CHAPTER 9 Buildings Department Food and Environmental ... · CHAPTER 9 Buildings Department Food...

CHAPTER 9

Buildings DepartmentFood and Environmental Hygiene Department

Joint-office operationon water seepage in buildings

Audit CommissionHong Kong28 October 2016

This audit review was carried out under a set of guidelines tabled inthe Provisional Legislative Council by the Chairman of the PublicAccounts Committee on 11 February 1998. The guidelines wereagreed between the Public Accounts Committee and the Director ofAudit and accepted by the Government of the Hong Kong SpecialAdministrative Region.

Report No. 67 of the Director of Audit contains 10 Chapters whichare available on our website at http://www.aud.gov.hk

Audit Commission26th floor, Immigration Tower7 Gloucester RoadWan ChaiHong Kong

Tel : (852) 2829 4210Fax : (852) 2824 2087E-mail : [email protected]

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JOINT-OFFICE OPERATION ON

WATER SEEPAGE IN BUILDINGS

Contents

Paragraph

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PART 1: INTRODUCTION

Background

Audit review

Acknowledgement

PART 2: INVESTIGATION ANDENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Investigation actions on water-seepage cases

Audit recommendations

Response from the Government

Enforcement actions on water-seepage cases



1.1

1.2 – 1.18

1.19 – 1.20

1.21

2.1

2.2 – 2.33

2.34 – 2.36

2.37 – 2.40

2.41 – 2.57

2.58

2.59

— ii —

Paragraph

PART 3: MONITORING OF SERVICE CONTRACTORS

Background

Service contracts for carrying out Stage III investigations



PART 4: MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM ANDPERFORMANCE REPORTING

Management information systems for water-seepage cases



Performance reporting



3.1

3.2 – 3.3

3.4 – 3.32

3.33

3.34

4.1

4.2 – 4.12

4.13 – 4.14

4.15 – 4.17

4.18 – 4.22

4.23 – 4.24

4.25 – 4.26

Appendices Page

A : Joint-office operation structure (extract) (31 March 2016)

B: Staff strength of the joint-office operation (March 2016)

C: Completion timeframes for Stages I, II and IIIinvestigations

D : Acronyms and abbreviations

71

72

73 – 74

75

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JOINT-OFFICE OPERATION ONWATER SEEPAGE IN BUILDINGS

Executive Summary

1. Mostly owing to defective water pipes, sanitary fitments and drainage

pipes, and deteriorated waterproofing of floor slabs, rooftops and external walls,

water seepage in buildings may cause nuisances, health problems, building-safety

issues and at times water wastage. In addition to the originating flat, these problems

may extend to adjacent and underlying flats. Under the Public Health and Municipal

Services Ordinance (Cap. 132 — PH&MS Ordinance), the Food and Environmental

Hygiene Department (FEHD) may issue a nuisance notice requiring the responsible

person of any premises, drain or sewer which is in such a state as to be a nuisance,

or injurious or dangerous to health to take actions to abate the water seepage within a

specified period.

2. Upon noting water seepage in a flat which is suspected to be originated

from an upper-floor or an adjacent flat, the affected flat owner may seek to resolve

the problem by approaching and liaising with the pertinent flat owners to carry out

necessary investigations and repair works. The affected flat owner may also refer a

water-seepage case to the Government for assistance. In response, the FEHD may

carry out investigations to trace the source of the seepage and, upon identifying the

source, issue a nuisance notice (see para. 1).

3. In July 2006, a joint-office (JO) operation comprising staff of the FEHD

and the Buildings Department (BD) was set up in offices of all the 19 FEHD districts

to handle water-seepage cases. The JO operation aimed to improve coordination of

FEHD and BD staff. FEHD staff had the enforcement power under the PH&MS

Ordinance and BD staff possessed building-survey expertise. The main objectives of

the JO operation were to shorten the time of investigation of water-seepage cases

reported by the public and improve the success rate of identifying the seepage source

of these cases. The Audit Commission (Audit) noted that the number of public

reports on water-seepage cases had increased by 70% from 17,405 cases in 2007 to

29,617 cases in 2015.

Executive Summary

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4. In 2014-15, the total cost of the JO operation was $129 million,

comprising staff cost of $97 million, and office expenditure and cost of hiring

contractors (for carrying out water-seepage investigations) totalling $32 million. As

of March 2016, 274 staff (comprising 211 FEHD JO staff and 63 BD JO staff) were

involved in the JO operation. Audit has recently conducted a review to examine the

efficiency and effectiveness of the JO operation in handling water-seepage cases with

a view to identifying areas for improvement.

Investigation and enforcement actions

5. As of December 2006, there were 6,228 outstanding cases. After the

setting up of the JO operation in all the 19 districts in 2006, from January 2007 to

March 2016, the JO operation had received a total of 231,968 reports on

water-seepage cases (or about 2,100 cases a month). As of March 2016, of the

238,196 (6,228 plus 231,968) cases, actions on 196,926 (83%) cases had been

completed, and 15,564 (6%) were outstanding cases with investigations in progress.

The shortfall of 25,706 (11%) cases was due to record-keeping discrepancies

between the number of cases captured in the FEHD’s Complaints Management

Information System (CMIS) and that in the FEHD JO monthly returns and BD

JO case records. Of the 196,926 completed cases: (a) 97,296 (49%) were screen-out

cases where investigations would not be carried out due to certain reasons such as

the water seepage being at a level not meeting the moisture-content threshold;

(b) 40,856 (21%) were cases where the water seepage had ceased or the informants

had withdrawn case reports during investigations; (c) 41,024 (21%) were cases

where the seepage source was successfully identified by the JO operation; and

(d) 17,750 (9%) were cases where the seepage source could not be identified after

conducting investigations. According to the formula adopted by the FEHD and the

BD, the success rate of identifying the source of water-seepage cases completed from

January 2007 to March 2016 was 41% (41,024 ÷ (41,024 + 17,750 + 40,856) ×

100%) (paras. 1.17, 2.3 and 2.10).

6. Deteriorating source-identification success rates. Notwithstanding that

one of the main objectives of the JO operation was to improve the success rate of

identifying the seepage source of water-seepage cases (see para. 3), according to the

formula adopted by the FEHD and the BD (see para. 5), the success rate of cases

requiring investigations had decreased progressively from 46% in 2007 to 36% in

2015 (paras. 2.9 and 2.10).

Executive Summary

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7. Long time taken to handle some water-seepage cases. Despite the fact

that a key objective of the JO operation was to shorten the time of investigation of

water-seepage cases (see para. 3), Audit examination revealed that it took a long

time for the JO operation to process some water-seepage cases. In this connection,

of the 28,332 cases having actions completed from April 2015 to March 2016, the

time taken to complete 9,710 (34%) cases had exceeded the 133-day reference

timeframe set by the FEHD and the BD. In particular, 643 (2%) cases took 2.2 to

7.5 years to complete. Furthermore, of the 15,564 outstanding cases as of

March 2016, 6,368 (41%) cases had been outstanding for more than 133 days,

where the time having been spent on 1,046 (7%) cases ranged from 2.2 to 8.3 years

(paras. 1.9, 2.17, 2.18 and 2.22).

8. Inadequate system for referring cases to BD and WSD for follow-up

actions. During investigations of water-seepage cases, FEHD JO staff and/or BD

JO staff would carry out preliminary assessments and refer cases involving

building-safety issues to the BD and cases involving leaking of water-supply pipes to

the Water Supplies Department (WSD) for further investigations and necessary

enforcement actions under the Buildings Ordinance (Cap. 123) and the Waterworks

Ordinance (Cap. 102) respectively. Audit examination revealed that, although

FEHD guidelines required FEHD JO staff to maintain a list of cases having been

referred to the BD and the WSD for follow-up actions, the staff of 8 of the

19 districts did not maintain such a list. Moreover, while the WSD had received

2,240 cases having been referred from the JO operation from 2011 to 2015 for

follow-up actions, the records of the JO operation showed that only 728 (33% of

2,240) cases had been referred to the WSD during the period (paras. 2.28, 2.29

and 2.31).

9. Lack of system control over investigations and issuance of nuisance

notices. From 2011 to 2015, the JO operation had successfully identified the

seepage source of 22,439 water-seepage cases and had served 20,729 nuisance

notices on the responsible persons. The FEHD promulgated an instruction in

March 2008 requiring JO staff of the 19 districts to maintain in each district a

Water-seepage Case Monitoring Database by using standalone computers for

monitoring the progress of actions taken on each water-seepage case. Information

for inclusion in the Database included the date of: (a) conducting a coloured-water

test; (b) inspecting the test results; (c) issuing a nuisance notice and its expiry date;

and (d) conducting a compliance inspection of a nuisance notice issued. However,

information of the Database could not be provided for Audit examination. The

absence of the related records and information had impeded the FEHD’s monitoring

Executive Summary

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and management of investigations and issuance of nuisance notices on water-seepage

cases, as well as Audit’s examination of the completeness and timeliness of actions

taken by the JO operation in conducting investigations and issuing nuisance notices

on water-seepage cases (paras. 2.42, 2.46, 2.47 and 2.49).

10. Lack of system control over follow-up actions on nuisance notices.

According to FEHD guidelines, JO staff of each district needed to maintain a

Nuisance Notices Monitoring List. However, Audit examination revealed that JO

staff of 14 of the 19 districts did not maintain information in the Monitoring Lists on

one or more of the following items: (a) the date of serving a nuisance notice; (b) the

date of expiry of a nuisance notice; and (c) the dates of conducting follow-up

inspections to ascertain compliance with a nuisance notice. Moreover, Audit also

noted that none of the Monitoring Lists of the 19 districts comprised information on

the results of compliance inspections and the dates of referring cases to the FEHD

Prosecution Section for taking enforcement actions. The absence of the related

records and information had impeded the FEHD’s monitoring and management of

follow-up actions on nuisance notices served, and Audit’s examination of the

completeness and timeliness of the related actions (paras. 2.50 and 2.52 to 2.55).

Monitoring of service contractors

11. To supplement staff resources, BD JO staff engaged and monitored service

contractors to assist in carrying out investigations of water-seepage cases. Service

contractors were required to submit bi-weekly progress reports to BD JO staff to

show the progress of actions taken on each assigned case. As of March 2016,

7 contractors had been appointed under 9 service contracts to provide water-seepage

investigation services for the 19 FEHD districts (paras. 1.10 and 3.3).

12. Inadequate monitoring and assessment of contractors’ effectiveness.

Service contractors were mainly engaged to carry out investigations with a view to

identifying the source of seepage of water-seepage cases. However, in monitoring

and assessing a contractor’s performance, BD JO staff did not compile and make

reference to the contractor’s success rate of identifying the source of seepage of

cases assigned to him. Audit examination revealed that there were large variations

among the success rates of the nine contracts covering the period April 2014 to

April 2015, with the rates ranging from 23% to 67% (paras. 3.6, 3.7 and 3.9).

Executive Summary

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13. Lack of effective actions taken against contractors for taking a long time

to complete investigations. Audit examination revealed that some contractors had

taken a long time to complete investigations of cases assigned to them. For

example, as of April 2016, of the 8,327 cases of the nine contracts covering the

period April 2014 to April 2015 where investigation reports had been submitted

to BD JO staff, the time taken to complete 281 (3%) cases ranged from 1.1 to

1.9 years. Furthermore, a target timeframe had been specified in the contract for a

contractor to complete an inspection of the affected premises and carry out necessary

tests within 30 days from assignment of a case. However, Audit examination

revealed that, as of April 2016, of the 5,457 cases of contracts covering the period

April 2014 to April 2015 where actions on inspection of the affected premises and

tests had been completed, 3,337 (61%) cases did not meet the 30-day target

timeframe. In particular, the time taken for 85 (2%) cases to complete this task

ranged from 1.1 to 2.1 years. However, the BD had not issued any warning letter

or adverse performance report to related contractors from January 2011 to

April 2015 (paras. 3.13 to 3.15, 3.18 and 3.21).

Management information systemand performance reporting

14. FEHD JO staff not fully adopting new CMIS for water-seepage cases.

In July 2012, the FEHD engaged a contractor at a cost of $7.3 million to develop a

new CMIS to facilitate the handling of all FEHD enquiry and complaint cases,

including water-seepage cases. The new system was rolled out by phases for

implementation in the 19 districts from December 2014 to December 2015. The

new CMIS provided new functions for storing scanned copies of case documents,

generating exception reports highlighting cases not complying with timeframes and

generating ageing analysis reports on long-outstanding cases. However, JO staff of

the 19 districts did not fully implement the new CMIS. For example, they did not

input into the new CMIS the dates of conducting tests and inspections, and issuing

nuisance notices of water-seepage cases, causing inefficiency for the management to

monitor performance and progress of the cases (paras. 4.2, 4.4 to 4.6 and 4.9).

Executive Summary

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15. Need to consider setting additional performance targets. While

informants of water-seepage cases and members of the public are mostly concerned

about the time taken by the JO operation in identifying the source of seepage of

water-seepage cases and the extent to which the JO operation could successfully

identify the source of seepage, the FEHD and the BD have not set performance

targets in these two areas (para. 4.22).


16. Audit recommendations are made in the respective sections of this

Audit Report. Only the key ones are highlighted in this Executive Summary.

Audit has recommended that the Government should:


(a) strengthen measures with a view to ensuring that the JO operation

actions on water-seepage cases are completed in a timely manner

(para. 2.34(c));

(b) periodically send a list of referral cases to the WSD and the BD for

reconciliation purposes (para. 2.34(e));

(c) take measures to ensure that BD JO staff take actions on outstanding

cases in a timely manner (para. 2.36(a));

(d) take necessary actions to ensure that Water-seepage Case Monitoring

Databases are properly maintained by the JO staff (para. 2.58(a));

(e) issue clear guidelines on essential information for inclusion in

Nuisance Notices Monitoring Lists (para. 2.58(b));

Executive Summary

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(f) take actions to ensure that contractors’ investigations on

water-seepage cases are completed in a timely manner, and warning

letters and adverse performance reports are issued to contractors

having unsatisfactory performance (para. 3.33(a));

Management information system and performance reporting

(g) take measures to ensure that all functions of the new CMIS on

water-seepage cases are fully implemented for the JO operation in a

timely manner (para. 4.13(a)); and

(h) consider regularly publishing performance indicators for the

JO operation (para. 4.24).


17. The Government agrees with the audit recommendations.

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— 1 —

PART 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 This PART describes the background to the audit and outlines the audit

objectives and scope.

Background

1.2 Mostly owing to defective fresh-water and seawater pipes, sanitary

fitments and drainage pipes, and deteriorated waterproofing of floor slabs, rooftops

and external walls, water seepage in buildings (see Photograph 1) may cause

nuisances, health problems, building-safety issues and at times water wastage. In

addition to the originating flat, these problems may extend to adjacent and

underlying flats.

Photograph 1

Water seepage from a ceiling

Source: Buildings Department records

1.3 According to the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD)

and the Buildings Department (BD):

(a) property owners are responsible for maintaining and managing their

buildings, and resolving any water-seepage problem occurring in their

buildings;

Introduction

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(b) if water seepage is suspected to be originated from an upper-floor flat or

an adjacent flat, the property owner affected should promptly approach

the pertinent flat owner for carrying out investigations and repair works.

He may seek assistance from the management office or the owners’

corporation of his building for resolving the problem. Where necessary,

he may engage a building professional to carry out investigations and

request the responsible property owner to take actions to cease the water

seepage, or lodge a claim for damages;

(c) an affected property owner may refer a water-seepage case to the

Government for assistance (for example, through the Government

hotline 1823). In response, FEHD staff will pay a visit to the site. If

FEHD staff find that the water seepage has posed a health nuisance or a

risk to the structural safety of the building, or has led to wastage of water,

they would handle the case by conducting an investigation. If the

investigation confirms the existence of water seepage (by measuring the

moisture content of the seepage area), the FEHD staff (and at times

service contractors engaged by the BD) will seek to pay visits to

upper-floor or adjacent premises suspected to be the originated place of

the seepage to carry out tests with a view to identifying the source of

seepage. Upon identifying the source of seepage, the FEHD will issue a

nuisance notice requiring the responsible person to take actions to abate

the water seepage within a specified period; and

(d) the FEHD will refer cases involving building-safety issues and leaking of

water-supply pipes to the BD and the Water Supplies Department (WSD)

respectively for further investigations and necessary enforcement actions

(see para. 1.4(b) and (c)).

Government enforcement actions under three ordinances

1.4 Upon receiving a public report on water seepage in buildings, pertinent

government departments may take actions under the following circumstances:

(a) Nuisances. Any premises, drain or sewer which is in such a state as to

be a nuisance, or injurious or dangerous to health shall be nuisances under

section 12 of the Public Health and Municipal Services Ordinance

(Cap. 132 — PH&MS Ordinance) and the FEHD may issue a

Introduction

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nuisance notice under section 127 (Note 1) of the Ordinance to require the

responsible person to abate the nuisance within a specified period;

(b) Building-safety issues. If the seepage has given rise to building-safety

issues, the BD may issue orders under section 24 (related to unauthorised

building works (UBW) — Note 2 ), sections 26 and 26A (related to

dangerous, dilapidated and defective buildings — Note 3) and section 28

(related to defective and insanitary drains of building — Note 4) of the

Buildings Ordinance (Cap. 123) to require the responsible person to take

rectification actions within a specified period; and

(c) Water wastage. If the seepage is originated from leaking water-supply

pipes and has resulted in water wastage, the WSD may issue a notice

under section 16 (Note 5) of the Waterworks Ordinance (Cap. 102) to

require the responsible person to take rectification actions within a

specified period.

Note 1: Under section 127 of the PH&MS Ordinance, the Director of Food andEnvironmental Hygiene may cause a notice to be served on the person by reasonof whose act, default or sufferance the nuisance arose or continues, or on theoccupier or owner of the premises on which the nuisance exists, requiring him toabate the nuisance.

Note 2: Under section 24 of the Buildings Ordinance, where any building works havebeen or are being carried out in contravention of any of the provisions of theBuildings Ordinance, the Building Authority (i.e. the Director of Buildings) mayby order in writing require the demolition or necessary alteration of the works.

Note 3: Under sections 26 and 26A of the Buildings Ordinance, where in the opinion ofthe Building Authority any building has been rendered dangerous or liable tobecome dangerous, or on inspection the Building Authority finds any dilapidationor defect in a building, he may by order in writing require the owner to carry outsuch works as specified.

Note 4: Under section 28 of the Buildings Ordinance, where in the opinion of theBuilding Authority the drains or sewers of any building are inadequate or indefective or insanitary condition, he may by an order in writing require theowner to carry out such drainage works as specified.

Note 5: Under section 16 of the Waterworks Ordinance, the Water Authority (i.e. theDirector of Water Supplies) may, if he is satisfied that an inside service is insuch a condition that waste of a supply has occurred or is likely to be causedthereby, by notice require the consumer to carry out the repairs or other worksas specified.

Introduction

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Government actions before July 2006

1.5 Before July 2006, a water-seepage case reported by the public would

firstly be referred to the pertinent FEHD district office (DO — Note 6) which would

carry out an initial investigation to ascertain if there was any evidence of water

seepage. If water seepage was suspected to have originated from defective drainage

or sewage pipes, the responsible FEHD DO staff might carry out a coloured-water

test (Note 7) to trace the source of the seepage. FEHD DO staff would not carry

out a coloured-water test if they found that the water seepage was not significant or

was intermittent because, according to the FEHD, the test might not help identify

the source of seepage in such circumstances. If the source of seepage could be

identified, the FEHD would issue a nuisance notice under section 127 of the

PH&MS Ordinance to the responsible person requiring him to abate the nuisance

within a specified period.

1.6 For a case where the source of seepage could not be identified, the FEHD

would not take further actions on the case, and would notify the informant of the

investigation results and any referral of the case to other government departments

for follow-up actions. For a case which might involve building defects and/or

leaking water-supply pipes (Note 8), the FEHD would refer the case to the BD

and/or the WSD as appropriate for follow-up actions, which would reply to the

informant notifying him of the investigation results directly with a copy of the reply

forwarded to the FEHD.

Note 6: The FEHD has set up 19 DOs to provide public services on a district basis, ofwhich 17 districts were the same as 17 of the 18 District Council districts. Theremaining Yau Tsim Mong District Council district is split into two FEHDdistricts, namely Yau Tsim district and Mongkok district.

Note 7: If water seepage was suspected to have originated from defective drainage orsewage pipes, investigators would apply coloured water to drainage and sewageoutlets and observe any appearance of the coloured water at the affected areas.This test is known as a coloured-water test.

Note 8: During investigations of water-seepage cases, FEHD DO staff would carry outpreliminary assessments of signs of water seepage due to building defects (seepara. 1.4(b)) or leaking water-supply pipes (see para. 1.4(c)).

Introduction

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Joint-office operation from July 2006

1.7 In December 2004, in response to a recommendation of the Team Clean

(Note 9), a joint-office (JO) operation comprising 7 FEHD staff and 6 BD staff

commenced on a trial basis at an FEHD office in Shamshuipo to handle

water-seepage cases. In addition to carrying out coloured-water tests (see Note 7 to

para. 1.5) by FEHD DO staff (hereinafter referred to as FEHD JO staff), BD staff

with building expertise (hereinafter referred to as BD JO staff) might conduct (or

engage service contractors to conduct) additional tests (such as coloured-water

ponding test — Note 10) to trace the source of water seepage. In addition, BD JO

staff also made preliminary assessments of whether any of the water seepage might

be caused by building defects and/or leaking water-supply pipes and refer relevant

cases to the BD Existing Buildings Divisions (Note 11 ) and/or the WSD for

follow-up actions. Other than carrying out additional tests and assessments, the

other follow-up actions adopted before July 2006 continued to be applicable (see

paras. 1.5 and 1.6).

1.8 From December 2004 to July 2006, the trial JO operation was

progressively extended to all the 19 FEHD districts using FEHD office facilities and

staff resources (mainly non-civil service contract (NCSC) staff) of both the FEHD

and the BD. The period of the trial scheme was later extended to March 2009, and

subsequently further to March 2012 and March 2014. Since April 2014, the JO

operation has become a permanent arrangement.

1.9 Under the JO operation, BD JO staff cost, BD office expenditures and

cost of engaging service contractors for carrying out tests to trace the source of

water seepage are borne by the BD whereas the FEHD JO staff cost and FEHD

Note 9: The Team Clean, led by the Chief Secretary for Administration, was set up inMay 2003 (in the wake of the spread of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome)to develop and take forward proposals for entrenching a high level of public andenvironmental hygiene in Hong Kong.

Note 10: If water seepage was suspected to have originated from floor slabs or a showertray, investigators would maintain a pond of coloured water on the floor slabs orshower tray for two hours and observe any seepage of the coloured water to theseepage areas. This test is known as a coloured-water ponding test.

Note 11: Cases under JO operation referred by the FEHD and BD JO staff to the BD forfollow-up actions under sections 24, 26, 26A and 28 of the Buildings Ordinancewould be handled by staff of the Existing Buildings Divisions of the BD.

Introduction

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office expenditures are borne by the FEHD. BD JO staff are under the supervision

of an Assistant Director of the BD’s Existing Buildings Division 2 whereas FEHD

JO staff are under the supervision of the respective Assistant Directors of

Operations Divisions 1, 2 and 3 of the FEHD (see Appendix A for a JO operation

structure). According to the FEHD and the BD, the main objectives of the JO

operation are to:

(a) shorten the time of investigation of water-seepage cases and improve the

success rate of identifying the source of water seepage of cases reported

by the public; and

(b) improve inter-departmental coordination and facilitate efficient and

effective management and investigations of water-seepage cases jointly by

FEHD staff having the enforcement power under the PH&MS Ordinance

and BD staff having the building-survey expertise.

Staff resources and recurrent expenditures

1.10 As of July 2006 (when the JO operation was first extended to all

19 FEHD districts), 129 staff (comprising 81 FEHD NCSC staff and 48 BD NCSC

staff — Note 12) were involved in the JO operation. As of March 2016, 274 staff (a

112% increase) comprising 211 FEHD JO staff (136 civil service and 75 NCSC

staff) and 63 BD JO staff (30 civil service and 33 NCSC staff) were involved in the

JO operation. The 211 FEHD JO staff were deployed in 19 FEHD DOs, and the

63 BD JO staff were stationed at 4 FEHD DOs and a BD office located in Kwai

Fong. The staff strength of the JO operation as of March 2016 is shown in

Appendix B. The 63 BD JO staff were mainly responsible for engaging and

overseeing the work of BD service contractors (Note 13) who carried out tests to

trace the source of water seepage. As of March 2016, 7 contractors had been

appointed under 9 service contracts to provide water-seepage test services for the

19 FEHD districts.

Note 12: According to the FEHD and the BD, before the JO operation becoming apermanent arrangement in April 2014, majority of staff involved in the JOoperation were NCSC staff and their staff turnover rate was high. Since then,civil service posts have been progressingly created to replace the NCSC posts.

Note 13: Before April 2007, about 69% of the investigation work for tracing the seepagesource was conducted by BD JO staff, with the remaining 31% by BD servicecontractors. Since April 2007, all such investigation work has been carried outby contractors.

Introduction

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1.11 In 2014-15, the total cost of the JO operation was $129 million,

comprising staff cost of $97 million ($71 million for FEHD JO staff and $26 million

for BD JO staff), and office expenditures and cost of hiring contractors totalling

$32 million ($1 million office expenditures borne by the FEHD, and $2 million

office expenditures and $29 million contractor cost borne by the BD).

Monitoring progress of actions taken on water-seepage reports

1.12 The following are relevant systems and records maintained for monitoring

and managing the JO operation:

(a) Complaints Management Information System (CMIS). The FEHD has

maintained a CMIS to record information of all public enquiry and

complaint cases received on its services and operations, including

water-seepage reports;

(b) FEHD JO monthly returns. FEHD JO staff in 19 districts submitted to

the FEHD Headquarters (to BD JO staff before 2015) monthly returns on

statistics and results of Stages I and II investigations (see para. 2.2)

conducted by them (Note 14); and

(c) BD JO case records. BD JO staff maintained records of water-seepage

cases being assigned to service contractors in spreadsheet format,

including the date of assigning each case to a service contractor, the date

of submitting an investigation report by a contractor, the date of

endorsement of the report by BD JO staff, and investigation results of

each case.

Note 14: According to the BD, it made use of FEHD statistics for compiling statistics ofthe JO operation.

Introduction

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1.13 Relevant statistics of the JO operation include:

(a) number of cases received in a month;

(b) number of completed cases (comprising screen-out cases — see

para. 2.3, completed cases with water-seepage sources identified,

completed cases without identifying the source and cases where water

seepage had ceased or reports had been withdrawn by the informants

during investigations);

(c) number of cases being referred to other government departments such as

the BD Existing Buildings Divisions and the WSD for follow-up actions;

and

(d) number of cases being followed up with enforcement actions.

1.14 According to FEHD JO monthly returns and BD JO case records, the

number of water-seepage reports having been received by the JO operation had

increased from 17,405 in 2007 (the first full year of adoption of the JO operation in

all 19 FEHD districts) to 29,617 in 2015 (a 70% increase), and the number of

completed cases had increased from 13,375 in 2007 to 25,093 in 2015 (a 88%

increase). Details are shown in Figure 1.

Introduction

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17,405

21,717 21,769

25,71723,660

27,35328,504 27,896

29,617

13,375

16,708

18,237

22,971 23,21024,553 24,856

22,056

25,093

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Num

ber

Year

Figure 1

Water-seepage public reports and completed cases

(2007 to 2015)

Source: FEHD and BD records

Remarks: The data were based on FEHD JO monthly returns and BDJO case records. Some completed cases in a year related tocases received in previous years. Furthermore, from Januaryto March 2016, the JO operation had received a total of8,330 water-seepage reports, screened out 2,667 cases andcompleted investigations of 3,200 cases. Moreover, fromApril to June 2016, the JO operation had received 10,567water-seepage reports, screened out 3,526 cases andcompleted investigations of 4,101 cases.

Totally 223,638 reports lodged by the public

Totally 191,059 completed cases

Year

Num

ber

Introduction

— 10 —

1.15 According to the FEHD, upon receipt of a water-seepage report from the

public, FEHD JO staff would pay visits to the affected premises to examine the

water seepage and its moisture content. If the moisture content of the water seepage

was found to be below 35% (see para. 2.3(a) — Note 15), or the seepage had not

caused nuisances (Note 16), FEHD JO staff would not take further actions and

would inform the premises owner accordingly.

1.16 On the other hand, if the moisture content of the water seepage was found

to be 35% or above, and that it had caused nuisances, FEHD JO staff (and at times

BD service contractors) would seek to pay visits to the premises (mostly upper-floor

or adjacent premises) suspected to be the origin of the seepage to carry out tests (see

paras. 2.5 and 2.7 for details of tests) with a view to detecting the source of water

seepage. Upon identifying the source and that the seepage had caused nuisances,

the FEHD JO staff would issue a nuisance notice to the responsible premises owner

requiring him to abate the seepage problem within a specified period.

1.17 Based on FEHD JO monthly returns and BD JO case records, as of

December 2006, there were 6,228 outstanding cases. After the setting up of the

JO operation in all the 19 FEHD districts in 2006, from January 2007 to

March 2016, the JO operation had received a total of 231,968 water-seepage reports

(223,638 plus 8,330 — see Figure 1 in para. 1.14). As of March 2016, the 238,196

(6,228 plus 231,968) cases requiring actions comprised the following:

(a) based on FEHD JO monthly returns and BD JO case records,

196,926 (83%) were completed cases (see Table 1);

(b) based on information in the CMIS, 15,564 (6%) were outstanding cases

with investigation in progress; and

Note 15: The moisture content, ranging from 0% (denoting completely dry) to 100%(denoting completely wet), of a substance could be measured by a moisturemeasurement meter.

Note 16: According to the FEHD, water seepage from potentially unclean sources (suchas sewage and drainage water) that may give rise to public health concerns isnormally regarded as causing nuisances.

Introduction

— 11 —

(c) the shortfall of 25,706 (11%) cases was due to record-keeping

discrepancies between the number of water-seepage cases captured in the

CMIS and that in the FEHD JO monthly returns and BD JO case records

(see para. 4.20 for details).

Table 1

Completed water-seepage cases(January 2007 to March 2016)

Number of completed cases

Year Screen-out

Seepagesource

identified

Seepagesource notidentified Others

(Note)Total

2007 6,350 3,246 327 3,452 13,375

2008 7,144 4,476 986 4,102 16,708

2009 8,115 4,813 1,433 3,876 18,237

2010 11,051 4,737 2,322 4,861 22,971

2011 12,219 4,199 2,089 4,703 23,210

2012 13,727 4,053 1,963 4,810 24,553

2013 13,062 4,692 2,336 4,766 24,856

2014 10,961 4,816 2,133 4,146 22,056

2015 12,000 4,679 3,494 4,920 25,093

2016(up toMarch)

2,667 1,313 667 1,220 5,867

Total 97,296 41,024 17,750 40,856 196,926


Note: Other cases included those where the water seepage had ceased orwithdrawn by informants during investigations.

Remarks: The data were based on FEHD JO monthly returns and BD JOcase records. From April to June 2016, the JO operation hadreceived a total of 10,567 water-seepage reports, screened out3,526 cases and completed investigation of 4,101 cases.

Introduction

— 12 —

1.18 Of the 29,617 (see Figure 1 in para. 1.14) water-seepage public reports

received in 2015:

(a) according to the records of the FEHD, 221 related to leaking

water-supply pipes had been referred to the WSD for follow-up actions

under the Waterworks Ordinance (see para. 1.4(c)); and

(b) according to the records of the BD, 65 related to building-safety issues

had been referred to the Existing Buildings Divisions of the BD for

follow-up actions under the Buildings Ordinance (see para. 1.4(b)).

Audit review

1.19 In 2012, the Audit Commission (Audit) completed a review on

Management of public enquiries and complaints by the FEHD (see Chapter 7 of the

Director of Audit’s Report No. 59 of October 2012). Audit’s findings on the

FEHD’s handling of water-seepage cases formed part of the audit report. The

FEHD accepted Audit’s recommendations included in the audit report for

implementation, including the following:

(a) reviewing the data accuracy of the CMIS, amending the incorrect data and

taking measures to guard against errors and omissions in recording data;

(b) reminding staff to properly maintain all case files;

(c) closely monitoring long-outstanding cases;

(d) looking into the reasons for the long time taken to complete some of the

cases so as to identify room for improvement, and for any long periods of

inaction during investigations; and

(e) taking effective measures to improve the efficiency of investigations.

Introduction

— 13 —

1.20 In April 2016, Audit commenced a review to examine the efficiency and

effectiveness of the JO operation in handling water-seepage cases. The review

focuses on the following areas:

(a) investigation and enforcement actions (PART 2);

(b) monitoring of service contractors (PART 3); and

(c) management information system and performance reporting (PART 4).

Audit has identified areas where improvements can be made by the Government in

the above areas, and has made a number of recommendations to address the issues.

Acknowledgement

1.21 Audit would like to acknowledge with gratitude the cooperation of the

staff of the Food and Health Bureau, the Development Bureau, the FEHD, the BD

and the WSD during the course of the audit review.

— 14 —

PART 2: INVESTIGATION AND

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

2.1 This PART examines the work of FEHD JO staff and BD JO staff under

the JO operation on water seepage in buildings, focusing on:

(a) investigation actions (see paras. 2.2 to 2.40); and

(b) enforcement actions (see paras. 2.41 to 2.59).

Investigation actions on water-seepage cases

2.2 Members of the public mostly lodge water-seepage reports to the

Government hotline 1823 or directly to JO staff of the 19 FEHD districts, and the

former will refer cases received to the pertinent district JO staff for follow-up

actions. Under the JO operation, three stages of investigations would be carried

out, namely Stages I and II investigations by FEHD JO staff and Stage III

investigations by BD JO staff.

Stage I investigations by FEHD JO staff

2.3 Upon receipt of a water-seepage report from the public, responsible

FEHD JO staff would pay visits to the affected premises to examine the water

seepage and its moisture content (Stage I investigations). According to FEHD

guidelines, FEHD JO staff would not take further actions if the case involves any

one of the following circumstances (known as a screen-out case):

(a) the moisture content of the seepage was below 35% (Note 17);

Note 17: According to the BD, water seepage with moisture content of less than 35% isinsignificant and the chance of detecting its source is slim, and follow-up actionswould not be taken on related cases.


— 15 —

(b) the seepage was caused by penetration of rain water through external

walls, roofs or floor slabs which did not give rise to public health

concerns;

(c) the seepage was originated from areas within the affected premises;

(d) the affected area was part of UBW (e.g. UBW on a flat roof, which

would be referred to the BD Existing Buildings Divisions for follow-up

actions);

(e) the report was not a seepage case in nature (e.g. a defective drainage

system at the exterior of a building, which would be referred to the BD

Existing Buildings Divisions for follow-up actions); and

(f) investigations under the JO operation on the case had been completed

within two weeks and the water seepage had not worsened since the last

investigation.

2.4 FEHD JO staff would notify the informants of the reasons for any

screen-out cases. Table 2 shows the number of water-seepage cases lodged by the

public and the screen-out cases from 2007 to 2015, which were based on

information contained in FEHD JO monthly returns.


— 16 —

Table 2

Number of water-seepage cases and screen-out cases(2007 to 2015)

Year Cases lodged by the public

(No.)

Screen-out cases

(No.) (Percentage)

2007 17,405 6,350 36%

2008 21,717 7,144 33%

2009 21,769 8,115 37%

2010 25,717 11,051 43%

2011 23,660 12,219 52%

2012 27,353 13,727 50%

2013 28,504 13,062 46%

2014 27,896 10,961 39%

2015 29,617 12,000(Note)

41%

Overall 223,638 94,629 42%

Source: FEHD records

Note: Based on a one-off exercise carried out by the FEHD for 2015, of these 12,000screen-out cases, 8,049 (27% of 29,617 cases) related to cases not meeting the35% moisture-content threshold.

Remarks: The data were based on FEHD JO monthly returns. Some screen-out cases in ayear related to cases received in previous years.

Stage II investigations by FEHD JO staff

2.5 For a water-seepage case other than a screen-out case, for the purpose of

identifying the source of seepage, FEHD JO staff would conduct one or more of the

following tests:

(a) moisture-content assessment. Other tests might not be required if the

moisture content of the seepage had fallen below 35%;

(b) coloured-water test (see Note 7 to para. 1.5); and


— 17 —

(c) reversible-pressure test. If water dripping from a ceiling was noted and

that the seepage was suspected to be originated from water-supply pipes,

FEHD JO staff would turn off the related main water supply and, in order

to release the pressure inside the pipes, drain off the remaining water in

the pipes by turning on all the pertinent water taps, and observe if the rate

of water dripping would reduce. Thereafter, the FEHD JO staff would

resume the pressure inside the pipes by turning on the main water supply

and turning off all the pertinent water taps, and observe if the rate of

water dripping would increase to determine whether the water-supply

pipes had any possible leakage.

2.6 If the source of seepage could be identified after conducting the

coloured-water test, FEHD JO staff would issue a nuisance notice to the responsible

person for taking rectification actions within the time specified in the notice. A case

involving possible leakage of water-supply pipes as revealed by a

reversible-pressure test would be referred to the WSD for follow-up actions.

Otherwise, FEHD JO staff would hand over the case to related BD JO staff for

conducting Stage III investigations.

Stage III investigations by BD JO staff

2.7 Stage III investigations involved conducting one or more of the following

tests:

(a) moisture-content assessment. Other tests might not be required if the

moisture content of the seepage had fallen below 35%;

(b) coloured-water spraying test. If the walls were suspected to be the source

of water seepage, investigators would spray diluted coloured water against

the walls and observe any seepage of the coloured water to other areas;

(c) coloured-water test (see Note 7 to para. 1.5);

(d) coloured-water ponding test (see Note 10 to para. 1.7); and

(e) reversible-pressure test (see para. 2.5(c)).


— 18 —

2.8 To supplement staff resources, BD JO staff engaged and monitored

service contractors to assist in carrying out Stage III investigations. If the source of

a water-seepage case could be identified and the seepage had caused nuisances under

the PH&MS Ordinance (see para. 1.4(a)), BD JO staff would inform FEHD JO staff

of the results for the latter to issue a necessary nuisance notice for rectification

actions. Cases involving possible leakage of water-supply pipes as revealed by

reversible-pressure tests would be referred to the WSD for follow-up actions. For

cases where the source of seepage could not be identified after completing Stage III

investigations, BD JO staff would notify the informants accordingly.

Deteriorating source-identification success rates

2.9 The objectives of the JO operation are to shorten the time of

investigations and improve the success rate of identifying the source of water

seepage of cases reported by the public (see para. 1.9(a)). The FEHD and the BD

jointly compiled success rates of identifying the source of seepage.

2.10 Figure 2 shows that the success rates had decreased progressively from

46% in 2007 to 36% in 2015, based on data recorded in FEHD JO monthly returns

and BD JO case records using the formula adopted by the FEHD and the BD

(Note 18).

Note 18: The source-identification success rates were computed using the following

formula:

Success rate =

No. of completed cases withseepage source identified (A)

× 100%(A) + No. of completed cases without identifying

seepage source (Net of screen-out cases)+ No. of cases closed during investigations due to cessation

of water seepage or cases withdrawn by informants


— 19 —

46% 47% 48%

40% 38% 37%40%

43%

36%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Per

centa

ge

Year

Figure 2

Success rates of identifying seepage source (Note)

(2007 to 2015)

Source: Audit analysis of FEHD and BD records

Note: The number of screen-out cases was excluded from thecomputation of the success rates.

Remarks: From January to June 2016, the success rate ofinvestigation actions on completed cases was 43%.

2.11 In October 2016, the BD informed Audit that the declining success rates

from 2007 to 2015 were attributed to the following:

(a) the public had become more aware of the service and less tolerant of

water seepage having a lower moisture-content level. Hence, public

demand for services of the JO operation had increased considerably; and

Year


— 20 —

(b) in recent years, more water-seepage cases at lower moisture-content

levels were received, and investigators would have a lower chance of

identifying the seepage source of these cases.

2.12 In view of the fact that one of the main objectives of the JO operation is

to improve the success rate of identifying the source of water seepage, the

deteriorating source-identification success rates in recent years is a cause for

concern. Audit considers that the BD and the FEHD need to strengthen actions with

a view to improving the success rate.

Lack of information on the time of sending final replieson screen-out cases

2.13 For a screen-out case (see para. 2.3), the FEHD has set a completion

timeframe on sending a final reply to the informant within 18 working days from the

time of receiving the related water-seepage public report. However, the FEHD’s

CMIS did not maintain information on the time of sending final replies to informants

of screen-out cases. The absence of related information has impeded FEHD

management’s monitoring and Audit’s examination of the timeliness and

completeness of the FEHD’s actions in handling screen-out cases.

2.14 In Audit’s view, the FEHD needs to take measures to maintain the

information on the time of sending final replies to informants of screen-out cases. A

comprehensive database system on water-seepage cases will facilitate this task (see

para. 4.12).

Long time taken to handle some water-seepage cases

2.15 In 2008, the FEHD and the BD issued guidelines on reference completion

timeframes on handling water-seepage cases (see Appendix C) by their staff, as

follows:


— 21 —

Guidelinesissued by Work

Referencecompletiontimeframe

FEHD From receiving a water-seepage reportto completing Stage II investigations

38 working days

BD From receiving a water-seepage casefrom FEHD JO staff to completingStage III investigations

52 working days

Total 90 working days(or 133 calendardays — Note 19)

2.16 According to the FEHD and the BD:

(a) the guidelines provided indicative timeframes for simple and

straightforward cases (i.e. cases not involving any problem for

investigators to gain access to the premises concerned, not involving

difficulties to trace the seepage source, not involving multiple seepage

sources nor multiple tests and not requiring Government Laboratory’s

confirmation of results of seepage-source tests);

(b) the actual timeframe for completing a case will vary depending on the

complexity of the case, the testing methods used, and the workload and

manpower situation of the JO operation; and

(c) a case will require longer time to complete and the timeframe would

become less meaningful if it involves laboratory testing of samples,

sub-divided flats or an application for an entry warrant from the Court.

Note 19: After deducting 52 Saturdays and 52 Sundays, and 14 public holidays not fallingon Saturdays in a year, 247 of 365 days in a year were working days. Therefore,the ratio of working days : calendar days was 1:1.48. Based on this ratio,90 working days = about 133 calendar days.


— 22 —

2%

2.17 From April 2015 to March 2016, based on the information in the CMIS,

JO operation actions on 28,332 cases had been completed. Audit examination

revealed that, of these 28,332 cases, the time of completing 9,710 (34%) cases had

exceeded the total reference completion timeframe of 133 days (see para. 2.15). An

analysis of the time of completing the 28,332 cases is as follows:

Days

(No.)

Cases

(No.) (Percentage)

133 days (or 90 working days) or less 18,622 66%

134 to 400 days 6,332 22%

401 to 600 days 1,863 7%

601 to 800 days 872 3%

801 to 1,000 days (or 2.2 to 2.7 years) 388 1%

1,001 to 2,730 days (or 2.7 to 7.5 years) 255 1%

Total 28,332 100%

2.18 Furthermore, as of March 2016, of the 15,564 outstanding cases with

actions not having been completed, the time used for handling 6,368 outstanding

cases (41% — Note 20) had exceeded the total reference completion timeframe of

133 days. An analysis of the time of processing the 15,564 outstanding cases as of

March 2016 is as follows:

Days

(No.)

Cases

(No.) (Percentage)


134 to 400 days 3,422 22%

401 to 600 days 1,083 7%

601 to 800 days 817 5%

801 to 1,000 days (or 2.2 to 2.7 years) 383 3%

1,001 to 3,026 days (or 2.7 to 8.3 years) 663 4%

Total 15,564 100%

Note 20: The 6,368 outstanding cases exceeding the 90-working-day completion timeframewas based on an ageing analysis management report provided by the FEHD (seepara. 2.57).

9,710

6,368

1,046 7%

34%

41%

643

7%

2%


— 23 —

2.19 Of the 6,368 (15,564 less 9,196) cases exceeding the completion

timeframe, as of March 2016, Stages I and II investigations on 837 (13%) cases

were in progress, and on 5,531 (87%) had been completed, which were awaiting

completion of Stage III investigations (Note 21).

2.20 Audit selected for examination 30 cases (Note 22) involving long time

(more than 800 days) for taking investigation actions (see paras. 2.17 and 2.18). Of

these 30 cases, the FEHD and the BD informed Audit that the case files of 7 cases

could not be located for Audit examination, and the apparent long time taken for

7 other cases (case files provided for Audit examination) were due to delays in

updating the CMIS records. Audit considers it unsatisfactory that the files of some

outstanding cases were missing which would create difficulties for the JO operation

to follow-up and complete the water-seepage cases. The absence of the records and

files has impeded Audit examination of FEHD’s and BD’s efficiency and

effectiveness in handling long-outstanding cases. In Audit’s view, the FEHD and

the BD need to take measures to improve record keeping and the filing system for

case files. The FEHD and the BD also need to take measures to ensure that

information of the CMIS is updated in a timely manner. Regarding the remaining

16 (30 minus 7 minus 7) cases, Audit examination revealed the following major

reasons for the long time taken:

(a) long periods without actions taken (see Case 1);

(b) investigators encountering difficulties in gaining access to the premises

suspected to be the origin of the seepage (see Audit comments in

paras. 3.23 to 3.25); and

(c) long time taken by contractors to submit investigation reports and by BD

JO staff to endorse the reports (see Case 2).

Note 21: In October 2016, the BD informed Audit that the number of cases awaitingcompletion of Stage III investigations as of June 2016 had decreased to 3,867.

Note 22: Of the 30 cases selected for examination, 8 (exceeding 800 days) were completedcases and 22 (comprising 15 longest cases and 7 other cases exceeding 800 days)were outstanding cases. Due to delays in updating the CMIS records,3 completed cases and 4 outstanding cases in fact did not exceed 800 days as ofMarch 2016.


— 24 —

Case 1

Case without actions taken for a long period of time(January 2010 to June 2016)

1. In January 2010, the FEHD received a water-seepage report. In

February 2010, FEHD JO staff visited the affected premises and, from

February to May 2010, conducted tests at the premises suspected to be the

origin of seepage.

2. In July 2010, the case was assigned to a service contractor

(Contractor A) for conducting Stage III investigations. In February 2011,

Contractor A submitted an investigation report stating that the source of

seepage could not be identified. However, as Contractor A did not provide

the BD with some requested information, the report was not endorsed by the

BD.

3. In May 2011, the case was re-assigned to another contractor

(Contractor B). In October 2011, Contractor B informed BD JO staff that it

had difficulties in making an appointment with the informant to visit the

affected premises, and suggested that a letter could be issued to the informant

requesting him to contact the office in ten days.

4. In June 2016, the BD issued a letter to the informant. About two

weeks later, the BD issued a final reply to the informant and owner of the

suspected premises, stating that no further action would be taken on the case.

Audit comments

5. There was no record showing that any action had been taken under

the JO operation during the 4 years and 8 months from October 2011 to

June 2016. Also, the BD did not take any follow-up actions (such as issuing a

warning letter) against Contractor A for not providing the requested

information, leading to re-assigning the case to Contractor B. The BD needs

to strengthen actions on monitoring contractors’ performance (see PART 3).

In Audit’s view, the BD needs to take measures to ensure that its staff take

actions on outstanding cases in a timely manner.



— 25 —

Case 2

Case with long time taken to submit and endorse investigation reports(May 2013 to November 2015)

1. In May 2013, the FEHD received a water-seepage report. Afterconducting Stages I and II investigations (without identifying the seepagesource), the case was assigned by BD JO staff to a contractor (Contractor C) inJune 2013 for conducting Stage III investigations. From August to December2013, Contractor C had visited the affected premises, conducted tests at thepremises suspected to be the origin of the seepage and inspected the testresults.

2. In April 2014, Contractor C submitted an investigation report,indicating that the seepage source could not be identified. In June 2014,Contractor C conducted another moisture-content assessment at the affectedpremises and found that the moisture level was above 35%.

3. In May 2015, BD JO staff endorsed Contractor C’s investigationreport. On the same day, the case was re-assigned to another contractor(Contractor D).

4. In June 2015, Contractor C submitted a supplementary report on theresult of the moisture-content assessment conducted in June 2014 (see para. 2).

5. In October 2015, after measuring the moisture content twice at theaffected premises (both measurements showed that the moisture levels werebelow 35%), Contractor D submitted an investigation report and concludedthat water seepage had ceased. In November 2015, after endorsing the report,BD JO staff issued a final reply to the informant and owner of the suspectedpremises.

Audit comments

6. BD JO staff had taken 13 months (from April 2014 to May 2015) toendorse the investigation report submitted by Contractor C, and Contractor Chad taken 12 months (from June 2014 to June 2015) to submit a supplementaryinvestigation report. In Audit’s view, the BD needs to timely endorseinvestigation reports, and strengthen actions on monitoring contractors’performance to ensure that the investigation reports are submitted in a timelymanner.

7. Also, there was no record in the case file showing the reasons forre-assigning the case to Contractor D for investigation after endorsingContractor C’s investigation report. The BD needs to make improvement inthis area.



— 26 —

2.21 In August and October 2016, the BD and the FEHD informed Audit that:

BD

(a) before the JO operation becoming a permanent arrangement in

April 2014, the majority of BD JO staff were contract staff whose

turnover rate was high. Also, the manpower strength and the staff

experience level at that time were less than satisfactory. With a more

stable workforce being progressively established since April 2014, the

performance of the JO operation had improved. The significant increase

in the number of water-seepage reports in recent years had resulted in the

JO operation taking a long time in completing some outstanding cases;

and

FEHD

(b) since the JO operation would only apply tests which would not cause

damage to premises suspected of causing water seepage, the related staff

normally needed to conduct multiple inspections (involving a number of

visits) in order to collect adequate evidence for taking legal actions.

2.22 Audit considers it unsatisfactory that FEHD and BD JO staff had taken a

long time in processing some cases. For example, they had taken more than

800 days (or 2.2 years) to handle 1,689 (388 plus 255 plus 383 plus 663) cases as of

March 2016 (see paras. 2.17 and 2.18). This may lead to prolonged nuisances and

increased public concerns over the Government’s efficiency and effectiveness in

taking enforcement actions under the PH&MS Ordinance. In Audit’s view, in order

to improve the efficiency of delivery of public services, the FEHD and the BD need

to strengthen measures with a view to ensuring that the JO operation actions on

water-seepage cases are completed in a timely manner, and publish the ranges of

time spent on completing the cases.


— 27 —

Case records not available for Audit examination

2.23 Audit noted that, in January 2016, BD JO staff of 7 (Note 23) of the

19 districts had informed the BD senior management that, regarding the clearance of

backlog assigned cases of service contractors, actions on all outstanding assigned

cases which were handled before 2014 had been completed. However, based on

CMIS information, as of March 2016, 1,046 (383 plus 663) cases had been

outstanding for more than 800 days (see para. 2.18), of which 162 (15%) were

handled by JO staff of the 7 districts (all related cases were received before 2014

and were under Stage III investigations as of March 2016). In view of the anomaly,

Audit requested the BD to provide details of the 162 cases for examination.

2.24 Of the 162 cases handled by JO staff of the 7 districts, from July to

September 2016, the BD informed Audit that:

(a) as of March 2016, actions on 115 cases (71%) had been completed and

35 cases (22%) were in progress. The 115 completed cases had been

erroneously indicated as outstanding cases in the CMIS (see para. 2.18) as

of March 2016 due to the CMIS not having been timely updated; and

(b) the case files of the remaining 12 cases (7%) could not be located because:

(i) for 5 cases (42%), according to FEHD records, the case files had

been transferred to BD JO staff for Stage III investigations.

However, according to BD JO staff, the case files had not been

received by them; and

(ii) for 7 cases (58%), the case files had been mislaid during Stage III

investigations.

Note 23: The 7 districts were Kowloon City, Kwai Tsing, Mongkok, Shamshuipo, TsuenWan, Tuen Mun and Yau Tsim districts.


— 28 —

2.25 However, as of September 2016, of the 115 cases (see para. 2.24(a))

having actions completed by March 2016, the BD could only provide Audit with the

final replies having been sent to informants of 93 cases (81%) notifying them of the

completion of the cases. In Audit’s view, the BD needs to take measures to locate

the final replies for the remaining 22 (115 less 93) cases, and ensure that its staff

send final replies to informants in a timely manner and keep related records on file.

2.26 Audit considers it unsatisfactory that the files of some outstanding cases

were missing which would create difficulties for the JO operation to manage the

water-seepage cases. The absence of the records and files has impeded Audit

examination of FEHD’s and BD’s efficiency and effectiveness in handling

long-outstanding cases. In Audit’s view, the FEHD and the BD need to take

measures to improve the filing system for case files (also see Audit comments in

para. 2.20). They also need to conduct a review to identify all cases involving

missing case files and take necessary remedial actions. A comprehensive record and

database system for water-seepage cases storing scanned copies of documents would

help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the JO operation (see

para. 4.12).

2.27 Regarding omissions in updating records in the CMIS (see para. 2.24(a)),

the FEHD and the BD need to take measures to ensure that the progress of actions

taken under the JO operation are updated in a timely manner (also see Audit

comments in para. 2.20).

Inadequate system for referring cases to BD and WSDfor follow-up actions

2.28 During investigations of water-seepage cases, FEHD JO staff and/or BD

JO staff would carry out preliminary assessments of whether the cases might involve

building defects or leaking water-supply pipes, and refer relevant cases to the BD

Existing Buildings Divisions and the WSD respectively for follow-up actions. The

BD would then check for any infringement of sections 24, 26, 26A and 28 of the

Buildings Ordinance (see para. 1.4(b)) and the WSD for any infringement of

section 16 of the Waterworks Ordinance (see para. 1.4(c)).


— 29 —

2.29 According to FEHD guidelines:

(a) in referring a case to another government department for follow-up

actions, FEHD JO staff will send a memorandum together with the

relevant information to the related department;

(b) for water-seepage cases justifying referral to the WSD, FEHD JO staff

would forward related memorandum to the WSD directly. For cases to

be referred to BD Existing Buildings Divisions, the cases would be passed

to BD JO staff for assessing the justifications and forwarding the cases to

BD Existing Buildings Divisions for follow-up actions; and

(c) FEHD JO staff would record the referrals in a list of referral cases.

However, in response to Audit’s request for the lists of referral cases for the period

January 2015 to March 2016, the FEHD provided Audit with such lists maintained

by JO staff of only 11 of the 19 districts, as follows:

FEHD districts

Maintaininga list of referral cases

Not maintaininga list of referral cases

1. Central & Western 1. Kowloon City

2. Eastern 2. Kwai Tsing

3. Islands 3. Kwun Tong

4. Mongkok 4. Sai Kung

5. North 5. Tsuen Wan

6. Shamshuipo 6. Tuen Mun

7. Shatin 7. Wanchai

8. Southern 8. Wong Tai Sin

9. Tai Po

10. Yau Tsim

11. Yuen Long

2.30 In Audit’s view, the FEHD needs to take measures to ensure that

FEHD JO staff of all districts comply with FEHD guidelines to maintain a list of

referral cases.


— 30 —

2.31 In July 2016, in response to Audit’s request for information on the

number of water-seepage cases that had been referred by the JO operation to the BD

Existing Buildings Divisions and the WSD for follow-up actions from 2011 to 2015,

the FEHD and the BD informed Audit that they could only provide Audit with

information related to the WSD but not to the BD Existing Buildings Divisions.

However, in response to Audit’s request for information on the number of

water-seepage cases that had been received under the JO operation by the BD and

the WSD for follow-up actions from 2011 to 2015, the BD Existing Buildings

Divisions and the WSD were able to provide Audit with the information (see

Table 3).

Table 3

Number of water-seepage cases referred under JO operationto the BD and the WSD for follow-up actions

(2011 to 2015)

Year

Cases referred to BD(No.)

Cases referred to WSD(No.)

Based onrecords of

JO operation(see para. 2.32)

Based onrecords of

BD ExistingBuildingsDivisions

Based onrecords of

JOoperation

Based onWSD

records Discrepancy

2011

Not available

75 142 513 (371)

2012 79 124 599 (475)

2013 111 116 516 (400)

2014 117 125 353 (228)

2015 65 221 259 (38)

Total 447 728 2,240 (1,512)

Source: FEHD, BD and WSD records

2.32 In October 2016, the FEHD informed Audit that the information on cases

having been referred by the JO operation to the BD was kept in individual case files

and was not readily available. The absence of the number of cases having been

referred to the BD Existing Buildings Divisions for follow-up actions in the past

years has impeded proper management and oversight as well as Audit examination

of whether all cases referred had been duly followed up.


— 31 —

2.33 Moreover, Audit noted discrepancies between the number of

water-seepage cases referred to the WSD under the JO operation and the number of

cases received and recorded by the WSD for follow-up actions (see Table 3 in

para. 2.31). In October 2016, the FEHD informed Audit that:

(a) the discrepancies were due to the different bases adopted by the FEHD

and the WSD in classifying a referred case. The number of cases based

on records of the JO operation was the number of completed cases with

seepage source found to be originated from water-supply pipes. The

number did not include other cases having been referred to the WSD

(e.g. cases requested by informants to be referred to the WSD which did

not involve water seepage from water-supply pipes); and

(b) the number of cases based on WSD records was the total number of cases

referred under the JO operation.

In Audit’s view, FEHD and BD JO staff need to periodically send a list of referral

cases to the WSD and the BD Existing Buildings Divisions for reconciliation

purposes.


2.34 Audit has recommended that, in carrying out investigation actions

under the JO operation on water-seepage cases, the Director of Food and

Environmental Hygiene and the Director of Buildings should jointly:

(a) take measures to improve record keeping and the filing system for

case files to prevent loss of files;

(b) take measures to ensure that information of the CMIS is updated in a

timely manner;

(c) strengthen measures with a view to ensuring that the JO operation

actions on water-seepage cases are completed in a timely manner, and

publish the ranges of time spent on completing the cases;

(d) conduct a review to identify all cases involving missing case files and

take necessary remedial actions; and


— 32 —

(e) periodically send a list of referral cases to the WSD and the BD

Existing Buildings Divisions for reconciliation purposes.

2.35 Audit has recommended that, in carrying out investigation actions

under the JO operation on water-seepage cases, the Director of Food and

Environmental Hygiene should:

(a) take measures to maintain information on the time of sending final

replies to informants of screen-out water-seepage cases; and

(b) take measures to ensure that FEHD JO staff of all districts comply

with FEHD guidelines to maintain a list of referral cases.

2.36 Audit has recommended that the Director of Buildings should, under

the JO operation on water-seepage cases:

(a) take measures to ensure that BD JO staff take actions on outstanding

cases in a timely manner;

(b) strengthen actions on monitoring service contractors’ performance to

ensure that investigation reports are submitted in a timely manner;

(c) take timely action to endorse investigation reports submitted by

service contractors; and

(d) take measures to ensure that BD JO staff send final replies on

completed cases to informants in a timely manner and keep related

records on file.


2.37 The Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene and the Director of

Buildings agree with the audit recommendations in paragraph 2.34. They have said

that:


— 33 —

Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene

(a) the FEHD and the BD are taking measures to enhance the CMIS,

including implementing applicable functions in the CMIS to improve the

record keeping in the system;

(b) the FEHD and the BD are taking measures to ensure that information of

the CMIS is updated in a timely manner. For example, in addition to

generating exception reports, the CMIS would periodically generate

outstanding case lists for reference by supervising officers of the JO

operation;

(c) the FEHD and the BD have started a review of all cases involving missing

case files and are exploring means to set up a bar-code filing system to

monitor file movements in future;

Director of Buildings

(d) to enhance the effectiveness of the investigations conducted by the

JO operation, in 2014, the BD commissioned a consultancy study on the

latest technological methods for identifying the source of water seepage in

buildings. The study will be completed in 2017. Furthermore, the BD

has engaged contractors (engaged under contracts other than those for

conducting Stage III investigations) under the JO operation to use infrared

thermography and microwave tomography technologies for investigating

complicated cases;

Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene and Director of Buildings

(e) in view of the significant increase in the caseload over the past years, the

FEHD and the BD will realistically review the reference completion

timeframe; and

(f) FEHD and BD JO staff will periodically send a list of referral cases to the

WSD and the BD Existing Buildings Divisions.

2.38 The Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene agrees with the audit

recommendations in paragraph 2.35. She has said that:


— 34 —

(a) for paragraph 2.35(a), FEHD and BD JO staff are required to upload the

final reply letters and input the issuing dates into the CMIS. The FEHD

will explore whether enhancements to the CMIS can be made on

recording information on final reply letters issued; and

(b) for paragraph 2.35(b), FEHD JO staff have been reminded to comply

with FEHD guidelines to maintain a list of referral cases, and will

compile such a list in future. Furthermore, to improve work efficiency,

the FEHD will enhance the existing CMIS or set up a new database

system for FEHD and BD JO staff to keep track of various actions taken

in processing water-seepage cases, so that related information can be

directly retrieved from the system.

2.39 The Director of Buildings agrees with the audit recommendations in

paragraph 2.36. He has said that:

(a) in October 2013, after conducting a review, the BD revamped its internal

guidelines on performance of service contractors (which was further

revised in December 2015) and promulgated clearer guidelines on

responsibilities of different levels of BD staff on monitoring contractors’

performance. The BD also required its staff to make realistic assessments

of contractors’ performance, timely issue warning letters to contractors

having unsatisfactory performance and inculcate partnership relationship

with contractors;

(b) new automation functions had been incorporated in BD JO case records to

facilitate monitoring of progress of actions taken, and consideration of

issuing warning letters and adverse performance reports to contractors

having unsatisfactory performance; and

(c) the BD will continue to take actions to locate the final replies for the

remaining 22 cases (see para. 2.25).

2.40 The Director of Water Supplies agrees with the audit recommendation in

paragraph 2.34(e). He has said that the WSD will support the JO operation in

conducting reconciliation of the number of referral cases and the review to ascertain

the reasons for discrepancies between the number of cases referred under the JO

operation and that received by the WSD.


— 35 —

Enforcement actions on water-seepage cases

2.41 The FEHD is responsible for taking enforcement actions against persons

not complying with the PH&MS Ordinance. Under section 127 of the PH&MS

Ordinance, if water seepage from premises was found to have caused nuisances, the

FEHD may issue and serve a nuisance notice on the responsible person requiring

him to abate the nuisance within a specified period (Note 24). Any person who fails

to comply with requirements of a nuisance notice shall be guilty of an offence and,

on conviction, may be fined up to $10,000 and a daily penalty of $200 during the

period of non-compliance.

2.42 From 2011 to 2015, the JO operation had successfully identified the

source of 22,439 water-seepage cases (based on FEHD JO monthly returns and BD

JO case records) and the FEHD had issued 20,729 nuisance notices (based on

FEHD JO monthly returns) on such cases. The statistics of these cases would at

times be reported to the Legislative Council (LegCo) in response to its enquiries.

Details are shown in Table 4.

Table 4

Water-seepage cases with source identifiedand nuisance notices issued

(2011 to 2015)

Year2011

(No.)

2012

(No.)

2013

(No.)

2014

(No.)

2015

(No.)

Total

(No.)

Cases with source identified 4,199 4,053 4,692 4,816 4,679 22,439

Nuisance notices issued 3,064 3,639 4,338 4,700 4,988 20,729

Nuisance orders grantedby Court

30 17 41 31 16 135


Note 24: The responsible person is normally given two to four weeks to carry outrectification works, depending on the scale of the works.


— 36 —

2.43 Furthermore, if a responsible person did not comply with a nuisance

notice, the FEHD might apply to the Court for issuing a nuisance order for:

(a) requiring the person to comply with the requirements of a nuisance notice;

(b) prohibiting the recurrence of a nuisance; or

(c) prohibiting the use of premises causing a nuisance for human habitation.

Any person who fails without reasonable excuse to comply with a nuisance order

shall be guilty of an offence and, on conviction, may be fined up to $25,000 and a

daily penalty of $450 during the period of non-compliance. From 2011 to 2015,

upon the FEHD’s applications, 135 nuisance orders on water seepage had been

granted by the Court (see Table 4 in para. 2.42).

Lack of system control over investigationsand issuance of nuisance notices

2.44 According to the FEHD, upon identifying the source of a water-seepage

case causing nuisances (i.e. source-identified case), FEHD JO staff would take

actions to ascertain the ownership of the seepage-originated premises by conducting

a search at the Land Registry, and serve a nuisance notice on the owners of the

seepage-originated premises in warranted cases.

2.45 As shown in Table 4 in paragraph 2.42, for example, in 2011, the JO

operation identified the sources of 4,199 water-seepage cases. However, in the

same year, the FEHD only issued 3,064 nuisance notices. According to the FEHD,

the difference between the number of source-identified cases and the number of

nuisance notices issued may be attributed to the following:

(a) nuisance notices for some cases might be issued in the following year; or

(b) repair works had been satisfactorily carried out and the water seepage had

ceased or been reduced to a level below 35% moisture content before

issuing a nuisance notice.


— 37 —

2.46 Furthermore, in March 2008, the FEHD promulgated an instruction

requiring JO staff of the 19 districts to maintain in each district a Water-seepage

Case Monitoring (WCM) Database by using standalone computers for monitoring

the progress of actions taken on each water-seepage case. A standard format of the

WCM Database was provided to JO staff of all districts for actions. Information for

inclusion in the WCM Database included the date of:

(a) conducting a coloured-water test;

(b) inspecting the test results;

(c) issuing a nuisance notice and its expiry date; and

(d) conducting a compliance inspection of a nuisance notice issued.

Under the WCM Database, cases with actions exceeding the completion timeframes

(see Appendix C) would be highlighted for follow-up actions.

2.47 Audit considers that the efficient and effective implementation of the

WCM Database system would facilitate the FEHD in monitoring the progress of

actions on each water-seepage case. However, the FEHD could not provide Audit

with information of the WCM Database for examination.

2.48 In October 2016, the FEHD informed Audit that:

(a) details of each of the water-seepage cases such as actions recommended

by case officers and endorsed by supervisors were recorded in individual

case files; and

(b) the WCM Database was a spreadsheet database established in 2008 to

facilitate individual case officers to record the actions taken and manage

the progress of actions taken against the timeframes set for Stages I and II

investigations. The Database captured essential information for frontline

supervisors of the JO operation to review the progress of cases. In 2012,

the FEHD incorporated some useful features of the WCM Database into


— 38 —

the new CMIS. However, in mid-July 2015, due to problems

encountered when implementing the new CMIS, FEHD JO staff were not

required to input some information (see paras. 4.5(a) and 4.6) into the

new CMIS.

2.49 The absence of the related records and information has impeded the

FEHD’s monitoring and management of investigations, issuance of nuisance notices

on water-seepage cases, as well as Audit examination of the completeness and

timeliness of actions taken by the JO operation in conducting investigations and

issuing nuisance notices. In Audit’s view, the FEHD needs to conduct a review to

ascertain whether FEHD JO staff have complied with FEHD instruction on

maintaining WCM Databases and whether the Databases have been maintained in

compliance with FEHD requirements, and take necessary actions on proper

maintenance of the required Databases.

Lack of system control overfollow-up actions on nuisance notices

2.50 According to FEHD guidelines, JO staff of each of the 19 districts needed

to maintain a Nuisance Notices Monitoring List (NNM List). The guidelines

also stipulated that, after issuing a nuisance notice to a responsible person of

seepage-originated premises:

(a) the pertinent JO staff needed to carry out a follow-up inspection after

expiry of the period specified in the nuisance notice;

(b) during the follow-up inspection, JO staff needed to ascertain:

(i) if the moisture of areas of the affected premises was below 35%

moisture content; and

(ii) proper repair works had been carried out;

(c) if the JO staff found that one or both of the two conditions in (b) were not

fulfilled, they would carry out a coloured-water test or a coloured-water

ponding test to obtain evidence of causing nuisances for taking

prosecution actions; and


— 39 —

(d) the JO staff would refer the case found in (c) to the FEHD’s Prosecution

Section for applying to the Court for taking prosecution actions against

the responsible person for not complying with the nuisance notice and for

issuing a nuisance order (see para. 2.43).

2.51 In 2015, a total of 4,988 nuisance notices had been issued (see Table 4 in

para. 2.42) and the FEHD took prosecution actions against the responsible persons

of 60 cases for not complying with nuisance notices on water seepage, of which

55 cases were convicted with each involving fines ranging from $800 to $5,500. In

the same year, the FEHD took prosecution actions against the responsible person of

one case for not complying with a nuisance order on water seepage, who was

convicted and was fined $1,400.

2.52 Notwithstanding that FEHD guidelines required JO staff of all districts to

maintain an NNM List, the guidelines did not specify information for inclusion in

the List. As a result, there were wide variations in the format and information

included in the NNM Lists maintained by JO staff of the 19 districts. In Audit’s

view, in order to effectively monitor the follow-up actions on nuisance notices

issued, the NNM Lists should include the following information of each case:

(a) date of serving a nuisance notice;

(b) date of expiry of a nuisance notice; and

(c) dates of conducting follow-up inspections to ascertain whether a nuisance

notice has been complied with (i.e. compliance inspections).

2.53 However, Audit examination of the NNM Lists of the 19 districts

revealed that JO staff of only 5 of the 19 districts had maintained NNM Lists

containing all the information stated in paragraph 2.52. Details are shown in

Table 5.


— 40 —

Table 5

Information included in NNM Lists of 19 FEHD districts

(2015)

District

Date ofservingnotice

Date ofexpiry of

noticeDate of conducting

compliance inspection

5 districts (Note 1) Yes Yes Yes

Eastern Yes No No

Islands Yes No No

Shamshuipo No No Yes

Tai Po No Yes No

10 districts (Note 2) No No No

Source: Audit analysis of FEHD records

Note 1: The 5 districts were Kwai Tsing, North, Sai Kung, Shatin and Tuen Mundistricts.

Note 2: The 10 districts were Central & Western, Kowloon City, Kwun Tong, Mongkok,Southern, Tsuen Wan, Wanchai, Wong Tai Sin, Yau Tsim and Yuen Long districts.

2.54 Moreover, according to FEHD guidelines, FEHD JO staff should refer

cases not complying with nuisance notices to FEHD Prosecution Section for taking

prosecution actions and applying for issuance of a nuisance order. However, Audit

examination of the NNM Lists of the 19 DOs revealed that none of the Lists

included information on:

(a) results of compliance inspections (see para. 2.52); and

(b) date of referring a case to the FEHD Prosecution Section for taking

enforcement actions.

2.55 In the absence of information on the dates of serving nuisance notices,

dates of expiry of the notices and dates of JO staff conducting compliance

inspections as shown in Table 5, and results of compliance inspections and dates of

referring cases to the FEHD Prosecution Section for actions of JO staff of all the


— 41 —

19 districts (see para. 2.54), the FEHD could not effectively monitor the follow-up

actions on nuisance notices issued with a view to ensuring that necessary

enforcement actions are taken in a timely manner. Likewise, the absence of the

above-mentioned information has impeded Audit examination of the completeness

and timeliness of the FEHD in discharging its duties in this area. In October 2016,

the FEHD informed Audit that the information stated in paragraphs 2.52 and 2.54

was kept in individual case files. In Audit’s view, the FEHD needs to issue clear

guidelines on information for inclusion in the NNM Lists, including information in

Table 5, and on results of compliance inspections and dates of referring cases to the

FEHD Prosecution Section for actions. Including a standard NNM List in the

guidelines will facilitate JO staff in maintaining essential information on

water-seepage cases.

2.56 Furthermore, Audit examination of the NNM Lists for 2015 compiled by

JO staff of the 19 districts revealed that a total of 3,263 nuisance notices had been

issued by them, which was 1,725 less than the aggregate total of

4,988 nuisance notices reported to the FEHD Headquarters for the year (see Table 4

in para. 2.42). In September 2016, the FEHD informed Audit that the discrepancy

might be due to:

(a) JO staff of the 19 districts had in fact issued 4,933 nuisance notices in

2015 instead of 3,263 notices because:

(i) more than one nuisance notice had been issued for the same

identified case because of multiple or co-ownership of the

premises concerned; and

(ii) JO staff of some districts had not provided updated NNM Lists to

the FEHD Headquarters; and

(b) the remaining 55 (4,988 less 4,933) notices were due to data corruption as

a result of a workstation breakdown in one of the 19 JO districts.

In Audit’s view, the FEHD needs to take necessary actions with a view to

preventing recurrence of the anomaly.


— 42 —

Data discrepancies on long-outstanding cases

2.57 Based on information maintained in the CMIS, monthly ageing analysis

reports on outstanding water-seepage cases were compiled for FEHD senior

management to monitor the progress of actions taken on outstanding cases.

However, Audit examination revealed that, while the FEHD’s ageing analysis

reports showed that as of March 2016, a total of 6,368 cases had exceeded the

90-working-day reference completion timeframe, Audit analysis of information

contained in the CMIS found a total of 8,145 such cases, representing a 28%

variance. In October 2016, the FEHD informed Audit that, it had conducted an

investigation on the issue. In Audit’s view, the FEHD needs to take necessary

measures to prevent recurrence of the anomaly.


2.58 Audit has recommended that, in monitoring follow-up actions on

nuisance notices issued, the Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene

should:

(a) conduct a review to ascertain whether FEHD JO staff have complied

with FEHD instruction issued in March 2008 on maintaining WCM

Databases and whether the Databases have been maintained in full

compliance with FEHD requirements, and take necessary actions on

proper maintenance of the Databases;

(b) issue clear guidelines on essential information for inclusion in

NNM Lists;

(c) take necessary actions with a view to preventing the recording of

incomplete information in the NNM lists; and

(d) take necessary measures to prevent variance between the number of

outstanding cases as shown in ageing analysis reports and that

maintained in the CMIS.


— 43 —



recommendations. She has said that:

(a) for paragraph 2.58(a), the FEHD has started to review the departmental

instruction issued in March 2008 on maintaining WCM Databases (see

para. 2.46), and whether the Databases have been maintained in full

compliance with the instruction, and will take necessary actions on proper

maintenance of the Databases. Measures will also be taken to ensure that

all related information in the system is updated in a timely manner. The

FEHD has also started to develop more effective and technically feasible

means to capture data which will be useful for monitoring the progress of

various actions taken on water-seepage cases;

(b) for paragraph 2.58(b) and (c), as a short-term measure, the FEHD has

issued clear guidelines to remind FEHD JO staff of the need to include in

NNM Lists essential information. In the long term, the FEHD will

explore means to enhance the existing CMIS or set up a new database

system to capture information relating to the issuance of nuisance notices;

and

(c) for paragraph 2.58(d), the FEHD will put in place measures as soon as

possible to prevent recurrence of the anomaly.

— 44 —

PART 3: MONITORING OF SERVICE CONTRACTORS

3.1 This PART examines the work of BD JO staff in monitoring service

contractors’ performance in conducting water-seepage investigations.

Background

3.2 In response to a public report on water seepage, the related FEHD

JO staff would pay visits to the affected premises to examine whether the water

seepage might infringe any of the PH&MS Ordinance, the Buildings Ordinance and

the Waterworks Ordinance, and if the moisture content of the seepage was 35% or

above (known as Stage I investigations). If a Stage I investigation found that the

seepage might infringe the PH&MS Ordinance and that the moisture content of the

seepage was 35% or above, the FEHD JO staff would carry out a coloured-water

test (see Note 7 to para. 1.5) and/or a reversible-pressure test (see para. 2.5(c)) to

trace the source of the seepage (known as Stage II investigations). If a Stage II

investigation failed to identify the source of the seepage, the case would be

forwarded to BD JO staff for carrying out further tests to detect the seepage source

(known as Stage III investigations). BD JO staff maintained BD JO case records (in

spreadsheet format) on cases handled by them in standalone computers.

3.3 To supplement staff resources, BD JO staff engaged and monitored

service contractors to assist in carrying out Stage III investigations. Moreover,

service contractors were required to submit bi-weekly progress reports to BD JO

staff to show the progress of actions taken on each assigned case, and attend

bi-weekly meetings with BD JO staff to discuss progress of the cases.

Service contracts for carrying out Stage III investigations

3.4 From April 2014 to April 2015, there were 9 service contracts (each for a

12-month period) at an estimated total cost of $20 million for carrying out Stage III

investigations for the 19 FEHD districts (Note 25). In tendering for each contract,

Note 25: From May 2015 to May 2016 and from May 2016 to May 2017, there wererespectively 9 and 10 service contracts (each for a 12-month period) for carryingout Stage III investigations for the 19 FEHD districts.


— 45 —

BD JO staff made an estimate of the number of cases for Stage III investigations

under the contract and tenderers were required to indicate a basic rate for a case and

a rate for each individual test. The rates indicated by the successful tenderer would

become the rates of the contract for payment purposes.

3.5 Upon receiving a case assigned by BD JO staff, a contractor would pay

visits to the premises concerned to carry out a moisture-content assessment and

subsequently compile and submit an investigation report to BD JO staff, and he

would be paid a basic rate for this service. Depending on the water-seepage

situation, one or more of the following tests might be carried out by the contractor:

(a) additional moisture-content assessment (see para. 2.7(a));

(b) coloured-water spraying test (see para. 2.7(b));

(c) coloured-water test (see Note 7 to para. 1.5);

(d) coloured-water ponding test (see Note 10 to para. 1.7); and

(e) reversible-pressure test (see para. 2.5(c)).

Inadequate monitoring and assessment of contractors’ effectiveness

3.6 The objective of engaging contractors to carry out Stage III investigations

is to identify the source of water seepage of each case assigned to them.

However, in response to Audit’s enquiries, the BD informed Audit that BD JO staff

did not compile the rate of each contractor who successfully identified the source of

water seepage (hereinafter referred to as contractor success rate — see Note 18 to

para. 2.10). Hence, BD JO staff did not make reference to contractor success rates

in monitoring and assessing the performance of contractors.

3.7 In August 2016, in response to Audit’s request, the BD compiled and

provided Audit with the contractor success rates as of April 2016 of the nine

contracts (involving 9,904 cases) for carrying out Stage III investigations covering

the period April 2014 to April 2015. Details are shown in Table 6.


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Table 6

Contractor success rates for period April 2014 to April 2015

(April 2016)

Completed cases

Contract(Note 1)

ContractorCases

assigned

(a)

(No.)

Seepagesource

identified

(b)

(No.)

Seepagesource notidentified

(c)

(No.)

Others(Note 2)

(d)

(No.)

Caseswith

action inprogress

(e)

(No.)

Success rate(Note 3)

(%)

1 E 1,147 766 201 176 4 67%

2 F 1,354 619 344 391 0 46%

3 G 1,138 471 410 205 52 43%

4 H 1,211 394 329 292 196 39%

5 F 657 245 135 277 0 37%

6 I 1,222 240 147 320 515 34%

7 H 1,033 241 199 314 279 32%

8 I 1,078 302 415 290 71 30%

9 J 1,064 174 348 228 314 23%

Total 9,904

(Note 4)

3,452 2,528 2,493 1,431 Overall: 41%

Source: Audit analysis of BD records

Note 1: Contracts 2 and 5, 4 and 7, and 6 and 8 were respectively awarded to Contractors F, H and I.

Note 2: Other cases included those where the water seepage had ceased or withdrawn by informants during theinvestigation.

Note 3: The success rates were computed using the formula adopted by the FEHD and the BD (see Note 18 topara. 2.10).

Note 4: The total number of assigned cases according to contractors’ bi-weekly progress reports was 9,704. Thevariance of 200 cases was due to Contractor G only recorded 938 instead of 1,138 assigned cases (i.e. ashortfall of 200 assigned cases) in his bi-weekly progress reports. In October 2016, the BD informed Auditthat Contractor G had deleted these 200 assigned cases from the progress reports as these cases had beencompleted with payment settled, and BD JO staff had reminded Contractor G to provide a full list of allassigned cases in the progress reports.

(b)(b)+(c)+(d) ×100%

8,473

(f)=


— 47 —

3.8 In October 2016, the BD informed Audit that the moisture-content levels

of cases being assigned to a contractor would affect his success rate, because the

contractor would have a higher chance of identifying the seepage source of a case

having a higher moisture-content level than a case having a lower moisture-content

level.

3.9 As shown in Table 6, contractor success rates ranged from 23% to 67%.

The higher success rates (e.g. 46% and 67%) of some contractors might be the

result of their adopting better practices or making more efforts than those achieving

lower success rates (e.g. 23% and 30%) in conducting Stage III investigations.

Therefore, the BD needs to periodically conduct reviews of contracts having:

(a) high success rates with a view to identifying good practices for sharing

with other contractors; and

(b) low success rates with a view to taking necessary actions for

improvement.

3.10 Audit also noted that the contracts did not provide incentives for

contractors to achieve higher success rates. Audit considers that, with a view to

improving the effectiveness of Stage III investigations conducted by contractors, the

BD needs to consider providing incentives in contracts such that contractors would

strive to achieve higher success rates in identifying seepage source.

Data discrepancies on completed cases

3.11 Audit conducted an examination of the bi-weekly progress reports

submitted by contractors under the 9 contracts covering the period April 2014 to

April 2015 (involving a total of 9,704 cases — see Note 4 to Table 6 in para. 3.7)

and another 9 contracts covering the period May 2015 to May 2016 (involving a

total of 9,844 cases) on the time of completion of Stage III investigations by

contractors. The audit findings are shown in Table 7.


— 48 —

Table 7

Data discrepancies on completed cases (Note)(April 2016)

Completed cases for 9 contracts coveringthe period April 2014 to April 2015

Completed cases for 9 contracts coveringthe period May 2015 to May 2016

Based on BDJO case records

(No.)

Based on contractors’bi-weekly

progress reports

(No.)

Based on BDJO case records

(No.)

Based on contractors’bi-weekly

progress reports

(No.)

8,473(see Table 6in para. 3.7)

7,416(88% of 8,473 cases)

4,466 3,712(83% of 4,466 cases)


Note: Based on the number of investigation reports being submitted by contractors andendorsed by BD JO staff as of April 2016.

3.12 In October 2016, the BD informed Audit that the discrepancies between

the number of completed cases being recorded in BD JO case records and that in

contractors’ bi-weekly progress reports were mainly due to deficiencies in data input

in the latter reports. Audit considers that the BD needs to take measures to improve

the accuracy of data presented in contractors’ bi-weekly progress reports.

Lack of effective actions taken against contractorsfor taking a long time to complete investigations

3.13 With a view to ensuring timely completion of Stage III investigations,

target timeframes for completing different tasks were specified in the contracts.

Details are shown in Table 8.


— 49 —

Table 8

Task timeframes specified in contracts

(April 2014 to April 2015)

Task

Maximum workingdays specified

in contract

(No.)

Equivalentcalendar days

(Note 1)

(No.)

(a) Conducting an inspection of theaffected premises and carrying outnecessary tests within 20 workingdays from assignment of a case

20 30

(b) Conducting an inspection of the testresults within one week afterconducting a test and a secondinspection not less than 3 weeks afterthe test if the first inspection could notidentify the source of seepage

Not applicable(Note 2)

21 or more

(c) Submitting an investigation report toBD JO staff within 10 working daysafter completion of actions in (b)

10 15

Total Not applicable 66 or more(or 9.4 weeks

or more)


Note 1: See Note 19 to paragraph 2.15.

Note 2: In contracts covering the period May 2016 to May 2017, it was specified in thecontracts that the second inspection shall be carried out not less than 15 workingdays but not later than 40 working days after the test.


— 50 —

3.14 According to contractors’ bi-weekly progress reports, as of April 2016,

contractors had submitted investigation reports on 7,416 cases (see Table 7 in

para. 3.11) that had been endorsed and 911 cases that had not been endorsed by BD

JO staff. Time taken by contractors from case assignments to report submissions

for the 8,327 (7,416 plus 911) cases as of April 2016 under contracts covering the

period April 2014 to April 2015 is as follows:

Days

(No.)

Cases

(No.) (Percentage)

66 days (see Table 8 in para. 3.13) or less 1,378 17%

67 to 100 days 1,728 21%

101 to 200 days 3,436 41%

201 to 300 days 1,080 13%

301 to 400 days 424 5%

401 to 500 days (or 1.1 to 1.4 years) 186 2%


Total 8,327 100%

3.15 Audit considers it unsatisfactory that some contractors had taken a long

time (the longest being 1.9 years as of April 2016) to complete the cases assigned to

them. The long time taken by some contractors to complete investigations for

identifying the water-seepage source would undermine the delivery of efficient and

effective public services to the public. In Audit’s view, the BD needs to strengthen

actions on monitoring contractors’ performance to ensure that investigations on

water-seepage cases are completed in a timely manner.

3.16 Notwithstanding that the contracts covering the period April 2014 to

April 2015 did not specify an overall timeframe from the case assignment to the

submission of an investigation report for a case assigned to a contractor, two

timeframes of 30 and 15 days were respectively specified in the contracts for

completing Tasks (a) and (c) in Table 8 in paragraph 3.13.

281 3%


— 51 —

3.17 According to contractors’ bi-weekly progress reports as of April 2016:

(a) contractors had completed Tasks (a) to (c) in Table 8 for 8,327 cases;

(b) contractors had completed Task (a) in Table 8 for 5,457 cases. This

number had been understated due to omissions by some contractors to

indicate the dates of completing Task (a) in the progress reports (see

Audit comments in paras. 3.30 and 3.31); and

(c) of the 8,327 cases in (a), only 5,462 cases had records of time taken from

completion of inspecting test results to submission of investigation reports

(Task (c) in Table 8).

3.18 The time taken by contractors in carrying out Task (a) (see Table 8 in

para. 3.13) for 5,457 cases against the target timeframe of 30 days is as follows:

Days

(No.)

Cases

(No.) (Percentage)


31 to 100 days 2,253 41%

101 to 200 days 671 12%

201 to 300 days 209 4%

301 to 400 days 119 2%


501 to 749 days (or 1.4 to 2.1 years(Note 26)) (see Case 3)

37 1%

Total 5,457 100%

Note 26: As of July 2016, the contractor of the case involving 2.1 years had not submittedan investigation report.

2%

61%

85

3,337


— 52 —

Case 3

Long time taken to conduct tests(May 2014 to April 2016)

1. In May 2014, the BD assigned a water-seepage case to Contractor H

(see Table 6 in para. 3.7).

2. In October 2015, Contactor H contacted the informant and

conducted an inspection of the affected premises.

3. In April 2016, Contractor H conducted tests at premises suspected to

be the origin of the water seepage. As of July 2016, there was no information

in the case file showing whether the tests could identify the source of water

seepage.

Audit comments

4. Contractor H had taken two years (from May 2014 to April 2016) to

conduct the tests after being assigned the case. Audit could not find any

document in the case file showing actions taken by the BD during the

two-year period.

5. In Audit’s view, the BD needs to strengthen actions on monitoring

contractors’ performance to ensure that investigations on water-seepage cases

are completed in a timely manner.


3.19 The time taken by contractors in carrying out Task (c) (see Table 8 in

para. 3.13) for 5,462 cases against the target timeframe of 15 days is as follows:

Days

(No.)

Cases

(No.) (Percentage)


16 to 100 days 3,648 67%

101 to 200 days 429 8%

201 to 604 days (or 0.6 to 1.7 years)

(see Cases 4 and 5)

89 1%

Total 5,462 100%


— 53 —

Case 4

Error in inputting date of completing investigation(June 2014 to January 2016)

1. In June 2014, the BD assigned a case to Contractor G (see Table 6 in

para. 3.7).

2. In July 2014, Contractor G conducted an inspection of the affected

premises and found that the moisture content of the water seepage exceeded

35%. However, Contractor G mistakenly stated in the bi-weekly progress

reports that the investigation had been completed in that month.

3. In October 2014 and February 2015, Contractor G attempted to

contact the informant but in vain.

4. In December 2015, Contractor G visited the affected premises and

found that the seepage had ceased.

5. In January 2016, Contractor G submitted an investigation report to BD

JO staff.

Audit comments

6. Contractor G made a mistake in stating in the progress reports that the

investigation had been completed in July 2014, resulting in an apparent long

time (18 months from July 2014 to January 2016) taken to submit the

investigation report from completion of the investigation. However, the BD did

not notice this mistake before Audit’s examination and did not take any

follow-up actions on the anomaly. In Audit’s view, the BD needs to strengthen

actions on monitoring contractors’ performance by vigilantly examining

progress reports submitted by them.

7. There was no record showing that Contractor G had taken any action

during the two-month period from August 2014 to September 2014 and during

the nine-month period from March 2015 to November 2015. In Audit’s view,

the BD needs to strengthen actions on monitoring contractors’ performance to

ensure that investigations on water-seepage cases are completed in a timely

manner.



— 54 —

Case 5

Long time taken to submit investigation report(May 2014 to January 2016)

1. In May 2014, the BD assigned a case to Contractor H (see Table 6 in

para. 3.7) which conducted an inspection of the affected premises (finding the

moisture content of the water seepage exceeding 35%) and conducted

coloured-water ponding tests at the suspected premises in the same month.

2. In June 2014, after conducting inspections of the test results,

Contractor H could not identify the source of water seepage.

3. In October 2015, the informant withdrew the case.

4. In January 2016, Contractor H submitted an investigation report to

BD JO staff.

Audit comments

5. There was no record showing that Contractor H had taken any action

during the 18-month period from July 2014 to December 2015. In Audit’s

view, the BD needs to strengthen actions on monitoring contractors’

performance to ensure that investigation reports on water-seepage cases are

submitted by service contractors in a timely manner.


3.20 According to BD guidelines, BD staff might take the following actions

against contractors having unsatisfactory performance:

(a) issuing a warning letter for unsatisfactory performance, such as a

prolonged slippage in submitting investigation reports;

(b) issuing a quarterly adverse performance report if a contractor did not

show improvement after receiving a warning letter; and


— 55 —

(c) if a contractor had been issued two or three consecutive adverse

performance reports under the same contract, suspending him from

bidding for work of the same category for at least 3 or 12 months

respectively.

3.21 Despite the fact that some contractors had taken a long time far exceeding

the timeframes specified in contracts (see paras. 3.18 and 3.19), the BD had not

issued any warning letter or adverse performance report to contractors engaged in

water-seepage investigations for the period January 2011 to April 2015. For

contracts covering the period May 2015 to May 2016, the BD had only issued two

warning letters and two quarterly adverse performance reports to the same

contractor for not carrying out investigations and not submitting investigation

reports within stipulated timeframes.

3.22 Audit considers it unsatisfactory that, before May 2015, the BD had not

issued warning letters nor adverse performance reports to contractors having

unsatisfactory performance which might lead to deterioration of the contractors’

performance. Therefore, the BD needs to strengthen actions on monitoring

contractor’s performance by issuing warning letters and adverse performance

reports to contractors having unsatisfactory performance.

Need to provide necessary assistance to contractorsto gain access to premises for carrying out investigations

3.23 According to guidelines issued for the JO operation, when encountering

access problems for carrying out investigations, FEHD and BD staff involved in the

JO operation may take the following actions:

(a) if an initial visit is unsuccessful, the staff should leave a Notice of

Appointment requesting the notified party to contact the staff to arrange

for a visit;

(b) if there is no response after seven working days, the staff should pay a

second visit to the premises and leave a Notice of Intended Entry giving a

date for the next visit, which should be within the next three working days;

(c) if the third visit is still unsuccessful, the staff should reconfirm the need

for entry and then leave a Notice of Intention to Apply for a Warrant for

Entry; and


— 56 —

(d) if no response is received after one week, the staff will reconfirm the need

for entry and report the case via his senior officers to the related Head of

the FEHD DO to consider the need to apply to a Magistrate for a Warrant

of Entry.

3.24 From 2006 to 2015, a total of 752 entry warrants had been granted by the

Court for the JO operation. Details are as follows:

Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

No. of

entry

warrants

granted

15 18 70 120 136 90 101 64 74 64

3.25 As shown in paragraph 3.14, some contractors had taken a long time to

complete investigations of water-seepage cases. According to file records, one of

the reasons for the long time taken was that some contractors had encountered

problems in gaining access to premises for carrying out investigations. In Audit’s

view, BD JO staff need to endeavour to provide necessary assistance to contractors

in accordance with JO operation guidelines in resolving problems in gaining access

to premises for carrying out investigations (see para. 3.23).

Incomplete records and files on contractors’ bi-weekly reports

and BD JO case records

3.26 Since May 2009, under a service contract for water-seepage investigations,

a contractor was required to submit to BD JO staff bi-weekly progress reports in

both hard and soft copies stating the dates of performing different tasks of each case

assigned to him (see Table 8 in para. 3.13). However, in June 2016, in response to

Audit’s request, the BD informed Audit that it could not provide Audit with both the

hard and soft copies of some bi-weekly progress reports for Audit examination

because it could not locate the whereabouts of the reports. Details are shown in

Table 9.

752


— 57 —

Table 9

Provision of contractors’ bi-weekly reports for Audit examination(April 2016)

Contracts with bi-weekly reports

Contract periodContractsawarded

(No.)

Provided forAudit examination

(No.)

Not provided forAudit examination

(No.)

January 2011 to March 2012 10 4 6

April 2012 to April 2013 13 7 6

April 2013 to April 2014 13 7 6

April 2014 to April 2015 9 9 0

May 2015 to May 2016 9 9 0

Total 54 36 18

Source: BD records

3.27 In August and October 2016, the BD informed Audit that:

(a) contractors’ bi-weekly progress reports served as a quick reference for

monitoring work progress and contractors’ performance during the

bi-weekly progress meetings. These reports were simply transient

summaries of the assignments but they were not accounting records. In

addition, upon receipt of the bi-weekly progress reports, BD JO staff

would input the relevant information of the reports into BD JO case

records; and

(b) the bi-weekly progress reports that were not provided for Audit

examination were related to completed contracts. Following completion

of all assignments under these contracts, the related progress reports were

no longer required and were not kept.

Regarding (a) above, it is not sure whether data of the bi-weekly progress reports

had been completely input into BD JO case records.


— 58 —

3.28 Moreover, in response to Audit’s request for BD JO case records (see

para. 1.12(c)) for the period 2011 to 2016 for examination, the BD could not

provide Audit with some records. Details are shown in Table 10.

Table 10

Provision of BD JO case records for Audit examination(April 2016)

BD JO case records

Contract periodContractsawarded

(No.)

Provided forAudit examination

(No.)

Not provided forAudit examination

(No.)

January 2011 to March 2012 10 5 5

April 2012 to April 2013 13 11 2

April 2013 to April 2014 13 12 1

April 2014 to April 2015 9 9 0

May 2015 to May 2016 9 9 0

Total 54 46 8

Source: BD records

3.29 The absence of some contractors’ bi-weekly reports and BD JO case

records covering the period January 2011 to April 2014 has impeded Audit

examination of completeness and timeliness of BD actions in monitoring the

progress of Stage III investigations. In Audit’s view, the BD needs to conduct a

review to ascertain whether BD JO staff had properly compiled BD JO case records

and why they had taken a long time to complete some cases.

3.30 The main purpose of bi-weekly progress reports was to help BD JO staff

keep track of the progress of contractors’ investigation of each case assigned to them

against timeframes specified in contracts. Audit examination of the contracts

awarded covering the period January 2011 to May 2017 revealed that, although the

work-progress information for inclusion in the bi-weekly progress reports had been

specified in the contracts, there were wide variations in the information included in

progress reports among contractors. For example, some contractors did not provide

in some progress reports information on dates of conducting tests (e.g. Contractor G)

and dates of submission of investigation reports (e.g. Contractor H). In the absence


— 59 —

of work-progress information in the progress reports, BD JO staff were unable to

effectively monitor the work of contractors and take necessary actions on

long-outstanding cases.

3.31 In Audit’s view, for the purpose of enhancing the monitoring of

contractors’ work, they should be required to highlight in progress reports

long-outstanding cases (against target timeframes of completing a case), reasons for

the delays and estimated time of completing the cases. The information will help

BD JO staff focus monitoring on long-outstanding cases and take necessary actions

in a timely manner.

3.32 As shown in Cases 1 and 2 in paragraph 2.20, two cases respectively

handled by Contractors A and C were subsequently re-assigned to Contractors B and

D respectively. However, the BD could not provide Audit with the number and

details of cases (out of the total 9,904 cases — see Note 4 to Table 6 in para. 3.7)

during the contract period April 2014 to April 2015 which had been re-assigned to

other contractors. In this connection, in August 2016, the BD informed Audit that,

upon expiry of a contract period, outstanding cases being assigned to a contractor

involving problems to gain access to premises for carrying out investigations would

be re-assigned to a newly appointed contractor under another contract period for

carrying out the investigation work. Audit considers that the BD needs to take

actions to find out the re-assigned cases.


3.33 Audit has recommended that, in monitoring the work of the

contractors in carrying out Stage III investigations, the Director of Buildings

should:

(a) strengthen actions on monitoring contractors’ performance:

(i) to improve accuracy of data presented in contractors’

bi-weekly progress reports;

(ii) to ensure that investigations on water-seepage cases are

completed in a timely manner; and


— 60 —

(iii) by issuing warning letters and adverse performance reports to

contractors having unsatisfactory performance;

(b) remind BD JO staff of the need to provide necessary assistance to

contractors in accordance with JO operation guidelines in resolving

problems in gaining access to premises for carrying out investigations;

(c) conduct a review to ascertain whether BD JO staff had properly

compiled BD JO case records and why they had taken a long time to

complete some cases; and

(d) require contractors to highlight in bi-weekly progress reports

long-outstanding cases (against target timeframes of completing a

case), reasons for the delays and estimated time of completing work of

the cases.


3.34 The Director of Buildings agrees with the audit recommendations. He has

said that:

(a) in collaboration with the FEHD, the BD is exploring means of enhancing

the CMIS to introduce features which would enable the JO operation to

assess the performance of the contractors. The BD has explored

appropriate incentives to encourage contractors to strive more efforts to

promptly complete different tasks. The BD is also studying the

applicability of adopting a new contract for engaging contractors which

would provide rewards and penalties for good and unsatisfactory

performance respectively; and

(b) the BD has developed functions in BD JO case records where cases with

time spent exceeding the milestones would be highlighted. The BD will

adopt the related functions for the contractors’ bi-weekly progress reports

which will help avoid discrepancies between the number of completed

cases recorded in the bi-weekly progress reports and that in BD JO case

records, and facilitate the monitoring of contractors’ work progress.

— 61 —

PART 4: MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM

AND PERFORMANCE REPORTING

4.1 This PART examines the management information system (see paras. 4.2

to 4.17) and performance reporting (see paras. 4.18 to 4.26) for handling

water-seepage cases under the JO operation.

Management information systems for water-seepage cases

4.2 Since November 2000, the FEHD has maintained a CMIS to record

information of all public enquiry and complaint cases received on its services and

operations, including water-seepage reports. Information for each case captured in

the CMIS included:

(a) date of receiving a public report;

(b) case reference number and the related address;

(c) date of completing investigations; and

(d) dates of the interim and final replies being sent to the informant.

4.3 In February 2012, the FEHD Management Services Unit completed a

study on the FEHD’s complaint and enquiry handling processes. Among other

issues, the study found that:

(a) ineffective paper-based processes. Considerable amount of time had been

spent in circulating paper files among officers concerned, resulting in

slow sharing and retrieval of information, and frequent loss and misfiling

of documents; and

(b) ineffective case monitoring. The CMIS could no longer fully meet the

user requirements, as it only served as a register providing basic case

information but not case investigation details.


— 62 —

The study recommended that a new computer system for complaint and enquiry

handling should be developed to replace the existing CMIS.

4.4 In July 2012, the FEHD engaged a contractor at a cost of $7.3 million to

develop a new CMIS (Note 27). From December 2014 to December 2015, the new

CMIS was rolled out by phases for implementation in the 19 FEHD districts. Under

the implementation arrangements, information of new complaint and enquiry cases

received would be recorded in the new CMIS. For information of existing cases, it

would not be migrated to the new CMIS and the old CMIS would continue to be

used for monitoring actions taken on existing cases.

4.5 In addition to recording case information (see para. 4.2), the new CMIS

provides the following new functions for all FEHD enquiry and complaint cases:

(a) storing scanned copies of case documents for easy reference and retrieval;

(b) generating internal memoranda for endorsement by senior officers and

replies for sending to complainants and informants;

(c) generating exception reports highlighting cases not complying with

timeframes for taking actions; and

(d) generating ageing analysis reports on long-outstanding cases for

management monitoring actions.

4.6 For a water-seepage case, the new CMIS (Note 28 ) also provides

functions for recording the date of:

Note 27: In the 2012 audit review of the FEHD’s management of public enquiries andcomplaints (see para. 1.19), Audit recommended and the Director of Food andEnvironmental Hygiene agreed that the progress of the new CMIS project shouldcontinue to be closely monitored, and effective interim measures should beexplored to alleviate the inadequacies of the existing CMIS.

Note 28: According to the BD, since 2012, for capturing useful and sufficient statistics forassessing performance of the JO operation, it has been working closely with theFEHD in developing the new CMIS incorporating functions covering casemanagement, reminders, exception reports and statistical reporting for Stage IIIinvestigations.


— 63 —

(a) conducting a coloured-water test;

(b) inspection of test results; and

(c) issuance of a nuisance notice and its expiry date.

FEHD JO staff not fully adopting new CMIS for water-seepage cases

4.7 By mid-July 2015, JO staff of 10 of the 19 districts had been requested to

input information of water-seepage cases into the new CMIS. According to the

FEHD, views and comments of users of the new CMIS indicated that:

(a) due to the complex nature of water-seepage cases which usually involved

a large number of reference documents such as layout plans and

photographs, fully adopting all the functions of the new CMIS for

water-seepage cases had adversely affected the efficiency and

effectiveness of the handling of the cases;

(b) it would be more convenient, efficient and effective for an officer to open

a paper file and forward the file to the subject officers to take follow-up

actions, and internal communication between officers on water-seepage

cases through paper files was considered more convenient and effective

(especially for complicated cases in which written communication

between officers was frequent);

(c) scanning and uploading of documents required considerable time and

efforts. As the new CMIS did not provide for efficient cross-reference of

scanned documents, it was difficult for FEHD staff to make cross

reference to the images stored in the new CMIS when checking case

reports. Also, retrieval of the scanned documents from the CMIS was

time-consuming and cumbersome; and

(d) when preparing for prosecution actions for a case, FEHD staff sometimes

found it difficult to reconstruct a paper file from the scanned documents

stored in the system, and some original documents might need to be

located for the purpose.


— 64 —

4.8 According to the FEHD, in mid-July 2015, after extensively consulting

FEHD JO frontline staff and thoroughly reviewing the system functions, the work

processes and nature of the cases and operational needs, the FEHD informed its JO

staff that, in order to help resolve the problems encountered by them in using the

new CMIS in handling water-seepage cases, the work process should be streamlined

and that some data were not required to be input into the new CMIS for the time

being. The FEHD considered it appropriate to adopt a pragmatic approach to

implement the above-mentioned measures to help FEHD JO staff improve their

efficiency and effectiveness in handling water-seepage cases while at the same time

the new CMIS could generate necessary management information.

4.9 As of July 2016, the FEHD JO staff of all 19 districts only input basic

information of new water-seepage cases (see para. 4.2) into the new CMIS but not

the information as stated in paragraphs 4.5(a) and 4.6. Audit considers it

unsatisfactory that, although the new functions provided in the new CMIS would

help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the JO operation in monitoring

actions taken on water-seepage cases, the new functions had not been fully

implemented for the JO operation seven months after implementation of the new

system in December 2015, causing inefficiency for the management to monitor

performance and progress of the cases. In Audit’s view, the FEHD needs to take

measures to ensure that all functions of the new CMIS on water-seepage cases are

fully implemented for the JO operation of all 19 districts in a timely manner. The

FEHD also needs to consult JO staff on their difficulties encountered in

implementing the new system and provide necessary assistance to them to resolve

the problems.

Need to consider adopting a comprehensive database system

4.10 Audit noted that some statistics of the JO operation could not be

reconciled. Examples included:

(a) the number of nuisance notices issued in 2015 as revealed in the

NNM Lists compiled by JO staff of the 19 districts was different from

that reported to the FEHD Headquarters (see para. 2.56);

(b) the number of outstanding cases as of March 2016 as recorded in the

ageing analysis reports was different from that reflected in the CMIS (see

para. 2.57); and


— 65 —

(c) the number of cases with tests having been completed as recorded in

contractors’ bi-weekly progress reports had been understated (see

para. 3.11).

Besides, some time information could not be provided for Audit examination (for

example, the processing time of screen-out cases — see para. 2.13). According to

the FEHD, the time information was recorded in the paper case files.

4.11 Furthermore, some information had been erroneously recorded in related

reports and systems. For example, 115 cases where actions had been completed

before March 2016 were erroneously indicated as outstanding cases in the CMIS

(see para. 2.24(a)).

4.12 Audit noted that the FEHD and the BD were maintaining separate

computer systems for monitoring water-seepage cases. In this connection, FEHD

JO staff were using the CMIS and standalone computers of FEHD to record case

information whereas BD JO staff were using standalone computers of BD to record

related information. In order to improve the data and record keeping and updating,

the FEHD and the BD need to consider implementing a comprehensive database

system, under which all related data and scanned copies of documents are input into

or shared among the systems, and investigators can make use of handheld devices to

access case details and input results of investigations into the system through the

handheld devices immediately after each inspection. The dates and details of all

actions taken on each case should be recorded in the system. This system with

handheld devices will facilitate timely input of details of actions taken and highlight

cases requiring follow-up actions.


4.13 Audit has recommended that the Director of Food and Environmental

Hygiene should:

(a) take measures to ensure that all functions of the new CMIS on

water-seepage cases are fully implemented for the JO operation in a

timely manner; and


— 66 —

(b) consult JO staff on their difficulties encountered in implementing the

new CMIS and provide necessary assistance to them to resolve the

problems.

4.14 Audit has also recommended that the Director of Food and

Environmental Hygiene and the Director of Buildings should jointly consider

implementing a comprehensive database system for water-seepage cases under

which handheld devices are used for recording and updating investigation

results.



recommendations in paragraph 4.13. She has said that:

(a) the FEHD has implemented applicable functions in the CMIS for

water-seepage cases, having regard to the nature of such cases,

operational needs and users’ views after extensive staff consultation. The

FEHD has started taking actions to develop more effective and technically

feasible means to capture data which are useful for monitoring actions

taken on water-seepage cases; and

(b) the FEHD will continue to explore enhancements to the CMIS, taking a

pragmatic approach and having regard to the users’ views and other

relevant factors.

4.16 The Director of Buildings has said that, regarding the recommendation in

paragraph 4.13(a), the BD will explore with the FEHD means of enhancing the

CMIS to provide functions related to Stage III investigations covering case

management, generation of reminders and exception reports, and statistical

reporting.


Buildings agree with the audit recommendation in paragraph 4.14. The Director of

Food and Environmental Hygiene has said that, to improve the present filing and

information system, the FEHD would make enhancements to the CMIS in

collaboration with the BD.


— 67 —

Performance reporting

4.18 In response to enquiries from Members of LegCo, the Government

provided LegCo from time to time with information on the number of water-seepage

cases received and number of cases with actions completed (Note 29).

4.19 Since January 2014, the FEHD has set the following two performance

pledges, with results published on its website:

(a) within six working days upon receipt of a water-seepage report,

contacting the informant to arrange for an investigation at the premises

concerned; and

(b) within seven working days upon verification of the investigation results on

the source of the seepage nuisance, issuing a nuisance notice.

According to the FEHD, in 2014 and 2015, 99% of water-seepage cases met the

two performance pledges.

Data discrepancies on JO monthly returns

4.20 Based on FEHD JO monthly returns and BD JO case records, from

January 2007 to March 2016, the JO operation had received a total of 231,968

water-seepage reports, and during the period actions on a total of 196,926 cases had

been completed (see para. 1.17). Given that there were 6,228 cases outstanding as

of December 2006, there should be 41,270 (6,228 plus 231,968 less 196,926)

outstanding cases as of March 2016. However, based on information captured in

the CMIS, Audit noted that the system only recorded 15,564 outstanding cases as of

March 2016. In August and October 2016, the FEHD informed Audit that:

Note 29: These cases comprised screen-out cases, cases with and without water-seepagesource identified after completing investigations, and cases with seepage ceasedor reports withdrawn by informants during investigations.


— 68 —

(a) the discrepancy (i.e. 25,706 (41,270 less 15,564)) in the number of

outstanding cases was noted and discussed at a directorate meeting

between the FEHD and the BD held in July 2014. Since August 2014,

the FEHD had started to share the relevant data in the CMIS with the BD.

In addition, from 2015, the FEHD Headquarters would collate monthly

statistics from FEHD JO staff of the 19 districts and provide the collated

data to BD JO staff for compilation of the JO operation’s monthly

statistical returns; and

(b) the FEHD had completed an investigation on the discrepancy stated in (a)

above. The discrepancy might be due to unclear instructions being given

to and different interpretations of FEHD JO staff in compiling the FEHD

JO monthly returns.

In Audit’s view, the FEHD needs to take measures to prevent the inclusion of

inaccurate data in the CMIS and FEHD JO monthly returns.

Need to consider setting additional performance targets

4.21 While the FEHD and the BD have jointly set timeframes of 38 working

days for completing Stages I and II investigations and 52 working days for

completing Stage III investigations for a water-seepage case (see para. 2.15), they

have not published these timeframes and results of achievement within these

timeframes. In August and October 2016, the BD and the FEHD informed Audit

that:

BD and FEHD

(a) as the time taken to complete a case depended on various external factors

which were beyond the control of the JO operation, it was impractical to

set a performance target on the overall timeframe for completing a case;

BD

(b) as the success rate of identifying the seepage source depended on case

circumstances that were beyond the control of the JO operation, it was not

appropriate to use the success rate as a performance target; and


— 69 —

FEHD

(c) while JO operation would strive to meet the existing reference completion

timeframe of 90 working days as far as possible, the timeframe is for

simple and straightforward water-seepage cases.

4.22 In Audit’s view, informants of water-seepage cases and the public are

mostly concerned about the time taken by the JO operation in identifying the

seepage source of the cases, and the extent to which the JO operation could

successfully identify the seepage source. The absence of performance targets in

these two areas is not in line with public expectations. Therefore, the FEHD and

the BD need to consider setting performance targets, and publishing results of

achievement of the targets, on the overall timeframe for completing a water-seepage

case and the success rate of identifying the water-seepage source. With a view to

enhancing public accountability, the FEHD and the BD also need to consider

regularly publishing performance indicators for the JO operation, such as the

numbers of completed cases, cases involving identification of seepage sources, cases

where the seepage ceased during investigations and cases having nuisance notices

issued.



Hygiene should take measures to prevent the inclusion of inaccurate data in the

CMIS and FEHD JO monthly returns.


Hygiene and the Director of Buildings should jointly consider regularly

publishing performance indicators for the JO operation.


— 70 —



recommendation in paragraph 4.23. She has said that clear instructions have been

issued to FEHD JO staff to remind them of the need to input correct data into the

monthly returns. Furthermore, the Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene

and the Director of Buildings have said that they will discuss on ways to improve

the information systems to prevent data discrepancies in the systems.


Buildings agree with the audit recommendation in paragraph 4.24. They have said

that:

(a) the performance of the JO operation should be transparent to the public so

as to enhance public accountability; and

(b) the FEHD and the BD will explore if performance targets can be

formulated for straightforward cases.

Appendix A(para. 1.9 refers)

— 71 —

Joint-office operation

Joint-office operation structure (extract)(31 March 2016)

Director of BuildingsDirector of Food and

Environmental Hygiene

Deputy Director ofBuildings

EnvironmentalHygiene Branch

(Deputy Director)

Administration andDevelopment Branch

(Deputy Director)

Existing BuildingsDivision 2

(Assistant Director)

OperationsDivision 1




Grade Managementand Development

Division(Assistant Director)



ManagementServices Unit

BD JO staffstationed at

4 FEHD districts(Eastern,

Kowloon City,Kwun Tong

and Mongkok)and 1 BD officein Kwai Fong

FEHD JO staffstationed at5 FEHD

districts (Central& Western,

Eastern, Islands,Southern and

Wanchai)

FEHD JO staffstationed at

6 FEHD districts(Kowloon City,

Kwun Tong,Mongkok,

Shamshuipo,Wong Tai Sinand Yau Tsim)

FEHD JO staffstationed at

8 FEHD districts(Kwai Tsing,

North, Sai Kung,Shatin, Tai Po,

Tsuen Wan,Tuen Mun

and Yuen Long)

Prosecution Section


— 72 —

Appendix B(para. 1.10 refers)

Staff strength of the joint-office operation(March 2016)

District Number of staff

FEHD BD Total

1. Central & Western 10 0 10

2. Eastern (Note 1) 27 23 50

3. Islands 1 0 1

4. Kowloon City (Note 1) 22 25 47

5. Kwai Tsing 13 0 13

6. Kwun Tong (Note 1) 16 5 21

7. Mongkok (Note 1) 11 5 16

8. North 4 0 4

9. Sai Kung 7 0 7

10. Shamshuipo 14 0 14

11. Shatin 16 0 16

12. Southern 8 0 8

13. Tai Po 6 0 6

14. Tsuen Wan 11 0 11

15. Tuen Mun 16 0 16

16. Wanchai 7 0 7

17. Wong Tai Sin 8 0 8

18. Yau Tsim 9 0 9

19. Yuen Long 5 0 5

Total 211 58(Note 2)

269


Note 1: For these 4 districts, FEHD JO staff and BD JO staff worked in the same office.BD JO staff stationing at the Eastern and Kowloon City districts (designated asthe two regional offices for the JO operation) also oversaw Stage IIIinvestigations related to the other 17 districts.

Note 2: In addition to 58 BD JO staff stationing at 4 FEHD districts, 5 BD JO staff alsostationed at a BD office located in Kwai Fong. Therefore, a total of63 (58 plus 5) BD staff and 274 (269 plus 5) FEHD and BD staff were involvedin the JO operation.

— 73 —

Appendix C(paras. 2.15 and2.46 refer)

Completion timeframes for Stages I, II and III investigations

Item ParticularsCompletionworking day

Stages I and II actions

1. Receiving a report on water seepage

38 days

2. Inputting case details into the CMIS

3. Issuing an acknowledgement reply

4. Contacting the informant and making an appointment to

conduct Stage I investigations at the affected premises

(Note 1)

5. Conducting site inspection (including measurement of the

moisture content) and recording the findings with photographs

taken of the affected area (Note 2)

6. For a case warranting further investigation (i.e. Stage II

investigations), gaining entry into the suspected premises and

carrying out tests (e.g. coloured-water test)

7. For a case with seepage source identified, sending a final

reply to the informant and issuing a nuisance notice to the

responsible party (Note 3), or for a case without seepage

source identified, sending an interim reply to the informant

and conducting Stage III investigations

Subtotal (a) 38 days

Stage III actions

8. BD JO staff screening the case file, and issuing a works order

and assigning the case to a service contractor6 days

9. Contractor arranging site visit, performing further

investigation, and compiling an investigation report for BD JO

staff endorsement

30 days

10. Vetting and endorsing investigation reports 10 days

Appendix C(Cont’d)(paras. 2.15 and2.46 refer)

— 74 —

Item ParticularsCompletionworking day

11. BD JO staff sending a reply to notify the informant of results

of Stage III investigations. For a case with seepage source

identified, FEHD JO staff issuing a nuisance notice to the

liable party (Note 3).

6 days

Subtotal (b) 52 days

Total (c) = (a) + (b) 90 days


Note 1: The FEHD has set a performance pledge to contact the informant within 6 working daysupon receipt of a case and to arrange for investigation at the affected premises.

Note 2: For a case not warranting further investigation (i.e. screen-out case), the FEHD has seta timeframe on sending a final reply to the informant within 18 working days fromreceipt of the case.

Note 3: The FEHD has set a performance pledge to issue a nuisance notice within 7 workingdays upon confirming the investigation results of the source of the seepage nuisance.

— 75 —

Appendix D

Acronyms and abbreviations

Audit Audit Commission

BD Buildings Department

CMIS Complaints Management Information System

DO District office

FEHD Food and Environmental Hygiene Department

JO Joint-office

LegCo Legislative Council

NCSC Non-civil service contract

NNM List Nuisance Notices Monitoring List

PH&MS Ordinance Public Health and Municipal Services Ordinance

UBW Unauthorised building works

WCM Database Water-seepage Case Monitoring Database

WSD Water Supplies Department

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