CHAPTER-2: DISASTER MANAGEMENT BY GOVT AGENCIES – SELECTED...

Chapter-2: Disaster Management by Govt.Agencies – Selected Case Studies

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CHAPTER-2: DISASTER MANAGEMENT BY GOVT AGENCIES –

SELECTED CASE STUDIES

In the recent times some of the crises like urban floods, earthquake and drought have

been causing considerable losses and creating the distress hotspots in the country. The

Mumbai floods 2005 along with the ONGC, Mumbai High disaster caused a loss of Rs

30,000 crore. Similarly, the recurrent droughts have been indirectly driving the small and

marginal farmers into extremely distress situation falling in the trap of local money

lenders. The disaster management strategies by Government agencies have been analysed

in the case studies described in this chapter.

In the government approach, there is a visible and subtle transitions leading from disaster

response to disaster risk reduction.2.1

The key points, listed below, reflects how a holistic

disaster risk reduction strategy is evolving in India:

i) Till Killari earthquake in 1993, India had been responding to natural disasters with a

relief centric approach. Very limited efforts were taken on mitigation and preparedness

and those were not connected with sustainable development efforts in the country. India

learnt from Killari earthquake experiences and started placing more focus on mitigation,

economic recovery and community participation;

ii) Following Andhra Pradesh cyclone in 1997 and Orissa super-cyclone in 1999, disaster

risk management concepts further developed; initiatives were led by affected states in

association with central government and multi-lateral agencies but have not been very

successful. However, the need was felt having proper institutional and legal framework

in disaster risk management;

iii) Bhujearthquake in 2001 prompted major institutional and legal framework; disaster

management shifted from Ministry of Agriculture to Ministry of Home Affairs;

mitigation and preparedness formally recognised at various levels; link between

disaster management and sustainable development recognized; disaster management

recognised also as a “political agenda”;


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iv) Since then, India has taken rapid strides such as:

� Gujarat disaster management strategy widely acclaimed – Honourable mention for

Sasakawa Award;

� Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Program initiated – Helped develop a cadre of

motivated and trained disaster management practitioners;

� Disaster Management Act passed by Indian Parliament;

� National Disaster Management Policy and Guidelines issued by the National

Disaster Management Authority (NDMA).

v) The major challenges/lessons listed out include:

� Inadequate review of past disasters – poor ability to learn from the past;

� Unable to evaluate future disaster risks;

� Inability to fully engage various stakeholders;

� Many programs based on empirical knowledge;

� Mismatch in scale of problem and programs under implementation

vi) These challenges could be addressed by putting into practices the learning from the

disasters of the past while preparing to mitigate the future disasters. Knowledge

management aspects, as listed below, have been highlighted as the key to effective

disaster management in future:

� Knowledge of contributory factors,

� Knowledge of consequences of disaster,

� Knowledge of mitigation measures,

� Knowledge of preparedness measures,

� Multi-disciplinary knowledge is required – technical, administrative, social,

political, financial, etc.

vii) Knowledge management cycle in disaster management covering assessment of lacunae,

empirical and academic knowledge, and specifications to state of the art practices was

advocated to form the basis of regulatory, social and policy inputs.

viii) Focusing on knowledge management as a key input for disaster risk reduction, it could

be concluded that:

� Lessons from the past provide important (but not total) knowledge,


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� Future strategies should be based on realistic understanding of disasters and the role

of all stakeholders – KNOWLEDGE IS THE KEY,

� Strategies should aim to support sustainable development,

� Disaster Risk Management should be embedded in various regular programs of all

stakeholders.

The Government response to some of the specific disasters in the recent times is

summarized below:2.2

2.1 Case Study 1: Mumbai Floods 2005

Mumbai city, having an area of 437 sqkm with a population of 12 million, came to a

complete halt owing to the unprecedented rainfall of 994 mm during the 24 hours on 26 July

2005. At least 419 people (and 16 000 cattle) were killed as a result of the flash floods and

landslides in Mumbai municipal area, and another 216 as a result of flood-related illnesses.

Over 100,000 residential and commercial establishments and 30, 000 vehicles were

damaged.This was the highest rain fall (for one day) ever recorded in India from past 100

years. The previous highest was atCherrapunji - 985 mm in 1974.

On 26th July2006, Mumbai received a record- breaking rain of 94 cm. Thousands of

Mumbaikars were stranded. Streets turned rivers and transport networks came to a complete

halt. Mumbai’s suburban rail and Bus system both lurched to a dead stop. Air services were

also affected. Massive water logging and congestion paralyzed telephone lines and cell phone

systems. Electricity was shut off in many places for several days, prompting the Government

to order electricity supply companies to resume operations forthwith. The Bombay Stock

Exchange suspended trading. The armed forces were called in for rescue and food

distribution work. Government authorities urged people to remain indoors.

The rain fall started early in the morning at 8:30 and it gradually started to pour down heavily

by around 3:30 PM to 4:30 PM. During this duration there was a heavy rainfall of around

190.3 mm. This was the highest rainfall recorded throughout the day. This heavy rainfall was

accompanied with high tides at around 3:50 pm. Due to these high tides the sea level


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increased by 4.48 m which made the sea water to come in to the drain which led to increase

in water level in the drainage system. There was no way for the rain water to drain. This led

to the flood.

One more reason for the flood was that the sewage pumps shutdown. To prevent damage to

the pumps at the sewage pumping stations, pumps were switched off. This led to the back

flow of the sewage water.

An assessment of strength and weakness of Governmental systems in handling Mumbai

floods 2005 has been highlighted below:

Strength

� Response of various agencies of Government was quick. Army was deployed within 12

hours of the first day of incessant rainfall of 27th

July 2006. Indian Army deployed 16

columns and 15 medical teams, Indian Navy put 16 relief teams and Indian Air Force

deployed 2 helicopters for rescue and relief operations in the affected areas. 3 teams of

Disaster Management Battalions provided by the CRPF were placed with DG Police for

rescue and relief operations. These helped rescue operations and helped to restore

normalcy soon.

� Declaration of 27th and 28th July as state holidays, closure of all schools and advisory to

all residents to stay indoors were real smart moves, which helped to ease the situations,

particularly considering the fact that 150,000 commuters and 15,000 school children were

stranded on the road on the first day of the disaster.

� Civil society responded in a big way. Shelter and food was provided to school children

and not a single case of arson or looting was reported despite the preoccupation of

thepolicein rescue operations. This was in sharp contrast to the situation in New Orleans

hurricane a month later.

� Massive immunization programme and effective mobilization of health infrastructure

prevented any major epidemics although as many as 170 persons lost their lives due to

leptospirosis. This could be much worse considering the magnitude and extent of

inundation of low-lying slum areas.


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Weakness

� Unprecedented rainfall completely exposed the weather prediction and early warning

system.

� Both the Indian Meteorological Department, in its 24-hour forecast and the National

Centre for MRWF in its 48-hour forecast predicted only 8cm to 16 cm of rain over

Mumbai on 26th

-27th

July but actual rainfall recorded was 94.4 cm. Thus the margin of

error was nearly 600%.

� There were significant intra-regional differences in rainfall due to cloudbursts in some

areas. For example Colaba had a rainfall of 7.3 cm while Santacruz experienced rainfall

of 96 cm. Neither IMD nor NCMRWF could forecast these huge intra city differences in

rainfall.

� While unprecedented rainfall was the main reason of Mumbai flood, other contributing

factors were unplanned urban development in complete disregard of delicate environment

and ecology of the area.

Other contributing factors for the flood were an antiquated storm-water drainage system

of MumbaiCity which is nearly 100 years old and is capable of draining 25 mm of water

per hour against actual rainfall of 96 cm. The drainage system is also clogged due to

heavy ingress of solid waste. Only 3 'outfalls' out of 115 are equipped with floodgates

and there is no way to stop seawater from rushing into the drainage system during high

tide. Rs. 600 crore project for overhauling the drainage system was prepared, but the

project had to be shelved by Bombay Municipal Corporation on cost consideration.

MumbaiCityDisaster Management Plan (DMP) was prepared in 2000 under World Bank

funded earthquake reconstruction project, but the plan was not updated during last five

years. The worst scenario not anticipated in worst affected wards. The process of bottom

up approach not followed in preparation on DMP. Community not involved with

preparation and implementation of disaster management plan. Concerns expressed by


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environmentalists not given any consideration. The city development authorities took no

meaningful flood mitigation project.

Sometimes unplanned development projects without due consideration of the hazards,

risks and vulnerabilities may themselves create or precipitate disasters. For example - a

study on the recent floods in Mumbai has shown that various city development projects in

the recent past had contributed to the crisis such: as (a) Bandra-Kurla complex over 730

acres of mangrove wetland in Mahim creek destroyed the natural drainage system and

cushion against tidal surge, (b) expansion of airport runway diverted the course of Mithi river,

(c) widening of the western expressway seriously compromised the drainage system and (d)

indiscriminate Transferable Development Right (TDR) without consideration of carrying

capacity of the area. Such examples would galore in every State.

2.2 Case Study 2 : Kosi Floods 2008

The response from Government of India to natural disasters has now been overall well

structured. Relief and rehabilitation were followed by long term mitigation and risk reduction

in the major disasters. For example, the floods which affected largely India in 2008 were

responded better. The response to Kosi flood 2008 is worth mentioning as a success story.

On Aug 18, 2008 an embankment of river Kosi in South Nepal breached, leading to change

of the river course completely and finally resulted in one of the worst flood disasters in

Bihar, India. The flood inundated large areas of Nepal and the state of Bihar in India,

affected nearly 4 million people (Nepal and India put together) and caused immeasurable

sufferings to poor people in one of the most backward areas of the region. As per the latest

damage assessment figure released by Govt. of Bihar in Feb 2009, inBihar alone, 3.32

million were affected, while 527 people lost their lives. Close to one million affected

population were evacuated and enabled to take shelters in relief camps for more than 3-4

months. On the mission mode, efforts were made to carry relief materials to remote areas by

helicopter, making the boat available in large numbers, providing the health facilities in the

affected areas and in the camps. The specialized Natural Disaster Response Force, which has

been set up recently by National Disaster Management Authority along with armed and


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paramilitary forces, took part in massive response operations. All these efforts helped in

enhancing the quality of response and keeping the loss of lives to the bare minimum.2.3

Strength: What made Kosi flood response effective?

Considering the nature of disasters, the people in Bihar calls ‘Kosi catastrophe’ not the floods.

Several new and innovative methods were adopted to enhance the quality of response, which

worked well on the ground. An effective management practice followed up by the Govt of

Bihar include the followings: 2.4

i) Control Room setup added efficiency as well as effectiveness

The Control room set-up was comprised of:

� State & District Level- Telephone Nos. adequately publicized through Radio, News

Papers, TV Channels

� 24 x 7 Operational

� Adequate Human Resources Support

� Data Bank concept (Near real time satellite maps showing the inundation dynamics) –

Regular Follow up

� Decision making –Quick Response

ii) Effective use of Technology

� Extensive use of mobile phones by all stakeholders

� Restoration of Tele-communication network

� Satellite Map – Flood Management Information System (FMIS) of Govt. of Bihar &

National Remote Sensing Centre (NRSC) portal of Govt. of India

� Satellite Phone setup in affected districts.

� Mobile Inspector

� Departmental website – Daily updation

iii) Monitoring Response & Relief Activities

� Minister in charge for each affected districts

� Deputation of Senior Officers -Districts/ Sub divisions/ Blocks


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� Inter Departmental Coordination - Daily Review

iv) Rescue & Evacuation Operation

� Identification of inundated areas

� Analysis through Satellite images

� Streamlining of Evacuation Plan

� Massive mobilization of boats from all over the state

� Proper deployment of early responders

� (Extensive deployment and more effective and strategic use of Army/ Navy/ National

Disaster Response Force (NDRF)/State Forces)

� Coordination between Civil &Defence Authorities

� Frequent Aerial Survey

� 24 x 7 Help Line Service at Control Rooms-important telephone numbers publicized.

� Special Appeal to affected populace (Media/Radio/Pamphlets)

v) Relief CampManagement

� Affected & evacuated persons sheltered in camps.

� Concept of mini township-Mega Camps

� People’s participation in camp management

� Utility services to camp inmates

� Special health care for women & children

� Entertainment & skill development initiatives

� Effective policing - special thrust on law & order

� GR & Cash Dole – in two phases

vi) Effective Handling of Media

� Separate Media Room established

� Updated Information on website

� Daily Press Release, Press conference

� Quick response on received information


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Weakness: Regional Cooperation – A Missing Link

With the backdrop of lessons emanating from Kosi flood 2008, the bilateral mechanisms

between India and Nepal gained momentum with the formation of Ministerial and high

level official committees to look into better ways to manage embankments and create more

accountable mechanisms to evolve trans-boundary solutions to problems of Kosi floods in

the future. Further, these committees are likely to examine various ways and means including

building the cluster of high dams, upstream embankments, benefit and resource sharing in the

forms of flood control, irrigation, power etc.

In the unique geographical settings of the region, unquestionably, solution to floods and

water security in South Asia lies in enhanced regional cooperation. It is important to

recognize that floods are the cumulative outcome of rainfall in the catchment areas, siltation

loads on rivers, settlement pattern on the plains and standards of maintenance of flood

protection works. Long term measures for flood risk mitigation include conservation of the

catchments, efficient system of early warning of floods, protection measures at vulnerable

locations and increased awareness about the measures to be taken to live with the

flood.Despite all the structural and non-structural measures, there would be still a residual

risks of flood which cannot be prevented and which we have to learn to live with. The

countries of the region would stand to gain immensely if a sound mechanism of regional

cooperation on flood risk mitigation in South Asia is developed. The specific issues on which

regional cooperation can play significant role in mitigating the risks of flood are as under: 2.3

� Set up an institutional mechanism for regional cooperation on flood risk mitigation in

South Asia on the pattern of Mekong River Commission which has immensely benefited

the countries of South East Asia;

� Develop a regional early warning system on flood whereby upstream countries share

information on rainfall and river discharge etc. with the downstream countries on a

regular basis;

� Develop a data base on regional drainage system, topography, settlement pattern etc. on

the basis of which flood modeling can be carried out at regional and local scales for better

understanding and planning for reducing the risks of flood;


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� Identify the cross country flood protection measures that can be taken up jointly at sub-

regional level;

� Study the short, medium and long term impacts of climate change on the flood situation

in South Asia and develop a long term strategy and planning for adapting to such

impacts;

� Share good practices on flood management adopted by the countries and the

communities;

� Promote greater exchange of ideas through field visits, training programmes etc.

2.3 Case Study 3 : Recent Droughts

While many definitions of drought exist, the importance of drought lies in its overall social,

economic and environmental impacts. With non-structural nature and greater spatial extend,

drought hits the largest number people. The agrarian economies of the developing nations are

therefore more vulnerable. In fact, drought has been one of the primary reasons for

widespread poverty and environmental degradation. Further the climate model predictions

indicate that global change is like to increase the vulnerability of tropical countries to drought,

more in south Asia, where India is likely to get hard hit (IPPC 1996 and 2001).

Droughts refer to a serious shortfall in availability of water, mainly but not exclusively due to

deficiency of rains, affecting agriculture, drinking water supply and industry. Droughts can

occur anywhere in the world bringing misery particularly to most of Africa and large parts of

West and South Asia due to heavy dependence of populations on agriculture and the

generally degraded status of land in these areas- the causative factors being both natural and

man-made. The impact of droughts on societies widely varies depending on `coping

capabilities' and the general health of the national economies concerned.

India is amongst the most vulnerable drought-prone countries of the world; a drought is

reported atleast once in every 3 years in the last 5 decades. What is of more concern is its

increasing frequency. Since the mid-nineties, prolonged and widespread droughts have

occurred in consecutive years while the frequency of droughts has also increased in the


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recent times (FAO, 2002, World Bank, 2003). The impact of droughts is more severe on the

food and agriculture sector. The loss of crop and livelihood and its effect on the agrarian

economy have severe consequences to the overall well-being of the rural poor. Continued

decline of productivity leads to diminished assets and reduced investments.

Within this generalization, droughts in India have their own `peculiarities', brief reference to

which is essential to understand what needs to be done to deal with emergencies more

efficiently. Such `peculiarities' require appreciation of some basic facts.2.5,2.6,2.7

These are:

♦ India has an average annual rainfall of around 1150 mm; no other country has such a

high annual average;

♦ However, more than 80% of rainfall is received in less than 100 days during the South-

west monsoon;

♦ Adequacy of rains coupled with adverse `land-man ratio' compels the farmers to

practice "rain-fed" agriculture in large parts of the country;

♦ Despite the overall liberal precipitation, 21% area receives less than 700 mm rains

annually making such areas the `hot spots' of droughts;

♦ Irrigation, supposedly the perfect answer to drought, itself aggravates the situation in

the long run as Ground-water withdrawal exceeds its replenishment; in the peninsular

region availability of surface water itself becomes restricted whenever there is severe

rainfall insufficiency;

♦ Per capita water availability in the country is steadily declining;

♦ Changing life-styles occasioned by a buoyant economy have immensely escalated

demand for water leading to a situation where even minor setbacks in supply produce

major problems;

These factors demonstrate the complexity of Indian droughts and the constraints which rule

out `perfect solutions'. Further, it is of utmost importance to understand a major corollary of

the Indian `peculiarities'; causes of droughts will be increasingly traceableto the mismatch

between supply and demand, particularly the demand for non-agriculturalpurposes. In other


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words, it is not as if, a pre-existing problem is awaiting better remedies, the 'problem itself is

becoming more complex.

Finally, it needs to be underscored that like anywhere else in the world, agriculture is

affected by weather in all its phases- from tillage and sowing to post harvest disposal. Thus

while adequate availability of water is crucial to the well-being of agriculture, it will continue

to be affected by other variables like temperature, humidity, solar radiation and wind patterns

etc.

2.4 Drought Management – Institutional Framework

The country has institutionalized drought monitoring system, declaration and mitigation at

different levels. The India Meteorological Department carries out drought monitoring and the

forecasting function. It has over time evolved complex parametric models to forecast the

probable arrival and intensity of the monsoon on broad regional scales. To internalize this

mechanism there is an Inter-Ministerial Crop Weather Watch Group within the Ministry of

Agriculture. Whereas drought declaration is the primary responsibility of the concerned State,

post-declaration, the Central Government assists and facilitates finance and institutional

assistance and processes. Financing Relief Expenditure is in accordance with the awards of

the Finance Commission appointed every five years. Under the award, two Funds have been

set up - constituting the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) and Natural Calamity Contingency

Fund (NCCF). The CRF has been in operation for each State with an amount prescribed by

the Commission and is maintained outside the government account, receiving contributions

from Central and State Government in the ratio of 3: 1 in two half yearly instalments. The

declaration of drought sets into motion several response mechanisms at various levels of

management, including constitution of several Special Task Force, High Level Committee

and Control Rooms. In almost all cases, the drought situation is moderated by

commencement of employment generation through relief works, cattle conservation camps,

medical and health arrangements and creation of new water sources.

For a long term solution and mitigation of drought relief problems, Government of India has

put in place several innovative and people centric programmes like the National Watershed


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Development Programme, Drought Prone Area Programme, Desert Development Programme

and very recently the Dry-land Farming Programme.2.8,2.9

2.5 Changing Patterns

It is not mere chance that the description of the situation resulting from failed or erratic

Monsoon has undergone changes over the last century or so. Till the 1920s, it was "famine",

indicating acute dearth of food supply; from the 30s to well into 60s of that century the

phenomenon was "scarcity" connoting inadequacy of agricultural production i.e. a situation

where it is the agriculture dependant who is distressed and not the rest of the population. The

current formulation is "drought" viz. inadequacy of water. There is more than changing

preference for words in this linguistic passage. Credit for this metamorphosis can be given to

the increasing efficacy with which Indian Public Administration has managed to deal with

the aftermath of disappointing monsoon rains in the above time span. Broadly speaking, the

transition from "famine" to "scarcity" owed itself to rational policies governing food grain

trade and the ability of the Government to speedily move goods; the graduation from

"scarcity" to "drought" is the gift of the Green Revolution.

There is no gainsaying the fact that this shift necessarily makes a difference to crisis

management. Improvement in resource base, and rising expectations of the affected

population, require that ameliorative measures commence much earlier. Improvements in

technology and widening of scientific knowledge enable early detection of emerging

problems and the awesome outreach of media now facilitates dissemination of such

information with a speed not conceivable even in mid 1990s. Larger resources now need to

be deployed to mitigate hardship than ever before- resources not only in terms of money but

also in the form of areas of `relief interventions'. A simple illustration will explain the point;

for the period, 1985-90 the total expenditure on drought relief was no more than Rs 2500

crores, this rose to almost Rs 40000 crores for 2000-05. Similarly, in 1985 there were around

20 identified àction points' for Central Government agencies and Departments to supplement

`relief efforts' of States, there are 41 such points now. 2.10,2.11, 2.12


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Such increases are clearly on account of more activities qualifying for relief, an even more

liberal scale of funding and increasingly early triggering of responses. Such factors have,

however, given rise to problems e.g. increasing the scope for coordination and strengthening

the existing administrative machinery to shoulder 'additional' responsibilities etc.

For all natural calamities, prevention and mitigation are closely linked,the linkage is

particularly strong in case of droughts. Added to this is the rather ambitious and considerably

unrealistic perception in the public domain-a view which experts have done little to put in

perspective- that if enough efforts are made droughts can be altogether eradicated. This

makes it imperative that measures to improve crisis management may not be considered in

isolation from strategies to reduce vulnerability.

2.6 Key Learning

2.6.1 Bringing "Water" at the Centre Stage of Policy Domain

Management of the crisis as also long term solutions would be sub-optimal unless they take

into account the larger issue of a National Water Budget and a policy regime that takes

holistic cognizance of the mismatch between supply and demand. A major impediment in

making progress in this direction is the `segmented policy attention' receives from a number

of ministries/Departments. Without being exhaustive, attention may be invited to the

following different policy platforms:2.13,2.14,2.15

• Ministry of Water Resources; Irrigation and Flood Control; Inter-Basin transfer etc.;

• Department of Drinking Water Supply; Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme;

• Ministry of Urban Development; Urban Water Supply; Ministry of

Environment and Forests; Lakes; control of Desertification/Aridity;

• Ministry of Agriculture; Watershed Development;

• Ministry of Rural Development; Water conservation in rural areas;

• Ministry of Science and Technology; Hydrology, Hydrogeology etc.

This is only an illustrative list and can be easily multiplied. The long term interests of the

country, including drought related concerns, will be better addressed if all the policy aspects


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and schemes with objectives like water, water conservation and improving water availability

as primary concerns are brought on a single policy platform. This aspect needs to be

considered along with other issues relating to `machinery of the central government'. It may

be added here that while a National Water Policy encompassing diverse policy concerns was

framed in 2001 with the Ministry of Water Resources as the `nodal point', recognition of

`policy diversities' has not resulted in emergence of an integrated Road Map, integration of

responsibilities under one roof is clearly indicated.

2.6.2 Crisis Preparedness- Limitations of `Drought Proofing'

Rhetoric about making the country "drought proof' has inadvertently contributed to a degree

of neglect of àcute' drought management. In 2002, for instance, some of the worst affected

pockets had some groundwater ìrrigation cover'. Local communities and administrations

alike were complacent in the belief that èxploitation of groundwater' had brought about

"drought proofing"; there was no adjustment in cropping pattern even with an unprecedented

break in July rains. The degree of distress in such areas was often more severe than in

adjoining ‘rain-fed’ pockets. Understandably, there was poor preparedness for relief

operations. The reason is obvious where droughts are ùnexpected', preparedness is poor.

Preparedness and recognition go hand in hand.

Such recognition should preferably inform a policy document on managing acute droughts to

be brought out by the nodal Department. Such document should facilitate putting general

formulations like, `making the country drought free' in perspective. It is imperative that

without discounting the essential role of long-term measures for reducing vulnerability,

inevitability of àcute events' occurring somewhere or the other is acknowledged. This will

contribute to maintaining a high level of preparedness and harmonize the `long' and `short'

term measures.

2.6.3 Long and Short-Term Measures - Policy Integration

While a number of centrally sponsored Schemes have objectives connected, directly or

indirectly, with drought avoidance, the two pre-eminent interventions in this sphere are the

Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP) and the Desert Development Programme


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(DDP). The thrust of these schemes is to `treat' land and vegetation in selected areas,ina

manner that the `treated areas' become less vulnerable to ill effects associated with high

drought vulnerability and aridity. These schemes are handled by the Department of Land

Resources (DoLR) in the Ministry of Rural Development. DoLR is also entrusted with

another issue of crucial significance to agriculture, namely, Land Reforms. As already

mentioned, for droughts, management of the acute crisis and the chronic malady are best

dealt with in a holistic manner. It is, therefore, imperative that management of the acute crisis

and chronic problems in case of droughts is handled in the same Ministry.2.14, 2.15

2.6.4 Diagnosis andPrognosis of Drought Situations

Satellite imagery and similar techniques are powerful tools in anticipating occurrence and

assessment of the effect of èxtreme weather events' generally. Its efficacy and value has

been repeatedly demonstrated in pilot mode, both during droughts and normal periods. Such

successful demonstrations have, however, not always lived up to the `pilot' promise in field

situations.

The problem is not with technology, hardware or expertise; it lies in evolving a paradigm that

enables the èxotic' to go `native'. Putting it simply, `remote sensing' has not yet been

dovetailed in the routine institutional framework, as for instance, is the case with

communication technologies. Given the tortuous course of droughts, remote sensing cannot

be used on `stand-alone' basis- there is no alternative to the `mainstreaming' taking place at

the cutting edge level in the States. The process calls for innovative solutions, which, apart

from being cost effective leave room for technological and professional innovation. A

workable, indicative, model would involve positioning of technical personnel of the

Department of Space (DOS), National Remote Sensing Centre (NRSC) at the District level

on the analogy of similar arrangements by the NationalInformaticsCentre (NIC). NRSC

personnel will function in close association with the revenue functionaries of the District to

generate information that is constantly buttressed by `ground truth verification'.2.15,2.16,2.17

A

State level cell of the NRSC will have the responsibility of collating District-wise

information on as near `real time' basis as possible.


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2.6.5 Rationalization of Drought Declarations

Requirements of Revenue laws or executive instructions of Famine/Scarcity codes entail a -

formal declaration of droughts. In many States relief works can commence only after such a

declaration. Such declaration has the effect of wholly or partly extinguishing the liability of

the land-holder to pay land revenue. In the days when land revenue constituted a major

resource for the State, issue of such declarations had major fiscal consequences unconnected

with the management of disaster per se. 2.18,2.19

Not surprisingly, therefore, issue of declarations has become a rather cumbersome process

preceded by `crop cutting' experiments variously called `Paisewari, Ànawari', `Relief

Khatauni' or 'Kharaba' etc. For 'Kharif droughts the earliest declarations have not been

possible before October i.e. at least three months into a severe drought. Some States do have

an enabling provision about èye estimations' in case of a very severe drought. This involves

an assessment of area that is left unsown due to severe moisture distress or withering of

plants soon after germination.

The method and mechanism of declaration of droughts can do with some rationalization. The

following broad guiding principles need to be kept in view:

a) Where twenty per cent of area normally cultivated remains unsown till the end of July or

December for Khalif and Rabi respectively the affected Tehsil/Taluka/Mandal could be

declared drought affected by the Government.

b) Declaration of drought be not insisted upon for meeting expenditure on Drinking Water

Supply from the CRF (and not the NCCF) if at least 20% of the villages in a District

Report deficient water availability attributable to failure of rains.

2.6.6 Financial Assistance for Droughts

A very significant difference between droughts and almost all other natural calamities is its

long course before the situation stabilizes. This difference has important implications for

relief operations. For floods and cyclones immediate relief measures are initiated which

involve incurring expenditure from the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF). This process is


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accompanied by projection of detailed additional requirements of funds from the National

Calamity Contingency Fund (NCCF). The exigencies of the situation in such cases leave

little scope for inaction. Experience in case of droughts, however, shows that inMost of the

cases initiation of relief operations is delayed as long as possible.This approach has serious

implications for Crisis Management - the very concept of CRF as a source of readily

available funds to meet the exigencies of a calamity without any delay is defeated. The

present arrangement of financing relief expenditure has no incentive or disincentive for early

provision of relief to victims of droughts. There is a strong case for introducing this element

in financing relief expenditure and accordingly, it is recommended that:2.20

a) A condition should be laid down that a State can seek assistance from the NCCF only

after it spends at least half the balances in its CRF on drought relief; and

b) The assistance sanctioned from the NCCF in case of droughts should be without

adjusting any balance in the CRF.

2.6.7 Relief Employment

Even in the mid-19th

Century a keen observer of the Indian scene (Baird-Smith) could remark

that (the)"Indian Famine is not a famine of food but a famine of work". It is not surprising,

therefore, that provision of relief employment has always accounted for bulk of relief

expenditure ever since Famine/Drought Relief operations were first undertaken

systematically from 1870s.

The enactment of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act-2005 (NREGA) has

important implications for relief employment although its impact may be felt only after some

time after the scheme spans the whole country and gathers momentum.

Relief employment sees the Victim through the period of crisis- typically, provision of

employment for 10-15 days a month ordinarily for 3-4 months and for 6 months in the worst

of droughts suffice. The new legislation, on the other hand assures 100 days employment

during crisis. With regard to the working of the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme

which has operated for close to-three decades, it can be assumed that once the REG stabilizes


54

a certain pattern of "predictable demand" will emerge for each District or other

administrative unit during `peace time'. Such averages will escalate during period of crisis

and distress, notably serious droughts. During such phases there will be added pressure on

the REG funds and it stands to logic that if REG receives more work-seekers on account of

drought related distress, relief funds must be deployed to meet such additional ties. It can be

argued that as the norms of relief employment differ considerably from the REG in that it

seeks to provide work for periods much less than the guaranteedl00 days, it should be a

`stand-alone' arrangement during periods of calamity related distress. It must be admitted that

till the late 1990s this approach was indeed adopted in Maharashtra where relief works were

kept apart from EGS work particularly during the severe drought of 1987. It is only in the

recent years that the EGS funds have been supplemented by subventions from the CRF and

the NCCF to off-set the additional costs.

From an objective stand-point there are negative aspects in both the scenarios; `loading' relief

works on the REG tends to encourage the beneficiary to go in for 100 days' employment

when exigencies of a typical drought can be met by a much shorter span of livelihood support ;

on the contrary, a few years down the line when REG is fully operational, ad hoc

arrangements to cobble together relief works will be a Herculean task and will often because

of much friction on executive and judicial fronts.

2.6.8 Livelihood Management in 'Extremely Drought Prone Areas'

Areas suffering repeated droughts over the millennia have highly degraded land resources

such areas are found in pockets in many parts of the country and the subsistence agriculture

in such areas fall an easy prey to even a modest drought. Human populations in many such

degraded spots have adapted their life-styles to deal with the vagaries of nature through a

predominantly pastoral mode of existence. There are a number of studies which show that

such well-adapted populations have developed greater resilience and coping capabilities.

There are, however, areas where deep attachment to agriculture tends to dissuade frequently

drought affected communities from looking for a more ecologically compatible livelihood.

Programmes like the DDP have contributed significantly to promoting alternative, more

sustainable non-agricultural livelihoods. The issue of concretizing a strategy of facilitating


55

pursuing of livelihoods appropriate to an ecosystem is beyond the remit of the Commission,

there are, however, some aspects, which need to be addressed urgently to mitigate frequent

crises which result from unsustainable agriculture. These are:

a) A multi-disciplinary team needs to be immediately constituted by the Ministry of

Environment and Forests to specifically identify villages where drought related

degradation of landmakes`conventional agriculture' incompatible with sustainable

development.

b) "Land" being a subject assigned to the States, the relevant Governments must decide

whether introduction of suitable incentives will be sufficient to achieve the goal of

sustainable development or whether, in the interest of the communities concerned,

exercise of legislative power would be necessary to ensure .an ecologically appropriate

livelihood regimen.

c) Areas not amenable to conventional agriculture, lend themselves very well to cultivation

of fodder-grasses. Considering the overall fodder deficit in the country, it is unfortunate

that adequate policy initiatives have not been taken to encourage fodder cultivation. An

indicative scheme for cultivation of suitable fodder crops need to be also drawn up by

the ICAR and funded through the DDP.

d) Villages identified as at (i) above, where it is decided to restrict practice of agriculture

may qualify for special `livelihood support' under the DDP for a specified time. This

will serve as a safety net to enable the local communities to adapt to major changes in

their relations with land.

2.6.9 Revisiting Long Term Interventions

There is strong circumstantial evidence, however, that many schemes like DPAP, DDP and

many of the Watershed Development Programmes have not lived up to their full or promised

potential. Thus an analysis of Districts where drought was declared between 2000 and 2004

reveals that as many as 136 Districts with DPAP Blocks and 36 Districts with DDP Blocks

found mention in one or more drought. declaration during the period. Even assuming that all

the declarations may not pass muster on strict, technical grounds, it is clear that these figures


56

strongly suggest that long term measures did not yield optimal results at least in these

Districts. 2.15

Similarly, while the net irrigated area which was 20.85 million hectares in 1950-51 rose to

53.07 million hectares in 2002-03 representing an increase of more than 150%, the

corresponding decline in areas vulnerable to repeated droughts has been no more than 20%.

A major constraint in developing this theme "further is absence of an over-all Impact

Evaluation of these enterprises. So far only specific projects have been assessed and positive

`local' findings like improvement in vegetative cover, and water table and improved

productivity etc. have been arrived at such local levels. There has been no assessment, for

instance, of DPAP making any difference to frequency and intensity of droughts. Similarly,

no study of "drought proofing" actually achieved, by extension of irrigation coverage in the

peninsular region is as yet available; even more important, the impact of use of Ground-water

for irrigation on increasing frequency of droughts in certain areas has also not so far been

systematically looked into. The point that emerges, therefore, is that much work remains to

be done to ascertain the reasons why droughts continue to occur even in areas where

irrigation has been introduced or other major ameliorative interventions have taken place.2.21

Another aspect which needs to be seriously studied is the long-term impact of water

harvesting on the local ecosystems as such measures, though of great immediate utility, alter

to some extent the natural `pathways' of water flow; changes in such pathways and their

possible impact on acute droughts deserve to be studied in detail unfettered by presumptions

and conjectures

A long-term impediment in understanding the causes (and remedies) for occurrence of

droughts is the absence of integrated expertise in water. There are institutions of excellence

in Hydrology, concerning scientific and engineering aspects of water and those concerned

with ground-water and water requirements of crops etc. Availability of integrated expertise

on water under one roof and utilization of talent from Social Sciences to understand socio-

economic factors that influence water resource management is a keenly felt need. It is only

with the availability of a multi-disciplinary platform that "Droughts" could be contextualized


57

in their entity, and strategies of preparing societies to sustainable use of water and live within

the inherent constraints of their habitats, can be evolved. These aspects need to be considered

carefully and setting 'up an institution devoted to "water" in its multi-disciplined totality

needs to be seriously explored.

2.7 Technology – an Enabler

Role of technology in disaster management lies in its criticality to produce as well as

disseminate the information – on real/near real time basis. Earth Observation (EO) satellites

are used for observing the disaster related phenomena, their impacts and associated

vulnerability; the observation provides appropriate information and information is converted

to knowledge through comprehensive value addition. After value addition, user-friendly EO

based knowledge products trigger decision-making processes for the action on the ground by

the stakeholders at the various levels. It is important to recognize that space enabled

knowledge inputs are scientific; help in resolving the complex issues pertaining to the

people’s vulnerability; address information needs covering all the phases of disaster

management (Fig 2.1). Science & Technology driven knowledge-based information

infrastructure is required to provide balanced support to each phase of these activities in the

Disaster Management cycle.

In the recent years, the focus of disaster management community is increasingly moving on

to the more effective utilizations of the technologies, including remote sensing, Geographic

Information Systems (GIS), and satellite communications enabling communities at risk to

prepare for, and to mitigate the potential damages likely to be caused due to the natural

disasters. Role of space technology, in terms of information gathering and their real time

dissemination leading to effective risk reduction at the national and local level, could be

visualized in terms of early warning, risk information, impact/damage assessment,

preparedness and communication sub-systems.


58

Use of high-end technology plays an important role in disaster management. India has well

established space systems, which are used strategically in case of disaster management.

Investments in building space assets do help in reducing the losses due to natural disasters.

Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Department of Space, Govt. of India has built

unique constellation of Satellites to support Communication/Broadcasting, Meteorology and

Remote Sensing. Geo-stationary meteorological satellites, INSAT and METSAT have

distinct advantages with their capability to image on a continuous basis, which is essential for

tracking cyclones and deriving atmospheric wind vectors over large oceanic areas. Indian

Remote Sensing Satellite (IRS) constellation of satellites captures disaster events and has

been helpful providing valuable data for risk management related applications. Aerial

systems with laser terrain mapper and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) do fill the

observational gaps. Thus, multitier space infrastructure with INSAT, IRS and Aerial

platforms forms combination for disaster management. 2.24,2.25,2.26

Fig 2.1 Space technology enabled knowledge products towards disaster management


59

INSAT Data Relay Transponder (DRT) has capability to collect data from platforms located

in remote, not easily accessible areas and over the oceans. Space enabled ground systems like

Automated Weather Station (AWS), Cyclone Warning and Dissemination System (CWDS)

and Doppler Weather Radar (DWR) are also augmented to dandify the observational

networks.

To deliver the services emanating from space applications for supporting disaster

management, ISRO has set up the Decision Support Centre (DSC) at National Remote

Sensing Centre (NRSC), Hyderabad, as a single window service provider. The related

centres/ units of ISRO, have been positioned to work in synergy; so that the DSC, with the

required institutional back-up will efficiently generate and deliver the variety of services to

meet the needs of the disaster management functionaries of knowledge institutions [IMD,

Central Water Commission (CWC), Geological Survey of India (GSI), Ministry of Earth

Sciences (MoES), Department of Ocean Development (DOD), Dept. of Science and

Technology (DST) and Forest Survey of India (FSI)] andend users [Ministry of Home

Affairs (MHA), National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Ministry of Agriculture

(MoA) for drought, PMO, CabSectt (Cabinet Secretary), Crisis Management Group (CMG)

and State Agencies].

Further, the DSC has already been linked through satellite based secure Virtual Private

Network (VPN) to the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) at MHA and PMO

(Fig 2.2).

2.7.1 Disaster Risk Management and Space

The different activities associated with disaster management can be broadly divided into

three phases, viz., pre-disaster planning, disaster response, and post disaster recovery and

management (Table 2.1).


60

Table 2.1: Main Phases of Disaster management

Phase of Disaster

management

Main Elements

Disaster Preparedness � Hazard mapping

� Vulnerability assessment

� Forecasting of events (intensity, impact potential}

Disaster Response � Warning of affected areas

� Evacuation of the affected to safer locations

� Rapid assessment of impact

� Detailed evaluation of damage

Recovery � Evaluation of needs of the affected

� Prioritization of reconstruction activities and

implementation

Satellite, Aerial & Ground

SystemsMet/ Ocean

ObservationsEmergencycommunication

High-Res. Imaging

Laser

Terrain Mapper

All weather mappingReal TimeMapping LEO

AerialGround basedAWS DWR

Geo.

Products & Services –

Damage Assessment,

Monitoring, .. NDEM, Hazard Zonation, Risk

Assessment, …

Networking, Early Warning

[CWDS, IOTWS, INFRAS, ..]

MHA, NDMA, MoA, PMO,

CabSectt [CMG], State

Agencies

Decision

Support Centre

(DSC)

CWC, IMD, GSI, MOES/

DOD, DST, FSI, ..

Delivery Mechanisms

Emergency Communication Network - VPN;

Support - MSS Type-D, WLL VSAT, …

Technology Development & Research - ASAR,

Forecasting/ Simulation Models, ..

Disaster Management Support (DMS) System

Fig 2.2: Indian Space Systems for Disaster Management


61

The role of space technology, in terms of information gathering, creation of value added

products/services and real time dissemination of information, leading to effective risk

reduction at the national and local levels, could be visualized in terms of early warning, risk

information, impact/ damage assessment, preparedness and communication sub-

systems.Thevalue added information/data provided by space systemshelps in decision

making and initiating required action on ground during all the phases of risk management

cycle.2.27,2.28

2.7.2 Use of Space Applications for managing Cyclone

The intense tropical storms are known in different part of the world by different names. In

the Pacific Ocean, they are called 'typhoons', in the Indian ocean they are called 'cyclones'

and over North Atlantic, they are called 'hurricane'. Among various natural calamities,

tropical cyclones are known to claim a higher share of deaths and destruction world over.

Records show that about 80 tropical cyclones form over the globe every year. India has a vast

coast line which is frequently affected by tropical cyclones causing heavy loss of human lives

and property. Cyclones occur usually between April and May (called pre-monsoon cyclonic

storms) and between October and December (called post-monsoon cyclonic storms). While

cyclonic storms can't be prevented, the loss of lives and damage to the properties can be

mitigated if prompt action is taken after receiving timely warnings.2.29

2.7.3 Cyclone Warning

Meteorologists have been using satellite images for monitoring storms for about thirty years.

One of the most important applications in this endeavor is to determine the strength and

intensity of a storm. In the late 1960's, meteorologists began observing tropical cyclones at

more frequent intervals. The infrared sensors aboard polar orbiting satellites began providing

day-and-night observations while geo-stationary satellite provided the continuous coverage

during daytime. There exists a very efficient cyclone warning system in India, which is

comparable to the best known in the world. The approach essentially involves the prediction

of the track and intensity of the cyclone using conventional as well as satellite and radar-

based techniques. 2.30,2.31


62

2.7.4 Cyclone Management - Orissa Super Cyclone

The most striking advantage of the earth observation satellite data has been demonstrated

during Orissa super-cyclone event. A severe cyclonic storm with a wind speed about 260

kmph hit the Orissa coast at Paradip on 29-oct-99 causing extensive damage to human life,

property, livestock and public utilities. The National Remote Sensing Centre acted promptly

and provided spatial extent of inundated areas using pre-cyclone IRS LISS-III data collected

on 11th

October, 1999 and Radarsat Synthetic Aperture Radar(SAR) data of 2nd

November,

1999 since cloud -free optical sensor data over the cyclone-hit area were not available. The

map showing inundated area as on 2nd

Nov, 1999 was draped over topographical map, and

was delivered to the Orissa Government on 3rd

Nov, 1999. Information, thus generated, was

effectively used by various departments of Orissa Government involved in relief operations.

Subsequently, the recession of inundated areas was also studied using Radarsat and IRS data

of 5th

, 8th

, 11th

, 13th

and 14th

November 1999. An estimated 3.75 lakh ha in Jagatsinghpur,

Kendrapara, Bhadrak, Balasore, Jajpur, besides Cuttack, Khurda and Puri districts had been

found to be inundated. In addition, the crop damage assessment was also made and maps

along with block-wise statistics derived using pre-and post-cyclone images. 2.32

2.7.5 Tsunami Response

Immediately after 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami which caused massive devastations, space

infrastructure was put to use while responding this major disaster. 1 VSAT Terminal, 10

INMARSAT telephones and 4 INSAT Mobile Satellite Phones were airlifted to Port Blair;

and the telecommunications link between the Andaman & Nicobar Islands and the mainland

was augmented. The VSAT based video conferencing facilities, set up in the Islands earlier

were used for videoconferencing between the Islands for uniting the scattered families and

coordinating relief operations. The telemedicine facilities set up earlier at 3 Hospitals in the

Andaman & Nicobar Islands were also put to extensive use.

Simultaneously, survey of the tsunami-affected areas of the country was carried out using

data from both Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellites and aerial surveys conducted


63

specifically using NRSC’s aircraft. This survey data was used in damage assessment, and

subsequently planning rehabilitation.

Government has since decided to set up a National Centre for Tsunami Warning and Storm

Surge Modeling. The Space Department is going to provide satellite connectivity to network

the Seismic Stations, Ocean Data Buoys measuring tidal variations; and the Data Buoys of

the DART system. Also, Space Department carried out aerial surveys, and provide spatial

data on Coastal Inundation and Storm Surge Modeling.2.33

2.7.6 Gujarat Earthquake: Reconstruction of Bhuj

Following the devastating earthquake in Kachchh, ISRO/DOS as desired by the Prime

Minister’s Office, New Delhi and also based on the request from the Government of Gujarat,

has taken up the responsibility for preparing land and water resources development plans for

the entire Kachchh district in a time-bound manner.

The project provided action plans to the Government of Gujarat for rebuilding of Bhuj with

cadastral level information with GIS queries; development planning for Kachchh region on

watershed basis on 1:25,000 scale; Seismotectonic studies of Kachchh/Gujarat and

rehabilitation sites for Bhuj earthquake affected villages.

The study area is covered by ~ 150 Survey of India topographic maps of 1:25, 000 scale.

Using satellite data land use map, ground water prospect map and soil maps have been

prepared. These maps were integrated to generate land and water resources action plans.

Digital database for the thematic maps and action plan maps have been created. Thematic

maps (~ 150) like land use, soil, hydro-geomorphology, drainage and watershed, transport

and settlement and action plan maps have been prepared and submitted to the Gujarat Govt.

in support of rebuilding Bhuj.2.29

2.7.7 GlacierLand Slides – The PereechuLake

The PereechuLake in the Tibet region (across the Indian border – 35 km away from India

boarder in inaccessible terrain of China, formed during end-July 2004 due to blockade by


64

landslide) was regularly monitored till end-June 2005, when the blockade was seen to have

breached (Fig 2.3). The information was provided to MHA and CWC, all through the life of

the lake, in a timely manner, so that adequate precaution to prevent loss to lives and property

downstream in Himachal Pradesh could be taken by the concerned.

Within 12 hours after receiving the alert, the newly formed lake on Pareechu river was

identified and information on its geographical location, lake dimensions and water spread

were computed and furnished to Ministry of Home Affairs. At the request of Cabinet

Secretary, monitored the lake on daily basis during Aug/Sept 04 and information was

provided on day-to-day basis. Monitoring of PareechuLake was continued from its frozen

state. During last week of June 2005, heavy discharges were reported in SutlejRiver in

Himachal Pradesh. IRS-P6 data of 27 June 2005 was analysed and observed that the

blockade was breached and free flow of water from the lake was noticed. 2.34

Lake

Observations:• No significant change in the water spread area as compared to

14th & 16th August 2004• The blockade is seen clearly

• Flow of water downstream of the blockade is also seen clearly

Water spread Area: 193 ha[including downstream and upstream reaches]

Lake Length [E-W]: Total 5.0 km

Upstream reach: 2.6 km

Lake proper: 1.9 km

Downstream reach: 0.5 km

Lake Width [N-S]: 1.1 kmAvg. upstream width:

0.16 km

Part of Sutlej BasinSatellite Image of 17th August 2004 showing the Lake

Downstream

water flow

Fig 2.3

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