Center for European Policy Analysis March 3, 2014 IC� ED: An American Strategy for Crimea Wess Mitchell - 3 Only Western Unity Will Stop Pun Edward Lucas - 6 Crisis in Crimea: Four Scenarios Peter B. Doran and Marta Sikorski -9 The Die Is Cast: How Russia’s Crimean Gambit has Reactivated Europe’s Frontier T his month, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic had expected to celebrate the 15th anniversary of NATO’s expansion into Central Europe. Instead, they are grappling with Russia’s abrupt seizure of Crimea and an escalating security crisis on the EU’s doorstep. More than a territorial grab, Russia’s action in Ukraine is a significant departure from the relative stability that has predominated in Europe since the end of the Soviet Union. By breaking the international agreements, which have governed the post-1989 settlement of Europe, Russia’s gambit in Crimea represents a geopolitical game- changer. What is certain is that the Kremlin’s latest move will have lasting consequences for the Atlantic Alliance, Russia’s relations with the United States and the people of Ukraine. What is less clear is how Western leaders will respond and whether they can remain unified in purpose. Wading into these questions, the latest edition of Central Europe Digest features the perspectives of leading CEPA experts. They assess the strategic significance behind Russia’s Crimean adventurism and what it suggests about the future of Europe’s Eastern frontier. First up, CEPA President Wess Mitchell considers the demonstration effect that Russia’s action conveys to other rising, restive or revisionist power centers. Writing that “Russia’s military seizure of Crimea marks the end of the stable post-Cold War territorial status quo east of Poland,” Mitchell makes the case for why “rebate revisionism” should not be tolerated by American and European leaders. “Unless the United States and its allies act decisively,” he cautions, they risk creating “a reactivated strategic frontier between NATO and Russia, with dangerous implications for Europe and the wider world.” Next, CEPA Senior Fellow and Contributing Editor Edward Lucas offers his perspective on the range of options that policymakers in the West might take in response to Russia’s occupation of Crimea. European allies clearly have the means to respond to Russia. The question
is whether they have the will to use them. By way of a warning, Lucas notes that the Euro-Atlantic
community should “seize this chance to be bold and generous, while we still have neighbors to engage
with.”
Finally, CEPA Director of Research Peter B. Doran and CEPA Research Associate Marta Sikorski identify the
geopolitical trajectories that a post-Yanukovych Ukraine could now take. From state capture by Russiato the establishment of a western-orientated government in Kyiv, Doran and Sikorski identify why the
outcome in Europe’s east matters for U.S. interests. In helping to shape that future, they conclude that
“the post-invasion landscape will require a strong – and ultimately, more strategic – level of engagement
from the United States.”
Center for European Policy Analysis
C� E D is a publicaon of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), a Washington,
DC-based research instute devoted to the study of Central and Eastern Europe. Material published inthe D is original, exclusive to CEPA and not reproduced from outside sources.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of CEPA.
of Eastern Europe to U.S. global strategy. For the
second me in six years, Russia has used military
force to alter the boundaries of neighboring stateswithout an effecve response from the West.Unless the United States and its allies act decisively,
the move threatens to harden into a Russian-
Crimean Anschluss that would end Ukraine’s
existence as a unified buffer state and create areacvated strategic froner between NATO andRussia, with dangerous implicaons for Europe andthe wider world.
In military terms, the possession of Crimea is not
of significant value to Russia; the Black Sea Fleetalready enjoys unhindered access to the port
facilies of Sebastopol and control of the peninsuladoes not enhance Russian power projeconcapabilies in the region. But geostrategically, thevalue of Russia’s Crimean gambit is potenallyimmense. The precedent of an unprovoked and
unanswered land grab in the post-Soviet space
would alter the balance of power—and balance
of percepons—among both NATO and non-NATOstates in the Balc-to-Black Sea corridor for decades
to come. Should Russia succeed in absorbingterritory from a sovereign neighbor, it would
strengthen two demonstraon effects establishedduring the 2008 Georgia War: That Russia can
engineer territorial faits accomplis at lile cost toitself, and that the United States lacks the ability—
diplomac, economic or military—to deter orrespond effecvely to Russian power plays in theregion.
The invasions in Crimea and Georgia represent
a paern of Russian strategic behavior in whicha rapid, limited military thrust is followed bya cessaon of hoslies to await mediaonand consolidaon of gains in the post-conflictselement. This “jab and pause” strategy has beenused by predatory states for centuries to achieve
low-cost expansion. It is parcularly useful for apower like Russia in avoiding unwinnable pitched
confrontaons while exploing inevitable Westerndivisions in the complicated clean-up, as was
the case in Georgia. It works especially well with
Western interlocutors who are willing to pay a highprice for Russian cooperaon to avoid jeopardizingdelicate deals elsewhere.
Allowing a paern of rebate revisionism to take rootin Eastern Europe would have profoundly negaveconsequences. An undeterred land grab would
radiate insecurity throughout the Eastern members
of NATO – especially the Balc States, whichpossess large Russian minories. It would especiallyaffect Poland, which would face radically enhanced
vulnerability as the greatest recipient of strategicinstability emanang from Ukraine. It wouldoffer a dangerous precedent for other revisionist-minded powers that covet the return of a lost
territory. What of the Chinese minority in Thailand
or Vietnam? Or the Iranian Shia minority in Saudi
Arabia? If China wants Taiwan or Iran wants the
Wess Mitchell is President of the Center for European Policy Analysis.
sends the message that they can—that the rules are
flexible for anyone willing to use military force.
Convenonal wisdom holds that the United Stateshas few opons for responding to the crisis. WhileWashington lacks the geographic proximity to steer
outcomes on the ground, it nevertheless possesses
a range of tools for altering the incenves framingRussian decision-making. The key is to develop a
strategy that imposescosts to deter further
escalaon whilecreang a counter-demonstraon effectto show that this or
similar acts in the future
will significantly injureRussia’s economic and
polical posion in theworld.
To start with the
obvious, the United
States should
suspend bilateral trade and other discussions
with Moscow, cancel President Obama’s trip to
Sochi for the G8 summit and work with European
allies to implement targeted sancons againstsenior Russian leaders. This should include highly
personalized visa and asset freezes that affect theability of polical and military leaders to draw
funds from or travel to the West for shoppingand vacaons (let them winter in Sochi or Dubairather than Miami or Mallorca). In light of therapidly worsening military picture, Washington
should reposion U.S. fleet assets to the EasternMediterranean and open discussions with Turkey
for the inseron of hospital ships and accompanyingair assets into the Black Sea.
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Center for European Policy Analysis
If a conflict breaks out, the United States can aidUkraine. In the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, U.S.
rhetorical and logiscal support for Georgianmilitary units returning to Tbilisi played an
important role in de-escalang the conflict. Whilecare should be taken not to send signals that would
embolden aggressive acts by Kyiv, Washington
should be prepared to organize collecve alliedefforts to provide military and medical supplies inthe event of armed hoslies. It can help alleviate
Russian energysupply interruponsby engaging with EU
leaders and in parcularNATO ally Slovakia to
ensure reverse flow ofgas into Ukraine if a
cutoff occurs.
The United States
should also retaliate
in areas that willerode Russia’s global
power posion on alonger-term basis. The
Administraon should begin noisily planning waysto exclude Russia from key elements of the U.S.-led
internaonal economic system, including relocangthe 2014 G8 Summit away from Sochi and
restricng the parcipaon of Russian actors in theU.S. banking system. But U.S. leverage is greater if
Europe and parcularly Germany give more than lipservice to our efforts. Poland could be a significanthelp in convincing Germany to take a bolder stance
than it may be inclined to take.
More immediately, Washington should conduct a
symbolic but highly visible transfer of select U.S.
Ukrainian crisis, and announce its intenon tomove ground units there if the crisis intensifies. U.S.offi cials should use this week’s NATO meengs toreopen the provisions of the 1997 NATO Founding
Act restricng the permanent placement ofallied military assets on the territory of Central
and Eastern European member states. A visible
bolstering of the American military presence—
especially in the Balc States, given their parallels toUkraine and Georgia—would send a clear message
of American determinaon to uphold the territorialintegrity of the post-1989 selement.
The key is that there must be costs for the seizure
of Crimea, irrespecve of how the crisis developsfrom here. If Russia’s goal was to once again grab
territory from a weak neighbor without paying a
price, it is imperave for the stability not only ofEastern Europe but the inherently-volale 21stglobal geopolical order that Russia and anyrevisionist onlookers be proven wrong. History is
not kind to states that allow rebate revisionism.America and Europe must exact a toll.
On the diplomac front, the key to success is unity.When European and American policians worktogether, the result is formidable. All too oen, theyhave not. Vladimir Pun has a bloodhound’s nosefor disunity and division. He is also good at stoking
them, playing divide and rule on trade, investment
and energy issues. Harried policians wanng short-term wins to placate their voters find the Kremlin’scarrots all too tasty.
Shameful examples in the past abound – GerhardSchröder’s energy diplomacy in Germany, Austrian
laxity towards
flows of dirtymoney from the
east, Hungary’s
deals on nuclear
power and Britain’s
new Kremlin-
friendly policy following the deal between the
country’s most important company, BP, and the
Russian energy giant Rosne.
But it is not too late to change. Ukraine may have
paid a terrible price for the West’s educaon, butthe lesson seems to be ge ng through, in a way itfailed to do aer the Russia-Georgia War of 2008.Coordinated diplomac support for the Ukrainian,Moldovan and Georgian governments will be far
more effecve than individual countries makingtheir own efforts.
As well as carrots for our friends, we must findscks for our enemies. It is vital to make it clearthat we have no quarrel with the Russian people
– whether in the Russian Federaon itself or in itsoccupied territories.
The most powerful weapon in our arsenal is one
that hurts not the Russian people, but their rulers.
The West – meaning the members of the EU and
NATO plus Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and
other allies – should jointly impose visa bans on
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Center for European Policy Analysis
all Russian policians and senior offi cials, as wellas anyone connected with the “power ministries”
(defense and interior), the criminal jusce system,and the security and intelligence agencies, and
people working for state propaganda organizaonssuch as the RT (Russia Today) television channel.This would include the funconaries themselvesand their family members.
This would have a huge effect. The people who run
Russia do not like their country enough to educatetheir children there; nor do they choose it fortheir vacaons.If their children
and grandchildren
cannot study at
the West’s top
universies, andif their wives can
no longer shop and holiday in the world’s most
desirable leisure locaons, the shock will be total.
More complicated, but even more effecve, wouldbe to impose targeted economic sancons on theelite. How is it possible that senior Russians, on
modest offi cial salaries, are able to buy colossallyexpensive properes in Britain, France, Austria andelsewhere? Money-laundering invesgaons arelong overdue.
The banks, lawyers and accountants who handle
these clients have betrayed the values of the
system. They should be shivering in their expensiveshoes at the uncomfortable quesons which awaitthem. Russian offi cials believe that greed has roedthe West’s willpower. It is me to show them thatthey are wrong. America has already led the way
– thanks to pressure from Congress – with the
Magnitsky Act sancons, which imposed visa bansand asset freezes on a handful of offi cials involvedin the death of the whistle-blower Sergei Magnitsky,
taxpayer he exposed. Even on the scale of a pinprick
this infuriated the Kremlin. Now it is me to turnthis weapon into a baering ram.
We can do more on energy policy too. The EU has
already made commendable steps in breaking
Gazprom’s grip on the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. The “complaint” (in effect, thecharges) against the Russian gas giant for market-rigging behavior and other abuses should now
come with the fullest polical backing and beenforced with the sffest penales. Talk of a“polical soluon” to Gazprom’s problems shouldnow be off the table.
But even more can be done. The EU can apply
compeon law toughly to other Russian energyprojects, such as the mooted South Stream
gas pipeline. It can accelerate the building of
interconnectors between countries supplied by
Russia – in effect, creang a north-south gas grid
between the Balc and the Black Sea. That willmake it far harder for Russia to exert pressure on
any individual country.
America can play its part too: President Barack
Obama should appeal to Congress for support in
immediately liing curbs on the export of LiquefiedNatural Gas (LNG) to EU and NATO members. Theunrestricted sale of LNG to Europe would not only
ease any supply constraints caused by a Russian
energy cut-off. It would also send a powerfulmessage about the connued importance to theUnited States of European security.
Ulmately, the West’s best chance of victory isso power: The more we can show that Westernpracces – rule of law, democrac polics and aEuro-Atlanc orientaon – bring a beer life, thegreater chance we have of contesng the Kremlinnarrave of populism, bombast and paranoia. In theshort term, this has boosted Pun’s popularity andperhaps even incited him to further recklessness
and aggression. In the long term, it leads nowhere.
Ukraine faces a volale geopolical future.From this point forward, several scenarios are
possible, each with different implicaons for the
wellbeing of the Ukrainian people, the stabilityof the European security order and U.S. interests.
While focusing immediate aenon on the needto halt and reverse Russia’s armed foray into
Ukraine, American policymakers should plan for
an acve and likely highly fluid “long game” in theEast. This would incorporate the best elements of
near-term crisis management in Ukraine yet be
structured to achieve a long-term, strategic aim:
The re-consolidaon of a democracally-governed,fully sovereign Ukrainian state. Significantly, bothoutcomes are now at risk.
I
By any measure, Russia’s invasion of Crimea
represents a turning-point in the security
order that has undergirded stability in Europe
for the last 25 years since the 1989 democracrevoluons. The cornerstone of that order was amutual agreement by Russia, the United States and
NATO following the break-up of the Soviet Union
to three basic principles regarding Ukraine. Thefirst was the inviolability of Ukraine’s sovereignborders, in keeping with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.
The second was that Russia would never use force
against Ukraine or violate its polical independence(1994 Budapest Memorandum). The third was that
broken with those agreements and signaled itsintent to revise the post-1989 selement in Europe.This represents a significant and sudden departurefrom the relave stability that has predominatedin Europe since the end of the Soviet Union. It
will have lasng consequences for both the Euro-Atlanc community and the people of Ukraine.
Russia’s land-grab in Crimea presents the interim
government in Kyiv with a naonal securityemergency of the first magnitude. Aer taking
offi ce in the wake of the impeachment of Ukraine’sformer President Viktor Yanukovych last week, the
new leadership in Kyiv is confronted with the task
of consolidang democrac rule in the country,stabilizing the state’s finances, and preparing forearly elecons in May – all while grappling with thefar more immediate and pressing naonal securitythreat posed by the Russian seizure of Crimea and
possible movement into Eastern Ukraine.
How Ukraine’s new leaders respond to these
challenges will determine Ukraine’s polical desnyand geopolical trajectory for years to come.A number of near-term outcomes are possible,
some of which would mark a confirmaon ofthe country’s pro-Western, independent future.
Other, increasingly likelier scenarios are more
Peter B. Doran is Director of Research at the Center for European Policy Analysis. Marta Sikorski is aResearch Associate at the Center for European Policy Analysis.
troubling. The post-invasion landscape will require
a strong – and ulmately, more strategic – level ofengagement from the United States and Europe.
This would replicate the beneficial role that Americaplayed during the height of the pro-EU protests that
facilitated Yanukovych’s departure, but be sustained
over a longer meframe.
W D U� M�?
What happens in Ukraine will have a lasng impacton the 21st century balance of power in Europe,the status of U.S.-Russian relaons, the securityoutlook of NATO allies, the economic vitality of East-
Central Europe, global
percepons of Americanpower and the plight of
the Ukrainian people.
In legal terms, Russia’s
invasion of Crimea is a
violaon of the UnitedNaons Charter, theHelsinki Final Act, the
Budapest Memorandum, the NATO-Russia Founding
Act and the Russo-Ukrainian Treaty of 1997. Since
the break-up of the Soviet Union, the unthreatened
independence of Ukraine has been an essenalkeystone of Europe’s security order. By violangessenal guarantees to Ukrainian sovereigntyand territorial integrity, Russia has cracked the
foundaon of the legal and treaty arrangements
that maintain peace in Europe. For this reason,America has a compelling interest in preserving
the sancty of internaonal borders, the stabilityof Europe and the sovereign independence of
Ukraine. If the United States and European allies
are incapable of enforcing the basic elements of
the internaonal order in Europe, the effects couldreverberate among NATO’s easternmost members
(especially Poland and the Balc States) for
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Center for European Policy Analysis
decades, while creang a dangerous precedent forother volale global regions.
In geopolical terms, the existence of a strong
Ukrainian state with an independent foreign and
defense policy creates a wide area of tranquility
along Europe’s froner. Over the last decade,Moscow has aempted to erode Ukrainianindependence by re-establishing a sphere of
influence over this former Soviet territory. The
invasion of Crimea is therefore significant becauseit represents an escalaon of that strategy from theuse of so power tools (i.e., financial, energy andpolical influence) to hard power ones (i.e., force
of arms). Boasng thesecond largest GDP,
largest populaon andmost important naval
base in the former
Soviet Union, Ukraine
has a lot to offer the
Kremlin. Ukraine’sre-integraon into aRussian-dominated
geopolical space is a top priority for Moscow.America has historically rejected spheres of
influence as a sustainable basis for geopolicalorder in any part of the world and has a strong
interest in prevenng the expansion of Russia’ssphere in Ukraine.
In hard security terms, a deterioraon of Ukrainian
sovereignty, renewed civic unrest or territorialinstability would further elevate the threat
percepons of America’s NATO allies in CentralEurope. Significantly, the invasion of Crimea opensthe possibility for an armed conflict just beyondNATO’s borders. If hoslies commence in Ukraine,it would follow Russia’s well-established paernof using ethnic proxies as a trigger for military
In global leadership terms, assisng the successfulpolical transion in Kyiv could benefit America’sstrategic priories elsewhere in the world. Overthe last two and a half decades, Washington has
made significant outlays of financial and diplomaccapital to bolster Ukraine’s democrac governanceand naonal independence from Russia. If Ukraine’ssovereign authority and governing instuons falternow, a high-profile setback in Eastern Europe couldlower the percepon of American leadership among
aspiring democracies and strategic competorselsewhere in the world.
In human terms, the potenal for large numbersof cross-border refugees from Ukraine was a real
possibility during the
recent street violence
in Kyiv. A flare-up ofcivic instability or
conflict with Russiawould reopen this
possibility. If militaryacon in the East doesbreak out, neighboring
countries could
experience an influxof migraon from Ukraine. While some of theseneighbors like Poland and Hungary would be in
a posion to accommodate refugees, others likeMoldova might be under-prepared. America has an
interest in prevenng the escalaon of condionswhich could cause an oulow of refugees fromUkraine and the destabilizing effects this could havefor the wider region.
F S�
If the stakes are high for U.S. interests, then the
scenarios that could unfold in Ukraine maergreatly. Since the early-1990s, European security
has existed on the premise that naonal borderswould be respected, the independence of former
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Center for European Policy Analysis
acon. This was the case during Russia’s invasionof Georgia in 2008. It mirrors the Kremlin’s strategy
up unl this point in Ukraine. The dilemma for theUnited States is that similar Russian minorieslikewise exist in NATO’s Balc States. And muchlike the fallout from the 2008 Russia-Georgia war,
fighng or territorial instability in Ukraine wouldlikely increase calls for overt demonstraons ofU.S. strategic reassurance among NATO members
in Central Europe. At a me when U.S. defense
dollars are shrinking and demands on Pentagonresources are growing, the consolidaon of astrong, independent Ukraine—one in full control of
its borders—would impose lower long-term costs
on the American taxpayer than any alternave.
In economic terms,
Ukraine faces a looming
foreign currency
shortage in addion tothe military crisis. In
2013, Ukraine’s currentaccount deficit reachednearly 9 percent of GDP
– an alarming figure.Even in the absence of
a conflict with Russia, the Ukrainian economy willrequire $15-$20 billion in foreign cash to operate
for the next year. That number could go higher
if hoslies commence. Without the injeconof rapid financial assistance from the West, thefourth-largest economy in East-Central Europe could
implode. This would hamper Kyiv’s efforts to defendits sovereignty, while risking financial contagion toother markets. As an influenal vong member ofthe IMF and the leader of the G-20, America has an
interest in helping Ukraine find a stable economicfoong. Such a step would aid the government inKyiv during this moment crisis and migate therisk of wider contagion from a currency shortage.
Global markets are linked. What happens in Ukraine
financially is unlikely to stay contained for long.
Soviet states would not be quesoned andinternaonal disagreements would be seled bydiplomacy and not the force of arms. By unilaterally
seizing Crimea, Russia has rejected all three of these
foundaonal pillars. Today’s geopolical condionsin Eastern Europe more closely resemble the post-
Soviet era of “extraordinary polics,” or even theSudeten Crisis of 1938, than the relave stabilityof the post-1989 era. This turbulence means that
the number and complexity of potenal pathways
for Ukraine is greater today than at any point inthe country’s modern-day independence from
Moscow. From a U.S., EU or Ukrainian perspecve,outcomes that would preserve the independence
and democrac governance of Ukraine arepreferable to a simmering crisis or Russian-backed
territorial instability.
Unfortunately, the
favorable trajectories
for Ukraine are looking
less likely in light of
the Russian seizure of
Crimea.
Scenario One: De Facto
State Capture
Similar to the process
that is currently
underway in Belarus,
this trajectory would bring Ukraine firmly into aRussian-dominated sphere of influence. There
are different ways for Ukraine to arrive at thisoutcome, either through the break-up of Ukraine
into Western- and Eastern-orientated territories
or through the establishment of a naonal leaderwho can suppress pro-independence opposionfrom the top. The State Capture scenario envisions
a government that is either dependent on the
Kremlin for self-enrichment and survival, or exposed
to coercive financial, security and energy pressuresfrom Russia. Under these condions, Ukraine’s
Center for European Policy Analysis
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T�’ � E� E
-S � “�� ,” S C 1938, � � � -
1989 �.
March 3, 2014
high-value economic assets—predominantly
steel, coal and food processing interests—would
gradually fall under Russian ownership; and thecountry’s naonal policies would be geared toaccommodate Moscow’s priories. In the event ofa territorial division, it is notable that weakened
Ukrainian rump states are easier for Russia to
capture than a large, unified Ukraine. And even ifthe country remains whole, the absence of a fully-
sovereign, independent and democracally-minded
government in Ukraine means that the StateCapture trajectory is enrely possible.
Scenario Two: Simmering Crisis
This represents a likely-but-unwelcomed scenario
for Ukraine. It would be analogous to the condionsin Moldova prior to
that country’s policaltransion in 2009.In this se ng, a
beleaguered naonalgovernment would
enjoy some—but not
complete—control
over the country’s
internaonally-recognized territory.
Hobbled by policalfeuds in Kyiv and
checked by a Russian-backed separast territoryin the East, the country’s governing elite would be
locked into a perpetual state of crisis-management.This would deflect aenon from needed domescreforms and ulmately expose Ukraine to greatercoercive influence from Moscow. The UnitedStates and EU would sll have diplomac pull onthe margins of a Simmering Crisis scenario, but
the maturaon of European norms in Ukrainewould be stunted. Best-pracces in EU-styleddemocrac governance would be the excepon—not the rule—in naonal polics; Russian business
pracces would govern the economy; and Ukraine’sindustrial base would have limited access to
prosperous markets in Europe. Due to the absence
of EU governing standards, public accountably
and transparency in civic life, a gradual accreonof Russian power in the country is likely to
materialize. Should Ukraine sele into a SimmeringCrisis scenario for an extended period of me, aneventual inclinaon toward State Capture is likely.
Scenario Three: Consolidaon
This represents a possible-and-preferable scenario
for Ukraine. It is the trajectory that Ukraine was
on just prior to the aborted signing of the EU
AssociaonAgreement
(DCFTA/AA) lastyear. This outcome
envisions a central
government in
Kyiv that hasfirm control of its Western and Eastern territories(including Crimea). Addionally, the Western-orientated Consolidaon government wouldmaintain a high degree of policy independence from
Moscow. One important dimension of this scenario
is that Ukraine would not enjoy the benefitsof formal NATO or EU membership. Instead,
implementaon of the DCFTA/AA would ensurethat democrac best-pracces guide the exerciseof state power; European business regulaons
govern the economy; and Ukraine’s industrial baseenjoys favorable access to EU customers. Under
these condions, the State Capture scenario isdiffi cult to achieve thanks to the inoculaon of EUnorms, accountably and transparency in Ukraine.
It is important to note that the Consolidaonscenario leaves open the possibility of a new
federal structure for the country. Such a move
could allow Ukraine’s regions a greater degree of
self-governance and ethno-linguisc identy, while
reserving control over foreign and defense policy
to Kyiv. To this end, greater self-government at the
regional level might even help to migate the risingsecessionist impulses in some parts of the country.
Scenario Four: Western Vector
Though sll a preferable path for Ukraine, thisscenario is increasingly unlikely. It was the
trajectory that U.S. and Ukrainian policymakers had
envisioned prior to NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit.
At the me, NATO’s “Open Door” policy aimed towelcome Kyiv as a signatory to the Washington
Treaty. In tandem with this effort, European leadersworked toward Ukraine’s eventual raficaon of
the EU’s legal
code (AcquisCommunautaire).Similar to the
policy template
employed
in Romaniaand Bulgaria, this outcome would represent
a substanal leap beyond the Consolidaonscenario. Under these condions, Ukraine’s formalmembership in NATO and the EU would create
a flourishing of Western European norms andbusiness pracces across all segments of policaland business life. Importantly, the “Open Door”
to Ukraine sll remains the formal policy of theUnited States and NATO. However, this outcome
will be diffi cult to achieve in pracce. For starters,
Ukrainians may no longer wish to embark on thispath. And much like the experience of Georgia and
Moldova, Russia can permanently close Ukraine’s
“Open Door” to NATO by manufacturing a territorial
dispute in the eastern poron of the county.
W� N?
Given the fluidity of current developments inUkraine, U.S. decision-makers should be prepared
for prolonged volality in Ukraine that includessome combinaon of the first three scenariosabove. As a first step in effecve crisis management,offi cials should ancipate a situaon that bringsmore set-backs than victories. As a second, they
should recognize that America has a limited power
toolkit at its disposal. The historic circumstances
that allowed America to broker the historic
Budapest Memorandum and the NATO-Russia
Founding Act have passed. What has now emerged
is a security environment with few clearly-definedlimits or rules. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in
2008 was its first aempt to test the tolerancesof the Euro-Atlanc security order. The land grabof Crimea represents a second. How the United
States and NATO respond to Moscow’s aggression
will send a strong message to the region and wider
world. The United States and its allies are either
tolerant of the use of force to take the territory
of others or they are not. If such acons areimpermissible—and indeed they should be—U.S.
offi cials will need to think carefully and creavely incalibrang a response.
Recommendaons
A basic strategy is beer than none
The United States lacks a coherent strategy
for managing problems in Europe’s East. Past
templates, such as “Europe Whole and Free” or
even the “Reset,” offer limited value today. The
former was developed at a me when Russia was incategorical retreat and decline. The laer gambledheavily that the Kremlin’s regional ambions werebenign. Since the underlying condions for eitherstrategy have changed, the Ukraine crisis provides
an important opportunity to develop elements of
a new game plan for the Euro-Atlanc froner. At aminimum, this approach would clarify: (1) U.S. andNATO objecves East of Poland; (2) how the Allianceintends to realize these goals; (3) what Washington
is—and is not—willing to sacrifice; and (4) whatsuccess would look like within the altered regional
power context. Beginning to reexamine these
quesons now will greatly assist U.S. and alliedcrisis-management and decision-making processes
in the future.
Raise the costs of revision
Washington should treat any outcome that allows
for the annexaon of Crimea (de facto or de jure) asunacceptable. In 2008, Russia’s seizure of Georgianterritory resulted in only marginal strategic costs
for the Kremlin. American policymakers can
prevent a repeat of that episode by imposing
strong penales for Russia’s territorial annexaonin Ukraine. Immediate opons include suspendingthe Kremlin’s coveted parcipaon in presgiousinternaonal gatherings such as the G-8 or G-20.These exclusive venues should only be open to
countries that abide by internaonal law and
respect the sovereign borders of their neighbors.Addional non-military opons include assetfreezes and visa bans for Russian naonal securityoffi cials, as well as steps to restrict the access ofKremlin-owned Russian companies to American
financial markets and banking system. Much like thesuccessful policy template used in Iran, the U.S. can
employ a wealth of so-power opons to show thatviolaons of internaonal norms incur obvious andcostly consequences.
Make the “Consolidaon” scenario the goal forUkraine
When assessing the priories of U.S. policy, allefforts should be vectored toward the Consolidaonscenario for Ukraine. The State Capture scenario
would subvert Ukraine’s hard-won independence
and elevate the threat percepons of NATO alliesin Central Europe. The Simmering Crisis outcome
And while Ukraine’s full integraon into Euro-Atlanc structures would conform to U.S. interests,for now that effort is unlikely to succeed. As aresult, Washington should aim to solidify a robustly-
independent, fully sovereign Ukrainian state.
This means keeping the country whole and in full
control of its internaonally-recognized territory.Ensuring the maturaon of EU norms inside Ukraineshould be an addional aim, since this will have aninoculang effect against any future accreon of
Russian power. This outcome should be a pillar ofAmerica’s long-game in Eastern Europe and it is one
that many Ukrainians would support.
Avoid Outsourcing
While seeking effecve coordinaon with Europeanallies as a vital prerequisite to successfully
confronng Vladimir Pun, American offi cialsshould resist any temptaon to outsource crisismediaon on Crimea to Europe—and parcularly,
Germany. The same level of U.S. engagement thatproduced the post-1989 selement in Europewill be required to resolve Russia’s latest effortsat internaonal revision. Both United States andEurope have an interest in fostering a territorially-
stable, democracally-governed, independentUkrainian state. Making this the minimum
requirement for any negoated selement onCrimea should be the first step in orchestrangpolicy between Washington, Brussels and other
European capitals. The United States and Europe
should issue a joint communiqué condemning theinvasion of Ukraine and idenfying steps that Russiacan take to swily reverse it. In the past, the UnitedStates and EU have shown they can achieve great
things when they synchronize their policies. Doing
so in the case of Ukraine can be another example
of that success, especially since the outcome in the
East will affect all sides of the transatlanc alliance.
Extraordinary moments allow for extraordinary
reforms
As vong members of the IMF, the UnitedStates and EU states should seek to prevent a
foreign currency shortage in Ukraine. However,
policymakers should use this as a catalyst for reform
instead of a bailout. As seen in the early 1990s,
extraordinary polical moments such as the one inUkraine create unique condions for diffi cult-but-
necessary reforms. The IMF and U.S. offi cials shoulduse the injecon of financial assistance to guaranteea host of essenal changes in Ukraine’s polical andeconomic governance. The list for potenal reformis long, but the OSCE’s suggested modificaons tothe electoral system, implementaon of the EnergyCommunity Treaty, greater transparency in state
finances and the end of Ukraine’s onerous energysubsidies are all good places to start. Ukrainians
have waited two decades for a chance to complete
the unfinished reform agenda of the 1990s. Best
of all, the compleon of these reforms now couldmake Ukraine more resistant to coercive Russian
pressure down the road.
C
Without a doubt, the unfolding crisis in Ukraine
is historic. The invasion of Crimea crosses a clear
dividing line that demarcates the post-1989
selement in Europe and a new geopolicalmoment. Determining Ukraine’s status as a unified
and if possible democracally-vectoring polity inthis new order should be a top priority for the
United States. Among the mulple geopolicalpathways that Ukraine might now take, Washington
should seek soluons in which, to the extentpossible, Ukraine retains territorial integrity and
Kyiv retains a high degree of policy independence
from Moscow. This outcome would salvage the
essenal ingredients of the post-1989 selement ofEurope, while allowing for the widest possible area
of stability along NATO’s froner. Any alternavewhich results in a weakened, less independent
Ukraine would shi the strategic costs of Russia’sinvasion of Crimea onto the shoulders of America
and its allies in Central Europe.
In navigang these geopolical shoals, U.S.policymakers would benefit by filling America’scurrent gap in strategy on the East. To this end,
Washington has a strong incenve for imposing
significant (non-military) costs on Russia’s latestaempt to revise the European security order.Failing to do so would send a message worldwide
that the United States and internaonal communityare tolerant of armed land grabs. At the naonallevel, the United States should acvely work toconsolidate the habits of good governance and
EU norms in Ukraine, since these will insulate Kyiv
from coercive Russian pressure over the long-run.
More immediately, the interim government risks
being overwhelmed by the proliferaon of crisis
points on the agenda. If the United States acts now,and acts with foresight, it can make an important
contribuon to pu ng Ukraine on the pathway toan independent future. That too would be historic,
and the United States should not let the opening go
