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Case No. 11-50814
IN THE
UNITED STATESCOURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTHCIRCUIT
______________
TEXAS MEDICAL PROVIDERS PERFORMINGABORTION SERVICES, A CLASS
REPRESENTED BYMETROPOLITAN OB-GYN,P.A., D/B/A REPRODUCTIVE SERVICES
OF SAN ANTONIO AND ALAN BRAID, M.D., ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND THEIR
PATIENTS SEEKING ABORTIONS,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
vs.
DAVID LAKEY, M.D., COMMISSIONER OF THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE
HEALTH SERVICES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; MARI ROBINSON, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS MEDICAL BOARD, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY,
Defendants-Appellants.
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
Civil Action No. 1:11-cv-00486-SS
______________
PETITION FORREHEARINGEN BANC
Richard Alan Grigg
SPIVEY & GRIGG, LLP
48 East Avenue
Austin, Texas 78701
Telephone: (512) 474-6061
Susan L. Hays
GODWIN RONQUILLO, PC
1201 Elm Street, Suite 1700
Dallas, Texas 75270
Telephone: (214) 557-4819
Jamie A. LevittJ. Alexander Lawrence
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
1290 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10104
Telephone: (212) 468-8000
Julie RikelmanIan Vandewalker
CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
120 Wall Street, 14th Floor
New York, New York 10005
Telephone: (917) 637-3670
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees
January 24, 2012
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CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
Texas Medical Providers, et al. v. Lakey, et al., No. 11-50814
The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons
and entities as described in the fourth sentence of Rule 28.2.1 have an interest in
the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the judges
of thiscourt may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.
Metropolitan OB-GYN, P.A., d/b/a Reproductive Services of San Antonio,
Plaintiff-Appellee;
Alan Braid, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellee;
All Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services, Plaintiff Class;
Bebe J. Anderson, Bonnie Scott Jones, and Julie Rikelman, Center forReproductive Rights, Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees;
Jamie A. Levitt and J. Alexander Lawrence, Morrison & Foerster LLP,
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees;
Susan L. Hays, Godwin Ronquillo, PC, Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees;
Richard Alan Grigg, Spivey & Grigg, LLP, Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees;
David Lakey, M.D., Commissioner of the Texas Department of State Health
Services, Defendant-Appellant;
Mari Robinson, Executive Director of the Texas Medical Board, Defendant-
Appellant;
David Escamilla, County Attorney for Travis County, Defendant;
All County and District Attorneys in the State of Texas with Authority to
Prosecute Misdemeanors, and their Employees, Agents, and Successors,
Defendant Class;
Jonathan F. Mitchell, Arthur C. DAndrea, Daniel C. Perkins, William T.
Deane, Beth Klusmann, and MichaelP. Murphy, Office of the Attorney
General, Counsel for Defendants-AppellantsLakey and Robinson; and
Elaine A. Casas, Jennifer Kraber, and Sherine Elizabeth Thomas, TravisCounty Attorneys Office, Counsel for Defendant Escamilla.
/S/ Julie Rikelman
Julie Rikelman
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees
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Opinion would subject women, including those who have chosen not to have an
abortion, to possible reprisals from their husbands, boyfriends, and/or parents.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
-v-
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS .................................................... i
STATEMENT OF COUNSEL .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF ISSUES.................................................................................... viii
STATEMENT OF THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE ............................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS..................................................................................... 3
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES .................................................................... 5
I. THE PANEL ERRED IN INTERPRETING CASEYAS
IMPLIEDLY REMOVING FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS FOR A DISCRETE GROUP OF
INDIVIDUALS............................................................................................ 5
II. THE ACT VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT
BECAUSE IT COMPELS SPEECH IN VIOLATION OF
PHYSICIAN JUDGMENT AND PATIENT AUTONOMY......................9
A. Strict Scrutiny Applies to the Act Regardless of Whetherthe Speech Compelled Is Ideological or Factual. ..............................9
B. Strict Scrutiny Applies Because the Act Imposes
Content- and Speaker-Based Restrictions. ........................................11
C. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny Because There Are Less
Intrusive Means Available to the State.............................................. 12
D. Even IfCasey Had Created a New Standard Applicable
Here, the Act Would Fail to Satisfy That Standard...........................13
III. THE ACT IS VAGUE BECAUSE THE PANEL AND STATE
OFFICIALS REACHED DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY
INTERPRETATIONS. ................................................................................ 14
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 15
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Bery v. City of New York,
97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996)................................................................................. 10
Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972) ........................................................................................... 14
Hersh v. United States ex rel. Mukasey,
553 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 2008)................................................................................ 9
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,515 U.S. 557 (1995) ............................................................................................. 9
Nova Health Systems v. Edmondson,
CV-2010-533 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Okla. County Aug. 3, 2010) ................................1
Pacific Gas and Electric Co.. v. Public Utilities Commission of California,
475 U.S. 1 (1986) ................................................................................................. 9
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) .................................................................................... passim
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota,
505 U.S. 377 (1992) ..................................................................................... 11, 12
Riley v. National Federation of Blind of North Carolina, Inc.,
487 U.S. 781 (1988) ................................................................................... 6, 9, 12
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) ........................................................................... 10, 11, 12
Stuart v. Huff,
1:11CV804, 2011 WL 6330668 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 19, 2011) ....................... 1, 5, 6
United States v. Williams,
553 U.S. 285 (2008) ............................................................................................. 5
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES(continued)
Page
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STATUTES
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3205 ...................................................................................... 7, 8
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. 74.102 .............................................................................. 4
Tex. Health & Safety Code 171.012 ................................................................ 3, 14
Tex. Health & Safety Code 171.0122 ........................................................ 3, 14, 15
Tex. Health & Safety Code 171.0123 .............................................................. 3, 15
Tex. Health & Safety Code 171.0124 .................................................................... 3
Tex. Health & Safety Code 171.018 ...................................................................... 3
Tex. Occ. Code 164.055(a) .................................................................................... 3
Tex. Admin. Code tit. 25, 601.2(g)(13)-(14) ................................................... 4, 13
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
(1) Has the Supreme Court sub silentio exempted physicians who provide
abortions from First Amendment protections?
(2) Does the First Amendment permit the State to force physicians to be the
actual speaker to deliver a message intended to persuade the patient not to have an
abortion when: (a) the patient has said she does not want to hear or see this
information; (b) delivery of the information is outside the standard of care for
obtaining informed consent; and (c) delivery of the information over the patients
objection violates the physicians ethical duties?
(3) Does the First Amendment require that strict scrutiny be applied to a law
that imposes content- and speaker-based burdens on speech because the State
disfavors abortion?
(4) Do the requirements of due process allow a federal court to uphold a
state law against a vagueness challenge at the same time as construing the law in a
manner directly contrary to the construction of the States enforcement authorities?
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1
STATEMENT OF THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
AND DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs respectfully seek rehearing en banc of the Panels decision to
overturn the District Courts ruling that certain portions of Texas House Bill 15
(the Act) violate the First Amendment and are unconstitutionally vague. Until
the Panels decision, every court that had considered the type of requirements at
issue here had blocked their enforcement.1 Indeed, the Act is far more extreme
thanany other ultrasound law enforced in this country.
The Act requires that, before a woman may obtain an abortion, the physician
must use the womans body to create images and sounds of the embryo or fetus
that the doctor must deliver to the patient, even against the physicians own
medical judgment and even if the patient says no. Thus, the Act mandates that,
while a woman is undergoing a vaginal or abdominal ultrasound, the physician
must (i) display the ultrasound images, (ii) describe the images, and (iii) make any
heartbeat audible. The physician must force this experience and information on the
patient and engage in this verbal and symbolic speech over the patients express
objection or face mandatory license revocation and criminal sanctions.
On August 30, 2011, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas enjoined four of the ultrasound-related provisions of the Act after
1See Stuartv. Huff, 1:11CV804, 2011 WL 6330668 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 19, 2011); Nova Health
Sys. v. Edmondson, CV-2010-533 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Okla. County Aug. 3, 2010).
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concluding that they violated the First Amendment rights of physicians and their
patients, were unconstitutionally vague, or both. State Defendants appealed the
District Courts Order, and on January 10, 2012, a Panel of this Court vacated the
preliminary injunction. Order attached hereto as Annex A (hereinafter Op.).
The Panels analysis rested upon an extraordinarily broad reading of the one-
paragraph First Amendment discussion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). According to the Panel, that
paragraph holds, without explicitly saying so, that First Amendment standards and
protections do not apply to physicians providing abortions, such that any law
mandating delivery of speech in the context of abortion is permissible, so long as it
does not impose an undue burden on patients seeking abortion. Op. at 7-12, 16.
The Panel also disagreed with the District Courts vagueness rulings and adopted
interpretations of certain provisions that (i) make the Act even more extreme, and
(ii) directly conflict with State Defendants own interpretation. Id. at 19-24.
The Panels conclusion that the reasoning in Casey requires upholding the
Act is incorrect. Unlike the law in Casey, the Act requires physicians to engage in
speech and expressive conduct even when it is harmful to their patients. 505 U.S.
at 883-84. Thus, the Panels decision equates the Act, which prohibits physicians
from exercising their medical judgment, forces physicians to violate medical
ethics, and forces women to submit to medical tests and experiences even if they
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say no, with the law at issue in Casey, which did none of those things. Id. at 881-
84; Tex. Health & Safety Code 171.012, .0122, .0123.
The Panel retained jurisdiction over any further appeals in this case. Op.
at 2. Two days later, State Defendants moved the Panel for immediate issuance of
the mandate. Within twenty-four hours before Plaintiffs had a chance to respond
the Panel granted the motion; the preliminary injunction is no longer in place.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Act compels a physician to present to each patient an ultrasound image
of the pregnancy, a detailed verbal explanation of that image, and auscultation of
the fetal or embryonic heartbeat, regardless of the physicians medical judgment
and even if the patient says no. Tex. Health & Safety Code 171.012(a)(4).2
Failure to comply results in criminal penalties, Tex. Health & Safety Code
171.018, and mandatory loss of medical license, Tex. Occ. Code 164.055(a).
Both legally and ethically, the doctrine of informed consent prohibits a
physician from violating the autonomy of a competent patient. See generally Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. 74.101 (defining informed consent); R. 388. Further, unless
requested by the patient, it violates medical ethics for a physician to interject into
2 Limited exceptions apply to the verbal explanation of the image for some sexual assault
victims, some minors, and women seeking abortion because of certain fetal anomalies.
171.012(a)(5), .0122(d). A medical emergency exception applies more generally. 171.0124.
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the informed consent process a discussion of the physicians own value-based
views or the value-based views of the government or any third party. R. 388-89.
In comments on the Senate companion to the Act, the Texas Medical
Association (TMA) stated that the bill is contrary to established ethics principles
pertaining to the physician-patient relationship and informed consent and clearly
mandates that physicians practice in a manner inconsistent with medical ethics.
R. 1109. The TMA cited the American Medical Association Code of Medical
Ethics for the principle that physicians should tailor disclosure to meet patients
needs and expectations in light of their preferences and should honor patient
requests not to be informed of certain medical information. Id.; see also R. 322,
389. Thus, the Act forces physicians to violate their medical ethical obligations in
order to avoid criminal punishment and loss of their medical licenses.
The Act imposes requirements on legally effective consent to abortion that
have no analogue in Texas law they even go far beyond the recommendations of
the Texas Medical Disclosure Panel, which is tasked with determining the
standards for informed consent to certain medical procedures. See Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. 74.102(a). Thus, the Act conflicts with medical practice, even as the
States own experts have defined it. See Tex. Admin. Code tit. 25, 601.2(g)(13)-
(14) (describing what information is necessary to obtain rebuttable presumption
that physician obtained informed consent for an abortion).
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I. The Panel Erred in Interpreting Casey as Impliedly Removing FirstAmendment Protectionsfor a Discrete Group ofIndividuals.
The Panel incorrectly interprets Casey to have removed First Amendment
protections for physicians who provide abortions and their patients. The Panel
concluded that the due process holding ofCasey altered First Amendment law sub
silentio. See Op. at 11 (arguing that Casey prevents Plaintiffs from prevailing on
First Amendment challenge to compelled speech requirement unless requirement
also violates the undue burden standard for a due process challenge). The Panels
reading ofCasey is wrong. It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court decided by
implication that long-established First Amendment law was irrelevant when speech
about abortion is at issue. Stuart, 2011 WL 6330668, at *4.
Further, the Panels analysis overlooks the independent vitality of
constitutional provisions, each of which provides unique and distinct protections.
Cf. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (analyzing claims under First
Amendment and Due Process Clause separately).3 Thus, it is possible for a law to
violate the First Amendment without violating the right to terminate a pregnancy,
as a law requiring doctors to tell abortion patients to vote a certain way clearly
3 Moreover, it cannot be the case that by helping women exercise one constitutional right (the
right to privacy), a physician loses protections that he or she would otherwise be accorded under
another right (the right to free speech).
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would. Indeed, the Casey plurality itself treated the First Amendment and due
process claims separately. 505 U.S. at 881-84; see also Stuart, 2011 WL 6330668,
at *4 (The Court in Casey did not, however, combine the due process/liberty
interest analysis with the First Amendment analysis.).
The Panels overly broad reading ofCasey overlooks a crucial part of that
decision: the speech that physicians were required to deliver under the
Pennsylvania law already was part of standard informed consent and medical
practice. 505 U.S. at 884 (reviewing under First Amendment requirement that
physicians disclose the nature of the procedure, the health risks of abortion and
childbirth, and the gestational age of the pregnancy).4 Thus, Casey says nothing
about whether physicians can be compelled, consistent with the First Amendment,
to provide verbal and symbolic speech that falls outside standard medical practice.
Instead, Supreme Court decisions other than Casey govern such speech. As
described below, these cases establish that even truthful compelled factual
disclosures are subject to strict scrutiny when they have a direct effect on speech.
With respect to speech that was notpart of the standard process of obtaining
informed consent (e.g. state materials on fetal development), the Casey plurality
4 The plurality did not state why it applied a reasonable regulation test in its First Amendment
analysis. Given that the law at issue required speech that already was part of standard informedconsent, the plurality may have concluded there was no direct effect on speech. The Supreme
Court applies a rational basis test to laws that do not have a direct or substantial effect on speech.Riley v. Natl Fedn of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 789 n.5 (1988).
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found only that the state could require physicians to inform women of the
availability of such information; in no way did the plurality hold that physicians
couldforce such information on women. See 505 U.S. at 882(If the information
the State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not
misleading, the requirement may be permissible.) (emphasis added); 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. 3205(a)(3) (materials to be provided to woman only if she so chooses).
Further, the Panels interpretation of Casey and First Amendment
jurisprudence is incorrect in three additional, crucial ways. The Panels decision
was based on the following legal conclusions:
First, informed consent laws that do not impose an undue burden on
the womans right to have an abortion are permissible if they require
truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures. Second, such laws
are part of the states reasonable regulation of medical practice and do
not fall under the rubric of compelling ideological speech that
triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny. Third, relevant informedconsent may entail not only the physical and psychological risks to the
expectant mother . . . but also the states legitimate interests in
protecting the potential life within her.
Op. at 9 (quoting Casey). Each of these legal conclusions is wrong.
First, in its undue burden discussion, the plurality in Casey says only that
informed consent laws may be permissible when all the State does is make
information available to patients that is truthful and not misleading. 505 U.S. at
882 (emphasis added). The Panels opinion profoundly changes this standard,
equating making information available to women, to review if they so choose, with
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requiring physicians to obtain this information from womens own bodies even
over womens express objections.
The Panels second conclusion is also incorrect. The Supreme Court has
expressly held that compelled speech need not be ideological to trigger strict
scrutiny. InRiley, strict scrutiny applied to truthful, factual disclosures. See infra.
The Panel also erred in its third conclusion. Casey did not hold that the
states legitimate interests in protecting . . . potential life, Op. at 9, were
relevant to informed consent for abortion in all circumstances, as the Panel states
and as the Act requires. To the contrary, the law at issue in Casey merely made
written information about embryonic and fetal development available to women;
the decision of whether the information was relevant, and whether to review it, was
left up to the woman herself. See supra.
Further, the law in Casey contained an exception to all of the informed
consent requirements, including informing women of the availability of
developmental information, when, in the judgment of the physician, providing the
information would result[] in a severely adverse effect on the physical or mental
health of the patient. 18 Pa. Const. Stat. 3205(c). The Casey plurality
considered it important that the statute does not prevent the physician from
exercising his or her medical judgment. 505 U.S. at 883-84. In contrast, the Act
prevents physicians from exercising their judgment and requires them to act and
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speak even when doing so would harm the patient. For all these reasons, the Panel
misconstrued Casey, which does not control Plaintiffs First Amendment claim.
II.
The Act Violates the First Amendment Because It Compels Speech inViolation of Physician Judgment and Patient Autonomy.
A. Strict Scrutiny Applies to the Act Regardless of Whether theSpeech Compelled Is Ideological or Factual.
Laws that compel speech that is not purely commercial and that have a direct
effect on such speech are subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g.,Riley, 487 U.S. at 789
n.5, 795-96; Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Commn of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 19
(1986) (plurality opinion). Strict scrutiny is appropriate in these circumstances
even when the compelled speech is truthful, factual, and non-ideological. See, e.g.,
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. ofBoston, 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995); Riley, 487 U.S. at 797-98; Hersh v. United States ex rel. Mukasey, 553
F.3d 743, 765-66 (5th Cir. 2008). The speech compelled by the Act directly
affects and changes the noncommercial speech that constitutes a physician-patient
consultation. Nonetheless, the Panel failed to apply strict scrutiny, reasoning that
such scrutiny only applies when the speech is ideological. Op. at 9.
The Panels reasoning is incorrect: the Supreme Court has squarely held
that compelled statements of fact are subject to exacting First Amendment
scrutiny. Riley, 487 U.S. at 797-98. Factual speech, including truthful
disclosure, is properly subject to close scrutiny because the act of conveying or not
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conveying particular facts can unquestionably convey viewpoints. SeeSorrell v.
IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011) (This Court has held that the
creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the
First Amendment. Facts, after all, are the beginning point for much of the speech
that is most essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct human affairs.)
(internal citations omitted);see also Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695
(2d Cir. 1996) (One cannot look at Winslow Homers paintings on the Civil War
without seeing, in his depictions of the boredom and hardship of the individual
soldier, expressions of anti-war sentiments . . . .). Further, factual information can
become ideological in context. A photo of dead soldiers conveys more than
purely factual information when shown at an anti-war protest.
Thus, although the Court need not find that the Act compels ideological
speech to rule it unconstitutional, the Act does compel an ideological message. It
does so not because an ultrasound image or sound is ideological in and of itself but
because forcing such an image or sound on a woman after she has said no is
ideological. When a physician is forced to deliver images and sounds of an
embryo or fetus to a pregnant woman who is seeking an abortion over her express
objection, the physician conveys a clear message that the State thinks she is
making the wrong decision and that she should not have an abortion.
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B. Strict Scrutiny Applies Because the Act Imposes Content- andSpeaker-Based Restrictions.
The Actwarrants strict scrutiny because it enacts content- and speaker-
based restrictions on the informed consent process. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at
2663;R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). Although many
medical decisions implicate the States interests in maternal health and potential
life e.g., using assisted reproductive technologies, treating fetal anomalies, and
having amniocentesis, which poses risks of fetal demise the Act targets only
abortion providers in Texas for burdensome requirements and unique penalties
because abortion is disfavored by the State.
In Sorrell, the Supreme Court rejected the states argument that a Vermont
statute prohibiting the sale of pharmacy records for marketing purposes should be
subject to rational basis review because it concluded that [t]he law on its face
burdens disfavored speech by disfavored speakers. 131 S. Ct. at 2663.
Specifically, the Supreme Court found that statute had the effect of singling out a
disfavored class (pharmaceutical representatives advocating the use of brand name
drugs) and preventing only individuals in that class from communicating with
physicians in an effective and informative manner.Id.
The same is true of the Act. It has the effect of preventing physicians who
provide abortions and no other Texas physicians from communicating with
their patients in a manner that respects the patients autonomy and best interests.
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D. Even IfCasey Had Created a New Standard Applicable Here, theAct Would Fail to Satisfy That Standard.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Casey created a new First Amendment test
specific to the abortion context, the compelled speech provisions of the Act still
would be unconstitutional. The plurality upheld the Pennsylvania informed
consent law because it implicated the right not to speak only as part of the
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. The Act does not constitute reasonable regulation of the
practice of medicine because (a) its goal is not to regulate the provision of medical
services, but, rather, to persuade women not to choose those services; and, (b) it
requires physicians to serve as the States messenger in direct conflict with the
standards of care, requirements of medical ethics, and patient autonomy.
In contrast to the law at issue in Casey, the Act cannot be considered
reasonable regulation of the practice of medicine for at least four reasons:
the Act eliminates physician judgment and patient autonomy, requiring a
physician to use a patients own body, even if she says no, to generate
information that only the State wants provided. See R. 1097, 1109;
the Act requires physicians to violate their ethical duty to respect patients
autonomy and thus turns informed consent on its head. See R. 322, 1109;
the Act forces women to submit to experiences that are not part of
ordinary informed consent. See , e.g., Tex. Admin. Code tit. 25,
601.2(g)(13)-(14) (providing lists of risks that must be disclosed for
informed consent to abortion); see also R. 386-90;
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the Act requires physicians to speak the States message, rather than
merely notify patients of the availability of state-produced materials.
Thus, the Act is not a reasonable regulation of the practice of medicine.
III. The Act Is Vague Because the Panel and State Officials ReachedDirectly Contradictory Interpretations.
The Panels proffered interpretation of key provisions of the Act directly
conflicts with State Defendants own interpretation and makes the Act even more
extreme. Further, the Panels decision that these key provisions mean something
different than State Defendants have repeatedly argued demonstrates that these
provisions are vague, as the District Court held.
Section 171.012(a)(4) requires the physician to make the heartbeat audible
and to display and describe the embryo or fetus in order to obtain legally valid
consent, whereas 171.0122 purportedly gives women the option not to see or
hear these images and sounds. The District Court found that these two provisions
are void for vagueness because they do not give adequate notice to physicians
whether they must take these actions even if a woman says no. See, e.g., Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (discussing vagueness standard).
State Defendants have consistently maintained that 171.0122 provides a
true exception to the heartbeat and display requirements (although only a limited
exception to the description of the images, seesupra fn. 2). As they have stated
repeatedly in their briefing and in the affidavits of state officials, [d]octors are not
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15
required to present sonogram images or heartbeat sounds to women who choose
not to hear them. R. 526; see alsoid. at 634-35, 640-41, 11, 13. Nonetheless,
the Panel held that 171.0122 does not obviate the physicians obligation to
display the ultrasound images and make audible the heart auscultation, even if the
woman says no. Op. at 22. Thus, under the Panels opinion and in direct conflict
with State Defendants argument, the only option available to women under the
Act is to plug up their ears and cover their eyes.
Likewise, State Defendants repeatedly stated that Section 171.0123 which
requires that paternity and child support publications be provided to women who
choose not to have an abortion did not require that physicians track down these
patients absent some actual knowledge of the patients decision. R. 636, 1362.
The Panel suggested that one method of compliance is for a physicians office to
disseminate the material whenever the woman fails to appear for her abortion.
Op. at 24. Of course, this would subject these women to possible reprisals from
their husbands, boyfriends, and/or parents who might open the mail to find that the
woman had considered having an abortion.
CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, the Plaintiffs pray that their Petition for Rehearing
En Banc be granted and that the mandate be recalled.
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16
Respectfully submitted,
/S/ Julie Rikelman
Julie Rikelman
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to verify that true and correct copies of the Petition for Rehearing
have been filed via electronic filing on this 24th day of January, 2012 on the
registered CM/ECF users listed below.
/S/ Julie Rikelman
Julie Rikelman
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees
Jonathan Franklin Mitchell
Office of the Attorney General209 W. 14th St., 7th Floor (MC-059)
Austin, Texas 78701
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ANNEX A
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-50814
TEXAS MEDICAL PROVIDERS PERFORMING ABORTION SERVICES,
a class represented by Metropolitan OBGYN, P.A.;
on behalf of itself and its patients seeking abortions,
doing business as Reproductive Services of San Antonio;
ALAN BRAID, on behalf of himself and his patients seeking abortions,
Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.
DAVID LAKEY, Commissioner of the Texas Department of
State Health Services, in his official capacity;
MARI ROBINSON, Executive Director of the
Texas Medical Board, in her official capacity,
Defendants - Appellants
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Chief Judge:Physicians and abortion providers collectively representing all similarly
situated Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services (TMPPAS)
sued the Commissioner of the Texas Department of State Health Services and
the Executive Director of the Texas Medical Board (collectively the State)
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E DJanuary 10, 2012
Lyle W. CayceClerk
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under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief against alleged
constitutional violations resulting from the newly-enacted Texas House Bill 15
(the Act), an Act relating to informed consent to an abortion. H.B. 15, 82nd
Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011). The district court granted a preliminary injunction
against four provisions for violating the First Amendment and three others for
unconstitutional vagueness. We conclude, contrary to the district court, that
Appellees failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on any of the
claims on which the injunction was granted, and therefore VACATE the
preliminary injunction. For the sake of judicial efficiency, any further appeals
in this matter will be heard by this panel.
Background
H.B. 15, passed in May 2011, substantially amended the 2003 Texas
Womans Right to Know Act (WRKA). The amendments challenged here are
intended to strengthen the informed consent of women who choose to undergo
abortions. The amendments require the physician who is to perform an
abortion to perform and display a sonogram of the fetus, make audible the
heart auscultation of the fetus for the woman to hear, and explain to her the
results of each procedure and to wait 24 hours, in most cases, between these
disclosures and performing the abortion. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
171.012(a)(4). A woman may decline to view the images or hear the heartbeat,
171.0122(b), (c), but she may decline to receive an explanation of the sonogram
images only on certification that her pregnancy falls into one of three statutory
exceptions. Id. at 171.0122(d).
Any woman seeking an abortion must also complete a form indicating that
she has received the required materials, understands her right to view the
2
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requisite images and hear the heart auscultation, and chooses to receive an
abortion. 171.012(a)(5). The physician who is to perform the abortion must
maintain a copy of this form, generally for seven years. Id. at 171.0121(b)(1)-
(2).
If a woman ultimately chooses not to receive an abortion, the physician
must provide her with a publication discussing how to establish paternity and
secure child support. 171.0123.
Finally, the Act amended the Texas Occupations Code to deny or revoke
a physicians license for violating these provisions. TEX.OCC.CODE 164.055(a).
The Act went into effect on September 1, 2011, and was scheduled to apply to
abortions after October 1, 2011.
Appellees filed suit on June 13, requesting a preliminary injunction
shortly thereafter. Following extensive briefing, the district court preliminarily
enjoined the disclosure provisions of the Act described above on the ground that
they compel speech in violation of the First Amendment. The district court
partially enjoined three other sections of the Act as void for vagueness: the
phrase the physician who is to perform the abortion, certain situations in
which the district court viewed the obligations of the physician and the rights of
the pregnant woman as conflicting, and enforcement of the Act against
physicians for failing to provide informational materials when they do not know
that a woman elected not to have an abortion.
The State promptly appealed and sought a stay pending appeal, which the
district court denied. A motions panel of this court carried with the case the
motion to stay enforcement of the preliminary injunction, but also ordered
expedited briefing and oral argument.
3
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Stay of Appellate Review
Appellees urge this court to defer ruling on the preliminary injunction
because the district court has, notwithstanding this appeal, proceeded apace
toward consideration of summary judgment. It is contended that our ruling on
this interlocutory matter would become moot if the district court enters final
judgment first, and that the district court will resolve issues not raised or
decided at the preliminary phase. We decline to defer. First, this ruling will
offer guidance to the district court, which is particularly important given our
different view of the case. Second, the unresolved issues below are of secondary
importance. Third, Appellees do not assert that fact issues pertinent to our
ruling remain insufficiently developed.
Standard of Review
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, the applicant[s] must show
(1) a substantial likelihood that [they] will prevail on the merits, (2) a
substantial threat that [they] will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is
not granted, (3) [their] substantial injury outweighs the threatened harm to the
party whom [they] seek to enjoin, and (4) granting the preliminary injunction
will not disserve the public interest. Bluefield Water Assn, Inc. v. City of
Starkville, Miss., 577 F.3d 250, 252-53 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted).
We have cautioned repeatedly that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
remedy which should not be granted unless the party seeking it has clearly
carried the burden of persuasion on all four requirements. Id. (quoting Lake
Charles Diesel, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 328 F.3d 192, 195-96 (5th Cir. 2003)).
An absence of likelihood of success on the merits is sufficient to make the
district courts grant of a preliminary injunction improvident as a matter of law.
4
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Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 328 F.3d 192, 203 (5th Cir. 2003).
We review legal conclusions made with respect to a preliminary injunction grant
de novo. Bluefield Water Assn, 577 F.3d at 253.
Discussion
I. First Amendment
Appellees contend that H.B. 15 abridges their First Amendment rights by
compelling the physician to take and display to the woman sonogram images of
her fetus, make audible its heartbeat, and explain to her the results of both
exams. This information, they contend, is the states ideological message
concerning the fetal life that serves no medical purpose, and indeed no other
purpose than to discourage the abortion. Requiring the woman to certify the
physicians compliance with these procedures also allegedly violates her right
not to speak. In fashioning their First Amendment compelled speech
arguments, which the district court largely accepted, Appellees must confront
the Supreme Courts holding in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), that reaffirmed a
womans substantive due process right to terminate a pregnancy but also upheld
an informed-consent statute over precisely the same compelled speech
challenges made here. Following Casey, an en banc decision of the Eighth
Circuit has also upheld against a compelled speech attack another informed
consent provision regulating abortion providers. Planned Parenthood
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Minnesota, et al. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 2011). We begin this1
analysis with Casey.
The law at issue in Casey required an abortion provider to inform the
mother of the relevant health risks to her and the probable gestational age of
the unborn child. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881, 112 S. Ct. at 2822. The woman also
had to certify in writing that she had received this information and had been
informed by the doctor of the availability of various printed materials describing
the fetus and providing information about medical assistance for childbirth,
information about child support from the father, and a list of agencies which
provide adoption and other services as alternatives to abortion. Id. Planned2
Parenthood contended that all of these disclosures operate to discourage abortion
and, by compelling the doctor to deliver them, violated the physicians First
Amendment free-speech rights. Planned Parenthood urged application of the
strict scrutiny test governing certain First Amendment speech rights. See Brief
of Petitioners, 1992 WL 551419, at *54.
The Casey pluralitys opinion concluded that such provisions, entailing
the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information which is relevant . . . to the
SeePlanned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 375 F.Supp.2d 881 (D.S.D. June 30, 2005)1
(granting preliminary injunction) (vacated); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds,
530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. June 27, 2008) ( en banc) (vacating grant of preliminary injunction and
remanding); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 650 F.Supp.2d 972 (D.S.D.
August 20, 2009) (granting partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and partial
summary judgment in favor of defendants) (affirmed in part, reversed in part); Planned
Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir., Sept. 2, 2011) (reversing grant ofsummary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on all but one claim and remanding) (vacated in part);
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D, v. Rounds, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. December 7, 2011)
(vacating panel's affirmance of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and granting
rehearing en banc on that issue).
The description included a month by month explanation of prenatal fetal development.2
6
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decision, did not impose an undue burden on the womans right to an abortion
and were thus permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 882, 112 S. Ct.
at 2823. The requirement that the physician relay the probable age of the fetus
furthered the legitimate end of ensur[ing] that a woman apprehend the full
consequences of her decision. Id. In other words, informed choice need not be
defined in such narrow terms that all considerations of the effect on the fetus are
made irrelevant. Id. at 883, 112 S. Ct. at 2824. As the Court noted, such
information furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman
may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological
consequences, that her decision was not fully informed. Id. at 882, 112 S. Ct.
2791. States may further the legitimate goal of protecting the life of the
unborn through legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and
informed, even when in doing so the State expresses a preference for childbirth
over abortion. Id.
The plurality then turned to the petitioners
asserted First Amendment right of a physician not toprovide information about the risks of abortion, and
childbirth, in a manner mandated by the state. To be
sure, the physicians First Amendment rights not to
speak are implicated, seeWooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 97 S. Ct. 1428 (1977), but only as part of the
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State, cf.Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
603, 97 S. Ct. 869, 878 (1977). We see no constitutional
infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide
the information mandated by the state here.
Id. at 884, 112 S. Ct. at 2824.
The plurality response to the compelled speech claim is clearly not a strict
scrutiny analysis. It inquires into neither compelling interests nor narrow
7
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tailoring. The three sentences with which the Court disposed of the First
Amendment claims are, if anything, the antithesis of strict scrutiny. Indeed, the
plurality references Whalen v. Roe, in which the Court had upheld a regulation
of medical practice against a right to privacy challenge. 429 U.S. 589, 97 S. Ct.
869 (1977). The only reasonable reading ofCaseys passage is that physicians
rights not to speak are, when part of the practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State[.] This applies to information
that is truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant . . . to the decision to undergo
an abortion. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882, 112 S. Ct. at 2823.
The Courts decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 127 S. Ct. 1610
(2007), reaffirmed Casey, as it upheld a states significant role . . . in regulating
the medical profession and added that [t]he government may use its voice and
regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within the woman.
550 U.S. at 128, 127 S. Ct. at 1633. The Court addressed in detail the
justification for state regulations consistent with Caseys reaffirming the right
to abortion:
Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult
and painful moral decision. While we find no reliable
data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude that some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once
created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of
esteem can follow.
In a decision so fraught with emotional
consequence some doctors may prefer not to disclose
precise details of the means that will be used, confining
themselves to the required statement of risks the
procedure entails. From one standpoint this ought not
to be surprising. Any number of patients facing
imminent surgical procedures would prefer not to hear
8
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all details, lest the usual anxiety preceding invasive
medical procedures become the more intense. This is
likely the case with the abortion procedures here at
issue [partial-birth abortions].. . . . The States interest in respect for life is advanced
by the dialogue that better informs the political and
legal systems, the medical profession, expectant
mothers, and society as a whole of the consequences
that follow from a decision to elect a late-term abortion.
Id. at 157-59, 1633-34 (citations omitted).
The import of these cases is clear. First, informed consent laws that do not
impose an undue burden on the womans right to have an abortion arepermissible if they require truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures.
Second, such laws are part of the states reasonable regulation of medical
practice and do not fall under the rubric of compelling ideological speech that
triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny. Third, relevant informed consent3
may entail not only the physical and psychological risks to the expectant mother
facing this difficult moral decision, but also the states legitimate interests in
protecting the potential life within her. 505 U.S. at 871, 112 S. Ct. at 2791.
See also Casey, 505 U.S. at 882, 112 S. Ct. at 2823 (Nor can it be doubted that
most women considering an abortion would deem the impact on the fetus
relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to ensure that a
woman apprehends the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the
legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only
to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision
But see Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 (Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State3
may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know that there are philosophic
and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the
pregnancy to full term[.]).
9
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was not fully informed.) Finally, the possibility that such information might
cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion does not render the
provisions unconstitutional. Id. at 889, 112 S. Ct. at 2791.
Fortifying this reading, the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc construed Casey
and Gonzales in the same way:
. . . [W]hile the State cannot compel an individual simply to speak
the States ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority
to require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading
information relevant to a patients decision to have an abortion,
even if that information might also encourage the patient to choose
childbirth over abortion.
Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735 (8th Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (emphasis added). Significantly, the Rounds dissent agreed that the
states reasonable medical regulation of abortion includes its assertion of
legitimate interests in the health of the mother and in protecting the potential
life within her. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 741 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting
Casey, 505 U.S. at 871, 112 S. Ct. 2791). Rounds upheld, against compelled
speech challenges, an informed consent provision, and associated compliance
certifications by both the physician and pregnant woman, requiring, inter alia,
a disclosure that the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate,
unique, living human being with whom the woman has an existing
relationship entitled to legal protection. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 726.
In contrast to the disclosures discussed in Rounds, H.B. 15 requires the
taking and displaying of a sonogram, the heart auscultation of the pregnant
womans fetus, and a description by the doctor of the exams results. That these
medically accurate depictions are inherently truthful and non-misleading is not
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disputed by Appellees, nor by any reasoned analysis by the district court. (We4
consider later the Appellees argument that the disclosures are not medically
necessary, and are therefore irrelevant to procuring the womans informed
consent under Casey). Unlike the plaintiffs in Casey and Rounds, the Appellees
here do not contend that the H.B. 15 disclosures inflict an unconstitutional
undue burden on a womans substantive due process right to obtain an abortion.
These omissions, together, are significant. If the disclosures are truthful and
non-misleading, and if they would not violate the womans privacy right under
the Casey plurality opinion, then Appellees would, by means of their First
Amendment claim, essentially trump the balance Casey struck between womens
rights and the states prerogatives. Casey, however, rejected any such clash of
rights in the informed consent context.
Applying to H.B. 15 the principles ofCaseys plurality, the most reasonable
conclusion is to uphold the provisions declared as unconstitutional compelled
speech by the district court. To belabor the obvious and conceded point, the
At times, the district court characterizes these disclosures as ideological, but the4
court misunderstands the term. Speech is ideological when it is relating to or concerned with
ideas or of, relating to, or based on ideology. See ideological, www.mirriam-
webster.com/dictionary/ideological. Of course, any fact may relate to ideas in some sense so
loose as to be useless, but in the sense in which Wooley discusses it, ideological speech is
speech which conveys a point of view. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715, 97 S. Ct. at 1435 (Here
. . . we are faced with a state measure which forces an individual . . . to be an instrument for
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.). The speech
in Wooley was the statement of a point of view that the plaintiff found morally, ethically,
religiously and politically abhorrent.Id. at 713, 1434. The distinction the Court there sought
to employ was between factual information and moral positions or arguments. Though theremay be questions at the margins, surely a photograph and description of its features constitute
the purest conceivable expression of factual information. If the sonogram changes a womans
mind about whether to have an abortiona possibility which Gonzales says may be the effect
of permissible conveyance of knowledge, Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 160, 127 S. Ct. at 1634that
is a function of the combination of her new knowledge and her own ideology (values is a
better term), not of any ideology inherent in the information she has learned about the fetus.
11
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required disclosures of a sonogram, the fetal heartbeat, and their medical
descriptions are the epitome of truthful, non-misleading information. They are
not different in kind, although more graphic and scientifically up-to-date, than
the disclosures discussed in Caseyprobable gestational age of the fetus and
printed material showing a babys general prenatal development stages.
Likewise, the relevance of these disclosures to securing informed consent is
sustained by Casey and Gonzales, because both cases allow the state to regulate
medical practice by deciding that information about fetal development is
relevant to a womans decision-making.5
As for the womans consent form, that, too, is governed by Casey, which
approves the practice of obtaining written consent as with any medical
procedure. 505 U.S. at 883, 112 S. Ct. at 2823. H.B. 15, 171.012(a)(5),
requires that a pregnant woman certify in writing her understanding that
(1) Texas law requires an ultrasound prior to obtaining an abortion, (2) she has
the option to view the sonogram images, (3) she has the option to hear the fetal
heartbeat, and (4) she is required to hear the medical explanation of the
sonogram unless she falls under the narrow exceptions to this requirement.6
To invalidate the written consent form as compelled speech would
potentially subject to strict scrutiny a host of other medical informed-consent
At oral argument, Appellees counsel conceded that Appellees have no objection to the5
requirements that a doctor perform and make available sonogram images of the fetus. Their
objection is to requiring a display and an oral explanation of the images.
The three exceptions are (1) pregnancy as a result of rape or incest which has been6
reported or, if it has not been reported, was not reported because the woman reasonably risks
retaliation resulting in serious bodily injury, (2) a minor taking advantage of judicial bypass
procedures to avoid parental notification, or (3) a fetus with an irreversible medical condition
or abnormality. If seeking to avoid the description of the sonogram images, the woman must
indicate within which exception she falls.
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requirements. Appellees have offered no theory how the H.B. 15 informed-
consent certification differs constitutionally from informed-consent certifications
in general.
Nevertheless, the district court was especially troubled by the requirement
that, to avoid the description of the sonogram images, a victim of rape or incest
might have to certify her status as a victim, despite fearing (by the very terms
of the certification) physical reprisal if she makes her status known. This
system of certified exceptions may be a debatable choice of policy, but it does not
transgress the First Amendment. If the State could properly decline to grant
any exceptions to the informed-consent requirement, it cannot create an
inappropriate burden on free speech rights where it simply conditions an
exception on a womans admission that she falls within it. Indeed, such an
infirmity could just as well be cured by striking down the exceptions alone as by
striking down the requirement of written certification. Because the general
requirement is valid, we see no constitutional objection to the certification
required for an exception.
Notwithstanding the facial application of Casey to H.B. 15, Appellees
characterize its disclosure requirements as qualitatively different in two ways.
First, the disclosure of the sonogram and fetal heartbeat are medically
unnecessary to the woman and therefore beyond the standard practice of
medicine within the state's regulatory powers. Appellees refer to currently
required disclosures of health risks to the mother alone and apparently would
limit information about the fetus in these circumstances to its probable
gestational age, as specifically approved in Casey. Requiring any more
information about the fetus amounts to advocacy by the state. Second, whereas
13
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Casey only required the physician to make certain materials about childbirth
and the fetus available to the woman, the physician here is required to explain
the results of sonogram and fetal heart auscultation, and the woman is required
to listen to the sonogram results. This interchange makes the physician the
mouthpiece of the state, again for medically unnecessary reasons. Appellees7
position seems to assume that the facts of Casey represent a constitutional
ceiling for regulation of informed consent to abortion, not a set of principles to
be applied to the states legislative decisions. On this broad level, however, the
Court has admonished that federal courts are not the repository for regulation
of the practice of medicine. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157-58, 127 S. Ct. at 1633.
Turning to Appellees specific objections, the provision of sonograms and
the fetal heartbeat are routine measures in pregnancy medicine today. They are
viewed as medically necessary for the mother and fetus. Only if one assumes
the conclusion of Appellees argument, that pregnancy is a condition to be
terminated, can one assume that such information about the fetus is medically
irrelevant. The point of informed consent laws is to allow the patient to evaluate
her condition and render her best decision under difficult circumstances.
Denying her up to date medical information is more of an abuse to her ability to
decide than providing the information. In any event, the Appellees argument
ignores that Casey and Gonzales, as noted above, emphasize that the gravity of
the decision may be the subject of informed consent through factual, medical
Appellees and the district court also question why H.B. 15 had to add these7
disclosures to the existing Casey-like requirements of the WRKA. The necessity or wisdom of
legislation, of course, is a decision committed to the peoples elected representatives and thus
beyond the purview of the courtsapart from the constitutionality of the law.
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detail, that the condition of the fetus is relevant, and that discouraging abortion
is an acceptable effect of mandated disclosures.8
More to the point, perhaps, is Appellees concern that H.B. 15 requires a
doctor, at a minimum, to converse with the patient about the sonogram as a
predicate to securing informed consent, rather than show her the way to obtain
a brochure or similar written information. Certainly, the statutes method of
delivering this information is direct and powerful, but the mode of delivery does
not make a constitutionally significant difference from the availability
provision in Casey. The Casey plurality opinion places this issue squarely in the
context of the regulation of medical practice:
Our prior decisions establish that as with any medical procedure,
the State may require a woman to give her written informed consent
to an abortion. [citation omitted] In this respect, this statute is
unexceptional. Petitioners challenge the statute's definition of
informed consent because it includes the provision of specific
information by the doctor . . .
. . .
We also see no reason why the State may not require doctors to
inform a woman seeking an abortion of the availability of materials
relating to the consequences to the fetus . . . . [analogizing to
informed consent bearing on the donor as well as recipient of a
kidney transplant.]
Casey, 505 U.S. at 881, 112 S. Ct. at 2823 (emphasis added). Casey did not
analyze the doctors status based on how he provided "specific information."
Similarly, in Wooley, the font of Appellees' compelled speech argument, the New
Hampshire auto owner was not required to speak Live Free or Die, he was
Another perspective on this point is to note that under Casey and Gonzales, what8
Appellees think is medically necessary does not cabin, under the states legitimate power, the
regulation of medicine, as Casey holds.
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merely required to display the phrase on his license plate. The mode of
compelled expression is not by itself constitutionally relevant, although the
context is. Here, the context is the regulation of informed consent to a medical
procedure. The constitutional irrelevance of the verbal nature of this description
is even clearer given the facts ofCasey; the law upheld there required doctors
to describe verbally the fetuss gestational age, a description which the Casey
plurality acknowledged was relevant to informed consent only in a sense broad
enough to include the potential impact on the fetus. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883,
112 S. Ct. at 2823.
For all these reasons, we conclude that the enumerated provisions of
H.B. 15 requiring disclosures and written consent are sustainable under Casey,
are within the States power to regulate the practice of medicine, and therefore
do not violate the First Amendment. Appellees have not demonstrated a9
likelihood of success on the merits justifying the preliminary injunction.
II. Vagueness
The Due Process Clause requires states define their enactments and
prohibitions with some specificity. U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304,
128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008). [T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires states
articulate a proscription with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited while providing enough objective metrics
that it does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
That Casey and Gonzales state principles broad enough to encompass the H.B. 159
disclosures and informed consent certificate eliminates any necessity to rule on the Appellees
earlier argument, adopted by the district court, that compelled speech is only constitutionally
permissible in the context of pure commercial speech. The statement is clearly overbroad,
but we need not analyze it further.
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Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 149. The degree of vagueness that the Constitution
tolerates . . . depends in part on the nature of the enactment, with greater
tolerance for statutes imposing civil penalties and those tempered by scienter
requirements. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489, 498-99, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (1982).
As we are [c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect
mathematical certainty from our language. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733,
120 S. Ct. 2480, 2498 (2000) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
110, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972)). Our analysis therefore cannot focus upon the
marginal cases in which an ordinarily plain statutory command can nonetheless
yield some mote of uncertainty. [S]peculation about possible vagueness in
hypothetical situations not before the [c]ourt will not support a facial attack on
a statute when it is surely valid in the vast majority of its intended
applications. Hill, 530 U.S. at 733 (internal citation omitted); see alsoAm.
Commcns Assn, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412, 70 S. Ct. 674, 691 (1950).
We must remember the elementary rule that every reasonable construction
must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 153.
We are aware that the penalties under the law do not evidently require
scienter and result in revocation or non-licensure of a physician, and potential
criminal sanctions for any abortion without sufficient informed consent. We also
note that the district court accepted only three out of multiple vagueness
challenges raised by the Appellees. We turn to the three portions of H.B. 15 the
district court enjoined as unconstitutionally vague in some applications.
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A. The physician who is to perform the abortion
The district court first concluded the phrase the physician who is to
perform the abortion was unconstitutionally vague under some circumstances
regarding the timing and making of required disclosures. 171.012(a)(1), (2),
(3), (4), (6). The State asserts that most abortions are performed by a single
physician, and that in the rare circumstances where more than one physician is
involved, compliance by any physician or combination of physicians satisfies the
requirements of H.B. 15. Thus, the statute applies to the physician who is to
perform, rather than the physician who performs, the abortion. Appellees, by
contrast, insist that physicians in multi-doctor practices would face substantial
uncertainty under this definition: when more than one doctor collaborates to
perform an abortion, it is unclear who is the physician who is to perform the
abortion. Appellees raise a similar challenges for doctors filling in for
colleagues in performing abortions.
The district court acknowledged the States position was reasonable and
then summarily dismissed it as merely argument. Absent a binding
interpretation of the phrase the physician who is to perform the abortion, the
court disregarded the States construction. The court enjoined penalizing a
physician when any one or combination of physicians has complied with the
disclosure requirements.
We do not disagree with the district courts result, but that is because we
conclude that the same result is compelled by the statutory language requiring
compliance by the physician who is to perform the abortion. In multiphysician
practices, this could necessitate more careful scheduling of the sonograms and
disclosures 24 hours prior to the procedure. But it is also reasonable to construe
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the law grammatically as allowing compliance by the physician who intends
or is intended to perform, even if unforeseen circumstances result in the
abortions actually being performed by a substitute. So construed, this provision
is not vague.
Moreover, other cases have addressed identical appellations of the doctor,
seemingly without legal challenge. See, e.g., Casey: the physician who is to
perform the abortion. Casey, 505 U.S. at 902. In Rounds, the South Dakota
statute also imposed duties upon the physician who is to perform the abortion,
again without incurring a distinct legal challenge. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 726-27.
See Brief of Appellants, 2005 WL 4902899; Brief of Appellees, 2005 WL 4902901.
That Appellees argument is novel does not defeat it, but novelty suggests its
weakness.
B. Conflict between Section 171.012(a)(4) and Section 171.0122
The district court further concluded Sections 171.012(a)(4) and 171.0122
are in conflict, resulting in constitutionally intolerable uncertainty. The relevant
sections provide respectively:
Section 171.012. Voluntary and Informed Consent
(a) Consent to an abortion is voluntary and informed only if:
. . .
(4) . . . at least 24 hours before the abortion or at least
two hours before the abortion if the pregnant woman
waives this requirement . . . :
(A) the physician who is to perform the
abortion or an agent of the physician who
is also a sonographer certified by a nationalregistry of medical sonographers performs
a sonogram on the pregnant woman on
whom the abortion is to be performed;
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(B) the physician who is to perform the
abortion displays the sonogram images in
a quality consistent with current medical
practice in a manner that the pregnantwoman may view them;
(C) the physician who is to perform the
abortion provides, in a manner
understandable to a layperson, a verbal
explanation of the results of the sonogram
images, including a medical description of
the dimensions of the embryo or fetus, the
presence of cardiac activity, and the
presence of external members and internal
organs; and(D) the physician who is to perform the
abortion or an agent of the physician who
is also a sonographer certified by a national
registry of medical sonographers makes
audible the heart auscultation for the
pregnant woman to hear, if present, in a
quality consistent with current medical
practice and provides, in a manner
understandable to a layperson, a
simultaneous verbal explanation of the
heart auscultation[.] (emphasis added.)
Section 171.0122. Viewing Printed Materials and Sonogram Image; Hearing
Heart Auscultation or Verbal Explanation
(a) A pregnant woman may choose not to view the printed materials
[provided by another section].
(b) A pregnant woman may choose not to view the sonogram images
required to be provided to and reviewed with the pregnant woman
under Section 171.012(a)(4).
(c) A pregnant woman may choose not to hear the heart auscultation
required to be provided to and reviewed with the pregnant woman
under Section 171.012(a)(4).
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(d) A pregnant woman may choose not to receive the verbal
explanation of the results of the sonogram images . . . if [she
satisfies one of three exceptions subject to documentation].
(e) The physician and the pregnant woman are not subject to apenalty under this chapter solely because the pregnant woman
chooses not to view the printed materials or the sonogram images,
hear the heart auscultation, or receive the verbal explanation, if
waived as provided by this section.
The district court noted that the introduction to Section 171.012(a)
nominally broaches no exceptions, because a womans consent to an abortion is
informed and voluntary only if a physician complies with its requirements. The
court then observed that Section 171.0122 exempts pregnant women from
several of these requirements by providing what the pregnant woman may do,
rather than under what circumstances the physician need not comply with
(a)(4)s requirements. The district court read the provisions together as
intending, but not succeeding, to create a requirement and an exception. Thus,
a doctor who complies with the disclosures ( 171.012(a)) may lose his license
even though the woman decided not to view the sonogram or hear the fetal
heartbeat ( 171.0122). The district court discounted the text of 171.0122(e),
which states that neither the physician nor the pregnant woman would be
penalized solely because the pregnant woman chooses not to view the
sonogram results, hear her childs heart auscultation, or receive a verbal
explanation from her physician. The court viewed the word solely as
constitutionally intolerable legislative gotcha tactics. In sum, the court
severed the word solely from Section 171.0122(e) for enforcement purposes,
and further enjoined enforcement of the provisions against physicians for failure
to display sonogram images or make audible heart auscultation results
whenever the pregnant woman elects not to view the former or hear the latter.
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The district courts skeptical interpretation of Section 171.0122(e) follows
from its belief that the disputed provisions do not represent a harmonious pair
of regulation and exception. We disagree. Section 171.012(a)(4) establishes
what the physician must do: have a sonogram performed, display the sonogram
images, perform a heart auscultation, and provide verbal explanations of the
sonogram images and heart auscultation. The district courts analysis of (a)(4)
ignores that the physicians unconditional obligations are merely to display
images so they may be viewed, to provide an understandable explanation, and
to make audible the auscultation. Section 171.012(a)(4) specifically does not
require the physician to ensure the woman views the images, that she
understands the explanation, or that she listens to the auscultation. Contrast
this language with the one requirement of 171.012(a)(4) that the pregnant
woman may not waive: Section 171.012(a)(4)(A) states that the physician or his
agent must perform a sonogram.
Section 171.0122 complements this language by expressly reserving to the
pregnant woman the right to refuse the physicians verbal explanation,
sonogram images, or heart auscultation. Taken together, the physicians duties
are more than reasonably clear a physician intending to perform an abortion
must sonogram the pregnant woman, display the appropriate images, obtain a
heart auscultation, and tender a verbal explanation unless refused. The woman
seeking an abortion may elect not to receive these images, sounds, or
explanations. This election does not obviate the physicians obligations to
display the sonogram images or make audible the heart auscultation; the woman
may simply choose not to look or listen.
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Unlike the district court, we perceive no vagueness in exempting a
physician from various regulatory consequences solely because the woman
elected not to participate in the disclosures under 171.0122. Eliminating
solely means that whenever a woman resorts to this election, the physician
faces no adverse consequences from flouting the disclosures. This alteration
encourages evasion of the disclosures and manipulation of the womans statutory
opt-out. The legislature had every right to maintain the integrity of the
mandated disclosures and displays by relieving a physician of liability for non-
compliance solely when the pregnant woman invokes 171.0122. Appellees
failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood that Sections 171.012(a)(4) and
171.0122 conflict in an unconstitutionally vague way.
C. Providing printed materials under Section 171.0123
Section 171.0123 provides in relevant part:
If, after being provided with a sonogram and the information
required under this subchapter, the pregnant woman chooses not to
have an abortion, the physician or an agent of the physician shall
provide the pregnant woman with a publication developed by [therelevant State agency] that provides information about paternity
establishment and child support . . . .
The district court found troubling the absence of mention of the
physicians knowledge, combined with the fact that the section contains no
la