Chapter-I
Introduction: The Nature of Authoritarian Regimes, Why and How the 'New Order' Came
into being in Indonesia, pp.l-33.
Chapter-1
Democracy can only work if it does not work, survive and endure only if its principles are violated. 1
-Nicolo Machiavelli
Democracy is a recent and rare phenomenon. Not a single democratic
government can be found in the nineteenth century, and it was not until the first
decade of the twentieth century that in two countries, Australia and New Zealand,
fully democratic regimes with firm popular control of governmental institutions
and universal adult suffrage were established? Keeping the recent origin of
modern democracy and the democratic regimes in mind, its growth in the 20th
century has been most spectacular. However, it should never go unmentioned that
there are a large number of governments, whose belief in democracy and
democratic principles has been minimal.
A democratic regime can be distinguished from a non-democratic one by
the broad application of the following criteria. It is all about political rights, such
as the right to participate in free and competitive elections, and civil liberties, such
as freedom of speech and association. A country to be broadly democratic must be
reasonably responsive to the citizens' wishes over a long period of time. However, '
such assertion usually does not go unchallenged. There are regimes that do not
comply with the broad criteria, and yet call themselves democracies. The often-
quoted argument refers to the non-western origin of democracy and asserts that
the principles emanating out of those western democracies can not be applied to
judge any regime's extent of democratization. This seems to be a fair argument.
Democracy, like other political concepts, is open to geographical influence.
1 Quoted in Combs, James E.and Nimmo, Dan, The Comedy of Democracy (London, 1996), p.l9. ·
2
However, the fact remains, a regime has to respond to some broad principles to be
accepted as a democracy. There has to be some unity over such principles.
The evolution of democracy in various nations followed diverse paths. In
some, it came automatically as an inheritance from the colonial government and in
some it evolved as a result of a movement from the below or as a result of
pressure from outside. "Where there is resistance to democratization- as for
instance, in Cuba, Myanmar (Burma), China and in many parts of the sub-Saharan
Africa- considerable direct or indirect international pressure is allegedly being
brought to bear on regimes to change their ways."3 This has been the way of
thinking of most western governments, international organisations, and
developmental agencies. They all believe that democracy is a good thing. They
seem to endorse Upset's view that, 'democracy is not only or ewn primarily a .
means through which different groups can attain their ends or seek the good
society; it is the good society in operation.' Such thinking has been emphasized by
writers iike Francis Fukuyama who would endorse, 'the universalisation of
western I i beral democracy is the final form of human development.'
Democracy is often associated with the process of modernization.
Theorists of modernization school of the 1960s defined modernization as "the
process of change towards those types of social, economic and political systems
that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth ·
century to the nineteenth century and have then spread to the other European
countries and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the South American,
2 Goran Therborn, "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy", New Left Review (London), no.l03, May-June 1977,pp.ll-17. 3 Adrian Leftwich, "On the Primacy of Politics in Development", in Adrian Leftwich,ed., Democracy and Development, Theory and Practice (Cambridge, 1996), p.3.
3
Asian and African continents."4 Political modernists like Eisenstadt argued that
politically modern societies are "in some sense''5 democratic societies, in which
the ideal of political equality had been established. This had generally been a
result of structural change in both economic and social systems, as a result of
which the power, legitimacy and control of traditional rulers have been eroded by
the emergence and spread of wider or popular power and the requirements of
some degree of institutional accountability.
Given the fact that all forms of government aim at one major goal of
overall development, the interrelationship between development and democracy
can hardly be ignored. In the twentieth century, these two are highlighted together
as universal goals for national communities. Democracy is considered to be a
means, while development signifies an end. However, along with it present is the
concept of dissent, that is, to voice one's difference of opinion regarding the nature
or governance and mode of development. Values are shared, compromised and
bargained and a consensus is arrived at. "Shared values are a prerequisite to ·
democracy."6 A democracy, as a matter of fact, allows voicing of opinion, which
is in contrast to the way the regime runs its government. The fact remains that no
practical system of government could ever be entirely democratic. Every system
represents a definite pragmatism, that is, an Aristotelian mixture of democracy
(rule of the people) and Oligarchy (rule of the few). More of democracy and less
of oligarchy makes the system a democratic one and its opposite, that is, more of
oligarchy and less of democracy, makes it an authoritarian one.
4 S.N Eisenstadt, Modernisation: Protest and Change (New York, 1966), p.l. 5 ibid.,p.4. c. Syed Farid Alatas, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Indonesia and Malaysia: The Rise of the Post- Colonial State (London, 1997), p.20.
4
A democracy is always based on the concept of tolerance of 'dissent'.
Dissent can take the form of speeches, movements, publications, and strikes. It has .
also the potential of acquiring violent nature. It all, in finality, depends upon the
degree of disagreement and discontentment. A democracy allows this and hence,
there is little need of conceptualizing the concept of 'dissent' in a democratic
regime. An authoritarian regime, in contrast, poses a different problem.
The twentieth century is described as the age of authoritarianism. The
conventional definitions of autocracy, tyranny, and authoritarianism are quite
similar. However, autocracy and tyranny describe the nature of the ruler, while
authoritarianism refers to the nature of the regime and the structure of its .
management. An authoritarian regime may be a collective dictatorship, an
oligarchy,' or a military government. The term connotes collective rule, though
supreme power may be vested in a single person. "There is a clear distinction
between modern and early notions of authoritarianism. The early version was rule
by the few in the name of the few; modern authoritarianism is rule by the few in
the name of the many."7 Modern authoritarianism is further distinguished by the
scope and type of political support, control, mobilization and ideology. "Modern
authoritarianism depends on political elite, on popular support, and on political ·
mobilization, however limited, exclusionary, and restrictive, but above all on
specialized political structures and institutions."8
Thus, it can be safely said that the legal mechanisms for expressions of
dissent are absent in an authoritarian regime. A voice, different from what the
government th.inks right, is highly discouraged. And this discouragement can
7 Amos Perlmutter. Modern Authoritarianism: A comparative Institutional Analyses (London, 19SI).p.2. K i/Jid.
5
range from issuing of notification, banning such activities to the application of
coercive measures to throttle the voice of dissent. But all said. and done, it is
highly sceptical to say that dissent dies as a result. Like an amoeba that refuses to
die after multiple incisions, dissent remains, takes root and grows through
unofficial subtle means. Thus, dissent articulation in an authoritarian regime has
its uniqueness due to the varied forms it is forced to acquire.
Birth of Modern Indonesia:
The birth of the modem Indonesian nation took place as a result of a
revolution. Indonesia represents a classic case of colonial domination and its
overthrow through a violent revolution. Explaining the relationship between social
revolution and the state, Theda Skocpol writes, "The state properly conceived is
no mere arena in which socioeconomic struggles are fought <. ut. It is, rather, a set
of administrative, policing, and military organisation headed, and more or less .
well coordinated by an executive authority."9 A brief glance at the historical
setting and the subsequent happenings that necessitated freedom for the nation
will reveal that something very similar happened in case oflndonesia.
The Dutch arrived more than three hundred years before the independence
in 1945, seeking spices and wealth for an expanding empire. "In 1605, the Dutch
East Indies Company (VOC) uprooted the Portuguese from their stronghold in the
Spice Islands, now called the Moluccas, in Eastern Indonesia, and gradually
expanded its hold over the archipelago." 10 Their rule of three centuries had far .
reaching implications for the Indonesian communities dominated by
autochthonous groups in which the hereditary families wielded power and
9 Theda Skocpol, State and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analyses of France, Russia and China (Cambridge, 1979), p.29. w Adam Schwarz, Indonesia: A Nation in Waiting (Boulder, 1994), p.3.
6
authority. The Dutch used the indigenous aristocracy to run the administration and
to collect raw materials and collect revenues for them. The absolutist elements in
the community were strengthened at the expense of democratic values and
traditions.
There were attempts by the colonial powers to actively prevent the
creation of nationalism through suppression of nationalist organisations. However,
the first Indonesian organisation was established in 1908.
"The Budi Utomo (Pure Endeavour). movement was the first organized expression of culturally conscious Indonesians seeking to regain a better position in society. Founded in 1908 it was based on the assumptions that only those who could transform their ways of life to suit the changed circumstances were likely to gain a..'ld preserve an honourable status on the Indonesian community. Its aim was to have higher posts thrown open to Indonesians." 11
With the first stirrings of nationalist sentiment in the island of Java,
reformist Islamic groups such as Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) and the
Muhammadiyah (Followers of Muhammad) were established. These were
attempts at creating mass based movements. This was accompanied by the
establishment of political parties such as the Indische Partij (Indies Party), ·
Indische ,'.'ociai-Democratische Vereniging (ISDV) or the Indies Social
Democratic Organisation which later became PKI (Indonesian Communist Party).
It can be mentioned here that PKI played a crucial role in the radicalization of
Sarekatlslam.
The most powerful nationalist organisation to emerge after Sarekat Islam
and the PKI was the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia-
PNI). In 1927, n group of Dutch educated nationalists led by Sukarno founded the
PNL which successfully promoted the adoption of the trading language Malay as ·
11 Satyavati .lhaveri, The Presidency in Indonesia, Dilemmas of Democracy (Bombay, 1975), p.19.
7
the national language, Bahasa Indonesia. The party also conceived the national
flag and anthem that survive till today. The colonial onslaught on this party saw
the birth of three new organisations, Partai Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian .
People's Party), Partai Indonesia (Partindo), and Golongan Merdeka
(Independence Group). Later Partindo was to dissolve to form a new party named
Gerindo (Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia- Indonesian People's Movement). In 1939
the major Indonesian nationalist organisations were brought together to form the
Federation of Indonesian Political Parties (Gabungan Politiek Indonesia- Gapi). 12
Thus, Indonesian nationalist struggle thrived under the banner of various
organisations. The Dutch tried to nip the bud of national awakening. However, it
tasted limited success. Indonesia found an active and pragmatic leader in young ·
Sukarno. The latter realised the importance of reconciling the three emerging
forces in Indonesia, namely Muslims, Communists and Nationalists. Each had
tried within its limited reach to challenge the authority of the Dutch and had
failed. "The Muslims followed a strategy of economic assault on the colonial
system, the Communists staged a premature revolution, and Sukamo's nationalists
had engaged in agitational politics."13 Recognizing and reconciling these three
important forces made the colonial authorities realise that time has come to start
giving Indonesians their due. Volksraad, a largely advisory, at best a semi- ·
legislative assembly was expanded to include those Indonesians who were willing
to cooperate with the authorities in return for modest political concessions.
The Dutch retreat and the Japanese invasion of the country gave the
nationalist struggle a new twist. The Japanese occupation turned out to be an
12 Syed Farid Alatas, n.6, pp.97-8. 11 U If Sundhaussen, "Indonesia: Past and Present Encounters with Democracy" in Lary Diamond, Juan J. Linz. Seymour Martin Lipset,eds. Democracy in Asia (New Delhi, 1989), p.426.
8
enormous boost for the cause of Indonesian independence. It demystified the
invincibility of the whites. The trained Dutch administrators were_largely replaced
by Indonesians officials, which served as their training period in sharpening their
skills and confidence. The exiled political leaders were released and allowed to
mobilise the masses for nationalist goals as long as they supported the Japanese
war effort. Indonesian youths were given paramilitary training and recruited into ·
either Japanese officered auxiliary units or an Indonesian home army, the PETA.
The Indonesian honeymoon with the Japanese. was brief and it was cut short by
the imperialist arrogance of the latter. Thousands of young Indonesians were
forcibly engaged by the Japanese for their military duty elsewhere in Southeast
Asia, many never to return. The wages of Indonesians who stayed back were
taxed to support the Japane~ ~ war effort. As a result of the large,..scale exploitation
export industries collapsed, inflation skyrocketed, and rationing led to black
markets and widespread corruption. After initially taking a benevolent view of ·
Indonesia's embryonic independence movement, the Japanese soon banned the
flying of the Indonesian flag and the playing of the national anthem. As one
Indonesian officer later commented, "Most Indonesians wished the Japanese had
never come in the first place. Theirs was indeed the most terrible rule twentieth
century Indonesians were made to suffer."14
This is exactly the backdrop, which needs to be kept in mind when the
analysis of Indonesian experience with self-governance was made. Indonesians
did not achieve independence until the Japanese surrendered on 14 August 1945
following the dropping of nuclear bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The fire of nationalism was high in the air when on 17 August 1945 Sukamo and
H Adam Schwarz, n.l 0, pp.4-5.
9
Hatta proclaimed independence. A constitution was promulgated and a cabinet .
formed. Within the promulgated presidential system of government, Sukarno
without much controversy assumed presidency, with Hatta as his vice-president.
However, what followed was not a smooth transition to democracy.
Notwithstanding the promulgation of the 1945 constitution, the Dutch
weres thinking in terms of occupying the political vacuum by reestablishing their
colonial regime.
"Eliminating the republic became their supreme endeavour. So long as the republic could not be smashed irreclaimably the Dutch began to circulate hideous lies about it: (i) there was no nationalism in the Indies which would always welcome back the sagacious colonial rulers, asserted many Hollanders, who were unrepentantly colonial minded; (ii) they dubbed the republican leaders as Japanese hirelings hindering a graceful resuscitation of Dutch power;(iii) tlie republican leaders, immersed in Japanese propaganda, while upholding totalitarianism; (iv)even if recognized the Republic was incagable of discharging the onerous responsibilities of administration." 5
·
Though all these claims were guided by a sense of sheer self-interest and in
the perceived superiority of the white skin, the last of the claims proved to be
prophetic. The following years revealed the incapability of the Indonesian
political leaders to provide a decent governance to the infant nation.
The Dutch reconquest was a lost cause. The former colonial power came
under increasing international pressure to relinquish its claims. The Hague
Agreement of 2nd November 1949 deprived the Dutch of any claim on Indonesia
and in December 1949 they gave up their control except on the western half of
the island ofNew Guinea. A Federal Constitution was drawn up for the Republic
of the United States of Indonesia in 1949, following negotiations with the Dutch
over a cease-fire.
-----·-· --- ---15 J.K. Ray, Trans(cr ofPower in Indonesia, 1942-1949 (Bombay, 1967), pp.61-2.
10
Indonesia's Experiment with Democracy:
This began the era of Indonesia's experiment with democracy. This
experiment of a farcical nature went on till 1957 when Indonesian politics took
another tum around. Before analysing the failure, the cause as to why Indonesia .
chose a democratic form of govemment can be dealt with. There were number of
reasons for this.
(i) Causes for Trading on Democratic Path:
All the newly independent nations of that time were great admirers of
democracy. Emerging from the long years of oppression, democratic principles
were promising them a breath of fresh air. Fighting the colonial masters over the
concept of liberty, equality and fraternity they found their commonality with the
idea of parliamentary democracy. And dem0cracy was the only form of·
government, by which the young could prove that they are also ·capable of
governing themselves as contrary to the belief created by their colonial masters.
Apart from these generalised explanations Indonesia had more specific and
contextual reasons to offer.
"Indonesia's decision to adopt democracy was influenced by the
attachment of a few individual leaders like Hatta and Sjahrir to the value of
constitutional democracy. These were the people who were at the helm of affairs
in the immediate post-independence period. Naturally their choice fell on the ·
democratic form of government for only in a democracy could they utilise their
skill and maintain their influence."16 "Given that the emerging elites in a colony
had heen nurtured in the democratic tradition of govemment and had come to
believe in democracy as an ideal to be cherished and achieved, these elites would
16 Baladas Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics 1955-59: The Emergence of 'Guided Democracy' (Calcutta, 1982), pp.2-3.
11
strive for an independent democratic post-colonial state because this is the model
best known to them." 17 It was also true that some democratic institutions were
already in place in the colonies long before independence. The appearance of
various councils such as Regency Councils, State Councils, the Volksraad and the
Federal Legislative Council, while being generally advisory bodies that conferred
little power upon the indigenous elite, nevertheless gave them an understanding
of the workings of democratic institutions. Thus, adoption of democratic ·
principles provided the Indonesians an opportunity to improve upon them.
Herbert Feith points out that national self-respect caused indigenous elites to
strive for democracy as this was one way that they could show the colonizers that
they were capable of self-government along democratic lines. 18
Adoption of parliamentary democracy had some practical considerations
as well. The 1945 constitution which unto the period of 'grant of independence'
governed Indonesia, though democratic but not providing for a parliamentary
system was used by the Dutch to brand Indonesia as pursuing dictatorship and ·
·hence many were influenced by the Dutch campaign against recognition of the
Indonesian state. In order to counteract the Dutch propaganda, the Indonesian
leaders felt the need to switch to the system of parliamentary democracy so that
they could convince the world of the genuineness of their government arising
from the wishes of the people. 19
/
However, Indonesia's experiment with parliamentary democracy was
marred by successive governments and their failure through intra-party divisions,
political factionalism, strife and mutual jealousies of the leaders. During the
period 1950-1 956, Indonesia witnessed six cabinets and the longest period of any
17 Syed Fnrid Alatas, n.6, p.lll. 18 Hcrberl Feith, The Decline o[Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, 1982), p.44.
12
one cabinet was two years (Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, July 1953-July 1955).
None of these cabinets had the true representative character since there were no .
elections since 1955 and the first elected government took office only in March
1956.
Reasons for the Failure of the Experiment:
Now the reason as to why parliamentary democracy could not flourish in
Indonesia can be discussed. The parliamentary set up instituted by the constitution
brought to the fore several conflicting trends that were in themselves contrary to
the very idea of parliamentary democracy. The failure of parliamentary
democracy was the result of forces and factors operating in Indonesia at that ·
period of time.
"'I he aftermath of the revolutionary period, heavy financial burden
involved in the treaty with the Netherlands, the weakness of the constitutional set-
up to contain the forces struggling for supremacy, the dissatisfaction in the army
and above ali the tendency of the people to look upto the president to pull them
out of the mess in which the country was thrown from time to time. These
contributed to the failure of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia."20
There was no doubt that parliamentary democracy was given a fair bit of
trial during that period of constitutional democracy. But, "parliamentary
supremacy according to the constitution was accepted only in principle, but not in
practice .... There were cases when decisions of parliament were challenged by
forces outside it. Again Parliament itself was not free from the influence of extra-
parliamentary forces like the President and the Army. Whenever any crisis
I'J Baladas Ghoshal, n.16, p.3. 211 S<~tyavati S. Jhavcri, n.ll, p.167.
13
occurred in Parliament, political parties tried to mobilise necessary support to
achieve their objectives." 21
Taking the argument to a different plain, Lucian W. Pye points out the lack
of an 'indigenous and traditional structure of national power in Indonesia. He says,
in case of Indonesia,
"the concept of national power and national administration was almost entirely foreign import. In terms of people's immediate understanding of power in their personal relationships, however, the Indonesians had more vivid traditional and mystical concepts of power than any of the other Southeast Asian peoples. Although the building of a sense of nationhood called for the use of European concept of power, the actual play of power in human relationships remained very traditional. Thus, political parties, national bureaucracies and the military services were all modeled on Western forms, but their practices followed the traditional rules of power relationships."24
While analysing the evolution of democracy and the maintenance of the same
in a post~colonial country, the historical circumstances under which post-colonial
state formation took place must be borne in mind. Democracy as a mode of
governance is essentially inherited from the colonial rulers. The indigenous elite,
educated in the western tradition and trained in the colonial administration, knew
only the democratic system as the best form. In many cases, the new democracies
were genuine, but failed to achieve stability and eventually declined only to be
replaced by authoritarian fonns. The maintenance of democracy has three
d. . 23 necessary con tt10ns.
11 Baladas Clhoshal, n.l6, p.4. ~~ Luci<~n W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics, The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Havard, 1985), p.ll2. ~1 These three conditions have been elaborated by Syed Farid Alatas while analysing the evolution of democracy in Indonesia and Malaysia. For details see Syed Farid Alatas, n.6, pp.40-l.
14
(l)Absence of Armed Resistance:
The extent to which anned and mass resistance threatens the interests of the
state elite. and the dominant classes determines the stability of the democratic
state. In case of Indonesia mass resistance was not an important factor in he
struggle for independence. But armed resistance was widespread in Indonesia.
(2) An Internally Strong State:
A state must be strong enough to mobilize resources in situations when its
power is challenged. If a democratic state is internally weak, it can hardly
withstand pressure and will resort to suspension of democratic process at the
earliest.
(3) A High degree of Elite Cohesion:
The ruling elite must have mutual material and' ideological interests. They
must share similar class and ideological backgrounds. If this condition is satisfied
the state will not be plagued by intra-state conflicts and opposition that could
potentially challenge authoritarian state forms.
Post-colonial Indonesia was neither a strong state nor there was any degree of
elite cohesion. Narrow personal gains ruled over the noble desire to nourish the
infant nation with care. Herbert Feith reaffirms this:
"It was a feature of politics in the Indonesia of 1949-1957 that cabinet posts were .most eagerly sought. The prestige of a cabinet minister was extra-ordinarily high, despite the fact that his tenure was normally expected to be short. Indeed, only isolated individual leaders in politics, administration, or education were able to enjoy the degree of prestige, which was the lot of each and every minister while he was in office. Ministerial posts provided opportunities to help family members, to repay obligations to others, and to create new ones to one self. They also provided important sources of income, a car, a house, furniture, and purchasing facilities- and in some cases business opportunities and gifts."24
24 Herbert Feith. n.18,pp.l46-7.
15
Thus, when the population wished that the civilian leadership would bring it
stability and development, what it experienced belied its hopes .. Their lot never ·
improved after they got rid of the oppression of the Dutch and the Japanese.
J
It can also be said that belief in democratic principles was missing at least in
one leader, that is, Sukamo. He brought with him his belief in the constitution of
1945, when he became the President of Indonesia.
"Though the constitution of 1945 laid down that the supreme authority vested in the People's Consultative Assembly (Article 1, Paragraph 2), the President who was vested with executive powers (Article 4, Paragraph 1) was able to exercise considerable authority because of the transitional provisions in Article 4 which laid down that, until the formation of the above mentioned body, the Chamber of Representative and the Supreme Advisory Council (the three repositories of power besides the President) all state powers would be exercised by the President assisted by a National Committee. "25
Thus, when political situations changed and Indonesia adopted new
constitutions, there was a constant hankering on President Sukarno's part to go to
the good old days of 1945. This nostalgia, in a way, contributed to the failure of
democracy. Sukatno paid little attention to the necessary day to day administrative
tasks; nevertheless the democratic system was blamed for the collapse of the
economy and infrastructure.
Sukarno's advocacy of the 'return to the past arrangement' was tried to be
achieved through a dual strategy, that is, firstly, denunciation of the western
concept of parliamentary democracy and secondly, admiration ofthe past system
"Sukarno argued that '50 percent- plus one' western parliamentary practices
exacerbated rather than solved problems. Therefore, he advocated a 'democratic
practice' of the villages for Indonesia, while deliberations are held until consensus
25 Baladas Ghoshal, n.l6, pp.275-6.
16
emerges, in the spirit of 'gotong rojong' with himself as the trusted leader. This
notion of democracy appeared to fit traditional Javanese value systems in which
power is bestowed on one person, usually a Sultan."26 Suk~o is reported to have
said, "I have the right to declare a state of emergency during which I can govern
by decree, and to do so I do not need the consent of the parliament, though of
course I would always talk it over with the ministers before hand.'m
Period of 'Guided Democracy':
After the second Ali cabinet resigned on 14th March 1957, President Sukarno
immediately proclaimed a nation-wide state of war and siege under article 129 of
the 1950 constitution. As a result, the parliamentary system collapsed and the
cabinet functioned under the direction of the president. Consequently, Sukarno's
notion of a unique, indigenous form of democracy was readily embraced as more
fitting for Indonesia. This ushered in the period of "Guided Democracy" in
Indonesia. It meant a practice of returning to a system of personal rule, which
resembles Javanese feudalism than the chaotic d,:mocratic experiment of the
I 950s.
With the establishment of 'Guided Democracy', all the political parties, with
the exception of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), were circumscribed and
depended directly on Sukarno for maintenance of the bureaucratic positions and
economic sinecures to which.they had grown accustomed. Their actual influence
was drastically curtailed. The other power centre in the country's politics was the
army. It was strongly anti-Communist, but opposed to the return of a
parliamentary system, which, it contended was responsible for Indonesia's
26 Clark D. Neher, South East Asia in the New International Era (Boulder, 1994), p.ll3. 27 George T. McKahin (ed), Major Governments of Asia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), p.570.
17 .
economic and political instability. Both the military and the PKI hated each other,
but preferred Sukarno to the outbreak of premature strife. This political situation
has been characterised as triangular in nature, with the military and PKI
occupying the bases of the triangle and Sukarno at the apex occupying the centre
of balance. 28
Although "Guided Democracy" was initially supported as an, Indonesian
antidote to a failed western system, the deterioration of the economy and the
administrative chaos that ensued undermined the unity Sukarno aimed to
establish. Sukarno spoke of the need to continue the revolution that brought
independence, mesmerizing the people with mass rallies and oratory laden with
compelling rhetoric but little else. Meanwhile, what the people needed was
stability, and to be fed. The country struggled under t\e burden of triple digit
inflation.29 Corruption was flagrant and the cost of living index rose from a base
of one hundred in 1957 to thirty-six thousand in 1965. Unemployment was
rampant and Communists were gaining strength as peasants and workers were
armed with Chinese weapons.30
Coup and Counter-Coup:
It was in the midst of such a confusion and mismanagement that the coup of
September 30,1965 occurred. The reason ·and the actual people behind the coup
are still a mystery and require a thorough investigation. However, suffice to say
for our purpose that General Suharto used PKI' s involvement to annihilate the
party as well as any other opposition to his regime. The coup was said to be led by
IX Allan A. Samson, "Indonesia" in Robert N. Kearney (ed), Politics and Modernisation in South and Southeast Asia (New York, 1975), pp.255-6. 29 Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure .fi>r Change (London, 1993), pp.I-3. 3° Clark D.Neher, n.26, p.l 06.
18
elements of the PKI, which resulted ultimately in the decimation of the latter.
Many army officers, including chief of staff General Yani, were killed in the coup
attempt. Sukarno's refusal to blame the PKI for the coup provided the opportunity
to General Suhatto, "commander of the army's strategic reserve forces (Kostrad),
who, according to a standing order, acted in Yani's stead whenever the army
commander was out of town"31 to start an anti-Communist campaign in which
thousands of communists were killed. The reign of administration switched hands
and General Suharto emerged as the new leader of Indonesia.
The coup of 1965 aborted all chances of PKI's march to superiority and
established the army as the only centre of power in Indonesian politics. Sukarno
. reluctantly named Suharto army chief of staff. Suharto gradually acquired more
and more power and succeeded in shunting the once immovable Sukarno aside in
what might be called an incremental coup. In 1967 Suharto forced Sukamo into
retirement and proclaimed a 'New Order' for Indonesia.
Before looking at the 'New order' of Suharto, a brief analysis of Suharto's role
in the aborted coup can be made. It can be said that it has been played down
considerably. As mentioned earlier, Suharto was in command over the Jakarta
based amiy Kostrad, which was an elite, rapid deployment force designed to .
counter any insurrectiona~y moves by regional commanders. Before that
''returning from command of Eastern Indonesia, where he was involved in the
successful campaign to wrest West Irian from the Dutch in 1962, Major General
Suharto joined Nasution's staff in armed forces HQ .... with feelings in the army
running high over the murder of six generals on the night of 30 September,
31 Ulf Sundhausscn, The Road to Power, Indonesian Military Politics /945-1967 (Kuala Lumpur, 19S2) ,p. 207.
19
Suharto's decisive moves to restore order the following day earned him kudos he
would have found hard to accumulate under normal circumstances. "32
Theories About the Coup:
Speculations were rife regarding the role of PKI in the coup and its collusion
with the army. One of the many theories still doing circles is that the PKI had set
up a "special bureau, acting without the knowledge of the party central committee,
to foster ties with the military." 33 In sharp contradiction, another theory plays
down the role of the PKI in the whole affair. "The operation both in Jakarta and in
central Java was completely in the hands of military people, including some
belonging to the Air Force. Army troops were the ones who occupied strategic
points _in Jakarta, and abducted the generals."34 It blames the assassination of the
kidnapped generals on either the military people or young trainees under military
command. It is to be noted that the Communist daily, 'Harian Rakyat' in its 2nd
October issue had stressed the internal division in the army as the reason for the
whole affair. Writers like Harold Crouch and Peter Dale Scott bought the same
theory and stressed the rivalry between the pro-Sukarno Yani faction and the anti-
Sukarno Suharto and Nasution faction. Even the 'Cornell Paper' authored by Ruth
Me Vey and Benedict Anderson emphasised the same argument.
There are theories about the involvement of the CIA and other western
intelligence agencies. The CIA study titled '1965: The Coup that Backfired'
emphasised that in November 1964, the PKI established a clandestine organisation .
to penetrate and subvert the Indonesian armed forces. Even though the CIA called
the coup 'one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century', it is a fact that
12 Michael JU. Vatikiotis, n.29, p.l7. JJ ihid..p.l8. 34 W.F. Wertheim, "Whose Plot? New Light on the !965 Events", Journal of Contemporary Asia (Noltingham), vol.9, no.2, 2nd Quarter, 1979, p.200.
20
the U.S. from as early as 1953, was interested in fermenting the regional crisis in
Indonesia, which induced Sukarno on 14 march 1957 to proclaim martial law. In
1957-58, the CIA infiltrated arms and personnel in support of the regional
rebellions against Sukarno. By August 1958, the military assistance programme to
Indonesia had reached the tune of twenty million dollars a year. The Cold War era
which pushed America to contain Communism in far corners of the world had
chosen Indonesia as a battle ground. Sukarno's sympathy for the Communists
must have rung alarm-bells in Washington. Ai one point of time Sukarno was
reported to have said that 'he would have no objection if Indonesia were to evolve
into a Communist state. ' 35 Thus, the non-Communist force with the capability of
.. obstructing the PKI, notably Nasution became the messiah to control the
Communist ivrces. In the years after 1958, U.S. trained Gen. Suwarto's
Indonesian Army Staff and Command School in Bandung (SESKOAD) received a
lot of attention from the Pentagon, CIA, RAND and also from the Ford
Foundation. SESKOAD's new strategic doctrine on Territorial Warfare was in a
way a counter-insurgency method. Thus, the organisation developed into an anti-
Communist centre, virtually a semi-state, independent of Sukarno's government.
Lyndon Johnson's accession to Presidency in the United States was marked by the
beginning of a more anti-Sukarno posture. It was a complete reversal of the policy
followed by the previous Kennedy administration. General Suharto being a
product of SESKOAD was a part of the whole conspiracy against the PKI. Thus,
when the internal struggle within the army resulted in the death of the pro-
Sukarno generals, it provided a golden opportunity to Suharto and company who
35 Donald Hindley. "Indonesian Politics 1965-1967: The September 30 Movement and the Fall of Sukarno", The World Today (London), vol.24, no.8 ,August I 968, p.346.
21
blamed the Communists entirely. What followed was a bloodbath.36 Reflecting the
'The West's best news for years in Asia.' 37
However, there are more number of theories about Suharto's role in the coup.
Writers like Michael R.J. Vatikiotis refer to an informal agreement among a group
consisting of Suharto, Dharsono, Kemal ldris and Sarwo Edhie Wibowo regarding
rotation of power among them after easing out Sukarno.38 However, this was a
pure miscalculation on their part and eventually. it was them, who were eased out
by Suharto. This person known for his cold and ruthless glare and a deep voice
accompanied by a passive style certainly emerged as the man of the hour. Another
finding insists that the coup originated with a move by officers loyal to Sukarno to
prevent pro-western generals from connivin s with the US and Britain to topple
Sukarno.39 If accepted, this theory points at the army's poor track. record of
intervention. The army was riddled with factionalism and hence, lacked a sense of
direction. Nasution's difference with Yani is an accepted fact and probably in
order to balance Yani's promotion as army chief in 1962, Suharto was given the
command of Jakarta based Army Kostrad. This theory also gains strength from
the fact that the army was involved in two unsuccessful coup attempts in 1952 and
1956. The 1952 incident has gone down as the famous '17 October Affair' when .
several senior officers attempted to pursuade Sukarno to dissolve the parliament.
In 1956, the acting Chief of Staff Zulkifli Lubis made a number of attempts to
ro = '6 For details of CIA's role in the 1965 affair refer to Peter Dale Scott, "The United States and the (J) fR ~ -t--. )verthrow of Sukamo, 1965-1967", Pacific Affairs(Vancouver), vol.58, no.2, Summer 1985, U) ~ ==~ ~p.239-64. ~~ m !!!!i!!i!!~ 37. "Vengeance with aSmile", Time(New York), 15 July 1966, p.26. 1--a co -1-- 38 Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, n.29, p.18 ~ ~ -
39 A paper written by Ruth McVey and Benedict Anderson in 1966 refers to this. A reference to this 'preliminary analyses' can be found in Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, n.29, p.19.
22
establish a military dictatorship. A year after, Sukarno had established his own
dictatorship through ''Guided Democracy''.
lt can be said that Suharto was a lucky man to be at the right place at the right
time. As the Kostrad commander he had the access to a sophisticated nation-wide
communications system at his headquarter. Being in the capital itself he was in
position to gain overall control taking advantage of the prevailing confusion.
Thus, he with a small group of supporters seized the opportunities as they
emerged without planning too much in advance .. The murder of six generals put a
seal of approval behind his actions against the communists. And from that point of
time he never looked back. Credit should also be given to him for the very fact he
held on to the position firmly and went on strengthening it as time progressed.
This was a. ~hieved in spite of the speculation that his health will not permit him to
continue for long. How he managed all that is, of course, a different story
altogether.
New Order Regime:
Suharto's 'New Order' government defined its main job in terms of re
establishing order in Indonesian society. The social disturbance that the 1965 coup
heralded, called for a new approach to governance. A successful and effective
government always carries its population along with it. Not to mention the famous
quote, 'Some people can be fooled for all time, All people can be fooled for some
time, but all people can . never be fooled for all time'. Thus, Suharto, while
beginning the journey along the 'New Order' path tried to garner support from ·
different sections of society. And different sections supported him for different
reasons.
23
The expenence with parliamentary democracy in the 1950s and with .
Sukarno's 'Guided Democracy' in the first half of the decade had convinced many
of the military of the need for a much stronger government.
"With ex-Communist party members as notable exceptions, many groups felt that the new rules of the game could only be an improvement: these groups included civ~lian politicians happy to see the demise of "Guided Democracy", government economists, liberals hoping for a restoration of constitutional democracy, journalists and intellectuals happy to be freed from the ideological strictures of the Communist-linked People's Cultural Institute, Muslims pleased with the elimination of the Communists as a political force, businessmen excited at the prospect of an economic resurgence, and many others tired of ceaseless ferment. Some of these groups were to see their hopes fulfilled, others were to become gradually and then deeply disappointed.'"'0
The 'strong state', which the 'New Order' government aimed to establish, '
· · was to be relatively insulated from the interests of any particular ethnic, religious
or geographical group. It was believed that this was the essential condition of
present day industrialisation. Political order and development were perceived as
two sides of the same coin.
The consolidation of Suharto's administration, who became the acting
President in March 1967, showed all signs of an authoritarian regime namely,
centralization of authority within the army, control over the administrative
structure, less freedom for the people and the militarization of the bureaucracy.
And all this was done with an eye on every political dissident so as to make the
state of the nation entirely passive.
Suharto had realised the importance of a strong army. He never for a
moment forgot that it was with the army support that he came to power. He also
40 Adam Schwarz. n.IO, p.29.
24
never forgot that without the army's support his fate would not be much different
from that of Sukarno. But at the same time, he was intelligent enough not to allow
the army too much of leverage that might threaten his own position. His
consolidation of power, within the faction-ridden army, involved taking on one .
group at a time, isolating it and rendering it ineffective. This extremely effective
strategy paid off by narrowing down the number of groups exercising power,
which reposed ultimately in the Suharto faction.
"Under Suharto, power is not only centralized but also held in very few
hands. The President, in the final analysis, depends on the services of perhaps a
dozen key military officers each of whom presides in turn over tightly organised
and often mutually antagonistic pyramids of authority.'.41 David Jenkins in his
work 'Suharto and His Generals' talks ofthe inner core group which included ·
people like Lt. Gen. Ali Murtopo, Gen. Benny Murdani, Admiral Sudomo, Gen.
Amir Machmud, Gen. Yoga Sugama, Gen, Sudharmono, Gen. Darjatmo etc. Thus,
"Suharto' s style of leadership during the early years of the 'New Order' certainly
encouraged the belief that he followed an essentially patrimonial approach."42
Three pillars of Suharto's rule were Hankam, Kopkamtib and Eakin. Suharto
saw to it that these organisations are always headed by people who are loyal to
him. Whereas Hankam was an intelligence organisation, Kopkamtib which,
"originated in the compromise reached between Sukamo and Suharto on the ·
morning after the coup attempt in October 1965,"43 dealt with a wide range of
civilian dissidents namely PKI supporters, students and Muslim demonstrators.
"Newspapers required Kopkamtib permission to publish and on many occasions
41 David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983 (Ithaca, 1984), p.20. 42 ihid. ,p.l6. 43 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (London, 1978), p.223.
25
this permission was temporarily and sometimes permanently withdrawn. In 1971,
Kopkamtib was entrusted with maintaining 'security and order' during the election
campaign and made many arrests to achieve this purpose. With virtually unlimited
power, the Kopkamtib was a key instrument in maintaining the government's
authority."44 Thus, Kopkamtib, a permanent martial law-like device enabled the
authorities to arrest and hold indefinitely anyone whom they suspected of
subversive activities.
A parallel body was Special Operations (Operasi Khusus, or Opsus),
which was built up by Gen. Ali Murtopo and was used for covert operation. Set up
in 1962, as an executive agency of General Suharto's Mandala Command for the
Irian campaign, it also played a key role in the negotiations to end the
confrontation with Malaysia (Konfrontasi), conducted political lobbying,
manipulated elections within political organisations and was a key· player in
organising the first New Order elections in 1971.45 The third important body was
Bakin, the State Intelligence Coordinating Body, which was a more clandestine ·
body. Established in 1967, this was a type of military dominated secret police with
responsibility for intelligence assessments and action aimed at the non-military
population, such as political parties, dissidents, the Chinese community, and
especially those who thought to be planning a Communist revival.46 Like Opsus, it
was originally constructed as a pro-Suharto organisation and operated in that
manner under the able leadership of General Benny Murdani.
The military officers in Suharto's company developed and expanded the
'dwifimgsi' or 'dual function' concept. This concept provided the theoretical
44 ihid. 45 Damicn Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia (Melbourne, 1988),p.65. 46 ibid .. p.66.
26
support to the military to expand its influence through out the government
apparatus, including reserved allocations of seats in the parliament and top posts ·
in the civil service. It can be mentioned here that 'dual function' owes its origin to
the then Chief of Staff General Nasution's 'half-way' or 'middle-way' speech at
the National Military Academy in Magelang, Central Java in November 1958.
There he said that:
"the Indonesian army would not follow the western model as a lifeless instrument in the hands of the government; on the other hand it should not take over the government as this would only lead to a series of coups and counter coups as in Latin America. Instead the armed forces should tread the 'middle way', participating in all areas of political and social life but not seeking to dominate the government."47
The Indonesian military never defended its expanded political role as a
temporary phase that would pass once an immediate crisis was Jver. On the
contrary, the message of 'dwi fungsi' was that the military's role in politics was to
become permanent.
(ii) Economy:
Indonesian economy, which was completely neglected under the
parliamentary period and also during the "Guided Democracy" period, warranted
urgent attention. Something quick needed to be done in the context of reining in
inflation, stabilizing the rupiah, getting a handle on foreign debt, attracting foreign
aid and encouraging foreign investment. The New Order government started
dismantling the limited economic foundations for independent capitalist
development, which had been haphazardly laid down during the ''Guided
Democracy" period. Nationalised foreign companies were denationalised and
foreign capital started playing a paramount role in the country's economy. The
47 Harold Crouch, "Indonesia" in Jakaria Hazi Ahmad and Harold Crouch, Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia (Singapore, 1985), p.57.
27
'New Stabilisation Plan' of October 1966 authored under the auspices of the IMF,
abolished the preferential treatment given to the public sector. It also tried to
create a favourable environment for foreign capital investment by taking measures
such as a balanced budget, a strict limitation of government expenditure, a rigid
credit policy and abolition of the system of multiple exchange rates, which so far .
protected the domestic industries. The 'Law on Foreign Capital Investment', of
January 1967 provided complete free hand to the foreign companies to invest in
any sector of the Indonesian economy. Thus, the ·over all aim was to make
Indonesia a safe haven for foreign investors.48
At the helm of economic policy making were the forty odd economists
consisting the 'Development Cabinet'. With a uniform western capitalist vision,
this group started to 'fix the problem', which in a way reinforced the colonial
structure of the Dutch. Where as the foreign investment definitely received a .
boost, the micro economic indicators presented a dismal picture. It was the
development of a 'dependent economy' the ills of which will be dealt with in the
subsequent chapters.
(iii) Politics:
After reining in the economic front, Suharto set about creating a more
favourable political system. The idea was to restructure the political system in
such a way that it could no longer compete with the executive office for power.
The forms of government would stay, but those outside the executive branch·
would be steadily drained of influence. The military's effort to depoliticize the
political parties, under the 'New Order', included the following steps.
(i) Interfering in the election of party leaders.
48 For details see John Taylor, "Economic Strategy of the New Order", in John Taylor and others, eds., Repression and Exploitation in Indonesia (Nottingham, 1974), pp.l3-28.
28
(ii) Forming a government-backed party to contest elections.
(iii) Consolidating the opposition parties into two dissension-ridden groups.
(iv) Banning partisan activity at the local level.
(v) Staging symbolic national elections to legitimize the regime, and
(vi) Compelling parties to adopt the national ideology as their sole
organising platform.
In the immediate aftermath of Sukarno's overthrow, political parties still
held a commanding majority in the People's Consultative Assembly, 'or MPR, the
body authorised by the constitution to select a president and to which the
President was nominally accountable. However, this changed soon. In 1967, the
government formulated a law, which gave it the right to appoint one-third of the
representatives to the People's Assembly and more than one-fifth of tl1e sitting
parliament, known as the DPR. In addition, elections scheduled for 1968 were
postponed until a non-hostile parliament could be assured.
The government started interfering in the internal affairs of the political
parties. In April 1966, the Nationalist Party was forced to dismiss its pre-New
Order leaders and replace them with officials who were acceptable to the regime.
The Muslim groups had participated with the army in its attack on the
Communists. In return they expected a better treatment than what they actually
received.
"Leaders of the banned Masjumi party petitioned unsuccessfully for its reinstatement. What soon became clear was that the Military-Muslim partnership in the anti-Communist party crusade was a short-term marriage of convenience. On longer-term strategic matters, the two groups remained as far apart as ever. In 1968, Suharto authorized the formation of anew Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Parmusi, but the former Masjumi leaders were banned
from playing any part and a government nominee, Djaelani Naro, was subsequently elevated to chairman."49
29
In 1967, 'Golkar' was introduced as a new player on to the political stage ..
1t served as the government's own electoral organisation. It was a coalition of
some two hundred groups representing peasants, labour, bureaucrats, youth,
women, religion, regional associations and so on. In keeping with the army's
distaste for political parties and party politics, the new association was to be
referred to as a functional group. Later Golkar came to be dominated· by only the
army, bureaucracy and its own civilian wing, with the army remaining very much
the senior partner. The mass based groups present at the Golkar' s birth quickly
faded into insignificance, just as the masses disappeared from the political scene .
more generally.
As a continuation of the depoliticisation process the political parties were
never given any scope to represent popular opinion. They participated in the
elections as they thought it to be ideal to restore their positions as representatives
of people and to make parliament once again a, major governmental institution.
But the government was cautious enough not to let anything like that happen. The
opposition to Golkar was made so feeble that it had no chance of playing a major
role.
words:
R. William .Liddle summarises the whole situation in the following
"Although the election itself was conducted with scrupulous honesty, Golkar's campaign tactics were heavy handed on the extreme. Most civil servants and village officials were prohibited from campaigning for the parties of their own choice and instead were obliged to join and work for Golkar. Military officials became local Golkar chairmen ... Party candidate lists were screened and many names were removed from the ballot. Party
49 Adam Schwarz, n.l 0, p.31.
leaders, considered insufficiently sympathetic to military rule, were forced out of their party positions. Voters were required in some areas to register as Golkar members, were told that a vote against Golkar was a vote against the regime (or against the nation), that there would be no jobs or government services for opponents of Golkar, or that if the parties won the chaos of the massacre period of 1965-66 would retum."50
30
This sustained pressure ?n the political parties forced the party leaders to
support the government's draft on all major issues.
Elections were held in 1971. The top two vote-getters of the 1955
elections, the Nationalist Party and the Parmusi (the Masjumi's heir), had been
manipulated so blatantly that they lost all credibility with their pre-1966
supporters. Gvlkar won 63 percent of the vote. The Nahdlatul Ulama held on to
its 1955 performance claiming about 18 percent. Both the Parmusi and the
Nationalist Party claimed less than 7 percent.
In the following years, two major developments occurred which had far-
reaching consequences for the Indonesian polity. In 1973, nine political parties,
excluding the Golkar were forced to dissolve themselves and create two new
parties. Thus, the four santri-dominated Islamic parties formed the Partai
Persaluan Pembangunan or the United Development party. This step, a brainchild
of Ali Murtopo, Suharto's assistant for political affairs, a member of staf pribadi
(Spri), weakened the parties by fostering internal disunity. The former Nationalist
and Christian parties merged and formed the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).
This added sophistication to the domination of Golkar and ensured that in future
elections 1971-like intervention won't be necessary. Suharto is reported to have
said, "With one and only one road already mapped out, why should we then have
nine different cars? The general Elections must serve the very purpose for which
50 R. William Liddle, "Participation and the Political Parties" in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, Political Power and Communications in Indonesia (California, 1978), p.183.
31
they are held, that is, to create political stability. Only those kinds of elections are
of value to us."51
The second development was the advancement of the concept of 'floating
mass'. Accordingly, people became a floating mass allowed to vote once in every
five years but otherwise refrain from political activity. This was accompanied by
restrictions on party activity in rural areas. Golkar too was affected by these
restrictions but it was much better able to maintain links with rural areas via the
army, which had a presence virtually in every village.
(iv) Bureaucracy:
The New Order regime, in order to set everything right that went wrong in
the previous regimes, dealt with the country's bureaucracy in the following
manner.
(a) The size of the bureaucracy was lessened. Suharto, cut the number of
ministers to fourth of what it had become in the late days of Sukamo's
regime.
(b )Suharto made his administration more loyal. Officials were recruited to
toughen the bureaucracy with an exoskeleton of military command.
(c)The president made the bureaucracy more active ... To improve their
performance, civil servants were given pay boosts, first selectively and
then across the board. 52
A new development that occurred side by side was the dominance of the
army in the government. The 'dual function' of the army that received
legitimization during the New Order saw overall army penetration in civilian
51 Adam Schwarz, n.IO, p.32. 52 Donald K. Emmerson, "The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness in Strength" in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, n.50, p.82.
32
posts. "The data of 1980 show that ABRI' s quantitative pressure at the national
government level amounted to 53.3 per cent, at the provincial level 70.3 per cent;
district level 56.3 per cent; municipality 33.3 per cent, and for foreign service it
stood at 34.3 per cent.' ' 53
The economic development brought about changes in the social strata of
the country. It gave birth to_ an auxiliary class of officials: managers, technocrats,
technicians and professionals. The exclusion of this class from the strategic offices
of power, and the absence of any genuinely representative political structures or
rule of law have created antagonism between them and the military rulers.
Nevertheless, their general attachment to the existing economic order and the
relative privilege of their position have made them cautious of courting alliances
with the popular forces. 54 Though Indonesia is described as a 'bureaucra.ic polity'
or a 'bureaucratic dictatorship' by writers like Carl Jackson and Heri Akhmadi,
writers praising the overwhelming role of the military in the bureaucracy are not
way behind. They say that due to the pressure of the military the bureaucracy has
become rationalized, energized and more coercive in the pursuit of the goals of the
New Order.
This in brief is how Suharto ran his New Order government.
"To summarize: The New Order is neither a self-serving monolith, nor congeries of ·personalities and factions, but something in between these extremes. Bureaucratic pluralism exists, and not merely because of empire building by corrupt generals. The autonomy of relatively civilian led agencies is to an extent programmatic. So long as Suharto's and the armed forces' control over internal security is not disturbed, there is room for the least
53 Ibrahim Ambong, "Relationships Between the Indonesian Armed Forces and Golkar", Indonesian Quarterly(Jakarta), vo1.17, no.3, Third Quarter 1990, p.24l. 54 Richard Robison, "Culture, Politics and Economy in the Political History of the New Order", Indonesia (New York), no.31, April 198 I, p26.
penetrated departments to influence policy on'the broad subject of economic growth."55
33
Suharto allowed institutions to grow only to the extent that they did not
threaten his own position. An extremely pragmatic man that he was, Suharto kept
his eyes open to all such developments. He had built around him a coterie, which
knew that its interest is best served with Suharto in power.
55 Donald K. Emerson, "Understanding the New Order, Bureaucratic Pluralism in Indonesia", Asian Survey (California), vol.23, no.ll, November 1983, pp.1231-2.