- 618 -

CHAPTER IV

ELECTIONS OF 1957: C01vLUNISM VICTORIOUS

The strategy of the Communist Party of Kerala in

starting its electoral campaign for the next general elec­

tions, to be held in January-February 1957, was based upon

the realization that there was no need to defeat the Con­

gress Party in Kerala for it was abundantly clear that the

Congress already was a spent force. The history of the

post-independence years demonstrated that the Congress had

been unable to rule, and that the admiration, sympathy and

support it had once commanded among the people of Kerala

was gone.

Particularly striking was the fact that Congress fail­

ed to provide further leadership and guidance to the forces

of the national democratic revoluticm, to workers, peasants,

and the national bourgeoisie, who all during that long post­

independence decade lived a dream of building their free

country into a prosperous home for all. Among the people

of Kerala, by 1957, the forces of that revolution were as

strong, vigorous and ambitious as ever; only their tradi­

tional leadership had failed them. This vigor and undimin­

ished patriotism of the national democratic forces in the

state was accentuated and whipped into a new pitch by the

- 619 -

demand calling for the formation of United Kerala, a dream

not fulfilled during the full decade of the Congress rule.

The combination of all these factors not only sustained the

spirit of the people of Kerala throughout the decade of

political reverses, but it also brought about a renaissance

of national aspirations and an enormous yearning for cultu~

al upsurge unparalled and unexperienced even during the

struggle against the British rule. As we have seen, the

Congress Party remained blind to this new upsurge of patrio­

tism and of cultural craving of the people of Kerala. The

Communist Party, however, carefully listened, and then based

its strategy upon harnessing this renaissance of nationalism

and patriotism to its electoral campaign.

The problem for the Communist Party was not to defeat

the Congress Party, this had already defeated itself, or to

wage the electoral campaign on negative issues and by flogg­

ing a dead horse. The problem was how to place the Commun~

Party at the helm of the new upsurge of nationalism and

patriotism, how to make the electorate recognize in the Com­

munist Party the natural successor of the Congress, and how

to make the electorate transfer the leadership of the coun~

into the hands of this party.

Once this basic line of approach had been laid, the rest

was a matter of organization and of making suitable electoral

alliances.

- 620 -

Nationalism Harnessed

The theoretical foundations, which enabled the Com-

munist Party of Kerala to.place itself at the helm of the

renaissance of nationalism and patriotism as soon as the

Congress proved unable to provide a fresh and inspiring

leadership to these upsurging forces in Kerala, was laid

by the foremost theoretician of the Communist Party and the

future Prime Minister of the Communist Government of Kerala,

E.M.S. Namboodiripad, in an important work entitled The

National Question In Kerala, written in 1952. In this

paper Namboodiripad boldly stated that it was not the pro-

gramme of a socialist revolution, but nationalism, patrio-

tism, and catering to the national democratic aspirations

of the people, which proved the most potent forces in any

colonial country after the Second World War.

Focussing upon the national problem of his own state tbe

writer declared that the essence of the mistakes, whi.ch had

been committed by the leadership of the Kerala Co~nunist

Party in the past, lay in

"· •• the underestimation of the national factor in working out the tactics of the revolution, in the failure to realize that the Communists in a colonial country can fulfil their class task only if they tru{e proper account of the fact that the national aspira­tions are the decisive political factor in a colonial country". (1)

Applying this maxim to the concrete situation obtaining

in.Kerala, the Communist Party launched upon a campaign of

- 621 -

reviving the movement for the Aikya Kerala, the United

Kerala. The movement put foi~ard a demand that the Malaya­

lam speaking districts of the Madras Presidency, i.e.

Malabar, be united with the State of Travru1core-Cochin.

The campaign for the Aikya Kerala led by the Communist Party

drew its aspiration from a legend going back to ancient

times, when Kerala had been united under Emperor Mahabali

into one empire, and when all, as the story goes, had been

equal and had plenty to eat. Taking the cue from this folk­

lore, the Communist Party campaigned for the return of those

happy days through hard work and through unification of all

the Malayalam speaking districts into a united Kerala. The

symbolism of this folklore was then reduced to a modern

semantic formula calling upon the people of the state to

fight for a United, Democratic and Prosperous Kerala. This

became soon an effective slogan, which later found its way

into all important documents of the Kerala Communist Party.

As Namboodiripad declared;

"· •• The Party however did not remain satisfied with this practical unification of the democratic movement throughout Kerala, but, through a series of articles and pamphlets raised the programmatic slogan of uniting all the homogeneous Malayalam­speaking majority areas of the Madras Presidency and the States of Cochin and Travancore into one province without any maharajas. This, as we shall see subsequently, was a slogan which caught the imagination of the people and created a very power­ful mass movement for democracy ••• " (2)

As Namboodiripad said, the Communist Party of Kerala

- 622 -

would not remain satisfied with exploiting merely the

national content of the Aikya Kerala Movement. A new dimen­

sion was added to that movement as soon as the Communist

Party linked this with the calls for deep political and

social reforms.

How ~his new dimension had been added to the Aikya

Kerala Movement, Namboodiripad explained in his work in the

following terms:

"· •• it was the 0ommunist Party alone that gave an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal content to this slogan. For it was the Communist Party alone that declared (1) that the struggle for United Kerala is an indivi­sible part of the struggle of the people of India for the ending of imperialist rule; (2) that the struggle for United Kerala is also a struggle for ending prince­ly rule and other remnants of feudalism, a struggle for the introduction of full and genuine democracy for the people; (3) th:1t the boundaries of United Kerala are to be so drawn-up that all those contiguous areas of Madras, Travancore and Cochin wherein the Malayalam-speaking people-are in majority shall be included, the rest going to neighbouring national area provinces; (4) that in the strug:);le for United Kerala, being the struggle for democracy, the common people of Kerala, in alliance with their brethern in the neighbouring nationalities, are the decisive forces_ in that struggle.

It was these basic premises of a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the national question in Kerala that enabled the Party to carry on an ideological struggle against the various disruptive slogans advanced by the feudal, bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties with regard to United Kerala ••• 11 (3)

The most important aspect of this attitude of the Com-

munist Party towards the national question in Kerala was

the fact that while the Congress leadership visualized the

national democraGic revolution in merely anti-British ter~

- 623 -

. and therefore the movement it led was one -dimensional, the

communists conceived of the revolution as not only directed

against the British, but also attending to the national pro­

blems specific to the aspirations of the Malayalee people.

Hence the movement they led acquired explosive dimensions

of social reformism and of local patriotism, in additio~ to

its anti-British content. Figuratively speaking, the com-

munist-led national democratic movement for the Aikya Kerala

was three-dimensional, while the Congress-led movement was

one-dimensional, exhausting itself by the attainment of

national dependence.

Thus the uniqueness of Namboodiripad's formulations

lies in the recognition of the fact that the national con-

tent of the national democratic revolution in India is not

exhausted by the attainment of independence from external

control. The flame of nationalism and patriotism is further

sustained and fanned by demands for the form_ition of lin-

quistic states, and by calls for other adjustments in the

rights and in the territorial domain of overlapping nation-

alities and their states. It is in this wheels-in-wheels

manner that Namboodiripad conceived the national democratic

revolution in Kerala. (4) An important aspect of this stra­

tification of the national phase of the national democratic

revolution in Kerala was the recognition of the fact that

the linquistic oppression of the Malayalee people living in

- 624 -

the non-Malayalam speaking territories of the neighbouring

states had been linked with their economic exploitation,

and that these two then generated almost the same intensity

of antagonism as the British oppression and economic exploi-

tation had done in Kerala at one time.

This recognition then served as the basis for the ex-

ploitation of the revolutionary potential of the Aikya

Kerala Movement, of the movement which the Communist Party

adroitly harnessed to the promotion of its own objectives.

Namboodiripad gave this approach to the national question

in Kerala a theoretical exposition.

True, the movement for the Ai~a Kerala had nominally -been led by the Congress Party, which set up a United Kerala

Committee already in 1947.This body was composed of the

Kerala Congress, the Praja Mandalam of Cochin, and of the

Travancore State Congress, and organized the first All Kera-

la Convention in April 1947. But as we have seen, soon re-

gionalism and parochialism bee;an to eat the vitals of the

Congress Party, making it unable to provide the movement for

the United Kerala with a steady leadership. One section of

the Congress leadership now began to agitate' for separation

of the Tamil speaking taluks from Travancore and for their

merger with Madras State, while another section advocated

formation of a large multi-lingual Kerala. This was to

include Travancore,·Cochin, Malabar, Coorg, Tulu, some areas

- 625 -

of South Kanara, and the Tamil and the tribal areas of the

Nilgiris. This conflict then prevented the Congress from

giving the movement a united leadership. The movement any­

how ended with the merger of Travancore and Cochin into one

state in 19~, as a result of the integration policy of the

princely states pursued by the Union Government.

But this -vvas not the ul tirnate end of the movement.

What had terminated at that time was merely the stewardship

of the Congress Party. The Aikya Kerala Movement received

a new impetus in 1952, when the people of Andhra took the

.lead in organizing a campaign demanding formation of states

on the linquistic principles. The hunger strike of one of

the leaders of the new movement, Potti Srirnalu, undertaken

to force the Central Government to agreeing to the forma­

tion ofthe Visala Andhra, United Andhra, and his subse­

quent death, unleashed a powerful national upsurge of the

Andhra people. The movement was led by the Comnmnist Party,

soon to evolve into a severe clash in the course of which

the police resorted to arms and killed several people. The

calls of the movement remained, however, not unanswered,

and the very next day after the massacre the Indian Parlia­

ment agreed to appoint a special com.1ission to inquire into

the question of re-organizaticm of the states Df the Union

on the linguistic basis. Consequently, a three member

States Reorganization Commission was appointed which began

- 626 -

to tour the country to ascertain the nature of the problem

and to suggest a remedy.

The agitation for the Visala Andhra and the appoint­

ment of the Commission had a profound effect upon Kerala in

reviving the movement for the Aikya Keral~ defunct since

1947. By that time, however, the leadership of the revived

movement fell into the hands of the Communist Party, for

the Congress in Kerala was immobilized by the revolt of the

TTNC, by the official policy of the Union uovernment and of

the All India Congress Opposing the formation of states on

the linguistic basis, and finally by the revolt of leaders

of the Akhanda Kerala rocking the Uongress of that state.

The clear cut policy of the Communist Party towards

the national question in Kerala, formulated by Namboomripad,

then provided the party with a guide which enabled it to

place itself at the helm of this movement. The party

organized several CruQpaigns agitating with national and

patriotic slogans and with emotionally charged poems and

songs specially composed for the purpose. In 1951 alone

no less than 2,000 poems and 200 short stoTIBs were pub­

lished. (5)

The renaissance of national and patriotic awareness

was in the making in Kerala. The Communist Party was its

recognized inspirer and undisputed leader while the CongreE

lay prostrate sick with internal dissent. It was by riding

- 627 -

high on the crest o.f t_his rejuvenated national democratic

revolution in Kerala that the Communist Party was placed to

power in the 1957 elections.

When the States Reorganization Commission finally came

to Kerala, it found the people in a state of high agitation

in favour of the formation of United Kerala on a linguistic

basis, exactly as had been proposed by the Co1n,~1unist Party

a long time ago. ~he upshot was that the Union Government,

upon recomm.e.ndation of the Commission, ordered the formation

of such a state through incorporation of Malabar and Kasergpd

into Travancore-Cochin State, and through separation of the

four Tamil speaking taluks from Travancore and their merger,

together with a part of Shenkotta taluk, with Madras State.

The new state thus formed assumed the proud and ancient name

of Kerala, and came into being on November lst 1956. On

November 27th 1956 the former advisor to the Rajpramukh,

B.R. Rao, was appointed Governor of the new state of Kerala.

November lst became a day of victory and rejoicing for

the Communist Party of Kerala, comparable in its significance

to the meaning August 15th has for the all India Congress

Party. November lst became the Independence Day for

Kerala. (6)

The Communists thus emerged as the unifiers and liber­

ators of the Malayalee people from the national, linguistic

and economic oppression by the neighbourly nationalities.

- 628 -

The deliverance from the British rule in 1947, and the role

the Congress had played in it, was matly forgotten or over­

shadowed by contemporary events. Now the Communist Party

was firmly in the saddle, enjoying the full leadership over

the second wave of the national phase of the national demo­

cratic revolution in Kerala long before the general elec­

tions were held in the new state in 1957. The electoral

results merely harvested the fruits of this leadership.

Builders Of Democratic And Prosperous Kerala

The leadership of the Kerala Communist Party realized

that it must carefully guard its freshly won hegemony over

the forces of the national democratic revolution. It was

obvious that by the attainment of United Kerala this revo­

lution must not exhaust itself, and that if the party wished

to be returned to its helm by the 1957 elections it must

attend to the problems created precisely by such a unifica­

tion. What was needed in order further to guard and nurture

this~volutionary upsurge, after the attainment of United

Kerala, was a progrrua~e of economic and social reconstruction

which would bring nearer to the people of Kerala the dream of

Emperor Mahabali's times.

The leadership of the Kerala Communist Party attended to

this problem at a Provincial Conference, held at Trichur from

June 22nd to 24th 1956, as the resolution adopted indicates.

It was proudly entitled lt'or Democratic And Prosperous Kerala.

- 629 -

The resolution welcomed the final plans for "the form-

ation of the UI).ited Kerala, lauded the role the Comrn.unist

·Party had played in their formulation, and d$clared that

these had been finalized in spite of the uanti-national"

and 'antilinguistic" polices of the Congress Party of Kerala.

With :the formation of the new state, however, only one part

of the tasks would be fulfilled. The new tasks, which the

people of Kerala would be facing soon, would relate to

building Kerala into a democratic and prosperous state of

all the Malayalee people.

The reso]ution then appealed to the people of the state

in a most earnest language:

"··· As till now and even more so let us work together on issues on which there is agreement. Let us now direct the unity and selfless work, which we had in the struggle for the Aikya Kerala, into the task of building-up the new Kerala of which we have been dreaming till now. The diffe~ ences among us must not become an obstacle to this ···" (7)

The resolution then attacked the Congress. It declared that

Kerala was rich, that it had resources and natural wealth,

but that it had been the poor husbandry of the Congress

which prevented the people of the state from profiting from

these riches. If the people of Kerala joined hands in a

political struggle, it would be possible to form a govern­

ment in the state, a People's Government, which would ful-

fil the age-old dream of the Malayalee people. Such a

government would industrialize the state and lay the found-

- 630 -

ations of socialism. The possibility of the formation of

such a government was a real one, and only the Congress

stood in the way of its realization. The central problem

of Kerala was of a political, and not of an economic,

nature.

The resolution then put forward the following programme

for building the new democratic and prosperous Kerala.

In the first place, the people of Kerala should fight

against the injustices, malpractices and anti-democratic

measures of Presidential Rule. The people then should de­

mand from the Central Government that the Provincial Legis­

lative Assembly should be constituted on October lst 1956,

when the new Kerala State would come into existence. The

people of Kerala then should make the Central Government

undertake steps in order to establish a new Government

responsible to the new Kerala Legislative Assembly. The

Presidential Rule must~rminate. The people of Kerala must

further create conditions which would make impossible the

reappearance of the Ministerial crises, and which would

forever terminate the instability of the Government. The

people must thus resolve to form a stable Govermnent capable

of implementing a minimum programme aiming at building a

democratic and prosperous Kerala. On the basis of such a

programme, the people of Kerala must forge an electoral

alliance of all the left parties of the state and of

- 631 -

democratic and progressive individuals and Congressmen

"willing to fight against the reactionary policies of the

Congressu. Such a united front would then give rise to a

coalition government able to inplement the minimum programme.

The resolution then appealed to the left parties, demo-

cratic individuals, and to "patriotic Congressmen 11, to unite

in order to arrest the rise in prices, increase wages and

salaries of workers and the middle class, ensure fair prices

for agricultural produce, prevent eviction from land, and

attain the fulfillment of other imll1ediate demands of the

people. In many parts of Kerala the people belonging to all

political parties were finding the way to each other in order

to co-operate on these national tasks. This auspicious pro-

cess then must be accelerated and promoted by all means,

said the resolution.

f•he leadership of the Communist Party then declared in

the resolution that an outline of all these proposals would

be presented soon to all progressive parties, groups and

individuals, in order to make them realize the tasks ahead,

and to prompt them in initiating to work on building the new-

Kerala. The resolution earnestly appeaTied to all of them for

support and co-operation on these national tasks. A special

appeal was addressed to the Praja Socialist Party:

"· •• The Communist Party wished to make its special appeal to the PSP. 'i'he Communist Party appeals to the PSP to remember again the great enthusiasm generated

- 632 -

among the people by the united front of the Communist Party and the PSP in Malabar during 1951 elections, and between the Communist Party, the PSP and other Leftist Parties during the general elections in Travancore-uochin in 1954, and the demoralization of the people when after the elections this united front froke up.

Nobody can deny the historical truth that it was the anti-Communist line of the PSP's leadership which made it impossible in 1954, and even earlier, to unite the democratic forces of Kerala, to oppose the Congreg;; Government's undemocratice policies, and to establish a Government which would have followed policies in the interest of the people.

Will they continue to follow the sfu~e policy in some form or other? Will they continue their intrigues to deny the Communists the place in the Legislative Assembly and in the Government which they have already earned in the public life of the people. Will they try to make agreements with other parties and groups excluding the Cooonunists, or even opposed to them? The Communist Party appeals to the PSP as a whole to re-examine its entire policy as to answer satisfac­torily all these questions. At the same time the Communist Party greets the PSP friends who are making effort~ to re-exa~ine their policies in this manner, and lay the foundation for unity". (8)

There was an appeal also to the leaders of the Revolu­

tionary Socialist Party, whom the Com:nunist Party wished to

use as a pressure group to hammer the PSP into a united

front. Declared the resolution:

"The Communist Party wishes to remind the Revolutionary Socialist Party that it has a special role to play in getting the Praja Socialist Party to accept such a policy ••• " (9)

Long before this Trichur Provincial Conference of the

Communist Party of Kerala took place, the research depart-

ment of the party had been hard at work in drafting the

- 633 -

really first and comprehensive plan of economic reconstruc-

tion of the new Kerala. It was through this programille that

the party planned to safeguard its leadership over the

national democratic revolution after the fol~ation of the

United Kerala. The resolution of the Trichur Conference

referred to this plan of national reconstruction in the

following terms:

u ••• As a basis for uniting these forces and building up democratic and prosperous Kerala the Communist Party puts forward a minimum programme before the people. The Party realizes that there are Congressmen who do not either accept the pro­gramme in full, or in accepting it in full believe that the Congress itself can imple~ent it. To these Congressmen the Communist Party appeals: Let us work united on items of the programme to which you agree.

The Party does not consider that this programme is either complete or that it needs no changes. The Party has prepared it for the discussion and acceptance by the entire Malayalee people. The Party declares that after eliciting the views of the people and consultations with other parties, it is ready to make necessary changes in the programme.

The unity that we require today cannot be confined to alliances and agreements among political parties. Thetask of building up a democratic and prosperous Kerala is a task which could be fulfilled only by the entire Malayalee people. The Communist Party therefore appeals to the workers, peasants, middle classes, intellectuals, women, youth and literary, art and cultural wor~ers of Kerala to strengthen their organizations and units to develop a power­ful mass movement to back this task ••• " (10)

With the resolution of the Trichur Conference, and

with the minimum progra~e of building a democratic and

prosperous Kerala, the Communist Party plunged into the

- 634 -

electoral campaign. The outstandins; feature of these two'

documents was the fact that they placed the Communist Party

upon the high pedestal of a national and patriotic force

striving for nothing more than better implementation of the

economic programme of the Congress Party. The minimum pro­

gramme of the Communist Party of Kerala was in fact based

upon the general outlines of the Second Five Year Plan,

which had been prepared by the Federal Government. This

minimum programme hence was a programme of the Congress

Party, a party of the national democratic revolution, and

not a programme of the Communist Party, a party of the so­

cialist revolution.

The Communist Party, on the eve of the 1957 elections,

hence stole from the Congress not only the national and

patriotic content of the national democratic revolution,

but also its economic programme; a programme of national

reconstruction which called for the development of state

capitalism and not for an immediate nationalization of

industry and a large scale distribution of land to the til­

lers. The Congress was replaced at the helm of the national

democratic revolution in Kerala in all respects.

Search For Allies

Having this basic outline of the electoral strategy

of the Co~~unist Party of Kerala laid down at the Trichur

Conference, the leadership of the party concentrated up~n

- 635 -

the formation of a united front which v;;ould enable the

party, and its allies, to annihilate the Congress in the

course of the forthcoming electoral contest. The great

obstacle to this drive of the Communist Party was, however,

a decision of the Gaya National Conference of the PSP, held

in December 1955, which declared that the PSP would have no

alliances or even electoral adjustments with the Congress,

the Communist Party, ru~d also with parties of communalism.

It was to this decision that Namboodiripad addressed

himself in January 1956. The writer first cited another

decision of the PSP Gaya Conference to the effect that "it

is not possible today for any of the opposition parties,

either singly or collectively, to replace the Congress Govenr

ment and to establish a Government that is pledged to the

defence of the interests of the working people". (ll) This

notion, said Namboodiripad, was also reaffirmed at the

founding conference of the new Socialist Party of India,

which had been held at that time in Hyderabad. Then he

continued:

"· •• We, Communists, would therefore urge upon both the PSP as well as upon the Socialist Party of India to realize that, even supposing that they are correct in saying that it is not possible today or for a few years to come to replace the Congress Government by a Socialist Government or by a Government of several Socialist Parties, it is quite possible even today to wage a successful struggle against many of the policies which the Congress Goverrunent is pursuing ... For, we are of the opinion that it is only to the extent to which we unite ourselves in such a struggle ..•

- 636 -

. that we will be able to create the necessary condi­tions for the replacement of the Congress Government by an alternative Government •. • • " ( 12)

The Communist Party of Kerala was prepared to go to any

length in attempting to secure co-operation of the PSP for

a joint assault upon the positions of the Congress. This

subject was dealt with at a meeting of the Provincial Com­

mittee of the Corrununist Party,. held in Ernakulam from Octo-

ber 6th to 9th 1956. The resolution adopted at that meeting

declared that the Comn1unist Party would take all necessary

steps, and vJOuld continue its negotiations, to unite all

parties and individuals, ready to agree to a common pro-

gramme of forming an alternative government, in order "to

prevent the Congress from returning to power". (13) The re-

solution further declared that the general elections in 1952

and 1954, the elections to the Malabar District Board in

1954, and the municipal elections in Travancore and Cochin

in 1954-56, all had made it abundantly clear that the Con­

gress had not the backing of the majority of the people.

Addressing itself to the PSP, the resolution expressed a

hope that the forthcoming National Conference of the PSP

would make the necessary alterations in the National Execu-

tive's ~ombay decision to enable the PSP in Kerala to co-

operate with the Com:r..unist Party.

Commentinghter upon this resolution, A.K. Gopalan

declared that the meeting also dealt with several problems

- 637 -

relating to the formulation of a common political and eco­

nomic programme which could serve as a basis for forging

a united front of the left forces. The Communist Party

maintained that before any electoral alliance could be

concluded all partiesm this alliance must first agree upon

such a programme. A novel feature of such a progr~me would

be provisions relating to co-operation in the post-election

period: (a) if a majority is won by the alliance, this must

not break up but must continue in order to form a new Minis­

try; (b) it would be wrong for any party of the alliance to

form such a Ministry to the exclusion of the other parties;

(c) even if the Communist Party itself won an absolute

majority, the party would not depart from those provisions

relating to the post-election co-operation; the party would

not exclude the other parties of the united front from shar­

ing power. (14)

'l'he necessity for the Communist Party having the PSP in

its electoral fold, because the PSP held the balance between

the declining Congress and ascending Communist Party,

prompted the communist leaders once again to press the PSP

into a joint assault upon the Congress. A Plenary Meeting

of the Kerala Committee of the Communist Party, held at

Alwaye from January 1st to 3rd 1957, dealt chiefly with

prospects of this Communist-PSP co-operation.

The resolution adopted at that meeting first reviewed

- 638 -

the preparatory work which had so far been undertaken in

view of the fast approaching elections. Then it put forward

the chief electoral slogan, calling for the formation of a

stable government based upon co-operation of the Communist

Party with the left parties and progressive individuals and

groups. (15) The resolution declared that the Revolutionary

Socialist Party had already agreed to the minimum programme,

as well as to the conditions relating to the post-election

co-operation. The resolution further went on to state that

for ensuring the future of United Kerala, endin;; the prover­

bial political instability, terminating Presidential Rule,

it was not enough to reduce the Congress to a minority party,

or merely to strengthen the democratic op~osition. The

lesson of the 1951 and the 1954 general elections in Kerala,

and of events since, clearly pointed out that the downfall

of the Congress from power had not automatically resulted

in the formation of a stable and popular government, and that

the political instability continued. This experience then

showed that the only solution of all these difficult pro­

blems plagueing Kerala lay in the most determined efforts

at the formation of a goverTh~ent of all opposition parties.

The resolution then lashed at the PSP for its unwilling­

ness to co-operate with the Communist Party in forming an

electoral alliance. This negative stand of the PSP was the

result of the Bangalore Session of the PSP National Conven-

- 639 -

tion which, it will be recalled, had reaffirmed the Gaya

Thesis, but amended it to the effect that only minor ad­

justments with other parties would be allowed in extremely

grave cases. The Alwaye resolution declared that at the

existing moment the PSP shovved no readiness to accept the

communist proposed solution of the problem of governmental '

instability in Kerala. The PSP leaders had only promised,

said the resolution, that they would not enter into any

alliance with the Congress, or otherwise help the Congress

climb back to power. But the PoP leaders had not been

ready to unite with other left forces in order to form a

popular government, declared the resolution, nor were they

prepared to help such an alliance to win power. They even

failed to state whether they would not try to form a mino­

rity government with the support of the Congress after the

elections. Such a stand must be condemned, said the reso­

lution, for it ignored the demand not of political parties,

but of the entire people of Kerala for a stable and popular

government which could secure progress ~United Kerala.

The resolution then appealed to the PSP to give up such an

"anti-national stand", and to co-operate on the creation of

conditions favourable for the replacement of the Congress

Government by a government of the left unity.

As for the position of the Communist Party, the resolu­

tion declared that the party firmly stood by the slogan call-

- 640 -

ing for the formation of a popular government, and that the

party and its allies would go ahead in its implementation

regardless of the position of the PSP. But this did not m~,

hastened the resolution to add, that the Communist Party

would not seek any other type of electoral understanding or

adjustment with the PSP. The party was prepared to avoid a

contest between the PSP on the one hand, and its own candi­

dates and those of the Iront on the other, in such consti­

tuencies in which this contest would result in a victory of

the Congress candidates. However, such an understanding

with the PSP, if arrived at, must not in any way affect the

alliance the party would have with the RSP, and other parties

and friends.

The decision of the Bangalore National Convention of

the PSP, held from November 26th to 28th 1956, to the effect

that "adjustments of seats only VJi th severely limited

objectives of preventing mutual competition between the

parties and elements of democratic opposition" would be

permitted to the PSP State Committees, provided then an open­

ing for the State Committee of the Kerala PSP to enter into

negotiations with the Communist Party for such an electoral

adjustment. 'l'he decision to enter into such talks had been

reached at the Kerala State Convention of the PSP, held at

Pudukhat on January 6th 1957, and the actual negotiations

were initiated at once. The negotiations went well, and

- 64-1 -

soon were enlarged to entail talks on a full-fledged agree­

ment for a united front and for the formation of an alter­

native government. The communist negotiators proved

extremely generous in offering the PSP exceedingly favour­

able terms. But the appetite of the PSP grew, (or perhaps

its exorbitant demands were merely to thwart in an oblique

way the prospects of the PSP-Communist co-operation), the

PSP negotiators coming up with demands which the other

party could accept only at the cost of almost self­

destruction. A report of January 8th 1957 indicates that

the PSP demanded as a price for co-operating with the com­

munists 55 out of 77 seats in the former Travancore-Cochin

State, and 20 out of 4-9 seats in the former Malabar District.

The communist side strongly objected, and the negotiations

broke off. (16) On January 9th 1957 the Communist Party

how ever sent a letter to the PSP offering 13 seats in

Malabar, the allocation in Travancore-Cochin to be renego­

tiated. But the PSP put forward new and steep demands, and

the negotiations terminated in a day or so. (17) The final

negotiations of the Communist Party with the Revolutionary

Socialist Party proved also futile, and the Com.1mnist Party

had to plunge into the electoral contest alone, supporting

only a number of independent candidates.

The leadership of the Communist Party of Kerala was,

however, aware that even if the party won a full majority

- 642 -

of votes in the State Assembly on its own, the party would

have to invite the PSP to share power in the cabinet in

order to isolate the Congress and prevent an eventual for­

mation of a hostile PSP-Congress combination which could

harass the communist regime. Hence, after the break-down

of the Communist Party-PSP negotiations, the com~::.unist l~ad­

ership stated that "even after the elections, if the Com­

munist Party wins absolute majority, the Communist Party's

declared objective is to form a Government of Democratic

Opposition". (18) This then left the door open for an

eventual Communist Party-PSP Co-operation.

The Communist Election Manifesto

After the futile efforts at securing an electoral

alliance with the PSP, the leadership of the Communist

Party initiated the last phase of its electoral campaign.

The final touch, threwing the party's campai3;n into the

highest gear, was the publication of its Election Manifesto

in January 1957.

The Manifesto was a unique document, combining hard­

hitting punches against the Congress with a constructive

programme for building a democratic and prosperous Kerala.

The Com-1unist Party was the only party which placed in front

of the electorate not only a positive and concrete plan of

how to end the agony of political instability in the state,

but also of how to improve the lot of the people.

- 643 -

The first part of the Manifesto was framed in nation-

alistic and patriotic terms. It praised the patriotic role

the Communist Party had played in the attainment of United

Kerala, and charged the Congress with "anti-national and

unpatriotic policies", bordering on national betrayal, on

the question of United Kerala. The most amazing aspect of

the situation in January 1957 was the fact that while in

the 1951 elections it had been the Communist Party which

badly suffered from its record of anti-national policies

followed in the course of war while the Congress had been

riding high on the crest of nationalism and patriotism, in

the elections of 1957 the position was just reversed. Now -

the Congress was labelled "anti-national and unpatriotic 11,

while the Communist Party assumed the garb of a national

and patriotic force. In this single fact of the exchanged

roles lies the entire significance and the real meaning of

the communist victory in Kerala in 1957.

The Manifesto proudly recalled the role the Communist

~arty had played in the attai~~ent of the Aikya Kerala, and

.then made an astounding declaration that the future of that

state was not at all secure because several conspiracies

against the new state were underway. (19) Three conspira­

torial groups menaced the future of the state: (a) advocates

of a Southern State; (b) advocates of a Western Coastal

State; (c) and agitators for the Akhanda Kerala. All these

- 644-

groups had not given up their separatist ambitions. Their

aim was, declared the Manifesto, to see that Kerala receivEd

no stable government as the result of the forthcoming elec­

tions. This in turn would create a constitutional crisis

causing the Presidential Rule to continue under the pretext

that the new state was an artificial conglomeration unable

to rule itself. The way would thus be paved for the separa­

tion of the southern provinces, and for their formation into

a separate state allegedly able to form a stable government

because of its more homogenous population.

It was against this background that the Manifesto called

upon the people to rally behind the Communist Party and its

allies in order not only to defeat these machinations, but

also to realize a centuries old dream of a prosperous Kerala.

The necord of the Congress Party had shown, said the Manifesm,

that it was not only unable to rule, but that in spite of the

enormous natural riches of the state all Congress governments

failed to attend even to the bare necessities of the people.

The Manifesto declared that the Communist Party of

Kerala would admit that the Government of India, a.12c. tl'le All­

India Congress Party, had adopted a number of progressive

measures. It was a matter of satisfaction to the party to

note that the Congress Party, which for years had been attac~

ing the communists by saying that socialism could not grow

on the soil of India, now declared that socialism was the

- 645 -

goal of the country. Equally so the party drew satisfac­

tion from the fact that the Congress Party, which in the

past had labelled the communists as Russian agents because

they had argued that only the Soviet Union, China and other

socialist states, were the real friends of India, now

accepted this as a fact and v10rked for the strengthening

of ties with these socialist lands.

After this blast against the CentralGovernment and the

All-India Congress Party the Manifesto took to task the

Kerala Congress. The document declared that the Kerala Con­

gress stood indicted for "not accepting even those progres­

sive measures which Pandi t l~ehru and the All-India Congress

leadership had adopted". If after ten years of the Congress

rule Kerala still remained a problem state, the responsibi­

lity for this must fall upon the heads of the local Congress

leaders. Their effort "had been not to implement the pro­

gramme" for the development of Kerala mapped out by the Cent­

ral Government 11, large sums allocated by the Five Year Plan

had not even been spent, "but to indulge in factional quarrels

and to break the heads of the people agitating for their

demands". It was this policy which generated hatred and

dissatisfaction among the patriotic Congressmen, said the

document.

~he Manifesto made a bid in order to place the leader­

ship of "people's strug:;le against the decadent rule of the

- 646 -

Congressn into the hands of the Communist Party. The docu­

ment said that the people of Kerala had enough of the Con­

gress rule, and that they would tolerate no longer its anti­

people policies. Theyhad already recorded their verdict in

the 1951 and the 1954 general elections, in the Malabar

District Board elections of 1954, and in the municipal elec­

tions which took place in Travancore-Cochin late in 1955 and

early 1956. (20) In the next elections the people would

even more firmly reject the Congress. This happens to any

majority party which rules by bayonets and against the wishes

of the people, alluded the Manifesto.

The political instability in the state could be elimin­

ated, declared the Manifesto, only if the majority of people

united in voting for progressive policies. There were good

indications that the majority of people was prepared to do

so, and that in fact it had already demanded the formation

of a stable government. The Communist Party was "fighting

this election to give a definite shape to this desire of the

people".

To convince the people of the state that the Communist

Party would be able to rule, if entrusted with this mandate

by the electorate, the Manifesto cited the proud record of

the communist-ruled Panchayats and, above all, of the succes~

ful communist stewardship of the Malabar District Board:

"· •• The. people also know that the administration of

- 647 -

many municipalities and of the Malabar District Board under the leadership of the Communist Party is better than before, and that both the panchayats which won awards from Prime Minister Nehru for good administration are under the leadership of the Communist Party. These. experiences have made it clear that the Communist Party is capable not only of uniting the people for conducting agitation, but that it can also take over and run the adminis­tration successfully .•• " (21)

Making its final appeal to the voters, the Manifesto

declared that the Communist Party had no other programme

than one of developing Kerala into a democratic and pros-

perous state. With such a programme the party had confidence

in facing the people.

The last section of the Manifesto was a detailed pro­

gramme pf economic, social and administrative reforms. (22)

It was an ambitious programme of national reconstruction of

Kerala, in genera:_ outline following the aims and objectives

of the Five Year Plan. The following are the abridged princ:b-

pal items of the national reconstruction section of the Mani-

festo which the Communist Party promised to implement if

elected to power either in alliance with friends or alone:

(1) in order to provide the necessary funds for the

national development programme, the Central Government would

be requested to increase the capital allocation for Kerala's

Second Five Year Plan from Rs 870 million to Rs 2,000 million.

This would amount to about 130% increase in capital resources;

(2) with these funds new industries would be established

to provide new employment opportunities for the people;

- 648 -

(3) these funds would also be used for development of

co-operatives in small-scale industries, like coil, hand­

looms, and others;

(4) plantation and industrial labour would receive an

immediate wage increase of 25%;

(5) workers would be e;ranted an .i..11crease of bonus up to

12.5% of the actual wage;

(6) funda~ental changes would be made in agriculture by

introducing an Agrarian Relations Bill. The main aim of the

Bill would be to safeguard the interests of the tenants, put

ceiltng on land holdings, redistribute surplus land to the

landless and to fix fair rent;

(7) to bring immediate relief to the tenants, to main­

tain the present status guo in the tenure, and to make sure

that the tenants would not be evicted before the Agrarian

Relations Bill is passed; an Anti-Eviction Bill would be

introduced imuediately;

(8) the tea, coffee, and other foreign owned plant­

ations, would be nationalized;

(9) special attention would be paid to the increase of

food production in order to convert Kerala from a food

importing into a food self-sufficient area; to this end pro­

duction of foodstuffs would be increased by 50%;

(10) a large progr~ne of housing would be put into

effect; care would also be taken to provide the people with

- 649 -

basic comnodities in good supply and fairly priced;

(11) the entire educational system, and the system of

Government subsidies to schools, would be reorganized;

(12) the entire administrative structure of the state

would be reorganized through decentralization of power;

measures would be taken to increase efficiency, eliminate

red-tapism ru1d to bring down costs;

(13) far reaching changes in the Police Policy would be

introduced so that the Police ~ay not interfere in the class

struggles of workers, agricultural labourers, students, and

of other sections of the working people, fighting for their

rights. The new Police Policy would make sure that the

labour laws were strictly and vigorously enforced "in the

interest of workers and against the employers 11;

(14) merciless fight would be carried out against cor­

ruption, nepotism, and favouritism, in order to provide the

state with a clean , cheap, and efficient a~~inistration.

This Election Manifesto then laid the main line of

attack of the Communist Party of Kerala upon the positions

of the Congress. And once the political line is laid,

teaches an old Leninist maxim, organization decides every­

thing. Consequently, the party made an enormous organiza­

tional effort to carry its message to all corners of the

state by throwing into the electoral battle-field close to

300,00 propagandists and party activists. (23)

- 650 -

The race for ~he leadership of Kerala was on.

To Power Through The Ballot Box

It was in the course of these general elections, and

through the ballot box, that the leadership of the national

democratic revolution in Kerala was formally transferred

into the hands of the Co~nunist Party. It will be recalled

that for some time the party had already been the undisputed

leader of the movement for the national renaissance of

Kerala. The general elections of 1957 merely projected this

dominant role the party had been enjoying in ·the public life

of the people of Kerala onto the political plane, giving it

a concrete expression in the form of votes polled ~nd seats

won.

The new state of Kerala was now divided into 114 singl&­

seat and 12 double-seat constituencies, to elect 126 members

of the State Assembly. The political parties threw the

following number of contestants into the field: the Congress

124; the Communist Party 100; the Praja Socialist Party 62;

the Revolutionary Socialist Party 28; the Muslim League and

Independents 74; the Kerala Socialist Party did not contest

the elections at all. There were 7,514,622 people eligible

for voting, and out of these 5,899,822 availed themselves of

this right and voted; this was 66.65%. Table YIII shows

the number of votes polled and the number of seats won by

the contesting parties.

- 651 -

As the Table shows, the Communist Party emerged the secon

largest party in the state, having won with 34.98% of votes

47.9% of the seats in the Assembly. The Congress was re­

duced to a minority party; the Congress won with 37.45% of

votes merely 34.1% of seats. True, the Congress still re­

mained the largest party in the State, polling 2.47% of votre

more than the Communist Party. But the electoral tactics of

the Communist Party of concentrating its f"ire-power to weak

constituences and of running its candidates in the so-called

safe constituencies, and the party's electoral adjustments

with the RSP in orcler to avoid triangular contests a...'ld

splitting of votes of the left parties, coupled with the

non-proportional representation electoral system in use in

Kerala, all these prevented the Congress from giving effect

to its almost 3% large popular appeal and from turning this

into a corresponding number of seats won. On the other hani,

all these factors played into the hands of the Communist

Party, making it to turn the 34.98% of popular vote into

47.6% of Assembly seats.

It was only in elections to the Kerala ~tate Assembly

that the Congress emerged the largest party in the state.

The vote polled for the election of deputies from Kerala to

the Lok Sabha placed the Comlllunist Party in the position of

the largest party of the state, giving it 37.~fo of votes,

while the Congress secured only 36.1%. (24)

- 652 -

The Communist Party thus commanded 60 seats in the

Kerala State Assembly on its own and, together with 5 Inde­

pendents, who had been elected through its support, the

party commanded 65 out of 126 seats of the House. This then

amounted to 51.58% of the total votes in the House, making

the party eligible to form the new government.

The regional distribution of the seats won by each con-

testing party can be ascertained from Table IX. Out of 60 of

deputiesjthe State Assembly elected in Travancore, the Com-

munist Party won 32; out of 18 deputies in Cochin 9; and

out of 48 deputies elected in Malabar the Communist Party

received 19. In addition, one Independent from Travancore

and four from Malabar strengthened the position of the

party in the House to 65 votes.

An analysis of the distribution of votes cast by the

principal communities of the state shows an important shift

in the community vote; this shift was the chief factor

responsible for the victory of the Communist Party. Table

X indicates the numerical strength of individual communities

of the state according to 1951 census, then the percentage

of seats they expected to secure had all members of each

community voted straight for candidates belonging to their

community, and then the number of seats actually secured in

the 1957 elections by each community.

This table shows that politics in Kerala is strictly

- 653 -

a communal affair, and that the communites vote on communal

lines. In the 1957 general elections the Hindu community,

accounting for 61.0% of the total population of Kerala,

elected 88 Hindu deputies, which is 69.8% of their total

number of 126. The Christian co~~unity of 21.3% elected

26 Christian deputies, which is 20.6% of the total number

of deputies in the House. The Muslim comJmnity- of 17.7% , is

elected 12 Muslim deputies, whic:tl9. 6% of 126 deputies.

Thus while the Hindu ru1d the Christian communities voted

strictly on communal lines, only the strength of the Muslim

community did not assert itself fully. The unfavourable

relationship between the total percentage of the Muslim

commuhity (17.75%), and the total percentage of the Muslim

deputies elected (9.6%), must be attributed to the fact

that a part of the female section of the Muslim community

failed to exercise its right to vote.

On the other hand, the highly favourable relationship

between the percentual strength of the Hindu community

(61.0%), and the percentage of Hindu deputies elected

(69.8%), must be explained by the fact that it was among

this group that the Communist Party had made an enormous

organizational effort to get every able bodied Hindu

sympathiser first enrolled in the voting lists and then

haulled to the electoral box.

Given the fact that the communities of Kerala voted

- 654 -

strictly along the communal lines, Table XI shows that the

Hindu community gave 61.4% of its vote to the Communist

Party, while the Congress received only 23.8% of its vote.

Thus the sources of strength of the Communist Party

was the Hindu com.clunity: the Nairs giving 65.7% of their

vote to the party, while the Ezhavas 65.6%, and the Sche­

duled Castes 53.3%. The real hard core of the party were,

however, the Ezhavas. According to K.R. Narayanan, General

Secretary of the S.N.D.P. Yogam, this is the communal

organization of the Ezhavas, this cormnunity contributed

30,000 of its members to the 60,000 members of the Communist

Party of Kerala. A full 50% of the party's membership. (25)

The Nair com:nunity in the early post-independence days

had voted for the uongress, then it shifted its loyalty to

the PSP, and in 1957 it solidly lined up behind the Communist

Party. This shift of the voting pattern of the Nair conmunity

in favor of the communists was the chief factor responsible

for the victory of the party in 1957. 'l'he man who brought

about this shift in the Nair vote was M.N. Govindhan Nair,

Secretary General of the Kerala Communist Party. He started

his political career as a prominent leader of the Nair

Service Society, and joined the Com~nunist Party comparatively

late. It was he who maneuvered the Nair community into the

communist .. to.ld.

Vfuile the H1ndus backed the Communist Party, the Chris-

- 655 -

tians voted for the Congress, Table XII shows that the

Christian community was the pillar of the Congress Party,

contributing 73.3% of its vote cast to the Congress. The

Communist Party received a meager 15.2%.

The depletion of the numerical strength of the Chris­

tian community, as a result of the formation of the new

Kerala State on November 1st 1956, was one of the factors

responsible for the fall in the number of votes received

by the Congress Party. The separation of the four Tamil

speaking taluks from Travancore, and the incorporation of

the Malabar area into the new state, considerably changed

the balance of the communal forces in that state: adversely

for the Congress and favJurably for the Communist Party.

With the territorial shift in Travancore the Christian

population in that area dropped from 31% to 24%, while the

incorporation of Malabar increased the percentage of the

Ezhava community from 22% to 26%.

Thus the form~tion of the new Kerala State proved a

double disadvantage for the Congress. Given the fact of

voting straight on communal lines in Kerala, the 5% de­

crease in the voting potential of the Congress and the 4%

increase in the voting potential of the Communist Party,

could not but have a profound effect upon the new distribu­

tion of power between these two principal contestants.

The fact that the principal communal groups voted

- 656 -

straight on communal lines was reflected in the communal

composition of the deputies \von by each principal party,

given in Table XIII. This Table indicates that out of

60 deputies the Coffilllunist Party had in the House full

90.0% were Hindus, and only 6.696 Christians and 3.496 MusliiiE.

The communal distribution of the 43 deputies of the Congre~

shows that 48.5% were Hindus, 44.8% Christians and 6.7%

Muslims. These figures seem to reveal ineffectiveness of

the Congress in making the numerical strength of the Chris­

tian community to reflect itself in the electoral results.

Obviously, a considerable abstention from participating in

the elections among the Christian community was responsible.

It will be recalled that only 69.9% of the total eligible

voters cast their votes, and that the full 31.1% abstained

from the ballot box. Undoubtedly, this had its effect upon

the polling of the Consress, as the abstention in the Muslim

community had upon the vote secured by the Muslim League.

Only the Communist Party seemed to have be2n able to get

the Hindu community, and its followers runong the Christians,

to the polls in full number. It will be recalled that the

party threw about 300,000 activists into the field, which

meant one propagandist for every 17 citizens who cast their

votes. This was a concentration of effort which the Con­

gress could not match.

When finally the dust settled over the electoral battle

- 657 -

field in Kerala in the middle of March 1957, the Communist

Party emerged the strongest party in the State Assembly of

126 deputies, commanding with its own 60 members, and with

the 5 Independents who had been elected with its support, a

total of 65 votes, i.e. 51.58%. ·On April 5th 1957 the Com­

munist Ministry was sworn in and installed in office. It

was headed by a veteran Congress Communist, E.M.S. Namboo­

diripad, and was composed of T.V. Tholllas, C. Achuta Menon,

K.C. George, Joseph Mundassery, Dr. A.R. Menon, K.P.Gopalan,

V.R. Krishna Iyer, T.A. Majeed, P.K. Chathan and R.K. Gouri.

The peaceful transfer of the leadership of the national

democratic revolution in Kerala was hence fully consummated,

confirming in the main the general validity of the first

proposition of the Theory Of Peaceful Transformation To

Communism and its special applicability to India. On April

5th 1957, when the first Communist Government ever placed to

power through a free electoral process assumed office in

Kerala, the ·way was opened for putting into effect the se­

cond proposition of the Theory Of Peaceful Transformation To

Communism. And this is exactly what Namboodiripad declared

his Government would attempt to do.

- 658 -

CHAPTER IV

(1) Namboodiripad E.M.S., The National Question In

Kerala, People's Publishing House, Bombay 1952, p. 1954.

(2) Ibid., p. 156.

(3) Loc. cit.

( 4) The High Command of the All-India Con:sress was slow

in understanding this aspect of the national democratic re­

volution in the multi-national Union of India. Not only in

Kerala, but also in Andhra, IVIaharashtra, and in other states

of the Indian Union, the national aspirations of the local

people proved a force of a considerable revolutionary poten­

tial on which crest the communists had ridden to influence

in those st.<?-tes. The large increase of influence of the CPI

in Maharasthra through the Maharasthra Samyukta Samithi,

which campaigned for the division of Bombay State on the

linguistic basis and for the formation of Maharasthra State,

and the noticeable spread of influence of the CPI in Assam,

West Bengal, the NEFA, and lately in Panjab, is due chiefly

to the harnessing of dynamism of the second phase of the

national rfvival in these states to the promotion of the

communist movement.

The Congress High Command in Delhi labelled these

aspiration of the people of different states of the Union of

India for linguistic and other adjust~ents as communalism,

.I

- 659 -

and vehemently fights them. This conveniently leaves the

entire field for the CPI to place itself at the helm of

these national movements and to lead the second wave of the

national phase of the national democratic revolution in

those states. Against this background, the attacks upon

the CPI with charges that it is "anti-national 11 have prac­

tically no effect, because the local branches of the CPI

lead the genuine national and patriotic movements deeply

rooted among the people.

(5) 11Communist Party Calls For United Kerala Week",

Cross Roads, Vol-V, Fo-14, August 2nd 1953, p.4; also

"Cultural Upsurge In Kerala 11, Cross Roads, Vol-V, No-14,

August 2nd 191i3, p.ll. This was a call for a United Front

in literature, art and drama, to imbue the movement of the

Aikya Kerala with a cultural and patriotic content.

(6) Menon C.A., "Welcome Kerala State", New AO'e,

Vol-III, No-3, October 16th 1956, p.l6; also uPolitical

Bureau Statement: Government For Kerala State", New Age,

Vol-III, No-3, November 20th 1956, p. 2.

(7) For the resolution entitled 11Communist Proposal

For Building A Democratic And Prosperous Kerala", adopted

at the Trichur Conference of the CPK on June 22nd-24th

1956, see New Age, Vol-III, No-43, July 22nd 1956, pp. 4

and 13.

For further elaboration of the policy line of the

- 660 -

Trichur Conference see "Kerala: Communist Party's Slogan:

Alternative Goverr.unent Of Democratic Opposition", New Age,

Vol-III, No-47, August 19th 1956, p. 12.

(8) Loc. cit.,

( 9) Lo c • cit • ,

(10) Loc. cit.,

(11) Namboodiripad l:!i.M.S., "Let Us Strive For United

Action. Policy Statement Of The PSP And Of The Socialist

Party Show That, Despite Differences With The Communists,

There Is A Vast Area Of Agreement", New Age, Vol-III, No-16,

January 15th 1956, pp. 3 and 12.

(12) Loc. cit.,

(13) For the resolution of the Ernakulam session of the

CPK see uKerala Committee Of The Cm:Eu..nist Party Of India:

Unity On Programme And The Forms.tion Of The Alternative

Government", New Age, Vol-IV, No-4, October 21st 1956, p.6.

Namboodiripad elaborated upon the meaning of the Ernakulam

resolution in his article entitled "United Front Also Can

Build Democratic And Prosperous Kerala", New Age, Vol-IV,

No-5, October 28th 1956, pp. 9 - 12.

(14) Loc. cit.,

(15) "Communist Party's Call: For,-iard For An Alternative

Government", a report on the Plenary Meeting of the Kerala

Committee of the Communist Party, held in Alwaye on Jam1ary

lst-3rd 1957, New Age, Vol-IV, No-16, January 13th 1957,

- 661 -

p. 4; see also Namboodiripad E.Ivl.S., "Kerala: Prospects

Of Electoral Agreement", a declaration issued on December

25th 1956, New Age, Vol-IV, No-15, January 6th 1957, pp. 7

and 6.

(16) For negotiations of the CPK with the PSP see "What

Stands In The Way Of Electoral Agreement? Kerala PSP's

Unhelpful Attitude, Unreasonable Demands", New Age, Vol-IV,

No-17, January 20th 1957, pp. 9, 10 and 12.

(17) For reasons responsible for the break-down of these

negotiations see "Communist Party Explains Why No Electoral

Agreement In Kerala 11, Resolution of the Kerala Committee of

the Communist Party, adopted at the Alwaye Conference held

from January lst-3rd 1957, New Age, Vo1-IV, No-17, January

20th 1957, p. 2.

The negotiations broke down because of the following

demands of the PSP:

In Travancore-Cochin: 41 seats out of 77, (8 out of

12 in Trivandrum District, 15 out of 28 in Quilon, 10 out

of 17 in Kottayam, 8 out of 20 in Trichur). The number of

seats which PSP had won in Travancore-Cochin in 1951 elec­

tions was merely 10; 5 of them had been won with the sup­

port of the CPK.

In Malabar: 20 seats out of 48; but this demand was

later reduced by the PSP negotiators to 15 seats. The CPK

offered 13 seats in its letter of January 9th 1957.

- 662 -

(18) See Ramdas, "Kerala: For An Alternative Government'~

New Age, Vol-IV, No-21, February 17th 1957, p. 4.

For an analysis of final electoral alignments in Kerala

see Namboodiripad E.M.S., "Electoral Alignmr:;nts In Kerala",

New Age, monthly, Vol-VI, No-2, February 1957, pp. 1-8.

(19) The full text of this Manifesto was not available

at the time of preparation of this study. It had been pub­

lished only in the Malayalam language, and public demand was

such that the 20,000 copies printed by the CPK disappeared

within days. The present excerpts from this Manifesto are

taken from its abridged form published in English in

New Age. See "Communist Manifesto For Stable Government,

Prosperous Kerala", New Age, Vol-IV, No-20, February lOth

1957, pp. 8, 9 and 10.

(20) For the results and meaning of the municipal elec­

tions in Travancore-Cochin, which were an important index

showing the rapidly changing correlation of forces between

the Congress and the CPK, see 11Congress Defeats In Travan­

core-Cochin Chairman Elections", New Age, Vol-III, l\o-29,

April 15th 1956, p. 5.

(21) "Communist Manifesto For Stable Government, Prosper­

ous Kerala", New Age, Vol-IV, No-20, February lOth 1957,

pp. 9.

(22) This section of the Manifesto was taken from Singh

Jitendra, Communist Rule In Kerala, pp. 2-2-4.

- 663 -

(23) One Leader of the Communist Party of Ceylon, Pieter

Keuneman, declared that the ComLmnist Party of Kerala "had

nearly 300,000 cadres actively working for it in the elec­

tions"; see The Times of India, August 29th 1957.

The impact of the enormous propaganda and organizational

effort of the Uommunist Party upon the electorate can be

felt from an article of Ramadas "Kerala In Ferment", New Age,

Vol-IV, No-22, February 24th 1957, pp. 1 and 13; see also

Ramdas, "Triumphant Strides In Kerala", New Age, Vol-IV,

No-24, March lOth 1957, pp. 1 and 16.

(24) Figures given by I\II.N. Govindan Nair in his article

entitled "Challenge Of Kerala", New Age, Monthly, Vol-VI,

April 1957, P• 7.

(25) The Malabar Herald, September 27th 1958.