47
CHAPTER III THE UNITED STATES FACTOR AND THE NUCLEAR ISSUE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY
CHAPTER III
THE UNITED STATES FACTOR AND THE NUCLEAR ISSUE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY
CHAPTER III
THE UNITED STATES FACTOR AND THE NUCLEAR ISSUE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY
During the Cold War, the main objective of the United
States military strategy was to prevent a territorial and
ideological expansion of its main adversary, the Soviet
Union, without embroiling itself in a direct confrontation
with it. Over the years the core eleme~t of this policy
(with slight variations), commonly known as 'containment',
remained unchanged. This policy was characterized by forming
military alliances with its Allies (namely Western Europe
and Japan) and resorting to deployment of nuclear weapons
and/or armed forces in these countries.1
Many factors contributed to America's global role. At
the end of the Second World War, the United States emerged
as the most formidable military power in the world.
Kotwithstanding its army which were smaller compared to that
1 The word 'containment' was first used in the context of the Soviet-American relations by the former U.S. diplomat, George F. Kennan in 1947. At that time it was not meant to deter the Soviet military threat because the latter recovering from the devastations of the Second World War was not strong enough to remobilize troops for aggressive purposes. Neither was it a nuclear power then. The policy was mainly coined as a tool to thwart the Soviet ideological expansion or its political threat. The· World Communist Movement at that vulnerable time appealed immensely to the destabilized people of Western Europe. An ideological switch over of these countries would have dealt an immense blow to the power and prestige of the U.S.A. For more details see Jerry L. Deibel, John Lewis Gaddis, Containment Cnncept & Policy (Washington, 1986), vol.2, pp.23-31.
86
of the Soviet Union, it had an edge over the latter in naval
and air power which determined its capacity to protect its
military might glo~ally. In addition, for many years, it
had a monopoly of the atom bomb.~
Briefly after the war, the United States was under
domestic pressure for rapid demobilisation of its armed
forces. But, the Cold War reversed this. The intensification
of the Cold War, and the establishment of the Soviet
satellites in Europe, together with the dilapidated economic
condition of war-devastated West European countries, acted
as a catalyst for American involvement in European
security:. The Truman administration undertook vast
programmes of econorrnc reconstruction and military
collaboration, through the Marshall Plan and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organ~zation (NAT0).3
While the United States grew gradually disillusioned by
Soviet policy it was not until the Truman doctrine of March
1947, that a general foreign policy based on the
acknow~edgement of disharmony of interests with the Soviet
Union emerged. Its traditional Monroe Doctrine had
prohibited the United States from undertaking such an
enormous programme of aid to other nations in peacetime or
z Christopher S. Raj, American Military in Europe Controversy oyer NATO Burden-Sharin~ (New Delhi, 1987) p.2. Planning for demobilization began in 1941 over two years before the war ended. For details see: ibid. pp.3-4.
3 . Ibid. , p. 2.
87
committin~ itself to a multilateral military alliance with
an integrated system of military commands while not engaged
1n war. The Rio Pact of the United States In 1944 was of a
different nature. Nor had American policy makers ever before
envisaged deploying US forces in Europe indefinitely In
times of peace. All these reflected a significant change in
traditional American foreign policy, giving it a leadership
position in the NATO partnership in Europe. 4
· The leadership position, however, did not last into the
1980s. 5 Statistics indicated a decline of the US economic
power, in relative terms, from that of its advantageous
position after the Second World War by the 1980s. This
negative trend automatically had repercussions for its
leadership role and the discharge of its responsibilities
globally and in Europe. This placed the US policy of
4 Ibid., p.2. The Rio Pact of Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed in Rio on 2 September 1944, was a regional collective security arrangement. Under the Rio Treaty every American state had to assist in meeting an armed attack upon another American state but there was no integrated command_system or integrated force.
5 The U.S. produced 39% of gross world product in 1950 with Western Europe and Japan-sharing 17%. By 1984, the U.S. share had dropped to 26% while the allied share has grown roughly to 27% (NATO-Europe and Japan). In terms of military spending the U.S. share of the global total declined from 51% in 1960 to 28% in 1984 while Europe and Japan had been growing to more than 13%. The U.S. share of NATO's combined defence spending fell from 68.8~ to 56.8% in 1986, Western Europe now contributed to over 50% as NATO's active manpower, main battle tanks and combat aircraft, roughly 45% of NATO's artillery and nearly 80% of NATO's trained reserve. For more details, see Gordon Adams and Eric Hunz, Fair Shares: B~aring the Burden of NATO Alliance (Washington D.C., 1988), pp.6, 18, 26-28 and 72-73.
88
containment under crttical review. It was further aggravaLed
by Mikhail Gorbachev's initiatives for better relations with
the West implying a reduction of the Soviet threat.s
The impact of Gorbachev's reform programme wa.s
far-reaching. It opened up a number of issues which
consecutively undermined America's prime importance in West
European security matters. Three major co-related factors
have certainly made an impact on the evolution of the US
role in the present European security environment. They
are: the American responses, particularly in the post
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) period; its
relationship with other NATO allies; and the dichotomy of
the US and West European perspectives on the future role of
NATO in Europe.
The relative doctrine of the two superpowers in the
European scenario was an outcome not of historical laws
governing the rise and fall of great powers, but an
aberrational assessment of their positions after the Second
World War. It was, indeed, derived from the weakness caused
by the war. This period was characterised by the acquisition
of nuclear weapons by the two super powers. 7 However, the
irony of the post-war era was that nuclear weapons did not
s Stephan N. Walt., "The Case of Futile Containment; Analysing U.S. Grand Strategy", International Ser.;urity (Harvard, U.S.A.), vol.14, no.1, Summer 1989, pp.5-6.
7 William G. Hyland, "Setting Global Priorities", Foreign Policy (New York) No.73, Winter 1988-89, p.26.
89
turn out to be the decisive determinants of national power.
Increasingly their existence in the USA and the USSR became
a function of countering the existence of the other side - a
sort of self perpetuating stalemate. The possession of
nuclear weapons over the years even in large quantities did
not qualify to any particular measure of power or influence,
except in relation to the other super power, and gradually
have become less critical to West European security.B
Eventually, both powers arrived roughly at the same
conclusion that achieving nuclear superiority was
impossible. This probably prompted Ronald Reagan and Mikhail
Gorbachev·s joint decision that nuclear war ··cannot be won
and must never be fought·· . e
The conclusion of the INF Treaty on 7th - December 1987
largely at the initiative of Gorbachev, was considered a
landmark in fostering a post-nuclear phase in Europe whereby
nuclear weapons were not likely to be resorted to as an
option in the event of a possible conventional attack. In
view of the changed circumstances, it is worthwhile to focus
on the first of the major co-related factors and its bearing
on European security.
B Ibid.
e William G. Hyland, "Reagan -Gorbac hev I I I" . Foreign Affairs, vol.63, no.l, Fall 1986-87, p_ll_
90
I. US Response to Soviet Reforms in the Post-INF Period
(1) Pre-disintegration period of the Soviet Union (1987-91)
The American public and United States policy makers
reacted in different ways to Mikhail Gorbachev. A number of
problems emerged during the last years of Ronald Reagan's
presidency. Primary among these were a huge budget deficit
and a gigantic trade imbalance. These automatically had a
bearing on the relationship of the United States with its
Allies. The desire to concentrate primarily on the domestic
issues was foremost in the minds of the majority of the
American public. Gorbachev's initiative in forging better
relations with the West was seen as the end of the worst
phase of the Cold War. 1 0 As a result, the American public
was mentally prepared to enter into a new and cordial
relationship with the Soviet ·union at a much faster pace
than did most Washington ' s policy makers . 11
US policy makers· reaction to Gorbachev could be
described as "cautious optimism blended with healthy
skepticism".12 They still perceived Soviet diplomacy as a
threat to be "parried", rather than as an opportunity to be
explored towards a well-meaning dialogue. This ' wait and
10 Ibid., pp.24-26.
11 Linda B. Hiller, "American Containment", International Affairs April 1990, p . 319.
Foreign Policy : Beyond (London), vol.66, no.2,
12 Claude R.enaude, "East West Economic R.elations in the Context of Perestroika", ..... N .... A .... T .... 0.__-'"-'8'"""e'--'v'--'·l"'"'. P-""-.. .u.H (Brussels), vol.36, no.4, August 1988, p.22.
91
watch· attitude led to criticism not ~nly from the domestic
front but also from most of its European allies who too were
wilting under similar domestic pressure.13
After the importance of nuclear weapons declined
significantly with the signing of the INF accord, American
policy makers were apprehensive about further reductions of
nuclear arms through bilateral agreements with the USSR. If
the balance of conventional forces between NATO and Warsaw
Pact countries remained as it was, the general situation
would be unfavourable to the West.14
The fact that the Soviet Union"s weak domestic economy
had compelled it to slow down its nuclear armament programme
made American suspect the intentions behind the Soviet
initiatives for nuclear disarmament. In consequence, us
policy makers initially hesitated to rev1se. let alone
abandon, old policies. Eventually, the administration was
forced to improvise newer positions that would allow them to
maintain existing defence budgets and nuclear arsenals on
the basis of different rationales.15
1 3 Arnold L. Horelick, '"US-Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era'", Foreign Affairs. vol.65. no.3, (America & the World 1988-89), p.55.
14 William G. Hyland, n.7, p.20.
15 Linda B. Miller. n.11, p.319. When Genera.l Brent Scroweroft was appointed as the National Security Adviser. he served notice on the burden-sharing talks with America·s NATO allies and attempted to persuade in it that Europeans should relieve the US in some of its defence spending as the US never wanted to maintain a large standing army in the Western Europe indefinitely. Whereas although Dick Cheney,
82
The INF agreement generated a mollientum for
denuclearization and shifted attention thereafter to the
area of conventional weaponry where NATO found itself in a
weaker bargaining position than the Warsaw Pact countries.
While it was evident that Moscow was under domestic economic
pressure to curtail the costs of maintaining conventional
weapons the areas where conventional weapons would be
reduced were not specified. They could be decreased
anywhere, not necessarily on its western frontier with
Europe. 16
The American defence analyst, Michael Mcc Gwine pointed
out that at the centre of the new Soviet thinking was the
question of national security. The Soviet argument was that
this could only be achieved by cooperating with other
nations to provide mutual security. Guaranteeing national
security has ''become above all a political task and not a
military one''. While stressing the need for equal security,
the Soviets had moved beyond the idea of parity to talks of
sufficiency. They acknowledged the need for symmetrical
reduction in arms and for levels that precluded the
the US Defence Secretary, had· said that it could be possible due to recent political changes in Eastern Europe but he ruled out immediate troop withdrawals. For more details, see Guardian Weekly (London). 4 December 1888 and 26 November 1888.
lB William G. Hyland, n.7. p.28.
"93
possibility of a surprise attack. 17
According to a Soviet researcher, Alexei Arbatov, there
were a number uf factors that compelled the Warsaw Pact's
shift from a military doctrine, that focussed on waging
nuclear war, to one of war prevention. The aim of
"preventing war" was not mentioned in the earlier military
doctrine based on the theory of deterrence. The prevention
of war and an attack by a possible enemy was of less
importance and was mainly delegated to the sphere of foreign
policy.
However, the realisation that the quantitative and
qualitative advancement of the technological arms race that
took place over the years. in pursuit of the doctrine of
deterrence, resulted in greater instability in East/West
relations than security reversed the thinking on Soviet
military doctrine.lB
But from Washington's perspective, Gorbachev was not
chosen to preside over the dismantling of Soviet Union's
defence or losing the Cold War. He had simply stopped
playing the game according to the old rules which were a
liability for the Soviet Union. United States proposed,
somewhat skeptically, that Gorbachev be judged by a set of
new rules which gave importance to self-restrain and
1 7 Michael R. Lucas, The Western Alliance After INF: Redefining the US Policy Towards Europe and the Soviet Union (Colarado, 1990),·p.18.
lB Ibid.' pp.l78-180.
94
unilateral arms reductions.lB
Consequently, the United States was unwilling to forego
the favourable bargaining position gained under Reagan time
and was adamant that the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
(START)2121 be stalled until a clear linkage was
established with START and regional arms control.2 1
In the context of the START, the US and the USSR
agreed, on 7-8 January 1985, to resume negotiations on
strategic offensive weapons as part of ·the broad Nuclear
Space Talks (NST). which also included a section on
intermediate range forces. This formed the fourth set of
talks on strategic weapons after SALT I. SALT II and an
aborted START (1982-1984). Following the creation of the
NST, the first session of the group on strategic arms- (in
reality a resumption of previous START talks) - was held on
27 March 1985.
Negotiations were resumed again at the Malta summit on
1e William G. Hyland n.7, p.19.
2121 The START negotiations opened in Geneva in July 1982 but made little progress in the wake of the Soviet walk out from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Talks following Reagan's refusal to stall the SDI programme. Following Ronald Reagan's re-election in 1984 and Mikhail Gorbachev"s coming to power in the Kremlin in March 1985, the two superpowers had resumed talks on strategic weapons limitations, alongside a series of Gorbachev and Reagan summits at Geneva in 1985 and Reykjavik in 1987. For more details see: Jeffrey M Elliot and Robert Reginald, The Arms Control. Disarmament and military Security Dictionary (California. 1984) pp 296-97.
21 William G. Hyland, n.7, p.29
85
2-3 December 1989. where the two sides agreed to resolve
outstanding issues 1n the Washington summit by June 1990.
The tre~ty was delayed and finally signed by Presidents Bush
and Gorbachev on 31 July 1991 at Moscow. It was ratified by
the US Senate on 1 October 1992. But unwarranted crisis
erupted with the disintegration of the Soviet Union on 26
December 1991. After. deliberating on how to treat the four
erstwhile republics of the Soviet Union (Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan and Belarus) which were 1n possessiun of
strategic nuclear weapons, the foreign ministers 6f the five
countries (including America) signed the Lisbon protocol on
23 Hay 1991. Accordingly, these republics had agreed to be
party to START I and assume the responsibilities of the
erstwhile Soviet Union.22
START I was succeeded by START II2 3 , when President
Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 16 June 1992
announced at Washington further cuts for NATO and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). According to the
22 Arms Control Reporter 1994 (Boston), April 1994, pp.11-12.
23 "START II: The End Game" , Arms Coo tro 1 Reporter, vol.22, no.10, December 1992, p.2. START II was negotiated between 27-29 September 1992. It was signed on 3 January 1993 in Moscow. At the end of January 1992, Yeltsin proposed a reduction to 2000-2500 warheads and Bush proposed to cut 4700 each. A series of meetings between Baker and Kozyrev produced the joint-understanding on 16-18 June 1992, between Bush and Yeltsin. At this meeting in Washington, Russia agreed to eliminate all MIRVED ICBHs by 2003 return for the American elimination with finan8ial assistance from the United States.
86
agreement reached on 3 January 1993, NATO and CIS would
reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to one-third their
current size by the year 2003 AD. The accord was possible
only after Yeltsin consented to abandon the concept of
"strategic parity" a governing principle in all arms control
between the two superpowers during the Cold War. The
unprecedented accord would leave Russia with 3,000 warheads
and America with 3,500 when fully implemented. START II
called for the elimination of all land based multiple
warhead ~MIRVED) ICBHs, considered to be the most menacing
and destabilising weapon on either side.2 4
The joint understanding brought US-Russian relations
out of the realm of the Cold War, introduced goodwill and
made possible further reductions in strategic forces in the
future given favourable bilateral political and global
conditions. 25
The Treaty ran into some obstacles when the Ukraine
refused, initially to be party to it. But more
significantly, the implementation of the INF Treaty raised
some technical problems. The Treaty when isolated from and
unrelated to other arms control negotiations, like the Anti-
24 Ar.m..s Control Reporter, n.22.
25 Spurgeon H. Keeny .Jr., "The Bush-Yeltsin Summit; Bringing Reality to the Nuclear Balance", .... A_..r_.,IIul5.~._·_""C_,.o'-'-r'-'It"-,r.._·""'o_._l Reporter (Washington), vol.22, no.6, July/Aug 1992, pp.lB-19.
97
Ballistic Missile CABH> Treaty. hardly made any sense.2B
It was difficult, according to some US commentators to
imagine its successful implementation if the US Strategic
Defence Initiative (SDI)2 7 was continued as well. Besides,
if the ABM Treaty collapsed the INF objectives could not be
fulfilled. 28
The US response largely stemmed from the concern over
the permanence of the radical economic reforms of Gorbachev,
which provided the impetus for negotiations between the· two
super powers. The Republican US Vice President, Dan Quale,
and the Secretary of Defence, Richard Cheney, expressed
their concerns. Other conservative, hardline policymakers
felt that the Soviet Union once reformed. could be a far
2B The ABH Treaty was the first part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). It was an agreement signed between the US President, Richard Nixon, and the USSR President, Leonid Brezhnev, on 26 Hay 1972. The two superpowers were both to be allowed to set upto ABH systems. One would be used to protect their national capitals and the other to guard their ICBM sites. These AHB systems were later reduced to one meant to guard national capitals. For more details see: Henry W. Degenhart Treaties & Alliances of the World (Essex, U.K., 1986), pp.238-39 and 243-44.
27 The SDI programme was announced by President Ronald Reagan in 1983. It signalled a reversal in the US policy which had previously rejected the strategy of building a Ballistic Missile Defence when the USA and the USSR signed the AHB Treaty in 1972. on the grounds of economically impossible. Reagan's initiative was largely based on the belief that modern technology can be utilised in research work to devise highly sophisticated space-based missile defence system. For more details see Jeffrey H. Ellio( & Robert Reginald, n.20, pp.141-43.
2e William G. Hyland, n.8, p.19.
98
more potent adversary in the future.~ 8
Another line of thought expressed by US hardliners was
that the covert intentions behind Gorbachev·s reforms were
to weaken the Western alliance and draw a wedge between the
US and its European allies. Moreover, they felt that
Gorbachev was aware of the fact that the NATO nations were
approaching a period of potential reduction in defence
budgets and were likely to face man-power shortage in the
long run.30
Furthermore, in the context of the two a.rrns
negotiations (SALT I , SALT II )31 and the treaty of
Conventional Forces of Europe (CFE)32, the USA confronted
2s Linda B. Miller, n.11, p.320.
30 Rodney Warwich and Robert Tonsetic, "East-West relations three years after Goibachev·s accession to power: Implications for NATO'', NATO Review, vol.36. no.4, August 1988.
3 1 SALT I: The first set of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks began in November 1969 and ended when US President Richard Nixon and the Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev signed two agreements in Moscow on 26 May 1972. For more details, see Henry W. Degenhart, n.26, pp.224-35. SALT II: Negotiations on SALT II started in Geneva on 21 November 1972. The draft as resulting treaty was signed by President Leonid Brezhnev and President Jimmy Carter in June 1979. Following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Carter withdrew from the negotiations and the treaty was shelved. For more details see Jeffrey H. Elliot & Robert Reginald. n.20, p.263.
32 The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement, concluded on 19 November 1990 at Paris by 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO countries officially marked the end of the cold war. It was being negotiated at Vienna for 21 months. Under this agreement both sides agreed to a ceiling of 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armoured cars, 20,000 artillery. 21,000 helicopters and 6,800 combat aircrafts deployed between Atlantic Ocean
99
the predicament that the Soviet Union was 1n a better
bargaining position. The US also feared that even as
economic necessities prompted Soviet force reductions, the
CFE agreement would provide the Warsaw Pact with its only
remaining military raison d'etre. According to one
perception, the Soviet Union would stand to gain politically
as well in East Europe. By establishing the pace for Soviet
withdrawal through negotiations with the West, Hoscow would
cleverly diffuse the politically explosive bilateral
negotiations between itself and its East European allies.
The official dissolution of the Warsaw Pact with effect from
1 April 1991 put some of these fears to rest. 3 3
Total weapons in Europe before and after CFE 34
NATO countnes F c.ra,er Warsaw
Wt-CipDT!S Ew• ore After :-.etc~re After
Tank: 22,0'12 11,142 li~ .. ~aa 6,8511,
Arr,oured :28,408 29~92l l J, 94J 1e,~00
C0~1bat vehicles Artillc:rv 18,6e4 18,286 Hl,818 6, 82:, Helicopters 1,573 2,0011 181 500 Co:;bat ~j ~ 332 6,662 1 '7 :.7 1 '6:.11, aircraft
and the Ural Mountains. For details, (Calcutta), 21 November 1990.
For111er SovJE:
E.ef cH i.; t ff
2e. 72:; 13, l =·~ F'.31~ 2~.il~i'
13~'174 13~17:·
1,481 1. :.011, 6,661 C 1C!l _1, J. • .IL•
see The Statesman
3 3 The US decision to maintain 30,000 more men on the periphery of Europe, i.e. in England Portugal. Spain and Turkey, has also been accepted by Hoscow on President Bush·s proposal to reduce 195,000 troops by the US and Soviet Union each in Central Europe. For more details see tl~.w York Times, 14 Feb. Hl90.
3 4 Arms Con t r rd R.t~_pn r t. e r ( W as h in g t on ) . v o l . 2 :s , n o . 5 , p . :3 2 .
100
On the whole it appeared that the US fears of Soviet
conventional arms superiority were exaggerated because,
-according to statistics, the erstwhile memb?rs of the Warsaw
Pact countries would have to destroy more conventional arms
than the NATO countries to bring about the proposed parity.
But the United States also felt that the START negotiations
would put America in an uncomfortable position. In the event
of substantial reductions, the NATO's residual forces would
be exposed to a pre-emptive Soviet attack. The logical
precautions against this would entail a costly modification
of its strategic arsenal which. however. was unlikely to be
endorsed by the US Congress.35
However, the prospects of Soviet economic recovery and
the expansion of its influence in West Europe did alarm the
US. Immediately after the war, the loss of Western Europe
would not have diminished the US power because globally iL
controlled a sizeable portion of the world's gross domestic
product. But, with the western European economic recovery,
there was a simultaneous decrease in European dependence on
United States. Were the Soviet Union's sphere of influence
to engulf western Europe, it would have an advantage of more
than 2.5:1 over the United States in population and gross
national product, in addition to tang~ble military assets.
So, all the more, the US was determined to thwarl
35 William G. Hyland, n.9, p.28
101
Gorbachev·s influence in Western Europe . 36
(2) Post disintegration of the Soviet Union
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, for the
second time since Second World War, the United States was in
a dilemma over the Soviet/Russian challenge. The collapse
of its former adversary presented a new geopolitical
challenge of enormous opportunity and tremendous danger.
Three aspects, however, were already very clear. First,
there was a wide range of possible outcomes in the erstwhile
Republics of the Soviet Union: the restoration of the
Russian empire under an authoritarian, xenophobic, anti-
western regime; the splintering of the region into different
groupings with widely divergent foreign policies and
culture, resulting instability and possibly a civil war; and
the emergence of truly democratic independent nations,
united by some form of common market and collective security
framework. Secondly, strategic importance was given to its
size ~nd its natural and human resources. And, thirdly, the
presence of thousands of nuclear weapons in the region would
generate a profound impact globally.37
The United States, as the only remaining global
superpower had evident in the outcome . It would be pointless
3B S tephen N. Walt, n.7 , p . 19 .
37 Demitri K. Surries. "America. and th e Po s t-Soviet Republi c s " , Foreign Affairs (N ew Yo rk ) . vol.71. no. ~:i , Summer 1993 . pp.73-77 .
102
to think of a benign new world order if America was to
preoccupy itself with a post-Soviet civil war or a resurgent
Russian empire. Conversely, -the integration of the former
Soviet landmass into western civilization would greatly
change the global correlation of forces, to use an old
Marxist-Leninist cliche, in a way favourable to US interests
Finally, western and particularly American and values.
actions, or
transition
inaction, would be a crucial factor during the
to new political economic and security
arrangements in this area.3B
In the aftermath of the abortive coup of 19 August 1994
to overthrow Gorbachev, the republics began declaring their
independence one by one. The United States was faced with
the choice of supporting the right of the people to self
determination or to continue to base its policy on relations
with Gorbachev's Union for the sake of stability. Before the
coup, the Bush administration's stand had been to su()port
Gorbachev. To many western analysts, the success of reforms
in the Soviet Union was linked to Gorbachev's ability to
stay in power.
The Bush administration chose the latter O()tion. The
American administration suspended aid to Moscow, maintained
contact with Yelt~in_an~_refused to send the newly appointed
American Ambassador. Robert Strauss to meet the new
leadership. Although the coup failed dnd Gorbachev returned
3B Ibid .. pp.74-76.
103
to power, there was a tremendous internal shift 1n power.
The power of the Soviet Communist party had declined
drastically and with the republics declaring their
independence federation. President Boris Yeltsin became the
new symbol of the aspiration of the Russian people. The coup
was partially blamed on Gorbachev's short sightedness and
failure to reform the Soviet economy.3S
The Bush administration soon qualified its support to
Gorbachev's attempt to hold the Union together. ~he first
test for the United States relationship with Gorbachev came
over when the three Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania and
Estonia) insisted on becoming independent. After Germany
spearheaded the twelve member European Community's
recognition of the independence of the Baltic States on 27
August 1991, President Bush urged Gorbachev to grant
independence to the Baltic States stating that the United
States would wait this before granting recognition. When
Gorbachev failed to get it passed in the Supreme Soviet, the
US went ahead and gave recognition to these states.
The Bush administration had outlined major requirements
for Soviet republics seeking recognition although American
Secretary of State, Baker's five principles did not apply to
the Baltic states because the United States had never
recognized their incorporation into the Soviet Union. These
39 James E. Goodby et al. ed., The Limited Part.IJersbip: Building a Russian-US Security Community (Sweden, 1993), pp '40-41.
104
five set of principles were discussed with the Soviet
Republic at the CSCE Conference in September 1991. They are:
1) The future of USSR must be decided peacefully by the
people of each republic in accordance with the Helsinki
Final Act of 1975.
2) Present borders must be respected and any change must
be consistent with the CSCE principles.
3) Change within the USSR and the republics must be
through democratic elections.
4) Basic human rights especially ·equal treatment of
minorities· must be established within the republics.
5) All republics must adhere to international laws and in
particular to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act of
1975 and the Charter of Paris of 1990.40
Essentially, these guidelines of US policy made it
clear to republic leaders that if they expected the USA to
welcome them into the community of nations, they must first
adhere to western notions of domestic political behaviour.
Though the Bush administration's view on giving the
Soviet Union economic aid after the coup remained unchanged,
the US congress's proposal for a massive aid package drew
flak from the administration. Congressman Robert Gephardt
called for 1-3 billion dollar fund and the White House ArmAd
Services Committee Chairman, Les Aspin supported a one
billion dollar aid for food, medicine and other humanitarian
40 Ibid.
105
needs. Both proposals suggested drawing these funds from the
Pentagon budget, in effect using the "peace dividend· as a
new type of defence spending that would enhance American
security for helping the erstwhile USSR undergo a stable
transformation. US Secretary of Defence, Richard Cheney, led
the administration's assault on these plans calling them
'foolish' and a 'serious mistake' which President Bush
merely called them 'premature·. To the administration the
situation in the Soviet Union was too unstable for the
United States to make any major adjustments in the policy
especially when it concerned financial aid. The same v1ew
was expressed by the United States at G-7 meeting at London
on August 1991 inspite of German support for a vast increase
in aid to the Soviet Union.41
However, the G-7 began to develop a more focussed
approach towards aid to the Soviet Union. At the IHF meeting
at Bangkok in October 1991, a Soviet delegation met the G-7
Finance Ministers and elicited a promise from them of
economic advisory missions to the Soviet Union. But within
the United States, Bush's tacit support for a million dollar
diversion of Pentagon funds as aid to the Soviet Union were
stalled due to continued domestic recession and the critique
that the money was needed at home to revive the US economy.
At this point the United States seemed preoccupied with
dismantling some of the remnants of the Cold War military
41 Ibid., p.43.
106
posture. In Septe~Ler 1991, President Bush announced major
cuts in the US nuclear forces and challenged Gorbachev to
match them. Gorbachev responded by announcing his own
proposals for further cuts. Till this time, the United
States policy was tilted in favour of central authority at
the Soviet Union but by the end of November, it realized
that it could not staff the breakaway of the Soviet
republics. With Ukranian vote for independence on 1 December
1991, the process of disintegration set in motion in the
Soviet Union. Washington withheld official recognition of
the Ukraine temporarily pending assurance of it adhering to
agreements signed by the USSR such as the NPT and CFE
treaties fearing that the break up of the Soviet Union would
leave the United States to deal with four independent
possible nuclear states (Russia, Belarus. Kazakhastan and
Ukraine). 42
Before the US policy could truly adjust, the break-up
of the Soviet Union accelerated after the 8-9 December
meeting at Brest, Belarus between the leaders of Russia,
Belarun and Ukraine where the CIS was established. In
response, on 12 December in a speech at Princeton
University, the US Secretary of States. James Baker,
outlined the essence of the new US policy towards the break
up of the USSR and the independence of the republics. Some
of the important elements of this new policy were:
42 Ibid., p.44.
107
i) dealing directly with the republic governments and
bringing them into the fold of Euro-Atlantic Community,
ii) a call for an international conference to eccnomically
aid the newly independent republics,
iii) sending US experts on non-proliferation and nuclear
weapons safety and dismantlement of nuclear weapons and
expansion of IMF and World Bank ties to the Republics.
It was the new US policy that undermined Gorbachev
almost completely because Gorbachev·s stand~ng in the
international community was what maintained his power in
post-coup Moscow as he had become increasingly unpopular
after the August coup.43
II. The United States and its NATO Allies
Between the end of the Second World War and the
outbreak of the Korea.n War, in June 1950. the r.elationship
between the United States and Western Europe was
transformed, the consequences of which are still much in
evidence on both sides of the Atlantic. Contrary to the
position that the United States might retreat to the pre-
Second World War stance of isolationism, abjurin~
responsibility for the operation of a diplomatic system
centred in Europe, there was created, in a five year period.
framework of diplomatic, strat.::gic and economic
entanglement, which has proved remarkably enduring and
43 Ibid., pp.44-47.
108
adaptable. 44
This may appear unexceptional 1n the light of events
since the late 1940s. When the whole process of American
entanglement was a focus of intense debate and controversy,
and a good deal of uncertainty much less a shear of
inevitability.45
American policy seemed at first to have no clear design
and seemingly resulted from an series of adhoc global,
regional and domestic responses to events - which were later
rationalised and codified by policy makeri. As it turned
out, some of these pressures had later resulted in the Cold
War. Over the years, American-European relations were
characterized by fluctuations between American priorities,
Soviet pressures and West European demands. The way in wt1ich
American involvement developed in West Europe was itself
relatively unpredictable.
America·s new world role would have provoked far
greater domestic dissension - and 1n all probability would
not have been taken up at all if the threat posed by the
Soviet Union and the communist idealogy to free institutions
and international order not simultaneously seem as a threat
to American security. For different reasons. Americans and
Europeans arrived at a common conclusion; the Soviet Union
44 Michael Smith, Western EJ.,u::·ope arill the .. Unitcl States: The Uncertain Alliance (London, 1984), pp.9-10.
45 Ibid.
had to be contained. During the Cold War. Americans debated
whether containment should be part icu la.r ist or
universalist - whether primary danger stemmed from the great
power threat emanating from the Soviet Union or from
communism as such. Nevertheless. a rough equation was
readily established between the ensuing order and protective
freedom on the one hand and providing for security on the
other. 46
Therefore, since 1949. the Atlantic Alliance has been
the nucleus of the postwar international system. Bound
together in the NATO, North America and Western Europe have
given the postwar world its vital element of military
stability and politico-economic order. The world around
NATO, however, has changed dramatically, while the alliance
itself has been relatively static. ·Militarily, it rema1ns
as it was in the beginning an American nuclear
protectorate for Europe.47 But 1n reality it 1s a
hegemonic American protectorate an American general is
Europe's Supreme allied commander (SACEUR), and Europe's
defence depended largely on the willingness of the United
States to initiate a nuclear war rather than see Europe
46 David C. Hindrickson, "The Renovation Foreign Policy", Foreign_ Affairs, vol.71. pp.52-53.
of American Spring 1992,
47
of D a v i d P . C a l l e o . B. e v on cl A rue ::r: i c: B n H P. g e n1 c•r-'-; ',r_i -=-: _ _..T'-'j·.....,I ,..,._:;. _.,_F.:..u..c..t'-"u"-'r"-'' P.""-.
the Western Allianc~ (New York. 1987). p.l.
110
overrun by Soviet conventional forces. 4 B
In the early years of the NATO, the European - allies
feared that the United States-might return to its old policy
of isolationism and, therefore, suppressed whatever doubts
they had about the understanding of the Cornmunist
threat. 48 The common fear held in Europe was that in the
event of a Soviet surprise attack, it would take the
Americans far too long to arrive on the scene if their
troops were to be brought all the way from the United
States. 50 However, after the death of Stalin, the earlier
Allied unanimity about the nature of the communist threat
altered. Under the impact of periodic ··Soviet Peace
Offensives", the latent differences simmering within the
alliance emerged. For example, Great Britain (under the
Labour Government), Italy and the Scandivanian countries
began to treat every such "peace-offensive", as a ba.s i<:
change in Soviet foreign policy and the beginning of a new
era of international cooperation, whereas, at the same time,
the FRG and France saw these merely as variations in
tactics, and not as any major shift from the basic
4B David P. Ca.lleo, "The American Role in NATO", in Ted G a l en C a r p e n t e r , ( e d ) , ..... N ..... A._.T,_,O.______..a ..... t~4....,0.,_,_: ___,Cc...:.o.un..L&.f ...... r-"'ou.r.._t t,._ ...... i.._.o-"'g.___a,.. __ ~Cu.t.....,t a.wru.lc,g ...... i~r'-=t g World (Washington, 1990), :··.205.
48 Henry Reappraisal pp.l90-91.
Kissinger, The Troubled of the Atlantic____Alliance,
Partnership: A (New York. 1965),
50 Arnulf Baring, 'Trans-Atlantic Relations; the v1ew from Europe". NATO RF:yiF:w. vol.37. no.l. Febru,:-,.ry 1888. p.18.
111
objectives of Soviet foreign policy.
oscillated between these perceptions.5l
The United States
West Europeans also feared the implications· of either a
rapport or clashes between the two superpowers. Frequently,
the Europeans accused the Americans, (at one moment), of
dragging them into futile and dangerous conflicts and, 1n
the next, negotiating with the Soviets on Europe's fate
without consulting them. They were interested in neither too
radical a hostility nor too intimate a rapport between the
two superpowers. They preferred chalking out a middle
course. The West Europeans were afraid of being a
sacrificial victim on both accounts and hence wanted distant
relations between the two superpowers rather than cordial
relations. Besides, the US had been prone to abrupt changes.
of direction undermining continuity in policy. Every four
years, with a new president at the helm the US tended Lo
start afresh.52
The other problem which impinged .on the relationship
between the United States and its West European allies was
the question of burden-sharing in the alliance. In the
United States, one set of statistics (usually defence
spending as a percentage of gross national product) was used
to accuse the Europeans of being "free-ric~c:rs". ~Jhil;:, t.he
United States, it was claimed, paid a disproportionate share
51 Henry Kissinger, n.49, pp. 190 91.
52 Arnulf Baring, n.50, p.22.
112
towards Europe's security. Half of America's defence budget
some 150 billion dollars a year, according to the Pentagon,
was utilised in keeping the NATO commitment. This was doub1e
the entire defence budgets of France and Germany which
combined, cam~ to only a little more than 70 billion dollars
a year. 63
The West Europeans, relying on another set of
statistics (the percentage of NATO's total forces provided
by Europe), resor.ted to the accusation, that the balance. in
reality was not titled against the US as the latter
claimed. 54 According to them, the input indicators were
not the only formula by which to measure each country's
performance. Output figures were more important and, on this
score, the European record was impressive. The West European
countries had about three million people in service of NATO
while the United States had only two million and if the
mobilization of troops were considered, the figures were six
53 David P. Calleo, n.48, p.205.
54 Michael Moodie, "Burden Sharing in NATO: A New Debate with Old Label", Washington Quarterly, vol.12 .. no.4, Autumn 1989, pp.62-65. In terms of gross national product devoted to defence - the US spends 6.4%, Britain 5.4%, Franc~ 3.9%, West Germany 3.1%, Netherlands 3%. On the other hand, the European members of the NATO content that they make the major contribution of forces in Europe by providing 91% of the ground forces, 86% of the Airforces, 75% of NATO's tanks and 90% of its armoured divisions and 65% of alliance warships.
113
and three ~illion respectively.55
In a bid to resolve this problem of burden sharing,
fo~mer Secretary General of NATO, Hanfred Worner, during a
trip to Washington in 1988, urged that the concept be
considered as an alliance and not a European issue, and not
be allowed to degenerate into a "-number-game·· or
"transatlantic slandering match".56
It was evident that the conflict largely arose from the
ambiguity in the definition of the word "burden" by the
members. The NATO allies did not agree on its definition or
its measure. This was largely due to the absence of
quantification. They were inclined to define "burden-
sharing" as a combination of the threat posed by the
potential adversary and the strategy adopted to meet it.
Changes in this threat perception would also influence the
strategy adopted by NAT0.57
Under "domestic pressure to reduce its defence expenses
in order to rejuvenate the economy, the US is insistent that . its NATO allies should share·· more of the total expenses.
However, its NATO allies are reluctant to do so as the East-
West political climate has been infused by dynamic changes
55 William F. Van Eeketen. The Euro-Group and the U.S. Group Dialogue", NATO Review, (Brussels). vol.36 .. no.4, August 1988, p.9.
~ 8 Michael Moodie, n.54. p.67.
57 Ibid., p.60.
114
that do not require additional defence expenses. 5 B
It is obvious that a new European security environment
is emerging because the European arrangements of Potsdam and
Yalta Conferences of 19455B cannot be prolonged any
further. General John Galvin, NATO's SACEUR has affirmed
that the Soviet threat has diminished. But this is the only
common denominator on which Europeans (both leaders and
public) agreed for the time being. Mikhail Gorbachev called
the new order "Common European Home", "George Bush looked
forward to "a Europe whole and free" and Fran co i.s Mit terand
spoke of a "broad confederation". Whereas the flourishing
West European half wants to strengthen the homogeneity of
the twelve member European community the aim of the
Masstricht Treaty of 1992 - the East European countries,
liberated from the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet hegemony, are
showing an inclination towards West European democracies.
Meanwhile, the Americans are unwilling to relinquish their
economic and political influence in Europe as the old
national fears are revived with the Russians trying to
ensure a safe Western front, and United Germany·s neighbours
5a Ibid., p.61.
58 The Yalta Conference was a wartime meeting which was held at Crimea on 4-10 February, 1945 among Churchil, Roosevelt and Stalin. It laid the ground for the postwar administration of Germany and the territories under German occupation. The Potsdam Conference was held from July 17 to August 2, 1945 and was attended by Attlle, Stalin and Truman to decide the fate of Germany after its surrender. For more details, see Henry W. Degenhart, n.26. pp.B-9.
115
seeking to forestaff German domination.s0 With th0 change
in the perception of the European security environment,
Germany, in turn, viewed the presence of Allied troops in
West Germany as occupiers rather than defenders. Thus, it is
clear that each nation is seeking to design an architecture
for the new Europe after the metamorphasis in East-West
relations and significantly each is working with a different
blue print.
Some Europeans see the Conference on Security and
Cooperation (CSCE), now Organisation for Security and
Cooperation (OSCE) at least in the area of arms control, as
a useful forum. France prefers it because it provides an
all-European forum in which an individual countries can
express their own views rather than by setting up as a
member of a military bloc. The Germans, which view it
positively as a device for legitimise the presence of
American and Russian forces in Europe as co-peacekeepers
than as leaders of confrontational military blocs. The
neutral and non-aligned European members favour it because
it allows them to participate in European matters without
being aligned to any bloc.
But, a forum such as the CSCE implying an "European
Security System" covering military responsibilities from the
Atlantic to the Urals, does not elicit a similar favourable
response from the Americans and the British. They see the
s0 Newsweti (Hew York) 12 March 1990, p.8.
116
Soviet Union striving, under Gorbachev, to achieve its
geopolitical goals through the
Europe though the dissolution
alliance and the subsequent
CSCE by gaining supremacy in
of the West&rn military
creation of a pan-European
security system with Russia as the motivating factor.B 1
The relationship between the United States and its
Western allies was also affected by US domestic policy, the
American reaction to the formation of a single European
Market_in 1992 and the growing spirit of Euronationalism.
The US administration has been under constant pressure
to reduce its defence expenditure in Europe, particularly
after Ronald Reagan·s costly endeavour to contain the Soviet
Union, created domestic economic inflation. Both the White
House and the Congress agreed to reduce tensions between.
Moscow and Washington but actual defence cuts were potential
points of conflict between the two. Democratic Senator, Sam
Nunn, sought deeper cuts in American troop strength in
Europe than those proposed by the Bush Administration.
Congress also advised the Pentagon to redefine the US role
in defending Western Europe in keeping with the proposed
cuts.
The administration was reluctant to do this for fear
that by relinquishing a major responsi~ility in West-
European security matters, the United States would lose the
coveted post of SACEUR because its West European allies. by
e1 Ibid.
117
assuming more responsibilities, would automatically insist
on a more decisive say in their own security matters
hitherto largely dominated by the United States. 8 2
In addition, the United States was also appreh~nsive
about the formation of the Single European Market in 1992 by
the twelve member European Community, because it was
apparent that this was to undermine us economic
competitiveness globally.sa European cooperation would
create clubs which would cut across the Atlantic Alliance.
However, former NATO Secretary General, Manfred Worner,
assured the United States that the European cooperation 1n
matters of security and defence outside NATO would be
"animated by transparency of activities and co1npa.tibility
with Alliance goals", and "a European pillar can only be
helpful for it will support the Atlantic bridge". But this
issue will largely be determined by what the United States
decide regarding its future role in Europe.6 4
The American relationship with its European allies is
also being gradually influenced by a growing spirit of
Euronationalism. Both th~ European left and right, clearly
long for Europe to establish its own political identity.
Aware of America's waning power ln Europe and cognition of
. 62 New York Times, 1 January 1990.
63 Hicha~l Hoodi~. n.54. pp.64-65.
6 4 Manfred Worner, "NATO Celebrates Anniversary .. , ..,N.._.A.._.T""O.__· ..._s___..1"""6<--__.__,.N"""o...,.t~i""o"'-'r._._·i..._::.; ( Amste rd o.m), Jan 1990, p.22.
118
its Fortieth vol.34, no.l,
its own post-war recovery, Western Europe is driven by both
fear and confidence towards a more autonomous geo-political
role of its security by establishing a relationship with
United States on the basis of equality.s5
The West European public find NATO's nuclear "first use
policy" morally distasteful. Similarly, Great Britain's
Labour Party finds the presence of the US nuclear weapons in
Britain (an anathema). Accordingly, they have pledged to
remove US nuclear weapons from their country. At the same
time, since Western Europe does not share Washington's
apprehensions about Russian imperial and ideological goals,
it is afraid that a belligerent America will provoke an
essentially defensive contemporary Russia to make rash and
dangerous decisions.ss
III. NATO's Future in European Security: Divergent Views
There seems to be a distinct divergence of op1n1on
between the United States and its West European allies on
the future role of NATO in European Security. The collapse
of Communism in Eastern Europe and the breakdown of the
B5 Michael Moodie, n.54, pp.64-65. Ho~ever, the December NATO communique stipulated that the presence of American troops in European Security is unavoidable. So America need not worry about hostilities emitted by Western Europe on its continued presenue there. For more details see: NATO, Communique of the Joint Ministerial Conference of __t_h_e_ 12..e.f.~ Planning Committee and the Nuclear Plano~ held on.B-7 December 1990 (Brussels, 1990), p.4.
ss Christopher Layne, "Atlanticism without NATO", Foreign Policy, no.67, Spring 1987-88, p.24.
119
former Soviet Union was the victory of freedom and democracy
which NATO had sought for four decades. But, it also robbed
the alliance of its raison d'etre leading some defence
analysts to question its relevance and existence. 67
The end of the Cold War in 1989 likewise
US to rethink its half a century hold foreign
compelled the
policy. The
implications were paradoxical. Changing relations between
the superpowers made the parallels drawn during the Cbld War
between world order and American security more tenuous than
ever. Without a great power base behind it, the threat posed
to American security was considerably reduced. At the same
time, enhanced cooperation between the superpowers made it
possible for the United States to promote objectives in the
world and particularly on the periphery - that were
previously obstructed by antago~ism at the centre such as
the war against Iraq. However, the favourable circumstances
in international relations. that allowed the US to entertain
a renewed vision of world order, undermine its importance in
matters related to European security.ss
Americans are loathe to realize that the West European
opinion by and large favoured a phasing out of the bipolar
alliance system and replacing it with a pan-European
security system most likely based on the Helsinki Accord of
67 Indian Express (New Delhi), 23 May 1990.
ss David C. Hendrickson, n.46, pp.54-55.
120
CSCE now OSCE.se
As early as 1986, Gorbachev had called for the
scrapping of the Warsaw Pact and NATO military
alliances. 7 0 Later, at the Halta Summit in December 1989,
he reiterated his desire in a slightly altered form. He
suggested that' instead of directly scrapping the two
mi~itary alliance, they should be infused more with a
political role so that these politico~military organisations
could lead the East European countries in developing their
own political institutions.
The US response, supported by Britain, was that it did
not prefer the early dissolution of NATO. According to the
official US view, American presence and participation in
Western Europe was essential in helping East Europe tide
over its turbulent transitional phase.71
In reality, the United States was aware that American
disengagement from NATO would be a "self destructive
solution". Given the American stake 1n Europe the
geopolitical connections of the transatlantic were vital.
Not only did it give the United State~ the scope to contain
the Soviet Union on its own ground. but also the necessary
. se Christian Science Hon1tor (Boston), 13 April 1990.
70 Times of In.d.i.a (New Delhi), 22 April 1986 .
71 Paul C. Wa.rnbe. "Arms Control 1r1 a New Age", Control Today_ (Washington), vol.18, no.4, Dec 89/.Jan p.3 .
121
A..l:Jr.u;;_ 1990.
attributes of a superpower position.72
Important questions have been raised about the role of
military powers in America's peacetime foreign policy. More
than a decade before the end of Cold War, many analysts held
that US military power had lost .a great deal of its utility
in America's relations with Western Europe and Japan. The
end of the Cold War, many argued, would devalue the role of
US military power even more. With a severely diminished
Soviet threat, these states would have little need for
American protection. Consequently, the United States would
no longer have the capacity to extract political leverage
from its provision of security to others. 7 3
During the Cold War era, the United States faced no
geopolitical threats, in reality but it acted as if it did.
It constructed military forces more suited for geopolitical
threats than for nuclear threats. From 1950-1990, the United
States maintained a large military establishment with (i)
large intercontinental capabilities; (ii) thousands of
tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe;- (iit) a huge
navy, far superior to anything the Soviets have deployed,
dominated the world's seas; (iv) a standing army of over
750,000 troops with significant numbers of heavily armoured
divisions stat..2.oned in the heart of Central Europe to
72 Earl C. Ravenal, n.48, p.224.
7 3 Robert J. Art "Defensible Defence: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War··, International Security (Harvard, U.S.A), vol.15, Spring 1991. pp.7-8.
122
counter any possible Soviet thrust Westwards; (v) a
formidable Air Force capable of intercontinental bombing;
and (vi) a sea and air power projection capability
indicating that the United States could move its
conventional forces with relative ease around the globe.
In addition, the strategic nuclear forces provided
bolster the counter-force capabilities to significant
credibility of deterrence against Soviet conventional
attacks on US allies. The tactical nuclear forces were
intended to counter the Sovi~t Uriion's perceived advantage
in conventional forces. The large Navy, Air Force and Army
were deployed to fight a long conventional war in Central
Europe to checkmate, and thereby dissuade, a Soviet
conventional attack there. Thus in constructing its forces
during the Cold War era, the United States acted as if
geopolitical logic was still at work.
Regarding the future role of the United States in
Europe, the Bush Administration pressed for allied agreement
that the new European security arrangement should remain
centred on the NATO, with a changed, possibly, expanded role
for the alliance.74
As the only alternative to satisfy both the US
Congress, and retain its hold over Western Europe, Pentagon
needed to evolve o policy devolution, whereby
responsibilities were reallocated because NATO as an
74 Ibid., pp.lB-19.
123
American protectorate, was no longer a viable proposition.
US policy makers, however, felt that the US should keep
a substantial number of conventional forces in Western
Europe and continue to extend its nuclear guarantee (in a
reduced form). This would enable the United States in the
future, to assume the role of an ally rather than that of a
hegemonic protector.75
Toeing this line, the British had initially warned
against changing Western defence plans prema.turely in
-response to the development in_ the East.7B They felt that
American military presence was necessary in Europe, not only
to provide reassurance against Soviet action even the
probability of this had decreased, but also to demonstrate
the American stake 1n European security. Thus for a time,
Britain lagged behind the European countries in support of
the CSCE. 77
The possession of nuclear weapons gave the British
argument some influence . But the end of the Cold War
eliminated this margin as it reduced the impact of its
~efence capability in a diminishing military alliance like
75 Earl C. Ravenal, n . 48, p.224.
7B Stanley R. Sloan, ·· NATO ' s Future in Europe : An American Perspective", International Affairs , (London ) , vol.65 , no.3 , Winter 1989 , p.503 .
77 Mi c hael Howard, "Military Grammar and Politic al Logic : Can NATO Survive if Cold War lS won?", NATO 8P.yiew, vol. :.37 . no.6, December 1989, p.12 .
124
the NAT0. 7 B Thus, by April 1990, there was a consensus on
the strengthening of the CSCE. British Foreign Minister,
Douglas Hurd, announced that as the Warsaw Pact
disintegrated the CSCE should play a greater role in
European security.7s
Similarly, the French felt that the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact and the consequent decline of the Soviet
military threat cared for the dissolution of NATO. Even if
NATO continued to exist, it would recede into the
background, unable any longer to provide the structural
framework for East-West relations. Hore relevant would be a
pan-European structure rather than a purely Western one that
would emphasise economics rather than security, bilateral
relations or global organisations, rather than exclusive
alliances. 80 And above all, Europe must be prepared, in
the future, to take a leading share in its management,
because according to the French, the future of Europe, first
and foremost, is the business of Europeans themselves.81
The Italians circulated a proposal to create a single
78 George Robertson, ''Britain in the New Europe" International Affairs, (London), vol.66, no.4, October 1990, p.70.
78 Christ ian Science... Hon it or (Boston), 13 Apr i 1 1996 .
80 Pi"erre Hassner, "Europe Beyond disintegration or reconstruction?", vol.66, no.3, July 1990, pp.464-68.
Partition and Unity: International Affairs,
a1 Valiery Giscard d Estaing, West", International Affairs. p . 654.
"The two Europe · s East and vol.65, no.4, Autumn 1984,
125
European security system at the (Helsinki II) follow up CSCE
meeting. The Belgians talked about unilateral withdrawal of
some of their troops from the NATO command82 and the
Dutch felt the alliance needed a new flexible response in
the next decade.83 The same desire was expressed by
Spain, which from the perspective of a greater European
contributor to the common defence, felt that the alliance
must adapt its strategy to the new international situation
and do away with rigidity in the process.8 4
The Federal Republic of Germany, in a bid to reassure
its neighbours prior to unification insisted that a unified
Germany would stay within NATO. But German Foreign Minister, -
Hans Dietrich Genscher, implied that the CSCE could replace
NATO and the Warsaw Pact security guarantee . The Chancellor
of United Germany, Helmut Kohl together with the French
President, Francois Mitterand, extended supp6rt for a pan-
European confederation. After the signing of the CFE
agreement in Paris in 1990, Helmut Kohl voiced his _
preference for the CSCE which received a hew lease of life
under Mikhail Gorbachev.85
Therefore changes in Eastern Europe were bound to shape
82 Christian Science Monitor, 13 April 1990 .
83 Cees Wiebesband and B~rt International Affairs , vol . 66,
Zeeman , "Holland and NATO", no . 1, January 1990 , p.113.
84 Narcis Sera, " The Atlantic Allian c e : focing a challenging new era", NATO Review , vol.37, no.S. 1989, p.7.
85 Christian Science Mo nitQI_ _. 13 April 1990 .
126
not only Washington's interest 1n Europe, but also the
cohesion of the western bloc. For NATO was born out of the
recognition of a common threat and a shared ·interest in
defending commonly held values against that threat. But
divergence of interests had long appeared among the partners
and it was imperative that the alliance reorient itself.
Official pronouncements on this issue reflected divergent
views. In January 1991, in his report to the President and
the Congress, US Secretary of Defence, Richard Cheney, noted
the changes and also the di~turbing continuities in the
Soviet Union arising out of the Soviet strategic military
programme. A similar view was expressed by British Defence.
Secretary Tom King, in his Statement of the Q~f~~
Estimates of July 1991. He sa.id: "'The Soviet Union remain::'
an unstable military super power whose capabilities need to
counter-balance if stability is to be preserved in
Europe"' . 88
The French Minister of Defence, Pierre Joxe·s statement
in the French National Assembly in June 1991 was more
reassuring. He said: ... one can assume that the US.S.R. of
President Gorbachev will not use its nuclear fire against
us, unless it is itself threatened in its essential being ...
but with the disappearance of the Eastern bloc whereby new
threats emerged i.e. the acquisition of missile technology
and weapons of mass destruction at the turn of the century
as Hichael R. Lucas, n.l7. pp.221-225.
by Third World countries near Europe. The Gulf War reve&led
that Turkey could find itself vulnerable to nuclear threats
from the Middle East.
Earlier, to meet the new challenges to European
security, the dormant Western European Union had launched an
initiative in October 1987, which adopted a defence policy
platform that develop into a more cohesive defence identity.
The participating foreign ministers of the WEU insisted at
the outset that they wanted to strengthen the western
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and not to
jeopardise West Europe's security partnership with the
United States.e7
Thus it becomes apparent in regard to conflicting West
European perspectives to the future of European security,
the United States will however continue to exercise its
influence in European security matters.
Conclusion
It is evident that the reduction of the Soviet threat
following Mikhail Gorbachev·s un~lateral initiatives to
diffuse international tensions compelled the United States
to reconfigure its role in Europe. From the inception of the
Western Alliance, the United States was the hegemon 1n it
and thus had a decisive say in West European security
matters. The fact that an American Gen~ral is the Supreme
e7 Ibid.
128
Allied Commander of Europe, the most coveted post of the
three principal Commanders of NATO 1s an indication of the
pivotal position the United States enjoys in the
organization.
On the other hand, from the outset, the Alliance was
characterised by skirmishes between America and its European
allies, over burden sharing but they never grew turbulent
enough to rock the foundation of the Alliance. For instance,
the West European partners had problems in determining
solutions to certain issues, l~ke the Arab Israel War in
1973, supply of gas from Siberia and the April 1986 US air
raid in Libya. As well the American economic position (by
virtue of which it was partly emboldened to form this
alliance), has undergone a drastic transforrna.t ion
undermining its post-war position in Europe. Fro~ a superior
economic position in comparison to the West European
countries just after Second World ~ar, its position 1n
Europe has been reversed owing to the success of the
Europ-ean integration nwvement.
But the -repercussions of Gorbachev·s disarmament
initiatives in Europe effected major changes in western
security policy, particularly after the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact in 1991. Furthermore, with the disintegration of
the Soviet Union and the p~esent economic crisis in Russia,
the US Conservatives have began to argue that since the
Soviet Union is no longer a. super po1-1er. it srwu ld not be
129
given a role 1n the reshaping of Europe. This was further
precipitated by the dominant US role in 1991 Persian Gulf
war, where the Soviet Union played a comparatively
insignificant role. Enamored by the American· success in the
Gulf War and the credibility of the anti-missile Patriot,
the US President, George Bush decided .to activate the
dormant SDI programme in order to provide an umbrella for
the United States against possible nuclear attack. This
decision appeared quite uncalled for since in the context of
diffused international tension there was little room for a
major super power to feel threatened enough to intensify its
nuclear defence programme. Such a move would inevitably
generate adverse repercussions on the republics of the
erstwhile Soviet Union, which could still pose a counter
military threat. Moreover. if stability is to be brought
about in Europe it has to be with Russian cooperation.
On the other hand, one needs to look into the US
motives for staying in Europe. With the European Union
strengthened by the Treaty of Haatricht in 1992, of which
the United States is not a member, American interests in
Europe can only be served by its continued dominant presence
in NATO its ability to exercise its · opinion in European
security. Furthermore, a reduced US presence in NATO would
erode its importance in it and probably give away to other
European powers the =ight to decide Europe security matters.
There has been 5 growing demand to enlarge the scope of
130
the dormant WEU by the West European powers specially France
and Germany in the post-Cold War phase which would enable
the European powers more_say in the security matters of
Europe. The United States is apprehensive of the growing
powers of United Germany in the European Union which has
began to play a decisive role in European politics like
granting recognition to
Croatia from Yugoslavia
Similarly, France has
the independence
ahead of the
of Slovenia and
other powers.
always nurtured great power
aspirations in Europe and has always been against American
involvement in European security.
The United States in the coming years, on and off,
might periodically resort to rake up the old issue of burden
sharing, but it is unlikely that it will wind up in Europe.
But ·caution· will be the key word in America·s foreign
policy owing to its inability to shoulder rr1a.j or
responsibilities due to its economic constraints. For
instance, America's involvement in Eastern Europe in the
wake of its transformation to democracy, was more low-keyed
than it was a decade earlier in its involvement in Poland.
Similarly, in the Yugoslav crisis, until recently, American
planes were flying under the NATO flag.
The question is should the Alliance continue? Taking
into account the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the
disintegration of the Soviet Union. the challenge ~o NATO is
to respond positively to Russian gestures.
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