Chapter 36 Public Goods

Chapter 36Public Goods

Public Goods -- Definition

A good is purely public if it is both nonexcludable and nonrival in consumption.Nonexcludable -- all consumers can

consume the good.Nonrival -- each consumer can consume

all of the good.

2

Public Goods -- Examples

Broadcast radio and TV programs. National defense. Public highways. Reductions in air pollution. National parks.

3

Reservation Prices

A consumer’s reservation price for a unit of a good is his maximum willingness-to-pay for it.

Consumer’s wealth is Utility of not having the good is Utility of paying p for the good is

Reservation price r is defined by

U w( , ).0w.

U w p( , ). 1

U w U w r( , ) ( , ).0 1

4

Reservation Prices: An ExampleConsumer’s utility isU x x x x( , ) ( ).1 2 1 2 1

Utility of not buying a unit of good 2 is

V wwp

wp

( , ) ( ) .0 0 11 1

Utility of buying one unit of good 2 atprice p is

V w pw pp

w pp

( , ) ( )( )

.

1 1 12

1 1

5

Reservation Prices; An ExampleReservation price r is defined by

V w V w r( , ) ( , )0 1 I.e. by

wp

w rp

rw

1 1

22

( )

.

6

When Should a Public Good Be Provided? One unit of the good costs c. Two consumers, A and B. Individual payments for providing the

public good are gA and gB.

gA + gB c if the good is to be provided.

7

When Should a Public Good Be Provided? Payments must be individually

rational; i.e.

and

U w U w gA A A A A( , ) ( , )0 1

U w U w gB B B B B( , ) ( , ).0 1

8

When Should a Public Good Be Provided? Payments must be individually

rational; i.e.

and

Therefore, necessarily and

U w U w gA A A A A( , ) ( , )0 1

U w U w gB B B B B( , ) ( , ).0 1

g rA A g rB B .

9

When Should a Public Good Be Provided? And if

and

then it is Pareto-improving to supply the unit of good

U w U w gA A A A A( , ) ( , )0 1

U w U w gB B B B B( , ) ( , )0 1

10

When Should a Public Good Be Provided? And if

and

then it is Pareto-improving to supply the unit of good, so is sufficient for it to be efficient to supply the good.

U w U w gA A A A A( , ) ( , )0 1

U w U w gB B B B B( , ) ( , )0 1

r r cA B

11

Private Provision of a Public Good? Suppose and . Then A would supply the good even if

B made no contribution. B then enjoys the good for free; free-

riding.

r cA r cB

12

Private Provision of a Public Good?

Suppose and . Then neither A nor B will supply the

good alone.

r cA r cB

13



good alone. Yet, if also, then it is

Pareto-improving for the good to be supplied.

r cA r cB

r r cA B

14



good alone. Yet, if also, then it is

Pareto-improving for the good to be supplied.

A and B may try to free-ride on each other, causing no good to be supplied.

r cA r cB

r r cA B

15

Free-Riding Suppose A and B each have just

two actions -- individually supply a public good, or not.

Cost of supply c = $100. Payoff to A from the good = $80. Payoff to B from the good = $65.

16

Free-Riding Suppose A and B each have just

two actions -- individually supply a public good, or not.

Cost of supply c = $100. Payoff to A from the good = $80. Payoff to B from the good = $65. $80 + $65 > $100, so supplying

the good is Pareto-improving.

17

Free-Riding

-$20, -$35 -$20, $65

$100, -$35 $0, $0

Buy

Don’tBuy

BuyDon’tBuy

Player A

Player B

18

Free-Riding

-$20, -$35 -$20, $65

$100, -$35 $0, $0

Buy

Don’tBuy

BuyDon’tBuy

Player A

Player B

(Don’t’ Buy, Don’t Buy) is the unique NE.19

Free-Riding

-$20, -$35 -$20, $65

$100, -$35 $0, $0

Buy

Don’tBuy

BuyDon’tBuy

Player A

Player B

But (Don’t’ Buy, Don’t Buy) is inefficient.20

Free-Riding Now allow A and B to make

contributions to supplying the good. E.g. A contributes $60 and B

contributes $40. Payoff to A from the good = $40 >

$0. Payoff to B from the good = $25 >

$0.

21

Free-Riding

$20, $25 -$60, $0

$0, -$40 $0, $0

Contribute

Don’tContribute

ContributeDon’tContribute

Player A

Player B

22

Free-Riding

$20, $25 -$60, $0

$0, -$40 $0, $0

Contribute

Don’tContribute

ContributeDon’tContribute

Player A

Player B

Two NE: (Contribute, Contribute) and (Don’t Contribute, Don’t Contribute).23

Free-Riding

So allowing contributions makes possible supply of a public good when no individual will supply the good alone.

But what contribution scheme is best? And free-riding can persist even with

contributions.

24

Variable Public Good Quantities E.g. how many broadcast TV

programs, or how much land to include into a national park.

25

Variable Public Good Quantities E.g. how many broadcast TV

programs, or how much land to include into a national park.

c(G) is the production cost of G units of public good.

Two individuals, A and B. Private consumptions are xA, xB.

26

Variable Public Good Quantities Budget allocations must satisfyx x c G w wA B A B ( ) .

27

Variable Public Good Quantities Budget allocations must satisfy

MRSA & MRSB are A & B’s marg. rates of substitution between the private and public goods.

Pareto efficiency condition for public good supply is

x x c G w wA B A B ( ) .

MRS MRS MCA B ( ).G

28

Variable Public Good Quantities Pareto efficiency condition for public

good supply is

Why?

MRS MRS MCA B ( ).G

29

Variable Public Good Quantities Pareto efficiency condition for public

good supply is

Why? The public good is nonrival in

consumption, so 1 extra unit of public good is fully consumed by both A and B.

MRS MRS MCA B ( ).G

30

Variable Public Good Quantities Suppose MRSA is A’s utility-preserving

compensation in private good units for a one-unit reduction in public good.

Similarly for B.

MRS MRS MCA B ( ).G

31

Variable Public Good Quantities

is the total payment to A & B of private good that preserves both utilities if G is lowered by 1 unit.

MRS MRSA B

32


is the total payment to A & B of private good that preserves both utilities if G is lowered by 1 unit.

Since , making 1 less public good unit releases more private good than the compensation payment requires Pareto-improvement from reduced G.

MRS MRS MCA B ( )G

MRS MRSA B

33

Variable Public Good Quantities Now suppose

MRS MRS MCA B ( ).G

34


Now suppose is the total

payment by A & B of private good that preserves both utilities if G is raised by 1 unit.

MRS MRS MCA B ( ).G

MRS MRSA B

35


Now suppose is the total

payment by A & B of private good that preserves both utilities if G is raised by 1 unit.

This payment provides more than 1 more public good unit Pareto-improvement from increased G.

MRS MRS MCA B ( ).G

MRS MRSA B

36


Hence, necessarily, efficient public good production requires

MRS MRS MCA B ( ).G

37


Hence, necessarily, efficient public good production requires

Suppose there are n consumers; i = 1,…,n. Then efficient public good production requires

MRS MRS MCA B ( ).G

MRS MCii

nG

1

( ).

38

Efficient Public Good Supply -- the Quasilinear Preferences Case Two consumers, A and B. U x G x f G ii i i i( , ) ( ); , . A B

39

Efficient Public Good Supply -- the Quasilinear Preferences Case Two consumers, A and B. Utility-maximization requires

U x G x f G ii i i i( , ) ( ); , . A BMRS f G ii i ( ); , .A B

MRSpp

f G p iiG

xi G ( ) ; , .A B

40

Efficient Public Good Supply -- the Quasilinear Preferences Case Two consumers, A and B. Utility-maximization requires

is i’s public good demand/marg. utility curve; i = A,B.

U x G x f G ii i i i( , ) ( ); , . A BMRS f G ii i ( ); , .A B

MRSpp

f G p iiG

xi G ( ) ; , .A B

p f GG i ( )

41

Efficient Public Good Supply -- the Quasilinear Preferences Case

MUA

MUB

pG

G

42


MUA

MUB

MUA+MUB

pG

G

43

Efficient Public Good Supply -- the Quasilinear Preferences CasepG

MUA

MUB

MUA+MUB

MC(G)

G

44


G

pG

MUA

MUB

MUA+MUB

MC(G)

G*

45


G

pG

MUA

MUB

MUA+MUB

MC(G)

G*

pG*

46


G

pG

MUA

MUB

MUA+MUB

MC(G)

G*

pG*

p MU G MU GG* ( *) ( *) A B

47


G

pG

MUA

MUB

MUA+MUB

MC(G)

G*

pG*

p MU G MU GG* ( *) ( *) A B

Efficient public good supply requires A & Bto state truthfully their marginal valuations.48

Free-Riding Revisited When is free-riding individually

rational?

49


rational? Individuals can contribute only

positively to public good supply; nobody can lower the supply level.

50


rational? Individuals can contribute only

positively to public good supply; nobody can lower the supply level.

Individual utility-maximization may require a lower public good level.

Free-riding is rational in such cases.

51

Free-Riding Revisited

Given A contributes gA units of public good, B’s problem is

subject to

max,x gB B

U x g gB B A B( , )

x g w gB B B B , .0

52


G

xB

gA

B’s budget constraint; slope = -1

53


G

xB

gA


gB 0

gB 0is not allowed

54


G

xB

gA


gB 0

gB 0is not allowed

55


G

xB

gA


gB 0

gB 0is not allowed

56


G

xB

gA


gB 0

gB 0is not allowedgB 0(i.e. free-riding) is best for B

57

Demand Revelation

A scheme that makes it rational for individuals to reveal truthfully their private valuations of a public good is a revelation mechanism.

E.g. the Groves-Clarke taxation scheme.

How does it work?

58

Demand Revelation N individuals; i = 1,…,N. All have quasi-linear preferences. vi is individual i’s true (private)

valuation of the public good. Individual i must provide ci private

good units if the public good is supplied.

59

Demand Revelation ni = vi - ci is net value, for i = 1,

…,N. Pareto-improving to supply the

public good ifv ci i

i

N

i

N

11

60

Demand Revelation ni = vi - ci is net value, for i = 1,

…,N. Pareto-improving to supply the

public good ifv c ni i i

i

N

i

N

i

N

0

111.

61

Demand Revelation

If and

or and

then individual j is pivotal; i.e. changes the supply decision.

nii j

N

0 n ni j

i j

N

0

nii j

N

0 n ni j

i j

N

0

62

Demand Revelation

What loss does a pivotal individual j inflict on others?

63

Demand Revelation


If then is the loss.ni

i j

N

0,

nii j

N0

64

Demand Revelation


If then is the loss.

If then is the loss.

nii j

N

0,

nii j

N0

nii j

N

0, ni

i j

N

0

65

Demand Revelation

For efficiency, a pivotal agent must face the full cost or benefit of her action.

The GC tax scheme makes pivotal agents face the full stated costs or benefits of their actions in a way that makes these statements truthful.

66

Demand Revelation

The GC tax scheme: Assign a cost ci to each individual. Each agent states a public good net

valuation, si. Public good is supplied if

otherwise not.

sii

N

01

;

67

Demand Revelation A pivotal person j who changes the

outcome from supply to not supply

pays a tax of sii j

N.

68

Demand Revelation A pivotal person j who changes the

outcome from supply to not supply

pays a tax of

A pivotal person j who changes the outcome from not supply to supply

pays a tax of

sii j

N.

sii j

N.

69

Demand Revelation Note: Taxes are not paid to other

individuals, but to some other agent outside the market.

70

Demand Revelation Why is the GC tax scheme a

revelation mechanism?

71


revelation mechanism? An example: 3 persons; A, B and C. Valuations of the public good are:

$40 for A, $50 for B, $110 for C. Cost of supplying the good is $180.

72


revelation mechanism? An example: 3 persons; A, B and C. Valuations of the public good are:

$40 for A, $50 for B, $110 for C. Cost of supplying the good is $180. $180 < $40 + $50 + $110 so it is

efficient to supply the good.

73

Demand Revelation Assign c1 = $60, c2 = $60, c3 =

$60.

74


$60. B & C’s net valuations sum to

$(50 - 60) + $(110 - 60) = $40 > 0.

A, B & C’s net valuations sum to $(40 - 60) + $40 = $20 > 0.

75


$60. B & C’s net valuations sum to

$(50 - 60) + $(110 - 60) = $40 > 0.

A, B & C’s net valuations sum to $(40 - 60) + $40 = $20 > 0. So A is not pivotal.

76

Demand Revelation If B and C are truthful, then what

net valuation sA should A state?

77



If sA > -$20, then A makes supply of the public good, and a loss of $20 to him, more likely.

78



If sA > -$20, then A makes supply of the public good, and a loss of $20 to him, more likely.

A prevents supply by becoming pivotal, requiring sA + $(50 - 60) + $(110 - 60) < 0;I.e. A must state sA < -$40.

79

Demand Revelation Then A suffers a GC tax of

-$10 + $50 = $40, A’s net payoff is

- $20 - $40 = -$60 < -$20.

80

Demand Revelation Then A suffers a GC tax of

-$10 + $50 = $40, A’s net payoff is

- $20 - $40 = -$60 < -$20. A can do no better than state the

truth; sA = -$20.

81


$60.

82


$60. A & C’s net valuations sum to

$(40 - 60) + $(110 - 60) = $30 > 0.

A, B & C’s net valuations sum to $(50 - 60) + $30 = $20 > 0.

83


$60. A & C’s net valuations sum to

$(40 - 60) + $(110 - 60) = $30 > 0.

A, B & C’s net valuations sum to $(50 - 60) + $30 = $20 > 0. So B is not pivotal.

84

Demand Revelation What net valuation sB should B

state?

85

Demand Revelation What net valuation sB should B

state? If sB > -$10, then B makes supply of

the public good, and a loss of $10 to him, more likely.

86

Demand Revelation What net valuation sB should B state?

If sB > -$10, then B makes supply of the public good, and a loss of $10 to him, more likely.

B prevents supply by becoming pivotal, requiring sB + $(40 - 60) + $(110 - 60) < 0;I.e. B must state sB < -$30.

87

Demand Revelation Then B suffers a GC tax of

-$20 + $50 = $30, B’s net payoff is

- $10 - $30 = -$40 < -$10. B can do no better than state the

truth; sB = -$10.

88


$60.

89


$60. A & B’s net valuations sum to

$(40 - 60) + $(50 - 60) = -$30 < 0. A, B & C’s net valuations sum to $(110 - 60) - $30 = $20 > 0.

90


$60. A & B’s net valuations sum to

$(40 - 60) + $(50 - 60) = -$30 < 0. A, B & C’s net valuations sum to $(110 - 60) - $30 = $20 > 0. So C is pivotal.

91

Demand Revelation What net valuation sC should C

state?

92

Demand Revelation What net valuation sC should C

state? sC > $50 changes nothing. C stays

pivotal and must pay a GC tax of -$(40 - 60) - $(50 - 60) = $30, for a net payoff of $(110 - 60) - $30 = $20 > $0.

93

Demand Revelation What net valuation sC should C state?

sC > $50 changes nothing. C stays pivotal and must pay a GC tax of -$(40 - 60) - $(50 - 60) = $30, for a net payoff of $(110 - 60) - $30 = $20 > $0.

sC < $50 makes it less likely that the public good will be supplied, in which case C loses $110 - $60 = $50.

94

Demand Revelation What net valuation sC should C state?

sC > $50 changes nothing. C stays pivotal and must pay a GC tax of -$(40 - 60) - $(50 - 60) = $30, for a net payoff of $(110 - 60) - $30 = $20 > $0.

sC < $50 makes it less likely that the public good will be supplied, in which case C loses $110 - $60 = $50.

C can do no better than state the truth; sC = $50.

95

Demand Revelation GC tax scheme implements

efficient supply of the public good.

96

Demand Revelation GC tax scheme implements

efficient supply of the public good. But, causes an inefficiency due to

taxes removing private good from pivotal individuals.

97

Date post:	31-Dec-2015
Category:	Documents
Upload:	zacharee-horn
View:	25 times
Download:	3 times

Chapter 36 Public Goods

Documents