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Chapter 13
Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System
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The Price Stability Goal
• Low and stable inflation
• Inflation
– Creates uncertainty and difficulty in planning for the future
– Lowers economic growth
– Strains social fabric
• Nominal anchor to contain inflation expectations
• Time-inconsistency problem
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Other Goals of Monetary Policy
• High employment
• Economic growth
• Stability of financial markets
• Interest-rate stability
• Foreign exchange market stability
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Should Price Stability be the Primary Goal?
• In the long run there is no conflict between the goals
• In the short run it can conflict with the goals of high employment and interest-rate stability
• Hierarchical mandate
• Dual mandate
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Origins of the Federal Reserve System
• Resistance to establishment of a central bank– Fear of centralized power
– Distrust of moneyed interests
• No lender of last resort– Nationwide bank panics on a regular basis
– Panic of 1907 so severe that the public was convinced a central bank was needed
• Federal Reserve Act of 1913– Elaborate system of checks and balances
– Decentralized
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Federal Reserve Banks
• The Federal Reserve Act created 12 Federal Reserve districts, each with a district bank.
• Each district bank has a board of directors consisting of nine members.
• Subject to the board’s approval, the nine directors elect the president of that bank.
• The 12 Federal Reserve banks carry out many duties of the Fed.
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Federal Reserve Districts
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Formal Structure of the Fed
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Informal Structure of the Fed
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Ben BernankeAlan Greenspan
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Member Banks
• The Federal Reserve Act required all national banks to become member banks.
• State banks were given the choice of whether or not to become members.
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Board of Governors
• The Board of Governors is composed of seven members appointed by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate.
• Members serve 14-year, nonrenewable terms.
• It administers monetary policy.
• It has certain responsibilities relating to financial regulation.
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Federal Open Market Committee
• The Federal Open Market Committee is composed of 12 members and directs the Fed’s open market operations.
• Members of the FOMC are the Board of Governors and five district bank presidents.
• The FOMC issues directives to the trading desk at the district bank in New York.
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Power in the Fed
• The Board of Governors and the FOMC exert most of the Fed’s formal influence.
• The informal power of the chairman, the board staff, and the FOMC predominates.
• Member banks have little actual influence within the system.
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Handling External Pressure
• The Fed was designed to operate independently of external pressures.
• In reality the Fed operates in a political arena, and is subject to political pressure.
• The President exercises pressure through his appointments to the Board of Governors.
• The Fed is the creation of Congress, which can amend the Fed’s charter and powers.
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Factors that Motivate the Fed
• The public interest view holds that the Fed acts in the interest of the general public.
• The principal-agent view implies that the Fed acts to increase its power and prestige.
• The principal-agent view also implies there could be a political business cycle.
• The evidence in favor of a political business cycle is at best mixed.
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Central Bank Independence
Factors making Fed independent
1. Members of Board have long terms
2. Fed is financially independent: This is most important
Factors making Fed dependent
1. Congress can amend Fed legislation
2. President appoints Chairmen and Board members and can influence legislation
Overall: Fed is quite independent
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Comparison of Major Central Banks
• The Fed has the longest fixed term of office for bank board members (14 years).
• The Fed has the shortest term for the head of the central bank (4 years).
• Only Germany had a federal structure for the central bank. Deutsche Bundesbankhas greater independence than the Fed
• The overall degree of independence of the central bank varies.
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Comparison of Major Central Banks
1. Bank of England least independent: Govt. makes policy decisions
2. European Central Bank: most independent—price stability primary goal
3. Bank of Canada and Japan: fair degree of independence, but not all on paper
4. Trend to greater independence: New Zealand, European nations
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Fed Independence
• The issue of the Fed’s independence arises
because of negative reaction to Fed policy.
• Proponents for Fed independence argue that politicians would do a poor job.
• Opponents of Fed independence claim that elected officials should make public policy.
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Should Fed be Independent?
Should Fed be Independent?Case For:1. Independent Fed likely has longer-run
objectives, politicians don't: evidence is independence produces better policy outcomes throughout the whole
2. Avoids political business cycle3. Less likely deficits will be inflationary
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Should Fed be Independent?
Case Against:
1. Fed may not be accountable
2. Hinders coordination of monetary and fiscal policy
3. Fed has often performed badly
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Central Bank Independence in Other Countries
• Central bank independence is becoming greater.
• Countries with the most independent central banks have the lowest average rates of inflation.
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The People’s Bank of China