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Chapter 5: Drought in the Middle East – Contrasting Fortunes in Syria and
Lebanon
Wehaveherepointedtoaconnectedpathrunningfromhumaninterferencewithclimatetoseveredroughttoagriculturalcollapseandmasshumanmigration.Thispathrunsthroughalandscapeofvulnerabilitytodroughtthatencompassesgovernmentpoliciespromotingunsustainableagriculturalpractices,andthefailureofthegovernmenttoaddressthesufferingofadisplacedpopulation.OurthesisthatdroughtcontributedtotheconflictinSyriadrawssupportfromrecentliteratureestablishingastatisticallinkbetweenclimateandconflict.–ColinP.Kelleyetal.20151AmongstotherthingsitshowsthatthereisnoclearandreliableevidencethatanthropogenicclimatechangewasafactorinSyria'spre-civilwardrought;thatthisdroughtdidnotcauseanywherenearthescaleofmigrationthatisoftenalleged;andthatthereexistsnosolidevidencethatdroughtmigrationpressuresinSyriacontributedtocivilwaronset.–JanSelbyetal.20172
InMarch2011,Syriadescendedintoacivilwarthatinitsfirstfiveyears
claimed400,000lives.3Asresearcherstriedtounderstandthecircumstancesthat
leduptothecivilwar,anumberofthemsurfacedamulti-yearseveredroughtthat
underminedagriculturalconditionswhich,inturn,ledtolarge-scalepopulation
movementsthatultimatelycontributedtoprotestsandensuingviolence.4Other
scholarshavedisputedthoselinks,identifyingwatermismanagement,repression,
andothergovernmentpoliciesthattheybelieveweretheprimarydriversofthe
war.5.
1 Kelley et al. 2015, 3245. 2 Selby et al. 2017a, 232. 3 CNN 2019. 4 Kelley et al. 2015; Gleick 2014; Femia and Werrell 2012; Werrell and Femia 2013; Werrell, Femia, and Sternberg 2015. This sequence was captured vividly in comic strip form by Quinn and Roche 2014. 5 Selby et al. 2017a; Fröhlich 2016; Châtel 2014. The back and forth has led to a vigorous exchange between those dismissive of the links between climate factors and conflict and those supportive of those connections. Kelley et al. 2017; Gleick 2017; Hendrix 2017b; Hendrix 2017a; Werrell and Femia 2017.
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Debatesabouttherelativeimportanceofdifferentfactorsintheleadupto
theSyriancivilwararelikelyunproductive,astheysimilarlywerewhenAlexde
WaalandThomasHomer-Dixondebatedthecausalcontributionofclimatechange
totheonsetofcivilwarinDarfur,Sudaninthemid-2000s.6Suchdebatesreplicate
theproblemMarcLevyidentifiedinhiscritiqueoftheenvironmentalsecurity
literatureofthe1990s.7Bytakingasinglecountryandexploringwhetherclimate
driverswereassociatedwiththecivilwar,scholarshavenotbeenabletoexplain
whyclimateexposureledtoconflictinthatinstancebutnotothers.Hereiswhere
comparativecasestudiescanhavevalue.AsinthediscussionbetweendeWaaland
Homer-Dixon,thedebatequicklydescendedintoadiscussionofrelativecausal
weightforwhichqualitativemethodsarenotespeciallywell-suited.8
Asinthelastchapter,droughtsdonotleadtohumanitarianemergenciesin
allsituations,nordotheyleadtoalwaysleadtocivilwar.Ifdroughtdidinfact
contributetotheSyriancivilwar,wehavetoisolatetheconditionsthatfacilitated
theviolencealongsidethedrought.Todothat,weneedacomparablecasethatis
enoughaliketotheSyriancasetobeplausiblebutthatfailedtohaveacivilwarin
thewakeofseveredrought.Whiletherearenoperfectcomparisoncases,the
neighboringstateofLebanonofferssomecomparability,intermsofthekindof
climate,agriculturalconditions,andsomesimilarculturalandlinguistic
characteristics.
6 Homer-Dixon 2007; de Waal 2007. 7 Levy 1995. 8 George and Bennett 2005, 25; Bennett 2016, 36.
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LebanonexperiencedaseveredroughtaroundthesametimeasSyria.
Lebanonhasknowncivilwarinitsnottoodistantpast–from1975to1990–and
hashadsomethingofafragilepeacesince.Afifteen-yearoccupationbySyriacame
toanendin2005inthewakeoftheassassinationofprimeministerRaficHariri.
IsraelcarriedoutbombingraidsonLebanontopursueHezbollahinJuly2006.More
thanamillionrefugeespouredintoLebanoninthemidstoftheSyriancivilwarthat
startedin2011,comingtocompriseabout20%ofthecountry’spopulation.9And
still,Lebanondidnotexperienceanothercivilwar.Bytheendof2019,Lebanonwas
teeteringonthevergeofpoliticalrevolutionbutwithoutthekindofviolencethat
buffetedSyria.IfdroughtinfactwasacatalystfortheSyriancivilwar,whyhas
Lebanonnotexperiencedoneofitsown?
Thefirstsectionofthischapterprovidesanoverviewofthecriteriaforcase
selectionandreviewsthecasescoveredandhowtheserelatetomytheoretical
expectations.ThesecondsectioncontraststheSyriaandLebanonexperienceswith
eachothertoshowwhyLebanonavoidedSyria’sfate.Thissectionreviewshazard
exposureandpresentsdataoncapacity,inclusion,andassistance.Thethirdsection
putsthepiecestogetherinasyntheticnarrativeofwhySyriaandLebanon
experienceddifferentoutcomesafterdroughts.Thefourthsectionexplores
alternativeexplanations.
9 Government of the Netherlands 2019, 5.
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ExpectationsandCaseSelection
BeforeoutliningtherationaleforcomparingSyriaandLebanon,itisworth
exploringclaimsmadeinthedebateoverexistingaccountsofclimateandtheSyrian
civilwar.Anumberofscholars,advocates,andjournalistshavearguedthatclimate
changeisoneofthecausalfactorsthatledtotheSyriancivilwar.Whilethese
narrativesofthegenesisofthecivilwarhighlightotherfactorsincludingthebrutal
repressionbytheAssadregime,theyhighlighttheroleplayedbyclimatechange.
Theyfocusontheeffectofamulti-yeardroughtthatroughlystartedaround2006,
whichcontributedtomajordeclinesinagriculturalproduction,reducedrural
livelihoods,andledtoasignificantexodusfromruralareastourbanareas.Inthe
tellingofthisclimate-conflictnarrative,thosemigrantsinturnstressedurban
locations,addingtopressuresforemploymentandservicesthat,inturn,servedasa
sourceofresentmentandrecruitmentforrebelmovementswhentheconflictbegan
in2011.
KelleyandGleickhavecapturedtheacademicversionofthisnarrative,
thougharguablytheircontributionisstrongeronthephysicalscienceofthe
drought.10WerrellandFemiafromtheCenterforClimateandSecurityhave
providedaquasi-academic,thinktankversionofthenarrative,connectingthe
droughttosecurityoutcomes.11Thiscausalstoryhasbeenre-toldindocumentaries
suchasTheAgeofConsequencesandYearsofLivingDangerously,thelatterwith
10 Gleick 2014; Kelley et al. 2015. 11 Werrell, Femia, and Sternberg 2015; Werrell and Femia 2013; Femia and Werrell 2012. See also this account from former U.S. diplomat Polk 2013b.
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claimsmadebyjournalistTomFriedmanwhereheinterviewsrebelcombatants
whoclaimtobeformerfarmerswhoselivelihoodswereaffectedbythedrought.12
Thefactualbasisoftheclaimshavebeendisputedbyothersocialscientists,
namelyapaperbySelbyetal.thatdisputes(1)theclaimthatanthropogenicclimate
changecanclearlybeascribedasthecauseofthedrought,(2)thatthedrought
causedmigrationonthescalethatothershaveclaimed,and(3)thatthedrought-
relatedmigrationcanbecrediblyclaimedtohaveainfluentialroleintheonsetof
theSyriancivilwar.13deChâtelalsodownplayedtheimportanceofclimatechange
asacausalfactorintheSyriancivilwar,focusingonwatermismanagementandthe
removaloffuelsubsidiesasmoreimportantdriversofproblemsinSyria’s
agriculturalsector.14Fröhlichdisputedthenotionthatclimatemigrantswere
heavilyinvolvedintheprotestsagainsttheSyrianregime.15.
MuchofthedebatebetweenSelbyandKelleyandGleickrestsonsemantic
andmethodologicaldisagreementsoverthemeaningofcauseandhowtoascribe
relativecausalweightincasestudies.Selbyetal.concedethatclimatechangecould
havebeenafactorinthecivilwarbutthenwrite:
itisworthreflectingonwhatGleickandKelleyetal.meanwhentheyinsistthatclimatechangewasacontributoryfactortotheuprising.Doesthismeanthatclimatechange-relateddroughtwasoneofasmallhandfuloffactorsbehindSyria'sdescentintocivilwar;orthatitwasoneamongstathousand,orevenamillion,others?Istheirclaimthatclimatechangewasasignificantfactorbehindtheuprising;orthatitwasafranklytrivialone?Wedonotknow.16
12 Friedman 2013. 13 Selby et al. 2017a. 14 Châtel 2014. 15 Fröhlich 2016. Gleick, Kelley, and others vigorously responded to the Selby et al. critique with their own claims about weaknesses in the Selby et al. piece and the strength of their claims. Kelley et al. 2017; Gleick 2017; Hendrix 2017b; Selby et al. 2017a; Hendrix 2017a; Werrell and Femia 2017. 16 Selby et al. 2017b, 253.
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Gleickrespondsthattheydisagreeovertherelativeimportanceofclimatedrivers:
Theytrytoparsethedifferencebetweenwhethersomethingisa“significant”causeora“contributory”factorandjudgebasedon“significance.”Thedifficultyinthisapproachisthat“significant”isameaninglesstermwithoutquantification,buttheauthorsdonotattempttoquantifyit…Atthesametime,theauthorsregularlysuggestthattheyagreethattherewassomenon-zeroroleorlinkamongthesefactors.Iftheonlyrealcomplaintisadisagreementabouttherelativecontributionofthemany,complexfactorsinvolved,thatisafarsimplerandmorejustifiablepaper.17Asnotedalready,IamremindedofthesimilardebatebetweenAlexdeWaal
andThomasHomer-DixonovertheDarfurcivilwarintheearly2000swhichthen-
UnitedNationsSecretaryGeneralBanKi-Moonlabeledasthefirstclimatewarina
provocativeop-edintheWashingtonPost.18Inanexchange,deWaalandHomer-
Dixonvigorouslydebatedclimatechange’simportance.DeWaaldownplayed
climatefactorsasimportant,suggestingthatpoliticalfactorswerefarmore
importantdrivers.19Homer-Dixonforhispartdisputedthatqualitativecasestudies
cangetatrelativecausalweight,particularlyforcomplexcausalmechanismswith
feedbackloops.20Inhisview,thetestiswhetheronecanplausiblytellthestoryofa
conflictwithouttheclimatehazard.Ifonecannot,thenyouhavetoincludeitaspart
ofthecausalanalysis.Theproblemhasasmuchtodowiththeslipperinessofthe
causallanguageweuse.Bycause,dowemeanthefactorthatwasthetinderor
triggerthatprecipitatedanevent?Or,dowemeanaspartofthebackground
conditionsortrendsthatmadeaparticularoutcomemorelikely?
17 Gleick 2017, 249. 18 Ki-Moon 2007. 19 de Waal 2007. 20 Homer-Dixon 2007.
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Scholarsarenotalwayscarefulinthesedistinctions.Indeed,Selbyetal.
pointedoutfourdifferentpossibleusesofcausalanalysisbyscholarsand
commentatorsoftheSyriacase:(1)asthefinalsparkfortheconflict,(2)the
primarycausalfactor(3)thatclimatewasasignificantcontributoryfactor,and(4)a
causalfactorofunknownorunspecifiedcausalweight.21Theyarguetheclaimthat
climatechangehadnoroleintheonsetoftheconflictisitselfunfalsifiablesothey
attempt,instead,toevaluatetherobustnessoftheevidencefortheclaimsofa
connectionalongthecausalchainfromdroughttoconflict,namely(1)thattheareas
affectedbydroughtwerethesameonesthatweresourcesofout-migration(2)that
therewasasignificantspikeinout-migrationafterthedroughtcomparedtonormal
migrationpatterns(3)andthatclaimsforredressofgrievanceswererelatedtothe
drought22Here,Selbyetal.raiselegitimateconcernsaboutthestrengthofthe
evidenceconnectingeachpieceofthecausalchain.
TheSelbycritiquedoesnotdisputethattherewasamajordroughtthat
affectedpartsofSyria,namelythenortheast,butfaultstheotherstudiesfor
exaggeratedclaimsaboutthelong-termseculardeclineinrainfallintheregionand
ourabilitytodetectananthropogenicclimatechangesignalinclaimsofattribution
aboutthedrought.Kelley’sclaimsoflong-termdryingarenotsocentraltothe
argument.23Mostotherscholarsseethe2006-2010perioddroughtasthetrigger
fortheconflict,ratherthanalong-termbackgroundcondition.Evenifonedisputed
21 Selby et al. 2017a, 234. 22 Ibid. 23 There is other evidence supporting related claims. Hoerling et al. found since 1902 that 10 of the 12 driest winters in the Mediterranean occurred between 1990-2010. Climate change was thought responsible for about half of that drying. Hoerling et al. 2012, 2146–2147.
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thelong-termdryingtrend,thereisstillevidenceofaseveredroughtwhichcould
haveactedasthetrigger.AsIarguedinthepreviouschapter,whetherSyria’s
droughtwasattributabletoanthropogenicclimatechangeisalsolessimportant
thanthepresenceofadroughtitself.24Scholarsarelookingtoproxiesforthe
expectedeffectsoffutureclimatechangeonsecurityoutcomes.Ifclimatechangeis
expectedtoyieldmoreextremedroughtsintheregioninthefuture,whichiswhat
scientistsexpect,thenthe2006-2010droughtisausefulcase,evenifsomedispute
theclarityoftheclimatesignalinthatparticulardrought.25
Hendrix,inreflectingontheclimateconnectionstotheSyriancivilwar,
makessomeadditionalobservationsoncausalpathways.Heproblematizesthe
processofcausalinferenceinsinglecases.Hearguesthatourconjecturesabout
causalityincasestudiesoftenassumecertainfactorsarenecessaryconditions,but
themoreappropriatewaytothinkaboutcausalityisprobabilistic:“Thatis,climate
shocksareprobabilisticallycausalinthesensethattheymakesomethingmore
likely.Theyarenotdeterministicallycausalinthesensethattheyarewholly
responsiblefortheoutcome.”Hegoesfurthertonotethat“Thatis,theevidenceis
strongerintheaggregatethanasevidentinanyindividualcase.”26Asalargely
quantitativesocialscientist,Hendrix’sbetisthatwecanidentifythecentral
tendenciesofcausationfromhundredsofcases,butitisperhapsafool’serrandto
trytosingleoutthecausalroleinindividualcases:
24 Again, there is evidence that the drought of the severity and duration of the Syrian drought was made twice as likely because of climate change. Kelley et al. 2015, 3241. 25 Regional climate models project higher average temperatures, lower rainfall, days of extreme temperatures, and longer drought periods. Government of the Netherlands 2019, 4. 26 Hendrix 2017a.
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Whenthisevidenceismarshalledtoexplainanyparticularevent,however,itoftentakesontheairofanecessarycondition-ifbutfortheclimateshock,theeventwouldnothaveoccurred.Thisclaimisalmostalwaysimpossibletosubstantiateandinvitessignificantcriticism-towit,theexchangehere.27
Iagreethatthelengthierandmorecomplexcausalchainbetweenclimatehazards
andconflictoutcomescomplicatestheascriptionofacausalroletoclimatehazards.
Inhumanitarianemergencies,itiseasiertosaybutforthecycloneorevenslow
onsetdroughts,largenumbersofpeoplewouldnothavebeenatriskofdeath.That
said,Iammorepersuadedthatcarefulprocesstracingofthecausalsequencecan
identifythecausalcentralityoftheclimatehazard.FollowingtheworkofGeorge
andBennett,Collier,andMahoneyonprocesstracing,Iremainconvincedthatwe
canisolatethemicro-processesconnectingcauseandeffectinindividualcases.28
WhilesomeofSelbyetal.’sspecificclaimsandcounter-claimsareworthyof
furtherexploration,alloftheseaccountsfocusonSyria.Pairedcaseswithother
countriesthatalsoexperienceddroughtbutnocivilwarareabsent.29Hendrix,inhis
responsetoSelbyandtheoriginalarticle,arguedthatthecaseunderscoredtheneed
formorecontingentcausalclaimsintheliteratureonclimateandsecurity:“Evenif
andwhenclimatematters,itmattersinaspecificpolitical,social,andeconomic
contextthatmustbetakenintoaccount.”30Pairedcasescanhelpidentifythescope
conditionsforcausalclaims.But,whatarethepossiblecomparisons?
FeitelsonandTubiusethecomparativecasemethodtocomparetworiver
basinsintheMiddleEast–theEuphrates(whichincludesSyria,Turkey,andIraq)
27 Homer-Dixon 2007. 28 George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney 2012; Bennett 2010. 29 For a corrective, see Feitelson and Tubi 2017. 30 Hendrix 2017b, 251.
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andthelowerJordanRiver(whichincludesIsrael,Jordan,andPalestiniansonthe
WestBank).Theyultimatelyhighlightdifferencesinthesocietalresponseto
droughtbetweenthebasinstoexplainwhyoutcomesintheEuphratesbasinwere
worse.Bothbasinswereaffectedbydroughtinthisperiod,butthiscaseselection
hasitsownchallenges.Eventhoughdroughteffectstranscendtraditionalpolitical
boundaries,theriverbasinsthemselvesarenotpoliticalactorssothebasinasaunit
ofanalysisisachallengingonetoevaluatedifferencesinsocietalresponse.
Moreover,thedroughteffectsonproductiondonotappearallthatcomparable,
whichmaybeafunctionofpoliciesandsocietalresponsesofdifferentactors.As
theynote,thestructureofregionaleconomies(withIsraelbeingapost-industrial
statewithdesalinizationcapacity)madestatesintheregionverydifferentfrom
eachotherintermsoftheirvulnerabilitytodroughteffects.31
AsSelbyetal.noted,bothnorthernIraqandsoutheasternTurkeywerealso
affectedbythesamedrought.32However,bothcountrieswerealreadyexperiencing
conflictatthetimeofthedrought,makingcomparisonwithSyria’scivilwaronset
problematic.33Arethereothercasesthatarepotentiallyabetterfit?Inhiscomment
ontheSelbyetal.pieceandwiderdiscussionHendrixidentifiessomepossible
cases,“ThedroughtthataffectedSyriaalsoaffectedneighboringJordan,Lebanon
andCyprus,yetwidespreadviolencedidnotoccurthere.”34Iusetheseobservations
31 Feitelson and Tubi 2017. 32 Selby et al. 2017a, 234. 33 Iraq was in the throes of an on-going civil conflict that grew out of the U.S. invasion in 2003. Turkey has long had an insurgency in the southeast of the country in the Kurdish region which was heavily affected by the drought. 34 Hendrix 2017b, 251.
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asthepointofdepartureforcaseselection,ultimatelytakingtheSyriaandLebanon
casesaspairedcases.
IfthestylizednarrativeofSyria’scivilwariscorrect,thenweneedacountry
withacomparableagriculturecommunitytohavebeenaffectedbydrought,with
concomitantlossesinagriculturalproduction.LebanonandpossiblyJordanmaybe
suitable,albeitimperfectcomparisoncasesforSyria.
Comparingcountriesfromoutsidetheregionmightbeproblematicbecause
ofverydifferentagro-ecologicalconditions.LevantcountriessuchasSyria,Lebanon,
andJordanmayshareasimilarclimateattheintersectionofthehumid
MediterraneanandthearidArabiandesert,thoughtherestillmaybesignificant
climaticdifferencesbetweenthem.AccordingtotheWorldBank,Syria’saverage
annualprecipitationis252mm/year,placingthecountry155thintheworld.
Lebanonforitspartiswetter,reaching661mm/year(forarankof114th)while
Jordanisdrierwith111mm/year(arankof168).35However,whenwecompare
widerfreshwaterresourceswhichwouldincludeflowsfromrivers,differences
betweenLebanonandSyriaarelessstark.Intheperiod2007,thepercapita
resourcesavailableinLebanonwere1,102m3perpersonperyearcomparedto
855.7m3inSyriaandonly151.3m3inJordan.36ThatputsLebanonjustaboveand
Syriajustbelowthethresholdof1000cubicmetersperpersonperyearforwater
scarcity.37
35 Verner et al. 2018, 38. 36 Food and Agriculture Organization 2019a. 37 Fanack Water 2019.
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Evencountriesthatsharesimilarclimatesmightbedifferentinother
respectssuchasthesizeoftheirterritoryandtheirpopulation,thedegreeof
urbanization,andtheirdependenceonagriculture.In2007,thelastdatapointfor
whichtheWorldBankprovidesdataforSyria,thecountry’sGDPpercapitain
currentdollarswas$2032comparedto$2735inJordanand$5217inLebanon.38
SyriaisamuchlargercountrythanbothLebanonandJordan(184,000squarekm
comparedto10,000and89,000squarekilometers)andwasfarlessurbanized
(55.6%)thaneitherLebanon(87%)orJordan(84%).39In2008,Lebanonhada
muchsmallerpopulationthanSyria–4.1millionto20.3million–butitsproportion
ofthepopulationemployedinagriculturewassimilartoSyria–13.5%inLebanon
comparedto17.5%inSyria.Jordan,foritspart,onlyhad3.9%ofitsworkforce
employedinagriculture.40In2007,Syria’sdependenceonagriculture,forestry,and
fishing,asashareofGDP,wasalsogreater(19.5%)thanLebanon(4.9%)orJordan
(2.5%).41
Ifwethinkthattheeconomicdislocationofbadharvestssetinmotiona
chainofeventsthatledtotheSyriancivilwar,thecomparisoncaseshouldhavean
agriculturalsectorsizableenoughthatanunhappyfarmingclasscouldhavestoked
aprotestmovement,arebellion,or,attheveryleast,beenpartofinternal
populationmovementsofsufficientsizetotriggerdomesticcontestationbetween
groupsoverresources.GiventhesmallsizeoftheagriculturesectorinJordan,itis
38 World Bank 2019d. 39 Verner et al. 2018, 38. 40 World Bank 2019c; World Bank 2019e. Other data sources suggest Lebanon’s share of agricultural employment in 2008 (2.97%) was more similar to Jordan’s (3.57%) than Syria (14.53%). Roser 2013. 41 World Bank 2019b.
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lessclearthattheseconditionsaremet.Lebanonlookslikeamoreplausible
comparisoncase,thoughotherdatasourcessuggestLebanon’sagricultural
employmentwasnotdissimilartoJordan’s.Whilenocasecomparisonsareperfect,
SyriaandLebanon,whichweretogethercarvedoutoftheOttomanEmpireandthen
latercleavedbyFranceintoseparatepolities,areperhapsthebestcasesfor
comparison.
Here,weneedtoshowthatbothcountriesfacedseveredroughts.Unlikethe
chaptersonhumanitarianemergencies,wealsohavethemoredifficulttaskof
showingthelengthiercausalchainconnectingdroughtinSyriatocivilwarand
interventionsthatattenuatedthatchaininLebanon.ForSyria,thatrequires
connectingthedroughttoadeteriorationinagriculturalproductionandincomes,
and,inturn,otherstepsthatmightspeaktothemotivationsforpoliticalviolence
andtheinabilityoftheSyriastatetostemsaidviolence.Ontheinabilityside,that
wouldintersectwiththeSyrianstate’sincapacityand/orunwillingnesstorespond
effectivelytothedrought.TheSyrianstate’sfailedresponsetothedroughtcould,in
turn,feedthemotivationsfordiscontent,includingfarmers’protestsandpopulation
movementsthatfurtherinflamedsocietalcleavages.
ForLebanon,Ishouldfinddifferencesinstatecapacityandpoliticalinclusion
fromSyriawhichshouldhelpexplainwhythecountrydidnotexperienceconflict
afterthedroughtsthatbeganin2007-2010.Thoughdroughtscreatedproblemsand
pressuresforthepopulacetodemandredressthroughprotest,Iexpecttoseethat
theLebanesegovernmentprovidedthepublicwithavenuestoexpresstheir
grievancesthroughthepoliticalprocess.Atthesametime,Ishouldbeabletoshow
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thegovernmentwasmoreresponsivetothesecomplaintsandmoreeffectiveinits
redressoffarmers’concerns.Inotherwords,Lebanonhadbothamoreinclusive
andcapablegovernment,evenasitwasincreasinglytestedwiththeflowofSyrian
refugeesintoitsterritoryinthewakeofthecivilwarnextdoor.Weshouldalsofind
evidenceofforeignfinancehelpingbothLebaneseandrefugeesaliketohelp
dampentherisksofconflictasLebanon,particularlyafter2011whenSyrians
migratedenmassefleeingviolence.
Table1:SyriaandLebanon
Country Hazard Events
Capacity Institutions International Assistance
Outcomes
Syria Droughts 2006-2010
Intermediate capacityà Diminished capacity (2007)
Exclusive
Limited access
Civil war 2011-
Lebanon Droughts 2006-2009
Intermediate capacity
Somewhat inclusive
Broad-based aid delivery
Protest activity but no civil war
SyriaandLebanon
Syriaexperiencedadevastatingcivilwarin2011whileLebanon,despite
oftenbeingonthevergeofpoliticalbreakdown,has,asoflate2019,yettodescend
againintocivilwar.If,asIarguedinchapter2,theprojectofsustainingpeacein
countriesislargelyafunctionofelitebargainsaboutrepresentationandequitable
servicedelivery,weshouldfindevidencetosuggestthattheSyriastatedidnothave
eithermeansormotivetoservicethedrought-strickencommunitiesaffectedbythe
2011drought,eitherinareasaffectedbythedrought,mostlyintheeastofthe
country,orinthetownsandcitiesmanySyriansmigratedtoaftertheirlivelihoods
asfarmersbecameuntenable.
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Lebanon,bycontrast,withitselaboratepowersharingagreementshadboth
incentiveandcapabilitytorespondtothedroughts,toensurethatfarminggroupsin
theBekaavalleyaffectedbythedroughtsof2007/8,2010,and2014didnot
experiencelarge-scalesuffering,discrimination,which,inturn,mightendangerthe
fragilepeacethatthecountryenjoyed.
Tosupportthisargument,First,Ineedtoshowthatbothcountries
experienceddrought.Second,Ishouldbeabletoshowdifferencesinstatecapacity
inSyriaandLebanon,thoughIamlesscertainthatthisiscentraltothedifferences
inoutcomesbetweenthetwocases.Third,IshouldbeabletoshowthatLebanon
hadmorepoliticalinclusionthanSyria,whatItaketobethekeydifferencebetween
thegovernmentstructures.Fourth,totheextentthatbothcountriesreliedon
internationalaidinthemidstoftheiron-goingdroughts,myexpectationisthat
Lebanon,givenitsmoreinclusivegovernment,wouldensurethatresourceswere
sharedequitably.
Beyondthesegeneralexpectations,therearemorespecificones.InSyria’s
case,Ishouldbeabletoshowthattheimpactcouldnotorwasnotdiminishedwith
irrigationtopreventlargedeclinesinagriculture.Moreover,Ishouldfindthose
productiondeclineswerenotoffsetwithsatisfactorycompensatorymechanismsto
ensurefarmers’livelihoodswerenotdrasticallyreduced.InLebanon’scase,Ishould
beabletoshoweitherirrigation-basedinterventionstopreventlarge-scale
productiondeclinesand/orcompensationmechanismstohelpfarmersmaintain
livingstandards.Lebanon,givenitsrelativewealth,couldhaveself-financedthese
interventionsorbeenabletochannelinternationalassistancetosupportfarmers.
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InSyria’scase,differentpathwayscouldhaveledthecountrydownapathto
civilwar.Forthedroughttohavecontributedtocivilwar,thedeclinesinfarmers’
incomeshouldhavealsocausedsufficienthardshipthattheybecamemorelikelyto
participateinrebelactivityinsitu.Alternatively,theymayhavemigratedtoother
citieswheretheybecamerecruitablebywould-berebelsbecauseoflowliving
standards.Anotherpossibleexplanationisthatmigrantpopulationscouldhave
competedwithurbanpopulationsintheirnewlocationsoverhousing,jobs,and
services,makingthosenewsitesmoresubjecttopoliticalproteststhatcouldhave
escalatedintoviolence.
Thisexplanationdoesnotdependonthemigrantsthemselveshavingjoined
theprotestsorrebelmovementsinmassnumbers.OnecritiquefromFröhlich,
basedonlimitedinterviewswithSyrianrefugees,isthatthereisnoevidencelinking
migrantstohavingtakenpartintheinitialproteststhatkickedofftheuprisingin
Syria.Theirownprecariousstandinginnewurbanareascouldhavemadethemless
likelytoparticipateinprotestsand/orviolence,buttheirpresencemayhaveledto
dissatisfactionfromexistingresidents.42ThisconjectureisconsistentwithSalehyan
andGleditsch’sworkonhowmigrationcanleadtointer-groupconflictbetween
incumbentpopulationsandmigrants(particularlyifincumbentsrespondnegatively
tonewcomers),butthisobservationisalsoconsistentwiththeclimateandsecurity
literaturethathasnotedmigrantsthemselvesmaybelesslikelytoengageinprotest
42 Koubi 2017, 201; Koubi 2019, 374.
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giventheirownvulnerabilitytoreprisalsfromhostcommunitiesiftheyengagein
politicalprotests.43
Lebanon,givenitshighurbanization,mighthavebeenmoreatriskof
domesticunrestthanSyriathroughanothermechanism,thepriceoffood.Drought
domesticallyandinternationallycouldhavehadanimpactonfoodprices,thus
triggeringdomesticprotests.Indeed,theroleofincreasedinternationalfoodprices
hasbeenmootedasoneoftheprimarydriversoftheArabSpringandthe
emergenceofprotestpoliticsinEgyptandotherNorthAfricancountries.44Smith
showedcountriesofteninsulatetheirpopulationsfromthepassthrougheffectsof
internationalfoodincreases,butthatwheretherearedomesticfoodpriceincreases,
protestsaremorelikely.45Similarly,HendrixandHaggarddemonstratedthat
democraciesandanocraciesaremorelikelytoexperienceprotestsinthewakeof
foodpricesincreases,asauthoritariangovernmentsaremorelikelytofearurban
unrestasathreattoregimestabilityandseektobuyoffthroughsubsidiesandother
measures.Withmoreelectoralcompetitionindemocraciesandanocracies,those
regimeshavetobemoreresponsivetoruralconstituents,wherefoodsubsidiesfor
urbanconsumersmightcomeattheirexpense.46Lebanonisaninterestingcasewith
aPolityIVscoreof6,thethresholdbetweenanopenanocracyandademocracy,
suggestingitmighthavebeenvulnerabletofood-relatedprotestactivitiesthatcould
haveescalatedintosomethingmoregiventhefragilityoftheregime.47
43 Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan 2008; Linke et al. 2018. 44 Lagi, Bertrand, and Bar-Yam 2011. 45 Smith 2014. 46 Hendrix and Haggard 2015; Hendrix 2013. 47 An anocracy is a mixed regime with democratic and authoritarian features. Syria, for its part, was a -8 in the period 2008-2012 before become fully authoritarian -10 in 2013. Center for Systemic Peace 2018.
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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Thissetofexplanationscapturesthemotivationsforparticipatinginrebel
movementsbutanother--notmutuallyexclusiveexplanation--fortheviolencein
Syriawouldbetheeffectsofoutputdeclinesonstatecapacityitselfbydecreasing
availabletaxrevenuefromagriculture.Theseeffectswouldmakeitharderforthe
statetoprovideessentialservicestothefarmersand/orsuppressviolence.Such
declinesinstatecapacitymayverywellpredatethedroughtandlargelybea
functionofothersocialandeconomicchangesthatmakeitharderforthestateto
affordservicedeliveryortosuppressviolence.48
Itmaybedifficulttodisentangletheeffectsofthedroughtitselfonstate
capacityandalonger-rundeteriorationincapacitywroughtbymismanagement.As
discussedinmoredetail,someSyriascholars,forexample,identifytherootsofthe
government’sproblemswithrespecttoagricultureandwatermanagementto
earlierdecisionstopursuefoodself-sufficiencyinwaterintensivecropssuchas
wheatthatcouldonlybesustainedwithirrigation,whichitselfwasdependentupon
fuelsubsidiesforpumping.Whenthegovernmentremovedsuchsubsidies,
productioncollapsed,hasteningafurtherdeclineintheagriculturalsector.49I
returntothesethemesinsubsequentsections.
Whatfollowsisanattempttodocumentevidencethatsupportsmy
expectationsforhazardexposure,statecapacity,inclusion,andforeignassistance.
Asinpreviouschapters,Idrawonareastudiesexpertsandexistingscholarly
narrativesofthetwocountries’divergenttrajectories.
48 Koubi 2017, 201; Koubi 2019, 374. 49 Châtel 2014.
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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EvidenceofHazardExposure
Thepointofdepartureforunderstandingthetwocasesbeginswitha
justificationfortheclaimthatthetwocountriesexperiencedseveredroughtsin
similartimeframes.InthecaseofSyriaandLebanon,thedroughtsweremore
directlyoverlappingtemporallythantheexperienceofSomaliaandEthiopia
documentedinthepreviouschapter.
AsIarguedinthatchapter,thereisnouniversaldefinitionofwhat
constitutesadrought.Somescholarslooktorainfallmeasuresforevidenceof
drought,whileothersseetemperatureasabettermetricgivensomechallengesof
dataquality.Someindicatorsofdroughtcombineinformationderivedfromrainfall,
temperature,andsoilconditionstoidentifydroughtperiods.Giventhatweare
mostlyinterestedintheimpactsontheagriculturalsector,itmakessense,asinthe
lastchapter,toidentifytheimpactsofclimaticconditionsonagriculture,suggesting
thatgrowingseasonconditionsmattermost.50
Forbothcountries,itiseasyenoughtoestablishgrowingseasondroughtsin
theperiod2006-2010aswellalongerhistoryofrainfallandtemperature
deviations.Asinthepreviouschapter,Iusetherainfallandtemperaturedatafrom
theClimateResearchUnit(CRU)attheUniversityofEastAnglia.Initsclimate
portal,theWorldBankaggregatedthisstation-leveldatauptothenationallevelto
providemonthlymeansdatingbackto1901.51Icalculatedthedeviationfrom
growingseasonrainfallandtemperaturelevelsforthemaincrop,wheat,ona
50 This again is inspired by the work of von Uexkull et al. 2016 on growing season droughts. I also use Smith 2014 for the methodology of deviations from rolling 20-year monthly mean rainfall and temperature. 51 World Bank Undated.
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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rollingbasisfortheprevious20years,extendingtheanalysisbacktothe1970s.For
bothcountries,themonthlymeanisbasedonrainfalltotalsforOctober-Maybased
ontheFoodandAgricultureOrganization’s(FAO)cropcalendar.52
Forrainfall,thatmeanscomparingthemonthlyrainfalltotalsforOctoberto
theprevioustwentyOctobersanddoingthesameforeachmonthbetweenOctober
andMay.Ithencalculatethecumulativedeviationfortheentireperiodtoshowhow
differentthetotalamountofrainwasforthatgrowingseasoncomparedtowhat
farmersconsidertobenormal,forwhichatwentyyearbackwardtimehorizon
seemsreasonable.Fortemperature,Iusetheaveragedifferenceratherthantotal
deviationfromnormaltemperaturelevelssincetemperaturedoesnotcumulatein
thesamewayasprecipitation.Iusebothrainfallandtemperaturemostlytocheck
toseeifthereareyearswhenrainfalllevelswerenottoofarbelownormallevels,
butwemightseehightemperaturescreatingwaterstressforcropsthatmightshow
upinyielddeclines.AsKelleyetal.note,“whatmattersforcropsissoilmoisture,
whichisinfluencedbytemperatureaswellasrainfall.”53Asinthepreviouschapter,
Icomplementsuchnationalleveldatawithsubnationalportraitsofagriculture
stressfordroughtperiodsofinterestusingmapsfromtheFAO.
Beforepresentingthatrainfalldata,itisworthnotingthatthechallengesof
wateraccessforagricultureandotherusesbecomemoreurgentwhenaccompanied
byotherchangesandproblemssuchasrapidpopulationgrowthandmanagement
ofgroundwaterresources.54InSyria’scase,thecountry’spopulationgrew
52 FAO 2019a; FAO 2019b. 53 Kelley et al. 2017, 246. 54 Null and Risi 2016, 26; Adelphi 2015.
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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dramaticallyfromnearly9millionin1980toalmost20millionby2007.The
countrywasalsohosttosome1millionIraqirefugeesbetween2003-2007.55Other
severedroughtshadbuffetedSyriainthe1990s.Syriawasalsoaffectedby
upstreamdiversionofwaterbyTurkey’sconstructionofdams.Gleickshowsthe
averageannualflowsoftheEuphratesatJarabulusjustdownfromtheTurkish-
Syriaborderdeclinedfromabout1000cubicmeterspersecondbetween1937-
1989toabout650m3persecondbetween1990-2010.56Thus,theamountofwater
availabilitypercapitadeclinedfrom744cubicmeterspercapitain1982to363m3.
57Suchproblemsaremagnifiedwhenwaterismismanaged,directedtowards
water-intensivecropssuchascottonandwheat,orwhereirrigationtechniquessuch
asfloodirrigationusemorewaterthanisneeded.58Thismakesitchallengingto
distinguishclimateandenvironmentalstressfrompopulationandresource
management.OtherscholarssuchasKahlbundlesuchdynamicsunderthebroader
labelofdemographicandenvironmentalstress.59Whilethesewereimportant
backgroundconditionsthatshapedthewiderresourceenvelope,therewasstilla
markeddeclineinrainfallduringthisperiodthathadamajorimpactonagricultural
production.
Forrainfall,theCRUdatashowsthat2006-2009wereallbelownormal
growingseasonrainfallyearsinSyria,with2008being123mmbelownormalfor
thegrowingseason,thecountry’sworstdroughtsince1973.Whilethe2006-2009
55 World Bank 2019e. 56 Gleick 2017, 334. 57 Ritchie and Roser 2017. 58 The New Humanitarian 2010. 59 Kahl 2006.
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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droughtisthemostseveresince1973,itisnottheonlymulti-yeardroughtoverthe
last40years,as1982-1987wasalsoadryperiod,ifnotbythesamemagnitude.Any
explanationforwhydroughtcontributedtocivilwarinthecontemporaryperiod
2006-2009oughttobeabletoexplainwhyanothermulti-yeardroughtdidnot
resultinasimilaroutcome,arguablywhenthecountry’sworkforcewasevenmore
employedinagriculture,withabout30%oftheworkforceemployedinagriculture
in1984(seeFigure1).60
Figure1:SyriaGrowingSeasonRainfallDeviations1973-2016
Source:Author’scalculationsusingCRUdata
Evenasrainfallreturnedtonormallevelsin2010,thetemperaturedatashowthat
2010wasthesecondhottestyearsince1973withtheaveragegrowingseason
deviationintemperaturenearly2degreesCelsiusabovenormal(seeFigure2).
60 Library of Congress 1988.
-200-150-100-50050100150200
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
SyriaAnnualRainfallDeviation1973-2016
October-MayCumulativeDeviation
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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Figure2:SyriaAverageGrowingSeasonTemperatureChange1973-2016
Source:Author’scalculationsusingCRUdata
InLebanon’scase,between2007and2010,thecountryexperiencedfour
continuousyearsofbelownormalrainfall,with2008being200mmbelowthe
averagegrowingseasonrainfallfortheprevioustwentyyears.Thatwasthelargest
negativedeviationinrainfallsince1973,thoughLebanonhasexperiencedanumber
ofseveresingle-yeardroughtsovertheyearsincluding1979,1986,1989,and1999
(seeFigure3).
-2
-1
0
1
2
31973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
SyriaAverageAnnualTemperatureChange1973-2016
October-MayAverageDeviation
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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Figure3:LebanonGrowingSeasonRainfallDeviations1973-2016
Source:Author’scalculationsusingCRUdata
TheWorldBankhasidentifiedboth2010and2014assignificantdrought
years,thoughtherainfalldeviationfor2010–negative25mmforthegrowing
season–isnotnearlyassevereas2008.However,whenwelooktolarge
temperaturedeviations,2010wasanespeciallyhotyearwhengrowingseason
temperaturesaveragednearlytwodegreesCelsiusabovenormal(seeFigure4).
-300-200-100
0100200300
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
LebanonAnnualRainfallDeviations1973-2016
October-MayCumulativeDeviation
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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Figure4:LebanonAverageGrowingSeasonTemperatureChange1973-2016
Source:Author’scalculationsusingCRUdata
Kelleyetal.putthedroughtintocontext:“BeforetheSyrianuprisingthat
beganin2011,thegreaterFertileCrescentexperiencedthemostseveredroughtin
theinstrumentalrecord.”61Inasubsequentpiece,Kelleyetal.anchoredthedrought
intheregion’swiderhistory:“And,ifinstrumentaldata,modelresultsandtheory
arenotenough,ananalysisofanewgriddedtreeringdatasetofwinter/spring
surfacemoistureavailabilityforallofEurope,NorthAfricaandtheMiddleEast
(Cooketal.ScienceAdvances,2015)concludedthat1998-2012wasthedriest15-
yearperiodintheLevantinthelast900years.”62Thisdroughtandthedryingofthe
region,theyargued,wasrootedinanthropogenicclimatechange:“Analysesof
observationsandmodelsimulationsindicatethatadroughtoftheseverityand
durationoftherecentSyriandrought,whichisimplicatedinthecurrentconflict,has
61 Kelley et al. 2015, 3241. 62 Kelley et al. 2017, 246.
-2
-1
0
1
2
31973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
LebanonAverageAnnualTemperatureChange1973-2016
October-MayAverageDeviation
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
26
becomemorethantwiceaslikelyasaconsequenceofhumaninterferenceinthe
climatesystem.”63
Eveniftheperiod2006-2010wasamajordroughtepisodeinbothcountries,
theeffectswereunequallydistributedwithinSyriaandLebanon.Wecanseethe
geographicdistributionofdroughteffectsbylookingatthemostintensedrought
yearof2008andFAOmapsofagriculturalstress.64InSyria’scase,severe
agriculturestress–wheremorethan85%ofagriculturallandexperienceddrought
conditions–extendedthroughoutmuchofthenorthofthecountryin2008,
affectingHasakaprovinceinthefarnortheast,ArRaqqahinthecentralnortheast,
andaportionofAleppoprovinceinthenorthwest.Smallpocketsofdroughtaffected
otherprovinces,includingtheadjoiningprovincesofHamaandHomsinthecenter
ofthecountryaswellasthreesouthernprovincesDar’a(whereearlyprotests
againsttheregimeoccurred),Damascus,andAs-Sweida(seeFigure5).65About75%
ofthecountry’swheatproductionwashistoricallygrowninthenortheastofthe
country.66
63 Kelley et al. 2015, 3241. Gleick summarized additional science on the likely warming and drying of the Middle East. Gleick 2014. 64 The FAO defines this indicator in terms of the extent of cropland affected by drought over the entire crop season: “The Annual ASI depicts the percentage of arable land, within an administrative area, that has been affected by drought conditions over the entire cropping season.” It is based on the Vegetative Health Index and looks at the duration and intensity of crop cycle stress over the growing season. Food and Agriculture Organization 2019b. 65 Food and Agriculture Organization 2019d. 66 USDA 2008.
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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Figure5:AgriculturalStressinSyriain2008
Source:FoodandAgriculturalOrganization
Theareasaffectedbythedroughtinthenortheastofthecountryincluded
theheavilyKurdishregionsofHasakaprovinceandthenorthernpartofAleppo
provinceborderingTurkey.ThecityofAlHasakahlocatedcentrallyinthatprovince
isalsowherealargeconcentrationofSyriansChristianslived.Thedroughtalso
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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affectedDruzepopulationsconcentratedinthesouthofthecountryinDar’aandAs-
Sweidaprovinces.Inthecenterofthecountry,thedroughtprimarilyaffectedSunni
dominatedregionsinHomsprovince.67Theruralareasaffectedbythedrought–
particularlyinthenortheastofthecountry–tendedtobethepoorestpartsofthe
country.In2007,averageannualpercapitaexpendituresintheruralnortheast
werelessthanhalf--2051SyrianLira–oftheircoastalurbancompatriots(where
theaveragewas4339Syrian).Between2004and2007,thecountryexperienced
improvedequalitybetweenregionsbutadeteriorationinincomesinbothurban
andruralareasandinmostregionsofthecountry.68
InLebanon’scase,thedroughtin2008affectedmostlytheagriculturalrich
landsofBekaagovernorateintheeastofthecountry,especiallythesouthern
districtofRachaya,wheremorethan85%oftheagriculturallandwasaffected
throughout,andNabatiye,agovernorateinthefarsouthofthecountry.Pocketsof
severedroughtwerealsofoundinothergovernorates–MountLebanonandNorth
(seeFigure6).69
67 Locations of ethnic groups are derived from Wucherpfennig et al. 2010. 68 Abu-Ismail, Abdel-Gadir, and El-Laithy 2011, 24. 69 Food and Agriculture Organization 2019c.
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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Figure6:AgriculturalStressinLebanonin2008
Source:FoodandAgriculturalOrganization
Asmentioned,theBekaaValley,runningnorthtosouthintheeastofthe
country,isLebanon’sprimaryagricultureregionandwasgreatlyaffectedbythe
2008drought.Thesouthernpartofthecountryismostlysmallfarmerswhilethe
NorthandBekaaValleyfarmersaremostlylargecommercialfarmers.70Hezbollah
hasaparticularlystrongpresenceinthefarsouthandthefarnorthofthevalleyin
70 World Bank 2010.
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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Shia-dominatedareas.ThesouthwasanespeciallyrichtargetofIsraelisortiesin
the2006militarycampaign.ThecentralpartoftheBekaaValleywouldbecomethe
mainrecipientofSyriarefugeesaftertheonsetofthe2011war.Ruralregionsin
Lebanontendtobepoorerthanurbanareas.In2004-2005,about18%oftheNorth
wasestimatedtobeextremelypoor,with12%and11%intheSouthandBekaa
Valleyrespectively,comparedtothenationalaverageof8%andlessthan1%in
Beirut.71
Theeffectsofthedroughtshowupinagriculturalproductiondeclinesin
bothcountries.BothLebanonandSyriastilloverwhelminglyrelyonrainfed
agriculture,thoughirrigationwasmoreavailableinbothcountriesthaneither
EthiopiaorSomalia.About20%ofLebanon’sagriculturallandwasirrigatedin2007
comparedto9.8%inSyria,thoughabouthalfwheatproductioninbothcountries
wasirrigated.72Whileirrigationmighthavecompensatedforsomeofthewater
shortfallsfromlowerrainfalltotals,thedroughtshouldstillshowupinproduction
declinesofmajorcrops,giventhelimitedpenetrationofirrigation,particularly
amongsmallholders.In2008,Syria’swheatproductionintonneswasnearly60%
belowproductionin2006.Whileproductionsubsequentlyrebounded,itremained
morethan20%belowthepeaklevelevenbeforethefurtherdramaticdeclineafter
thecivilwarcommenced(seeFigure7).
71 UNDP 2007. 72 World Bank 2019a. Wheat statistic for Lebanon from Verner et al. 2018, 25. Wheat irrigation statistic of 45% from USDA 2008.
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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Figure7:WheatProductioninSyria1972-2017
Source:FoodandAgricultureOrganization
InLebanon’scase,productiondeclinesshowupinmultipleyears.Production
peakedin2006,withproductionin2007down25%ofthatpeakbeforerebounding
in2008to93%of2006levels.Wheatproductionin2009was72%ofpeaklevels
beforebottomingoutin2010at54%ofpeak2006production(seeFigure8).Wheat
isespeciallysensitivetotemperaturespikes,witha1degreeCelsiusincrease
contributingtoa13%reductioninproduction.73Recallthattemperaturesin2010
werenearly1.8Cabovenormal.TheWorldBankwritesthatthe2010droughtwas
thesignificantdroughtyearintheLebanoncontextwithacombinationofdrought,
temperature,andfireleadingtodeclinesofwheatproductionbyasmuchas83%.74
73 Verner et al. 2018, 25. 74 Ashwill et al. 2013, 57.
0
1000000
2000000
3000000
4000000
5000000
6000000
Tonnes
SyriaWheatProduction1972-2017
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
32
Figure8:WheatProductioninLebanon1972-2017
Source:FoodandAgricultureOrganization
At this stage, we have evidence of a severe drought that affected both
countries,withwheat production in both experiencing a significant decline.What
effectdidthedroughthaveonlivelihoods?Here,avarietyofpolicyinterventions—
from support for irrigation, income and food support, food for work, insurance
mechanisms, assistance for asset rebuilding and recover—could have protected
people from harm. Nonetheless, there should be evidence of distress in both
countriesbeyondproductiondeclinesintermsof incomedeclines, foodinsecurity,
and/orlivestockdeathsthatwouldhavetriggereddemandsforapolicyresponse.
IntermsofSyria,somedatapointshavebeenreportedevenbythosemore
skepticalofthelinksbetweenclimateandconflict.deChâtelnotesthat“According
toseveralUNassessmentsbetween2008and2011,1.3millionpeoplewereaffected
020000400006000080000100000120000140000160000180000
Tonnes
LebanonWheatProduction1972-2017
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
33
by the drought,with 800,000people ‘severely affected’.”75That assessment found
80% of those severely affected were living on bread and sugared tea, only good
enoughforabout50%ofdietaryneeds.76Fröhlichcitesotherimpacts:“Herdersin
the Northeast lost 85% of their livestock, affecting 1.3 million people. In 2009,
according to theUN,more than 800,000 Syrians had lost their livelihoods.”77One
2011 estimate for theUN International Strategy forDisasterReduction suggested
the droughtwas theworst in 40 years, causing a tributary of the Euphrates –al-
Khabour – to dry up, with wheat production in non-irrigated areas declining by
82%. The report suggestednationally that total livestock levelsdropped from21
millionpre-drought to14-16millionafterwards.78AMay2008U.S.Embassycable
released by Wikileaks also reported that the regime increased prices on
domesticallyproducedfoodinApril2008,wheatby40%,sugarbeetsby30%,and
almost a 100% increase forwheat and barley, leading to at least one food price-
relatedprotest.79
Lebanon’s drought, which had similar effects on wheat production is not
recordedasadisaster.But,foodpricesdidincreasedramaticallyinthe2007/2008
period,withaveragefoodpricesrising18.2percentin2008alone,suggestingthat
the regime faced a risk of protest activity. That study suggested the government
respondedbyre-introducingsubsidiesonwheat,breadandflourthathadbeen in
process of being phased out. The report noted themore significant challenges to
75 Châtel 2014, 525. 76 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2009. 77 Fröhlich 2016, 40. 78 Erian, Katlan, and Babah 2010, 15. 79 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2008.
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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food security in the country occurred later in 2014 after more than 1 million
migrants fromSyria floodedintothecountry,particularly insouthernLebanonin
theagriculturalrichBekaaValley.80Theimplicationhereisthatgovernmentactions
mayhavestanchedtheriskoffood-relatedprotests.
Atthesametime,thedeclineinwheatproductioninthisperiodcouldhave
adverselyaffectedfarmers’incomesinthewaytheydidinSyria,potentiallyleading
tofoodinsecurityinruralareas,abandonmentoffarms,suicides,migrationtourban
areas,andultimatelyconflict.WheatproductionhasbeensubsidizedinLebanonas
a strategic priority to enhance national self-sufficiency and insulate farmers from
fluctuationsinglobalwheatprices.Lebanonstillimportsmorethan80%ofitsfood
stuffs,including cereals.81Given that international prices canvarywidely (as they
didafterRussiabannedgrainexportsinAugust2010inthewakeofadroughtand
wildfires), the decision to subsidize production of awater-intensive crop such as
wheatmaymakemorestrategicsense.82Syria,asdiscussedfurther,alsohistorically
adoptedasimilar,evenmoreambitious,commitmenttofoodself-sufficiency.
InLebanon’scase,thegovernmentthroughtheGeneralDirectorateofWheat
and Sugar Beet Subsidy (GDCS) plays a critical role to subsidize production by
paying farmers a premium when international prices are low and through
subsidized loans. Thoughproductionwasbelow2006 levels, one study suggested
thatrobust internationalprices in2007and2008allowed farmers tosellall their
wheat directly to themarket without relying on state subsidies. The researchers
80 UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 2016, 10. 81 Ibid., 20. 82 Parfitt 2010.
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
35
notedthatin2010,however,theimpactofthedroughtonproductionmadefarmers
evenmoredependentonthestateforsupport.Inasurvey,lessthan10%offarmers
were willing to continue to grow wheat without state subsidy. Here, too, the
implication is that were it not for state subsidy, the situation of wheat farmers
would have been much worse in the midst of the drought.83I will discuss these
policiesfurtherbelowaswecontrastthesuccessfuleffortsbyLebanontoshoreup
both consumers’ access to food and farmers’ income from food saleswith Syria’s
failedeffortstoprotectfarmerandconsumers’interests.
The differences in governance, both state capacity and inclusion, between
Syria and Lebanon loom large here. Even though Lebanon has its share of
governancechallenges,especiallyasaresultofmisalignedincentivesfromitsnow
thirty year-old power-sharing agreement, the country has managed to avoid a
descentintoanothercivilwar,despiteoccupationfromSyriaandexternalmeddling
fromIsrael.
EvidenceofStateCapacity
Thefirstdimensiontoevaluateisstatecapacity.Asinthelastchapter,Ibegin
by examining broad indicators of governance from the World Bank and other
sources before discussing in more detail agriculture-specific governance
arrangements.
The World Bank governance measures capture different dimensions; a
number of them—government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of
83 Tawk et al. 2019, 199, 203.
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
36
corruption—mayberelevantforthinkingaboutthestate’sabilitytodeliverservices
in the midst of a multi-year drought.84The core expectation is that Lebanon’s
capacity should have been higher than Syria’s at the onset of the drought. The
droughtitselfcouldhavehadaneffectonstatecapacityitselfintermsofresources
toservethepopulaceandalsoitsabilitytoretainamonopolyonforcethroughout
its territory, but, as suggested earlier, it is less clear how quickly a slow-onset
droughtcanhavesuchanegativeimpactoncapacity.
World Bank measures typically reflect investor evaluations of country
performance and are only available back to 1996 and were only available every
otheryearuntil2002.Asnapshotviewofall threemeasuresshowshigherquality
governanceinLebanonforallthreedimensionsinlinewithmybasicexpectations.
Early in the drought period in 2007, Lebanon’s government effectivenesswas 45
percentilerankwhileSyria’swas22.Onregulatoryquality,the2007dividebetween
LebanonandSyriawaswiderwithbothcountriesscoringpoorlyoncorruption(see
Table1).
84 World Bank 2019f. Government effectiveness captures “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.” Regulatory quality captures “perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.” Control of corruption reflects “perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.”
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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Table1:GovernanceIndicatorsforLebanonandSyria
Source:WorldBankWorldwideGovernanceIndicators
BytheadventofSyria’scivilwarin2011,investors’perceptionsofSyria’s
governmenteffectivenessandregulatoryqualityactuallyimproved.Theupswingin
overalleffectivenessiseasiertoobserveinFigureX.Thesteepdeclinein
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
38
perceptionsofeffectivenessonlyreallycrystallizesinthewakeofthecivilwaritself
(seeFigure9).
Figure9:GovernmentEffectivenessinLebanonandSyria1996-2018
Source:WorldBankWorldwideGovernanceIndicators
Asdiscussedinthelastchapter,thePRSgrouphasanindicatorof
bureaucraticqualitythatdatesbackto1984.85Ittooisbasedlargelyoninvestor
perceptions.ThatindicatoritselfisacomponentofWorldBankgovernment
effectivenessmetric.Lebanon’sbureaucraticqualityreacheditsnadirin1990,just
asthecountry’slong-runningcivilwarended.BureaucraticqualityinLebanon
improvedthroughoutthe1990s,eclipsingSyria’sin1997andremaininghigher
thereafter,thoughwouldexperienceasteadydeclineovertime.Syria’sbureaucratic
85 Bureaucratic quality “measures institutional strength and quality of the civil service, assess how much strength and expertise bureaucrats have and how able they are to manage political alternations without drastic interruptions in government services, or policy changes. Good performers have somewhat autonomous bureaucracies, free from political pressures, and an established mechanism for recruitment and training.” Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010.
0
20
40
60
80
19961998200020022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018
PercentRank
LebanonandSyriaGovernmentEffectivenessPercentRank
1996-2018
Lebanon SyrianArabRepublic
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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qualitywouldremainlowerthroughthe2000swithaslightimprovementin2008
(seeFigure10).
Figure10:BureaucraticQualityinLebanonandSyria1984-2017
Source:PRSGroup
Onsomelevel,theseindicatorsconfirmtheexpectationthatLebanonhad
bettergovernancethanSyriaintheleaduptoSyria’scivilwar.However,theWorld
Bankgovernmenteffectivenessindicatorssuggestaconvergenceofcapabilitiesup
inthe2000sto2011,evenaftermultipleyearsofdrought,raisingquestionsabout
therelevanceofthisindicatororthecontributionofdifferencesinstatecapacityto
theoutcomesinbothcountries.Here,itmaybeusefultothinkaboutthereputation
thatBasharal-Assadenjoyedpriortohisrepressiveresponsetotheprotestsof
March2011.Assadcameintoofficein2000afterhisfatherdied.Heestablished
somethingofareputationasaneconomicreformerthroughoutthe2000sashe
soughttoreorientthecountryonthebasismoreofamarketeconomywithless
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
BureaucraticQualityinLebanonandSyria1984-2017
Lebanon Syria
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
40
heavy-handedstateintervention.86Thatreformagendapickedupin2005,which
correspondstotherenewedinvestorconfidenceingovernmenteffectivenessinthe
WorldBankdata.87
Internationalinvestorsmaywellhavejudgedtheremovalofsubsidieson
dieselfuelandfertilizersin2008tohavebeenmarket-friendlyandthereforea
symbolofgoodgovernance.Thatdecisionondieselfuelthoughhadanimpacton
theirrigationpumpingcapacityoffarmersinthemidstofthelaterdroughtaswell
astheirabilitytogettheirgoodstomarket.88Alongwithotherpolicies,such
decisionsmighthavemadethesituationworseandlesstenableforfarmers,butit
mightnotbereflectedinforeigninvestors’perceptionsofgovernanceuntilthe
situationbecamemiredinviolence.
Asinthelastchapter,wecanalsolookforindicatorsofstatecapacityspecific
todroughtpreparednessandresponse.Thiswouldincludepredictionandearly
warningsystemsfordrought,programstopreparefordroughtsandinsulatethe
populationfromadverseimpactsincludinggrainstorage,irrigation,insurance
schemes,income,andfoodsupport.Wecanalsoevaluatetheresponsemeasuresthe
countryhasestablishedtopreventmalnutritionandstarvationsuchasfood-for-
workschemesandfooddonationsaswellasprogramstore-startagriculturesuch
asseed,agriculturalinputs,andlivestockrestockingprograms.Becausebothof
thesecountriesweremorereliantonirrigationthaneitherEthiopiaorSomalia,
86 Horn 2012; Haldevang 2017. 87 Bennet 2005; Raphaeli 2006; Butter 2015. 88 Châtel 2014, 527.
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watermanagementinstitutionsthatregulateandapportionirrigationarealso
relevant.
Here,Ifocusonpoliciesofproductionsubsidiesinbothcountries,asthese
seemtobemostrelevantforthinkingthroughdifferentialstatecapacity.Idiscuss
somemoredetailsintheinclusionsectionbelow.
Bothcountrieshaveencouragedsomemeasureoffoodproduction,evenfood
self-sufficiencyinSyria’scase,throughsystemsofsubsidy.Thesecanprovecostly
bothtosustainbutalsoifremovedinhaste.
Syriahadanaggressiveprogramtofosternationalself-sufficiencyinfood
productiondatingbacktothe1960s.Onthewatermanagementside,thiswas
facilitatedbyeffortstodamriversandextendirrigationinthenortheastofthe
country.Ontheproductionside,thiswas,asFröhlichnoted,“definedbysubsidies
forfarminputsandfuels,especiallyforstrategiccropssuchaswheat,cottonand
barley.”89
Aftertheintroductionofdieselmotorpumpsinthe1960,lowcostcreditand
subsidizedfuelfacilitatedtheextensionofdrillingwellsandpumpingfromthe
1970stothe1990s.Groundwaterlevelsdeclinedsignificantly.Ostensiblytocontrol
groundwaterlevels,thecountrylaterinitiatedanannualwellpermittingprocess,
thoughthiswouldbecomepoliticizedandsubjecttocorruption.90Evenbeforethe
drought,watermismanagement,waste,alongsideotherfactorshadledtosignificant
declinesinwateravailability,byasmuchashalfbyoneestimatebetween2002and
89 Fröhlich 2016, 41. 90Châtel 2014, 531.
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2008.91Staffcompetenceinthisareawasverylow.AccordingtodeChâtel,“The
majorityofstaffintheministriesofAgricultureandIrrigationhasbarelyfinished
secondaryschoolandonlyasmallminorityhasauniversitydegree.”92What’smore,
shedescribedtheinstitutionalstructureofwatermanagement“arcane”and
“fragmented”withnolessthan22differentministries,councils,anddirectorates
involved,withlittlecoordinationbetweenthemdespitesimilarresponsibilities.93
Alongsidethisweresubsidiesforfarmers.A2008WorldBankassessment
reviewedthecountry’ssubsidyprogramandnotedavarietyofpressureswere
makingitmoredifficulttoafford,includinglowoilrevenues.UnderitsAnnual
AgriculturalProductionPlan,Syriabegancreated“agriculturalstabilityzones”
beginningin1975toregulatelandallocationsfordifferentcropswithagoalof
nationalself-sufficiencyinwheatandcotton.Thoselicensestooperate,inturn,were
tiedtoaccesstocredit,inputs,andmarketingservices.Thestateregulatedthesale
ofstrategicallyimportantcropsthroughstate-controlledcompanies.Thestate
offeredpricesubsidiesforwheat,cotton,sugar,sugarbeet,barley,andtobacco,
thoughinsomeyearsinternationalpriceswerehigherthandomesticprices,
lesseningtheneedfordomesticsubsidy.94
Thisreportsuggestedagriculturalsubsidiescollectivelyamountedtoabout
4%ofGDP,withdieselsubsidies2.6%ofGDP,fertilizerandseedupto0.3%,credit
0.1%(augmentedbybaddebts),withpricesubsidiestocottongrowers(0.9%)and
91 Fröhlich 2016, 40. 92 Châtel 2014, 531. 93 Ibid., 530–531. 94 World Bank 2008.
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beetfarmers(0.1%)othersignificantsubsidyitems.95Thereportnotedthat
agriculturefunctionedasasortofsafetynetandwherethelowskilled,ruralpoor
wereconcentrated.96However,thissubsidyprogramwascapturedbylargefarming
interests,thoughalsoweredirectedtothepoorestregionsofthecountryanddid
includesubsidiesforpoorcottonlaborers.TheBank’sgeneralconclusionwas
Syria’sstatistapproachtoagricultureandsupportfor“strategiccrops”wasleaving
thecountryill-equippedtotakeadvantageofmorelucrativeinternationaltrade
opportunities,bothforsellingwheatabroadbutalsodiversifyingintofruitsand
vegetables.97TheBankcounseledthatdieselsubsidyremovaloughttobeenacted
alongsidemoresupportforstrategiccropslikewheattodampenthesocialimpacts
offuelsubsidyremoval.98
Syriabeganaprocessofliberalizationthatwouldscalebacksubsidies.This
subsidyreformagendastartedinthemid-1980sbutpickedupin2005,whenSyria
releasedits10thFiveYearPlanfor2006-2010.In2008and2009,asthecountry
faceditsworstdroughtindecades,thegovernmentcancelledsubsidiesondiesel
fuelandfertilizer,leadingtoimmediatepricehikes.99Suchpricehikesonfuelmade
itbothhardertoirrigatewhatlittleharvesttheywereexpectingandaffected
productioninthefinalweeksandincreasedthecostsoftransportinggoodsto
market.100OnereasoncitedforthechangeinpolicieswasthesizeofSyria’sfiscal
deficit.Byoneaccount,fuelsubsidiesamountedto15%ofSyria’sGDP.Repealing
95 Ibid., 4, 8. 96 Ibid., 11. 97 Ibid., 6. 98 Ibid., 8. 99 Châtel 2014, 526. 100 Ibid.
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thosesubsidiesapparentlyquadrupledfuelpricesovernightinMay2008.101InMay
2009,thegovernmentalsocutsubsidiesforfertilizersandpricesdoubled.102
Intheleaduptothedrought,otherchoicesalsomadeitharderfortheSyrian
statetorespond.deChâtelwritesthatthe“thelackofsocialsafetynetsleftmanyin
theagriculturalsectorunabletocope.”103Relevanttothis,in2006,thecountrysold
itsstrategicwheatreservestocapitalizeonhighinternationalprices–some1.5
millionmetrictonsandtwiceasmuchasyearbefore–andthushadtoturnto
importstwoyearslaterasthedroughtunderminedproduction.104Syriahadbeena
netexporterofwheatsincethe1990sandthuswereforcedtoimportwheatin2008
forthefirsttimeinfifteenyears.105
InNovember2008,inacablelaterreleasedbyWikileaks,anFAO
representativeaskedUSAID,theUSbilateralforeignassistanceprogramforhelp
withthedrought.Callingthedroughta“perfectstorm,”theofficialnotedthatthe
SyrianMinisterofAgriculturesaid“that[the]economicandsocialfalloutfromthe
droughtwas‘beyondourcapacityasacountrytodealwith.’”106Oncetheimpactson
foodsecuritywererecognized,thegovernmentadoptedanumberofmeasureunder
the2009droughtappealtodeliveremergencyfoodsuppliestothemostaffected
regionsaswellaslivestockfeed,seedstock,replacementlivestock,andtechnical
assistance.107
101 Fröhlich 2016, 42. 102Châtel 2014, 526. 103 Ibid. 104 Polk 2013a; Polk 2013b. See Wikileaks released U.S. government cable for confirmation of reserve sales. U.S. Embassy in Syria 2008. 105Châtel 2014, 527. 106 Quoted in Polk 2013a. 107 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2009.
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Asnotedearlier,Lebanonsubsidizesbothconsumptionof
wheat/flour/breadaswellasproductionofwheat.Lebanonhassubsidizedand
continuestosubsidizeothercropssuchassugarbeetsandtobacco,butIfocuson
wheatforillustrativepurposesandforwhichmoreinformationisavailable.Since
the1960’s,theLebanonhasdiversifieditsagriculturalproductionintomorehigh
valuefruittreesandvegetablesforexport(especiallytoGulfcountries),forwhich
additionalsubsidiesandincentivesareprovided,mostofwhicharecapturedby
largelandowners.108
TheLebanesegovernmentestimatedthatwheatsubsidiescostLL129billion
between2007and2011(roughly$85million)onanetbasis,withnearlyallofthe
costsassociatedwithconsumersubsidies.Thosesubsidieswerepaidforwith
protectionisttariffsonimportedcerealsandotherfoodstuffs,foreignaid,taxeson
services,andotherrevenuesources.Therewereeffortsinthe2005-2006periodto
scalebackandreducefarmersubsidies.Becausefarmerswereunabletoselltheir
wheatin2006,thispolicywassuspendedandsubsidieswererestoredtobenefit
some1,300farmers(lessthan1%ofthecountry’s170,000farmers).109The2007
and2008internationalpriceswerehigherasbeforeandonlylimitedsubsidieswere
offered.Thepolicyofsubsidyphaseoutwasfullyreversedin2009,with2010being
animportantyearasaconsequenceofavarietyofweatherextremes,highdaytime
temperatures,lownighttimetemperatures,aswellasfloodingwhichreducedcrop
yieldsbyasmuchas60%.Becauseproductionwassolow,thequantityof
subsidizedwheatthatwasboughtwaslessthan20%ofwhatthegovernmenthad
108Banfield and Stamadianou 2015, 44. 109 Ibid., 22.
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budgetedfor.The2010netcostswereestimatedtobesmall,only0.01%ofGDP,
benefitingfewerthan700farmers.110Whilethenumberofbeneficiarieswas
relativelylow,theperpersonsubsidieswereontheorderof$6000to$6500,which
suggeststhebeneficiarieswerereasonablywellofffarmers,asmeanpercapita
consumptioninBekaaValleywasonlyabout$2300in2004-2005.111Ifthesewere
thekindsoflocalelitesinthecountry,pricesupportscouldhaveservedtosecure
theiron-goinggoodwilltotheregimeinotherwisedifficultproductionmoments.
Themorecostlyinterventionwasacaponthepriceofbreadthatinthe
season2007-2008alonehadanetcostof93billionLebanesepounds(about$61
million),whichwasmorethan70%ofthesubsidytotalovertheentireperiod.This
constitutedabout.21%ofthecountry’sGDPinthatperiodandnearly1%of
primaryexpenditures.BetweenApril2007andtheearlymonthsof2008,
internationalwheatpricesincreasedfrom$200permetrictontonearly$450per
metricton.Thegovernment’spricecapsnegotiatedwithdomesticbakery
syndicateshadsetpricesatalevelbasedonchargingthebakeriesabout$210per
metricton.Itisalittleunclearthenumberofbeneficiariesbutgiventhecostoutlay
andthenumberoftonspurchased—morethan240,000—itpresumablywas
ordersofmagnitudemorethanthenumberoffarmers.In2010-2011,after
additionaldroughtsdomesticallyandinternationally,anotherversionofthesubsidy
policyforconsumerswasreinstatedwithnetcostsof21billionLebanesepounds
110 Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Finance 2012, 7–9. 111 This is based on consumption adjusting for regional prices differences. UNDP 2007, 5.
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($13million).112ThissuggeststhattheLebanesegovernmentwasmoreconcerned
abouttheprotestpotentialofurbanconsumersthanthoseoffarmers.
Intermsofqualityofgovernance,theWorldBankin2018evaluated
Lebanon’sdroughtresponseand,likeSyria,notedfragmentationbetweenmultiple
agenciesandlackofclarityoveragencyroles.Thereportcitedanundatedstudy
thatsaidthecountrylackedadroughtemergencyplanandthattheseproblems
persistedthrougha2014drought.Coreconclusionswerethattherewasno
concerteddroughtmanagementeffort,thatthecountrydidnotprioritizedrought
riskmanagement,andhadnodroughtmonitoringsystem.113In2016,aUSAID
projectwashelpingfundaregionaldroughtpreparednessinitiativetocorrectthese
deficiencies,butthissuggeststhatLebanon’scapacityinthisspacethroughthemid
2010’swaspoor.114Thissuggeststhatwhilecapacitymayhavebeenbetterin
LebanonthanSyria,Lebanon’sdrought-relatedgovernancewasnotespeciallygood,
thoughthestatemanagedtomaintainsomesubsidiestoconsumersandproducers
inthemidstofthedrought.
Thusfar,IhavecomparedstatecapacityinSyriaandLebanon,asexante
differencebetweenthem,butitisalsopossiblethatthemulti-yeardroughtaffected
statecapacityitselfbyreducingtaxrevenuefromagriculture.Whiledisaggregated
sectoraltaxreceiptsarenotreadilyavailable,thereareestimatesoftaxcollectionas
apercentofGDPthrough2008.Neithercountrycollectsalargeshareofrevenuein
taxes.Denmark’sshare,forcomparison,wasover40%.Here,weobservethe
112 Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Finance 2012, 17. 113 Ashwill et al. 2013, 67–68. 114 National Drought Mitigation Center 2016.
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countriesdiverginginthemidstofthedroughtwithtaxrevenuesasashareofGDP
goingdownfrom14%in2006inSyriatoabout10.5%in2008whileLebanon’s
wentupfrom15.4%to16.6%.Whiletheremayhavebeenotherreasonsforpoor
taxcollectioninthisperiod,thissuggeststhatthedroughtcouldhavehadaneffect
onSyria’savailableresources,bothforservicedeliveryandsuppressionofdissent
(seeFigure11).115
Figure11:TaxRevenueasaShareofGDP
Source:ICTD/UNU-WIDERviaOurWorldinData EvidenceofPoliticalInclusion
Thesecondrelevantdimensionisthedegreeofpoliticalinclusion,arguably
themostimportantdifferencebetweenthesetwocountrieswithimplicationsfor
115 Ortiz-Ospina and Roser 2016.
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equitableaccesstoservicesandattentivenessofthegovernmentstodifferent
constituencies.Arguably,theSyriastatesince1970shasexhibitedahighdegreeof
politicalexclusion,rewardingtheminorityAlawitegroupthatcontrolledthe
governmentattheexpenseofothergroups.TheLebanesestatehashadelaborate
power-sharingagreementsinplacewhichwerereaffirmedinthewakeofitsfifteen
civilwarthatendin1990.Thosecarefullycraftedarrangementshaveensuredthat
thevarietyofLebanesestakeholdershavehadrepresentationingovernmentanda
meansofsurfacingtheirconcernsandclaimsforservices,includingfarmers.
AsaresultoftheUNmandatesystemthatemergedafterWorldWarIandthe
partitionoftheOttomanEmpire,SyriaandtheLebanoncametobeadministeredby
France.LebanonboundarywithSyriareflectseffortsbytheFrenchtocreatea
MaroniteChristiancontrolledstateinthe1920s.116DespiteFrencheffortstocreate
alargelyMaronitestate,SyriaandLebanonarebothdiversecountrieswithavariety
ofethnicandreligiouscleavagesuponbecomeindependentinthe1940s.While
bothhaveultimatelysufferedfromcivilwarsinthemodernera,Syriawas
nominallymorestableduringthelatterpartoftheColdWarwhenHafezal-Assad
seizedpowerthroughaseriesofcoupsandconcentratedpowerinhispresidency
whichlastedfrom1971untilhisdeathin2000.Assadruledthiscountryinfavorof
hisminorityAlawitegroup,asectofIslamthatisdistinctfromShiaandSunniIslam,
themajorsourceofintra-Islamcleavages.TheAlawitesconstituteabout13%ofthe
populationinSyriaandhaveretaineddominantcontrolofthepoliticalapparatus
116 Sly 2013.
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sincethe1970s,withmajorimplicationsforpatronageandpoliticalrewardsthat
theSyriastatehasofferedtoitsprimarysupporters.
ThesedifferencesarecapturedintheEthnicPowerRelationsdatasetthat,as
discussedinpreviouschapters,chartsthepoliticalrepresentationofdifferentethnic
groupsincountriesovertimeasgovernmentscomeandgo.Previousworkby
Bretthauersuggestedthatpoliticallyexclusiveregimeswereoneswheremorethan
20%ofthepopulationwasexcludedfrompower.117InSyria’scase,theminority
Alawites,asjustmentioned,constituteabout13%ofthecountryandhavebeenthe
dominantpartneringovernmentsince1970.Fully86%ofotherethnicgroupshave
beenexcludedfrompoliticalrepresentationeversince.ThemajoritySunniArabs,
whichaccountfor65%ofthepopulation,wentfrombeingjuniorpartnersinthe
governmentfrom1966-1969tobeingdiscriminatedagainstthereafter.Kurds,who
accountfor8%ofthepopulation,havebeendiscriminatedagainstthroughoutthe
country’shistory.Christianswhoamountto10%ofthepopulationhavebeen
powerlessunderbothHafezal-AssadandhissonBashalal-Assadwhoassumed
powerin2000.BothKurds(8%ofthepopulation)andDruze(3%)havealsobeen
powerless.
InLebanon’scase,Shias(32%),Sunnis(20%),andMaroniteChristians
(16%)wereallseniorpartnersingovernmentbetween1992-2017.Druze(6%),
GreekOrthodox(5%),ArmenianOrthodox(4%),andGreekCatholic(3%)haveall
beenjuniorpartnersoverthistimerperiod.Excludedpopulationsonlyconstituted
13%ofthepopulation.OnlyArabPalestinians(10%)havebeendiscriminated
117 Bretthauer 2015.
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againstwithArmenianCatholics(1%),Protestants(1%),andAlawites(1%)being
powerless.Atnotimefrom1946onwardhasLebanoneverhadmorethan13%of
thepopulationexcludedfrompower,includingthelengthyperiodofcivilwarfrom
1975to1990.From1971to1991,however,ShiaMuslims–32%ofthepopulation–
werejuniorpartnersingovernment.118
Asinthelastchapter,IalsoshowthemeasureofsocialexclusionfromtheV-
DEMdataset.119Relevantforthinkingaboutbothsocialserviceprovisioninthelead
upandinresponsetodrought,themeasureofsocialgroupsreflectsthedegreeto
whichthereisequalityofaccesstopublicservicesbasedonotherdistinctionssuch
asethnicity,caste,language,race,andregion.120AsacontrasttobothLebanonand
especiallySyria,highlyinclusiveDenmarkisalsoshown.Consistentwiththe
politicalrepresentationfiguresfromtheEthnicPoliticalRelationsdata,V-DEM
showsSyriawithconsistentlyhighsocialexclusionwithLebanonbeingmore
inclusivethroughoutandimprovingovertime(seeFigure12).
118 ETH Zurich 2018. Historically, rural farmers were mostly Shia and Maronite Christians, with the Maronites somewhat better off than the Shia. 119 V-Dem Project 2019. 120 Ibid., 195–198.
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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Figure12:SocialExclusioninSyria,Lebanon,andDenmark
Source:V-DEM
TheAssadfamilyruledSyriawithgroup-basedfavoritismtotheminority
Alawitesecttowhichtheybelonged,whichismostlyconcentratedalongthecoast.
Originallyapoorgroup,theAssadfamilyelevatedthisgroupbyappointingAlawites
tokeypositionsinthesecurityservices.121TheBa’athcoupthatultimatelybrought
Hafezal-Assadtopowerin1970notonlyservedtoelevateanewelitebuiltsome
widerlegitimacywithpeasantsthroughlandreformandloyaltiesofanemergent
middleclassthroughpublicsectoremploymentfromaprogramofnationalization.
CoupledwithArabnationalism,investmentsinhealth,education,andelectrification
continuedtobuildabaseofsupportinruralareas.122Thisprocessof“selective
goodsprovision”toregimesupportersincludedthenorthwesterngovernorateof
Latakia,where¾ofAlawitesarefromaswellasotherregionspartoftheBa’athist
121Sachs 2000. 122 Hinnebusch 2012, 95–96.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
11980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
SocialExclusioninSyria,Lebanon,andDenmark1980-2018
Denmark Lebanon Syria
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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coalitionincludingthesouthernregionofHawran(whichincludesDar’a,thelocus
forsomeofthefirstprotestsinMarch2011),theruralareasaroundAleppo,andthe
northeasternpartofDeiral-Zor.123
WhilesomeoftheSunnimajorityinDamascuswerealsobeneficiariesof
governmentfavoritism,otherSunnisresentedthisarrangement,withrebellionsby
theMuslimBrotherhoodintheearly1980sputdownwithgreatbrutality.The
regime’sabilitytocontinuethismodelbecameharderovertime.Thenational
securitystate,whichwasnecessarytosuppressinternaldissentwasexpensive.
Patronagejobsandsubsidizedfoodalsowereadrainonthepublicpursue.Asa
consequence,thecountry’seconomicbasedeteriorated,withthestateinthe1980s
forcedtoembraceausterity,includingmassivepublicsectorspendingcuts.Partial
privatizationofstate-ownedimportmonopoliescreatedanewclassofbeneficiaries
whoweredependentupontheregimefortheirwealth,withremainingsocial
programslikesubsidizedfoodandjobskeepingasemblanceoflegitimacywiththe
middleandlowerclasses.124
ThesecontradictionsacceleratedwhenHafezal-Assaddiedin2000.Hisson
Basharal-Assadsoughttobothdeepentheliberalizationagendaandretainsomeof
thesocialprotectionsforthemasses,throughaso-called“socialmarket”economy
withreformsbeginningin2005.However,hewasmoredependentuponanarrower
groupofsupportersintheAsad-Makhflouffamilyclanwhichwererichlyrewarded
withpatronage,whichangeredsomeoldguardelites.Theinexperienced
123 De Juan and Bank 2015, 94. 124 Hinnebusch 2012, 98.
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technocratsthatAssadrecruitedtopursuetheliberalizationagendawerenot
especiallyskilledsincesalariesforthesenewofficialswerelow.125
Despiteoilrevenue,theparlousstateofthecountry’seconomicsituation,
madeworsebyWesternisolationandsanctionsbecauseofAssad’ssupportfor
SaddamHussein,ledtheregimetoabandonsomeofthesocialprotectionsand
subsidiesithadmaintainedtoretainlegitimacywiththemasses,startingwithfuel
subsidiesandthenagriculturalinputsandpricesupport.126Tradeliberalizationled
tocheapimportscomingintothecountrywithsmallbusinessesbadlyaffected.
Hinnebuschdescribesthecontoursofthisemergentsystem:“Attheheartofthe
regimecoalitionwerethe‘cronycapitalists’—therent-seekingalliancesofpolitical
brokers(ledbyAsad’smother’sfamily)andtheregime-supportivebourgeoisie.”127
Thiswasthesceneasthecountryenteredintoamulti-yeardroughtin2007.
AsforLebanon,managingsectariandividesasinSyriahasalwaysbeena
challenge.Sincethe1860s,Lebanon’sgovernancestructurehasconsistedof
differentpower-sharingagreementsthathavetriedtomaintainadelicateabalance
ofthecountry’seighteendifferentreligiousgroupsorconfessions,someperiods
withmoresuccessthanothers.128Becausepowerdistributioningovernmentis
basedonthehistoric1932census,nonewonehasbeencompletedsincethen,even
thoughgroupshavelikelyexperienceddifferentialpopulationgrowth.129
125 Ibid., 99. 126 Ibid., 102. 127 Ibid., 101. 128 Zahar 2005. 129 Barshad 2019; Brown 2009.
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Inthepost-independenceperiod,theprojectbecamelesstenableovertime.
Inthe1970s,theinfluxofPalestinianrefugeesledtofurthercleavagesbetweenthe
dominantMaroniteChristiansandleftistgroupssympathetictothePalestinians.In
1975,disputesovereffortsbytheformerpresidentChamountomonopolizzfishing
rightsforhisMaronitecommunityiscreditedasthesparkforafisherman’sstrike.
Thatstrikeinturn,whensuppressedbythegovernment,escalatedintothelong-
runningcivilwarthatwouldultimatelyclaim120,000lives.130
Inoneassessment,Lebanonwaspost-civilwarseenascarvedupintoa
landscapeofdifferentgeographies:“Thecivilwarproducedamosaicofsmall
territoriesandsocialspaces,inwhichthepowerofthestate,andtheinfluencesof
thelocalpoliticalelite,arerelative.”131WhiletheTaifAgreementof1989helpput
anendtothecivilwarthrougharenewedpower-sharingagreement,withSyria
chargedwithbeingthemainpowerbrokerinthecountry.132Likeotherpower-
sharingagreements,itwasnotfullydemocraticandencumberedbyinertia.The
countryattimeslackedapresidentandhadparliamentaryparalysisin2013.Since
thattime,theevolutionofpluralismandconsociationalismhassuccessfullyaverted
areturntoviolencesincetheendofthecivilwarin1990butjustbarely.133
Lebanon’spower-sharingagreementmayhaveavertedconflictinthe
contemporaryerabuthascreateditsownproblems,namelyalegacyoflog-rolling
130 Reilly 1982. 131 Banfield and Stamadianou 2015, 23. 132 The Taif Agreement shifted power from the president to a Council of Ministers, provided for parliamentary, cabinet, and civil service parity between Muslims and Christians regardless of demographic trends. Bahout and Bahout 2016. 133 Kota 2012; Hartzell et al. 2016. For a more pessimistic take on the semi-feudal nature of Lebanon’s confessional system of parliamentary representation, see Ignatius 1983.
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corruptionandclientelismthathasimpededservicedeliveryandcreateda
perceptionthatelitesareservingtheirowninterestsratherthanthemasspublic:
Hospitals,roads,schoolsandotherprojectsaredistributedtofavoredcontractorsaccordingtosectarianquotasthatensureeverygroupbenefits,regardlessofnecessity.”134
A 2019 garbage crisis underscored the limits of this sectarian patronage-based
mode.Apreviousgarbagecontractwasapportionedtoprovidehundredsofmillion
dollar contracts for two separate landfills, one to the brother of an aide to a top
Sunni politician and the other to a businessman close to the senior Christian
politician. Even as these elites have gottenwealthy,much trash has been instead
dumpedmuchgarbageintheoceanandalongthecoast.
Such self-dealingbyelites acrossdifferent groupswasamajor impetus for
massive popular protests in 2019 that (peacefully) toppled the primeminister.135
But,therelativeopennessofthestatetotoleratesuchprotestsprovidesameansby
thesocietycanpeacefullyexpressitsgrievancesandseekredress.Asoneobserver
notedin2016asSyrianrefugeestestedtheregime’stability,“TheLebanesepolitical
systemisdefinitelyinneedofaraftofpoliticalreforms,butthebasicinclusiveness
ofthesystemremainsakeybulwarkatleastagainstseriouscivilconflictofthekind
weseeinseveralneighboringArabcountries.”136
EvidenceofInternationalAssistance
Bothofthesecountriesweremiddle-incomecountriesandreliedlesson
foreignaidinthecontemporaryerathanpoorerstatesintheinternationalsystem.
134 Yee and Saad 2019. 135 Ibid. 136 Salem 2016.
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Figure11showsaidasapercentageofgovernmentexpenseandshowsLebanon
andSyriacomparedtoEthiopia,arelativelyaiddependentstatediscussedinthe
previouschapter(seeFigure13).
Figure13:DevelopmentAssistanceasShareofGovernmentExpense
Source:WorldBankviaOurWorldinData
Thatsaid,Lebanonhasreliedonitsdiasporacommunityforarelativelylarge
shareofitsGDP,formorethanSyria(seeFigure14belowwithEthiopiaagain
includedforcomparison).
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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Figure14:PersonalRemittancesasaShareofGDP
Source:WorldBankviaOurWorldinData
Giventhatbothcountriesfacedseveredroughtsinthelate2000s,flash
appealsforhumanitarianassistancecouldhavebeenrequestedfromtheUnited
NationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(UNOCHA).However,
therewerenodrought-relatedappealsforfinanceforLebanonfrom2006-2011but
therewereforSyria.
SyriacoordinatedwiththeUNinSeptember2008andAugust2009toissue
emergencydroughtappealsbutjustforthenortheasternprovincesofHasaka,
Raqqa,andDeirez-Zor.Noassistancewassoughttoaiddisplacedpopulationswho
hadrelocatedtothesouth.Just$5.4millionofthe$20.4millionrequestedin2008
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
59
wasprovidedbytheinternationalcommunity,andonly1/3ofthe$43million
requestedin2009wasprovided.137
In2006and2007,Lebanondidhaveemergencyappealsforfinanceinthe
wakeofIsrael’s34-daymilitaryoperationagainstHezbollahthatstartedinJuly
2006,whichdisplacedsome700,000peopleinLebanon.UNOCHAcoordinateda
$150humanitarianappealin2006withanothersmallerappealof$20millionin
2007foron-goingrefugeesupport.138ThefirstLebanonappealsecuredmorethan
120%oftheinitialfundingappealwhilethe2007appealonlysecuredabout45%of
thefundingneeds.Whilethenatureofthefundingappeal(refugeesdisplacedby
armedattackinLebanoncomparedtodroughtvictimsinSyria)wasdifferent,the
differencesbetweentheefficacyoffundraisingappealsdoessuggesttherelative
isolationofSyriafromtheinternationalcommunitycomparedtoLebanon.
Châtelsuggeststheunderperformanceofinternationalcommunitysupport
forSyriawasinpartbecausetheSyrianwasambivalentaboutseekinginternational
assistanceanddownplayedthedrought’ssignificanceinitsownmediaandto
donors.Giventhecountry’sprideandself-imageasself-sufficientinfood
production,fullyacknowledgingthedroughtwasperceivedasabridgetoofar.
Moreover,donorswerenotquitesureaboutthegovernment’sstrategy.Adrought
managementplan,startedin2000andcompletedin2006,wasapparentlynot
activated.139
137 Financial Tracking Service 2019b; Financial Tracking Service 2019c. 138 Financial Tracking Service 2019a. 139 Châtel 2014, 527–528.
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CablesfromtheU.S.governmentnotedthatitdidnotcontributetothe
appealin2008,whichwaslimitedtoprovidingaidtojust10,000families.Bad
relationsbetweentheU.S.andSyriaseemedtobeattheheartoftheObama
administration’sreluctancetosupportaid,thoughthechallengesofactually
deliveringassistancethroughtheWorldFoodProgramwerealsonoted.140In2009,
theUNaskedtheUnitedStatestomakea$10millioncontribution,whichmight
havehelpedsignaltootherdonorstomakecontributionsoftheirown.141The
UnitedStatesalsodidnotcontributetothateffort.142A2010cablereleasedby
WikileaksshowedthattheWorldFoodProgrammecontinuedtohavedifficulty
gettingitsfundingappealssupportedin2010.Ofthemorethan$22million
requestedinNovember2010,abitmorethan$5millionhadbeenmobilizedby
February,limitingthenumberofbeneficiariesto240,000,sixtythousandlessthan
intended.TheObamaadministrationhadwantedtocallthecrisisanemergency
whiletheSyriagovernmentwasreluctanttolabelitassuch.143Syria’sexperienceas
donoroutcastisakintoEthiopiainthe1980sundertheDergandSomaliainthe
leaduptothe2011famine.Whencountriesareledorsubstantiallycontrolledby
groupsorindividualsdeemeduntrustworthybytheinternationalcommunity,that
canbeassignificantadecisionaseffortsbytherecipientcountriestoblockaid
themselves.
140 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2009. 141 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2010a. 142 Financial Tracking Service 2019c. 143 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2010b.
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PuttingthePiecesTogether
Thusfar,Ihaveshownthatthecountriesbothexperiencedseveredroughts
in the period 2006-2010 that led to major declines in agricultural production. I
showed that the countries differed in state capacity and political inclusion and
traced thedifferences insubsidyregimesanddroughtresponse inbothcountries.
Whatisthesequenceofeventsthatleadsfromdroughtinbothcountriesbuttocivil
warinonlyoneofthem?
Here, I need to show that the drought led to populationmovements from
affectedareasinSyriatosomeofthesoutherncitieslikeDar’athatweretheearly
sites for political protest against the regime. Fröhlich has disputed that
northeasterners displaced by drought were in a position to protest, given their
tenuous standing asmigrants to the south.That claim isplausible, thougheven if
theywerenotinvolvedindissentagainsttheregime,thatisnotfataltotheclimate
migration connection to conflict here. The presence of largemigrant populations
competing for housing, jobs, and services from the Syrian regime might have
triggered dissatisfaction of long-time residents, even if the migrants themselves
shunned participation in the protests themselves. While drought might have
surfaced as a reason for the protests themselves, it is quite possible that other
driverswerethesparksforprotestsandultimateviolencethattookplace.Drought
could have played an important role in either creating an underemployed
population of youngmen who took part in the protests and later violence or by
displacingalargenumberofpeopletoareaswherecompetitionforworkwithother
underemployedmencreatedarecruitablepopulationoffighters.
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In Lebanon, the absence of violence is unobserved, but aside from the
provision of subsidies to consumers and producers, there may have been crisis
momentsduringthedroughtsuchasstreetproteststhatcouldhavegoneadifferent
waybutwereresolvedpeacefully.Here,IfocusonSyriaanddiscussLebanonmore
fullyinthealternativeexplanationssectionbelow.
In 2018, Ide surveyed the Syria evidence and concluded that (1) the links
betweenclimatechangeandthedroughtareplausiblebutnotproven,(2)thatthere
isstrongevidenceofthedroughtleadingtomassivelossofagriculturallivelihoods
but that evidence is contested, (3) as is the evidence for massive rural to urban
migration,and(4)thattheroleofmigrationin intensifyinggrievances isplausible
butlimitedinformationexists.144
Ashenoted,thereisgoodevidencetosuggestthatthedroughtdiddisplace
largenumbersofpeoplefromthenorthofSyriatosoutherncities,butthereis
disagreementamongscholarsaboutthesizeofdisplacementandwhethermigrants
themselvesparticipatedinprotests.145InaNovember2008cablereleasedby
Wikileaks,theU.S.EmbassyinSyriareportedthefearsoftheUNFAOrepresentative
AbdullahbinYehia:“Withoutdirectassistance,Yehiapredictsthatmostofthese
15,000small-holdingfarmerswouldbeforcedtodepartAlHasakahProvinceto
seekworkinlargercitiesinwesternSyria.”Yehiaworriedthat15,000unskilled
laborerswouldaddtothesocialandeconomicpressurespresentlyatplayinmajor
Syriancities,”alreadyburdenedbyIraqirefugees,inflation,middleclass
144 Ide 2018. 145 Nasser, Mehchy, and Abu Ismail 2013, 26; Erian, Katlan, and Babah 2010, 32; Wodon et al. 2014, 55; Abu-Ismail, Abdel-Gadir, and El-Laithy 2011, 24.
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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dissatisfaction,and“aperceivedweakeningofthesocialfabricandsecurity
structures.”146Ina2009reportfortheemergencyaidappeal,theUnitedNations
estimatedthesizeofinternalmigration:“Migrationfiguresrangefrom40,000–
60,000families.36,000familieshavereportedlymigratedfromHassakeh
Governoratealone.”147In2009,thatreportedlyleftabout60–70percentofvillages
inthegovernoratesofHassakehandDeirez-Zor.148InaJune2009cablereleasedby
Wikileaks,theU.S.EmbassyinSyriareportedthatsome250,000to300,000had
migratedoutoftheregionaccordingtoFAO,mostlytoseekcasuallaborinmajor
citieslikeDamascus,Aleppo,andHomsaswellascasualfarmlabornearthe
JordanianborderinDar’aandAs-Suwaida.149AFebruary2010cablefromtheU.S.
Embassynotedthattherewassomereversemigrationbacktothenortheastasthe
rainshadreturned,buttherewasstillimmensehumansufferingintheregion.
Moreover,thecablenoteditwasstill“taboo”toacknowledgepubliclythescaleof
migration.150
SomeresearchersreportevenhighernumbersofdisplacedSyrians.
Femia/Werrell,Gleick,andKelleyreportasmany1.5oreven2milliondisplaced
personsasaresultofthedrought.151Selbyetal.critiquethisestimateaswildlyout
ofproportiontomostestimatesofbetween40,000and60,000families,orabout
300,000people.Theygoontodisputewhetherornotthedroughtwasallthat
criticalindrivingeventhosenumbers,givingexistingseasonalmigrationfromthe146 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2008, 4. 147 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2009. 148Châtel 2014, 527. 149 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2009. 150 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2010b. 151 Kelley et al. 2017; Gleick 2014; Femia and Werrell 2012; Werrell, Femia, and Sternberg 2015; Werrell and Femia 2017.
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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regionandotherdriversofmigrationfromtheregionsuchaseconomic
liberalization.152Ide’sconclusionofthedisputeisthatauthorsofcompetingcamps
arepotentiallyexaggeratingtheirdifferences,andthedisciplinewouldbebetter
servedbyacknowledgingthechallengesofestimatingprecisenumbersindata-poor
Syria:
Insum,thefigureofupto1.5millionrefugesusedbyKelleyetal.,butalsobyFemiaandWerrell,FeitelsonandTubi,Gleick,andWerrelletal.isalmostcertainlyoverstated.Butitisstillverylikelythatseveralhundredsofthousandsofadditionalpeoplemigratedfromthedrought-affectedareastotheoutskirtsofurbancentres.ThisnumberismoresignificantthanimpliedbytheestimatesprovidedbySelbyetal.andcouldhavehadconsiderablenegativeimpactsonsocialserviceprovisionandresourceavailability.153
The precise size of drought-related migration may not be knowable, given
challenges of understanding the baseline levels of seasonal migration and other
disruptions thatwereoccurring in Syria at this time, including Iraqi refugees and
thereturnhomeofSyriansaftertheendofthecountry’soccupationofLebanon.154
Itisdifficulttodisentanglethephysicaleffectsofthedroughtfromthegovernance
failuresofresponse.AsdeChâtelconcluded:“Similarly,climatechangeperse–to
theextentthatitspredictedeffectswouldalreadybevisible–didnotdriveSyrians
intothestreetinprotest;itwastheSyriangovernment’sfailuretoadapttochanging
environmental,economicandsocialrealities.”155
152 Selby et al. 2017a, 238. 153 Ide 2018, 351. 154 Selby et al. 2017a, 239; Ash and Obradovich 2020, 6. 155Châtel 2014, 522. . 522
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Thespecificmagnitudeofthemigrationmaybelessimportantthanthe
socialconsequences.Werethenumberslargeenoughtopotentiallytriggerthekinds
ofproblemstheFAOfeared,namelylocalcontestationoverresources?Accordingto
deChâtel,thoughtherehadbeenseasonalmigrationofyoungmeninthepast,this
droughtwassoseverethatwholefamiliesmigratedtosoutherngovernorates,with
anumbersettlingintentcampsoutsideofthesoutherncityofDar’a,156thesiteof
earlyprotestsagainsttheregimeinMarch2011afterfifteenteenagerswere
imprisonedandtorturedforwritinganti-governmentgraffiti.
HinnebuschalsosawthedroughtplayingapartinDara:“InDera,formerlyabaseof
theBa’ath,where it began, the loss ofwork opportunities in Lebanon, corruption
anddroughthadencouragedSalafismamongunemployedyouth.”157
Ash and Obradovich try to connect the migration within Syria through a
uniquedatastrategy.Theyuselightsatnightasaproxyforpopulationdensityand
show changes in light penetration between 2005 and 2010 to suggest population
growthanddecline.Theythencorrelatesuchchangeswiththelikelihoodofprotest,
findingthatareasinthenortheastthatexperiencedadeclineinlightintensitywere
associatedwithlowerprotestriskswhileSunniArabareasthatexperiencedhigher
light intensity (and hence were recipients of displaced populations) were more
likely to experienceprotests.158This finding complements a studybyDe Juan and
Bankthat,alsousingnighttimelight,foundbothselectivedistributionofelectricity
156 Ibid., 526. 157 Hinnebusch 2012, 107. 158 Ash and Obradovich 2020.
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to regions preferred by the regime and lower levels of violence in those areas
comparedtolessfavoredareas.159
Whilebothofthesestudieshavesomebearingontheconnectionsbetween
drought-relatedmigrationmovementsandprotest,AshandObradovichnotethatin
theirqualitativereviewofdemandsbyprotestersattheearlystageoftheuprising
in March and April 2011 that the drought was not mentioned, nor were many
economicdemandsingeneral,theemphasisbeingonfreedomandcallsforreduced
corruption.Theyseethisasprovidingsomesupportforoneoftheirhypothesisthat
people migrated to areas with similar kin and religious identities so rather than
foster inter-group cooperation, migration served to accentuate the claims of the
nowlargeridentitygroup.160Theynotethepresenceofsharedtiesbetweensending
andreceivingareasintheirtechnicalappendix:
Specifically,thereisevidenceSyria’smigrantsandlocalssharedtribal,inadditiontosectarian,connections.Inparticular,Syria’sSunniArabshaveacomplexpatchworkofkinshipnetworksandthesesometimestranscendregionalboundaries(Tibi,1990).Severaltribesandtribalconfederationshavepopulationsinbothareasstrickenbydroughtandthosethatreceivedmigrants:thereareBaggarainbothAleppoandDeirez-Zour,FadaninRaqqaandAllepo’sAinal-Arab,Al-AbdainHasakehandHamaandAl-HarbinHasakeh,Aleppo,DamascusandHoms(Zakariya,1983).161
Their argumentprovides aprovocativenew lineof potential research inquiry.On
some level, it is not surprising that two to three years after the beginning of the
droughts, there is no explicitmention in the protest activity in 2011, though the
relativeabsenceofeconomicclaimsissomewhatsurprising.Moreover,asSelbyet
al. note, while Dar’a is often flagged as the first case of mass post-Arab Spring
159 De Juan and Bank 2015. 160 161 See Appendix C2 in Ash and Obradovich 2020.
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protest in Syria, there were at least two other protests in Damascus as well as
ongoingprotests in theKurdish regiondatingback to February2011.162Asnoted
earlier,theU.S.embassycablesofMay2008alsosignalthattherewasatleastone
food-relatedprotestatthetimebutthatitwasquicklydispatchedwithwaterhoses:
“Aminority-runpolicestatewithheavy-handedinternalsecurityservices,theSARG
keepsaclosewatchonanycivilunrest thatcouldposea threat to theregime.”163
Nearly three years later, such demands for redress of food-related concernsmay
havemorphedintobroadercallsforpoliticalreform.Thus,thisworkraisesasmany
questionsasitanswers.
Moreover,itisalsounclearwhichsocialgroupswerethemainprotagonists
in anti-government activity, at least at the start.Hinnebuschwrites that the early
protagonistsweremiddle-class intellectualswho reachedout to Islamists and the
Kurds.WiththeKurdsambivalentbecauseofoffersofcitizenship,manyoftheinitial
protesterswereSunnis.Whatprotestshadincommonwas“reactiontotheneglect
ofareasoutsidethemainurbanareas.”164
ThegeographyofwheredifferenttribalandreligiousgroupsliveinSyriais
notwellunderstoodoutsideofSyria.ThegeoreferencedversionoftheEthnicPower
Relations dataset that I consulted is based on dated ethnic maps from a 1964
GREG/AtlasNarodovMiraDataset, though includessomeupdatedrefinements.De
Juan and Bank use another dataset from Izady to generate dummy variables for
SunniandAlawiteareas.Theynotethat“Tothebestofourknowledge,noreliable
162 Selby et al. 2017a, 240. 163 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2008. 164 Hinnebusch 2012, 107.
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databeyondroughapproximationsexiston theexactsizeandsettlementareasof
the various communities. Moreover, most regions of Syria have actually been
ethnicallyand/orreligiouslymixed.”165Theyarguetheirresultsareconsistentwith
thewithdrawaloftheSyrianstatefromserviceprovisionintownslikeDar’a:
In what was traditionally a Ba‘athist stronghold and the administrativecenteroftheHawrangovernorate,localstateinstitutionsgraduallywithdrewfromthecityandtheadjacentregionsincethe1990s,therebyweakeningthepreviouslystrongpatron–clienttiesbetweentheregimeandimportantlocalconstituencies.166
Thesetwoperspectivesseematoddssincetheformeremphasizespoliticalcriteria
while the latter focuses on withdrawal of the Syrian state from their history
clientelism.Theyperhapscanbereconciledwithfutureresearchwhichassessesthe
claimsthatmigrantswereofthesametribal/identitygroupsofreceivingareas.The
DeJuanandBankargumentisconsistentwithminethatdecliningstatecapacityin
anincreasinglyexclusiveregimetranslatedintolossofpublicsupportinthewakeof
thedrought,evenifthatwasnotarticulatedasthereasonfortheprotestactivity(if
AshandObradovicharetobebelieved).
EvenifwehavemoreconfidenceinthecausalroleofthedroughtinSyria’s
2011uprising,dowehavemuchclarityforwhyLebanondidnotexperiencesuchan
outcome?Bothcountriespossessedgovernancewithsomedegreeofself-serving
elitesandseemedpoisedforviolenceatdifferentmomentsintime.Inthesection
belowonalternativeexplanations,IfirstaddresswhySyriaandLebanonmightbe
fundamentallydifferentfromeachotheranddifficulttocompare,beforeturning
165 De Juan and Bank 2015, 98. 166 Ibid., 101.
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backtomymainargumentaboutthedifferentialroleofcapacity,inclusion,and
assistance.
AlternativeExplanations
Thestrongestalternativeexplanationforthediscrepantoutcomesbetween
thetwocountriesisthatSyriaandLebanonaredifferentintoomanyimportant
respects.Lebanonisricher,farmoreurbanized,andlessdependentonagriculture
thanSyria.Indeed,theeffectsofthedrought,thoughsignificantforwheat
production,donotshowupintermsoflarge-scalehumansuffering.
Thislineofargumentsuggestsacoupleofdifferentpossibilities,(1)thatthe
droughtwasnotassevereinLebanonand(2)thatthecountriesaredifferentfrom
eachotherinfundamentalwaysintermsofsocio-economicdevelopment.Interms
oftheformer,thelogicofthatcritiquewouldonlyreinforcethecausalsignificance
ofphysicalexposuretodrought.Ifthedroughthadbeenmoresevere,thelogicgoes,
Lebanontoowouldhavebeenatriskofconflictandstatebreakdown.
Thesecondexplanationsuggeststhatthepoliticaldifferencesingovernance
intermsofcapacityandinclusionarelesscentraltotheoutcomethanSyriaand
Lebanon’sdivergentlevelsofeconomicdevelopment.IfLebanonhadbeenpoorer
andmoreagriculturallydependent,wouldittoohavesuccumbedtoviolenceinthis
period?Assuggestedearlier,theregimeisvulnerabletofoodpriceshocksinurban
areas,andthegovernmentundertookexpensiveeffortsin2008toinsulatethe
populacefromtheseproblems.Morebroadly,Lebanon’ssituationhasbeen
precarious,bothintheleaduptothedroughtandinitsaftermath.Thetwo
countriesareintertwinedwiththeSyrianstatefunctioningasanoccupyingforce
JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019
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untiltheassassinationofLebanon’sprimeministerin2005forcedSyria’s
withdrawal.Lebanonweathereddifficultprotestsandviolencebetween2006and
2008,includinganIsraeliaircampaignagainstHezbollahin2006aswellasviolent
protestsin2008inresponsetothegovernment’seffortstoshutdownaHezbollah
communicationsnetwork.IntheaftermathofSyria’scivilwar,Lebanonwouldtake
inmorethan1millionSyrianrefugees.Despiteallofthesedevelopments,Lebanon
has,ofthiswritinginlate2019,notlapsedyetagainintolarge-scaleviolence.While
resources(bothinternalresourcesandinternationalfundingmobilizedbythe
internationalcommunityandLebanon’sdiaspora)helpedfacilitateamore
aggressiveresponsetoavarietyofchallenges,whatwouldLebanonlooklikeif
publicgrievanceshadbeenviolentlyrepressedthroughoutthisperiodasinSyria?
Conclusion
Thisprecedingdiscussionunderscoresthatdifferencesingovernance
betweenthetwocountriesareimportantbothintermsoftheLebanesestate’s
abilitytowithstandandrespondtothedroughtitfacedin2008-2010butalsoother
challengessuchasIsrael’sbombingcampaignof2006andon-goingchallengesfrom
HezbollahaswellastheinfluxofSyrianrefugees.WhileLebanon’sinternalsituation
isfarfromperfect(andperhapsdeteriorating),itisnotablethatLebanon,which
facedsimilarchallengestoSyriaoffragmentationinitspopulation,didnotsuccumb
tothekindsoflarge-scaleviolencethatplaguedSyriainthe2010s.Atthesametime,
theself-dealingbyelitestousepower-sharingarrangementsthatwereintendedto
makesureallgroupshadastakeinLebanon’sgovernmentthreatenedtocleave
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elitesofvariousconfessionsfromthemasspublic.Thatcertainlyhascreated
openingforprotestmovementsin2019thatbroughthundredsofthousandsouton
tothestreets.ThisissimilartothewaytheSyrianprotestsinitiallyevolved,as
Hinnebuschargued:
Theshocktroopsofrebellionwereyoung,unemployed,deprivedpeoplewithlittlestakeinthestatusquo,widelydispersedandunknowntothegovernment,hencequicklyproducingnewleaderstoreplacethosearrestedorkilled.167Theroleforleaderlessmassprotestsissomewhatatoddswiththe
argumentsIhavemadeaboutelitepactsinfosteringand/orunderminingstability
andsuggestsanumberofimportantconsiderationsasweturninthenextchapterto
whyinternationalactorsmightcareaboutclimatesecurityconcernsoutsidetheir
ownbordersandwhatthepolicyagendaoughttobeinaworldwheremoreregimes
willbetestedlikeSyriaandLebanon.
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