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2006 33: 219Criminal Justice and BehaviorBrenda L. Russell and Linda S. Melillo

Attitudes Toward Battered Women Who Kill : Defendant Typicality and Judgments of Culpability

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10.1177/0093854805284412CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIORRussell, Melillo / ATTITUDES TOWARD BATTERED WOMEN

ATTITUDES TOWARDBATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL

Defendant Typicality andJudgments of Culpability

BRENDA L. RUSSELL

LINDA S. MELILLOCastleton State College

Battered woman’s syndrome has become highly controversial, particularly when used as adefense in cases of homicide. According to legal scholars and social scientists, the characteristicsassociated with the syndrome constitute a standard that jurors use to evaluate battered women.This study evaluated the hypothesis that jurors use prototypical standards of battered women toreach conclusions about defendants in these cases. Results supported the hypotheses that ver-dicts are directly influenced by typicality and response history (passive vs. active) of the defen-dant. Defendants portrayed as atypical with an active response history received more guilty ver-dicts and were less credible. Conversely, typical defendants with passive response histories weremost likely to receive verdicts of not guilty and found to be more credible. Traditional gendereffects showed men were more likely than women to render guilty verdicts in all conditions.

Keywords: battered woman’s syndrome; prototypes; jury decision making; self-defense

For the past 25 years, battered woman’s syndrome (BWS) hasremained the most sophisticated theory to capture the plight of

219

AUTHORS’ NOTE: The authors would like to thank Dr. Richard Wiener, Dr. CurtBartol, and Elizabeth Wall for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of thisresearch. Thanks to Gerri-Ann and Joe Brandt for their assistance in data collec-tion and Krista Richard and Bryanna Gile for their assistance in data entry. Corre-spondence concerning this article should be directed to Brenda Russell, Ph.D.,Department of Psychology, Castleton State College, Castleton, VT 05735; e-mail:[email protected].

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR, Vol. 33 No. 2, April 2006 219-241DOI: 10.1177/0093854805284412© 2006 American Association for Correctional and Forensic Psychology



women who are assaulted by their intimate partners. Although BWShas served to educate both clinicians and the general public, it has alsoinspired controversy concerning its effectiveness in legal decisionmaking, particularly when battered women turn to homicide in re-sponse to a partner’s aggression or threat (Faigman, 1987; Schneider,2000; Schuller & Hastings, 1996).

The most common defense plea for the murder or manslaughter ofan abusive partner is self-defense (Faigman, 1987; Kasian, Spanos,Terrance, & Peebles, 1993; Pagelow, 1992; Terrance & Matheson,2003). A not-guilty verdict based on self-defense rests on the beliefthat individuals may take reasonable steps to defend themselves fromphysical harm (Farr, 2002; LaFave & Scott, 1972; Walker, 1993). Thelegal standard for self-defense and the typical circumstances sur-rounding homicide in these cases are, however, very different (Gagne,1998; Schneider, 2000). In most cases, the defendants experience arecent battering incident that they believe will continue at a later timeand result in their death (Gagne, 1998; Schneider, 2000; Walker,1979). Based on this assessment, they do not kill their partner duringthe battering incident but some time later, while he is incapacitated(Gagne, 1998; Schneider, 2000). Therefore, a not-guilty verdict basedon self-defense requires the trier of fact to decide if the person whoused deadly force reasonably believed that she was in imminent dan-ger of death or serious bodily injury. Furthermore, that a reasonableperson would have found it necessary to resort to deadly force to avoidthat danger, even in nonconfrontational cases (Ewing, 1990; Farr,2002; Kinports, 1988; LaFave & Scott, 1972).

Expert testimony regarding BWS is typically used to explain theunique psychological distress battered women endure (Kasian et al.,1993; Schuller, 1992). Experts explain how psychological states con-tribute to the reasoning of battered women and why they perceivethemselves to be in imminent danger as well as their inability to per-ceive alternatives to homicide. The intended purpose of the testimonyis to address common myths or misconceptions regarding batteredwomen (Hocking, 1999; Terrance & Matheson, 2003).

A number of studies have found that the public generally embracesa number of misconceptions regarding battered women. For example,Dodge and Greene (1991) found that compared to experts, laypersonswere less likely to believe that battered women could be persuaded to

220 CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR



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Chapter 5. In instances where the battered woman killed her partner while he is incapacitated, the court must decide whether the woman was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury and that the force used was necessary to prevent such an impending danger. Cite cases.

stay in the relationship by an abuser’s promises to reform. Further-more, laypersons were more likely to believe that battered womenwere passive and dependent, were probably abused because of theiremotional instability, and provoked their own beatings (Russell,1999). In addition, gender and age effects have found that the beliefsof men and older individuals are even further from those of experts.

Expert testimony relies heavily on the work of Walker (1979, 1993;Walker, Thyfault, & Browne, 1982) and her three-stage batteringcycle. Walker’s (1979) original research found that battered womenoften blame themselves for the abuse and are unable to leave an abu-sive situation because of low self-esteem, powerlessness, financialdependence, social isolation, and fear of retaliation. Walker’s theoryalso uses Seligman’s (1975) theory of learned helplessness to explainwhy a woman might remain with a batterer and would be unable toacknowledge alternatives to her situation.

Shortly following the introduction of BWS into the courtroom,scholars noted the testimony’s potential limitations (Crocker, 1985;Hocking, 1999; Kasian et al., 1993; Schneider, 1986; Terrance &Matheson, 2003). A full-fledged controversy has since ensued regard-ing the informational value and potential impact of BWS evidence onthe trial process and outcomes (Blackmun, 1989; Crocker, 1985;Easteal, 1992; Hocking, 1999; Jenkins & Davidson, 1990; Schneider,1986; Terrance & Matheson, 2003). Specifically, major concerns havebeen raised regarding the testimony’s inability to address the apparentcontradiction between the woman’s use of force and the characteris-tics associated with the syndrome (e.g., learned helplessness, passiv-ity, etc.). Thus, the difficulties originate largely from the testimony’sfocus on incapacity and learned helplessness, characteristics often atodds with perceptions of reasonableness (Dowd, 1992; Karmen,2001; Schuller, 1994).

Scholars (Dutton, 1993; Jenkins & Davidson, 1990; Schneider,1986; Terrance & Matheson, 2003) have argued that the term syn-drome promotes images of mental instability. The implications arethat rather than viewing the battered woman’s actions as a reasonableresponse to her abusive situation, jurors may interpret the woman’sactions within the “context of her psychological (dys)functioning”(Stubbs, 1992, p. 360). As a result, the use of BWS may be seen as anexcuse, rather than a justification for self-defense (Schneider, 2000;

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Schuller & Hastings, 1996). Those who advocate the use of syndromeevidence acknowledge that not all women conform to the symptoma-tology of the syndrome or the pattern of abuse (Blackmun, 1989;Dutton, 1992; Schneider, 2000; Walker, 1984, 1992, 1993).

The application of these standards may leave battered womendefendants who attempt to explain their behaviors based on BWS at adisadvantage when their characteristics or experiences deviate fromany one of these standards (Blackmun, 1990; Kasian et al., 1993;Terrance & Matheson, 2003). This leads us to inquire about the out-come when a defendant on trial is atypical or exceptional with regardto the characteristics of the syndrome. To date, few studies have exam-ined juror responses to expert testimony when the defendant on trialdid not display typical characteristics of the syndrome. A recent studyby Terrance and Matheson (2003) found that the further the defendantmoved away from jurors’beliefs of what a battered woman should be,the harsher their verdicts became.

Schuller and Hastings (1996) investigated the controversial natureof a defendant’s passivity. Expert testimony typically portrays womenwho have been battered as weak and helpless. When a defendant devi-ates from these characteristics, her motives are intensely scrutinized.Schuller and Hastings directly assessed this dilemma through sce-narios in which the defendant’s prior history of response to abuse aseither active (e.g., fighting back) or passive was manipulated. In addi-tion, the content of expert testimony was manipulated to reflect BWSwith reference to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and learnedhelplessness, social agency (which made no reference to PTSD orlearned helplessness), and a no-expert control group. Their resultsfound both forms of expert testimony provided more favorable evalu-ations of the defendant’s claim of self-defense compared to a no-expert control group. Surprisingly, the woman’s prior response his-tory seemed to have little effect on the decision process, suggestingthat the defendant’s testimony had no detrimental effects when re-sponse histories were active.

Social psychological factors involved in jury decision making sug-gest that jurors evaluate typical and atypical cases differently. Al-though both are evaluated against the backdrop of prevailing stereo-types (Terrance & Matheson, 2003), the degree to which a defendantis typical plays an important role in juror decision making. Typicality,




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derived from prototype theory (Rosch, 1973, 1975, 1978; E. E. Smith& Medin, 1981), refers to the degree of fit with prototype characteris-tics (Casey, 1992). The greater the number of prototypical featuresthat are present, the greater the perceived fit (V. L. Smith, 1991).

Juror responses may also differ depending on the typicality of thedefendants. However, although prior studies offer insight, it is evidentthat research is needed to better understand what information is usedby jurors. Cases that deviate only slightly from the stereotyped cate-gory are readily filled in with stereotypical imagery and often pose lit-tle problem for decision makers (Farrell & Holmes, 1991). Typicalitymay help explain the lack of findings in both Greene, Raitz, andLinblad’s (1989) and Schuller and Hastings’s (1996) studies, as onlyone or two exceptional features were manipulated.

One purpose of the current study was to examine these issues andextend the current research as it applies to battered women defen-dants. The present research used shared prototypes (Russell, 1999)in case scenarios in which the defendant was accused of murderingher partner. Defendants were presented with either typical attributes(attributes conforming to the battered woman prototype) or atypicalattributes.

Prior research has identified several characteristics that laypersonsshare of the prototypical battered woman (Russell, 1999). If these fea-tures truly constitute defining characteristics for battered womendefendants in the minds of jurors, then the presence or absence ofthose characteristics should impact verdicts. Thus, it follows thatthese representations should influence judgments of culpability, par-ticularly when a standard form of expert testimony is used as a basis ofcomparison.

In this study, actual case summaries were presented that includedstandard forms of expert testimony modeled after BWS evidence. Theexpert offered explanations about why a battered woman may notleave the batterer, focusing on her fear of retaliation, the dangers ofseparation, and the batterer’s control, components typically discussedby experts (Schneider, 2000; Schuller & Hastings, 1996). It was pre-dicted that as respondents were provided with expert testimony, theywould be less likely to convict when the facts of the case or character-istics of the defendant closely matched the shared prototype of a bat-tered woman (Russell, 1999). For example, it was expected that com-




pared to the atypical case scenarios, defendants portrayed as typical/passive would meet the legal requirements of not guilty based on self-defense, and the defendant’s claims would be perceived as credible.Therefore, it was believed that main effects would reveal that par-ticipants in conditions illustrating a typical/passive battered womanwould be more likely to justify the woman’s actions.

Expanding research by Schuller and Hastings (1996), the woman’sresponse history—specifically, her degree of passivity—was alsoinvestigated. It seemed likely that when a defendant was portrayedwith an active response history (i.e., provoking violence, fightingback on previous occasions), then the BWS evidence would con-tradict the woman’s actions and challenge her status as a batteredwoman. We predicted that a defendant with an active history, who dis-played additional atypical attributes, would be more likely to receiveguilty verdicts than would participants in all other conditions. In con-trast, a defendant with a passive history toward her abuser, com-pounded with typical attribute features of a battered woman, wouldinvoke the most judgments of not guilty.

METHOD

The goal of this study was to examine the effects of prototypes anddefendant typicality in the courtroom. Prototypes were assessed byexamining typicality (typical vs. atypical) and response history(active vs. passive) of the defendant in relation to dependent variablesof interest including verdict, ratings of legal requirements for self-defense, and credibility of the defendant’s claim. Results were ex-pected to help establish the role of prototype theory in verdicts of bat-tered women.

PARTICIPANTS

Six hundred and eighteen (410 female and 208 male) undergradu-ate students were recruited from two St. Louis Universities. Two uni-versities were included to increase the overall number of participants.Procedures were identical at both sites. Participants were recruited




during class sessions. The mean age of the respondents was M =20.28, SD = 4.02.1

DESIGN, PROCEDURE, AND MATERIALS

The design was a 2 (defendant typicality: typical vs. atypical) � 2(response history: active vs. passive) � 2 (case fact pattern: Evans vs.Goforth) � 2 (respondent gender) between subjects factorial design.Defendant typicality, response history, and case type were the experi-mentally manipulated variables of interest. Dependent variables ofinterest included the extent to which the defendant met the require-ment of self-defense as defined by law, perceived options available tothe defendant, the extent to which the defendant fit the typology of abattered woman, the mental state of the defendant, and the verdict.2

DEFENDANT TYPICALITY

Variables chosen to portray the typical and atypical defendant in-cluded shared characteristics identified in previous research (Russell,1999). Physical, social, behavioral, and psychological characteristicsmost frequently mentioned by participants that demonstrated thehighest effect sizes as typical characteristics and their respectiveopposite as atypical (Russell, 1999) were used in the current studyto depict defendant typicality. The manipulated variables of interestwere described identically across cases and placed in the same area ofthe case (either in the case summary or generally within defense state-ments mentioning typical characteristics and prosecution statementsmentioning atypical characteristics).

Variables depicting the typical defendant included physical charac-teristics of being young (age 26 vs. age 60), frayed and weary (vs.rested and refreshed), and physically fragile (135 lbs. vs. 190 lbs.,physically strong vs. fragile).

Social attributes depicted a typical defendant as having little or nosocial interaction versus an atypical defendant portrayed as socializ-ing with coworkers. In addition, the typical defendant was depicted ashaving two children and being financially dependent on her partnerversus the atypical defendant who was not financially dependent on




her partner, was employed as a loan advisor at a bank, held primaryresponsibilities for finances, and had no children.

Typical behavior included hiding signs of her abuse versus theatypical defendant who did not hide signs of abuse. In addition, thetypical defendant made excuses for her partner’s behavior and tried toplease her partner versus the atypical defendant who said her hus-band’s behavior was inexcusable and arguments were his fault.

Typical psychological attributes included a guilt-ridden, confused,depressed, and fearful defendant. Psychological attributes within theatypical scenario described the defendant as not feeling guilty for rela-tionship problems, clear-headed, happy, rested, refreshed, and not ap-pearing fearful.

CASE SCENARIO FACT PATTERNS

Participants were presented with general instructions and providedwith one of two case summaries describing fact patterns that make uptwo homicide cases in which the defendants claimed to be batteredwomen. These court cases, People v. Evans (1994) and State v.Goforth (1986),3 illustrated instances of confrontational and noncon-frontational situations of homicide. A confrontational situation ofhomicide may be represented as a case in which the defendant and vic-tim were actively engaged in direct conflict. Nonconfrontational situ-ations suggest that the defendant was not directly engaged in conflictat the time of the event (the victim was not directly confronting theperpetrator; e.g., the victim was sleeping or incapacitated). In Peoplev. Evans (1994), an example of confrontational homicide, Evans wascharged and convicted of first-degree murder in the state of Illinois forthe killing of her husband. Evans claimed she stabbed her husband inthe midst of a domestic dispute in fear that her husband would kill her.Although the initial trial did not present Evans as a battered woman,the facts that established her abuse were included in her defense. Theprosecution countered with evidence that Evans killed in a jealousrage after discovering that her husband was having an affair. Evanswas found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison. On appeal, how-ever, the court reversed the conviction. The Appellate judges cited herhistory of abuse as a clear indication of BWS. Judge Rizzi ruled thatnot only should the trial judge have weighed the evidence of abuse




against the motives suggested by the prosecution but also that thisparticular case illustrated the need for changes in the statutes definingself-defense.

The second case summary was illustrative of a nonconfrontationalhomicide. In State v. Goforth (1986), the defendant, a self-proclaimedbattered spouse, was charged with second-degree murder for the kill-ing of her husband and convicted of involuntary manslaughter. In thiscase, Goforth shot her husband because he threatened to kill her andher son. At the time of the killing, her husband was arguing with theirteenage son in the kitchen. The defendant stood in the hallway andtold her husband to stop. The husband then turned toward Goforth andshe shot him. The prosecution countered this evidence with facts sug-gesting that Goforth had just recently filed for a divorce and was look-ing for a way out of the relationship. In addition, although she and herson testified that abuse had occurred in the home, there was no medi-cal evidence or other witnesses to substantiate her claim that her hus-band abused her. Although Goforth appealed, her conviction was up-held by the state of Missouri.

EXPERT TESTIMONY

In each case, the same form of expert testimony of BWS was pro-vided. In both cases, a psychologist (a woman) explained that batteredwomen are not masochists nor do they suffer from some personalitydefect. Rather, the abuse should be understood in the context of thebatterer’s domination and control (Schuller & Hastings, 1996). Thistestimony gave reference to BWS, PTSD, and learned helpless-ness. The testimony also explained that battered women experience aset of emotional and psychological responses referred to as BWS.Symptoms of PTSD were described, along with symptoms of learnedhelplessness and the cyclical nature of domestic abuse. This experttestimony appeared in both cases to provide an explanation for thedefendant’s behavior and offer a frame of reference for respondents.

RESPONSE HISTORY

To further assess typicality and expand on the work of Schuller andHastings (1996), the defendant’s response history was varied. Thus,




two history levels (passive and active) were produced. This wasachieved primarily through the testimony provided by the prosecutionor defense. In the active-response-history conditions, the prosecutiondescribed the defendant as a woman who fought back against herabuser on previous occasions, wherein the passive defendant was rec-ognized by the defense as never aggressing against her abuser andonly trying to placate him.

MEASURES

Participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimentalconditions. All participants were instructed to assume the role of ajuror, to read the case scenario, and then complete a questionnairepacket (approximately 60 minutes). The packet included a Verdictquestionnaire and the Elements of the Law of Self-Defense, Defen-dant Believability and Psychological Stability questionnaire devel-oped by Schuller and Hastings (1996). Some modifications weremade to address the law of self-defense as defined in the state of Mis-souri. All Cronbach’s alphas reported in the following analyses repre-sent the current data that are consistent with alphas reported bySchuller and Hastings. With the exception of Verdict, 9-point Likert-type scales (from 1 = not at all to 9 = extremely likely) were used toassess dependent measures.

Verdicts. Verdict was categorical in nature. Participants were askedto select one of three possible verdicts, either second-degree murder,manslaughter, or not guilty based on self-defense.

Self-defense claims. Questions pertaining to the laws of self-defense consisted of eight items (� = .85). These measures assessedissues pertaining to the claim of self-defense. All questions addressedelements of self-defense, elements of imminent danger, whether thedefendant provoked the incident, the use of deadly force, and the rea-sonableness of the defendant’s actions.

Options available to the defendant. This measure consisted of threeitems designed to assess the extent to which jurors thought otheroptions were available to the defendant (� = .72): For example, “To




what extent do you think options other than killing her husband wereavailable to the defendant?”

Defendant typology. This measure assessed how well the defendantfit the typology of the battered woman as described in the expert testi-mony as well as the respondents’own perceptions. This measure con-sists of five items (� = .86) such as “To what extent does the batteredwoman syndrome apply to the defendant?” and “To what extent didshe perceive herself as helpless in the relationship?”

Mental state of the defendant. Comprised of three questions, thismeasure was designed to tap the mental state of the defendant (� = .75;e.g., “To what extent do you believe her actions were under hercontrol?”).

RESULTS

VERDICT DECISIONS

Overall, juror verdicts were somewhat evenly distributed acrossguilty of manslaughter (n = 287, 46.5%) and not guilty (n = 236, 38%).Approximately 15% (n = 94) of respondents rendered a verdict ofsecond-degree murder. Chi-square analyses were conducted becauseof the categorical nature of the dependent variable verdict. Analysesfound a verdict by gender difference (see Figure 1), �

2(2, N = 617) =12.47, p = .002, where a lower percentage of women (n = 49, 12.0%)rendered a verdict of second-degree murder than men (n = 45, 21.7%).No significant gender difference was found for manslaughter as 46%(n = 190) of women rendered a verdict of manslaughter compared to47% (n = 97) of men. Last, more women (n = 171, 41.7%) than men(n = 65, 31.4%) rendered a verdict decision of not guilty based on self-defense.

Conditions were then collapsed into four scenario conditions(atypical/passive, atypical/active, typical/passive, and typical/active).Chi-square analyses investigating the four scenarios and three verdictpossibilities indicated a verdict by scenario difference (see Figure 2),�

2(6, N = 617) = 38.23, p = .001. Results showed respondents in atypi-




cal scenarios (atypical/active, n = 35, 37.2%; atypical/passive, n = 26,27.7%) rendered more judgments of second-degree murder thanrespondents in typical scenario conditions (typical/active, n = 18,19.1%; typical/passive, n = 15, 16%). Results for manslaughter ver-dicts found that respondents in atypical/active (n = 83, 28.9%) andatypical/passive (n = 83, 28.9%) conditions were most likely to findthe defendant guilty of manslaughter. Participants in typical/activescenarios were almost as likely to render verdicts of manslaughter (n =70, 24.4%), whereas respondents in typical/passive conditions wereleast likely to give a verdict of manslaughter (n = 51, 17.8%).

A converse pattern was identified for judgments of not guilty on thebasis of self-defense. Participants in typical/passive scenariosassigned the highest rates of self-defense (n = 86, 36.4%), followed bythe typical/active scenario conditions (n = 58, 24.6%). As expected,the lowest number of not-guilty verdicts were found in atypical sce-narios such as atypical/active (n = 40, 17.0%), and atypical/passive(n = 52, 22.0%). Gender differences with regard to condition and guiltwere evident only within the atypical/active scenario condition, �

2(1,N = 158) = 6.18, p = .013. Collapsing across guilt groups (second-


05

101520253035404550

female male

2nd degree

manslaughter

not guilty

Figure 1: Verdict Decisions as a Function of GenderNote. �

2(2, N = 617) = 12.47, p = .002.



degree murder and manslaughter = guilty, not guilty) females in atypi-cal/active scenarios (n = 72, 68.6%) were less likely to render a guiltyverdict than men in that scenario (n = 46, 86.8%). In fact, 13.2% (n =7) of men voted not guilty compared to 31.4% of women (n = 33) inthe atypical/active condition. No significant differences were foundfor the typical/active, typical/passive, or atypical/passive conditions.

JUDGMENTS OF CULPABILITY

To investigate the effect of the independent variables on the depen-dent variables related to judgments of culpability and legal require-ments, a 2 (defendant typicality: typical vs. atypical) � 2 (responsehistory: active vs. passive) � 2 (case fact pattern: Evans vs. Goforthcases) � 2 (respondent gender) MANOVA was conducted4 using theextent to which legal requirements for self-defense were met, per-ceived options available to the defendant, extent to which the defen-dant fit the typology of the battered woman, and the defendant’s men-tal state at the time of the crime as dependent variables.

Results revealed multivariate main effects for typicality, F(4,584) = 15.45, p = .001, �

2 = .10, and gender F(4, 584) = 4.08, p = .003,�

2 = .027. A significant case by response history interaction was alsofound, F(4, 584) = 2.80, p = .03, �

2 = .02. Follow-up univariate analy-


0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1 2 3 4

2nd degree

manslaughter

self defense

Figure 2: Verdict Decisions as a Function of Scenario TypeNote.1 = atypical/active condition, 2 = atypical/passive condition, 3 = typical/active con-dition, 4 = typical/passive condition. �

2(6, N = 617) = 38.23, p = .01.



ses were then conducted. For the sake of clarity, results are organizedby dependent variables.

Extent to which the defendant met the legal requirements of self-defense. Follow-up univariate tests were conducted on scale scoresrepresenting the extent to which the defendant met the requirementsof self-defense. Main effects were found for typicality, F(1, 584) =26.13, p = .001, indicating respondents in the typical conditionsreported that the defendant met the requirements of self-defense (M =6.18, SD = 1.50) significantly more often than did respondents inatypical conditions (M = 5.51, SD = 1.52). In addition, a main effectfor gender, F(1, 584) = 13.69, p = .003, revealed that across condi-tions, women were more likely to rate the defendant as meeting thelegal requirements for self-defense (M = 5.99, SD = 1.52) more oftenthan were men (M = 5.52, SD = 1.57).

A response history by case interaction was significant, F(1, 584) =10.70, p = .001, for self-defense. The difference in legal requirementsmet between passive and active response histories was not significantin the Goforth case; however, respondents in the Evans (confronta-tional) case were more likely to believe that the defendant met therequirements of self-defense when she was portrayed as passive (M =6.36, SD = 1.36) as opposed to active (M = 5.48, SD = 1.56).

Perceived options available to the defendant. A main effect for typ-icality, F(1, 584) = 12.06, p = .001, showed that participants in atypi-cal conditions believed the defendant had more options available thatshould have been considered than did respondents in the typical con-ditions (M = 6.55, SD = 1.73 vs. M = 5.98, SD = 1.75, respectively). Asignificant main effect for gender was also found, F(1, 584) = 11.86,p = .001, suggesting that men perceived the defendant to have moreoptions to killing (M = 6.50, SD = 1.73) than did women (M = 5.98,SD = 1.75). Finally, a case by response history interaction was found,F(1, 584) = 3.85, p = .05, which revealed that when the defendant wasportrayed with an active history, she was perceived as having signifi-cantly more options to killing (M = 6.49, SD = 1.52) than when shewas portrayed with a passive response history (M = 5.30, SD = 1.77),but only in the Evans case.




Typology of the defendant. Main effects for typology, F(1, 584) =60.79, p = .001, found that respondents rated the defendant as morelikely to fit the typology of a battered woman when she was portrayedas typical (M = 6.49, SD = 1.52) as opposed to atypical (M = 5.30, SD =1.77). A main effect for gender, F(1, 584) = 7.57, p = .006, found thatmen were less likely to believe the defendant fit the typology of a bat-tered woman than were women (M = 5.65, SD = 1.71 vs. M = 5.99,SD = 1.77, respectively). A response history by case interaction wasevident for typology, F(1, 584) = 6.44, p = .011, indicating that re-spondents in the confrontational case were more likely to report thedefendant fit the typology of a battered woman when the defendantwas portrayed with a passive response history, (M = 6.22, SD = 1.75)as opposed to an active response history (M = 5.41, SD = 1.69).

Mental state of the defendant. A main effect for gender, F(1, 584) =6.61, p = .010, showed that men believed the defendant was more incontrol of her behavior (M = 5.89, SD = 1.62) than did women (M =5.56, SD = 1.90). Main effects for typicality, F(1, 584) = 14.54, p =.001, found that participants rated the defendant’s mental state as sig-nificantly less in her control in typical conditions (M = 5.36, SD =1.84) than defendants in atypical conditions (M = 5.97, SD = 1.74).

Finally, a significant case by response history interaction, F(1,584) = 5.06, p = .025, found that when the defendant in the confronta-tional case was portrayed as passive, respondents were more likely torate the defendant as having significantly less control of her mentalcapacities (M = 5.18, SD = 1.87) than if she was portrayed with anactive response history (M = 5.73, SD = 1.76).

DISCUSSION

This study sought to empirically test the assumptions of prototypetheory, which suggest that prototypical defendant attributes wouldaffect judgments of culpability. Main effects were predicted for typi-cality and response history on verdict decisions and elements of legaldecision making, with participants in the atypical/active conditionfinding the most evidence of second-degree murder. Conversely, par-ticipants in conditions illustrating a typical/passive defendant would




be more likely to justify the woman’s actions as self-defense. Al-though case effects were not expected, it was hypothesized that if caseeffects should occur, they would most likely surface in the Evans case,an example of a direct confrontational case. Last, traditional gendereffects were expected, suggesting that men would be less likely thanwomen to believe that the defendant met the requirements of self-defense and would, therefore, be more likely to assign more guiltyverdicts than women.

The results clearly support the additive effects of typicality and re-sponse history on judgments of culpability. As expected, participantsin atypical/active conditions were more likely to assign judgments ofsecond-degree murder, whereas those in typical/passive conditionsmost often rendered not-guilty verdicts. Atypical defendants wereperceived to have more options available, and respondents were lesslikely to believe the defendant’s version of events. In contrast, respon-dents rated typical defendants as more likely to meet the requirementsof self-defense. Respondents in passive conditions also perceived thedefendant as having fewer options to killing and were most likelyto find a fit with the typology of a battered woman. Respondents intypical/passive conditions rated the defendant’s version of events assignificantly more plausible and believed that the defendant had lesscontrol over her actions at the time of the crime.

Typicality and response history also resulted in case effects. Re-spondents in passive conditions found the defendant was more likelyto meet the requirements of self-defense, was more likely to fit thetypology of a battered woman, and had less control of her actions inthe Evans (confrontational) case. This interaction pattern betweentypicality and response history provides strong support for the conten-tion that defendants are more likely to have multiple attributes, and assuch, the combination of factors can profoundly influence judgmentsof culpability.

The importance of gender in evaluating judgments of culpabilitywas evident. Although women were less likely to assign a verdict ofsecond-degree murder, an equivalent number of men and women ren-dered verdicts of manslaughter. Women, however, rendered a verdictof not guilty significantly more often than did men. This supports thehypothesis that men are more likely to assign guilty verdicts than arewomen.




Gender differences also had significant ramifications for judg-ments of culpability. That is, across conditions, women rated the de-fendant as more likely to meet the requirements of self-defense. Menperceived more options available to the defendant other than killing,were less likely to believe that the defendants fit the typology of a bat-tered woman, and thought that both women were more in control oftheir behavior and emotions at the time of the killing. The presentresearch is consistent with previous studies that have found men tendto assign harsher judgments to battered women defendants (Aubrey &Ewing, 1989; Dodge & Greene, 1991; Schneider, 2000; Schuller,Smith, & Olson, 1994; Terrance & Matheson, 2003; Terrance,Matheson, & Spanos, 2000).

Researchers and theorists (Blackmun, 1989; Crocker, 1985;Jenkins & Davidson, 1990; Schneider, 2000; Terrance & Matheson,2003) have asserted that BWS has created a stereotypical view of abattered woman to which defendants may be compared. Of crucialinterest is whether defendants who claim to be battered are at a disad-vantage when their experiences and behaviors deviate from the stan-dard. The present research has investigated this belief by examiningwhether or not prototypical attributes would affect judgments of cul-pability. The present research provides persuasive evidence that judg-ments of culpability are indeed influenced by the extent to which thedefendant fits or does not fit the typology of a battered woman.

When Dodge and Greene (1991) compared the views of experts tothose of laypersons, there was much disagreement. For instance,although experts believed that battered women thought it was impos-sible to leave their abusers, blamed themselves for the abuse, and dis-played both anxiety and depression, laypersons were more likely tobelieve that battered women were dependent, passive, provoked theirown beatings, and remained in the relationships because of emotionalinstability and/or masochism. The current research suggests layper-sons’prototypes are much richer in detail and somewhat more in con-cordance with experts. Moreover, these findings suggest that not onlyare prototypes the product of general knowledge of the syndrome butalso these prototypes reflect changes in attitude over time.

The present study suggests that in the context of evaluating crimi-nal defense claims, research participants rely on their own expecta-tions of what constitutes a battered woman. This is consistent with




previous research, which has found that the prototypes jurors bring tothe courtroom act as filters through which trial information and culpa-bility are evaluated (Schneider, 2000; Schuller & Vidmar, 1992; V. L.Smith, 1991, 1993; Terrance & Matheson, 2003).

Prototype theory offers an explanation for the failures of previousstudies (e.g., Greene et al., 1989; Schuller & Hastings, 1996) thatmanipulate one or two attributes of battered women to find links withverdicts. Defendants are more likely to possess multiple attributes thateither match or do not match those in the typology associated with thebattered woman. By manipulating various attributes, the current studysupports the belief that decision strategies reflect a graded structure ofthe category of battered women (V. L. Smith, 1991, 1993). Peopledetermine the guilt or innocence of a defendant by comparing thecharacteristics of the defendant with the features of the prototype. Ifsufficient feature overlap exists, then not-guilty verdicts should result.The results of this research are in accordance with this claim.

As expected, second-degree murder verdicts were most oftenfound when the defendant was portrayed as atypical with an activeresponse history. Guilty verdicts were more likely when respondentswere male. Other gender effects were apparent that were consistentwith previous research (Aubrey & Ewing, 1989; Dodge & Greene,1991; Schuller et al., 1994; Terrance & Matheson, 2003; Terranceet al., 2000). Theorists speculate that these differences may bebecause of the possibility that men do not have similar representationsof battered women as women do. An alternative explanation can betaken from a social referencing perspective, wherein both men andwomen may simply use themselves as a reference point from which tomake decisions.

The study found more case effects in the confrontational case sce-narios. For instance, when the defendant was passive, participants inthe Evans case rated the defendant as meeting the requirements ofself-defense and perceived fewer options available to the defendant.The interaction effects suggest that typicality and response historymay be context dependent and more pronounced in direct confronta-tional cases. This lends support to the suggestion that defendants innonconfrontational cases have a significantly more difficult time con-vincing jurors that their actions were truly self-defense. There are twopossible explanations for the current findings. First, if—as our results




suggest—mock jurors rely on prototypes to guide their legal decisionmaking, it makes sense that typicality and response history played rel-evant roles in this research. On the other hand, it is possible that non-confrontational cases do not activate prototypical comparisons in theminds of jurors.

LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The current study represents only a first attempt to assess whether ashared standard held by laypersons exists for battered women and theextent to which battered women defendants are compared to that stan-dard. Typicality and atypicality were assessed by using multiple attri-butes previously found to be associated with battered women. Al-though this may not be the best portrayal of typical/atypical features,it is intended to serve as a starting point. Therefore, a number of ques-tions remain unanswered. Although this research demonstrates anadditive effect of typicality and response history, the data could notaddress the extent to which, and how many particular prototypes areenough to portray a typical or atypical battered woman defendant. Inother words, at what point would there be too few prototypical fea-tures to find similar effects? Future research can examine this issue bymanipulating the number of attribute features within case scenarios.

Another pressing issue is the extent to which participants relied onthe expert testimony in which to make their comparison judgments.Would the results be the same had no expert testimony been used?Would results differ in conjunction with different types of expert testi-mony designed to address the atypical defendant? For example, fur-ther research should determine whether effects would be found ifexpert testimony gave reference to whether the defendant fit the typol-ogy of a battered woman.

In defense of the current research, this study modeled the law ofself-defense for battered women in the state of Missouri. The Mis-souri statute took the decision of whether to admit expert testimony onthe BWS out of the trial judges’ hands. According to Missouri statute(Revised Missouri Statutes, 563.033, 1987, 1990, 1996) when self-defense is an issue in the case, the defendant may offer evidence re-garding the battered spouse syndrome. In essence, expert testimony ina battered spouse case will automatically be allowed in court when the




defendant injects the issue and makes a prima facie case showing ele-ments of self-defense.

Several limitations within this research should be addressed. Forinstance, the current study used college students as mock jurors. Re-search has found that college students are not necessarily represen-tative of juries. Researchers (Aubrey & Ewing, 1989; Schuller &Cripps, 1998) have found that students hold fewer stereotypes regard-ing battered women than do voter samples. Gender effects are also lesslikely in the student samples as compared to voter samples. Therefore,the results of this study must be evaluated in context to the collegesample used. Previous research (Schuller & Vidmar, 1992) has dem-onstrated that those with higher levels of education and younger peo-ple are also more informed regarding abusive situations. This wouldsuggest that older, less informed, and less educated participants mayhold different prototypes of battered women. Therefore, the results ofthis research should be replicated with different populations to dis-cover whether prototypes are different within different populationsand whether verdict decisions would be similarly affected by the ex-perimental procedure.

Generalizations from the study are also limited by the use of stimu-lus materials. Materials used in the present study were written text. Amore sophisticated approach might include a videotaped version ofevents. The current study had participants complete the experimentindividually. The results may be affected if respondents were to delib-erate in a group format. Furthermore, mean scores tended to hoveramid the midpoint of the Likert-type scales. This may be a remnant ofstimulus materials used.

Last, and most important, is the lack of an appropriate controlgroup. Fashioned after a study conducted by Schuller and Hastings(1996), we sought to investigate the additive effects of prototypes.Experimentally, the design would call for a minimum of four addi-tional conditions, making the design unwieldy. However, future re-search should investigate the extent to which findings may differaccording to control conditions.

Despite these limitations, results from this research have severalimportant practical implications. First, this study provides persuasiveevidence that a prototypical standard does indeed exist for batteredwomen and verdict decisions appear to be dependent on this standard.




Defendants who deviate from this shared prototype may be adverselyaffected when it comes to judgments of culpability, whereas thosewho fit the typical/passive portrayal of a battered woman may be morelikely to have their claims of self-defense accepted.

This advances our knowledge regarding the extent to which bat-tered women defendants’ characteristics and actions affect legal de-cision making. If the defendant does not depict the typical/passivebattered woman, then the defendant’s use of expert testimony regard-ing the syndrome may not be a successful strategy.

NOTES

1. Of participants, 5.8% of men (n = 12) and 10.6% of women (n = 43) reported having been avictim of domestic violence. Twenty-one percent (n = 44) of men and 18.8% of women (n = 78)had witnessed domestic violence in their household while growing up. Sixty percent of men (n =125) and 75% of women (n = 302) had heard of BWS before reading the summary case.

2. Manipulation checks used a series of univariate analyses. Two (defendant typicality: typi-cal vs. atypical) � 2 (response history: active vs. passive) � 2 (case fact pattern: Evans vs. Goforthcases) � 2 (respondent gender) analyses of variance investigated the extent to which respondentsbelieved the defendant displayed an active or passive response history and the extent to which thedefendant fit the typology of a battered woman according to their own perceptions and the experttestimony provided. All expected manipulations were significant below the .05 level.

3. The Goforth case was referred to as the “Jones case” in the stimuli materials to prevent rec-ognition by the participants.

4. All analyses were performed using a unique sums of squares because of unequal cell sizes.

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