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    Electoral Polit ics in Post -Conflict States: The Case of Punj ab

    Neera Chandhoke and Praveen Priyadarshi

    Introduction

    A study of the patterns of electoral mobi l isat ion in Punjab in the 1990s and in the f i rst yearsof the twenty f i rst century is, we consider, important for two reasons. I t helps us tounderstand the dynamics of state pol i t ics in India, and i t helps to throw l ight on a rathersignif icant research q uest ion: what does electoral pol i t ics in post-confl ict societ ies look l ike?The question is of som e import considering that normalcy was rest ored t o the st ate without a single demand of t he Anandpur Sahib Resolut ion being m et. That is t he Akal i Dal,w hich hadset out t o confront the cent ral government in and thr ough t he adopt ion of t he Resolut ion, hadnot achieved any of the object ives laid out in the resolut ion, least of al l the object ive ofrecast ing centr e-state r elat ions1. In eff ect, the Resolut ion w hich inaugurated t he centre-stateconfl ict in the late 1970s, and which gave an ini t ial boost to mil i tancy, may wel l never have

    happened. On the other hand, the Congress which control led the central government formuch of the period of mil i tancy was largely identi f ied as the very party that had sanctionedthe use of massive force to suppress militancy. It was also identif ied in the popular eye as theparty whose leaders had directed the anti-Sikh pogrom in Delhi after the assassination of P.MIndira Gandhi in 1984. But in 1992 this very Congress had to face the electorate of Punjab asan aspirant for power.

    It is also a fact that a substantial section of opinion in the state holds polit ical parties asresponsible f or visi t ing violence on the heads of Punjabi s in the f i rst inst ance. According tot he f indings of our survey which was conducted earl i er t his year in Amrit sar distri ct of Punj ab,26percent of t he respondents feel that pol i t ical part ies were responsible in some way or t heother for the outbreak of confl ict . 86 percent of the respondents who blamed pol i t ical part ies

    opined that the conflict was due to the fact that no party ever addressed the issue of basicneeds, and 43.5 percent bel ieved that the outbreak of the confl ict had a lot to do with thesepart ies being corrupt2.

    Both part ies had t herefore t o reinvent agendas, recast t heir im ages, and re-seek legit im acy i fthey w ished t o win the elect ions. Expectedly bot h t he AD and the Congress were t o resort t othe pol i t ical ly vague and amorphous rhetoric of peace, f ight ing corruption, and heal inghearts and minds. For aft er al l a st ate and a people that had been torn asunder under theonslaught of mil i tants as wel l as the onslaught of the securi ty forces; a state and a peoplet hat had been l iving under the shadow of t he gun for over t welve years, had to be coaxed into

    1 Since successive government s in t he centre paid l i t t l e heed to t he core demand of the Resolut ion, a

    th ird force had erupted in the state by the late 1970s. This th ird force was const i tuted by themi l i tan ts . The mi l i tan ts faced by a reca lc i t ran t cen t ra l government on the one hand, and a po l i t ica lpar t y t ha t seemed incapab le o f sa feguard ing the au tonomy o f t he sta t e on the o t her , t u rned the i r backupon democrat ic inst i tut ions and resorted to the use of the gun. From 1980 to 1992 Punjab waswracked by v io lence, suspension o f normal democra t i c act iv i t y , and suppression o f dem ocra t ic r igh ts .Mil i tancy was to lead to the assassinat ion of one Prime Minister and the ant i-Sikh r iots which fo l lowedthe assassinat ion were to lead to thousands of deaths of innocent Sikhs. The r iots a lso renderedthousand of Sikhs shelter less as their homes and their propert ies were burnt by marauding hordes inNovember 1984.

    2 Pre l im inary Data Find ings o f t he p ro j ect Conf l ic t and Inst i t u t iona l Change in India conducted byresearch scholars of dcrc f or t he Cri sis St ates Programm e. Amr it sar was categorized by t he Governmentof India as the h ighest conf l ict area in the state.

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    accepting the two part ies as legit imate. Since both the AD and the Congress were pre-occupied with their respective quests for legitimacy, it is not surprising that crucial issueswhich had begun to impact the lives of the people by the beginning of the decade of the

    1990s were put onto the back burner of pol i t ical agendas. The foremost issue-that of theagrarian crisis which threatened to disrupt l ives and livelihoods and which continues to do so-was simply not addressed in any of the three elect ions that fol lowed the containment ofmilitancy in the state in 1992, 1997, and 2002.

    Certainly formal democratic polit ics is not enough to ensure that governments will address ornegotiate pressing polit ical, economic, and social problems. Any government, howsoeverdemocratic be the ways in which it has been elected into power, has to be pressurised intodoing so by groups in civil society. But the peasant movement in Punjab beset as it is by itsown contradictions and weaknesses has simply failed to represent the needs of the peasantry.Neither has i t been able to ensure the production of appropriate pol icies that might serve toresolve t he problem.

    In short, the agrarian crisis has neither been ref lected in nor set the terms of debate for

    electoral and pol i t ical processes in the state. Resultant ly, we f ind a marked dissonancebetween pol i t ical economy and pol i t ical processes in Punjab, with the former hardlyinfluencing the latter. This is somewhat worrying because since the 1990s it has become cleart hat agricult ure, which i s t he mainst ay of t he Punj ab economy, is in serious t rouble. And thepredicament of the agrarian sector continues to mount even as the main pol i t ical part ies inthe state continue t o talk past the needs of t he rural populat ion.

    This essay maps out the disjunct ion between the pol i t ical economy of a state which at onepoint of t ime was touted as a model for the rest of the country; and pol i t ical and electoralprocess. The argument proceeds in three sections: in the first part it explores the dynamics of

    the agrarian crisis of the state, in the second part we examine the main issues that formedt he core of electoral m obi l isat ion, and in t he thir d sect ion w e suggest t hat t he answer t o thequestion of why there is a disjunct ion between pol i t ical economy and electoral pol i t ics inPunjab, can be found both in the weakness of party polit ics and in the weakness of thepeasant m ovement in t he st ate.

    IThe Poli t ical Economy of Punjab

    That the technologies of the green revolut ion had sparked off robust agricultural growth inPunjab is more than clear when we consider that mil i tancy hardly affected agriculturalproduction in the state. During the highest phase of militancy that is from 1980 to 1992, wedo not f ind any negative correlat ion between confl ict and agricultural performance3. Amritsarand Gurdaspur in the Majha region, Ludhiana in the Malwa region, and Jullunder in the Doabaregion al l of which were high confl ict areas, actual ly performed better than low confl ictareas4. For instance paddy production in Amritsar which was categorised as the highest

    3 Mil i tancy adverse ly a f f ected r ea l esta t e and t he serv ice sector to some ext en t .4 Our pro ject Conf l ic t and Inst i tu t iona l Change in Ind ia mapped ou t h igh conf l ic t a reas and low

    conf l ic t a reas in the s ta te f rom 1980-1994 on the bas is o f th ree ind ica to rs in the Cr ime Repor tSta t ist i cs pub l ished by the Government o f India - murders, k idnapp ings, and r io ts . The t h ree cr i t e r iawere chosen as the basis of ident i f icat ion for one main reason. Al l cases of terror ism dur ing theconf l ict were f i led under three categories of murders, kidnappings, and r iots. There is no separateca tegory fo r te r r o r ist ac ts in the records. Th is is cor robora ted by our f ind ing tha t the inc idence o fmurders, kidnappings and r iots went up phenomenally dur ing the phase of the conf l ict . The high

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    confl ict area in the state was lower to that of a low confl ict district l ike Patiala in 1980, 615metr ic tonnes per annum f or t he former and 793 metr ic t onnes per annum f or t he lat t er. By1995 paddy product ion in Amri t sar had increased compared t o Pati ala, t he f i gure being 1381

    metr ic tonnes per annum for the former and 1224 metr ic tonnes per annum for the lat ter.Similarly, wheat production in Amritsar district was 821 metric tones in 1980, compared toPatiala w hich produced 867 metri c t ones of w heat. But by 1995 the r elevant f igures are 1476for Punj ab and 1075 for Patiala 5.

    It is because of this robust agricultural growth which was sparked off in the second half of the1960s that Punjab came to be generally seen as a model state, as the granary of India, and asthe locus of individual entrepreneurship, sheer gri t and fort i tude. This is more thanremarkable when we recol lect that the part i t ion of Punjab in 1947 had irremediably scarredcollective life in the region. The entire Hindu and Sikh population migrated from West to EastPunjab, and almost the entire Musl im community migrated to West Punjab amidst intensecommunal stri fe, riot ing, and widespread ki l l ings. I t is est imated that about three hundred

    thousand people were ki l led even as 8.6 mil l i on people migrated fr om one part of t he regionto another. Moreover, since 70 percent of t he rich agricult ural economy of t he canal colonies

    was transferred to Pakistan, Indian Punjab was turned into a food-deficit province. And asHindus and the Sikhs returned to East Punjab from where they had migrated to the canalcolonies in the latter half of the nineteenth century, population pressures on the land soared.

    However, by the 1950s, agricultural production in Punjab had revived largely as a result ofthe adoption of rather prudent pol icies of land reform, compensation for property left behindin West Punjab, land consol idat ion and land cei l ing. But i t was the introduction of thepackage of high yielding variety of seeds, i rrigat ion, fert i l iser, and pesticides that generatedan agrarian revolut ion, the l ikes of which were just not seen in the rest of the country. By1997 the stat e had achieved an irrigat ion cover of 94 percent of t he cropped area, a cropping

    int ensit y of 186 percent as compared to 133 percent in t he rest of t he countr y, and 98percent HYV coverage which is highest among the Indian states. Agriculture in Punjab is ahighly capital intensive and mechanized enterprise, with the state possessing 9.35,000energised tube wel ls and 9.35 lakh tractors or 18 percent of total number of tractors in thecountry6. In fact every third farming household in the state owns a tractor. The consumptionof electrici ty in the state is the highest in the country, and the consumption of fert i l izer inPunjab is 184 kg per hectare compared to an average of 70 kilogram per hectare in otherstat es. The st ate t ops the countr y in t erms of per capita m ilk consumpt ion and incidental ly inl iquor consumpt ion as wel l . The output of f ood grains rose almost four t imes in threedecades- fr om 73 lakh t ones in 1970- 71 to 253 lakh ton es in 1999- 2000. The area under wheatincreased 2.1 t imes and production of wheat increased 6.3 t imes in the period 1966-67 to2000-01. The area under rice increased in the same period seven t imes, and rice yields

    increased t wo t imes from 1970-71 t o 2000-017

    .Today the state produces over eight tonnes perhectare of wheat and r ice8. In 2004 Punj ab contri but ed 40 percent of w heat and 60 percent of

    conf l ict areas were Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Ludhiana, Jul lunder, Ferozepur, Sangrur in only 1992. Lowconf l ict areas wer e Sangrur except 1992, Kapurt hala, Roper, Hoshiarpur, Mansa, and Pat ia la.

    5 These stat ist ics have been generated by our project

    6Punj ab Development Report 2004, Planning Commission, Delh i, Government of India, chapter 4,henceforth PDR.

    7PDR, pp 12-258 ib id, pg v

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    rice to the central pool 9 and produced a surplus of cotton and sugarcane. It is this that hasgiven Punjab t he stat us of t he bread basket of t he countr y.

    More importantly, the green revolut ion dramatical ly transformed l ives and l ivel ihoods in thest ate, because i t ensured t hat Punjab became one of t he most aff l uent st ates in t he countr y.Right up to the end of the 1990s Punjab has been ranked first among all the states in terms ofper capit a income. In 1966-67 per capit a income in t he st ate w as Rs, 1791, in 1976-7 i t rose t oRs 2388, to further rise to Rs 3302 in 1986-7 and to Rs 3750 in 1989-90. After 1990 whenl iberal isat ion w as int roduced in India, Maharashtr a and Guj arat overtook t he st ate i n t erms ofper capita income. The rate of growth of per capita income in Punjab in the decade of the1990s was 2.8 percent per annum compared to 7.6 percent per annum for Gujarat, and 6.1percent per annum in Maharasht ra. But even though Punj ab s st atus in per capita incomewent down t o fourt h rank in t h is period, i t s per capi ta income remains one of the highest inthe country standing at Rs 4791 in 2000-0110 . At p resent only t wo st ates- Goa and J and K- havepoverty levels lower than that of Punjab, only about 6 percent of the rural and urban

    population is below the poverty l ine, and life expectancy in the state is the second highest inthe countr y that is aft er Kerala for both men and women11.

    But it is also true that Punjab is characterised by severe regional inbalances both in terms ofeconomic growth and in terms of human development indicators. In Mansa district of SouthPunjab the l i teracy level is only sl ight ly higher than that of Bihar, and infant mortal i ty in thedistrict is comparable to Rajasthan. Human development indicators are worrying in otherfields as well. A food surplus state l ike Punjab has large numbers of anaemic children, ashocking rate of female foet icide result ing in a gender rat io which is far lower than that ofthe rest of country- 793 females per 1000 males, and a high rate of unemployment amongeducated youth. The Scheduled Castes are worse off. Female literacy is only 31 percentamong the SCs, and very few of this community own land. Though the SCs comprise 28

    percent of t he populat ion in t he st ate, t hey only hold one tent h of t he land.

    By the 1980s the green revolut ion had run i ts course and Punjab agriculture entered into astructural crisis. This has resulted in heightened rates of out-migrat ion, farmers suicides,high rates of indebtedness, and an ecological crisis of considerable magnitude. The questionis: how did this sorry state of affairs come to pass? For in the first phase of the greenrevolut ion from 1965-66 to 1975-76, economic growth in Punjab outpaced that of the rest ofthe country. The economy grew at the rate of 4.8 percent per year compared to the 3.5percent per year growth rate of t he national economy. In t he second phase t hat i s fr om 1980-81 to 1990-91, Punj ab s economy grew at 5.3 percent, but t he national economy grew in t hesame period at 5.5 percent per annum. And the neighbouring states of Haryana and Rajasthangrew at 6.4 percent and 6.6 percent per annum respectively. In the third phase that is from

    1991-97, t he economy of Punj ab began to s low down wi t h t he rate of growth r educed t o 4.1percent per annum at a t ime when the economy of Gujarat was growing at 9.6 percent per

    9 ib id , pg 110 ib id, pg 58211 See F James Levinson, Suchet a Mehra, Dorot hy Levinson, Anit a Kumari Chauhan, Ast er M Alm edom,203, Nutr i t ional Well-Being and Gender Dif ferences: Af ter 30 Years of Rapid Growth in Rural PunjabEconomic and Poli t ical Weekl y, August 9- 15, vol xxxvi i i , no 32, pp 3340-3341. However Punjab lagsbehind Kerala, Maharastra, and West Bengal in l i t eracy, and lags behind t he rest of t he countr y ingender rat ios.

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    year, that of Maharashtra by 8 percent per year, and that of the country 6.89 per annum 12.The agricultural sector in Punjab was greatly hit and agricultural growth decl ined from 5.15percent per year in the decade of the 1980s to 2.16 percent per annum in the period 1991-98.

    If we further segregate the agricultural sector into agriculture and l ivestock, agriculturerecorded a minimal growth rate of 0.37 percent per annum in 1991-1998. This comparesunfavourably to the growth rate of 4.87 percent per annum in the 1980s. Over the years theshare of the agricultural sector in the State Domestic Product has declined from 52.85percent in 1966-67 to 41.33 percent in 1998-9913.

    Several reasons can be identi f ied for t he crisis in Punj ab agricult ure of w hich the main are t hefol lowing.First ly, i t is undeniable that t he green revolut i on had a profoundly uneven impact on dif ferentcategories of farms. Unl ike many other states in India Punjab is not known for very largelandholdings, and i t is dominated by medium and large landholdings. Medium and largelandholdings proved especially profitable for the use of new technology. On the other hand,

    marginal and small l andholding do not per mit t he optim al use of t he technologies of t he greenrevolution, and marginal and small farmers do not possess the resources to buy the package

    of high yielding varieties of seeds, chemical ferti l isers, tractors and combines. Resultantly thef ir st post -green revolut ion phase f rom 1965-66 to 1980 saw a shrinking of m arginal and smalllandholdings and a small increase in the size of large landholdings. With the creation of amarket in land, and the generat ion of employment on land based act ivi t ies, marginal andsmall farmers had the incentive to either sell their land or lease it out to medium and largefarmers14 .

    However from 1980 onwards prof i tabi l i ty in agriculture began to fal l , and l imited thereby thegrowth of employment opportunit ies. Even as t he absolute number of l andholdings increased,the average size of landholdings contracted from 4.07 ha in 80-81 to 3.61 ha in 1990-91. All

    except small farmers registered a decl ine in the average size of their land holdings but thenumber of m arginal farm ers increased by 50 percent in t he period 1980-81 to 1990-91, whi letheir operating land base during the same period increased from a total of 1.26.000 ha to1.64.000 ha; an in crease of 30 percent . Small far ms also incr eased because of t he subdivi sionof f arm land under laws of inheri tance15 .

    In the t hird phase t hat i s fr om t he 1990s onwards, t hese developments were sl ight l y arrestedwith data from the agricultural census 1995-96 showing that except for marginal and smallfarm s, t he average holding size impr oved to nearly 3.80 ha. But t his is st i l l considerably bel owthe level of 1980-8116 . In general the average size of landholdings has over the yearscontracted17. Fragmentation of land holdings not only ensured that the advantages of newtechnology could not be ful ly ut i l ised, the growing scarci ty of employment opportuni t ies in

    the non-farm sector from 1980s onward meant that the pressure on the land grew, making

    12 M.S Aluwalia, 2000, Economic Performance of States in Post-reform Period Economic and Poli t icalWeekly, vol 35, no 19, 6 May pg 1637- 1648.13 Lakhwinder Singh & Sukhpal Singh, 2002, Decelerat i on of Economi c Growt h in Punjab: Evidence,Explanat ion and a Way Out Economic and Poli t ical Weekly Vol. 37, No. 6, February 9- 15, pp 579-588in pp 581-58214PDR, pg 11215 ib i d, p g 11216 ib i d pg 11317 ib id, pg 111

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    small landholdings even more unviable. Consequently, the period from the 1990s has beenmarked by st at ic r eturns per ha.

    The effect s of al l t his were moment ous. I t has been est im ated t hat by 1998 20 percent of t hefarming populat ion-24 percent of small farmers and 31 percent of marginal farmers-cameunder the poverty l ine, and the family income of 47 percent of households from agriculture aswell as dairy farming is less than the lowest pay scale of an unskil led worker in the state18.Analysts tel l us that large landholdings were also impacted, and that by the 1980s incomefrom a seven-hectare farm was lower than the annual income of a government departmentassistant 19 .

    Whereas t he overwhelm ing presence of m arginal and small farm s cancels out t he benefi t s ofadvanced technology, and whereas agriculture on small farms does not generate labourabsorpt ive capacit ies, t here are ot her reasons for t he decl ine in Punjab agriculture. For one,rapid increases in the cost of inputs which go into the making of the green revolution package

    have made t he survival of small f arms dif f icult . The returns per ha in Punjab w ere lower t hanthe returns per ha in Madhya Pradesh20 . Secondly, Punjab has got bogged down in a two crop

    economy making i t d i f f icul t to shi f t to new pat terns of cropping. Thi rdly and moreimport antly, extensive use of new t echnology has led t o the degradation of t he environment.As both wheat and paddy are water intensive crops, massive ground water based irrigat ionhas resulted in a depleting water table in Punjab. According to estimates the water table incentral Punjab is going down at the rate of 0.23 centimetre per annum. Other parts of thestate are witnessing a rise in the water table, result ing in sal ini ty and water logging.Widespread deficiency on micro-nutrient has appeared in the soil (soil degradation) and thereis an increase in weed infestat ion, pest and disease out break.

    But in the main agricultural slow down in the state coincided with the introduction of

    l iberal isat ion in India and wit h the comi ng int o being of t he WTO regime. The int roduct ion ofl iberal isat ion accentuated the agricultural crisis mainly because the pol icy environmentchanged. From the days when the central and the state government act ively supportedagricul tural t ransformat ion in t he stat e, f rom t he t im e when agricul tural extension of f icersvisi ted the f ields for long periods of t ime to instruct farmers in the use of new technology,t he stat e now seeks t o energise t he economy t hrough t he inter play of m arket forces. Thedevelopment expendi ture of the state government dropped f rom 71.92 percent to 64.92percent of the total government expenditure in the period 1981-1991 largely on account ofmil i tancy, but there was no reversal of this trend when normalcy returned in the 1990s. Onthe contrary i t witnessed a further drop and according to 1998-99 est imates, i t was 46.49percent of the total government expenditure21.

    Ini t ial ly, t here was some opt imism among expert s t hat t he WTO regime mi ght actual ly f avourIndian agriculture because (a) the subsidies provided by the Indian government to farmers arewell within the WTO l imits, and (b) international agricultural prices were expected to go

    18 These f igures were part of the agenda paper of the brainstorming session organised jo int ly by thePunjab Government and the Punjab Agricultura l University Ludhiana in October 1998 to d iscuss thecondit ions of far mer s and f armi ng in Punjab. See Ramesh Chand, 1999, Emer ging Crisis in Punj abAgriculture: Severi ty and Opt ions for Future Economic and Polit ical Weekly. Special Issue onAgr icu l tu re , March 27, pp A7-A10 in p g A3.19 Lakhwinder Singh & Sukhpa l Singh, op ci t20 ib id, pg 58421 Source, St at i st ica l Abst ract o f Pun j ab, Economic Advisor to Governm ent of Punj ab, (Various Years)

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    down even as developed countries cut down subsidies to their farming sectors. This shouldhave resulted in a surge of agricultural exports which could have benefited the farmers.Moreover, the export of agricultural products should have been faci l i tated by accessibi l i ty to

    the markets of member countries as st ipulated by WTO provisions 22 . These expectat ionsproved misplaced and optimism has given way to apprehension that the new internationaltrade regime is in fact drast ical ly counterproductive for countries l ike India in general andstates l ike Punjab in part icular. In fact contrary to predict ions, not only have internationalagricult ural pri ces decl ined sharply in post WTO period, agricult ural export s fr om developingcountries l ike India have also dwindled. Further the developed world has actual ly protectedthe interest of i ts farmers by the grant of subsidies in dif ferent forms. In sum the newinternational trade regime hardly grants to the farmers of the developing world a levelplaying fiel d 23 .

    Al l these factors have combined to create an economic crisis of some magnitude in theagrarian sector. As the concept note circulated at the brainstorming session organised by the

    Government of Punjab and Punjab Agricultural University in Ludhiana24

    in 1998 makes clear,not only has the economic condit ion of vast majori ty of farmers deteriorated, these

    condit ions cannot be improved within exist ing cropping systems. Nor can the problems beremedied by the use of existing technology because this has already been exploited to 75percent of i t s potential .

    In sum, the prol i ferat ion of small landholdings, increases in costs of production, stagnatingreturns, over-exploitat ion of natural resources, decl ining publ ic and private sectorinvestments, inadequate marketing and pricing, insuff icient processing of vegetables, frui t ,and other crops, dwindl ing research and extension inputs, low investment f lows in agro-processing indust ries, and above al l the w it hdrawal of t he st ate f rom t he support ive role t hati t played t i l l the late 1980s, have combined to create a serious agrarian crisis. Al l this has

    resulted in decl ining employment avenues for rural people. The problem is compounded bythe fact that other sectors of the economy provide few opportunit ies for employment. Oneof t he serious problems Punj ab is confront ed wi th at present st ates the Punj ab DevelopmentReport 2004, is the high volume of unemployment. Disguised unemployment in theagricultural sector and the large volume of low-quality, existing employment, are causes forconcernThe growt h of empl oyment has not been commensurate w it h that of t he st atedomestic product, result ing in underut i l isat ion of the labour force 25.The rate ofunemployment is not high compared to the rest of the states in the country, but i t increasedfrom 3.08 percent during 1993-94 to 4.15 percent on current daily statuses during 1999-2000,wi t h urban unemployment rat es higher than rural unemployment . 91 percent of t he workforcein the state is engaged in the informal sector, 42 percent of the work force is i l l i terate, and53 percent of the unskil led or semi-skil led workforce is employed in the rural areas. More

    serious is t he high rat e of unem ployment among graduat es.

    22 Ashok Gulat i and Ani l Sharm a, 2001, Agri cult ure and GATT: What i t Hold s for Indi a in K. S. Dhindsa& An ju Sharma (eds. ) Dynamics o f Agr icu l tu ra l Deve lopment (Vo l . 3 ) : Po l icy P lann ing andL ibera l iza t ion , New Delhi, Concept Publ i shing Company, pg 277-295.23 Chand, R & Linu M. Phi l ip , 2001, Subsid ies and Support in Agricult ure: Is WTO Provid i ng A LevelPlaying Field? Economic and Poli t ical Weekl y, August 11, p g 3014- 3016.

    24 The note was t i t led Punj ab Agricult ure 2020: Farmers and Farmi ng in Punj ab25PDR, pg 510

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    The growt h of organised sector employment especial ly in t he publ ic sect or has decl ined from1.01 percent during 1990-95 to 0.19 percent during 1999-2000. The growth rate ofemployment in the private sector decreased from 2.34 percent to 0.80 percent in the same

    period. I t is est imated that by the end of t he Tenth Five Year Plan unemployment f igures wi l lactually rise, because the state is unable to generate regular income employment in theforeseeable future According to a Planning Commission est imate, Punjabs projectedemployment growth rate is the lowest among major states. During the Ninth plan period of1997-2002, employment in t he st ate w as proj ected t o grow at 0.73 percent per annum againstthe projected labour force growth rate of 2.27 percent per annum. According to the FourthEconomic Survey of Punj ab in 1998, t here are nearly fif t een lakh unemp loyed per sons inPunjab, of which nearly 70 percent belong to the rural areas26. According to an estimate,approximately 12.85 lakh agricultural workers are surplus27. Wi th employment opportuni t iesin the agrarian sector decl ining, and few opportunit ies avai lable in non-land act ivi t ies, theemployment scenario in t he st ate has acquired serious proport ions.In short, the polit ical economy of Punjab is marked by the following features:

    Agriculture in Punjab is highly commercial ized. Commercial izat ion benefi ted ruralPunjab in the 1970s and early 1980s when the state witnessed high rates of economic

    growth. Correspondingly, the increase in the total area of cult ivat ion resulted in asurge of agricult ural employment despit e the int roduction of t he technology intensiveand labour replacing green revolution strategy.

    But the benefi ts of the green revolut ion technology were uneven with the marginaland small f armers of Punjab, who const i t ute a l arge sect ion of the f arming populat ionin the state, adversely affected. In the f i rst phase of the green revolut ion i tself , thenumber of marginal and small holdings declined sharply while those in higher sizecategory showed a modest increase. Afterwards, even i f this trend witnessed areversal, it was fast becoming clear that agriculture in marginal and small landholdings has become unviable.

    Since agriculture in the state has reached saturat ion point, i t is unable to provideemploym ent. I f marginal and small far mers are st icking to agricult ure, t his is becauseof the unavai labi l i ty of al ternative employment avenues. With the decl ine inagriculture, al l ied act ivi t ies that grow around farming have also witnessed a decl ine.Result ant ly an army of semi-educated unemployed youth have either m igrated abroador resort ed t o drugs, a fact t hat t he Punjab Development Report has noted w it h someconcern.

    The decline in the growth rate in the 1980s not only brought a sense of relativedeprivat ion but also impoverishment for many as for instance witnessed in theemergence of a second hand tractor market. 28

    The crisis of agrarian sector would not have adversely affected the people had it beencompensated by the other major sector, i .e. industry. However, industry in Punjab

    does not give us a very pret t y pict ure in ter ms of GDP and employment . Thoughindustry showed some signs of r evival in t he ini t ial years of post -confl ict Punjab, t het rend could not be sustained f or long. I f w e look at t he share of m anufacturing sectorin St ate Gross Domestic Product i t was recorded as 21.1 p ercent in 1990-91, which is asmall jump from 19.4 percent in the year 1985-86. However, this trend witnessed areversal in the ensuing years and was recorded at 17.1 percent in the year 1999-2000.

    26 ib id , pg 510-4227 Ghuman, 2000, Impl icat ions of WTO Regime: Chal lenges Before Punjab Agricult ure The T r ibune Chandigarh, June 19.28 Sukhpal Singh, 2002 Crisis in Punjab Agricult ure Economic and Poli t ical Weekly June 3, pg. 1889-1892.

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    Whatever growth in employment has taken place in the manufacturing sector, i t isclearly not suff icient f or accommodating the l arge army of the rural unemployed.

    It w as only because t he Indian st ate pur sued wit h great vigour a single point pr ogramme, t heachievement of self -suff iciency in f ood grains that the green revolut ion t echnology could t akeoff in Punjab. An initiative of a similar scale, urgency, and intensity is required to reverse thedownward movement of Punjab agriculture. Exist ing technology needed to be corrected andt he tw o crop patt ern needs t o be diversif ied. However, t he pol icy of l i beral isat ion has meantdisengagement rather than t he engagement of t he st ate f rom such aff airs. For i t involves t heeventual phasing out of subsidies and the elimination of price control on food grains.29Unfortunately, the onset of l iberalisation also happened to be the precise phase when Punjabwas most i l l pr epared to go that way. I t also so happened t hat l i beral isat ion compounded theeconomic problems of Punjab at a t ime when the pol i t ical el i te in Punjab was least incl inedto come to grips with these problems.

    II

    Electoral Politics in Punjab

    Given the crisis in the agrarian economy in Punjab, electoral pol i t ics, pol i t ical mobi l isat ion,and policies should have revolved around the agrarian crisis and the socio-economicrepercussions of the crisis. But even though the two main pol i t ical part ies in the state havetaken up t he issue randomly, these references are more i n t he nature of rhet orical f l ourishes.The agrarian crisis has just not formed the l inchpin of electoral pol i t ics, pol i t icalmobil isat ion, or pol icies quite in the manner i t should have done. This to any student ofpublic policy is astonishing, for policy makers in a democracy ar e expected to address thebasic problems of ci t izens, deal with them, and produce appropriate pol icies. What are thecauses of the failure of democratic polit ics to do so?

    The context of the elections to the state assembly in Punjab in 1992- which were held afterfive years of Presidents Rule in the state30 -w as characterised by thr ee factors, each of whichcombined to draw pol i t ics in the direct ion of indeterminacy. First ly, the central governmentwhich was at that time controlled by the Congress party was resolute that elections should beheld to the state legislat ive assembly even though mil i tancy had not yet been contained.Secondly, the mil i tants cal led for a boycott of the elect ions and threatened the use ofviolence against any person who dared to cast her or his vote. Thirdly, the Akal i Dal whichhad by that t ime fragmented into a number of groups boycotted the elect ions. Only AD (K) the faction led by Amrinder Singh- contested the elections.

    The process of holding the elections was deeply marred by violence, and elections could takeplace after a number of abort ive moves that cost not a few candidates their l ives. For

    29 V. M. Rao, 2001 Farm ers in Market Economy: Would Farmers Gain t hrough Liberal izat ion? in K. S.Dhindsa & Anj u Sharm a (eds.) Dynamics of Agricultural Development: Pol icy Planning andL ibera l iza t ion , New Delh i , Concept Publishing Company, pg 319-355.30 In September 1985 elect ions were held to the legislat ive assembly. The AD and the Longowal fact ionin t he AD scored a great success and secured 73 seats in t he assembl y. A government under ChiefMinist er Surj t Singh Barnala ru led t he stat e f rom Sept ember 1985 to May 1987. In 1986 27 AD MLAs ledby Prakash Singh Badal defect ed and sought recognit ion as a separat e group, leaving Barnala dependenton the suppor t o f the Congress. In the m eanwhi le mi l i tan t act iv i t ies con t inued to m ount and in Apr i l1986 mi l i t an t o rgan iza t ions decla red an independent sta t e o f Kha l istan f rom t he prec incts o f t heGolden Temple . In 1987 the cent ra l government imposed Presidents Ru le on t he st a te . Elect ions wereheld to Parl iament in 1989 November but e lect ions to the state legislat ive assembly were held sevenyears af ter the 1985 elect ions.

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    instance when t he central government t ried t o hold elect ions both t o the state assembly andto parl iament in June 1991, not less t han 28 candidates were ki l l ed by m il i t ants. Result ant ly,t he elect ions wer e count erm anded in 3 Lok Sabha and 17 assembl y const it uencies even befor e

    they were completely cal led off . When elect ions to the state assembly were f inal ly held in1992, the general ised environment of fear resulted in an al l t ime low electoral part icipat ionwit h j ust 24 percent of the electorat e cast ing i t s vote.

    The extraordinariness of the elections themselves, held as they were amidst violence and thecal l for a boycott , shaped the rhet oric and the electoral st rategy of pol i t ical part ies. The f ir stmajor bone of contention between the two main part ies: the AD and the Congress, waswhether the elections should be held at all. The Congress insisted that the return of normaldemocrat ic pol i t ics was an essential precondit ion for the return of peace. Various fact ionsof the AD on the other hand argued that the elections could not be held for two reasons.Firstly all outstanding issues remained unresolved. Secondly the overwhelming presence ofsecuri t y forces almost guaranteed t hat elect ions could not be fr ee and fair. I f we look at t he

    posit ion of pr o-elect ion part ies i .e. t he Congress, t he Akal i Dal (K) fact ion which w as at t hatt ime led by Amarinder Singh31, the CPI and other small part ies on the one hand, and anti-

    elect ion groups i .e. Akal is of di f ferent shades on the other, i t is very clear that thefundamental di f ference between the two groups was the fol lowing: what should come f irstpopular government or peace? To reiterate the point made above, whi le pro-elect ion groupsargued the instal lat ion of a popular government was important for the restorat ion ofnormalcy, those boycotting elections insisted that unless peace was restored, the formationof popular government was simply not possible 32. In ot her wor ds, whereas t he Akal iscampaigned for a boycot t of t he elect ions by chal lenging the legit imacy of t he elect ion i t self ,the participants in the electoral process were riding the peace plank. The two sides in shortdisagreed upon the legitimacy of elections themselves.

    The reluctance of al l fact ions of the AD save one to contest elect ions can be traced to twofactors. One, the Akal is found that they were unable to completely ignore the boycott cal lgiven by mil i t ant groups. From t he lat e 1970s mil i t ant groups had chal lenged the capacity ofthe AD to safeguard the interests of the state in general, and the Sikh community inpart i cular, against t he authori t arian procl ivi t ies of t he central government . The reason why a th i rd force had ar isen in Punjab pol i t ics had largely to do wi th the percept ion that theAkalis had not pressed the case for state autonomy in the durbar of the central governmenteither competently or seriously. In effect the mil i tants chal lenged the very legit imacy of theAD to represent the interests of the panth. To ignore the boycot t cal l would have been toinvite further pol i t ical disaster.

    Secondly, and perhaps more impor t antly t he AD had lost face simpl y because i t was unable

    to secure even one demand of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution- the transfer of Chandigarh toPunjab, control over irrigat ion projects, adequate support from the central government foragriculture, and above al l the recasting of centre-state relat ions. What could i t take to thepeople of Punjab? Why should the people vote for the AD considering that the confrontationbetween the party and the central government in the period 1977-1984 had come to naught?Matters would have been dif ferent i f the central government had given to the state aneconomic and polit ical package that would have satisfied at least some of the demands of theResolution. But this did not happen.

    31 Amarinder Singh lat er j o ined t he Congress32The Front l ine , Vol. 9 Feb 28 1992 pg. 13-15.

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    The reason why the Congress did not deliver such a package can be traced to polit icalpragmatism arising out of electoral calculat ions. For the act would have pract ical lyguarant eed t he ret urn of t he AD t o st ate pol i t ics. As electoral strat egies go, this was a master

    stroke. Knowing that the announcement of such a package would give the Akal is reason tocontest t he elect ions, t he Congress party/ central government del iberately w it hheld i t . I t wasclear t hat t he idea was t o faci l i tat e a Congress win by f orcing t he Akal is to w ithdr aw fr om t heelect ions. And i t was equal ly clear from the statements of Akal i leaders that they wantedsomething concrete f rom the central government before they went before the electorategiven the general disenchantment with Akali polit ics. In fact dominant leaders in the Akali Dalwere to point this out publ icly. I t is worthwhile ref lect ing in this context that a specialpackage for the state would have helped the moderate sect ions of Akal is to chart out apol i t ical agenda independent from that of extremist Akal i groups, as wel l as from themil i tants. But in the absence of any concrete offer from the central government, the Akal issimply did not have the required pol i t ical resources at their disposal to contest theelect ions33. In effect the Congress virtually pushed the Akalis into boycotting the 1992

    elect ions. For the Congress on the other hand i t simply made for good pol i t ical sense toconnect the grant of such a package with i ts own victory in the elect ions. To put i t blunt ly,

    the people of t he stat e would be rewarded if they voted for the Congress.

    The Akal is protested in vain that that the very legit imacy and fairness of the exercise wasunder doubt. Given the permut at ions and combinations of electoral pol i t i cs in the stat e, i t isnot surprising that the Congress came to power in the state with Beant Singh as the ChiefMinister. The low electoral turn out however cast a damper on the legit imacy of the newgovernment. The Congress government came to power on a very thin electoral back up notonly because t he electoral t urn out was the l owest in t he st ate w hich is otherw ise marked byhigh voting turnouts, but also because the turn out in elections was the lowest in the last fourdecades of elections in India 34. Though i t is di f f icult to dist inguish between those who choose

    not to votef rom those who did not vote out of fear, analysts believe that in the contestbetween the part icipants and the boycotters, the latter were the clear winners35 The low t urnout was interpreted by the Akal is as a victory of their boycott cal l rather than as a victory ofthe Congress Party. Besides parties l ike Bahujan Samaj Party and the Communist Party ofIndia conceded that the legitimacy of the entire exercise was doubtful because of the boycottand because of the low turnout 36. Whereas the question-who won and who lost in the 1992elections in the state and why- is of great interest to psephologists for very good reasons, theCongress government did manage to complete i ts ful l terms of f ive years. I t also remainedfaithful to the main plank of i ts electoral agenda: peace. In was in pursuit of this nebulousconcept termed peace that the Congress was to suppress militancy with an iron hand.

    The electoral games that the two main part ies in Punjab played in order to restore their

    image in the col lect ive mind had t he expected f al l out . The Congress, alr eady suff ering froma legit imacy defici t because of i ts role in the confl ict , a legit imacy defici t which waswor sened in the 1992 elect ions, made the restorat ion of normalcy and the ret urn of peace tothe state i ts main concern. The only problem is that i t def ined restorat ion of normalcy and

    33 Ib id .34 Yogendra Yadav, 1992, Who Won in Punj ab: Of t he Real Cont est Front l ine Apri l , Vol. 10, pg. 122-126.35 i b id36 Senior CPI leader Satpal Dang and BSP leader Dr. Ramlal Jassi stated in separate interviews to thepress that any e lect io in Punjab without Akal i part ic ipat ion was not complete. See TheF r o n t l i n e issuesof Feb 28 & March 27, 1992. Al so, Yogendra Yadav, 1992 Who Won in Punjab: Of t he Real Contest

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    peace strict ly in pol i t ical terms; the agenda had no place for the social or economicreconstruction of the state. Both the demands of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution and thepromised economic package for the state remained unfulfi l led and undelivered. The Congress

    simply assumed t hat since i t had become acceptable t o t he people albeit t hrough a rest rict edvoter turn out, al l that i t needed to do was to ensure the containment of mil i tancy. Thoughthe Congress government made t he right kind of noises in t erms of development , i t was clearthat pol i t ics and pol icy al ike were concerned wit h peace defined narrowl y as t he el iminat ionof mil i tancy. I t was simply not accompanied by any pol icy ini t iat ive for the long termeconomic regenerat ion of the state. Admittedly one constraint on the forging of this agendawas the resource crunch because a large part of the resources were spent on containingviolent confl ict . In the period 1988-1993 the expenditure of the state government increasedby approximately 17.5 percent, but most of this increase went into f ight ing mil i tancy 37. Butthis was not the only factor which fed into the neglect of economic and social issues; equallyimportant was the way in which the government interpreted both i ts mandate and pol i t icalagenda, t hat of rest oring normalcy. Result ant ly t he impending agrarian crisis was complet ely

    ignored.

    In the post election scenario the issue of peace was to dominate state polit ics for many yearsto come even as the Akalis were trying to put their own house in order. They in effectprogressively real ised t hat t hey needed to chart out an agenda which w as independent t o t hatof the mil i tants. The Akal is had to in other words regain the pol i t ical ground that had beenappropriated by the mil i tants in the 1980s in order to compete with the Congress. Within ayear condit ions in the st ate changed somewhat and t he Akal is decided to part icipate in t hepanchayat elect ions in 1993, in which more than 80 percent people turned out to vote.Though this impressive increase in electoral part icipat ion was due to the fact that the Akal ispart icipated in the elect ions, and to the local ised nature of the pol l , the CongressGovernment claimed that the electoral turn out represented a vote of confidence in the

    government38.

    The situation had however dramatically changed by the time the next assembly elections tookplace in 1997 in Punj ab. For one t he Akal is had come out of the t wi l ight of m il i t ancy in orderto participate in the electoral process. Secondly, various Akali factions decided to comet oget her for elector al purposes39 . Thi rdly, mi l i tant organizat ions were pract ical ly wiped out ofthe polit ical scene. And fourthly, the Congress was in disarray after C.M Beant Singh wasassassinated by a section of militants-the Babbar Khalsa. In sum, the 1997 assembly electionswere held in normal condit ions which were far removed from the hype, the contestat ion, thefear, and the apathy that had marked the 1992 elections.

    Two factors were to govern the electoral outcome in 1997. One the Congress was hampered

    not only by the absence of the former C.M Beant Singh who had presided over the agenda ofrestoring normalcy, the party found i tself completely out of sync in a si tuat ion in which i tsmost important achievement-that of containing mil i tancy- was not an elect ion issue.

    37TheFron t l i ne , Vol. 10, 1993 March 12, pg. 35. The i ndustr ia l pol i cy of t he government envisaged t heannua l investm ent o f 500 crores, bu t th is d id no t take in t o account the agrar ian sector .38 Interview with Chief Minister Beant Singh, TheFron t l i ne , Vol. 10 Feb 26, 1993, pg. 15.39 At the insistence of the Shrimoni Gurudwara Prabhandak Commit tee, var ious fact ions of the AD cametogether in 1993, but the a l l iance did not last for long and var ious fact ions took part in subsequentelect ions on thei r own. Also the Akal i Dal was t ransformed i nto t he Shrim oni Akal i Dal or the SAD,however t he changed name w as adopted y var i ous fact ions of t he AD. Theref ore, w e use ADint erchangeably w it h SAD.

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    Secondly, the electoral scene was transformed mainly because mil i tant act ivi t ies hadsubsided in Punjab, but also because Akali polit ics came to be cast in a new mould. By thetime of the 1997 assembly elections, the AD under the leadership of Prakash Singh Badal40,

    had not only f i rmly put the demand for state autonomy41 into t he closet, i t had entered into aregional all iance of the rightist BJP. This was not the first t ime this had happened. The ADwhich has never commanded more than 30 percent of the vote in the state, had beencompelled to seek the most unlikely all ies to come to power in the state in 1967, 1969, and1977- the Jan Sangh which is the precursor of the BJP, the CPI which is decidedly against themerger of rel igion and pol i t ics, and the Janata party. In the process, the compulsions ofelectoral pol i t ics had forced the party to move to a more secular pol i t ical idiom, and awayfrom the slogan of the panth in danger which had marked the struggle for a Punjabi Suba.But by the decade of the 1980s the AD had launched a struggle against t heHindu dominationof India. And the BJP had launched a st ruggle f or t he Hindu domination of India. In t he 1980seach party was wedded to dif ferent not ions of what a nation is and what i t should be. But in1997 both parties came together to fight elections.

    The following themes dominated the polit ical platform of the AD-BJP all iance. One theme

    was that of the corruption of the previous Congress regime42. The AD- BJP combine promisedto set up a Lokpal [ombudsman] which would have the power to bring the Chief Ministerunder i ts purview and which would del iver the state from corruption. Freedom fromcorruption became the main slogan of the al l iance and the main issue on which i t sought tomobil ise the people of t he st ate. In the pr ocess, t he Anandpur Sahib Resolut ion w as f i rm ly putinto the storeroom because the BJP as a highly nationalistic party has consistently refusedto have any truck with what it sees as separatist agendas. The second issue on which the twopart ies found a common ground was what they cal led their rel igiosity. Both part ies statedthat since Punjab is a land of Sants and Gurus only religious parties like the AD and BJP hadthe right to govern such a land. Prakash Singh Badal, the projected Chief Ministerial

    candidate of the al l iance promised to the people of Punjab both Ramrajya and governanceon the l ine of t he Sikh King Ranj i t Singh rol led int o one 43. Consequently in its electionmanifest o, t he AD declared that (a) t he party would work f or t he Panth, Punj ab, Punjabi andPunjabiyat and (b) would provide a corrupt ion f ree government . I t is of some interest tonote that the state assembly elections provided a testing ground in the practice of coalit ionpol i t ics for the BJP. By that t ime i t was trying to reconci le i ts hard Hindutva l ine with theexigencies of coal i t ion pol i t ics, simply because i t had fai led t o win any al ly in t he af t ermat hof 1996 general elect ion.

    I t is not t hat t he AD manif est o had not hing for t he farm ers-i t made refer ences t odevelopment, roads, bridges, octroi, free power and water, traders demands, and f iscal

    40 Other Aka l i f ac t ions led by var ious ext remi st leaders a lso took par t in t he e lecto ra l f ray- SAD (A)headed by Simaranjit Singh Mann, Panthic Akali Dal led by Bhai Jasbir Singh Rode, SAD (Wadala) led byKuldip Singh Wadala, and SAD (Sukhj inder) led by Sukhj inder Singh. However, i t was the sect ion l ed byBadal that was the strongest and with largest support base. The other groups entered into an al l iancewi t h t he BSP, bu t were w iped ou t in t he e lect ions.41 The rhetor ic of separat ism in Punjab as in Kashmir has vaci l la ted between demands for a separatest a te and demands fo r s ta te au t onomy.42 Many leaders of t he a l l i ance said t hat t he Congress has ceased t o be a pol i t ica l par t y and has becomea money harvest ing m achine instead. See TheF r o n t l i n e , Vol. 14, March 7 199, pg. 30.43 The Front l ine , Vol. 14, February 7 1997, pg.36-38.

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    governance44. The problem is that i t addressed only t he dominant concerns of t he big farminglobby. Therefore, the manifesto promised free water and electrici ty for agriculture. Thoughthe promise was undoubtedly farmer friendly inasmuch as it helped to bring down the costs of

    inputs considerably, i t was by no means suff icient to address the worsening economicsituat ion in rural Punjab. In other words the manifesto of the AD did not conceive or did notwant to conceive of a larger plan or a long term strategy for the regenerat ion of agriculture.I t provided sops more than anything else because the promise of free water and electrici tywas targeted to the noble purpose of garnering votes. The Congress on the other handcontinued t o harp on t he issue of peace and promised t o t hwart t he separat ist t endencies oft he Akalis as enshrined in Anandpur Saheb resoluti on .

    I t is c lear f rom the unprecedented mandate that went in favour of the Akal is that by 1997Punj ab had out grown t he peace agenda. People searched for new ini t iat ives that could wardoff the impending agrarian disaster, for a new pol icy ini t iat ive that would make agricultureprof i table once again for al l category of farmers; for a new vision which would arrest the

    decl ining productivi ty of soi l and deplet ing water tables; for a new idea which would haltenvironmental degradation; and for a new pol icy framew ork which w ould create new avenues

    of emp loyment . Their search was wast ed. What t hey got wer e orator ical add-ons whichpromised free power and water. These incidental ly are promises which have broughtconsiderable harm t o st ate governments al l over India landing them as i t w ere int o t he lap off inancial def ici t . Therefore when the new AD government came into power, i t had neither apol icy ini t iat ive nor a comprehensive plan at hand to deal with serious issues of l ivel ihood.The absence of a far reaching agenda pract ical ly ensured that pol i t ics would be more of thesame. And the issue of corruption on which the AD-BJP government had ridden to power in1997 came back t o haunt t he al l iance wi t hin a short period of t ime. But t h is t ime i t was t het urn of t he Congress t o charge the r ul ing al l iance wit h rampant cor rupt ion and misrule in t hestate.

    Ironical ly by t he t ime the 2002 elect ions to the state assembly came around, t he roles of t heCongress and the AD were completely reversed. First ly despite the fact that i t was the ADwhich had raised crucial issues in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution which it had confronted thecent ral government wit h in t he lat e 1970s and t he 1980s, now i t was the Congress manifestothat spoke of interstate disputes like the Sutlej Yamuna Link and the handing over ofChandigarh and Punjabi speaking areas to Punjab. I t is worthwhile to recol lect that the ADhad in t he past att acked t he Congress for not responding to these very demands. But in 2002Congress included t hese very issues into it s manifesto simpl y because t he AD was in p ower inthe centre as a part of the rul ing National Democrat ic Front. The Congress in other wordsintended to embarrass the AD through holding aloft the very issues that had led to aconfrontat ion between the two part ies in the past. Secondly, in contrast to the 1997

    elect ions, now i t was the Congress that accused t he Akal is of corrupt ion. In t he manifesto t heCongress promised to set up a judicial commission headed by a sitt ing judge of the High courtto inquire into acquisi t ion of wealth and property by the Akal i chief minister Mr Badal, hisfamily members and other ministers of his government. In keeping with the agenda ofgovernance that had become the core t heme of m ost par t y manifestos in t he country by 2000,the Congress manifesto further maintained that i f the party came back to power, the ChiefMinister and al l ministers would declare their assets immediately after taking off ice, andmaintain a model code of conduct and tr ansparency in government w ork.

    44See Ashutosh Kumar, 2004, Electoral Politics in PunjabEconomic and Political Weekly, April 3-9/10, vol

    xxxix, no 14 and 15, special issue on State Parties, National Ambitions pp1515 -1520.

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    The Congress manifesto made some reference to the worsening economic situation in itsslogan of f reedom from bankruptcy 45. But ever fai thful to i ts t ime honoured elect ionstrategy, the Congress promised everything to every sect ion of society. Therefore when he

    released the party manifesto, the state party chief Amarinder Singh offered concessionsw or t h 1200 cror es t o various sect ions of societ y- t raders, farm ers, weaker sect ions, andemployees. In part icular the manifesto promised to continue with i ts pol icy of free electrici tyand water for agriculture, and to assure rel ief to those farmers who run their tube wel ls bydiesel. On macro economic issues, t he manifesto st ated t hat t he Congress would not al low t hedismantl ing of t he minimum support price system , that i t would provide crop insurance cover,and that i t would abol ish the arrest w arrant syst em t o recover cooperat ive loans. Themanifesto also spoke about increasing irrigation capacity and of sops for unemployed youth,pensioners and ex - servicem en46 . Apparently drafted by the economists of the AgriculturalUniversity of Patiala, the AD manifesto was not far behind when i t came to making promisesto the farmers in part icular and the rural populat ion in general . This however bore l i t t leresult because the party had done nothing to resuscitate the farm economy of the state

    during last f ive years of i t s rule apart fr om paying l ip service to t he needs of t he farmers andoff ering sympathy i f not t ea. The AD manifesto at a more general level, sought t o emphasise

    the past wr ongs of t he Congress Party and harped on the step m otherl y t reatm ent met ed outto the state by the Congress governments at the centre47 .

    By the turn of the twenty f i rst century the crisis in agriculture and the state economy hadaccentuated so much that the manifestos could i l l afford to ignore this discomfort ing fact.Whatever were the pledges and promises made by the major part ies, they were clearlyinadequate because they fai led to address the root cause of the problem. In effect, no roadmap was offered by either of the part ies for reviving the Punjab economy, al l that wasoff ered w as sops. As a Tribune edit orial t el l ingly comment ed, wit h so much of shining st uffon offer, who has the time to think about issues like the decline in agriculture, lack of

    industrial growth and deficiencies in primary sectors? Bread is not essential when butter isbeing doled out 48 . Such is the nature of electoral and democrat ic pol i t ics in the state ofPunjab.

    IIIThe Peasant Movement in Punj ab

    How is it that polit ical parties can ignore the most burning of issues and yet mobilize votes?Do sect ions of the populat ion who are affected adversely by economic decl ine not have thecapacity to mobilise and press their demands? What for instance is the state of the farmersmovement, for af t er al l i t has been the farming communi ty t hat has been worse hi t by thecrisis. Given the centr al i t y of agricult ure t o the st ate and given the cent ral i t y of Punj abagricul ture t o food sel f -suf f ic iency in the countr y, why has the f armers movement not beenable to influence polit ics in the recent past? These are troubling questions answers to whichcan only be found in the history of the peasant movement in the state.

    In Punj ab t he peasant m ovement arose as part of t he national ist st ruggle in the canal colonyagitation of 1907 under leaders like Sardar Ajit Singh. Later, it was the landlords whoactivated peasants under the aegis of the Unionist Party. The Kisan Sabha movement of the

    45 The Tri bune, Chandigarh, January 28 2002.46 i b id47 Ibid, February 2 2002.48 Ib id, January 28 2002

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    Communist Party and Zamindara League of Chaudhary Chhotu Ram also mobilized peasantryduring this period. However, i t was the green revolut ion in the 1960s that inst i tuted thematerial condit ions for the growth of a sustained farmers movement. First ly, surplus

    production of food grains brought farmers into a close relat ionship with the market. In otherwords, farming became an enterprise that required professional solidarity.

    Secondly, the green revolution also brought about far reaching changes in productionrelat ions since agriculture required hired rather than family labour. The growth ofagricultural labour set the scene for a renewed emphasis on conditions of work 49. Thi rdly,since the ini t ial period of green revolut ion prof i ted most sect ions, these sect ions of thefarming class had a common interest in the prices fixed for inputs and outputs.

    I t was against t his background t hat t he Punjab Khetibar i Zamindara Union [PKZU] -t hepred ecessor of Bhart iya Kisan Union-was est ablished in 1972. The result of t he eff ort s of ei ghtprominent leaders, the PKZU took up the troublesome issue of stagnant procurement prices

    for wheat . Betw een 1972 and 1984 the Union organised eight rounds of mobil izat i on wit h thefam ous Raj Bhawan gherao of 1984 being the final one. Subsequently, the PKZU converted

    itself into the Punjab unit of the Bhart iya Kisan Union [BKU] in 198050 . Predominantly amovement of the rich peasantry, the PKZU was more interested in issues such as higherprocurement prices of wheat and paddy and subsidized prices of inputs such as electrici ty,diesel and ferti l izers than issues related to marginal or small farmers. These issues werefur t her marginalised because as a result of t he ri se of t he BKU, Kisan Sabhas organised by t heCommunist Part ies were considerably sidelined 51 . The act ivi t ies of t he PKZU however came t oa halt in 1984 with Operat ion Blue Star making normal pol i t ical act ivi t ies impossible in thest at e. The gherao of the governor s house in the same year was arguably the peak of BKUmobilization, so much so that Operation Blue Star was interpreted by the leaders of themovement as a diversionary tact ics by the central government to contain the farmers

    str engt h in Punj ab52 .

    Mi l i tancy affected the act ivi t ies of the farmers movement considerably because i t divertedattent ion away from everyday l i fe and l ivel ihood into other channels such as the demand forKhalistan. Moreover, during the same period differences began to crop up between theleaders on various issues. In 1989 the first split in the movement took place even as AjmerSingh Lakhowal and Manjit Singh Kadian separated and formed another organization. Theresidual group was ow left with Bhupinder Singh Mann and Balbir Singh Rajewal. The divisionwas apparently triggered off by the nomination of Bhupinder Singh Mann to the Rajya Sabhaby the V.P Singh government then in power at the centre.

    49 Sucha Singh Gil l , 2000, Agrar ian Change and Farm ers Movement in Punj ab: A St udy of BKU inHarish K Puri and Paramj i t Singh Judge (eds.) Social and Pol i t ical Movement s, New Delhi, RawatPubl icat ions, pg. 356- 377.50 Sucha Singh Gil l & K C Singhal, 1984, Punjab Farm ers Agit at i on: Response to Development Crisis ofAgriculture Economic and Poli t ical Weekly, Vol. 19, No. 40, pg. 1728-1732.51 Sucha Singh Gil l , 2004, Farm ers Movement : Cont i nuit y and Change Economic and Po l i t ica l Weekly Ju ly 3 , vo l xxx i x , no 27 , pp2964-2966 Inc identa l ly , the med ium and b ig fa rmer dominated PBKU fu r t herisolat ed t he issues pert a in ing to l andless work ers. The PBKU invariably t ook a pro-farm er standwhenever w orkers put f ort h demands such as a wage hike. Debanjani Chakrabart i From Greenrevo lu t ion t o L ibera l isa t ion : Growth o f Agrar ian Cap i ta l ism in Pun jab (Unpub l ished d isser t a t ion , JNU)52 Part ha Nath Mukherj i , 1998, The Farmer s Movement in Punjab: Pol i t ics of Pressure Groups andPressure of Part y Pol i t ics Economi c and Poli t ical Weekl y, May 2, 1043- 1048.

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    The division gained more ideological cont ent lat er, because various far mer s groups wer efaced with the need to take a considered stand on the issue of l iberal isat ion of the Indianeconomy in general and of the agricultural sector in part icular. The members of the Mann-

    Rajewal group favoured l iberal isat ion pol icies because in their opinion, open trade ofagricultural produces would benefi t farmers. They thus joined the principal defender of thisideological l ine, Sharad Joshi of t he Shet kari Mazdoor Sangathan at t he nat ional level. But t heLakhowal-Kadiyan group was much more skeptical about the known and unknownconsequences of such a policy. It therefore aligned with Mahendra Singh Tikait of U.P andNanjundaswami of Karnataka to fight l iberalisation 53.

    The Raj ewal and Kadiyan group was to go t hrough yet another vert ical division in 1994 whenthe Left elements in the organization decided to go ahead and form BKU (Ekta). Since 2003,there have been further divisions in BKU (Ekta) and as things stand now, there are severalpeasant organizations in Punjab: three factions of BKU, three factions of Kisan Sabhascontrolled by CPI, CPI(M), and a faction of the CPI(M) respectively, and an independent left

    orient ed peasant organisat ion. Even t hough m any scholars are opt imist ic about t he resurgenceof the peasant movement given the unprecedented stress that Punjab peasantry is facing

    today, the fragmentat ion of the movement since the 1990s is actual ly cause for somepessimism for the following reasons.

    Firstly , mil i tancy not only created a pol i t ical environment which was not at al l conducive fort he mobil isat ion of farm ers, i t actual ly mar ginal ised issues relat ing to the f arming communit y.The period bet ween 1980 and 1992-t he lost years of Punjab pol i t ics- have had a maj or and al ingering impact on farmers mobi l isat ion in the state. Therefore, when the chal lengingdecade of the 1990s came cal l ing, the farmers movement in Punjab was organisat ional lyfragmented and ideological ly blunted with a dwindl ing support base. In sum, farmers andtheir issues were more or less absent from the polit ical scene of Punjab during the major part

    of t he decade of 1990s.

    Secondly , the int ernal contradict i ons of t he peasantry began to emerge most forceful l y duringprecisely t his period. This contr adict ion art iculated i t self most sharply on t he issue ofliberalisation and the WTO regime. Even as big farmers in Punjab as in much of the countrycame to bel ieve that fr ee market pol icies would mean more prof i t for t hem because they hadthe capaci ty to compete internat ional ly, smal ler farmers just i f iably fe l t that new pol ic ieswere going to marginal ise t hem even furt her.

    Thirdly, the peasant movement in Punjab led by BKU had always maintained a strategicdist ance from pol i t ical part i es ever since i ts format ion. Nor has i t accepted any support fr ompolit ical parties during mobilizations and demonstrations even though such support was

    offered. Conversely the BKU has not at any point extended electoral or pol i t ical support toany pol i t ical party t i l l the late 1980s. In the aftermath of mil i tancy some fact ions of themovement did begin to pol i t ical ly f l i rt with one party or the other. But high pol i t ics dividedt he movement wit h t he nominat ion of Bhupinder Singh Mann to t he Raj ya Sabha, and his closel inks with the central government, triggering the f i rst spl i t in the organisat ion. The secondsplit that saw the emergence of BKU (Ekta) was an outcome of Lokhewals close involvementwith Akal i pol i t ics, an involvement that many in the organizat ion chal lenged as against thespiri t of the movement. Subsequently even as the Ekta group moved closer to the KisanSabhas organized under the aegis of communist parties particularly on the anti-WTO and

    53 Ib id .

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    l iberalisation plank, the Lokhewal group held a Jat panchayat at Ludhiyana in March 1995 andannounced t hat t he organisat i on would tr ansform itself into a pol i t ical part y wit h the purposeof capturing pol i t ical power at the stat e level.

    Finally even as the BKU brand of peasant mobilization brought various sections of farmersunder t he leadership of large farm ers; t he basic thrust of the ent ire movement: subsidizat ionof input prices and maximizat ion of out put prices was premised on the assumpt ion that greenrevolut ion technologies were going to work for al l the t ime to come. However, once i tbecame increasingly clear by the 1990s that this was not the case and that the agrarianrevolut ion of t he 1960s was peter ing out, t he agenda and t he st rategy of t he movement i tselfrequired a fresh look. Considering that the agrarian crisis has been caused by the decl iningproductivi ty, soi l degradation, water deplet ion, and dwindl ing dif ference between input andoutput prices, any enduring solution requires much more than economic concessions. Forinstance the issue of soil and water conservation requires a much more holistic approach thanthe one adopted by the movement so far. There are instances of some fact ions of the

    movement taking the ini t iat ive and helping farmers diversify into agro-industrial and othersectors. However, neither of these factions has launched any collective program for

    environmental conservation.

    In sum t he farm ers movement has neit her managed to address t he st ruct ural crisis in Punj abagriculture, nor managed to press the government to do so. For this requires clari ty ofapproach, consensus on the causes of the problem, and an equal consensus on the solution.But the farmers movement in Punjab had been fragmented, wit h each division being wrackedby internal contradictions and disagreements between the leadership and personalisation ofissues. In t he pr ocess even as t he int erests of t he big far ming lobby have been r epresented t osome extent, the needs of the small and marginal farmers who have been hardest hi t by thecrisis in agriculture have been sidelined. The farmers movement has consequently not been

    able to emerge as a formidable pol i t ical force in the state. Consequently the stategovernment continues t o wend i t s own way, a w ay that is completely removed fr om t he needsof t he people of t he st ate. In sum, t he weaknesses of peasant m obil isat ion in t he st ate haveallowed polit ical parties to ignore farmers issues.

    Conclusion

    I f we were to return to the question of what does pol i t ics in post-confl ict societ ies look l ikethe answer m ay wel l be: catch-al l and for t hat very reason indeterminate. The need of the ADand of the Congress to reinvent agendas in order to recapture the legit imacy that they hadlost led them to hold aloft agendas that had litt le to do with the pressing needs of thepeasantry. The 1992 election which was conducted in the shadow of l ingering violence, by thecal l for a boycot t of t he elect ions and by the refusal of t he major i t y of t he Akal i fact ions t opart ic ipate t hrew up t wo main issues- return to peace and the val id i ty of t he elect ion i tsel f .The second elect ion i n 1997 was organised ar ound t wo t hemes-corrupt ion and the need for areligious Punjab to be governed by religious parties. The 2002 election saw a reversal ofagendas and of stands, with now the Congress accusing the AD of neither securing anydemand that was vital t o the f ut ure of t he st ate-t he return of Chandigarh for instance, and ofcorruption. In all this the structural roots of the impending agrarian crisis have been simplyignored or put aside as secondary to the consideration to come into power.

    Punjab is once again in the throes of a crisis, but this time the crisis is economic and notpol i t ical. And just l ike pol i t ics was unable to negotiat e the grievances t hat led t o mil i t ancy inthe f i rst place, i t is unable to address the problems that have led to a structural crisis in

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    agricult ure. Pol i t ics remains confined t o t he making and unmaking of government s even as i trefuses to recognise let alone resolve the major problems that have beset the state of Punjabsince it s incept ion in 1966.

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    APPENDIXChart 1

    Punjab Assembly Elections 1992: Party-wise PerformanceTot al Seat s - 117 Tot al Turn out (%) - 23.8

    Party

    (1)

    Seats Contested

    (2)

    Seats Won

    (3)

    Vote (%) Secured

    (4)

    INC 115 87 43.71

    BSP 105 9 16.32

    BJP 67 6 16.60

    CPI 20 4 3.64

    SAD 58 3 5.20

    CPM 17 1 2.40

    JD 37 1 2.15

    UCPI 1 1 0.48

    IPF/CPML 4 1 0.24

    LKD 1 0 0.01

    BKUS 1 0 0.01

    BJMD 1 0 0.01

    SAD (K) 1 0 0.1

    DPP 1 0 0.01

    Independent 150 4 9.21

    Total 579 117 100.00

    [Source: www.eci.gov.in]

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    Chart-2

    Punjab Assembly Elections 1997 :Party-wise Performance

    Total Seats

    117 Total Turn out (%)

    68.7Party

    (1)

    Seats Contested

    (2)

    Seats Won

    (3)

    Vote (%) Secured

    (4)

    SAD 92 75 37.64

    BJP 22 18 8.33

    INC 105 14 26.59

    CPI 15 2 2.98

    BSP 67 1 7.48

    SAD(M) 30 1 3.10

    CPM 25 0 1.79

    JD 27 0 0.56

    BSP(A) 24 0 0.24

    CPIML(L) 4 0 0.08

    SMT 2 0 0.03

    FBL 3 0 0.02

    MCPI(S) 1 0 0.02

    UCPI 1 0 0.02

    SJP(R) 6 0 0.02

    SHS 3 0 0.01

    SP 2 0 0.01

    JNP 1 0 0.01

    RPI 1 0 0.01

    SHS(R) 4 0 0.01

    Other Parties 14 0 0.18

    Independent 244 6 10.87

    [Source: www.eci.gov.in]

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    Chart-3

    Punjab Assembly Elections 2002:Party-wise Performance

    Total Seats

    117 Turn out (%)

    65.0

    Party

    (1)

    Seats Contested

    (2)

    Seats Won

    (3)

    Vote (%) Secured

    (4)

    Congress 106 62 36.5

    Akali Dal 90 41 30.5

    BJP 24 3 5.7

    CPI 10 1 1.7

    CPI(M) 13 0 0.4

    BSP/RPI/SCF 98 0 5.5

    JD/JP/Soc/SSP/PSP 2 0 0.1

    SADM 84 0 4.7

    NCP 40 0 1.3

    All Other Parties 180 0 2.2

    Independent 275 9 11.4

    [Source: www.eci.gov.in]


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