Chappell ThrasymachusVirtues 1993

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The Virtues of Thrasymachus

Author(s): T. D. J. ChappellSource: Phronesis, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1-17Published by: BRILL

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The Virtues of Thrasymachus

T.D.J. CHAPPELL

'We should at least consider the possibility that justice is not a virtue. This

suggestion was taken seriously by Socrates in The Republic, where it was

assumed by everyone that if Thrasymachus could establish his premise -

that injustice was more profitable than justice - his conclusion would

follow: that a man who had the strength to get away with injustice had

reason to follow this as the best way of life. It is a strikingfact about modern

moral philosophy that no one sees any difficultly in accepting Thrasy-

machus' premise and rejecting his conclusion, and it is because Nietzsche's

position is at this point much closer to that of Plato that he is remote from

academic moralists of the present day.'

(Philippa Foot: 'Moral Beliefs', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,

59 (1958-1959), 99-100)

Thrasymachus' statement of an alternative to standard views about justice

in Republic Bk.I sets the challenge which Republic Bks. II-X must answer.

If this is not a serious challenge, if Thrasymachus'alternative view of justice

is not interesting, plausible or coherent, it is not clear why moral philoso-

phers should bother with The Republic at all. Here I will offer an in-

terpretation of Thrasymachus' alternative view of justice which does make

his view out to be interesting, and plausible, and coherent. My interpreta-tion differs in one way or other from some very well known interpretations;

I hope it will become clear what, if anything, my interpretation achieves

that these others do not.

Consider the conflicts between these seven understandings of Thrasy-

machus:

Phronesis 1993. Vol. XXXVIII/J (AcceptedSeptember1992)

1







1. Thrasymachus makes no clear point; on Plato's depiction he is merely

confused. (So Macguire, in Phronesis XVI (1971) 142-163.)2. Thrasymachus is a revolutionary who wants to turnsociety upside down:

he rejects 'Conventional Justice' in favour of 'Natural Justice'.

(The entry on Thrasymachus in Pauly-Wissowa's Encyclopadie embrac-

es (2): 'Die These rep.338c, daB das btXaLOV von Natur nichts anderes

sei als der Nutzen und Vorteil des Starkeren . . . entspricht der De-

struktion des Rechtsgefuihles und der ethischen Normen'.

3. Thrasymachus is a Thucydidean cynic.

(Alasdair Maclntyre, in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London:

Duckworth,1985), ascribes to Thrasymachus the 'Thucydidean' thesis

that 'Arete is one thing, practical intelligence quite another'.)

4. Thrasymachus' position is the same as Callicles' in the Gorgias.

(Shorey, the Loeb translator of The Republic, Vol. I, p.64: 'The actual

ruler or shepherd of the people . .. tends the flock only so that he may

shear it. All political experience and the career of successful tyrants. . ..

[Thrasymachus]thinks, confirms (sic) this view, which is that of Callicles

in the Gorgias'.)

5. Thrasymachus is a Nietzschean immoralist.

(So Shorey again, in his Loeb translation of The Republic Vol. I, p.x:

'Thrasymachus . .. affirms the immoralist thesis that justice is only the

advantage of the . .. stronger' (p.x) - a thesis which Shorey goes on to

call, not only 'Nietzschean', but 'sophistic', 'Machiavellian', and 'Hob-

besian'.)

6. Thrasymachus believes that justice means obedience to the laws.

(So G.F. Hourani, Phronesis VII (1962), 110-120.)

7. Thrasymachus means to recommend injustice as a way of life.

(So, famously, G.B. Kerferd (Durham UniversityJournal, IX (1947-8),

19-27; Phronesis IX (1964-5), 12-16: 'Thrasymachus . .. makes it clear

that his own ideal is for everyone to seek his own interest, and he regards

justice as always involving the contrary, namely seeking another's in-

terest, and injustice as always involving seeking one's own interest'. So

also Philippa Foot, to judge by her suggestion, above, that Thrasy-

machus' thesis is that 'a man who [has] the strength to get away with

injustice [has] reason to follow this as the best way of life'.)

It will already be clear that, of these seven views, I disagree most strongly

with (1). Yet even (1) seems, prima facie, quite plausible. After all, Plato

does make Thrasymachus say all of the following':' All translationsfrom Plato in this paperare my own.

2







A. qud yCE ?yO EvaMt6o 8xaLov oiUx akko Tt - TtoIO XQErTiOVo;

upEQov - 'I say that justice is nothing other than the interest of thestronger.' (338c)

B. TLOETat&e yE toiig v6'ovU ?xaoTNTIXl rtleo; t6oCMtl tpovQOV

... EWVaL& Ct3EW11VaVTOUTO bLXXaLOV T0L5 aQXoEvoL; Ecvat

- 'Each kind of government makes laws in its own interest, and, by so

enacting, proclaims to its subjects that this is justice. . . (338e)

C. TOf)T' OVUV?xrLuV, J PE'XTLOTE, O XEyO EV CaTtaOCttg TCtu Jto06Xr

TCLTov EivwL &,xalov, Tro Tl'r XaOEOrviXULCg&Qx#;UtRE'Qov'This then, my good sir, is what I say is one and the same justice in all

states: the interest of the government in power.' (338e)

D. i1 jiEv 6xaton3v1 xTo t6 &'xaLov CXXOTQLov yaOOv T4) 6VTL -

'Justice and the just are in reality the other person's good.' (343c)

A-D all look incompatible. A will not square with B or C: it is not obviously

a necessary truth that 'the stronger' is always going to be the ruler, or (a

member of) the government in power. (Unless we define 'stronger'to mean

'more politically powerful'; but who says we have to do that?) Socrates

points out at an early stage that B and C are not consistent with each other,

either: those in power might be wrong about what was in their interest, and

so make laws intended to be in their own interests, but not actually in their

own interests (339e). As for D, this undermines all the other theses. If

justice is, with D, the other's good, then how can the stronger, or a

government, or the rulers, be just in pursuing their own interest - as A, B

and C require?

So this evidence could easily be taken to support Macguire's claim (1)

that Thrasymachus is simply lost in these perplexities. But in fact these

perplexities can be solved. This is the question to ask: Is Thrasymachus'

thesis a descriptive thesis about justice, or a prescriptive thesis?

For my purposes here, this distinction between the 'prescriptive' and the

'descriptive' might as well be exhaustive. It is not, of course: there are

plenty of other interesting things to do with words besides prescription and

description (cp. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations1,23). But I have

been unable to think how any of those other activities could be relevant to

the elucidation of Thrasymachus' thesis (though naturally I welcome sug-

gestions). Therefore I will proceed upon the basis that, if Thrasymachus'

thesis about justice says anything worth hearing, and does not fit the one of

these two alternatives, then it must fit the other.

This is how I shall be using the distinction. If Thrasymachus' projectregarding the social practice called LxaLoru'v1 is simply to observe and

3







describe it, I will say that he has adescriptive thesis about justice. Whereas,

if Thrasymachus' project regarding justice is to make reference to justice inorder to offer us reasons to behave or live in a certain way, I will say that

Thrasymachus has a prescriptive thesis about justice. I shall argue that

Thrasymachus does not have a prescriptive thesis about justice, and does

have a descriptive thesis about justice.

One important complication which will appear in this. Although Thrasy-

machus does not hold a prescriptive thesis about justice, he does hold a

prescriptive thesis about a character trait which is, very often though not

always, coextensive with the character trait of justice. This fact makes it

look at times almost as if Thrasymachus does hold a prescriptive thesisabout justice itself, rather than about the other charactertrait with which it

very often coincides. But I shall argue that this appearance is deceptive. if

Thrasymachus ever prescribes justice or just behaviour, he does so, as

Aristotle would say, only xaxa oaufP3E0Pxo6;,nd not essentially.

II

If Thrasymachus did hold a prescriptive thesis about justice, what form

could it take? Note first that neither Thrasymachusnor Socrates thinks, aswe are often inclined to think, that 'a just person' means pretty much the

same as 'a good person' and that the word 'justice' is, or can be, simply a

(rough) synonym for the phrase 'moral rightness'. Many modern moral

philosophers, for example Professor Hare, have tended to talk as if 'It

would be just to do F' were often or even usually a straightforward equiv-

alent to 'It would be morally right to do F'. But however this may be for us,

it cannot have been so for Socrates and Thrasymachus,for the reason noted

by Mrs. Foot in my epigraph. The modern moral philosophers suppose that

someonewho is told that it would be

'morally right'to do

somethingcannot

go on to question this without making a mistake. It is, they say, merely

incoherent to ask 'But what reason do I have to do what is morally right?'.

If, tacitly or openly,they accept the rough-synonym view of the meaning of

'justice', they must presumably think that 'What reason do I have to do

what is just?' is similarly incoherent. But Thrasymachus and Socrates

apparently do not think it merely incoherent to ask 'But what reason do I

have to do what is just?'. However else Socrates may try to meet Thrasy-

machus' attack on justice, it is not by accusing him of this kind of incoher-

ence. It follows, as Mrs. Foot notes, that Thrasymachusand Socrates must

mean something rather different from these modern theorists when they

talk of 'justice'. Their concept is more specific, less grandiosely all-embrac-

4







ing, 'thicker' as Bernard Williams would say2. In particular, 'justice' for

them is not only a concept which might be used in the justification of

particulardeeds or ways of living. It is a concept which itself stands in need

of justification, by reference to the more basic notion of that flourishing

human life to which justice or injustice may or may not be seen as contrib-

uting, and to question which is (perhaps) what they would find puzzling in

the way that modern theorists find it puzzling to question why we should do

what is 'morally right'.

It seems, then, that there are two prescriptive theses about justice, either

or both of which Thrasymachus might be offering us. (I) He may be

answering the question 'How should we behave?' by replying 'We should

behave in such and such a way, because it's just to behave like that'. Or (II)

He may be answering the more basic question 'But why should we be just?'

by replying 'Because it's a human excellence to be just'. Form I of the

prescriptive thesis will say that, in general, 'x is just' provides creatures like

us with a reason of some sort for doing x. Form II of the prescriptive thesis

will say that, in general, justice is a good thing to have in your character, a

character trait which is important or even essential to a flourishing human

life: in other words, a virtue.

Although I and II are logically distinct theses, there is no problem about

supposing Thrasymachus to be asserting both. Rather, as we shall see, there

is a problem about supposing him not to be asserting both theses of such a

pair. For, evidently, I prompts the question 'Why does "x is just" provide

creatures like us with a reason of some sort for doing x?' and, plausibly, II

answers this question. I is a thesis about one level of practical reasoning:

namely, our motivation for doing certain sorts of actions rather than others.

II is a thesis about another level of practical reasoning: namely, our motiva-

tion for pursuingcertain sorts of developments in our characters ratherthan

others. Within the framework of an ethics of virtue, I and II are comple-

mentary theses.I now argue that Thrasymachus does not argue either for I or for II, nor

(III, IV) for these theses in 'inverted' forms.

Suppose that Thrasymachus is arguing for I. Then he is recommending

certain forms of behaviour by reference to their being just. Why should we

do what is in the interest of the stronger, or obey the laws, or promote the

interest of the prevailing government, or promote the good of others?

Given I, the Thrasymachean answer will be: 'Because it's just to do so'.

2V. BernardWilliams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy(London: Collins, 1985),Chapter7.

5







The obviousproblemfacingthis is simplythat Thrasymachus'emarks

about justice, if construed n this way as recommendations bouthow toact, contradicteach other. Thiscan be shownby comparing nly the first

and the last of Thrasymachus'ourremarks,A and D3.

Suppose,withI, that'xisjust'givesusa reason o do x, and, withA, that

justice swhatever s intheinterestof thestronger.Thenit followsthat'x is

in the interestof the stronger'givesus a reasonto do x. But now suppose,

with D, that justice is also 'another'sgood'. By parityof reasoning, y is

another's good' will also give us a reasonto do y. But what if I am the

strongernsomesituation,and my goodconflictswithsome otherperson's?

In that case, it maybe true boththat'x isanother'sgood',and that 'not-x sin the interestof the stronger'.Inwhichcase, apparently, havereasonto

do both x andnot-x; which s absurd.

SoThrasymachuss notarguingor formI of theprescriptivehesis: hat,

ingeneral,'xis just'providescreaturesike uswithareasonof somesortfor

doingx.

WhataboutformII of the prescriptivehesis:thatjusticeis a virtue,a

desirable raitto havein yourcharacter?Thrasymachuss not arguing his

either, for at 348che explicitlydeniesthatjusticeis a virtue:

SOCRATES:Come now, what will you say about justiceand injustice?

One of them, I suppose, is a virtueon yourview, andthe other a vice?

THRASYMACHUS: Yes - why not?

SOCRATES:Justice,I take it, is the virtue,andinjustice he vice?

THRASYMACHUS:Is that likely, you sweet fool, when I say that in-

justice is profitable (XvoTEkEXv) ut justice isn't?

SOCRATES:Thenwhat do you mean?

THRASYMACHUS:The opposite.

SOCRATES:What,thatjusticeis a vice?

THRASYMACHUS:Well, no - but it is naivesimplicity ;naviUEvvCtav

EVJYIOELaV).

In my technique for refuting the idea that Thrasymachus'doctrine about justice is

primarilya prescriptiveone, and in my emphasisupondefinitionD of justice, I am, of

course, influencedby Kerferd'sclassictreatment(DurhamUniversity ournal1947-8,as

cited). However, (i) I spell the argumentout differently o Kerferd,whomakesno use of

anydistinction between levels of practicalreasoning;and (ii) my conclusionis different

from his. Unlike him I do not use this technique to argue that Thrasymachus hinksinjusticeis a virtue, but (on the contrary) o arguethatThrasymachushinksthatneither

injusticenor justice is either a virtueor a vice.

6









348dl-2:

SOCRATES: Thrasymachus, do the unjust seem to you to be intelligent(PQ6vLlVLoL)nd good (aEyaOo0)?THRASYMACHUS: Yes - those who are able to be completely unjust ...

348e 1-4:

SOCRATES: ... But this is what made me wonder: that you put injustice

in the class of virtue and wisdom, but justice in the opposite classes.

THRASYMACHUS: But that is just what I do.

348e7-349a3:

SOCRATES: Now it is clear that you are going to say that [what is unjust] isgood (xakcov)and strong, and that you will render to it all the additions that

we rendered to what is just - since you have dared to put it [sc. what is

unjust] in [the class of] virtue and wisdom (rEL&bi yFexai Ev &'eETi aiT'o

xait oopqt eloPX&oAagOrEvat).THRASYMACHUS: What a good prophet you are.

The first and simplest way to defend IV would be to say this: that if

Thrasymachus denies that justice is a virtue, then he must for that very

reason hold that justice is a vice and injustice a virtue. But at 348c, where

Thrasymachus certainly asserts that justice is not a virtue, he also deniesthat justice is a vice:

SOCRATES: Then what do you mean?

THRASYMACHUS: The opposite.

SOCRATES: What, that justice is a vice?

THRASYMACHUS: Well,no. . (oi)x...

So Thrasymachus does not think that justice is a vice, and injustice is a

virtue, simply because justice is not a virtue. But might he not hold that

justice is a vice and injustice a virtue on other grounds? A second, and moresubtle, line of argument for IV might point to what comes next at 348c:

THRASYMACHUS: Well, no - but it is naive simplicity (3navic Evvatcav

vIOEMav).

SOCRATES. You mean then that injustice is duplicity (xaXoiOELav)?

THRASYMACHUS. No: injustice is practical intelligence (EvBouXkLav).

Here, it can be argued, Thrasymachus identifies justice and naive simplic-

ity, and injustice and practical intelligence. Now he clearly holds that naive

simplicity is a vice, and that practicalintelligence, as opposed to duplicity, isa virtue. In which case Thrasymachusmust, surely, hold that justice is a vice

8







(namely, naive simplicity), and that injustice is a virtue (namely, practical

intelligence).

Thrasymachus nowhere actually affirms the conclusion which this second

argument attributes to him, that justice is a vice and injustice a virtue.

However, he does say that 'the unjust are intelligent (qwevLlioL) nd good

(&yctOo')' (348dl-2); and he does say that he 'puts injustice in the class of

virtue and wisdom, but justice in the opposite classes' (348el-4; 348e7-

349a3). So can we not infer, without further ado, to the conclusion that he

thinks that justice is a vice and injustice a virtue?

No: for at least three reasons. First, to say that injustice is 'in the class of

virtue and wisdom' (ev CIwETij xat oopL'ct FQ?t), but that justice is 'in

the opposite classes' (Ev ToL; EvavUtot;), is not equivalent to saying

that injustice simply is virtue (or wisdom). If Plato wants Thrasymachus to

say that 'injustice is virtue', why does Thrasymachus not say precisely that,

rather than what he actually says: that 'injustice is in the class of virtue and

wisdom'? (And notice how he sticks to this double formulation. The unjust

are not good, they are 'intelligent and good'; injustice is not virtue or a

virtue, it is 'in the class of virtue and wisdom'.)

Conceding that Thrasymachus means it when he observes that injustice is

'in the class of virtue and wisdom' does not prevent us from denying that

injustice is itself a Thrasymachean virtue. For that observation might mean

rather that for Thrasymachus injustice is characteristic of the virtuous or

excellent man, without itself being one of the cardinal character traits that

make him a virtuous man. It might mean that his injustice is a secondary

feature of his character, an incidental consequence of his havingsome other

characteristic which is cardinal, essential to his excellence. (What other

characteristic? If we take 'virtue and wisdom' as a hendiadys, then we can

make room for the suggestion that the characteristic in question is 'the

virtue of wisdom'; where 'wisdom' is taken of course in a suitably Thrasy-

machean sense - i.e., as equivalent to 'practical intelligence'.)The second reason is that, if Thrasymachusdoes hold IV, that justice is a

vice and injustice is a virtue, then it will be very odd if he does not also hold

III, that 'x is unjust' states a reason for doing x. If he holds IV without

holding III, then he supposes that there is a virtue of which he cannot say

how practical reasoning articulates it in action; but how can anything which

has no specifiable way of affecting action be a virtue? Yet we have already

seen why he cannot hold II1, any more than he can hold I: because given

Thrasymachus' own explicit remarks about justice, it yields contradictory

practical imperatives.

9







Thethirdpointisthatthissecondargumentdependscruciallyuponthere

beinga strict dentitybetweeninjusticeandpracticalntelligence.For it isargued hat (a) injustice s (thesameas)practicalntelligence; b) practicalintelligence s a Thrasymachean irtue;and therefore(c) injustice s (thesameas) aThrasymacheanirtue.ButThrasymachusejects hisargumentbecausehe rejects(a). For(a) tobe true sforthistobe true:anybehaviouris practicallyntelligentbehaviourf andonlyif it is unjustbehaviour: Vx)(Px <-> Ux). But thisbiconditionals doublyfalsified,forThrasymachusclearlyholdsthattherecan bebothunjustbehaviourwhich snotpracticallyintelligentbehaviour, and practically ntelligentbehaviourwhich is not

unjust behaviour. This is a consequence of Thrasymachus'emarks, orexampleat344c, aboutthe need forfullorperfect njustice o be accompa-nied by power:

'Thus, Socrates, injustice is stronger,andmoreliberated,and more masterlythanjustice when it comes to thefull (Nxavds yLyvot )..

Thrasymachusdoes not hold that any unjust act I do exemplifiesmypractical ntelligence:only the unjustact which is calculated o matchmypower.Actingin accordwithThrasymacheanracticalntelligence, here-fore, cannot simplymean actingunjustly;rather t must meanactingasunjustlyas you can get away with. It follows from this that practicalintelligenceandinjusticeare, on Thrasymachus'iew, notonlynot identi-cal; in manysituationsthey are actually nverselyproportionate o eachother. Glaucon'sstoryof Gygesin Bk.II brings hispointout well. Com-paretwo men, equallyempowered,whobothwant to do whatGygesdid,butneitherof whomhasGyges'ring.The one whotriesto do whatGygesdidwithoutthe ring s the moreunjust,butthe one who restrainshimself,knowinghe will neverget awaywithit, is the morepracticallyntelligent.

ThusThrasymacheanracticalntelligenceandThrasymacheannjustice

cannotbe identified:henceinjustice s not shown to be a Thrasymacheanvirtuejust becausepractical ntelligence s. Thiscompletesmy argumentagainstprescriptive hesis IV, whichwas the last prescriptive hesis stillavailable.So, if it is coherentat all,Thrasymachus'hesiscannot,inanyofthese senses, be a prescriptivehesis.

III

Considernow the profferedalternative: hat Thrasymachus'hesis is a

decriptive hesis.

10







In this case, Thrasymachus is not primarilyconcerned to tell us why, as a

matter of policy, we should choose justice (or for that matter injustice). Hismain concern is to tell us what, as a matter of fact, justice is like; to observe

and describe the social practice called bxa1orC'v1, justice.

What is the nature of that social practice, according to Thrasymachus?

For him justice is neither a virtue nor a vice; it is a device. Consider in its

context what I labelled (4):

'You do not realise, Socrates,thatjusticeand the just is in realityanotherperson'sgood (thatis, it is the strongerand the rulingperson's nterest)andone's own injury- if one obeys and complies. But injustice is the opposite, and gives control overthose who are in truthsimpleandjust (Tiv d;ga'kTJ06g EiMi0OX6VTe xai btxaiwv).

Butthey, since they arebeingcontrolled,do what is in the interest of the one who isstronger.' (343c-d)

Thrasymachus believes that justice is a device in this sense: that it is a trick

played on the naive by the cunning, to make the naive give up any ad-

vantages they may have over the cunning. He gives us what are clearly

meant as descriptions of how this works in social practice:

'The just person always come out the worse in his encounters with the unjustperson. For one thing, suppose they co-operate together in some partnership.When the partnershipis dissolved, you will invariablyfind that the just personcomes away, not with more, but with less than the unjustperson. Again, taketheirrelationswith the city. Whenever there are taxes of some sort to be paid, the justpersoncontributes more thanthe averageamount, and the unjustpersonless; butwhenever there are benefits to be claimed, the just persongainsnothing, and theunjust person gainsa lot.' (343d)

For another example of what Thrasymachus means when he describes the

just person as E"Thr'I;,aive or simple, take the deed of the Anglo-Saxon

general Beorhtnoth, fighting the Vikings at the Battle of Maldon in 991

A.D.:

'The Northmen andthe English were . . . separatedbyan arm of the river; illedbythe incomingtide, it could only be crossedby a . . . causeway,difficult to force inthe face of a determineddefence . . . But the Vikingsknew, or so it would seem,what mannerof a manthey had to deal with:they askedfor leave to cross the ford,so that a fairfightcould be joined. Beorhtnothacceptedthe challenge andallowedthem to cross. This act of pride and misplacedchivalry proved fatal. Beorhtnothwas slain and the English routed . . .'

(J.R.R. Tolkien's account: TheHomecoming of Beorhtnoth(London: Unwin,1975, p. 149-150)

Beorhtnoth's failure, in Thrasymachus'eyes, would not be to do with a fatalflaw in his character of pride and misplaced chivalry', as Tolkien suggests

11







(in line with the Maldonpoet's 'ofermode':v. TheBattleof Maldon, ines

85-954).For Thrasymachus,Beorhtnoth's atal flawwould be his lack of?Fi4oukXa,practical ntelligence: his inability, or refusal, to see through

the socialpracticeof justice. He fails to see that the institutionof justice is

simplynot somethingwhich humanshave any need of if they are to liveflourishing ives;on the contrary, o act according o justice is, in normal

cases, to choose to contributeto the flourishingof others' lives at theexpense of one's own flourishing. Justice as a social institution is, then, the

embodiment of a trick; a trickwhich the stronger play on the weaker, which

rulers play on their faithful subjects, and which the Vikings play on Beohrt-

noth - with the very natural result, as Thrasymachus would see it, thatBeorhtnoth not only ceases to have a flourishing life, but ceases to live at

all.

If this is Thrasymachus' escriptive hesisaboutjustice, then thereare

four interesting consequences. First, it becomes apparent that Thrasy-

machus is not an 'immoralist' - if by this it is meant that, in Shorey's words,

'Thrasymachus' "Umwertung aller Werte" reverses the normal applica-

tion' of all moral terms. For (i) Thrasymachusdoes not reverse, simply hold

the mirror image of, any standard moral views at all. He may believe that

justice is not a virtue, but he does not, ipso facto, believe that justice is avice; nor that injustice is a virtue. And (ii) he does not express disagreement

with all standard moral views; he expresses disagreement with standard

moral views about justice. What his views are of the other virtues in Plato's

list-temperance, courage and wisdom - we do not hear. We certainly have

no reason to think that he would deny thatcourage and wisdom have at least

some importance for human flourishing.

Secondly: we have seen that Thrasymachus' thesis about justice is a

descriptive one, and not a prescriptive one. But we can now see that, quite

apart from his descriptions of the nature of justice, Thrasymachus does

have a general prescriptive thesis, a view about what human flourishing is,

and a more specific prescriptive thesis, a view about what character traits

enable one to flourish, both of which have a bearing on our attitude to

justice. Thrasymachus believes that human flourishing consists roughly in

this: in getting for oneself as much as possible of what are uncontroversially

agreed, in our society as much as in his, to be clear and obvious examples of

good things to have: money (343e), property and valuables like treasure

(344b), and power over others to bend them to my will (344b). Now one

'Text and translationof TheBattleof Maldoncan be found in R. Hamer, ed., A Choice

of Anglo-Saxon Verse (London: Faber, 1970).

12







character trait which we need to obtain this sort of good life is practical

intelligence. For practical intelligence involves knowning how to use the

device justice; and so what is prescribed for us about justice is that we

should use it, as the device it truly is, to help us achieve just these sorts of

good things. But this recommendation, that by putting practical intelli-

gence to work we use justice as a device, is not a prescriptive thesis about

justice, but about practical intelligence.

Thirdly, and consequent to this, Thrasymachus'stated or implicitview of

human flourishing may even suggest that he has a list of four cardinalvirtues

to rival Plato's. At 344c he mentions three of these virtues: 'Thus, Socrates,

when it comes to the full, injustice is stronger and more unrestrained and

more imperious than injustice . . '. Why is injustice to be preferred to

justice? As we have seen, not because it is itself a virtue; rather because it is,

in general and as a rule, more in accordance with the Thrasymachean

virtues of Strength ('ioxtU3),f Unrestraint(XEvuOEQcta;or the justifi-cation of my translation cp. Gorgias 492c), and of Imperiousness (bEolo-

tEa). What is the fourth Thrasymachean virtue? It is not Injustice, for

reasons we have already seen. It is rather that quality of mind which,

Thrasymachus says, discerns the realities of the social institution of justice,

and of which he sees unjust behaviour as being, normally, a manifestation:

namely Practical Intelligence, cv3ouVXca.

IV

The fourth consequetice of this descriptive understanding of Thrasyma-

chus' thesis about justice is that we can now reconcile his remarks about

justice, A-D, with which we began, and also sort out the sheep from the

goats among the commentators' opinions about Thrasymachus, 1-7.

First, then, his observation that justice is 'another's good' (D) means that

going in for justice entails doing like Beorhtnoth, entails being persuadedor duped by the other person into giving up all your advantages over her. So

when Thrasymachus says that justice is 'the interest of the government in

power' (C), he will mean that whatever government is in power, it will,

wittingly or not, be playing exactly this confidence trick of justice on its

subjects. In persuading them or legislating for them to act justly, it will be

causing them to do what is in fact in its own interest. If the Thrasymachean

account of virtue is right, perhaps the citizens would do much better for

themselves, and for their own interests, if they did not generally act justly by

(to take one prominent example) 'obeying the laws' (B). But they are beingdeluded by their rulers into thinking that they have some good reason to act

13







justly. And in being so deluded, they are in truthacting as weaklings, not in

their own interest, but 'in the interest of the stronger' (A). Here 'thestronger' could mean either 'those who (already) have the strength of

character to see through the trick of justice', or 'those who by seeing

through the trick of justice, and seeing how to use it as a device or weapon,

have become the stronger'; or perhaps it could refer to both groups.

As for the commentators: (1) Evidently we do not have to think, with

Maguire, that Plato's Thrasymachus is just confused. (2) So far from his

being a political revolutionary, Thrasymachus' view is that all political

structures tend to have the same effect (338b). The only way in which they

influence human flourishing is that those at the top of political structuresflourish, and those at the bottom do not. The ideal situation, because it

maximises one's power over others, is to be a tyrant (344a). That he

believes this, however, does not mean that Thrasymachus is arguing that

such a situation exemplifies 'Natural Justice' (a good thing) as opposed to

'Conventional Justice' (a bad thing), or that a tyrannicalconstitution is the

best one. Thrasymachus'question is: 'Best for whom?'. Your justice is good

for me and badfor you, and my justice is good for you and badfor me; but

there is for Thrasymachus no interesting sense in which any old justice,

yours or mine indifferently, is either good or bad without qualification.(That is the point of his rejection of the prescriptive theses, and of the

assertion that justice is neither a virtue or a vice, but a device.) So likewise,

a tyranny is the best constitution for the ruler and the worstfor theruled;but

there is no sense in Thrasymachus' eyes, in calling tyranny a good or bad

state of affairs without reference to some person's good or bad. In short

Thrasymachus is neither a revolutionary nor a fascist; he's an opportunist.

(3) No doubt Thrasymachus'sremarks do bearcomparison with, e.g., the

speeches of the Athenian envoys to Melos (Thucydides 5.84-116) - speech-

es which express just the kind of belief in 'Naturrecht' which Pauly-Wisso-

wa foists on Thrasymachus. (So for example Thuc. 5.89: 'Justice, in human

affairs, is judged according to the balance of compulsion: those with an

advantage do whatever they are able to, those at a disadvantage suffer

whatever they have to'.) On the other hand, Maclntyre seems wrong to say

that Thrasymachus would agree with the 'Thucydidean' thesis that aQETinis

one thing, practical intelligence quite another'. For of course Thrasy-

machus rejects Plato's conceptions of &QETf and of practical intelligence,

and so must also reject the Platonic ways of connecting them. But Thrasy-

machus' reason for rejecting these Platonic views is precisely that Thrasy-

machus has his own conceptions of what a'QEnTnd practical intelligence

14









command affect the virtues of those who obey. "I serve, you serve, we

serve" - so here even the hypocrisy of the rulers intones - and alas, if thefirst ruler is only the first servant '

Nietzsche deplores the 'hypocrisy' of the ruler in pretending to the virtues

of his subjects (like the Pope, who is Servus servorum Dei). He deplores

this kind of behaviour because he thinks that it stunts and warps the

development of the Ubermensch. Thrasymachus, by contrast, would ap-

plaud this sort of hypocrisy as a piece of riU3ouXta;s Glaucon says in his

recapitulationof Thrasymachus' iews, EOX4TI yt CEbxLa bO6XELV 8&-

xaLov [01 OVTa, 'the height of injustice is to seem just without being just'

(361a). The person in this situation, in fact, gets the best of both worlds: forshe gets all the good repute and honour of justice, without having to suffer

any of its disadvantages. Thrasymachus would no doubt agree with

Nietzsche that, if one is foolish enough to thinkjustice a virtue, then one can

damage one's soul. But provided justice is recognised to be a device and not

a virtue, and used accordingly, it can be a very useful thing to the superior

person on Thrasymachus'view. In short: Nietzsche thinks that the so-called

virtue of Justice, and indeed all 'slave morality', is a device of the weak for

preventing the strong from getting too great an advantage over them;

whereas Thrasymachus, on the contrary, thinks that Justice is a device ofthe strong for keeping the weak in their place.

(6) Houranian conventionalism is disposed of by my remarks about the

compatibility of A-D in Section I. And lastly (7) the Kerferd/Foot view,

that Thrasymachus argued from the premise 'that injustice was more profit-

able than justice' to the conclusion 'that a man who had the strength to get

away with injustice had reason to follow this as the best way of life', is also,

if I am right, to be rejected. For my view has the consequence that injustice,

as such, will not be Thrasymachus' 'best way of life'; for considerations of

justice and injustice will not feature at all in Thrasymachean practical

reasoning, or not at least (to borrow a phrase from Aristotle) as supplying

'premisses of the good'. Hence, though it might on my interpretation of

Thrasymachus' view be true 'that a man who had the strength to get away

with injustice had reason to follow this as the best way of life', such a

Thrasymachean agent's reason to live some form of the unjust life could not

be: 'Because this life is unjust'. The injustice of his preferred life is not

central, but incidental, to the practical reasoning on account of which he

chooses to live that way. For it is true that the person of Thrasymachean

virtue does, typically but not always, do what is unjust; but he does not do

what is unjust under the description 'act of injustice', but under the descrip-

tion 'act of ci4ouXv(a'.His reasons for living like that would be given, not

16







by reference to a supposed virtue of injustice; but by reference, firstly, to

the Thrasymachean conception of the flourishing human life which I have

tried to develop, and, secondly, to the human character traits (especially

'ri4ouia) by which the good life so conceived is to be rendered attain-

able: which is to say, by reference to the virtues of Thrasymachus5.

Wolfson College, Oxford

' I am grateful to MalcolmSchofield and Roger Crispfor written comments on earlierdrafts. In conversation, Steven Everson and David Charles gave useful criticisms.ElizabethTelfer, RichardStalleyandMary Haightmadevaluablepointswhen I presen-ted one form of the paper at Glasgow University, as did Roger Trigg at WarwickUniversity. I am also indebted to my pupils David Kensingerand James MacLain of

WilliamsCollege, Massachussetts,U.S.A., for obliging me, in Trinity Term 1992, tothink harderabout Thrasymachus.

17

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