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Chapter 9 An Analysis of Conflict
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Chapter 9 An Analysis of Conflict
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9.3 A Non-Cooperative Game
Table 9.1 UTILITY PAYOFFS IN A NON-COOPERATIVE GAMEManagerHONEST (H) DISTORT (D)BUY (B) 60, 40 20, 80
Investor REFUSE
TO BUY (R) 35, 20 35, 30
» Continued
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9.3 A Non-Cooperative Game (continued)• Nash equilibrium solution
– RD: payoffs 35,30• Cooperative solution
– BH: payoffs 60, 40• Single play of the game
– Why is BH unlikely?• Multiple plays: BH more likely
– Manager reputation and ethical behaviour– Folk theorem
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9.4 Agency Theory• A principal wants to hire an agent for
some specialized task– Assume single-period, for simplicity– Agency models separation of ownership and
control• Principal and agent are rational. Agent is
risk-averse. Principal may be risk-averse, but assume risk-neutral for simplicity
• Principal wants agent to work hard, but– Agent is effort-averse
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Moral Hazard Problem of Information Asymmetry
• Principal cannot observe manager effort - call it a
• Call manager’s disutility of effort V(a)– More effort ---> greater disutility
• Implies manager may shirk on effort– E.g., if paid a fixed salary, how hard will the
manager work?– Analogy: if no final exam, how hard will
students work?
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Examples of Agency Contracts
• What gives the following agents an incentive to “work hard” for the principal?– Doctor, dentist– Lawyer– Auditor– Hockey player– Construction worker– Manager
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9.4.2 Agency Contract Example
• Owner: rational, risk-neutral– Wants manager to work hard, to max. expected firm payoff
x• Think of x as the total cash flow to be realized from manager’s
current-period effort• Manager: rational, risk-averse and effort-averse
– Wants to max. expected utility of compensation c, net of disutility of effort V(a)
• If manager works hard, V(a) = 2 units of disutility• If manager shirks, V(a) = 1.71
» Continued
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9.4.2 Agency Contract Example (continued)• Motivating the manager to work hard
– Salary: manager will shirk– Direct monitoring of manager effort: unlikely in
owner/manager context. Manager will shirk– Indirect monitoring: Unlikely in owner/manager
context unless moving support. Manager will shirk– Owner rents firm to manager: Manager will work
hard, but manager bears all the risk, requires low rent for manager to attain reservation utility
– Give manager a share of the payoff» Continued
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9.4.2 Agency Contract Example (continued)
• A problem arises if manager paid a share of payoff– Firm payoff x not known until after contract expires
(single period contract). • Some manager effort does not pay of in current period
– e.g., R&D, contingencies– Manager has to be paid at contract expiry
• A solution– Base manager compensation on a performance measure
(e.g., net income), which is available at period end» Continued
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• To motivate manager effort, most efficient contract may base manager compensation on a share of firm net income
• Will manager be willing to accept contract?– Concept of reservation utility, call it R
• If manager is to work for owner, must receive expected utility of at least R
– Level of R depends on manager reputation– R treated as fixed in a single-period contract
» Continued
9.4.2 Agency Contract Example (continued)
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9.4.2 Agency Contract Example (continued)
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Example 9.3 Agency Contract• Assumptions
– Manager has 2 effort choices:• Work hard (a1 )• Shirk (a2 )
– If manager works hardx = 100 with prob. 0.6x = 55 with prob. 0.4
– If manager shirksx = 100 with prob. 0.4x = 55 with prob. 0.6
Note fixed support» Continued
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Example 9.3 Agency Contract (continued) • Assumptions, cont’d
– Manager’s contract (linear): c = ky, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1• y is net income• k is manager’s share of net income
– Manager’s reservation utility: R = 3– Quality of net income y (noisy, but unbiased, e.g., fair
value accounting)• If x is going to be $100
– y = $115 with prob. 0.8– y = $40 with prob. 0.2
• If x is going to be $55– y = $115 with prob. 0.2– y = $40 with prob. 0.8
Continued
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Example 9.3 Agency Contract (continued) • Manager’s utility
EUm(a1) = 0.6[0.8(k × 115)1/2 + 0.2(k × 40)1/2]+ 0.4[0.2(k × 115)1/2 + 0.8(k × 40)1/2] - 2
EUm(a2) = 0.4[0.8(k × 115)1/2 + 0.2(k × 40)1/2]+ 0.6[0.2(k × 115)1/2 + 0.8(k × 40)1/2] – 1.71
• Owner’s utility (risk neutral)EUO(a1) = 0.6[0.8(100 - (1 – k) × 115) + 0.2(100 - (1 – k) × 40)]
+ 0.4[0.2(55 - (1 – k) × 115) + 0.8(55 - (1 – k) × 40)]
» Continued
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Example 9.3 Agency Contract (continued) • Formal Statement of the Owner’s Problem
– Find k to maximizeEUO(a)Subject to:
• Manager wants to take a1 (incentive compatibility—i.e., manager utility higher for a1 than a2)
• manager receives reservation utility of R = 3• The result:
K = .3237
» Continued
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Example 9.3 Agency Contract (continued)
• Check– Manager’s utility
EUm(a1) = 0.6[0.8(.3237 × 115)1/2 + 0.2(.3237 × 40)1/2]+ 0.4[0.2(.3237 × 115)1/2 + 0.8(.3237 × 40)1/2] – 2 = 3
EUm(a2) = 0.4[0.8(.3237 × 115)1/2 + 0.2(.3237 × 40)1/2]+ 0.6[0.2(.3237 × 115)1/2 + 0.8(.3237 × 40)1/2] – 1.71 = 2.9896
– Manager wants to “work hard” since his/her utility is higher
» Continued
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Example 9.3 Agency Contract (continued) • Check, cont’d.
– Owner’s utilityEUO(a1) = 0.6[0.8(100 - .3237 × 115) + 0.2(100 - .3237 ×
40)] + 0.4[0.2(55 - .3237 × 115) + 0.8(55 - .3237 × 40)]
= 55.4566
Compare with owner’s utility of rental contract (Example 9.2) = 51Contract based on net income is more efficient
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Example 9.4 A More Efficient Contract• Retain Example 9.3 assumptions, except
– Higher quality of net income y (less noisy, still unbiased)
• If x is going to be 100– y = $110 with prob. 0.8462– y = $45 with prob. 0.1538
• If x is going to be 55– y = $110 with prob. 0.1538– y = $45 with prob. 0.8462
» Continued
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Example 9.4 A More Efficient Contract (continued)
• Thenk = .3185 (compared with .3237 in previous contract)
EUm(a1) = 0.6[0.8462(.3185 × 110)1/2 + 0.1538(.3185 × 45)1/2] + 0.4[0.1538(.3185 × 110)1/2 + 0.8462(.3185 × 45)1/2] – 2 = 3
EUO(a1) = 0.6[.8462(100 – (.3185 × 110) + 0.1538(100 - .3185 × 45)] + 0.4[.1538(55 – (.3185 × 110) + 0.8462(55 - .3185 × 45)]
= 55.8829Compare with owner’s utility of 55.4566 in Example 9.3Less noisy net income increases contract efficiency
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9.5 Manager’s Information Advantage
• Post-decision information– Manager can observe unmanaged net income,
but owner can’t– In a single-period contract, rational manager
will shirk and report highest possible net income
– Example 9.5: Owner utility falls to 50.8165
» Continued
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9.5 Manager’s Information Advantage (continued)• The revelation principle
– If high net income is realized, manager will report high net income
– Raise manager’s compensation if low net income is realized to the point where same compensation is received whether net income is high or low
– Then, if low net income is realized, manager is indifferent between reporting high or low net income
– Assume if indifferent, manager will report low net income if low net income is realized
– Result: manager reports truthfully» Continued
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9.5 Manager’s Information Advantage (continued)• Example 9.5
– Manager continues to shirk– Owner’s utility remains at 50.8165 as per
example 9.5– But, manager reports truthfully
• No adverse selection problem
» Continued
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9.5 Manager’s Information Advantage (continued)• Problems in applying revelation principle in a
financial reporting context– Manager may be punished for reporting the truth
• May be fired if low net income reported– Contract restrictions
• If compensation is capped, manager is effectively punished for reporting net income higher than cap
– Restrictions on ability to communicate• Reporting the truth may impose legal liability and reputation
loss on manager and owner, effectively blocking honest communication
» Continued
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9.5 Manager’s Information Advantage (continued)• Result of these problems is that it may be
more efficient to allow some upwards earnings management
• But manager will then overdose on earnings management– i.e., back to example 9.5
• A solution: restrict earnings management through GAAP
» Continued
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9.5 Manager’s Information Advantage (continued)• Example 9.7
– Illustrates how GAAP can restrict earnings management to point where manager must work hard to attain reservation utility
– Some earnings management remains, but under control
– Owner’s utility now 55.4981, up from Examples 9.5 and 9.6 (50.8165)
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9.8 Implications of Agency Theory For Financial Accounting• The agency relationship is a contract.
Contracts are rigid– Implies accounting policy choice and changes
to accounting policy matter• Manager will usually object to new accounting
standards that:– Lower reported net income (why?)– Increase its volatility (why?)
» Continued
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9.8 Implications of Agency Theory For Financial Accounting (continued)
• Net income must be jointly observable (i.e., by manager and owner)– Role for GAAP, audit
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9.8.1 Holmström’s Agency Model
• Basing manager’s compensation on 2 variables is better than on 1 variable, unless the 2 variables are perfectly correlated– Example 9.9
• Holmström’s model implies that net income is in competition with share price performance for “market share” in compensation contracts
» Continued
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9.8.1 Holmström’s Agency Model (continued)• To maintain market share in compensation
contracts, net income must be informative about manager effort
• To be informative, net income must have– Sensitivity– Precision
• These 2 desirable qualities usually have to be traded off– Similar to, but not same as, tradeoff between
relevance and reliability
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9.8.2 Contract Incompleteness & Rigidity• Basic reasons why accounting policies can have economic consequences– Incompleteness
• Contracts cannot anticipate all possible state realizations– e.g., New accounting standards may arise during contract term– Manager’s net-income-based compensation may be affected– Debt covenant ration may be affected
– Rigidity• Once signed, contracts hard to change
• Result: accounting policies matter since they can affect contracts
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9.9 Reconciliation• Contract incompleteness and rigidity
mean that accounting policies matter• This argument does not conflict with
efficient securities market theory
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9.10 Conclusions• Accounting policies (even without cash flow
effects) can have economic consequences and securities markets can still be efficient
• Role of net income in monitoring and motivating manager performance equally important as informing investors
• Net income competes with share price as a performance measure
• Some earnings management can be “good” if controlled by GAAP
The End
Thank you