Centre for Organisations In Development

Institute for Development Policy and Management

School of Environment and Development

Organisations in Development Working Papers – No. 8/ 2012

PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN PROVINCIAL

ADMINISTRATION IN THAILAND

Nicha Sathornkich and Derek Eldridge

Centre for Organisations in Development

Working Paper Series

No. 8 / 2012

PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN THAILAND

Nicha Sathornkich and Derek Eldridge

ISBN: 978-1-905469-63-5

The Centre for Organisations in Development (COD) working papers series is a first-hand outlet for research output of COD members and associates. It includes papers presented at conferences, first drafts of papers intended for submission in journals and other reports from ongoing or completed research projects. The series provides an opportunity to expose ideas to debate which are intended for subsequent publication.

Series Editor Dr Nahee Kang – nahee.kang@manchester.ac.uk

Published by Centre for Organisations in Development (COD)

Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM) School of Environment and Development (SED)

The University of Manchester Arthur Lewis Building,

Manchester, M13 9PL, UK http://www.manchester.ac.uk/cod

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PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN THAILAND

Nicha Sathornkich and Derek Eldridge1

Abstract

This study investigates how the Thai public sector at provincial level incorporates and utilizes the Thai Government’s performance management system to drive forward improvements in public service delivery and to build internal management capacity. The paper examines the rich literature on performance management in order to understand its application in provincial administration in Thailand and argues that it constitutes a crucial element in supporting decentralized administration and in the evolution of democratic governance involving local stakeholders. While the establishment of a performance management system (PMS) has created new challenges for Provincial Governors and their administrations, findings suggest that it has contributed significantly in the shift from a traditional administrative culture to one that is more managerial and participative in nature. The performance agreement (PA) has played a crucial role in improving and evaluating performance, driving public sector development and linking performance with monetary incentive schemes. However, the study also reveals limitations in PA execution particularly as a result of a perceived unfair incentive distribution to provincial staff and in unfulfilled aspirations in the coordination of central ministries’ functions. Keywords: Performance management, decentralisation, provincial administration, Thailand

1 Corresponding authors: Dr. Nicha Sathornkich, Public Sector Development Commission,

Government of Thailand and Derek Eldridge, Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, M13 9PL, UK; nicha2004@yahoo.com and derek.eldridge@manchester.ac.uk

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS BOB Bureau of the Budget

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CSTI Civil Service Training Institute

GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office

KPIs Key Performance Indicators

MOI Ministry of Interior

NESDB National Economic and Social Development Board

OCSC Office of the Civil Service Commission

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OPDC Office of the Public Sector Development Commission

OPM Office of the Prime Minister

PA Performance Agreement

PDC Public Sector Development Commission

PDRI Prince Damrong Rajanubhab Institute of Research and

Development

PM Performance management

PMS Performance management System

POs Public Organizations

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Aims of Research

The Public Administration Act (No. 5) B.E. 2545 (2002), the Government

Organization Restructuring Act B.E. 2545 (2002) and the Royal Decree on

Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance, B.E. 2546 (2003), together set

in motion a change process aimed at greater effectiveness in public service

delivery to the people of Thailand. Additionally, in 2004 the Performance

Agreement and Incentives for Promoting the Good Governance Scheme

strengthened performance management (PM), under the supervision of the

ministries or departments as discrete and integrated Chief Executive Officer

(CEO) led organizations. All seventy-five provincial managements, excluding

Bangkok, participate in this scheme (OPDC, 2004c) with their performance

being judged under four perspectives, namely effectiveness in meeting citizen

needs, quality of services, efficiency of administration and progress on

organization development. Public Sector Development Commission (PDC), to

implement new Public Sector Development Strategies and to promote a new

organisational mindset (OPDC, 2004c).

Also, since 2002 the Government has promoted decentralization of

administration and mandated the role of the head of each government agency

as a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) with overall responsibility for implementing

PM and its associated Performance Agreement (PA) . This development

enabled provincial administrations to be treated separately from parent

Seven years have elapsed since the introduction of PM and its associated

incentives and the research reported in this Paper represents the first

opportunity to explore the impact of the changes at provincial level. The aim of

the research has been to investigate how the public sector at the provincial

level makes sense of the prescribed Performance Management System

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(PMS) in relation to the development of management capacities to drive

forward improved and sustainable service quality. The specific research

questions addressed in this Paper are:

• What are the impacts of PMS on management capacity at the

provincial level?

• To what extent does PMS enhance the capacity of provincial

government management to deliver services?

• What role is played by central organizations, such as the parent

ministries or departments, training institutes, and the Office of the

Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC), in supporting the

development of management capacity at the provincial level?

• What are the factors enabling and inhibiting the enhancement of

performance improvement and the creation of a self-sustaining

management capacity at provincial level?

The reporting of this research comes at an opportune time in respect of

administrative developments in Thailand which increasingly recognise the

value of enhancing provincial development in the quest for harnessing

country wide resources for economic and social development. This

decentralisation process aims to be sensitive to the cultural and resource

endowments of each province and pays due regard to the varied strengths

they bring to national progress. Also, the concern for more autonomy in

provincial administration runs parallel to the achievement of political unity

based on the active involvement of all sections of provincial society.

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Theoretical Foundations for the Research

The fundamental principles of performance management

Not only does PM focus on clarifying strategic objectives, but also on how

they may be achieved through an integrated approach in an organisation that

stresses the ‘cascading’ of strategic goals to work unit and individual targets.

It involves setting performance goals, allocating and prioritizing resources,

developing measurements, setting agreed performance targets, monitoring

and evaluating progress towards those targets and giving feedback to

managers (Busi and Bititci, 2006; Hume, 2005). In addition, associated human

resource policies and practices assist PMS implementation by the

identification of core competency requirements and the development of team

and individual capabilities (Marchington and Wilkinson, 1997). Such an

approach encourages organizations to establish a culture in which individuals

and teams take increased responsibility for developing their own skills,

improving processes and contributing to the achievement of organizational

goals (Philpott and Sheppard, 1992).

Bryson (1995: 7) contended that making effective decisions on strategic

priorities depends on analysing both the internal and external environments

and understanding the interests of the different groups who are affected.

However, because varied stakeholder expectations can constrain clarity on

needed actions a process of bargaining and negotiation is required to avoid

conflict (Collier et al., 2001) and to ensure that statements made on the

actions necessary do embody real commitment (Mintzberg et al.,1998c:158).

To achieve such commitment Bryson (1995: 224-226) suggested that when

making decisions leaders should be concerned with five significant factors.

First, they should be capable of designing and using both formal and informal

networks in communication within and amongst organizations in order to

balance competing demands from stakeholders. Second, leaders must be

skilled in dealing with all parties involved in the strategy implementation

through negotiation and bargaining as events unfold. Third, leaders need to

know who to influence to obtain resources for strategy implementation.

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Fourth, leaders are required to build winning, sustainable coalitions and

alliances so that they can support and defend the required strategy in

implementation. Finally, leaders should avoid bureaucratic confinement and

encourage challenge to existing restrictions which impede progress.

Fundamental in PM is the use of a range of feedback indicators meaningful to

service delivery and standards which give a holistic picture of an

organisation’s performance, balanced between results and process, financial

and non-financial and the short-term and long-term. Such comprehensive

feedback can potentially satisfy the perspectives of different stakeholders as

well as providing vital information for performance improvement (Jackson,

1995a, Kaplan and Norton, 1992).

Performance management in the public sector

Historically, employment in the public service has demonstrated two unique

characteristics. Firstly, it usually has a ‘welfare’ component which offers a

degree of staff security unmatched in other sectors including buffering against

unemployment (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1996: 5). Secondly, traditional

public management demonstrates large, centralized bureaucracies and the

prevalence of ‘command and control’ systems driven by rules and budgets

(Ellingson and Wambsganss, 2001). As reported in many studies, these two

aspects can contribute to overstaffing, workplace inertia, an inefficient service

delivery, a poor management planning cycle, de-motivation of staff and even

more seriously corruption (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1998). In response to

this potential scenario, PM has been adopted from the private sector with the

aim of improving public service efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness

in order to satisfy the needs of customers and citizens, as well as giving an

improved public perception of government (OECD, 1995). Drucker (1989: 89)

emphasized that ‘nonprofits need management even more than business

does, precisely because they lack the discipline of the bottom line’ and in line

with this idea Radnor and McGuire (2003) suggested that because public

services are operated without market competition, performance measurement

is implemented as a substitute for market pressures.

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In setting the public sector context for PM, Jackson (1995b:19-20) recognised

the complexity that organisations face: they serve multiple objectives; have a

diversity of clients; deliver a wide range of policies and services; and exist

within uncertain socio-political environments. This view is aligned with the

views of other scholars, for example, Moynihan and Pandey (2005) who

concluded that what was needed was a model of public sector organizational

effectiveness that focused on the need to both exploit and buffer the external

environment while ensuring the improvement of operations. Additionally, the

public sector is charged with producing ‘public values’ (Alford, 2001: 5)

including the provision of the legal framework, responses to market failure and

interventions to promote equity. Alford also pointed out that values held by

public sector officials can influence the priorities set although it is difficult to

identify and measure the scope of this interference when monitoring

outcomes.

Public sector organisations inevitably have multiple stakeholders who include

parliament, current customers, potential customers, citizens, communities,

taxpayers, professional groups, unions, suppliers and employees (Jackson,

1995a; Rouse, 1999, 1997). Stakeholders invariably have different interests,

sets of values, performance expectations and perceptions of what constitutes

effective performance (Painter and Isaac-Henry, 1997). The challenge then in

designing and implementing PM is enacting a process in which stakeholders’

interests are identified and balanced.

Another important consideration was raised by Rouse (1997: 78) who

observed that PM in the public sector can be markedly different from that in

the private sector by the nature of the required outputs which can involve

overseeing coercive relationships (policing), responding to dependent citizens

(social security), settling conflicts (contested planning applications) and

enacting decisions that are irreversible in the short term (impact of current

statutory or case law).Additionally, encountered in this context for PM are

issues related to equity, fairness, community, citizenship, justice, and

democracy (Rouse, 1999: 78). Also, outcomes of PM will undoubtedly include

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such factors as economy (Jackson, 1995a), effectiveness (Jackson, 1995a,

Rouse, 1999; Holloway, 1999; Lawton and Rose, 1994), efficiency (Jackson,

1995a; Lawton and Rose, 1994), and quality of service (Rouse, 1999; Talbot,

2000).

Given this complexity Mintzberg (1987) stressed the urgent need to apply PM

for unique challenges in the public sector, a theme taken up by Osborne and

Gaebler (1992) in the quest for ‘reinventing government’ and for rule-driven

organizations to become:

‘more efficient, more effective, more innovative, more flexible,

and having higher employee morale. (and)… To be effective, an

organization’s mission must be narrow enough to be achievable

but broad enough to allow for innovative ways of meeting the

needs of constituents.’

Kerr (2009) in supporting this proposition referred to the value of mission

statements in the public sector which broadly express socially desirable

outcomes, but cautions that buried within them are goals, which to be

purposefully enacted, require adequate attention to multiple stakeholder

interests. These interests can be complex, unclearly defined, and often

conflicting (Farnham and Horton, 1999; Rouse, 1997). Consequently, public

sector organizations find it a real challenge to identify clear strategic

objectives in a changing environment (Lawton and Rose, 1994; De Waal,

2001).

Also, a clear focus on public sector goals becomes difficult when cascading

down an organization’s objectives to subsidiary bodies when ‘parenting styles’

of central ministries have strong influence. Two of these styles are

fundamental considerations in the design of PMS: strategic control and

financial control (De Waal, 2001: 21-24). Strategic control usually implies a

situation in which corporate headquarters issues guidelines and the lower

levels independently develop their own strategic plans which are then

evaluated and perhaps prioritized by headquarters. Financial control

necessarily runs in parallel with strategic control with emphasis placed on

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defining both short- and long-term financial objectives within the overall

budget set by headquarters, which then regularly checks on the

accomplishment of those objectives. If there is not a clear alignment and

linkage between higher-level decision making and operational performance,

identified organizational priorities may not be adequately funded and

monitored (Plant, 2006).

Ellingson and Wambsganss (2001) provided some clarity on the way that

strategic priorities and associated budget allocations may be handled within

PM. They advise the use of budgetary components such as the per capita

cost of providing a unit of service or the per capita cost per unit of satisfaction

level. However, the long term utilisation of such measures may prove elusive

as experience in the public sector suggests that there is no incentive for

mangers to reduce impending expenditure because the targeted amounts

saved may be hard to recover in any future planning period because of central

authority rules (Ellingson and Wambsganss, 2001). Thus flexibility of

response to achieve new priorities in the quality and quantity of service

provision may be difficult to achieve. Such a context in public sector

organizations is further exaggerated when powerful elected officials and

interest groups unduly influence budget funding and thereby potentially ignore

the needs of targeted beneficiaries (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).

The use and appreciation of the value of different performance indicators also

have a profound connection with the resultant allocation of resources. Even

when all stakeholders have recognised the need for change, there will

undeniably be winners and losers amongst those who have contested for their

share of the resource allocation. The latter can be expected to complain

loudly, argue over performance indicators to be used and often challenge

performance information (Talbot, 2000; Johnsen, 2005), while the silent

majority who have probably had a positive outcome may not clearly declare

support. However, Talbot (2000) suggested that, if there are no complaints or

appeals, it can be implied that people may not be interested at all as a result

of their belief that government actions may not change anything. In spite of

these potential hazards, performance measurement can open communication

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within and between government agencies, societies and communities, and

enhance democratic competition (Johnsen, 2005).

Performance agreements (PAs) in the public sector

At the heart of PM in the public sector, within the array of pressures

recognised above, lies the Performance Agreement (PA), which is the

statement on what an organization has agreed to accomplish within a specific

time period. An agreement is used as a cascading tool to hold organizations

and managers accountable for results, align executive performance

expectations with organizational goals, help translate organizational strategic

goals into day-to-day operations linking employee performance to

organizational results, and to reflect specific organizational priorities,

structures, and cultures (GAO, 2000). GAO also reports that using a PA

enhances collaboration, interaction and teamwork across organizational

boundaries, and increases opportunities to discuss and routinely use

performance information to seek opportunities for performance improvement.

Furthermore, such an agreement can help maintain the consistency of

programme priorities and the continuity of those programmes during

leadership transition periods (GAO, 2000).

A PA provides a clear picture of how day-to-day operations contribute to

organizational results and as a consequence potentially brings about

employee commitment and involvement (GAO, 2000), and ‘synergy in

partnership’ (Covey, 1995). In addition, while the agreement can have a legal

entity, it is profoundly a psychological and social contract (Covey, 1995) in

which desired results are based on a balancing process involving multiple

stakeholders with a wide range of expectations. In sum, the PA identifies

specific desired results, establishes guidelines on how to achieve those

results, formulates frameworks for budgeting and resources allocation

including staffing, defines accountabilities, and enhances learning capacities

at both the organizational and individual levels.

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A PA can be viewed as a multi-dimensional construct which is embedded in

the context of intergroup relationships and reciprocal judgments of

performance. Within an intergroup context, seeking agreement can be viewed

as ‘multilevel phenomenon that encompasses individuals’ judgments about

their own situation, the comparison of such judgments with those of reference

group members, and the projection of such judgments across formal and

informal group boundaries’ (Shanley and Correa, 1992: 245). Also, a resultant

agreement can be specified in three dimensions: perceived agreement, actual

agreement, and accuracy. A perceived agreement is the extent to which ones

believe themselves to agree, while actual agreement is the substantive nature

of their positions. Accuracy is the comparison between perceived and actual

agreement. According to Shanley and Correa (1992: 246), a positive

relationship between an agreement and performance is found when perceived

agreement and actual agreement align. Such an agreement benefits

performance through cooperation and synergies compared to the situation in

which perceived agreement is high but actual agreement is low leading to

disillusionment and latent conflict. When perceived and actual agreements

differ, affective and cognitive factors account for biases and differences in

expectations, and are the basis for group and intergroup collective distortions.

As a result, the unchecked perspectives of individuals in an organisation

undertaking a PA can potentially affect in a negative manner how they create

and execute their agreements.

Performance management and capacity building

Roberts (2001:540) and Buchner (2007) suggested that PM activates learning

based on identifying how to achieve goals, establishing self-monitoring on

progress and impact, and providing assessment and feedback. Managing

performance is a cyclical series of events which includes measuring and

documenting actual performance, providing feedback to groups and

individuals, coaching and counselling employees to improve performance and

building the learning process for all those involved.

The learning and growth perspective of PM emphasizes the long-term

investment in employees, information systems, and organizational capabilities

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(Ellingson and Wambsganss, 2001:117) which include employee satisfaction,

retention, and productivity (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Associated with these

outcomes are employee learning (Ellingson and Wambsganss, 2001) and

employee participation in decision making (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), with

many studies confirming that goal-setting processes have a positive effect on

learning how to perform better in the workplace (Buchner, 2007). In this

respect, difficult and specific goals are said to lead to higher performance

compared to vague do-your-best goals (Buchner, 2007: 63). Also, Gibbs

(2002) suggested that the more demanding a goal is, the more learning and

development may result on the basis that high, specific goals ‘direct the

learners’ attention to content that is relevant to the goals and relates learners’

efforts to attain the high goal level’ (Maier et al., 2003: 23). Goals provide

challenge which stimulates efforts and development (Buchner, 2007) but can

lead to high performance only when

Additionally, Buchner (2007) suggested that there are five moderators

influencing an individual’s perception of goal-driven performance: goal

commitment, goal importance, individual’s self-efficacy, value placed on

feedback and task complexity. Perceptions may not be congruent with needs

when for instance ‘goal displacement’ occurs in which individuals substitute

means for ends (Wheelen and Hunger, 2000), or when individuals focus on

easily measurable activities that attract reward at the expense of real

priorities. This can result in sub-optimization in an organisation’s overall

accomplishment and its ability to enhance capacity, which may curtail the

scope for individual learning.

When organizational members put emphasis on outcomes rather than

processes, they are motivated to work toward superior performance (Boyne

and Chen, 2007). Furthermore, the specification of goals and targets creates

feedback for learning that enables managers and individuals to make

corrective actions. Against this positive scenario i a minority viewpoint

suggests that individuals are more likely to achieve success with vague goals.

Also, Mintzberg (1998) claimed that if targets are too precisely defined, it may

direct efforts to the disregard of a significant area of activity later discovered to

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be important. In addition, precise goals or targets can undermine the

autonomy of professional members who expect to exercise their own

judgment in designing actions for the provision of public services (Boyne and

Chen, 2007).

Measurement is fundamental in stimulating learning and actions to improve

results (Parsons, 2007; Meekings, 1995) but measures have to be visible,

tangible and comparable. Successfully designed measures enable the

management of performance to be steered in a more accurate and effective

way and most importantly are ‘a means of organizational learning’ (Jackson,

1995b: 20). Such learning based on feedback is essential in dealing with

unexpected changes, coping with uncertainty and complexity in the

environment and ‘creating opportunities for sustainable competitive

advantage’ (Bratton et al., 2004 cited by Gold, 2007a: 339).

Also, to maintain their effectiveness, performance indicators need to be

continuously reviewed and linked with the organization’s strategy, achieving

this connectivity being perceived as a learning process (Dixon et al., 1990). In

support of this view Jackson (1995b: 25) maintains that some government

agencies have demonstrated ‘the capacity to learn from information signals

that indicators provide, as well as the organizational capabilities to act upon

that learning.’

Incentive schemes in performance management

In recent years to improve the effectiveness of public services and to reinforce

accountability, reform agendas have increasingly advocated the use of

incentive schemes based on approaches derived from the private sector

(Radnor and McGuire, 2004). Behaviorally based theories suggest that an

incentive pay scheme has the potential to create a clear motivational linkage

between an individual’s performance and rewards derived from the effort

extended (Lawler, 1990). However, implementing such a scheme in the public

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sector may be difficult in many aspects. First, the public sector typically serves

many principals who usually pay attention to different dimensions of output

and their interests may not align. Burgess and Ratto (2003: 288) stated that in

the multi-principals setting, ‘each principal will offer a positive coefficient on

the element(s) she is interested in and negative coefficient on the other

dimensions. This creates a negative externality on the other principals who

have to face lower efforts in those dimensions.’

Second, in the context of multiple outputs not only is it difficult to measure and

monitor performance but also to distinguish good performers from the poor

ones. Additionally, perverse incentive effects can occur when a job requires

individuals to perform several tasks but only some are measured and

rewarded (Burgess and Ratto, 2003: 292). As a consequence, individuals are

likely to increase effort only on the rewarded tasks.

Third, in many cases in the public sector individuals achieve results as team

members contributing to the same output requirements and in these

circumstances Burgess and Ratto (2003: 289) suggested that the greater the

uncertainty in output measurement and the greater the size of the team, the

more complex is the design of an optimal incentive scheme. Also, the free-

ride problem is likely to exist when all team members share the same output

and are subject to team-based rewards.

Fourth, when introducing financial rewards it sends a message that the

relationship between individuals and the organization is a pure market one

which may undermine intrinsic motivation (Burgess and Ratto, 2003: 290).

Further, Khojasteh (1993) developed a survey based on Herzberg’s

motivation theory to record perceived dissatisfaction with categorized intrinsic

and extrinsic rewards from both public and private sectors’ points of view. He

found that employees in the public sector placed higher value on achievement

and advancement and significantly less value on pay and job security than

those in the private sector.

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Kohn (1997) further built on these arguments by suggesting that financial

rewards are only effective for temporary compliance and have little connection

with sustaining changes in attitudes and behaviour. Once there is no longer

an extra reward available, individuals tend to slip back to their old behaviors.

He maintained that rewards fail for various reasons. First, as discussed

above, pay can have limited motivational impacts in the public sector. Second,

‘reward punishes’ when a received reward is not equal to an expected reward.

Third, rewards disrupt relationships and destroy cooperation when individuals

compete for them. Fourth, if an assumption that incentives can solve

organizational problems is dominant then underlying issues affecting

performance are less likely to be discussed. Fifth, rewards discourage risk-

taking when individuals avoid risk which may jeopardize their chances of

rewards. Finally, rewards undermine intrinsic value stated as ‘The more a

manager stresses what an employee can earn for good work, the less

interested that employee will be in the work itself’ (Kohn, 1997: 22).

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The scope of performance management in the Thai Public Sector

The Public Sector Strategies of 2003-2007 Development

The Public Sector Development Strategies of 2003-2007, approved by the Cabinet in May 2003, are:

• Strategy 1: Re-engineer the work processes aimed at improving

service quality, efficiency, effectiveness, and value for money

• Strategy 2: Restructure the framework and administration of

government agencies as part of responsive government

• Strategy 3: Reform the financial and budgetary systems

• Strategy 4: Review HRM and compensation systems

• Strategy 5: Introduce change management paradigms, culture and

values

• Strategy 6: Modernize the public sector through e-government system

development

• Strategy 7: Enlist public participation in the work of the government

system for open democracy, citizen involvement and participation

Overall the Strategies aim to enhance service quality, rightsize the

government, promote a management for results approach and establish a

participatory form of public sector organization. The legislative framework for

this reform approach is shown in Figure 1.

Figure1. Key legislative enactments for public service reform (Source:

OPDC, 2004c)

State Administration Act (Volume 5) of 2002Section 3/1

Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance, B.E. 2546 (2003)

Public Sector Development Strategies of 2003-2007

Good Governance

EfficiencyValue-for-Money

Effectiveness QualityAccountability

ParticipationTransparency

ResponsivenessDecentralization

Rule of Law

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The Strategies form a fundamental building block in identifying the priorities to

be followed by any agency when it enacts its PMS cycle, as shown in Figure

2. PMS cycle implementation is guided by the Public Sector Development

Commission (PDC) with each organization developing its PA and key

performance indicators within the Performance Agreement and Incentives for

Promoting the Good Governance Scheme.

Figure 2. The PM process in an organisation with KPIs as the driving

force of its PA

Role of the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission

(OPDC)

OPDC leads the implementation of PAs within a fiscal annual cycle to build

performance and accountability based on a shared comprehension and

expectation between the deliverers and the receivers of public services. PMS

as the process driving the formation and implementation of PAs requires each

organization to:

1. Vision, mission clarification

8. Data analysis

7. Entering actual dataInto IT application

6. Data collectionconstruction

5. Target setting For KPIs

4. Data source andResponsible unit for

KPIs assignment

3. Key PerformanceIndicators (KPIs)

identification

2. Critical Success Factors (CSFs)determination

9. Reporting

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(1) Change and improve the culture, methods and processes of its public

service delivery;

(2) Improve performance through appropriate budget allocation, monitoring

and evaluation of its activities; and

(3) Utilise incentives to encourage continuous performance improvement.

Since 2004, under the guidance of OPDC, every departmental-level

organization and province has entered the PM scheme and developed a PA

on a fiscal annual basis. There are 163 departmental-level organizations and

75 provinces participating in this scheme aimed at cascading each ministry’s

strategic plan and targets to its cluster-level and constituent departments. The

number of agencies participating is illustrated in Table.

Table1. Participating organizations in the Performance Agreement and

Incentives for Promoting Good Governance Scheme for fiscal years

2004-2007 (OPDC, 2007: 156)

Fiscal Year

2004 2005 2006 2007

Participating

organizations

Government

Departments

143 142 142 143

University 20 62 73 73

Province 75 75 75 75

Public Organizations

(POs)

0 16 17 19

Total 238 295 307 310

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A PA allows a government agency’s performance to be evaluated in four

major perspectives: strategic effectiveness; quality of service; efficiency of

work processes; and organizational development (see Error! Reference

source not found.). Each perspective consists of many KPIs, either

mandated by PDC or ministries’ policies, or based on a department’s choice

to reflect its own interpretation of priorities. However, each KPI has its criteria

and detailed procedure for provincial departments to execute and to be

evaluated on.

Perspective 1

Strategic Effectiveness

Perspective 2

Quality of Service

Work effectiveness and completion

of goals and missions of an

organization.

Quality of public services based on

public satisfaction survey and

transparency of public

administration.

Perspective 3

Efficiency of Work Process

Perspective 4

Organizational Development

Efficiency of work process based on

promptness, time, and resource

reduction in service delivery.

Organization’s readiness for change

based on human resource

management, knowledge

management, information

technology, and change

management.

Table 2. Four perspectives for performance evaluation

Incentive Scheme

Based on the four perspectives for performance evaluation, shown in Table 2,

PDC in recent years has provided an annual incentive sum of 5,550 million

Baht to be allocated to government departments and provinces which achieve

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a total performance of 3.0 points and above (from a five-point scale where 5.0

is the maximum scale) (OPDC, 2008). Departments with an overall

performance score less than 3.0 are not eligible to receive any incentive. The

two factors which are taken into account when allocating incentives are the

organization’s overall performance score and its total annual salary bill, not

including allowances and other benefits. An organization’s spending on total

basic salaries reflects its size and an assumption is that organizations that

have the same overall performance score and pay the same amount of basic

salary will be awarded the same amount of monetary incentive.

After OPDC awards an incentive sum to an eligible organization, the

respective head is responsible for creating allocation criteria to distribute

incentive sums to individuals. However, such criteria need to be in compliance

with PDC guidelines and government organizations must report their

allocation criteria for further analysis.

Performance management in Provincial Administration

The Cabinet approved the implementation of integrated provincial

administration in October 2003, which extended the roles and responsibilities

of Provincial Governors within the structure, shown in Figure 4, to promote

(OPDC, 2004c):

• management that effectively links together national strategy, regional

strategy, and provincial strategy;

• opportunities for the public sector, the private sector and citizens to

participate in developing provincial development strategy and solving

area-based problems;

• support from central, regional, and local government agencies in

respect of budgetary and personnel decisions, information system

development and legal issues;

• decentralization to local administration and creating a work

coordination environment rather than purely controlling mechanisms;

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• work delegation to officers in service provision and developing

information systems to support decision making; and

• a monitoring and evaluation system.

From studies undertaken, it is clear that this development represents new

paradigm for provincial administration aimed at effectively utilising personnel,

budgets and other resources to improve the living conditions of the people

and to maintain public order and safety, as well as to maximize profit of the

nation (Jatusripitak, 2003; Shinawatra, 2003; OPDC, 2004b; Sirisumphand,

2004; Chulalongkorn University, 2005; Office of the Permanent Secretary for

Interior, 2009). A new realism has emerged on the future of provincial

administration which encompasses shared ideas and networking at every

level in trying to achieve improved service delivery by integrating resources to

achieve maximum results.

Figure 4. Structure of an Integrated Administration at the Provincial

Level (Research and Consultancy Institute, Thammasat University, 2005:

20)

Provincial Governor

Provincial Management Committee

Citizen Board

Provincial Strategic Team

Cluster Based onProvincial Strategy

Cluster based onAuthority and Duties

• General Public Service• Infrastructure and Economic Development• Social Development• Social Order & Public Safety

• Area Initiative

24

PMS has been adopted to drive the development and implementation of the

Integrated Provincial Administration through an annual PA for each province

based on KPIs which drives, motivates, and monitors components of service

delivery that are centrally led, as well as based on locally inspired initiatives.

While the annual PA cycle is similar to that for central departments, it has

additional processes, as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5. The process of implementing the performance management at

the provincial level [adapted and translated from OPDC (2004b)

ScreeningProvincial Cluster’sStrategy

Action Learning Programor CEO Retreat Program

Provincial Cluster’sStrategyApproval

CreatingProvincialStrategy

ScreeningProvincialStrategy

DevelopingPerformanceAgreement

DeployingStrategy

EvaluationAndIncentiveAllocation

PDC NESDB Cabinet ProvincialGovernor

DeputyPrime MinistersNESDBOPMBOBOPDC

PDC DeputyPrime MinistersInspector-GeneralMOI

PDC

KEY PLAYERSBOB Bureau of the BudgetMOI Ministry of InteriorNESDB Office of the National Economic and Social Development BoardPDC Public Sector Development CommissionOPM Office of the Prime MinisterOPDC Office of the Public Sector Development Commission

25

Research design and methodology

Choice of research methodology

Given the nature of the research questions and the context a qualitative

research methodology has been used in this study to explore how the Thai

public sector at the provincial level makes sense of PMS and how it is utilized

to improve current activities (Patton, 2002). The approach was also valid on

the basis that little was known about PMS at the provincial level and the

methodology provides a means of gaining access to the views of key

informants, primarily Provincial Governors, Heads of Provincial Offices and

top executives of central agencies (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The

conceptual framework for undertaking the research and for identifying the key

components and stakeholders is shown in Figure 6. Elements 1-3 relate to

the provincial government’s procedures for the PMS cycle while elements 4-7

constitute fundamental impacts which are the focus of the research questions.

The latter elements form the basis of the interview questions for the

respondents, as shown in the Appendix.

Figure 6. The conceptual framework for the study

Procedures vs.FundamentalImpact

Agencies/ personnelInvolved at different stages

Actions on specificprojects/ programs

(how data generatedon performance)

Review ofPerformance

Formal Informal

Theories on how thingsshould be done differently

for projects/ programs(required learning initiatives)

Performance Agreement

Management Structures/Roles/ Responsibilities

at provincial level (to build capacity PA

implementation)

Reviewof InternalLearningCapacity

Building Capacityof provincial administration

(specific decisions on managementInfrastructure including initiativesfor learning and development)

Theorizingon

How To Improve

Commitmentto learninginitiatives

IdentifyingThe RequiredInitiatives to

Improve

enablers/constraints

1

2

3

4

7

6

5

26

Respondents in the study

A total of 55 officials at senior level were interviewed in five provincial

governments, shown in Table 4.

Province Number of interviews

Lumphun 12

Phayao 11

Phetchaburi 9

Prachuap Khiri Khan 12

Samut Songkhram 11

Total 55

Table 4. Number and location of respondents

Inclusion of a province related to the need to achieve a representative

selection by location in the country chosen to reflect varying endowments in

local culture and resources. Provinces were also selected on the basis of a

demonstrable impact of PM being apparent. To this end the following

selection criteria were adopted:

• Performance evaluation score. Provincial performance is evaluated

by OPDC based on the annual PA’s targets and performance

indicators in priority areas (OPDC, 2008). Provinces included in the

research achieved a final performance score of 3.0 or above during the

period 2004 to 2007, which equates with a functioning PMS.

• Provincial governor length of service in a province. Provincial

governors should have governed in the selected provinces for enough

time to be familiar with local conditions and had personally negotiated

the previous PA and seen it through to evaluation.

27

In addition to public officials, interviewees in the provinces included private

sector representatives with key roles in development and members of

communities as recipients as well as contributors to public services. Key

informants were: Provincial Governor, Vice Provincial Governor, Deputy

Governor, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, Chief of Provincial Strategy

Group, Policy and Planning Officer, Heads of Provincial Departments,

Chairman and Vice Chairman Provincial Chamber of Commerce, Chairman of

the Federation of Thai Industries at Provincial Cluster, Provincial Tourism

Society, and farmers. Each interview took approximately 60-90 minutes.

However, during interviews the researcher had a chance to immediately

observe the work environment in the Provincial Governors’ Offices.

Staff of central ministries which have functional responsibilities for service

provision in the provinces were included as respondents, including OPM,BOB,

NESDB, OCSC and OPDC. Importantly, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) as the

parent ministry of provincial government with responsibility for the

appointment of Provincial Governors was included. This Ministry’s

responsibilities include maintaining public order, enhancing social justice,

promoting the development of politics and overviewing arrangements for

regional administration and local government. An interview was conducted

with the MOI’s Director of Research and Development Unit. Also, the Civil

Service Training Institute (CSTI) is responsible for research on human

resource development and civil service training and an interview with its

Director was conducted.

Secondary data sources

Documents used in this study included: the provincial PA and performance

reports; the OPDC performance evaluation and annual report on Public

Development; PDC meeting reports; complaints and comments posted on the

OPDC website (www.opdc.go.th); related ministries’ or departments’ annual

reports; research studies, and officers’ field notes.

28

Analysis of data

Analysis of the findings of the research was based on discourse analysis

which explores the way in which at the macroscopic level (the implementation

of the PMS in the Thai public sector) and in the microscopic perspective

(internal implementation of such system at the provincial administration) the

practices and the performance of the provinces are affected. Discourse

analysis is primarily concerned with all aspects of communication, including

‘its content, its author (who said it?), its authority (on what grounds?), its

audience (to whom?), its objectives (in order to achieve what?)’ (Potter and

Wetherell, 1994).

29

Research findings

The findings of the research are reported in relation to the stated objectives as

follows:

• What are the impacts of PMS on management capacity at the

provincial level?

• What are the factors enabling and inhibiting the enhancement of the

performance improvement and the creation of a self-sustaining

management capacity at the provincial level?

• To what extent does PMS enhance the capacity of provincial

government management to deliver services?

• What role is played by central organizations, such as the parent

ministries or departments, training institutes, and the Office of the

Public Sector Development Commission in supporting the development

of management capacity at provincial level?

What are the impacts of PMS on management capacity at the provincial level?

The study reveals that PMS contributes significantly to the development of

provincial vision and strategies with PAs and associated KPIs taking account

of national priorities and functional strategies derived from ministries and

departments, as well as issues raised by local citizens. Additionally, provincial

departments’ strategies are significantly aligned with provincial goals with

assigned responsibilities resulting in a sense of shared accountability.

However, respondents reported that PA targets considered too ambitious

provide a de-motivating effect and can lead to some KPIs being set at a sub-

optimum level knowing that there will be pressure to increase their substance

in subsequent years. Also, detected was a lack of ability to take goals forward

operationally in line with Bourgeois’s (1980: 227) claim that ‘agreement on

goals without agreement on means correlates with poor performance.’ This

reflects in some cases a lack of internal provincial process for identifying and

choosing means to attain targets. In this respect, Lumphun and Phayao

30

Provinces provide a unique example where there was a goal to increase

longan exports but how this was to be done eluded provincial staff. This was

eventually resolved by the Deputy Prime Minister overseeing these provinces

and actively playing a crucial role in leading the public and the private sectors

in detailed trade negotiations with China.

Importantly, it was found that the implementation of PMS introduced new roles

and responsibilities for Provincial Governors and created a shift in the working

culture from an administrative approach towards a managerial one. In all of

the provinces investigated, the Governors have become to varying degrees

strategic leaders managing provincial development plans and monitoring and

evaluating performance of PAs. Teamwork and participative government

administration have been stimulated to some extent in all of the provinces to

the benefit of citizens. Additionally, the study reveals that both executives and

subordinates value the advantages that PMS has brought to their work by an

increased ability to identify necessary actions and monitor results.

Provincial Governors to a significant extent have become role models in

continuous learning and improvement, in particular by focusing on group

processes to stimulate learning to address problem areas. Also, there is

encouragement to challenge existing practices, to make changes as

necessary and to seek collaboration from various local resources in achieving

outcomes. One example of how citizens have benefited from new thinking is

the creation of ‘one stop’ points of contact for members of the public with

several key service staff being present to deal with local issues at specified

times, sometimes on a mobile basis.

Overall, the research reveals that a PA serves as the focal point for learning

because it moulds a new administrative process that involves the creation of a

provincial vision and strategy, the identification of KPIs, the negotiation of

performance targets, the coordination of inter-sector activities, and the

evaluation of performance. Such activities create a stimulus for staff to

acquire new knowledge, techniques, and skills which to some extent are

addressed through training and development activities.

31

However, in the quest for PMS led revised working practices, it is apparent

that Governors are increasingly sensitive to the socio-emotional needs of

staff, including recognition of effective performance, acting on subordinates’

ideas and empathy for subordinates’ feelings. One result of this involvement is

Governor’s concerns about staff ill-health due to high stress and work

overload. For instance, in response to this situation in Samut Songkhram

Province sport events were organized which aimed at ice breaking, creating

teamwork and maintaining good health.

The research reveals crucially that Provincial Development Team members’

lengths of service in a province are important for the continuation of an

effective PMS. Reported experience reveals that relocation of team members

in the recent past has significantly disrupted PA implementation whose

success depends on the presence of a critical mass of experienced persons

who are assigned to design and deliver PA components, organize stakeholder

meetings, monitor performance and seek collaboration from the wider

community as necessary.

In addition, this study found that an important need in PMS implementation is

a relevant and integrated information system that supports strategic planning

and performance measurements. Significant improvement of performance is

possible if provincial information is systematically kept and shared among

provincial departments and the wider public. As a result of shared information,

terms and definitions are clarified and agreed for mutual utilization which is

crucial for report production given the varying formats required by central

agencies. Progress still has to be made on this aspect.

To what extent does PMS enhance the capacity of provincial government management to deliver services?

The study reveals the impact of PMS implementation on service provision in

many ways. First, service improvement is demonstrated because of cycle time

reduction and simpler work processes as a result of a special KPI designed

for this aspect. Also, the Quality Service Awards for Citizen Benefit, provides

32

a significant impetus to a province to improve services. Second, more

coordination of activities has resulted through the alignment of the work

schedules of provincial departments, particularly in the provision of a mobile

service to remote villages and communities. This achieves cost-effectiveness

for both the provincial departments and the citizens themselves in accessing

relevant officials on community issues which may be multi-dimensional in

nature. Third, the emergence of strengthened teamwork, coordination, and

collaboration has resulted in a more harmonious, friendly, and sharing work

atmosphere that is apparent to citizens in all the provinces studied. This offers

a new perspective in service delivery with PMS to some extent overcoming

the limitation of hierarchical structures faced by large organizations by better

coordination, control and sensitivity to client needs.

The findings suggest that the increasing involvement of the private sector,

academic institutes and citizens in provincial management and development

plans, together with the public sector support on community projects, creates

a sense of provincial ownership. Thus, it results in improved understanding

and relationships between the public sector and other sectors within the

province and empowers all to work towards provincial development goals.

Very importantly on the negative side the research reveals that the PA can

result in a neglect of tasks not formally included in it but thought by many

provincial stakeholders to be important. The possibility here is that while

centrally defined functions and goals may be well served through PMS, local

service needs may go unrecognized or be poorly supported because of lack

of resource allocation. Locally induced service provision is an important

consideration as each province is different in terms of citizens’ needs,

economic resource potential and cultural endowments. However, the very

nature of the PMS experience may over time induce the inclusion of local

needs through increased managerial awareness of how resources can be

brought together to achieve development targets in a self sustaining manner.

33

What role is played by central organizations, such as the parent ministries or departments, training institutes and the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission, in supporting the development of management capacity at the provincial level?

The study reveals that PMS is firmly rooted in the policies initiated by the

Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers as agreed by Parliament and

translated into the State Administration Plan which identifies desired goals

and achievements. This four year Plan is cascaded to ministries,

departments, and provinces who then develop their own aligned strategic

plans and annual operational targets. A Deputy Prime Minister, appointed by

the Prime Minister, oversees a group of provinces and supports Governors in

the quest to deliver the agreed development targets. The research establishes

that this process is now well embedded with each province having a well

defined PA stating its service and development intentions, performance

targets, and associated measures. Furthermore, the study illustrates that

activities related to the PA receive a significant degree of priority in ministries’

budgets resources and that key Government priorities are being enacted at

provincial level, such as those on natural and environmental conservation,

drug eradication and energy efficiency.

However, the research shows that while the PMS aims to gather central

agencies together in support of the emergent CEO roles of Provincial

Governors, there is limited coordination and cooperation to do this. Each

ministry to a significant extent pays attention only to its functional

responsibilities with a limited view of holistic provincial development and the

challenge of providing multi-dimensional services in support of the well being

of the citizens. The evidence can be seen in the deviation in terminology used

for the same service items and the multiple report production for different

agencies utilizing the same base information. These findings are not

surprising with central administration reflecting the common public agencies’

characteristics of hierarchy, bureaucracy, red tape, and rigidity (Wilson, 1989;

Dahl and Lindblom, 1976; Downs, 1967; Warwick et al., 1978). The normal

working culture of government departments and the political importance of

different functions to a significant degree remain the same as in pre PMS

34

times. Procedures are highly formalized which Mintzberg (1979) refers to as

‘machine bureaucracy’, with formal legislation playing an important role in

governing public administration (Gray, 1994; Banfield, 1975).

What are the factors enabling and inhibiting the enhancement of the performance improvement and the creation of a self-sustaining management capacity at provincial level?

Enabling factors

Knowledge Support for PMS

Central agencies provide development support on PMS implementation and

on defining roles and responsibilities in provincial administration through

seminars, workshops, road shows, manuals, teleconferences, on-line training,

on-line information and e-programs designed for reporting. Academic

institutes provide research outputs that not only build an understanding of the

philosophy, concepts and procedures in PMS, but also inform graduates who

plan to enter the public service.

Participation of the private sector

Respondents from the private sector reported that they are honoured to be

appointed as Provincial Management Committee members and support policy

implementation.

Participation of the private sector

Respondents from the private sector reported that they are honoured to be

appointed as Provincial Management Committee members and support policy

implementation.

The PA and continuity of action

The research found that the PA helps during a Provincial Governor’s transition

period after appointment into office in terms of continuity of directions and

targets agreed for the current plan period. As such the PA reduces any self-

35

motivated agenda that a Provincial Governor may bring which could result in

interruption or discontinuation of ongoing activities.

Teamwork and a sense of ownership

The PM processes require joint effort in order to fulfill requirements resulting

in a sense of ownership being built based on teamwork within and across the

provincial departments and such cooperation results in a growing intrinsic

value being attached to the workplace.

Active learning environment

The PMS implementation involves several new concepts and procedures

requiring an active learning environment and the research reveals that

increasingly Provincial Governors encourage this. Apart from formal training

provision they actively organize events that promote the sharing of knowledge

and experience, such as ‘Coffee Forums’.

Building an information system

Provinces reported they are in the process of collecting and restoring data in a

more systematic and integrated manner for PMS through database

development. As such databases are updated and shared, terminologies

identified and agreed for mutual utilization and responsibilities for data

recording and maintaining assigned.

Inhibiting factors

Instability in government processes

While strong support from the government has enabled PMS implementation,

changes at the political level can, on the other hand, jeopardize the system

and disrupt continuous improvement in provincial administration.

Unfortunately, the current study reveals a recent dilution of government

support in terms of PMS implementation has resulted in uncertainties on the

future of strategically driven provincial development plans.

36

Too much reliance on the PA

While strategic thinking at provincial level has been enhanced as a result of

PMS, this study reveals that attention can be drawn unduly towards the

execution of the PA which generally covers only a portion of the roles and

responsibilities of provincial administration. Moreover, the provincial strategy

and the PA are based heavily on economic aspects and can pay limited

attention to social ones. As a consequence, what is being measured in the PA

receives attention leaving other essential provincial roles and responsibilities

with less.

Time lags in legal support

The study reveals that PMS implementation in provinces is heavily influenced

by legislative requirements related to the emergent role of the Provincial

Governor as CEO, budget preparation and the management of human

resources. However, the demands on management decision making inspired

by PA implementation may outpace available legal rights, which crucially puts

Provincial Governors in jeopardy, being unaware of potential misconduct as

judged under current legal requirements. Additionally, as legislation changes,

the Provincial Governors reported the need for legal personnel working in the

provinces to provide advice as legislation is often difficult to comprehend and

incorporate, which potentially constrains leadership in service improvement

and innovation.

Personnel issues

It was found that there are several personnel related issues which inhibit PMS

implementation. First, while the emergent learning culture has stimulated the

development of new capabilities there is still a deficit in required knowledge

and skills if PM is to be effective, particularly those related to analysis and

planning. Second, frequent relocation of senior staff causes a degree of work

system disruption and possible discontinuation of some important activities,

because ministry driven relocation usually happens quickly and a province

has little chance in preparing for this. Third, a significant number of staff in key

areas at provincial level suffer work overload, in spite of some efforts to

alleviate this. Finally, limited opportunities to participate in training and

37

workshops organized by central agencies result in staff not being prepared

appropriately to cope with changes. It should be noted, however, in this

respect that there is evidence that the more educated staff members do

understand the demands of PM requirements and are more capable of

adapting to changes.

Budget management and integration

This study reveals that a lack of capacity to fully prepare and manage

provincial budgets has a significant impact on management capability

because each province still relies on budget components emanating from

several ministries, which according to sector allocations may not fully support

PA service provision. While this situation has eased since 2009 with a

province having the authority to prepare its own budget, the supporting

processes are complicated because they involve terminologies and guidelines

which provincial staff find difficult to comprehend and sometimes deadlines for

procedure completion which are difficult to meet.

The missing link with the local administration

While the provincial vision and strategy are linked with those at the national

and ministerial levels, the coordination with local administrations has largely

been ignored. Although representatives from local administrations are

appointed to a Provincial Management Committee, it does not guarantee that

local development strategies are aligned and linked to those at the higher

level which may result in government policy not being fully effective at

grassroots level.

The dis-incentive of incentive schemes

When the incentives for top executives are compared with those for other

senior staff members it is seen that the amounts allocated are markedly

different even though they rely on the same provincial performance scoring.

The incentive schemes for various reasons act in an uneven manner with

some negative consequences in the quest for improved performance. First,

the incentives for different groups can be based on different philosophies and

purposes which potentially undermine the equitable and fair intentions implied

38

in PMS implementation. Second, the incentive scheme for local administration

is perceived as relatively easy to access on favourable terms when compared

to the ones available for the province. Third, monetary incentive results in

system distortion because more attention is paid to activities that potentially

lead to a high performance score in order to secure a monetary allocation.

Fourth, the provincial incentive distribution criteria are tightly linked with the

PA meaning that eligible provincial departments and individuals are limited to

those playing a significant part in the PA which can cover only a proportion of

total provincial roles and responsibilities. Next, misunderstanding of the

incentive scheme occurs due to it being referred to as a ‘bonus’ providing a

sense of required equal distribution to all staff members which distorts the

original intention. Perceived as a ‘bonus’, it suggests that the government

agencies are making a profit for distribution like a business when in fact sums

for the scheme are limited and involve the use of taxpayers’ money.

Moreover, there is a possibility that the incentive scheme in its current form

can destroy civil servants’ pride in serving the King as it creates greediness,

undue competition, and selfishness. The key question is how far should

monetary incentives be balanced against the intrinsic rewards of public

service contribution. It may possibly not be worth distorting important PM

benefits by continuing with incentive schemes in their current form.

39

Conclusions

This research offers empirical evidence of the effect of PMS implementation

at the provincial level in Thailand, which is a topic that has been previously

under-researched. A conceptual framework, shown in Figure 7, derived from

the findings provides a systems view of PMS and the potential points of

capacity impact on provincial administration, and can act as a guide to

methodologies to be incorporated in further studies in the area. More

importantly, this study revealed the challenges regarding PMS implementation

and crucially notes concerns raised by provincial staff on the need for

additional guidance and support from central agencies.

An important finding of this study is that while much progress has been made

more time is necessary for PMS to fully embed itself in provincial

administration given that some staff still have a limited understanding of its

concepts and philosophy, practices and associated learning needs. Additional

support is therefore necessary to promote PMS values and the necessary

change behaviors, otherwise performance improvement may only occur at a

superficial level with the potential for the system being distorted from its due

intentions and possibly misused. Furthermore, this study suggests that linking

and cascading the PA from the provincial level down to departments and

individuals levels requires more attention in terms of coordination with

budgets. Finally, urgent consideration needs to be given to the termination or

amendment of the incentive schemes as applied at provincial level.

40

Figure 0. The conceptual framework of the implications of PMS

implementation

Limitation of the research

The results discussed have to take account the limitations of the research.

First, although the study explores the implications of PMS implementation at

provincial level between 2002 and 2008, it is not based on longitudinal

research. To obtain information over this period respondents were asked to

recall their prior experiences which are subject to memory distortion. Also, the

prime researcher is a staff member of the OPDC which is the major central

agency responsible for PMS design and PA coordination as well as the

implementation of the incentive schemes. In this respect, the researcher was

fully aware that interviewee answers could be favourable to the OPDC’s

interests. However, being an OPDC staff member, on the other hand,

provided advantages in obtaining access to relevant sources of information.

A. Establishing priorities, rolesand implementationprocesses

B. Deploying resources(implementation)

C. Evaluating andunderstandingconsequences/ impacts

D. Adjustment ofapproaches duringcurrent phrase

E. PerformanceAgreementReview

• Establishing criteria measurements for success• Negotiation of practices within PA limits• Joint policy development/ strategizing• Sense of accountability• Shared understanding of direction and responsibility• Leadership development• Team/ group building• Joined up administration• Effective and continuous Communication

• Project/ programme management skills• Solving problems• Applying criteria for efficiency, and value for money• Managing people’s skills• Managing relationship with stakeholders• Handling cultural conflicts

• Data review• Reflection• Individual/ group evaluation procedures (building learning capacity)

• Designing strategies for organizational changes• Mediation• Building sustainability mechanisms

Locally derivedstrategies

• Local political• Leadership/Stakeholders

Central agencies/Parent ministryderived strategies

• Review and feedback• Gap Analysis• Target setting• Negotiation• Managing IT system• Enhanced managerial capacity

• National agenda• Government policies

41

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Appendix. Interview Guide

1.1 Provinces

Having reviewed the significant literature on PM and the PMS in the Thai

public sector, the study diagram, shown in Figure 1, was created as a basis

for constructing potential interview questions for respondents in the provinces.

Figure 1. The study diagram

Identified interview questions for each stage of the study diagram are the

following:

1. Action on specific projects/programs

1.1 For projects/ programs currently implemented

• What did you do when a new initiative was imposed? Who was

involved? Who managed? How was a working team recruited? How did

Procedures vs.FundamentalImpact

Agencies/ personnelInvolved at different stages

Actions on specificprojects/ programs

(how data generatedon performance)

Review ofPerformance

Formal Informal

Theories on how thingsshould be done differently

for projects/ programs(required learning initiatives)

Performance Agreement

Management Structures/Roles/ Responsibilities

at provincial level (to build capacity PA

implementation)

Reviewof InternalLearningCapacity

Building Capacityof provincial administration

(specific decisions on managementInfrastructure including initiativesfor learning and development)

Theorizingon

How To Improve

Commitmentto learninginitiatives

IdentifyingThe RequiredInitiatives to

Improve

enablers/constraints

1

2

3

4

7

6

5

48

you set up the system (i.e. communication, coordination, cooperation,

collaboration, reporting, implementation, etc.) for that new initiative?

• Did you develop a network or seek help, support, and involvement from

others? From whom? How? Why seek help, support, and involvement

from those people? (i.e. central agencies, NGOs, communities, local

administration, public/private/business , educational institutes, experts,

consultants, etc.)

• What do you feel about the demands made on you and what is your

response?

• Do you think you have appropriate skills and knowledge to complete

the job? How do you apply your current knowledge and experience to

do the job? What skills or knowledge do you need for delivering a

better job?

• What support did you need and what support did you get?

• What factors/conditions support/constrain the success of the

implementation of the current project/program?

• What changes would you suggest for this current project/program?

Why? And how (if possible)?

• What did you learn from the previous project/program which you would

like to use for the future project/program? What support do you need

(i.e. training, academic support, etc.)?

1.2 For future project/program

• If a new initiative is imposed today, how would you set up the system

necessary for its planning, implementation and monitoring? What

would you do differently from the implementation of a previous

project/program?

• What support do you need (i.e. tools and equipment, consultation,

training/learning needs, infrastructure, etc.)?

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2. Review of performance (formal & informal)

How is the project/program monitored/ reported/ evaluated/ reviewed? By

whom? To whom? When? How often? How is data recorded and

communicated?

• How is performance data used (i.e. link with training and development,

promotion, reward system, etc.)?

• How is feedback given? By whom? To Whom? When? How often?

What response?

• What do you think of the current performance of the project/program?

Why?

• When reviewing performance, what issues were usually discussed (i.e.

target achievement, difficulties/success, who is responsible for not

meeting the target, training and development/learning needs, etc.)?

3. Theories on how things should be done differently for projects/programs

• What do you think about how the project/program should be operated?

Why?

• What would you like to do differently?

• What did you conceptualize about the project/program?

• How would you define performance management?

4. Performance agreement (PA)

• What benefits do you think the PA bring to your organization? And

what are the losses/ disadvantages?

• What benefits do you think the PA should bring to your organization?

Do the PA deliver what you expect from them? Why and why not? To

meet your expectation, what would you like to change, and what do

you need?

• Do you link results from the PA with other processes (i.e. training and

development, promotion, budget allocation, incentive allocation, etc.)?

• What do you feel about the demands made on you and what is your

response?

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• Do you think you have appropriate skills and knowledge to complete

the job? How do you apply your current knowledge and experience to

do the job? What skills or knowledge do you need for delivering a

better job?

• Does the previous PA influence (or has an impact on) the current PA?

In what ways: areas/issues? How and why?

• How information in regard to PAs is generated/ communicated?

• Do you observe any differences/changes from one PA cycle to the

next? What do you think were reasons for those changes? Why? How

are decisions to change made?

• For executives: What do you learn from signing on/ being attached to

the PA requirements? Did signing a PA make you do something

differently? What was that? Why? How? Do you feel you are committed

to meet the PA requirement? Why? How do you cascade performance

targets? What do you need to achieve the PA requirements?

• For staff: What do you learn from being attached to the PA

requirements? Did a PA make you do something differently? What was

that? Why? How? Do you feel you are committed to meet the PA

requirement? Why? What do you need to achieve the PA

requirements?

5. Management structures/ roles/ responsibilities at provincial level

• How do you manage requirements from your parent

ministry/department and those at the provincial level? What support do

you get? What support do you need?

• How do you recruit individuals from different departments (i.e. selection

criteria, working system, etc.)?

• How is a working team (PD team) able to achieve collaboration/

cooperation/ coordination/ communication within itself and among

departments within the province?

• At provincial level, what support do you need for better service delivery/

PA accomplishment (i.e. infrastructure, management, etc.)?

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• For provincial governor: what roles do you play in delivering

performance based on the PA?

• For head of department within the province: what roles do you play in

delivering performance based on the PA? What is your response on

assigned performance targets based on the provincial PA? Did the

assigned provincial performance targets have an impact on

performance based on the chain of command or daily service delivery?

Or vice versa?

• What roles can be played by each target group in order to support PA

accomplishment at the provincial level?

6. Review of internal learning capacity

• How are learning needs identified? And how are those needs fulfilled?

• What learning activities can you observe? How do they happen? Who

is involved?

• How are learning activities proposed/ supported? By whom?

• What are the factors/conditions that influence/support/constrain

learning?

7. Building capacity of provincial administration

• What strengths do you think you have (at provincial level, departmental

level, team level, and individual level)?

• How are learning activities (at individual, team, and organization level)

supported?

• For better service delivery, what skills do you need?

1.2 Central agencies

The main questions for all central agencies are:

• How do you connect with what happens in the implementation of

PMS/PA with learning and development?

• Do you observe any differences/changes from one PA cycle to the

next? What reasons do you think are behind those changes? Why?

How was the decision to change made?

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1.2.1 The Bureau of the Budget (BOB)

(as a central agency who allocates budget, a member of the committee who

negotiates performance targets in the PA)

• How budget is allocated to the province?

• How the Bureau supports the implementation of PMS/PA at the

provincial level?

• What would you do differently in budget allocation?

1.2.2 Office of Civil Service Commission (OCSC)

(as a central agency who is responsible for personnel management)

• How does OCSC support the implementation of PMS at the provincial

level?

• What kind of provincial requests for support from OCSC are made?

• What changes have been made internally in OCSC in order to handle

the needs from the provinces?

1.2.3 Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board

(NESDB)

(as a central agency who develops regional agenda, a member of the

committee who negotiates performance targets in the PA)

• How do you develop the regional agenda?

• How do you support the implementation of the regional agenda?

• What would you do differently in developing and supporting provinces

in the implementation of regional agenda?

1.2.4 Office of the Prime Minister (OPM)

Inspectors-General who works as a secretariat to the Deputy Prime Minister in

strategic development and deployment, and negotiates performance targets

at the provincial level

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• How strategy at provincial level is developed/ agreed?

• How do you use information generated by PMS/PA?

• How would you support the learning environment at provincial level?

• What do you feel about the demands made on you and what is your

response? What skills do you need?

• What would you do when revising next year’s provincial strategy?

1.2.5 Ministry of Interior (MOI)

Bureau of Provincial Administration Development and Promotion, Office of the

Permanent Secretary

as parent ministry/ department to which provincial governors are attached

• How do you support the implementation of PMS at the provincial level?

• How do you use information generated by PMS/PA?

• How are performance targets cascaded to provinces? Who is involved

in decision making?

• How is performance at provincial level reported to department/

ministry? What are your responses? How do you use that information?

• From a performance report, can you identify further skills and learning

needs at provincial level?

1.2.6 Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC)

as a central agency which imposes, gives supervision on, governs and

evaluates the PMS/PA

• How is a PA framework developed (or revised)?

• How do you obtain involvement from other agencies as one of the

performance indicators’ owners?

• How are performance targets made?

• What support do you give to potential provincial governors?

• How do you communicate?

• What are the learning needs at the provincial level? How they are

assessed?

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• What issues are discussed?

• How do you achieve coordination and collaboration with

i. other central agencies

ii. ministries/ departments

iii. provinces

• How do you use information generated by the PMS/PA?

• How do you support the learning environment?

• What do you feel about the demands made on you and what is your

response? What skills do you need?

• In revising a PA framework for the next fiscal year, what would you do

differently?

• If there is a new requirement to be imposed, how do you make decision

whether to add in PA or not? If yes, how do you communicate this

requirement and change?

1.3 Training and development institutes

There are two training and development institutes subject to be involved in

this study. Firstly, Prince Damrong Rajanubhab Institute of Research and

Development (PDRI), Ministry of Interior, as the parent ministry responsible

for research and development related to the ministry’s work system, such as

with human resource planning and development, and knowledge

management. Secondly, the Civil Service Training Institute, Office of Civil

Service Commission as a central agency responsible for civil service training.

Potential interview questions include:

• What is taught in the classroom?

• What are learning needs?

• What issues are discussed? How they are assessed?

• What support do you give to potential provincial governors?

• How is experience shared/ discussed?

• What is done in the classroom to support learning?

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• How do you connect with what happens in the implementation of the

PMS/PA with learning and development?

• Do you observe any differences/changes from one PA cycle to the

next? What reasons do you think are behind those changes? Why?

How are the decision to change made?