, theyarealready contained inotheraspectsofnationalsecurity(e.g.militaryinterestswillbecontainedinsovereignty,territorialintegrityorforeignrelations).Likewise, terms suchas ‘economic interests’ arebroadand ill-definedand likely tooffendagainst theprincipleofproportionality.
Inlightoftheabove,thefollowingdefinitionof‘nationalsecurity’issuggested:
National security is understood as the internal and external security of the State, which consists of one or more of the following elements:
• the sovereignty of the State;
• the integrity of its territory, its institutions and its critical infrastructure;• the protection of the democratic order of the State;• the protection of its citizens and residents against serious threats to their lives, health and
human rights;
• the conduct and promotion of its foreign relations and commitment to the peaceful coexistence of nations.
Thelimitationoffundamentalhumanrightsbyinvokingnationalsecurityrequiresthatitbesubjecttothesafeguardofproportionality,exceptwherethecarefulbalancingactcannotbeperformedduetoacuteemergencies (in conformitywithArticles 4 and19of the International CovenantonCivil andPoliticalRights).
CCBE Recommendations 17CCBE 17
The definition outlined abovemay not be universally accepted, either because of differingnational circumstances (consider the hypothetical example given above of Vanuatu in thecontextofclimatechange)orotherwise,butthequestionisnotoneofdefinitiononly.Theabovediscussionhasrevealedthatthepresentlackofdefinitionmayoweasmuchtopoliticalfactorsas itdoestoasimplefailuretograpplewiththe issue.Theexecutivebranchofgovernmentcanoftenseeaclearadvantageinmaintainingimprecisioninthenameof‘flexibility’.ThiswasmadeexplicitinrespectoftheUnitedKingdombyEarlHowe’scommentsintheHouseofLords,quotedabove,butitseemsreasonabletosupposethatsimilarfactorsmayalsobeatplayinotherStates.
ThisleadstoasituationwherethecourtsseektofillthevoidbyformulatingprinciplesgoverningtheinvocationbytheStateofnationalsecurity,eitherbysupplyingsomecontentto‘nationalsecurity’(asintheRehman caseintheUK)orbyformulatingcertaingeneralprinciplesastoreasonableness,forexamplethattheexecutive’sinvocationofnationalsecurityoughtnottobe“contrary to common sense or arbitrary”,asinthejudgmentoftheECtHRinJanowiec and others v. Russia.
Theprobleminherentinanapproachwhichinvokesprinciplesofcommonsenseispreciselythat if there isnounderlyingdefinitionofnational security, then the lawremainsuncertainbecausewhatmaybepermissiblewilldependonwhataparticularjudgemayconsidertobe‘commonsense’onagivenoccasion.Ofcourse,over timeandoveranumberofcases, thecourtsmightdevelopmorepreciseprinciplesastowhatconstitutesnationalsecurity,buttheabovesurveyrevealsthat,inmanyStates,thecourtsarefarfromdevelopingcleardefinitions.ItisthereforehopedthatthisPapermight,atleast,provideastartingpointforthecourtsandforotherresponsiblebodiesatnational(and,possibly,international)leveltobegintodevelopmoreprecise,commondefinitionsofwhatconstitutesthenationalsecurityofaState.
However,evenifadefinitioncanbedevelopedandmeetsuniversalacceptance,itshouldnotbeassumedthattheproblemwillbesolved.Theprocessofdevelopingadefinitionofnationalsecurity(whetherornotitisuniversallyaccepted)and,indeed,definitionsofnationalsecurityineachStatecanbecomeanemptyexercise,unlessthereisproceduraljustice,whichistosaythatthosewhowouldinvokenationalsecurityaresubjecttotheruleoflawandthecitizencanhavetheassuranceofaclearandfairprocedurefortheinfringementupontheirfundamentalrights in the nameof national security, appropriate independent oversight and appropriatejudicialremedies.
ThisideaofproceduraljusticeverymuchunderpinstheapproachoftheECtHRincasessuchasJanowiec, withitsemphasison“adversarial proceedings before an independent authority or a court competent to effectively scrutinise the reasons... and review the relevant evidence.”
Inthesecircumstances,therealkeytoeffectivecontrolofinfringementsoffundamentalrightsin the name of national security, including the use of surveillance activities,may lie in theestablishmentofrigorousoversightprocesses,ratherthansimplybyformulatingadefinitionofnationalsecurity.Nonethelessaclearunderstandingofwhat,undertheruleoflaw,lieswithinthelegitimateboundsofnationalsecurityandacleardefinitionofnationalsecurityisnecessaryinestablishingcontextfortheoversightprocess.
THE CONCEPT OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
In this context, Section 6 below sets out a number of basic principles that are recommended to beemployedindealingwithsituationsinwhichtheexecutiveseekstorelyuponnationalsecurityasabasis,inanygivencase,forinterferencewithfundamentalrights.Inmakingtheserecommendations,theCCBEisawarethat it is traversingsimilargroundtothatwhichhasbeencovered, indetail, inotherpapers.Referenceismade,forexample,to Ten Standards for Oversight and Transparency of National Intelligence Services (UniversityofAmsterdam)34; Options for more Effective Intelligence Oversight (Wetzling)35; and the MAPPING Project Legal instrument36.
However,theCCBEbringstothetableitsownexperienceinresearchingandpublishingitsRecommendations on the Protection of Client Confidentiality within the Context of Surveillance Activities, theconclusionsofwhichareconsistentwiththecommonthreadsdiscernibleinthepaperscitedabove.
34 Availablehere:https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1591.pdf35 Availablehere:https://www.stiftung-nv.de/sites/default/files/options_for_more_effective_intelligence_oversight.pdf36 Availablehere:https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Privacy/DraftLegalInstrumentGovernmentLed.pdf
CCBE Recommendations 19CCBE 19
Recognising the fundamental principle that the invocation by the executive of nationalsecuritytooverridefundamentalrightsissubjecttotheruleoflawandthatsuchinvocationshouldnotbearbitraryoropaqueorunreasonable,theCCBErecommendsthefollowing:
1. NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE CONTROL
ThereshouldbeaninternationallyaccepteddefinitionofthenationalsecurityofaState,assuggestedinSectionIVabove.Whetherornotsuchadefinitionisinternationallyagreed,each Statemust have a clear legal definition of the nature of national security and theprerequisitesunderwhichnationalsecuritymaybeusedasabasisuponwhichtojustifytheviolationofcivilrights.
Similarly,as is thecasewithanyother lawfulactivitythat impingesuponcivil rights, themeasuresused inconnectionwithnational securityneed tobe regulatedwith sufficientprecision.
Legislationmustprovidesufficientguaranteesintheeventoftotalorpartialoutsourcingof national securitymeasures to private entities (where suchoutsourcing is available togovernmentauthorities),soastoensurethatthegovernmentalwaysretainsfullcontrolandresponsibilityfortheentireprocess,includingtheprocurement,recoveryoruseofmaterial.
Measures should only be permitted when the body wishing to undertake the activitiesimpingingoncivilrightscandemonstratethattherearecompellingreasonsthatsufficientlyjustifysuchmeasures.
2. JUDICIAL AND INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT
InallcaseswherenationalsecurityisinvokedinordertojustifyStateaction,andthatactionimpingesadverselyuponcivilrights,thepersonswhosecivilrightsareadverselyaffectedshouldhaveanappropriatejudicialorotherequivalentremedy.Thebodyresponsibleforgrantingthatremedyshouldrecognisetheaboveprinciples.
When seeking to invoke national security as a justification for taking measures whichimpingeadverselyuponcivilrights,thefollowingconditionsmustbemet:
• Thereshouldbeadequatesupervisorycontrolwhichmustbeentrustedtoanindependentjudicial body. In particular, the supervisory judicial bodymust have the authority todecidewhetherthemeasurefulfilstherequirementofproportionality.Proportionalityrequiresthatanymeasureencroachingonfundamental rightshasa legitimatepublicpurpose(i.e.actuallyservesnationalsecurity)andisappropriate(i.e.themeasureisatleastusefulinachievingthepurpose),necessary(i.e.therearenoothermeasureswhichachievethesameeffectwithlessintrusionupontherightsoftheindividual–seealsoArticle8para2ECHR),andproportionateinthestrictsense(i.e.theintrusionmustnotbeoutofproportioncomparedtothepurpose).Ameasurewhichdoesnotmeettheserequirementsshouldberegardedasunlawful.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Intheeventofawarrantbeinggrantedfortheuseoftherelevantmeasuresfortheprotectionofnationalsecurity,supervisionmusttakeplaceonacase-by-casebasisandshouldberequiredatallstagesoftheprocedure.
• Onceauthorisationhasbeengranted, a separatebody,meeting the same requirements as theone granting authorisation,must supervise the implementation of themeasure that has beenauthorised.Thisbodymusthavethepowertoterminatethemeasureand/ordestroythematerialwhich has been intercepted if it finds that the surveillancemeasureswere implemented in anunlawfulmanner.
• In order to fulfil itsmandate, the oversight bodymust be given proportionate, adequate, andbinding powers by law. These competencesmust enable the body tomake fully informed andenforceabledecisions.
3. LEGAL REMEDIES AND SANCTIONS
Inordertoenforcetherulesdescribedaboveandmakethesupervisorycontroleffective,legalremediesandsanctionsmustbeimplementedintheeventthattherulesarebreached.Inthisrespect,theCCBErecommends:
Whererelevantandappropriate,legalremediesshouldbemadeavailabletoindividualsandlegalentitieswhohavebeensubjectedtounlawfulmeasures. Inparticular,theyshouldbeinformedwithoutunduedelayafterthemeasureshavebeenterminated,ofthesurveillancemeasuresundertaken,thescopeofthemeasures and thedata collected. They shouldbe able to challenge the legality of suchmeasuresbeforeajudge.
Non-disclosureofthemeasuresandthematerialcollectedshouldbeexceptionalandonlybepermittedin caseswhere there are substantial reasons to demonstrate that disclosurewould interferewith thecontinuing investigationofaseriouscrimeormatterofnationalsecurity.Shouldthatbethecase, thescopeofthemeasurestakenandthematerialcollectedshouldbedisclosedtoasupervisoryjudicialbodyforreview,accompaniedbyaclearstatementofthereasonsfortherequesttowithholdtheinformationandanysupportingevidence justifying thenon-disclosure.The judicialbodyshouldbeempowered toinformthesubjectofthemeasuresintheeventthatnon-disclosureisfoundnottohavebeenjustified.
All government authorities which have been found to have been undertaking unlawful surveillanceactivitiesshouldbeliabletohavesanctionsimposeduponthem.
4. PROFESSIONAL SECRECY AND LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE
With regard to informationprotectedbyprofessional secrecyor legalprofessionalprivilege, theCCBEaffirmsthefollowingprinciples:
• Statesshouldberequiredtoprovideinlawforexplicitprotectionofprofessionalsecrecyandlegalprofessionalprivilege.Onlycommunications fallingoutsidethescopeofprofessionalsecrecyorlegalprofessionalprivilegeshouldbe intercepted. Inaddition, lawyersshouldnotbepreventedfromadequatelyprotectingtheconfidentialityoftheircommunicationswithclients.
• State agencies or law enforcement authorities should be required to use all technologicaland procedural means available to leave material protected by professional secrecy and legalprofessionalprivilegeoutofthescopeofsurveillanceoperations.
• Theoversightbodyorbodiesshouldberesponsibleforensuringthatsurveillancemeasuresdonotinfringeuponlegalprofessionalprivilegeorprofessionalsecrecy.
• These principles should not be subject to derogations based on claimed national securityconsiderations.
CCBE Recommendations 21CCBE 21
TheprotectionoftheStateanditscitizensistheprimaryfunctionofanygovernment,butthisshouldnotbeusedasajustificationforarbitraryordisproportionateviolationsoffundamentalrights,justified,ifatall,bytheexpression:“exceptional times demand exceptional measures”.Dictatorsthroughouthistoryhaveinvoked‘exceptionaltimes’asajustificationforarbitraryandoverbearingrestrictionsontherightsandlibertiesofcitizens.Therehavealwaysbeentimesinthetideofhistorywherewehavehadtofacedifficultchallengesandinternalandexternalthreatstothestabilityofthenationandthelivesofitspeople.Itistooeasytotakeonemomentintimeandtreatitasexceptionalwhen,inreality,thatmomentisfullofthreatsthatwehavealwayshadtoface.Theinvocationof‘exceptionaltimes’ isseldom,ifever,agoodreasontorebalancetherightsofthecitizenandtheinterestsoftheStateinfavouroftheState.
Thisisnottosaythatdemocraciesmaynotbeconfrontedbyserious,evenexistentialthreats,againstwhichitisessentialthattheybegiventhemeanstoprotectthemselves.Democracies,however,areStatesthataregovernednotbythewhimofthedespot,butbytheruleoflaw.Whattheruleoflawrequiresasaresponseto‘exceptionaltimes’arenotexceptionalmeasures,butmeasureswhicharebalanced,proportionateandconsidered.
Inordertoupholdtheruleof law it isessential that lawsareclear,certainandconsistentlyapplied.When broad portmanteau expressions like ‘national security’ are invoked,withoutany clarity as towhat theymean, it is difficult for the courts,who are responsible for theadministrationoftheruleoflaw,tosensiblydealwiththatdifficultboundarybetweenwhatistrulyinthenationalinterestandwhatrelatestoalesserinteresthoweverimportantitmaybe.Yet,wherethefundamentalrightsofcitizensareunderthreat,thecourtsmustseektodiscernthatdividingline,forononesideofitliesthelegitimateinterestoftheStateanditscitizensinensuringprotectionfromexternalandinternalthreats,andontheothersideliestyranny.
ItisforthisreasonthattheCCBEpresentsthispaperwhichseekstohighlightaconceptwhich,indifferentplacesanddifferenttimes,hastendedtoexistonly intheshadows.Tothisend,theCCBEproposesapossibledefinitionof‘nationalsecurity’withtheaspirationthatitmightachievewideinternationalacceptance,or,atleast,mayinformwhatisacontinuingdebateinalldemocraticsocieties.
Furthermore, the CCBE is mindful that whatever the definition of ‘national security’, it ispointlessthatsuchadefinitionexistwithoutclear,robustprocedurestoensurethattheruleoflawisupheld.Tothisend,theCCBEmakestheaboverecommendationswithregardtowhatistermed‘proceduraljustice’,inotherwordsseekingtoensurethatrobustproceduresexistwhichguarantee a fair balance between considerations of national security and the fundamentalrightsofcitizens.
Bythesemeans,democraticsocietiescouldrespondtotheexternalandinternalthreatstheyface,whileupholdingthedemocraticvaluesuponwhichtheyarefounded.
CONCLUSION
