Chapter 1: Sign, Object, Interpretant 1.1 INTRODUCTION In this chapter, the three elements which constitute semiosis, sign, object and interpretant, will be described. In section 1.2, a characterization of the musical sign will be given. The musical object will be dealt with in section 1.3. The last section of this chapter, section 1.4, will deal with the musical interpretant. The general Peircean idea behind each element is presented, and subsequently applied to music. 1.2 THE MUSICAL SIGN 1.2.1 Introduction The first element which together with the object and the interpretant, constitutes semiosis, is the sign, [...] something which stands to somebody for something in some

respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the sign. The sign stands for something, its object. (2.228, c. 1897)

In this section, a conception of the nature of music as a sign is given. This conception is an orientation in a controversy which exists in musicology, the subject of which is the question whether music has ’meaning’ or not. Regarding the meaning of the word ’meaning’, a lot of disagreement and inclarity exists. For example, Medushevsky distinguishes between three different kinds of musical meaning (Bedeutungen): 1. Die syntaktischen Bedeutungen verweisen auf potentielle oder

realisierte Verbindungen des gegebenen Zeichens mit anderen Zeichen. [...]

2. Die semantischen Bedeutungen verbinden die Zeichen mit den Erscheinungen der Welt, mit den Vorstellungen von ihnen, mit den Beziehungen zu ihnen. [...]

3. Dei kommunikativen Bedeutungen richten die Wirkung der Zeichen auf die Wahrnehmung. [...] (Medushevksy, 1990)

The first two kinds of musical meaning which Medushevksy distinguishes are closely related to the common sense notion regarding ’meaning’: a musical sign is connected with another musical sign or with extra-musical elements. However, the third kind of musical meaning, the communicative meanings of musical signs, is of

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a different kind: it can be equated to to the intriguing aspects of a musical sign which can initiate the interpretation process or semiosis because they draw the attention of the sign-user. Peirce too mentions the word ’meaning’ in his works. However, when it is used in a Peircean context, we are dealing with something else than when it is used in every-day language. As will be shown in 1.2.2, the everyday use of the word meaning implies the question whether the musical sign can refer to a reality

1, which is, in

Peircean terminology, the question whether the musical sign has an immediate object (an aspect of the sign) which indicates a dynamical object (an element of the Peircean idea of reality which is represented by the sign). When meaning is used in a Peircean context, we are dealing with what is called by Peirce the immediate interpretant: In regard to the Interpretant we have equally to distinguish, in the

first place, the Immediate Interpretant, which is the interpretant as it is revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself, and is ordinarilly called the meaning of the sign [...]. (4.536, 1905)

The immediate interpretant is the quality of the sign which indicates the direction of a semiosis

2, or , in other words, the meaning of a sign is that part of the sign

which provides us with some clues regarding the direction which the interpretation process should take. 1.2.2 Orientation in a Controversy In Chronicle of my Life, Stravinsky says: [...] I consider that music is, by its very nature, powerless to express

anything at all, whether a feeling, an attitude of mind, a psychological mood, a phenomenon of nature, etc. Expression has never been an inherent property of music. That is by no means the purpose of its existence. If, as is nearly always the case, music appears to express something, this is only an illusion, and not a reality. (White, 1979:566)

This statement represents one position in the controversy on musical reference, the 1 Here again differences occur between the everyday use of a word and the Peircean

use of it. Peirce distinguishes between reality and existence. Reality is everything we have knowledge of and everything we could gain knowledge of in semiosis. Existence is everything we have knowledge of (see 1.3). An existing object is a reality, but not all realities are existing objects (Van Driel, 1993). In everyday language, this distinction is not relevant: reality is equal to existence.

2 More on the interpretant and its subdivisions can be found in 1.4.

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topic of which is whether music can refer to extra-musical phenomena. Within this controversy, two extreme positions can be discerned: 1) the position that music cannot refer to extra-musical phenomena (the autonomous conception) and 2) the position that music is a language which always refers to extra-musical elements (the referential conception). Stravinsky belongs to the first position. His statement regarding musical expression shows remarkable similarities with Hanslick’s polemic Von Musikalisch-Schönen: On the one hand it is said that the aim and object of music is to excite

emotions - i.e., pleasurable emotions; on the other hand, the emotions are said to be the subject-matter which musical works are intended to illustrate. Both propositions are alike in this, that one is as false as the other. (Hanslick, 1974:18)

Hanslick wrote his polemic in the romantic era, when music was regarded as a language of feelings, of emotions, or, to put it differently, music expresses emotions and refers to them. This, as was generally assumed, is the essence of music; it is its sole aesthetic property, a view which was partly based on a misconception of Hegel who thought music to be able to express emotions, however it does not have to. Hegel’s notion of the possibility of music to express feelings and emotions was interpreted as an obligatory feature of music (Hegel, 1985). According to Hanslick, not the expressive qualities account for the beautiful in music, but the structural aspect of the musical composition is the carrier of music’s aesthetic properties: Its nature is specifically musical. [...] it consists wholly of sounds

artistically combined. (Hanslick, 1974:66) The essence of music is not the expression of feelings, it is not its contents, but its form. Hanslick and Stravinsky consider music as an autonomous structure which cannot express something of refer to something. Their conception, however, ignores the fact that people often do try to associate certain musical structures with certain extra-musical elements like emotions. This seems to support the view of music as a referential language. Ever since the baroque era, the idea that music is a referential language has dominated music theory and practice. In the baroque, music was regarded as a language of affects. To express affects, music was regarded as a speech which had to be composed and performed according to the principles of rhetoric, a collection of prescriptions which could be used in order to make a discourse as effective as possible. Prescriptions were related to the choice of a topic (inventio), the main structure of the discourse (dispositio), the filling out of its details and the use of figures of speech (elaboratio), memorizing the speech (memoria) and extra-textual instruments the orator could use when presenting his speech, such as the applica-tion of gestures (actio) (Leussink, 1984; Ueding, 1986). Especially the inventio, dispositio and elaboratio were of great importance to music; many music theorists

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in the baroque era have written about those aspects of rhetoric in regard of their application to music, the most famous of which is Johann Mattheson with Der vollkommene Kapellmeister from 1739 (Mattheson, 1980). The idea that music is a language with a referential character has some significant consequences, which have to do with the characteristics of language. Language has a syntactic, a semantic and a pragmatic aspect. The syntactic aspect of language deals with the structure of language. The syntactic rules are written down in a grammar. The semantic aspect of language deals with the meaning of words and sentences. Pragmatics refer to the study of linguistic phenomena which cannot be fully analyzed on the level of syntax or semantics. In pragmatics, the question in what circumstances a certain kind of language is appropriate, is the object of re-search. Pragmatics is a general term for the study of diverging linguistic phenomena (Renkema, 1987). A conception of music as a referential language implies that music has a syntactic, a semantic and a pragmatic component. Kessels (Kessels, 1986/1987) deals with this problem

3. According to Kessels,

[...] music consists of percepts that are built from a set of basic ele-

ments: pitch, volume, duration and timbre. (Kessels, 1986/1987:209) With regard to the semantic component, Kessels states that one should distinguish between music that is listened to as a structure of plain percepts, like fugues, minimal music and simple tunes, and music that is listened to as a set of referring percepts. Kessels illustrates this second kind of music with a comparison of the first with the second movement of Beethoven’s Moonlight Sonata (opus 27-2): To someone who listens intently and who is susceptible to it the

music seems to be an expression of some characteristic bodily behaviour - for instance, a slow, heavy and dragging pace and a quick, light and skipping one. And through this it also seems to be an expression of the corresponding mood or feeling. [...] The same observation applies to such indication for the execution of music as

3 Kessels deals with the syntactic and semantic aspects of music. The pragmatic

aspect is not under discussion in his text. A topic of pragmatics is the influence of context on the interpretation of language. Translated to music, pragmatics could study the influence on semiosis of the context in which music is listened to. An example is attending a concert in a concert hall. In psychoacoustics terms, in an enclosed space like a concert hall, direct and indirect sound is involved. Indirect sound adds sound energy at the position of the listener, which is perceived as an increase in loudness. Indirect sound arrives later than direct sound because its path is always longer. This influences the ability to distinguish and to recognize sounds. Indirect sound also arrives from other directions than direct sound, which results in an impression of spaciousness (Rasch and Plomp, 1982a).

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crescendo and decrescendo, legato and staccato, accelerando and ritenuto, etc. or to general aspects of music like tension and release, excitement and rest, harmony and disharmony, preparation and fulfilment, etc. All of these seem connected to bodily behaviour and can be expressed in posture, gestures and movements, as mime and performances show. And all of these terms apply not only to music but to inner emotional states as well. (Kessels, 1986/1987:210)

A similar idea regarding the semantics of music, or the referential character of music, can be found in Deryk Cooke’s The Language of Music (Cooke, 1978). Kessels often refers to him. Cooke considers music as a langage with its own unambiguous vocabulary, and in his book he tries to catalogue musical structures and their referents in what he calls a Musical Vocabulary. Cooke comes to a vast amount of fixed combinations between particular musical structures and particular referents. An example: according to Cooke, the structure as shown in Figure 1.1 is an outgoing feeling of pain - an assertion of sorrow, a complaint, a

protest against misfortune. (Cooke, 1978:122)

FIGURE 1.1: THE MINOR 1-2-3-4-5 PROGRESSION Cooke’s conception, and with it all other conceptions of music as a referential language, starts from the principle that musical structures have a fixed meaning, or - in Peircean terminology - that the musical sign has an immediate object which determines a dynamical object

4. This view needs to be looked at very critically, for

it passes over the important idea that any actualization of a certain relation between sign and object depends not only on aspects of the sign, but on one’s habits and beliefs regarding a phenomenon, which can differ from person to person, as well. Starting from this idea, it is rather easy to present counter examples to e.g. Cooke’s Musical Vocabulary. Take for example the trio Suscepit Israel from Bach’s Magnificat. The text of this trio is:

4 More on the dynamical and the immediate object can be found in 1.3.

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Suscepit Israel puerum suum recordatus misericordiae suae.

He hath holpen his servant Israel in remembrance of his mercy.

Bach has set this text to music as shown in Figure 1.2:

FIGURE 1.2: BACH’S SETTING OF SUSCEPIT ISRAEL Here we have the minor 1-2-3-4-5 progression (see Figure 1.1) on the word Suscepit

5, according to Cooke’s vocabulary an outgoing feeling of pain, an assertion

of sorrow, a complaint, a protest against misfortune. But if Cooke is right, then why has Bach used this progression on the word suscepit, which does not nessecarily refer to sorrow, complaint and protest at all in the context of a canticle-like work the Magnificat is? Another example which can be used to criticize the notion of music as a referential language can be found in Mozart’s symphony no. 40. This symphony begins with an appogiatura:

FIGURE 1.3: APPOGIATURA IN MOZART’S 40TH SYMPHONY An appogiatura (or Seufzer) gives, according to Cooke, the effect of a burst of an-guish. Like all the other musical structures described in his vocabulary, Cooke illu-strates his point by using excerpts of vocal music, which indeed support his case. In the case of the appogiatura, Cooke extends his ideas about this musical structure to instrumental music:

5 This motive could also be looked upon as a descending major sixth from a#

’ to f#’’.

However, because the a#’ is placed on a weak beat, we consider the b’ the beginning of the descending motive, which encompasses a perfect fifth.

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Having identified this term of musical language, are we not in a position to understand the moods of the opening pages of Mozart’s Fortieth and Vaughan Williams’s Fourth Symphony? (Cooke, 1978:150)

Cooke may be right, but why is it that this symphony is always played in a vivid, light, exciting way which, at least for us, has more to do with happiness than with anguish? Only two counterexamples are presented here, more examples could be given. Cooke’s Vocabulary, Kessel’s conception of music as a referential language and all other attempts to uncover the referential character of music and musical structures which result in a description of inherent ’meaning’ are the results of a projection on those structures of one’s interpretation. Any interpretation depends on one’s habits and beliefs regarding a musical phenomenon, as well as on characteristics of the sign. This is an important notion which is ignored by referential approaches of musical ’meaning’, which explicitly assume that a one-to-one relation exists between a given musical sign and its object. Such a view which can easily lead to statements like the following: Hindemith is undoubtedly right in his observation that people react in

different emotional ways to a given piece of music, but his statement that each reaction is equally justifiable fails to take a simple psychological point into account. Could it not be that some listeners are incapable of understanding the feeling of the music properly? (Cooke, 1978:21)

The conception of music as a referential language totally ignores the fact that interpretations can vary considerably from era to era, from person to person, from hearing to hearing, and that each statement regarding the referential aspect of music has the right to exist. Therefore, it seems logical to reject this view in favour of the conception of music as a non-referential structure. However, we have seen that this view cannot be held either, for it ignores the fact that it is often tried to associate certain musical structures with certain extra-musical elements. Now the question arises how people make this kind of connection. The musical sign plays a crucial role in this: it contains several immediate objects which indicate several dynamical objects. This view stands between the two extremes: on the one hand, it acknow-ledges the existence of a musical structure, which is - to a certain extent - an autonomous whole, on the other hand it takes into account that people now and then try to relate music to extra-musical elements. Now let us take a closer look at the musical sign as an autonomous system. 1.2.3 Musical Parameters Musical semiotics differs from e.g. semiotics of film in the nature of the sign that is involved in a semiosis. In general, a sign can be described as a perceptible artefact,

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the representamen, which represents in a certain way the dynamical object and which suggests an interpretant (Van Driel, 1993:77). The musical representamen (or percept) is the musical sign in its perceptibility. On the one hand, it carries the immediate object and the immediate interpretant. On the other hand, the musical representamen moulds the immediate object and the immediate interpretant. Each musical structure, or musical representamen, consists of parameters, a form of Thirdness. Each parameter consists of potential variables, a form of Firstness, which can be actualized, a form of Secondness. Each actualized variable can be looked upon as an intriguing phenomenon which can be the beginning of semiosis. Two characteristics can be attached to parameters (Van Driel, 1993:78/79): a. Something is a parameter, if it is nessecarily present in each artefact of a

phenomenon. In other words, parameters indicate the uniqueness of a phenomenon, for they are the essential conditions which have to be met before we can talk about a certain phenomenon.

b. A parameter cannot be reduced to another parameter. Which are the parameters of the musical representamen? Musical sound is usually described in four categories: 1. pitch 2. duration 3. loudness 4. timbre Problems arise when those categories are given the status of musical parameters: the first characteristic cannot be fully met, for pitch, duration, volume and timbre are characteristics of any sound. Even the eight parameters Miereanu mentions (hauteurs, durées, intensités, timbres, modes d'attaque, spatialisation, densité de la distribution, enveloppe) (Miereanu, 1987) cannot take away this problem: his parameters are not exclusively musical parameters, they can easily be applied to e.g. spoken language as well. We are dealing with a major problem here: what distinguishes music from spoken language or from any other sound? What distinguishes the musical sign from other signs? This question is very hard to answer, if it can be answered at all (and if it must be answered at all): even the Grove Dictionary (Sadie, 1980) avoids to define music and musical sound. However, tools are required to analyze the musical sign, this analysis being part of a description of a semiosis of a musical phenomenon. In this thesis, pitch, duration,

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loudness and timbre are used for this purpose, for they are present in each musical phenomenon. Although they do not account for the uniqueness of music, it is assumed here that pitch, duration, loudness and timbre are musical parameters

6.

Pitch refers to the height of a tone. The psychoacoustic dimension of pitch is frequency, which is measured in Herz (Hz). In its musical sense, pitch has a range of about 20 to 5000 Hz, roughly the range of the fundamental frequencies of piano strings and organ pipes (Rasch and Plomp, 1982b). All frequencies ranging from 20 to 5000 Hz, which make up a continuum, are the variables of musical pitch. When music is listened to, the height of tones is not perceived in terms of absolute frequencies, but in relative terms of high and low. High and low can only be applied to a relation of tones, for it is impossible to say that a certain tone is high or low without relating the pitch of this tone to the pitch of another tone. Pitch can be indicated in the printed score. It is the position of a note on a staff with a cleff. Duration refers to the length of a tone. It is the time which passes between the attack of a tone and its release, which is measured in seconds, the variables of musical duration. Duration is perceived by listeners to music in terms of short and long, not in terms of seconds. Short and long can only be applied to a relation of tones, for it is impossible to say that a certain tone is long or short without relating the duration of this tone to the duration of another tone. In the printed score, duration is the value of a note. The psychoacoustic dimension of loudness is intensity, which is usually expressed in dB, the sound pressure level. Sound pressure levels of performed music vary roughly from 40 dB for a pianissimo to about 90 dB for a full orchestral forte tutti (Rasch and Plomp, 1982b). All sound pressure levels from 40 dB to 90 dB, which make up a continuum, are the variables of musical loudness. In the listening process, loudness is not perceived in terms of dB but in terms of soft and loud. Soft and loud can only be applied to a relation of tones, for it is impossible to say that a certain tone is soft or loud without relating the loudness of this tone to the loudness of another tone. In the score, loudness is indicated with linguistic signs like PP, P, MP, MF, F, FF. Timbre is defined by the American Standards Association as that attribute of auditory sensation in terms of which a listener can

judge that two steady-state complex tones having the same loudness

6 Maybe the use of categories as applied in semiology (see for instance (Speelman,

1991)) instead of parameters offers a solution to the problems which are involved in the parameter approach. Up to now, this remains an unexplored field.

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and pitch are dissimilar. (Rasch and Plomp, 1982b)7.

Timbre is the quality of the voice or instrument making a sound (Coker, 1972), which can be expressed in waveform. With the so-called Fourier analysis, the wave form of a tone can be decomposed into its harmonics, the simple tones that constitute a complex tone (Rasch and Plomp, 1982b). Timbre is a multidimensional characteristic of sound. Unlike pitch, duration and loudness, timbre cannot be placed on a single scale with contrastive ends. In the score, timbre is indicated with linguistic signs that indicate the instruments which should be used (violin, oboe, timpani) and the special effects which should be used (e.g. con sordino, pizzicato, una corda). Instruments and effects are the variables of musical timbre, the most complex musical parameter. The problem of the smallest element When trying to describe the musical parameters, a problem arises: what is the smallest element of music which can be used to describe the musical parameters? The difference between the written composition (the score) and its performance is important here. In a musical composition hardly ever just one variable of a parameter is actualized. Take e.g. Figure 1.4, an excerpt of the plainsong Tuba mirum. In this example, several variables of the parameter pitch are actualized, which is the case with every melody. It is generally assumed that the different shapes of the notes indicate actualizations of different variables of the parameter duration. The Tuba mirum example doesn’t provide us with information on loudness and timbre, but we may expect that in a performance of the plainsong Tuba mirum many variables of those parameters are actualized: usually different variables of loudness are used in a performance - e.g. the end of a line is usually sung decrescendo. Timbre depends on characteristics of the performing artist’s voice and his interpretation of the text - there can be a difference in voice colouring if the text is Requiem aeternam instead of Tuba mirum.

FIGURE 1.4: PLAINSONG TUBA MIRUM

7 This definition becomes rather problematic when dealing with simple tones like

sinusoids, of which can be argued that they have timbre as well.

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This example is meant to make clear that it makes a difference whether the written composition is under discussion or whether we are dealing with a listener in a situation in which the composition is performed. With regard to the score, it is possible to make statements about the actualized variables of the parameters for each single note (although one can wonder to what extent this is useful), which is the written form of the smallest element of music, the tone. However, when we are dealing with a performance of a musical phenomenon, the single tone cannot be used to describe the musical parameters, for the single tone lacks two essential characteristics of performed music: melody and motion

8. Furthermore, performed

music is never listened to as a sequence of single tones. For these reasons, the single tone is not considered to be the smallest element of music which can be used to describe the musical parameters in a performance situation. The interval, the relation between two successive tones, is the second smallest element. With regard to the interval, it is possible to make statements about the pitch of the two tones (tone x is high compared to tone y, tone y is low compared to tone x), the duration of the separate tones (x is short compared to y, y is long compared to x), the loudness of the different tones (x is loud compared to y, y is soft compared to x) and the timbre of the different tones (x is played pizzicato, y is played con arco). In other words: the interval does not lack the essential characteristics of performed music (melody and motion). This seems to validate the use of the interval as smallest element which can be used for a description of the musical parameters. In music theory, the term interval is applied to describe the pitch relation between two tones. For analytical purposes, the term interval, which is derived from the Latin word intervallum (interspace - see [Speelman, 1991]), will be used here to describe the pitch relation, the duration relation, the loudness relation as well as the timbre relation between two tones. In order to avoid terminological misunderstanding with regard to the application of the term interval, the terms pitch-intervallum, duration-intervallum, loudness-intervallum and timbre-intervallum will be used to describe the pitch relation, the duration relation, the loudness relation and the timbre relation between two tones. It is more appropriate to use the intervallum as smallest element for a description of the musical parameters in a performance situation than to use the single tone for this purpose. However, when music is listened to, it is not perceived as a sequence of pitch-intervalli, duration-intervalli, loudness-intervalli and timbre-intervalli, which are relations between two single tones, but as a flow of motives, themes and

8 Melody and motion cannot be considered as musical parameters, for they are

composed of the actualization of different variables of the musical parameters pitch and duration. This is not consistent with the second characteristic of parameters as formulated in 1.2.3.

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melodies, relations between musical elements which can be larger than the traditional size of the intervallum. Therefore, the definition of ’intervallum’ has to be adjusted. Here, we define the intervallum as the interspace between two musical elements, ranging from notes via motives and themes through movements and separate compositions. Now it is possible to speak of differences which may occur between two musical elements in pitch (the pitch-intervallum), duration (the duration-intervallum), loudness (the loudness-intervallum) and timbre (the timbre-intervallum). With the broadening of the definition of the term ’intervallum’ a problem arises regarding the different musical elements: what different musical elements can be discerned, how they can be discerned, and is it possible to rank them according to size. This is a serious problem: although music theory distinguishes between elements like motive and theme, it does not offer unambiguous criteria by which it is possible to distinguish one theme or motive from another. Take as an example the element theme. In the Grove Dictionary, theme is defined as [...] the musical material on which part or all of a work is based,

usually having a recognizable melody [...]. (Drabkin, 1980b:736) This is a rather hazy definition, for by means of this definition, it is impossible to distinguish between different themes: what is a recognizable melody? Things become more confusing when the motive is involved, the motive being [...] a short musical idea, be it melodic, harmonic or rhythmic, or all

three. A motif may be of any size, though it is commonly regarded as the shortest subdivision of a theme or phrase that still maintains its identity as an idea. (Drabkin, 1980a:648)

This definition makes it even hard to distinguish between motive and theme: if the motive can be of any size, then where does the motive end and where does the theme begin? Apparently, it is difficult, if not impossible, to give an unambiguous definition of the musical elements. Therefore, when the musical elements of a composition are under discussion, it should be clearly argumented why a certain musical structure is called theme, motive, part or whatever it is labelled. A legitimate - and truly Peircean - argument can be that it is commonly accepted within a community of musicologists that e.g. in this particular composition this particular musical element is considered to be a theme. 1.2.4 The Relation Music - Text The foregoing discussion on the nature of music only relates to instrumental music. In the history of westeuropean music, however, vocal music plays an important part. Vocal music entails a specific problem: how can the relation between text and music be expressed in a sign model?

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Mosley assumes that the music is an interpretation of the text, a view which is closely related to common sense: a poetic representamen determines an interpretant which is at once an

equivalent or more developed sign than the poetic representamen and able to become a musical representamen determining its own triadic relationship. (Mosley, 1990:16)

The interpretant of the poetic sign is called a melopoetic interpretant/repre-sentamen. It is a poetic interpretant and becomes a musical sign. The change from word to tone is called intersemiotic transmutation, a concept Mosley derived from Roman Jakobson. To put it differently: the poetic representamen initiates semiosis, the interpretant of which is the composer’s musical setting of the text. Interpretation of a song should begin with an analysis of the text, followed by an analysis of the music. In Figure 1.5, Mosley’s conception of song as a sign is expressed in a model. Mosley is particularly interested in the specific correspondences between the objects of text and music, which his model should account for. For a more general view on the relation text - music, his conception is too limited, for it does not account for situations in which there are no correspondences between the objects of text and music at all.

FIGURE 1.5: SONG AS A SIGN (MOSLEY) Dougherty (Dougherty, 1993) uses a more elaborate sign model in which he tries to account for situations of noncongruence between the objects of text and music. According to Dougherty, we are dealing with a play of interpretants here. It is not the poetic interpretant which becomes the more developed sign, but the interaction between the poetic and musical interpretants (see Figure 1.6). Beside the fact that Dougherty’s model accounts for noncongruence between poetic and musical objects, it also has - in contrast with Mosley’s conception - the important underlying principle that music and text are equal. This implies that any separate analysis of the music and the text of a song is not equal to ananalysis of the song, for the song is the conjunction of music and text. Or, as Dougherty puts it,

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[...] the study of the lied stands as an important test for a cross--disciplinary methodology: the juxtaposition of music and poetry in the art song requires that the theory guiding the analytic method must transcend mono-disciplinary approaches, and the appropriateness of such interdisciplinary forays can be measured in terms of their value in explicating the supple play between music and text. (Dougherty, 1993:2)

According to Dougherty, semiotics is the theory which is suitable for this task. As is the case with Mosley’s model, Dougherty’s model only relates to the written composition, the score. When it is extended to a performance situation, or to be more specific, to a situation in which the music is listened to, this model becomes very complicated (see Figure 1.7). In the performance of a song, a multitude of sign-systems is involved. On one hand there are the sign-systems which constitute the song (see Figure 1.6), on the other we have the sign-systems which constitute the performance situation, e.g. the acoustical characteristics of the hall, the performing artists and the social factors which play a role in attending a concert

9.

Those sign-systems are important when semiosis of a live performance of a song is being discussed. When semiosis of a mechanical reproduced performance of a song is being discussed, e.g. listening to a compact disc, other sign-systems play a role in semiosis, e.g. the quality of the recording, the quality of the stereo equipment and the amount of attention one gives to the song (background music versus intense listening). All these separate sign-systems should be taken into account when semiosis of a situation in which a song is listened to is under discussion, which results in a very complicated sign model. To make things not more complicated than they already are, the influence of all aspects of the performance situation on semiosis will be neglected in the remainder. 1.2.5 Summary The musical sign contains several immediate objects which indicate several dynamical objects. This view is a position within the controversy which exists in musicology, the subject of which is whether music is a language with a definite referential character or a non-referential structure.The musical parameters, the elements which constitute the musical sign, are pitch, duration, loudness and timbre. A problem with regard to those parameters is: what is the smallest element 9 In Figure 1.7, the sign-systems which constitute the performance situation are

indicated by capitals. This extended model contains a slight but important alteration: in the original model, continuous lines were drawn between object and interpretant, which implies a direct relation between them. However, such a direct relation between object and interpretant is impossible. Therefore, the continuous line is changed into a dotted line, implying a relation between object and interpretant but not a direct relation between those two elements of semiosis (see 1.3).

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which can be used to describe the musical parameters? The difference between the written composition (the score) and its performance is important here: when a performance situation is being discussed, it is impossible to use the single tone as smallest element, for it lacks melody and motion, two essential characteristics of performed music. The interval, the second smallest element, does not lack those characteristics. Instead of the term interval, the term intervallum (interspace) will be used to describe the musical parameters, the intervallum being defined as the interspace between two musical elements.

FIGURE 1.6: SONG AS A SIGN (DOUGHERTY) How can the relation between text and music be expressed in a sign model? Mosley (Mosley, 1990) assumes that the music is an interpretation of the text. Therefore,

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the interpretation of a song should begin with an analysis of the text, followed by an analysis of the music. Dougherty (Dougherty, 1993)argues that music and text are equally important, constituting the song together. This view has an important consequence with regard to the interpretation of a song: a song is always perceived by a listener as a unity. In this thesis, Dougherty’s model will be applied.

FIGURE 1.7: PERFORMANCE OF SONG AS A SIGN (AFTER DOUGHERTY)

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1.3 THE MUSICAL OBJECT The second element which constitutes semiosis, together with the sign and the interpretant, is the object. Peirce distinguishes two kinds of objects: 1. immediate object 2. dynamical object The difference between those terms is expounded by Peirce as follows: Namely, we have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the

Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation. (4.536, 1905)

With regard to the term object, differences occur between its everyday use and its use in a Peircean context. In everyday language, the range of the object is usually restricted to the Peircean notion of existence, which is everything we have knowledge of. In its Peircean sense, the term object has a much wider scope: it is related to the Peircean notion of reality, which is everything we have knowledge of (a form of secondness) and everything we could gain knowledge of in semiosis (a form of firstness)

10. Looked upon in this way, the musical sign can refer not only to

tangible dynamical objects, such as the call of the cuckoo or a raging storm, but to intangible dynamical objects, such as the composer’s view on life and death, the creation process of a certain composition or the cultural context in which the composition is written, as well. The nature of the dynamical object is indicated by the immediate object, a quality of the sign. A sign contains several immediate objects which refer to several dynamical objects. Which immediate object is actual-ized, depends on one’s habits and beliefs regarding a certain phenomenon. How can this be applied to music? It is impossible to gain knowledge of a dynamical object directly, e.g. knowledge of the different moods within a musical composition. Knowledge can only be expressed by means of signs, it is mediated by signs. This implies that a direct relation between a dynamical object and its interpretant is impossible. To the extent that a musical sign indicates the direction of the reality to which it refers, we are dealing with an immediate object. The immediate object is moulded by the musical representamen, which is constituted by the musical parameters. An interpretation of the musical parameters might enable one to make statements about a possible direction of the dynamical object, e.g. the different moods within a musical composition, the object to which the musical sign really refers.

10 The purpose of semiosis is to develop existence.

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Dougherty argues that any attempt to examine music critically as a semeiotic phenomenon

must try to account for the object of the sign, however tentatively; otherwise, terms such as "represents," "signifies," "stands for," "suggests" and their cogeners will become even more suspicious in musicological discourse than they already are. (Dougherty, 1992:11

The terms Dougherty mentions (’represents’, ’signifies’, etcetera) are frequently used in everyday language as well as in scientific discourse. Usually, those terms are considered to be synonymous and as a result of this misapprehension, they are considered to be interchangeable terms. A Peircean view on this matter can be elucidating. When the relation sign-object is being discussed, we are dealing with what is commonly called reference; the sign refers to an object, it stands for the object. When the relation sign-interpretant is under discussion, we are dealing with what is commonly called representation. The interpretant is a formulation of one’s assumptions regarding the object to which the sign refers; although mediated by the sign, the interpretant represents the object. Reference and representation are different terms which are not interchangeable. 1.4 THE MUSICAL INTERPRETANT 1.4.1 Introduction The third element which constitutes semiosis, together with the sign and the object, is the interpretant. In Peirce’s work, two classifications of the interpretant can be found. In the first classification, Peirce distinguishes an immediate interpretant, a dynamical interpretant and a final interpretant: In regard to the Interpretant we have equally to distinguish, in the

first place, the Immediate Interpretant, which is the Interpretant as it is revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself, and is ordinarily called the meaning of the sign; while in the second place, we have to take note of the Dynamical Interpretant which is the actual effect which the Sign, as a Sign, really determines. Finally there is what I provisionally term the Final Interpretant, which refers to the manner in which the Sign tends to represent itself to be related to its Object. (4.536, 1905)

In the second classification, Peirce distinguishes an emotional interpretant, an energetic interpretant and a logical interpretant: The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by it

[...]. This "emotional interpretant," as I call it, may amount to much

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more than that feeling of recognition; and in some cases, it is the only proper significate effect that the sign produces. [...] If a sign produces any further proper significate effect, it will do so through the mediation of the emotional interpretant, and such further effect will always involve an effort. I call it the energetic interpretant. [...] It never can be the meaning of an intellectual concept, since it is a single act, [while] such a concept is of a general nature. But what further kind of effect can there be? [...] I will call it the logical interpretant. (5.475/476, c. 1907)

Now the question arises how those two classifications are related to each other. Van Driel (Van Driel, 1993) mentions two options: in the first option, the two subdivisions are equal, in the second option, the emotional, the energetic and the logical interpretant are considered to be a subdivision of the dynamical interpretant. Van Driel rejects both, in favour of another option, in which the second classification is the main subdivision: semiosis can result in a feeling, an action and/or a proposition. This option can be derived from Peirce’s work: a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which

the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. (4.356, 1905)

In other words: semiosis can lead to an emotional interpretant (’a feeling’), an energetic interpretant (’an exertion’) or a logical interpretant (’a Sign’). The logical interpretant, a third, can be subdivided into an immediate interpretant, a dynamical interpretant and a final interpretant. The energetic interpretant, a second, can be subdivided into a bodily interpretant and a mental interpretant. The emotional interpretant, a first, cannot be subdivided. 1.4.2 Logical Interpretant The nature of the logical interpretant, the cognitive effect of a sign, is indicated by the (musical) sign, which indicates a possible direction in which semiosis could go. This qualitative aspect of the musical sign is the immediate interpretant, [...] the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign. (8.343,

1908) With regard to music, the name of the composer is a sign which contains some qualities that indicate a possible direction of semiosis. When e.g. a new compo-sition of Andrew Lloyd Webber is being discussed, it is not too difficult to make preliminary statements about the nature of the composition, at least for someone who is familiar with Lloyd Webber’s music: the name of the composer is the sign which activates a network of habits and beliefs with regard to the music of Andrew Lloyd Webber. These beliefs, which are the result of prior experience with Lloyd

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Webber’s music, are used to express expectations regarding his new composition. The idea of the existence of a network of habits and beliefs regarding a musical phenomenon can be compared to the schemata theory. Carroll defines a schema as a structure in semantic memory that specifies the general or expected

arrangement of a body of information. A story schema includes all of the information we expect to occur in a story. We have many story schemata, with different ones for detective stories, fairy tales, and romances. (Carroll, 1986:231)

The idea behind the schemata theory is that each event regarding a certain schema is compared to information which is already stored in this schema. When an event is encountered which does not match these habits and beliefs, two options come into view: information regarding this new event is not stored in the schema or one tries to find an explanation for the surprising phenomenon, the latter option being the initation of semiosis. It can be assumed that schemata exist not only for stories, but for musical phenomena as well. The existence of a network of habit and beliefs regarding musical phenomena is indicated by Tarasti (Tarasti, 1987a) and Meyer (Meyer, 1956). According to Tarasti, three paradigms underlie musical consciousness: the paradigm of memory, which is characterized by an increased recognition as the composition moves forward, the paradigm of expectations, which is characterized by a decreasing number of possibilities as the composition moves forward, and the paradigm of the repertoire of intonations. The repertoire of intonations influences the easiness with which musical elements are stored in the musical mind. A musical element is easily stored if it fits in the repertoire of intonations. Such an element influences the knowledge of the composition which is involved. The repertoire of intonations makes it possible for the listener to expect certain things. It can be compared to the network of habits and beliefs. A similar idea regarding the existence of a network of habits and beliefs in case of musical phenomena can be found in (Meyer, 1956). According to Meyer, musical meaning is embodied meaning: the stimulus and what it refers to are of the same kind. This does not mean that the meaning of music is limited to relations within one composition: musical meaning depends on relations with compositions previously heard as well. The notion that musical meaning is embodied meaning is problematic, for it implies that a musical sign can only represent musical objects, be it within a certain composition or between different compositions, but that it cannot represent extra-musical objects. We have seen that such a view on musical meaning ignores the fact that listeners often do try to relate certain musical signs to extra-musical objects on the basis of elements of the sign and particular habits and beliefs

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regarding a musical phenomenon11.

Meyer distinguishes three stages regarding embodied meaning: hypothetical mean-ings, which are construed during the musical expectation, evident meanings, which are construed after each musical occurence, and determinate meanings, which are construed when the musical experience is ’timeless in memory’ (Meyer, 1956). The determinate meanings, which are forms of convetions, can be compared to Tarasti’s repertoire of intonations and to the network of habits and beliefs. The logical interpretant, the cognitive effect of a sign, is determined by the sign, which in its turn is determined by the object. It may be a thought, a mental sign, yet if this sign be of an intellectual kind [...] it must itself have a logical

interpretant; so that it cannot be the ultimate logical interpretant of the concept. It can be proved that the only mental effect that can be so produced and that is not a sign but is of general application is a habit-change, meaning by a habit-change a modification of a person’s tendencies towards action. (5.476, c. 1907)

In other words, each statement about the effect of music, each interpretation, in so far as it is not a habit-change, is provisional: it becomes a new sign which can initiate another semiosis which can result in another logical interpretant

12.

When semiosis leads to a statement with regard to a certain musical composition, e.g. "In Beethoven’s Sixth, a pastoral atmosphere is expressed", we are dealing with what Peirce calls the dynamical interpretant, [...] the actual effect which the Sign, as a Sign, really determines.

(4.536, 1905) The notion that a statement regarding a musical composition is a dynamical interpretant implies that the number of dynamical interpretants is infinite, for an infinite number of statements (interpretations) exists. However, it can be argued that its number is not infinite but finite. According to Dougherty, dynamic interpretants do not spin off unfettered; instead, they are

governed by the final interpretant, the goal toward which they tend and that they reach given ideal circumstances and an indefinitely

11 More on the relation between a sign and its object can be found in 2.3.

12 With regard to this notion, Schuyt comes to two conclusions: 1) the sign or the meaning does not exist and 2) it is impossible to speak of the one and only sign and the one and only interpretation. (Schuyt, 1993:28). Schuyt’s conclusions can be used to criticize the conception of music as a referential language with fixed referents (see 1.2.2).

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long run. Thus, the number of dynamic interpretants is finite [...], and the notion of the final interpretant hints at the means by which subjective interpretations can be grounded in a broader intersubjective framework; as such, the concept can help us account for the relatively consistent interpretations of musical signs - interpretations that tend to be self-corrective. (Dougherty, 1992:14)

Dougherty’s idea of the final number of dynamical interpretants makes sense, but his argumentation needs some complementation. According to Dougherty, the final interpretant is responsible for the fact that interpretations of musical signs are relatively consistent. This is true, for final interpretants are added to one’s habits and beliefs regarding a musical sign and habits and beliefs influence semiosis. But it is not the final interpretant alone which accounts for relatively consistent interpretations. The immediate interpretant, which is an element of the sign which indicates the direction of the interpretation process, influences semiosis as well. It is possible that different people come to the same interpretation because they actualized the same immediate interpretant. The final interpretant can be defined as the interpretant in the ideal situation in which consensus regarding knowledge of a phenomenon is reached. It is a form of thirdness, a notion which could easily lead to the misconception that something like the ultimate final interpretant of a sign exists. Like all other concepts of Peirce’s semiotic, the final interpretant is a dynamic concept. Final interpretants can be adjusted now and then. take e.g. two different editions of a music encyclopedia, where final interpretants regarding music can be found. It will not be hard to find final interpretants in the latest edition which differ from previous editions. This can lead to the conclusion that final interpretants, or knowledge, can vary in time and culture. The final interpretant is what is commonly considered to be objective knowledge. To avoid misunderstandings, it would be better to call this kind of knowledge objectified knowledge: the final interpretant is primarily the result of consensus within a certain community. The final interpretant is a form of thirdness, which involves a dynamical interpretant, which in its turn involves an immediate interpretant. 1.4.3 Energetic Interpretant When semiosis results in action, we are dealing with an energetic interpretant, which is a form of secondness. The energetic interpretant can be divided into a physical interpretant and a mental interpretant: The effort may be a muscular one [...] but it is much more usually an

exertion upon the Inner World, a mental effort. (5.475, c. 1907) Peirce’s idea that the effort usually is a mental effort, differs from the notion of Lidov, who argues that music involves mainly muscular action:

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Associations of somatic experience and music are so prevalent as

hardly to require demonstration. [...] Anterior to its status as a sign, music is an action on and of the body. [...] Music is significant only if we identify perceived sonorous motion with somatic experience. (Lidov, 1987:69/70)

Lidov uses several examples to make his point clear: The most common tempo indication in classical music, Allegro,

means walking, and the comparable common jazz term, swing, is also kinesthetic in reference. [...] A skilled conductor can convey what he requires of an orchestra by silent movements of his hands [...]. [...] All around the globe, music commands and directs the dance. (Lidov, 1987:69)

The idea that, regarding the musical sign, the (bodily) energetic interpretant is rather important, makes sense; Lidov’s list of examples can be enlarged ad infinitum. To equate musical motion with muscular action is another thing, which involves the risk of an, as to paraphrase (Dougherty, 1992), ’overdetermined theory of meaning based on simplistic assignments of somatic experience to musical motion’. Lidov’s article is tending a little towards such an overdetermined theory. Instead of elaborating his ideas regarding the energetic interpretant, Lidov switches to the referential relation between sign and object, and he tries to show how in Chopin’s Ballade (Opus 47) muscular action is expressed. Despite the importance of the bodily energetic interpretant, in music, a mental energetic interpretant is much more involved. The mental energetic interpretant, the ’exertion upon the Inner World’, is the feeling one recognizes; it is the actualized emotional interpretant. The mental energetic interpretant bears upon the different moods one can have when listening to music ("sad", "happy", "joy", etc.), but it also bears upon the attitude one has towards a certain musical composition ("like", "dislike", "beautiful", etc.). The energetic interpretant is a form of secondness. When it leads to a statement, it becomes a dynamical interpretant, a form of thirdness. 1.4.4 Emotional Interpretant The emotional interpretant is The first proper significate effect of a sign [...]. (5.475, c. 1907) It is a feeling produced by the sign, a form of firstness. The emotional interpretant [...] may amount to much more than that feeling of recognition; and

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in some cases, it is the only proper significate effect that the sign produces. (5.475, c. 1907)

The notion that the emotional interpretant can be the only proper significate effect of a sign, implies that in certain cases the musical sign gives no rise to a conscious form of semiosis, simply because that particular musical sign perfectly fits into one of our networks of habits and beliefs. An example is Muzak, music which is played in elevators and stores. The kind of music which is used for this purpose is music of which can be assumed that it is familiar to the majority of the shopping audience

13.

An emotional interpretant can become an energetic interpretant, which on its turn can become a logical interpretant. A logical interpretant always involves an energetic interpretant, which in its turn always involves an emotional interpretant. 1.5 CONCLUSION In this chapter, the three elements which constitute semiosis, sign, object and interpretant, have been discussed. In section 1.2, a characterization of the musical sign was given. The musical object was dealt with in section 1.3. Section 1.4 dealt with the musical interpretant. The description of semiosis regarding music will be continued in chapter 2, which will deal with three trichotomies: the sign in itself (or, to be more specific: how can we distinguish a possible sign from a sign?), the relation sign-object and the relation sign-interpretant.

13 The purpose of Muzak is to create a homelike environment, which can influence

the shopper’s perception of the image of the store, which on its turn can influence sales.