The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 14 | Issue 7 | Number 1 | Apr 01, 2016

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“Ceasefire” on Oura Bay: The March 2016 Japan-Okinawa“Amicable Agreement” Introduction and Six Views from withinthe Okinawan Anti-Base Movement

Gavan McCormack

ContributorsThis compilation is designed to offer an account and interpretation of the recent,sometimes perplexing events surrounding the March Agreement and its implications. Itintroduces a set of comments by Okinawans prominent in one or other part of the anti-base movement, as follows:Sakurai Kunitoshi, "How is the 'Amicable Settlement' to be Understood?"Nakasone Isamu, "Henoko: the 'Amicable Settlement'"Ashitomi Hiroshi, "After the 'Amicable Settlement': For a True Solution to the NewBase Construction Issue"Miyagi Yasuhiro, "On the 'Amicable Settlement' between the Japanese State andOkinawa Prefecture"Urashima Etsuko, "The 'Amicable Settlement': One Citizen's Reflections"Yoshikawa Hideki,"The 'Amicable Settlement': Statement from 'Okinawa Citizens'Network for Biodiversity"

Stalemate

Much has been written on the government ofJapan's determination to provide a new base forthe United States Marine Corps at Henoko onOura Bay in northern Okinawa and to transferthe existing, obsolescent, dangerous andinconvenient Futenma Air Station to it.1 Whenthe agreement to "return" the Marine Corps'Futenma Air Station to Japan was first reached(April 12, 1996), it was to occur "within five toseven years." As the 20th anniversary of thatagreement loomed early in 2016, the MarineCorps' "Marine Aviation Plan 2016" amended

the already several times pushed backtransfer/reversion date to "fiscal year 2025"(October 2024-September 2025).2 AdmiralHarry Harris, Commander-of US Pacific forcespresented that date in evidence to Congressearly in 2016.3 But even as that 2025 date wasbeing reluctantly accepted in Washington, atthe beginning of March 2016, Japandespatched its top security official, YachiShotaro, to Washington to seek the Obamagovernment's understanding (and presumablyalso its permission) for a further substantialdelay.4 Once the US consented, the Abegovernment came to an "out-of-court" March 4agreement (discussed in this paper and in thefollowing opinion essays by Okinawans) withOkinawa Prefecture, that involved a completeand indefinite suspension of site works atHenoko. Lt. General Robert Neller, commanderof the US Marine Corps, told a Senate militaryaffairs committee meeting that that suspensioncould be expected to last a further 12-months.5

President Obama, advised of the impendingdelay, merely responded with "So there will benothing happening for a while then."6

Despite the presidential calm, anger inWashington is palpable as the date forfulfilment of the Japanese pledge keeps beingpushed back, and as the most pro-Americangovernment of recent times fails to deliver onits repeated promises of closure. As AdmiralHarris noted, of 200 base transfer-related itemscarried in Japan's 2015 budget, just nine hadbeen completed with eight more still underway,and the situation at the Henoko site was notimproving but rather protest was "continuing to

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escalate."7 On the Japanese side too, as Abeand his circle found their plans for baseconstruction blocked by stubborn Okinawanopposit ion, frustration mounts. BothWashington and Tokyo recognize that there isno end in sight to that struggle. The world'smajor powers had been unable, for almost twodecades, to impose their will on the 1.4 millionpeople of Okinawa. It is inconceivable that thehead of any other local self-governing body inJapan should refer, as Okinawa's GovernorOnaga did in 2015, to the government of thecountry as "outrageous" (rifujin) or "depraved"(daraku) and (as he did before the UnitedNations Human Rights Commission) as"ignoring the people's will."8

Protest against Henoko base, February2015.

The "Futenma return" promise was conditionalupon construction of new, substitute facilities,and those facilities, the Government of Japaninsisted, could not be anywhere else in Japanbut Okinawa, specifically at Henoko on OuraBay, around 50 kilometres to the north ofFutenma. In December 2013, then OkinawanGovernor Nakaima Hirokazu issued thenational government the authority it needed tocommence construction - the license to reclaima large swathe of Oura Bay. Nakaima gave his

consent without explanation, despite anelectoral pledge to the contrary and despiteoverwhelming prefectural opposition, followinga week of intensive meetings closeted withgovernment leaders in Tokyo on pretext ofneeding hospital treatment. His consentbecame the central issue in the gubernatorialelection of November 2014. Nakaima wasoverwhelmingly defeated (by 100,000 votes) byOnaga Takeshi, who campaigned on thepromise that he would "do everything in mypower" to stop Henoko construction.

In July 2015, much of the Bay was declared off-limits and preliminary survey works at the sitebegan, with state forces (Coastguard and RiotPolice) mobilized to impose the project in theteeth of strong Okinawan opposition. In Augustan Okinawan Experts' ("Third Party")Committee advised Onaga that the reclamationlicense was legally "flawed" and should not beallowed to stand. On October 13 he cancelledit.

The license thus withdrawn, the state had tocall a halt to the works. However, it almostimmediately ordered Onaga's order suspendedand two weeks later, ignoring a massive (950page) Okinawan prefectural statement of itscase, in a few brisk paragraphs declared thatthere was no "legal flaw" in the Nakaimalicense and so work could resume.9 After bothits "advice" (October 27) and then its"instruction" (November 6) to Governor Onagato withdraw the cancelation order failed toelicit submission, on November 17 the nationalgovernment (through the Minister of Land,Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, orMLITT) filed suit against the prefecturalgovernment under the Administrative AppealsAct, alleging administrative malfeasance andseeking to have Onaga's order set aside and a"proxy execution" procedure adopted. As Inoted earlier on this suit,

"Overall, the national government appears tobe engaged on a constitutional coup: stripping

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the governor and prefectural government ofpowers vested in them by the constitution andthe Local Government Act and seeking at allcosts to just i fy the MLITT minister 'sreinstatement or 'proxy execution' of the landreclamation approval."10

On November 2, 2015, Okinawa prefecturelaunched a complaint against the Abegovernment with the Central and LocalGovernment Disputes Management Council, ahitherto relatively insignificant independentreview body set up in 2000 by the government'sDepartment of General Affairs. That complaintwas rejected on December 24. On December25, the prefect launched a separate counter-suit against the government in the Naha branchof the Fukuoka High Court.

Court Recommended Resolution

Lawyers representing the state (left) andOkinawa (right) in court, February 29,2016.

On January 29, 2016, in the suit launched bythe Government of Japan against GovernorOnaga, Judge Tamiya Toshiro of the NahaBranch of the Fukuoka High Court advised thedisputing parties to consider an out-of-courtsettlement, offering two alternative scenarios.11

He began with the following exhortation:

"At present the situation is one of confrontationbetween Okinawa and the Government of

Japan. So far as the cause of this is concerned,before any consideration of which is at faultboth sides should reflect that it should not belike this. Under the 1999 revision to the LocalAutonomy Law it was envisaged that the stateand regional public bodies would serve theirrespective functions as independentadministrative bodies in an equal, cooperativerelationship. That is especially desirable in theperformance of statutory or entrusted matters.The present situation is at odds with the spiritof this revised law.

The situation that in principle should exist isfor all Japan, including Okinawa, to come to anagreement on a solution and to seek thecooperation of the United States. If they didthis, it could become the occasion for positivecooperation on the part of the US too, includingbroad reform.12

Instead, if the issue continues to be contestedbefore the courts, and even if the state wins thepresent judicial action, hereafter it may beforeseen that the reclamation license might berescinded or that approval of changesaccompanying modification of the design wouldbecome necessary, and that the courtroomstruggle would continue indefinitely. Even thenthere could be no guarantee that it would besuccessful. In such a case, as the Governor'swide discretionary powers come to berecognized, the risk of defeat is high. And, evenif the state continued to win, the works arelikely to be considerably delayed. On the otherhand, even if the prefecture wins, if it turns outthat the state would not ask for Futenma returnbecause it insists that Henoko construction isthe only way forward, then it is inconceivablethat Okinawa by itself could negotiate with theUS and secure Futenma's return."

Judge Tamiya offered the parties twoalternative scenarios for resolution, referring tothem simply as "A" and "B" (sometimes referredto as "basic" and "provisional" though thedocument itself does not use these words).13

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The tone and content of the Tamiya exhortationwas remarkable, and legal specialistssuggested that it constituted a rebuke, and aplain warning to the state that it was headingtowards defeat and needed to fundamentallychange its strategy. The full implication of thiswarning only became clear later when the statewithdrew its existing suits under theAdministrative Appeals Act (for which purposeit had been acting "as if it were a privateindividual") and, in accord with the advice fromJudge Tamiya, shifted its case to the LocalAutonomy Act, which fundamentally revised therelationship between central state andprefectures from vertical, superior/inferior, to"equal and cooperative," and stipulated that inthe event of disagreement, the nationalgovernment should first ask the localgovernment body to revise its action and onlyas a last resort seek redress by asking a courtto verify the illegality of the local governmentbody's action. Clearly the court saw such a suitas more appropriate to the newly equalizedrelationship and therefore more appropriatethan the execution-by-proxy suit that the Abegovernment had chosen. The Ryukyu shimpodescribed the methods the Abe government hadadopted as "a blatant denial of local autonomy… and … counter to legal principles."14

Under "Plan A," the defendant (Okinawa) wouldwithdraw the order cancelling the reclamationlicense and

"The plaintiff [the Japanese government] enterinto negotiations with the United States at anappropriate time to negotiate for the newairfield to be either returned to Japan orconverted into a joint military-civilian airport atsome point within thirty years from the time itbecomes operational."

After that reversion (or other disposition), thestate would operate the facility as a civilairport. The state was also to make maximumeffort for environmental conservation andprovide prompt compensation for any damage

caused in the reclamation and subsequentworks. To the extent that these things weredone, the defendant [prefecture] and theplaintiff [the state] were to cooperate in thereclamation and subsequent operation [of thebase].

Under Plan "B," both parties would withdrawtheir court actions, the Okinawa DefenseBureau [i.e., the Government of Japan] wouldimmediately stop site works, and the partieswould open discussion to achieve a satisfactoryresolution (enman kaiketsu) pending outcomeof a judicial determination as to illegality.Defendant and plaintiff would jointly commit topromptly respecting the outcome of suchjudgement and to carry out steps in accordancewith it. This formula amounted basically to asubstitution of fresh judicial proceedings forthe existing ones, though it refers to that in themost oblique way only, calling for resumptionof negotiations in quest for "satisfactoryresolution" pending the outcome of fresh courtproceedings. Since the contradiction was toremain unresolved and absolute in this"amicable settlement," negotiations in 2016would be unlikely to accomplish more thanthose of the "intensive negotiations" of August-September 2015.15 How such fresh courtproceedings would overcome the problems thejudge referred to in the existing ones was notclear.

While the national government initially rejectedboth proposals, the prefectural governmentexpressed "forward-looking" interest in "B,"presumably because it involved a stoppage ofworks during negotiations.16 As for Plan "A,"since it was predicated on the contested baseat Henoko actually being built and provided tothe Marine Corps, probably until at least theyear 2045, there was nothing conciliatory oramicable about it. Judge Tamiya thus combinedformal, procedural critique of the Abegovernment' with support for its case, evidentin this recommendation of a "solution" thatinvolved construction of the very base that

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Okinawa was determined to stop.

"Out-of-Court Settlement"

On March 4 an "out-of-court" settlementbetween the national and prefecturalgovernments was announced.17 Following, anddrawing upon the court's January proposals,both parties agreed to withdraw theirrespective suits, the Okinawa Defense Bureau[the government] was to call a halt to siteworks, and the state to ask the prefectureunder Article 25 of the Local Autonomy Act tocancel the order cancelling the reclamationlicense, with that matter being referred to theCentral and Local Government DisputesManagement Counci l in the event ofprefectural refusal to comply. The partieswould discuss and seek "satisfactoryresolution" pending the final outcome ofjudicial proceedings, and both would thenabide by that final outcome; in other words, theGovernor would promptly carry out whateverthe court ruled, even if he thought it wrong,and would revoke his October 2015 orderwithout further ado.

Announcement of "Amicable Agreement,"March 4, 2016.

While rejecting applications by the prefectureto call expert witnesses on military and defensematters (who might dispute the need for aMarine Corps presence in Okinawa) or on theenvironment or environmental assessment law(who might challenge the compatibility ofOkinawa's unique bio-diversity with large-scalereclamation and militarization), the courtshowed exceptional interest in one matter:securing an explicit statement from GovernorOnaga that he would abide by its ruling.18

Paragraph 9 of the "Amicable Agreement" read:

"The complainant and other interested partiesand the defendant reciprocally pledge that,after the judgment in the suit for cancellationof the rectification order becomes final, theywill immediately comply with that judgmentand carry out procedures in accord with theruling and its grounds, and also that thereafterthey will mutually cooperate and sincerelyrespond to the spirit of the ruling."

The tortuous prose of this clause (confirmingseveral courtroom oral exchanges to the sameeffect) left no doubt of the intent. During hisappearances before the court he wasrepeatedly asked for assurances. "Will youabide by the judgement?" asked the judge, towhich Onaga replied, repeatedly "Shitagau" (Iwill follow it.) Yet the wording of the paragraphthat in due course incorporated this pledge,especially the commitment to "cooperate andsincerely respond to the spirit of the ruling,"was problematic. It suggested a "spirit" or"essence" (shushi) that was somehow morethan the core content (shubun) of thejudgment, which was simply a ruling onGovernor Onaga's October 2015 striking downof his predecessor's reclamation license.

Challenged in the Okinawa PrefecturalAssembly on March 8 as to what this meant,Governor Onaga explained his understandingthat Paragraph 9 signified consent to complywith a court ruling should the case go againsthim. As an elected official he had little

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alternative but to reply in such terms.However, he went on to explain (through hisstaff) that he understood it to mean simply thathis October 2015 order would be cancelled, i.e.the Nakaima license would be restored, whilein respect of all other matters he would make"appropriate judgement in accord with thelaw."19 Though he did not go into detail, thatwould seem to mean that, even if defeated incourt, he could still, should he choose, issue afresh revocation of the Nakaima reclamationlicense and he could refuse or obstructrequests from the state for detai ledadjustments to the reclamation plan orengineering design. Onaga supporters hopeand believe he will do this, playing, so to speak,a decisive trump card if and when the statewins a judicial victory. They expect or hope thathe would then, as he promised at an electoralcampaign speech on 21 October 2014 (andelsewhere), revoke the Nakaima license even ifthe court ruled that there were no legal flawsin the process.20

The Abe government, however, is bound toinsist that Paragraph 9 of the Agreementmeans p ledging comprehensive andthoroughgoing cooperation under the rubric ofthe "spirit of the ruling," and that it thereforetranscends Onaga's pledge to do "everything inmy power" to resist the Henoko base plan.

There is a peculiar irony about the focus of thiscase on the "rule of law" which Chief CabinetSecretary Suga has repeatedly said is beyondquestion in Japan. While the state in itsdealings with Okinawa has often adoptedperverse or arbitrary readings of law andconstitution, Onaga has been ever scrupulousand exhibits a naïve faith in Japaneseinstitutions and in the certainty of hisOkinawan cause triumphing if only it is given afair hearing. While the Governor has beenrepeatedly subjected to grilling over hisreadiness to abide by a final court decision onthe Henoko matter, the government itself hasthroughout the Henoko case relied on superior

force and intimidation. It is this governmentthat in 2014 manipulated the constitution bythe simple device of adopting a radically newinterpretation of it (setting aside theunderstanding followed by all previousgovernments, embodied in a decision of theCabinet Legislat ive Bureau, that theConstitution's Article 9 forbade the exercise ofthe collective right of self-defense) and then in2015 adopted a raft of security legislation thatmany – almost certainly a majority – ofc o n s t i t u t i o n a l s p e c i a l i s t s s a w a sunconstitutional.

Large and potentially very serious allegationsnow circulate as to the process by which the"Amicable Agreement" was negotiated.21 Theyremain unconfirmed, and so need to be treatedwith caution, but in the context of the Abegovernment's known policies and actions inregard to Okinawa, plausible. They suggestthat the Abe government orchestrated theMarch settlement through a high-level, secretplanning group set up early in February(comprising Suga Yoshihide, Chief CabinetSecretary and head of the group, ForeignMinister Kishida Fumio, Defense MinisterNakatani Gen, and Tezuka Makoto, head of theJustice Ministry's Litigation Bureau and aspecialist in "out-of-court" settlements,including that in 2015 of the long-runningNarita Airport dispute). It may be significantthat the judge on that occasion was TamiyaToshiro, the same judge who, following transferby the Ministry of Justice from the Tokyo HighCourt to the Fukuoka High Court, Naha branch,on October 30, 2015, became presiding judgein the "proxy execution" suit launched by thegovernment against Okinawa prefecture onNovember 17, 2015.22 It now appears thatTezuka may have colluded with Judge Tamiyato arrive at the most certain way to exactOkinawan submission to the base constructionplan and to remove all possibilities of furtherjudicial obstruction.

The result was the agreement reached on

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March 4, avoiding the potential perils of the"Proxy Execution" suit already noted above and"baiting the hook" to induce Okinawansubmission by including the suggestion (in PlanB) of works stoppage and resumption of talks(to both of which Okinawa could respondpositively), and adding the further sweetener ofreference (in the January 29 Recommendationto Settlement), to a renegotiation with the USof the SOFA arrangements governing USAforces in Japan. Meanwhile, however, the realbarb was hidden in Plan B, whose keycomponent was the superficially innocuous"sincerity" provision in Paragraph 9, designedto remove any possible further recourse to thecourts once the Supreme Court's decision isreached (presumably later in 2016 andassumed by almost all observers to be adecision favorable to the state).

What this suggests is a conspiracy at the centreof the Abe state to deny the division of powersand the independence of the judiciary and toentrap Okinawan prefecture into submission.

Though Onaga's support level remains high inOkinawa, there is a nagging doubt as to how hewill respond when or if faced with a SupremeCourt ruling and how exactly he will theninterpret his pledge under paragraph 9. This isfed by Onaga's inclination to engage in "secretnegotiations" with the Abe government (asduring the month's "intensive negotiations" oflate 2015, for which it seems that no recordwas kept), or during the weeks leading to theMarch 4 agreement),23 by his refusal to criticizeAbe's controversial constitutional 2014interpretation of collective self-defense andsubsequent 2015 security legislation package,and by his support for the US base system ingeneral (obviously with the exception of theFutenma substitution project),24 his failure tooppose the construction of landing pads forMarine Corps "Osprey" aircraft in the middle ofvillages in Northern Okinawa, and his silenceon projects to expand Japanese Self-DefenseForce presence through the Southwest (or

Frontier) islands of Ishigaki, Miyako andYonaguni.

As noted in a previous essay, the Governor hasalso persistently declined to take any step to"cancel" the license for rock and coral crushingin Oura Bay issued by his predecessor inAugust 2014.25 It is clear that his attention hasfocussed on the "main game" – the reclamationlicense – but as the Okinawa Defense Bureaureadied hundreds of massive concrete blocksearly in 2016 for dropping into Oura Bay manybelieved that any steps in defense of the baythat could be taken should be taken, especiallyby a Governor who had promised to do"everything in my power" to stop reclamationand base construction.

"Rectification Order"

Paragraph 8 of the agreement reads:

"Until such time as a finalized court judgementon the proceedings for cancellation of therectification order is issued, the plaintiff andother interested parties and the defendant willundertake discussions aimed at 'satisfactoryresolution' (enman kaiketsu) of the Futenmaairfield return and the current [Henoko]reclamation matter."

However, no sooner had the "AmicableSettlement"" with Okinawa promising those"discussions aimed at satisfactory resolution"been reached than Prime Minister Abe insistedanew that Henoko was "the only option,"implying that there was nothing to negotiatebut Okinawa's surrender. 26 Just three daysafter agreeing to engage in discussions, andwithout so much as a preliminary meeting,MLITT Minister Ishii (for the government) sentGovernor Onaga a formal request that heretract his cancellation of the Oura Bayreclamation license (i.e. that he restore thelicense granted by Nakaima in December2013). 27 It was exactly as prescribed under

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Paragraph 3 of the agreement, committing theparties to proceed in accord with Article 245 ofthe Local Autonomy Law, but it was plainly atodds with the prescription under Paragraph 8:that they negotiate.

On March 14, Governor Onaga responded,refusing, pointing out that, contrary to theprocedure spelled out in the Local AutonomyLaw, the Government had given no reason forits request and therefore his cancellation ordercould not be seen as a breach of the law.28

Submitting the matter to the DisputesManagement Council, he referred to Ishii's actas "an illegal intervention by the state."29 Itwas, he said, a "pity" that the government hadseen fit to issue such a Rectification Orderimmediately after entering the AmicableAgreement.

The Disputes Management Council thusassumes centre stage in a major constitutionalcrisis. Till now an obscure and almostirrelevant bureaucratic appendage, since itsestablishment in 2000 it had only twice beencalled upon to adjudicate a dispute and onneither occasion – both matters of relativelyminor importance – had it issued any rulingagainst the government.30 The fact that inDecember 2015 it dismissed out-of-hand thethen Okinawan submission, without so much asa statement of its reasons, made it seem asingularly unpromising avenue for Okinawa.

While the Wheels Grind

As lawyers in Tokyo and Naha pore overdocuments and issue writs or other courtdocuments, it is already clear that the March 4"Amicable Settlement" or "out-of-court"settlement was neither "out-of-court" nor a"settlement." It was drawn up and agreed inaccord with court directives (and conceivably insecret negotiations between government andcourt), and under it the government shifted itscase against Okinawa from the Administrative

Appeals Act , where i ts pos i t ion wasprocedurally weak, to the Local GovernmentAct, where it might be stronger.

As the Asahi noted,

"The Abe government has acted as if it werebacking off, only to push harder. This suggeststhe arrogance that comes from Tokyoregarding Okinawa as an inferior. And this isdespite the High Court's statement that thecentral government and all local governmentsare 'equals'."31

Large issues – not least of course the fate ofOura Bay and the expans i on o f t heoverwhelming US base presence on Okinawa–are at stake. These include constitutionalinterpretation (distinction of central and localgovernment powers, relation of treaty-baseddefense and security relations with the UnitedStates to constitutional principle, andenvironmental protection. As I wrote earlier,

While the prefecture insists it is a breach of itsconstitutional entitlement to self-governmentfor the state to impose the Henoko constructionproject on it by unilateral, forceful decision, thestate, for its part, argues that base matters areits prerogative, a matter of treaty obligationsnot subject to any constitutional barrier, andhave nothing to do with local self-government.32

The "settlement" merely concentrated courtproceedings into a single suit, from which apreliminary judgement is expected around mid-May. The heavy responsibility of making thatjudgement falls to a completely untried quasi-judicial organ, whose finding is then almostcertain to be referred to the Supreme Court. Atthat level it is almost inconceivable that thestate could lose. The separation of powers isweak. Prime Minister Abe inclines to seecourts, especially the Supreme Court, asorgans of state subject in the last resort to him,and the precedent has been clear since theDecember 1959 "Sunagawa case" that thejudiciary does not pass judgement on matters

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pertaining to the security treaty with the US.This is because they are "highly political" andconcern Japan's very existence, hence are to beleft to the Prime Minister.

Medoruma Shun

Estimates of the overall time the judicialprocess might now take range from six totwelve months. Even then, however far fromnecessarily signifying an end to the problem,that presumed "final" and "irreversible"judgement, regardless of Governor Onaga'sresponse to the ruling, might simply spark amore intense level of political and social crisis,affecting in turn the Japan-US relationship andthe frame of regional order. One of Okinawa'smost respected figures, the prize-winningnovelist Medoruma Shun, who as a Henokocanoeist has formed part of the non-violentcivic blockade designed to block reclamationworks, recently commented, pregnantly,33

"It seems very unlikely that the Henoko newbase construction problem can be solved solelyby the administration, the law, or theparliament. Public opposition will keepdelaying the construction. And the Japanesegovernment will probably only give up onconstruction if public protest extends beyondCamp Schwab to US bases throughout theprefecture, and comes to affect the functioningof Kadena Air Base, with the US governmentand military only then realizing the seriousnessof the situation."

That, Medoruma adds, is a far from impossibleprospect.

Governor Onaga, too, looks beyond the Abegovernment to the ultimate arbiter, thegovernment of the United States. He detects aposs ib l y f a ta l weakness in the Abegovernment's stance:

"The Abe government looks strong, but itseems to me that it is a government thatpossesses a fragility that makes it liable tocrack under pressure. As for what it is thatconstitutes that weakness, it is that thisgovernment is completely lacking in ability tosay anything to America."34

Okinawa too, however, possesses a certainfragility, especially in the "All-Okinawa"formulation favoured by Governor Onaga. Inthis crisis of the 21st century Japanese state andthe Okinawan people, Onaga Takeshi, in somany respects the quintessential, conservativelocal government Japanese politician, poses amajor challenge, rooted not in ideology but inidentity politics, to the government of Japan(and beyond it, to that of the United States).Many wonder how far such an unlikely figurecan go down the path of resistance to hisconservative colleagues and counterparts atthe helm of the nation state on the one majorissue on which he differs from them. Theunpredictable factor is his claim that hisOkinawan identity is the crucial determinant ofhis policies, his moral and political compass.The question, ultimately, is whether identitycan in fact trump ideology.

What follows is a series of six short commentsby Okinawans active in one or other aspect ofthe movement opposing construction of thenew base a t Henoko , o f fer ing the i runderstanding of the March 4th agreement.

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Planned site for relocation, May 2015.

How is the "Amicable Settlement" to beUnderstood?

Sakurai Kunitoshi

Professor Emeritus and Former President,Okinawa University

The March Amicable Settlement means in thefirst instance that the state avoids defeat in theproxy execution suit. The chief judge'srecommendation of settlement was a messageto the national government that it was likely tolose the suit. The chief judge believed theforceful steps for proxy execution that the statehad adopted abruptly, without going throughproper procedures, were in breach of the LocalAutonomy Law.

However, in the judgement that was to havebeen delivered on April 13, the chief judge didnot want to rule against the state. Theimplication of his advice was that the likelihoodof the state winning would be very high if itwent back and restarted proceedings forcancellation of the rectification directive inaccord with this law. The Abe governmentcould swallow the "Amicable Settlement" dealbecause by doing so it avoided the damage ofdefeat and overcame the image of a strong-armgovernment. It also had its eye on theforthcoming June [Okinawa] PrefecturalAssembly and July nat ional House ofCouncillors elections.

It was a significant accomplishment for theOkinawan movement that under theagreement, work stopped and the naturalenvironment of Henoko and Oura Bay andpeople's livelihood could enjoy at least atemporary respite. This was thanks to the yearsof struggle at the Henoko site, the involvementof the "All Okinawa" [prefecture-wide]movement backing it, and the support of peopleof conscience in Japan and around the world.The problem now is: how to get the governmentto give up the construction of a new base atHenoko.

Abe insists that foreign affairs and nationaldefense are exclusive prerogatives of the nationstate, and he has not the slightest inclination tolisten to the Okinawan proposals. The fact thatthe government issued the rectificationdirective without bothering to resume the

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discussions that were supposed to be held [withOkinawa] provided eloquent testimony of this.All that Abe can think of is his pledges to theUS, not Okinawa.

There is high probability that the prefecturewill lose in the suit against the prefecture forrectification. Paragraph 9 of the AmicableSettlement states:

"The complainant and other interested partiesand the defendant reciprocally pledge that,after the judgment in the suit for cancellationof the rectification order becomes final, theywill immediately comply with that judgmentand carry out procedures in accord with theruling and its grounds, and also that thereafterthey will mutually cooperate and sincerelyrespond to the spirit of the ruling."

However, defeat for the prefecture just meansthe cancellation of the order by GovernorOnaga nullifying former Governor Nakaima'sreclamation license. The reclamation licenseissued by Nakaima would then be restored andthe Okinawa Defense Bureau (ODB) wouldresume works. But, as it presses ahead withworks various design changes will becomenecessary. Each time that happens, the consentof the Governor of Okinawa, as the authoritygranting the license, becomes necessary andGovernor Onaga has declared that he willexercise to the full his authority as Governor toprevent any new base being built.

The problem is the existence of the sincerityclause in the latter part of Paragraph 9, bywhich the parties "reciprocally pledge" that(after implementation of procedures prescribedin the judgment) "thereafter they will mutuallycooperate and sincerely respond to the spirit ofthe ruling." The Abe government will want toenforce this sincerity clause. The question iswhether or not we can construct a publicopinion capable of blocking it.

(Translated by Gavan McCormack)

Henoko: the "Amicable Settlement"

Nakasone Isamu

Co-representative of the Uruma Gushikawa"Article 9 Association" and the "All-Okinawa" Council Uruma branch.

This article first appeared in Okinawa Times onMarch 22, 2016 under the title "9-ko ni kojikyoko no senryaku" and is translated andreproduced here by kind permission of theauthor and Okinawa Times.)

A settlement to a lawsuit is not a ruling thatdecisively declares victory or defeat based on

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each side's assertions and evidence regardingthe civil dispute at issue. Rather, it is a methodof voluntary dispute resolution chosen by theparties involved when both parties havedetermined that they can be satisfied by aconclusion involving mutual concessions. Awritten settlement has the same legally bindingforce as a judge's ruling. While in the case ofadministrative lawsuits, which differ from civillawsuits, settlements are generally uncommon,there are rare exceptions to this rule.

On March 4, the Japanese government and theOkinawa prefectural government agreed to asettlement in the proxy execution lawsuit. Fromthe start, I voiced my concerns with variouselements of the related legal process on theinternet and in other public forums. Aspects Ifound problematic included the court'ssupervision of the lawsuit, from the progressionof the oral proceedings to the timing andmethod by which a settlement was advised aswell as the details of the court's settlementproposal.

The court initially proposed two settlements.The first was referred to in the media as the"fundamental proposal" and by the court as"proposal A." The terms of proposal Astipulated that

"The plaintiff [the Japanese government] enterinto negotiations with the United States at anappropriate time to negotiate for the newairfield to be either returned to Japan orconverted into a joint military-civilian airport atsome point within thirty years from the time itbecomes operational."

From my experience dealing with numeroussettlements in court, I instinctively felt thisparagraph to be particularly unnatural.

Requisite for the conclusion of a settlement are

(1) that both parties make some concession,and

(2) that the terms refer to actions the partieshave the authority to execute freely, or that canbe executed by application of the law.

However, the success or failure of diplomaticnegotiation with the United States as describedin the above paragraph is contingent on thecooperation of a third party, namely the UnitedStates. In other words, the paragraph does notdescribe something that the Japanesegovernment has the authority to execute freely.Thus, it fails to adhere to the requisites of aterm of settlement, and thus the settlementproposal as a whole lacks validity from a legalstandpoint.

It is inconceivable that, under ordinarycircumstances, a judge would insert such aparagraph into a proposed settlement. For sucha paragraph to be included, the United States,as an interested party, would need to becomeinvolved in the settlement procedure in orderfor the settlement to be concluded (SupremeCourt ruling of 9 August 1938). The inclusion ofsuch a paragraph in a settlement proposalwould render the entire settlement invalid.Furthermore, for two settlement proposals tobe recommended s imul taneous ly i sinconceivable in ordinary judicial practice. Theinclusion of proposal A, which was highlydisadvantageous to the Okinawan side, maywell have been no more than a distractioncunningly used as a form of psychologicalmanipulation in order to entice the Okinawanside to accept the provisional proposal(proposal B).

Neither proposal A nor B even slightlyresembled the sort of settlement ordinarilyproposed by a court. From the start, Isuspected that both proposals were politicalinstruments written jointly by Ministry ofJustice bureaucrats and officials from the PrimeMinister's office unaccustomed to courtpractice and theory, which would explain theinclusion of wording that would invalidate thesettlement. Sure enough, there have since been

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shocking reports that the government acceptedthe settlement after behind-the-scenes talkswere held between the Prime Minister's officeand top Ministry of Justice officials.

If these reports are true, they seriously call intoquestion the independence of Japan's judiciary.

The most serious problem faced by theOkinawa prefectural government lies in thewording of Paragraph 9 of the settlement,which stipulates that

"The complainant and other interested partiesand the defendant reciprocally pledge that,after the judgment in the suit for cancellationof the rectification order becomes final, theywill immediately comply with that judgmentand carry out procedures in accord with theruling and its grounds, and also that thereafterthey will mutually cooperate and sincerelyrespond to the spirit of the ruling."

Since the settlement fails to specify either thetime period or length of time during which thetwo parties must engage in talks, thegovernment will likely bypass talks altogetherand aim to hurry the proceedings of the futurelawsuit.

The seemingly innocent language of Paragraph9 of the settlement devises a trap to utterlycircumvent any methods the Okinawaprefectural government could otherwisepotentially use to prevent the Henoko baseconstruction in the event that it loses the futurelawsuit. Article 114.1 of the Civil ProceedingsLaw states that "Res judicata will only apply tothe contents of the main text of a finaljudgement." This is accepted to mean that resjudicata and executory power only arise fromthe main text of the verdict, or the verdict'sconclusion. With the sole exception of cases inwhich the verdict is offset by an appeal asdescribed in article 114.2, the text of the"verdict reasoning," which describes the factsconsidered and the decision-making processleading up to the verdict, cannot be grounds for

asserting res judicata. (There do exist legaldoctrines, such as the collateral estoppeldoctrine, that recognize binding force arisingfrom the "verdict reasoning.")35

Regardless of this accepted interpretation ofthe Civil Proceedings Law, however, in thesettlement between the national governmentand Okinawa prefectural government, thewording of Paragraph 9 means that theOkinawan side will inevitably be bound by thecontents of the "verdict reasoning" in additionto the main text of the verdict. The Okinawaprefectural government has "pledged" thateven after the lawsuit is over it will "mutuallycooperate and sincerely respond to the ruling'sspirit." This means that if the governor ofOkinawa attempts to exercise his authority, forexample by denying authorization of futurechanges to the construction plans that willinevitably arise as the construction proceeds,the national government could use this asgrounds to bring Okinawa to court once again,arguing that the governor's actions go againstdeterminations described in the "verdictreasoning." Thus, hidden in Paragraph 9 is thesecret behind the government's strategy to usethe settlement to press forward with the baseconstruction while using the temporarysuspension of construction as a scheme to gainOkinawa's trust.

The oral proceedings in the proxy executionlawsuit also showed the government'smeticulously thought-out scheme to manipulatethe court proceedings in such a way as topreclude future difficulties. Detailed reports ofthe proceedings show that when the lawyersrepresenting the national government cross-examined Governor Onaga Takeshi, theyquestioned him over and over as to whether hewould abide by the court's final ruling. Afterthe settlement was concluded, Prime MinisterAbe also made repeated reference to Paragraph9 when speaking to the press. The paragraph isa maneuver designed to preemptively thwartany form of opposition that the Okinawa

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prefectural government could potentiallyattempt to utilize.

The court battle up until this point centered onthe current governor of Okinawa nullifying theland reclamation permit authorized by hispredecessor on the grounds that theauthorization contained legal flaws or defects.In addition to the act of nullification, thegovernor could also potentially revoke thepermit. Nullification and revocation are twoseparate administrative actions, withrevocation being permissible when necessaryto protect the public good. Revocation is thusanother card which the governor couldpotentially play, but Paragraph 9 of thesettlement could act as a hindrance in theevent that he chooses to do so.

(Translated by Sandi Aritza)

After the "Amicable Settlement": For aT r u e S o l u t i o n t o t h e N e w B a s eConstruction Issue

Ashitomi Hiroshi

Co-Representative, Council Against theHeliport

On March 4, a settlement was concluded in thelawsuit over the proxy execution of the Henokoland reclamation authorization brought by theAbe administration against the governor ofOkinawa. The settlement contained thefollowing terms:

(1) The Japanese government and the Okinawaprefectural government will withdraw alllawsuits they have brought against each otherregarding the nullification of the landreclamation permit.

(2) The Japanese government will withdraw theformal objection and stay of execution itenacted in response to the permit nullification,and immediately suspend all construction workrelated to the project.

(3) On the basis of the Local Autonomy Law,the Japanese government wil l issue arectification order to the governor of Okinawa,ordering him to reinstate the land reclamationpermit. If the Okinawa prefectural governmentrejects the order, it will file a lawsuit to havethe order withdrawn. Both sides will accept theoutcome of the ensuing trial.

(4) Until a court verdict is reached, both sides

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will continue to hold talks aiming to find amutually acceptable solution to the issue ofFutenma's return and the Henoko landreclamation.

It is difficult to fathom the true intent behindthe government's sudden decision to accept asettlement in the lawsuit it initiated.Nonetheless, after being subject to regularviolence by the Coast Guard at sea and thepolice and riot police on land, we welcome evena temporary suspension of work on the groundthat will provide us with a brief respite fromour continued struggle.

However, even while announcing hisacceptance of the settlement, Prime MinisterAbe reconfirmed his insistence that "Henoko isthe only solution." Only three days later, onMarch 7, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure,Transport and Tourism issued an orderdemanding that the governor withdraw hisnullification of the permit. This forcefulinvocation of power clearly shows that thegovernment's "settlement" signifies not areadiness to listen earnestly to what Okinawanshave to say but is rather an expedient used topromote the new base construction by avoidinga loss in the proxy execution lawsuit andsetting the stage to its own advantage in afuture lawsuit.

One week after the settlement was reached, weprotestors on the ground are still unable to letour guard down. Even though the governor'sorder to nullify the permit has regained itslegal force and construction has been stopped,construction vessels remain stationed on thewater, and floats and oil fences remain fixed inplace around the construction area. The riotpolice from the Tokyo Metropolitan PoliceAgency are still stationed at the protest site onland.

We believe the following premises representthe minimum conditions needed for theJapanese government and the Okinawaprefectural government to negotiate toward a

mutually acceptable solution.

(1) Withdrawal of the Tokyo MetropolitanPolice Agency riot police, Coast Guardpersonnel, and private security companypersonnel both on land and at sea;

(2) Removal of security vehicles and corrugatedmetal blockade in front of the Camp Schwabconstruction gate;

(3) Removal of the "temporary restricted area"in Henoko Bay and Oura Bay;

(4) Removal of floats, oil fences, and concreteblocks demarcating the restricted area, as wellas of all construction vessels;

(5) Suspension of all works on land related tothe new base construction.

We call on the Japanese government toearnestly carry out all of the above actions. TheAbe administration must realize that withoutfulfilling the above conditions, there can beneither a "settlement" nor a "mutuallyacceptable solution" to the matter.

We hereby reaffirm that the "only solution"from the perspective of Okinawa's history andfuture prospects, as well as for the future ofJapan, is for the government to abandon theHenoko base construct ion p lan . Wefurthermore declare our determination to joinGovernor Onaga and Nago Mayor InamineSusumu in fighting for a true solution.

Statement Adopted, March 13, 2016

(Translated by Sandi Aritza)

On the "Amicable Settlement" AgreementBetween the Japanese State and OkinawaPrefecture

Miyagi Yasuhiro

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Author, Activist, Former Nago CityCouncillor

The government of Japan launched a courtaction to challenge Governor Onaga Takeshi'scancellation of the license for Oura Bayreclamation as part of the Henoko baseconstruction plan. Okinawa prefecture thenlaunched an action against the governmentseeking to cancel its cancellation of the license,so that state and prefecture were locked injudicial battle.

The court hearing the dispute issued a"Recommendation for Amicable Settlement" tothe state and the prefecture and the twoparties deliberated on it subject to a courtorder that they not publish the conditionsattached and not reveal the contents to thepeople of either nation or prefecture.

The impression one gets from the media is thatthe nation state was negative about "amicablesettlement" and persisted in talking aboutenforcing the works, while the prefecture wasinclined to take a positive view of thesettlement so long as it involved a stoppage ofthe works. March 4 brought a sudden change.

The state accepted the court's call for"amicable settlement," both state andprefecture came to agreement, works stopped,and proceedings in accordance with the"amicable settlement" commenced. At thatpoint, for the first time the content of the"amicable settlement" became clear: state andprefecture would withdraw their respectivesuits, the state would halt reclamation worksforthwith, proceedings concerning theprefecture's cancellation of the reclamationlicense would be referred under the LocalAutonomy Act to the Central and LocalGovernment Dispute Resolution Council and ifeither party did not accept the outcome at thatpoint they would contest it in court.

What only became clear from later reports(Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 12 2016) wasthat the head of Japan's National SecurityCouncil had visited the US, explained itsinclination to accept the "amicable settlement"to US President Obama's National Securityadviser Susan Rice at the White House, and gotthe impression that that position would berespected. Chief Cabinet Secretary SugaYoshihide had been engaged in ongoingdiscussions with Ministry of Justice officials andwhat seems to have led the government ofJapan to switch its position and accept"amicable settlement" was the judgment thatthe state could win, even though it might takeup to one year to secure a Supreme Courtjudgment.

Paragraph 9 of the "Amicable Settlement"reads:

"The complainant and other interested partiesand the defendant reciprocally pledge that,after the judgment in the suit for cancellationof the rectification order becomes final, theywill immediately comply with that judgmentand carry out procedures in accord with theruling and its grounds, and also that thereafterthey will mutually cooperate and sincerelyrespond to the spirit of the ruling."

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The "thereafter" reference may be seen asindicating the Abe government's understandingof the agreement as "irreversible" and itsresolve to win the court case and to depriveOkinawa prefecture of any means of resistance.

For Okinawa prefecture, this "AmicableAgreement" is a settlement of the suits onreclamation license cancellation. Even if it wereto lose in the court proceedings envisagedunder the settlement, the prefecture would stillbe able to exercise Governor's powers inrelation to subsequent design changes andsuch matters.

Blatantly ignoring the will of the Okinawanpeople, the governments of Japan and theUnited States issued a joint statement on April25, 2015 that "the combination of early transferof Futenma Airfield to Camp Schwab and theconsolidation of Okinawan bases will ensure along-term, sustainable US military presence."The plan of the Japanese and US governmentsto preserve Okinawa as a base island for thelong term is now stalled before the determinedstruggle of the non-violent, direct action of thepeople of Okinawa.

Among the activists blocking construction ofthe new base, whether at the gate in front ofCamp Schwab or at sea, no one looksoptimistically on the present situation and thefuture prospects, but neither are wepessimistic. The will of the people of Okinawato absolutely reject "war" is a reminder thatthere is a straight line between the hell of theBattle of Okinawa [in 1945] and the Okinawa oftoday.

(Translated by Gavan McCormack)

The Amicable Settlement – One CitizenActivist's Reflections

Urashima Etsuko

Poet, Historian, Activist

The sudden March "Amicable Settlement"astonished us, but at least for those of us on theharsh and demanding frontlines it meant thatwe could take some rest.

In principle, it is clear that nobody connectedwith the [Henoko] frontline trusts the Abegovernment and that the government's focus ison "best way forward is the roundabout way"following the court's suggestion that it mightlose its hasty proxy execution suit and onelectoral policies for the June [Okinawan]prefectural assembly and the July [national]House of Councillors elections. It has not theslightest intention of stopping Henoko baseconstruction.

I do not for one moment doubt that GovernorOnaga remains unwavering in his stance ofstopping Henoko construction, though at first Ifelt some concern and anxiety that he mightfind himself bound hand and foot and unable toresist under the "Ámicable Settlement" wordsabout "both sides to submit and sincerelycooperate in accord with its [the judgment]'sspirit" However, as also is evident from theGovernor's explanation to the prefecturalassembly, to "comply with the judgment" refersto the suit on cancelation of the reclamationlicense. Even if Okinawa loses that suit, thereare many things he can still do that would be

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within the scope of governor's powers,including "revocation of the reclamationlicense."

I think the question is how well, over the nextyear or so, while maintaining our watch overthe site and keeping up our guard, we cansucceed in shifting national and Americanopinion.

There are some things we find difficult tounderstand about the approach of GovernorOnaga. He is a man who built his career withinthe LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) and ofcourse we do not support everything he does.But what we must avoid at all costs is the sortof fear and mistrust that could cause internalsplits among us (the sort of thing that wouldgive most delight to the Abe government). Atvery least, I have not the slightest doubt aboutthe resolve of Governor Onaga, as an"Uchinanchu" [Okinawan native] to [in hiswords] "stake my life on stopping the Henokobase construction, for the sake of the future ofOkinawa and of future generations."

In the anti-base movement over nearly twentyyears, the present phase, in which prefecturaland city governments and the citizens andpeople of Okinawa stand up resolutely againststate power, is unprecedented and epochal.Along with gratitude that we have come so far,I feel the desire to treat this unity as precious. Irefrain from any casual assessment of theprospects for the future, but all we can do iscontinue demanding cancellation of the Henokobase plan. To accomplish that goal I think thereis nothing for it but for we Okinawans and ourGovernor to trust each other and support eachother in opposing the state power of Japan andthe United States.

(Translated by Gavan McCormack)

The "Amicable Settlement" – Statementfrom "Okinawa Citizens' Network for

Biodiversity"

Yoshikawa Hideki

"Okinawa C i t i zens ' Network forBiodiversity" Representative

On March 4, 2016, the Japanese governmentand the Okinawa prefectural governmentaccepted the "provisional settlement proposal"(hereinafter "the settlement") set forth by theNaha branch of the Fukuoka High Court in thetrial regarding the plan to build a U.S. militarybase in Henoko/Oura Bay. The Japanesegovernment agreed to immediately suspend allconstruction work, and both sides agreed toengage in talks to try to find a solution to theHenoko base construction issue. Both sidesfurther agreed to consolidate the three lawsuitsbrought against each other in the past severalmonths into one single lawsuit. Lastly, bothsides agreed that if talks do not lead to an

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agreement, they will respect the court's finalruling in the ensuing trial.

Three days after accepting the settlement,however , on March 7 , the Japanesegovernment's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,Transport and Tourism issued an order toOkinawa Governor Onaga Takeshi demandingthat he reinstate the Henoko land reclamationpermit.

The Okinawa Citizen's Network for Biodiversitybelieves that the settlement and related movesby the Japanese government and Okinawaprefectural government must be carefullyobserved with caution and firm resolve. Ourview of the situation is as follows.

We are extremely troubled by the Japanesegovernment's dogged insistence that building anew base in Henoko is the "only way" to solvethe problems posed by U.S. Marine Corps AirStation Futenma. Some are saying that thegovernment's acceptance of the settlement wasa political maneuver with an eye toward theHouse of Councilors election and the OkinawaPrefectural Assembly election coming up thissummer. We are concerned that once theelections are over, the government may comeup with some just i f icat ion to resumeconstruction on the Henoko base. Just threedays after accepting the settlement, on March7, the government issued an order for OkinawaGovernor Onaga to reinstate the landreclamation permit. This clearly indicates thegovernment's intention to push forward withthe new base construction, not a willingness toengage in discussion. The government mustrealize that insisting on the Henoko plan willonly lead to a deadlock, making a breakdown innegotiations inevitable.

We are also deeply apprehensive regarding thefact that the government has not clearly statedthat "suspending construction" actually meansstopping all construction related to the Henokobase. For instance, because the new base willbe built on reclaimed land in Henoko Bay and

Oura Bay, many tons of soil and gravel willneed to be excavated and accumulated fromvarious areas in Okinawa and other parts ofJapan in order to carry out the landreclamation. The Japanese government has notclearly stated that it will stop all work relatedto the excavation and accumulation of soil andgravel. The Japanese government, the Okinawaprefectural government, and the court mustclarify that "suspension of construction" refersto the suspension of all works related to theconstruction of the base.

Furthermore, we are concerned by thelikelihood that the planned talks between theJapanese government and the Okinawaprefectural government will lack transparency,and by the lack of clarification about themanner in which the opinions of the Okinawanpeople will be reflected in these talks. TheOkinawa prefectural government mustremember that the Henoko base constructionplan has been stalled due in large part to theefforts of the people of Okinawa. The Japanesegovernment and the Okinawa prefecturalgovernment must both recall that by holdingprevious talks behind closed doors, theyaroused even greater mistrust on the part ofOkinawans, which led to even strongerresistance to the base construction. Both thenational and the local government must ensuretransparency in future talks and guarantee amethod for the views of the Okinawan people tobe reflected in these talks.

We are also concerned as to whether the finalruling by the court in the event that talks breakdown between the Japanese government andthe Okinawa prefectural government will beone that protects the natural environment inHenoko and Oura Bay, and the lives of thepeople who reside there. We fear that thedecision may not be one that the Okinawanpeople will be able to accept and comply with.We fear that Okinawa's right to local autonomyas defined by the Local Autonomy Law may notbe guaranteed. Our fears are based on

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numerous precedents in which the Japanesecourts have tended to err in favor of the centralgovernment. In finding a solution to theHenoko base construction problem, democracymust be respected as a principle, as a value,and as a process. The Japanese governmentmust acknowledge that every democratic andadministrative process available, includingpotential future lawsuits, may be utilized toprotect the natural environment in Henoko andOura bay, and the lives of local residents.

We believe that the Japanese government, theOkinawa prefectural government, and the courtmust ensure that in implementing the terms ofthe settlement, the natural environment inHenoko Bay and Oura Bay be returned to theiroriginal state. The responsible parties shouldimmediately remove the vessels and oil fencesthat were being used for the drilling surveysdone to prepare for the land reclamation. Theymust also remove the floats and buoys put up todemarcate the "temporary restricted zone"established in order to keep out protesters inkayaks and other boats. They must return therichly biodiverse ocean environment to thevarious forms of marine life, including theendangered dugongs and sea turtles that residethere.

Furthermore, in implementing the terms of thesettlement, the Japanese government andOkinawa prefectural government must ensurethat citizens are able to express theiropposition to the Henoko base construction andrelated ongoing works without fear of violentretribution from the police and Coast Guard.

We believe that as a basis for future talks, theJapanese government and the Okinawaprefectural government must conduct athorough review of scientific reports andassessments regarding the natural environmentin Henoko and Oura Bay, and the impact of thebase construction on that environment.Scientific reports and assessments subject toreview should include those provided by NGOs.

As an Okinawan environmental NGO, wereso lve to spread awareness o f therighteousness of our assertions regarding theenvironment. The natural environment ofHenoko and Oura Bay is a treasure, not only forOkinawa, but for the whole world. The plannedbase construction would unequivocally destroythis environment. In order to protect thenatural environment in Henoko and Oura Bay,as well as the lives of the local people, weresolve to continue our struggle until the newbase construction plan is abandoned.

Adopted, March 10, 2016

(Translated by Sandi Aritza)

Contributers

Sakurai Kunitoshi. Sakurai, emeritus professorand former president of Okinawa University, isa specialist in environmental assessment lawand a prominent f igure in Okinawanenvironmental conservation circles. BetweenJanuary and September 2015 he served asmember of the Okinawan Prefectural ThirdParty (Experts) Committee to investigate thedecision by former Governor Nakaima to grantlicense to reclaim the seas of Oura Bay andHenoko Bay. That committee's report formedthe basis for Governor Onaga's Octoberdecision to cancel his predecessor's license.

Nakasone Isamu. Nakasone graduated in 1965from the University of Tokyo's law departmentand worked in the court system under theGovernment of the Ryukyu Islands to 1972 andafter reversion of Okinawa as judge of asummary court in Tokyo (retiring 2010). He iscurrently co-representative of the UrumaGushikawa "Article 9 Association" and the "All-Okinawa" Council Uruma branch.

Ashi tomi H i rosh i . Ash i t omi i s co -representative of the Council Against theHeliport; a key figure in the Henoko protest

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movement.

Miyagi Yasuhiro. Miyagi is a former Nago CityAssembly member (1998-2006) who wasinstrumental in the 1997 Nago citizens'plebiscite that resulted in a vote against thenew base plan. Currently activist, author, andGinowan City resident).

Urashima Etsuko. Urashima is a Nago Citywriter and environmentalist, involved from theoutset in 1997 in the movements opposing theconstruction of a new military complex inHenoko, She is the major chronicler andhistorian-participant of struggles in NorthernOkinawa during the past two decades, authorof a series of books and articles on them (inJapanese). She is also a poet of somedistinction.

Yoshikawa Hideki . Yoshikawa is ananthropologist who teaches at Meio University

and the University of the Ryukyus in Okinawa.He is the International director of the Save theDugong Campaign Center and former ChiefExecutive Director of the Citizens' Network forBiodiversity in Okinawa."

Translator:

Sandi Aritza is a graduate student oftranslation and interpretation at theMiddlebury Institute of International Studies atMonterey.

Recommended citation: Gavan McCormack andstatements by six Okinawan authors,"'Ceasefire' on Oura Bay: The March 2016Japan-Okinawa "Amicable Agreement"Introduction and Six Views from within theOkinawan Anti-Base Movement", The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 14, Issue 7, No. 1, April 1,2016.

Gavan McCormack is emeritus professor of Australian National University and an editor ofThe Asia-Pacific Journal. His works on Korea include Cold War Hot War: An AustralianPerspective on the Korean War, (Sydney, Hale and Iremonger, 1983), and Target NorthKorea: Pushing North Korea to the Brink of Nuclear Catastrophe, (New York, Nation Books,and Sydney, Random House Australia, 2004). His most recent books are Resistant Islands:Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States(http://www.amazon.com/dp/1442215623?tag=theasipacjo0b-20) (co-authored with SatokoOka Norimatsu, Rowman and Littlefield, 2012) and Tenkanki no Nihon e – Pax Americana kaPax Asia ka (co-authored with John Dower NHK Bukkusu, 2014). His The State of theJapanese State is to be published by Paul Norbury (Millennium Books) in April 2018.

Notes1 For three recent texts, see "To the Courts! To the Streets! Okinawa at December 2015,"(http://www.japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/4405/article.html/) (December 7,2015), "Battle Stations - Okinawa in 2016," (http://apjjf.org/2016/02/1-McCormack.html/) (January 18, 2016), and "The Ginowan Mayoral - Okinawan Currents andCounter-Currents," (http://apjjf.org/2016/03/McCormack.html/) (February 10, 2016).2 See "The Ginowan Mayoral," op. cit.

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3 Admiral Harry Harris, Commander-in-Chief US Pacific Forces, Congressional evidencequoted in "Beigun no honne, hirogaru hamon, Bei shireikan no Henoko isetsu okurehatsugen," Okinawa taimusu, March 3, 2016.4 Shimada Manabu, "Henoko isetsu 'isogaba maware' kuni, sosho ipponka e Okinawa-ken towakai shikirinaoshi ni 'shosan,' Bei mo rikai," Nihon keizai shimbun, March 14, 2016.5 "Henoko koji ichinen chudan, Bei kaiheitai toppu ga shogen," Ryukyu shimpo, March 17,2016.6 Heianna Sumiyo, "Obama daitoryo Henoko okure o yonin 'shibaraku ugokanai no da na,"Okinawa taimusu, March 20, 2016.7 Quoted in Heianna Sumiyo,"Harisu Beigun shireikan 'hantai undo kakudai shite iru'Nakatani shi ni Henoko okure ken-en tsutatsu," Okinawa taimusu, February 25, 2016.8 See discussion in my (forthcoming) "Ryukyu/Okinawa's Trajectory – From Periphery toCenter, 1600-2015," in Sven Saaler and Chris Szpilman, eds., Routledge Handbook of ModernJapanese History, Routledge, 2016.9 On the 950 page document, Miyamoto Kenichi, "Okinawa no jichi to Nihon no minshushugi,"Sekai, January 2016, pp. 75-83, at p. 76. For other details see my previous texts, especially"Battle Stations."10 "Battle Stations," op. cit.11 Major documents, in Japanese only, are to be found on the Okinawa prefecture home page,including both the January 29 conciliation proposal and the March 4 agreement. See (for theformer) Chiji koshitsu Henoko shin kichi kensetsu mondai taisakuka, "Heisei 28 nen 1-gatsu29 nichi ni saibansho ga teishi shita wakai-an."(http://www.pref.okinawa.lg.jp/site/chijiko/henoko/)12 It is not clear what Judge Tamiya meant by this, but he may be understood as referringobliquely to the need to get the United States to agree to a revision of the SOFA (Status ofForces Agreement).13 My previous essays, using these terms, were written based upon newspaper reports of theconciliation process, before I could refer to the actual documents.14 "In Henoko lawsuit, court ruling must respect local autonomy and legal principles," Ryukyushimpo, March 1 2016.15 Discussed in Takahashi Tetsuya, "Kenja no chie – Henoko, kichi isetsu mondai 'chi noshototsu' wa kaihi kano ka," (http://www.gendai.ismedia.jp/articles/-/46410/) Gendai visinesu,November 19, 2015.16 See my "The Ginowan Mayoral - Okinawan Currents and Counter-Currents,"(http://apjjf.org/2016/03/McCormack.html#sthash.7opdifef.dpuf) The Asia-Pacific Journal –Japan Focus, February 10, 2016.17 Chiji koshitsu Henoko shin kichi kensetsu mondai taisakuka, "Wakai joko,"(http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/henoko/documents/h280304wakaiseiritu.pdf/) March4, 2016.18 "Dai shikko sosho dai yon kai koto benron," Ryukyu shimpo, February 16, 2016. See alsodiscussion in Kihara Satoru, "Henoko saiban judai kyokumen (2) 'mizukara torikesu wa ritekihanshin koi," Ari no hitokoto, February 17, 2016.19 "Chiji, haiso demo kengen koshi, Henoko sesei shiji, keiso-i ni uttae e," Ryukyu shimpo,March 9 2016.

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20 Quoted in Kihara Satoru, "'Chiji kengen koshi' no shikinseki wa shonin no 'tekkai'," Ari noHitokoto, March 10, 2016.21 The following paragraph is based on reports from Kyodo news agency published in ChugokuShimbun, Okinawa Times and other papers, on March 24, under the heading (ChugokuShimbun) "Henoko wakai no butaiura, Suga-shi shudo, gokuhi no chosei, sosho furi no kyutenkai," and taken up again in articles or editorials in Okinawa Times and other papers. For aconvenient resume, Kihara Satoru, Ari no hitokoto – "Wakai no butaiura – Abe seiken tosaibancho ga gokuhi ni sesshoku?" Ari no hitokoto, March 25, 2016.22 "Zetsumyo? Henoko dai shikko mae ni jinji ni okusoku tobu, Kosai Naha shibu nosaibancho," Okinawa taimusu, November 17, 2015.23 Deputy Governor Ageda Mitsuo appears to have been engaged in secret negotiations inTokyo with the Abe government from February 18 till the March agreement. See KiharaSatoru, "Henoko mitsuyaku wa yurusenai – 'wakai' kyogi no kokai, gijiroku wa saitei gimu,"Ari no hitokoto, March 7 2016.24 See inter alia on this question Kihara Satoru's "Senso 'ampo-ho'-ho haishi ni sansei shinaiOnaga chiji," Ari no hitokoto, February 27 2016.25 "The Ginowan Mayoral," op. cit.26 Reiji Yoshida, "Tokyo settles lawsuits, halts landfill at Henoko," Japan Times, March 4,2016.27 The Agreement was reached on Friday March 4. The order was issued on Monday March 7.28 "Ken, keiso-i ni fufuku moshide 'zesei shiji' no torikeshi kankoku motome," Ryukyu shimpo,March 14, 2016.29 "Henoko isetsu, keiso-shori i ni shinsa moshide hasso, Okinawa ken," Asahi shimbun, March14, 2016.30 "Keiso-i handan wa yosoku konnan," Okinawa taimusu, November 2, 2015.31 "Vox Populi: Abe looks down nose at Okinawa despite court's advice on issue," Asahishimbun, March 10, 2016.32 "Battle Stations - Okinawa in 2016," op. cit.33 Medoruma Shun (winner of the 1997 Akutagawa Prize and the 2000 Kawabata Yasunariprize for literature), "'Wakai' o kangaeru – fukutsu no shimin undo kuni ugoku," Okinawataimusu, March 21, 2016.34 Onaga Takeshi, "Okinawa wa shinkichi o kobamu," Sekai, (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten), January2016, pp. 66-74 at p. 73.35 Translator's Note: When making a ruling, a judge presents a document stating the court'sdecision ("main text") and a separate document explaining the rationale behind the decision.Res judicata, or claim proclusion, indicates that a claim has been settled and cannot berelitigated. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, indicates that an issue has been settledand is used to prevent relitigation of the same issue.