38
CHAPTER IV AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND TARGETS OF THE INSURGENTS
CHAPTER IV
AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND TARGETS
OF THE INSURGENTS
AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND TARGETS OF THE INSURGENTS
Insurgency in the North East has come to occupy, over
the years, a central role in the events of everyday life.
The sensitivity of the region, as a result of high incidence
of secessionist tendencies is undisputed today. The earlier
breakout of insurgency in the Naga and Mizo Hills took the
state as well the Central Government off guard and there was
lack of co-ordination and planning to effectively check the
outbreak, and its subsequent developments. The succeeding
movements which followed close on the heels of the Naga and
Mizo insurgency proceeded on similar lines by taking up arms
to pursue their goals.
The cause and nature of the insurgency movements has
been discussed in the preceding chapter. It is also impor-
tant to fully comprehend the forces, that compel the insur
gents to continue their fight against difficult odds. The
motivating factors which provide the extra_edge for the
survival and sustenance of their movement.
The fulfilment of goals set before them, is the primary
objective and the method utilized for such, has been through
an armed uprising. The insurgency movements of the north
east are organised in a comprehensive manner, with definite
aims and objectives, which are expounded during the initial
160
phase of the movement. In the course of the movement, new
issues are also taken up which are regarded as relevant and
important. The insurgent groups spell out the aims and
objectives in an attempt to attract and appeal to the people
and to make them conscious of their rights. Through their
effort and struggle they seek to set up a new order in which
the people will be the sole beneficiary.
The aims and objectives are the guiding force of the
movement, and it must be genuine and authentic in order to
sustain itself. They must also be permanent and unaltered
during the struggle for its attainment. Unless it is· so, ·it
lacks direction and purpose. The goals must not be com-
prised at any cost, for its own survival.
The importance of the end objective cannot be overem-
phasised. It guides the movement and motivates the people
through the different phases of the movement. It takes over
the purpose and direction of the insurgency movement towards
the goals set before it.
NORTHEAST INSURGENCY GROUPS, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES:
The northeast region has proved to be one of the most
sensitive region of the country. The importance and signifi
cance of the area has come to be realised over a long period
of time, which has been marked by events of consequential
161
importance. The multiple insurgency movements have been
guided by clear guidelines which have been laid down in
their aims and objectives, by which they are committed to
carry on their struggle.
The insurgency groups of the region, having had experi
enced similar and related problems today as well as in the
past, have striking similarities in their aims and objec
tives. The earlier Naga and Mizo insurgency had laid down
the groundwork for the latter movements to draw their aspi
rations from. There are common factors which have worked to
provide a common platform to the insurgents.
INDEPENDENCE:
The integral demand of the insurgents is characterised
by the common factor, independence. It has become a catch
work heard in almost every nook and corner of the northeast.
The independence of India, 1947 opened the floodgates
of discontent and anger directed against the Indian govern
ment and the people in the northeast questioned the legality
of Indian rule over them. They wanted to be left alone to
their laws and customs as they had been before the British
annexed their land for economic and political gain. The
rejection of the demands triggered a chain reaction of
direct confrontation between the Indian Government and the
162
hill people.l
The N.N.C. declared Naga Independence on 14th August,
1947 and rejected the Indian Constitution on 24 January,
1950. The N.N.C. has consistently maintained that the
question of the Nagas seceeding from the Indian Union does
not arise because they never formed part of the Indian
Union. Moreover, they were adamant to prevent the inclusion
of Naga Hills and declared that in the face of forced inclu-
sion to the Indian Union, 'the Naga people shall cease to be
a part of the Indian Union from December 6, 1947. 2 The
Nagas were not willing to accept anything short of recogni-
tion to the independent status of their land.
The M.N.F. in the Mizo Hills declared that 'Mizoram is,
and of rights ought to be free and independent, they are
absolved from all allegiance to India and its Parliament and
all political connection between them and the Government of
India is and ought to be dissolved and that as free and
independent state, they have full power to levy war, con-
elude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce and do
all other things and acts which independent state of right
1. Udayon Mishra, North East India, ~ Quest for Identity, Omsons PUb., New Delhi, 1988, p.lS.
2. Yuno Yusoso, The Rising Nagas, Vivek Pub., New Delhi, 1974, p.197.
163
may do. 3 Even prior to the rise of the M.N.F., there were
attempts to integrate with Myanmar, rather than with India.
The move was made under the United Mizo Freedom Organisation
(UMFO) whose aim was to create an independent state to be
known as Chin State, incorporating the tribal areas of
Myanmar inhabited by the Mizos with the Lushai Hills of
India. However, no concrete results yielded, but in the
context of the prevailing situation, it was a significant
move.
The MNF called for ~full freedom for the Mizo people
and t o u n i t e a 11 t he d i f f e r en t t r i be s u n de r one
government' . 4 They were guided with the sole objective of
achieving independence for their land and people.
In the Manipur valley, the PLA, PREPAK and UNLF echoed
the same demand. The PLA, through its pamphlet. the Dawn,
called for a revolution for the liberation of Manipur.
Likewise PREPAK demanded an independent sovereign state
which would encompass ~geographically all the North Eastern
States, except the Western part of Assam, and a patch of
3. MNF Declaration of Indpendence, 1 March, 1966, The Declaration further stated that ~We appeal to all freedom loving nations and individuals to uphold Human Rights and Dignity and to extend help to the Mizo people for realization of our rightful and legitimate demand for self-determination.'
4. MNF, Aims and Objectives, Pub. by MNF, General Head Quarters, Mizoram, 16 Nov. 1972.
164
Tripura' . 5
The UNLF which floats the plan of a long term national
liberation movement in Manipur, propagates the imperative
need of armed revolution, promises to 'liberate Manipur from
the hands of "Indian colonialists'' with the military assist
ance of China. 6
In Assam, the emergence of ULFA gave a fillip to the
insurgency movement in the region. The Mizo Accord had
ended two decades of insurgency in Mizoram which was a
setback to the cause of other insurgents. The ULFA and its
enigmatic rise in stature and strike capability, gradually
filled the void left by the MNF.
The aim of the ULFA is to achieve a sovereign socialist
Assam, where every citizen will be liable to be fed by the
state and have equal status. A total social revolution was
sought to be realised. ULFA's strategy to achieve an
'independent Assam' was to be in a phase and gradual manner.
The confidence and support of the people were to be won over
at the outset and when the stage was set ~n armed uprising
was to follow which would enable them to take full control
of Assam.
Tripura has witnessed an endless confrontation between
5. Sun, Vol.III, no.28, 23 February, 1980.
6. The Sentinel, 26 August, 1986.
165
the government and the insurgents which has taken its toll
on the people and development of the state. However, the
die-hard insurgents refuse to give up till their aim of
uplifting the tribals through armed struggle is achieved.
The imbalance created by the immigrants and the resultant
crisis has been sought to be neutralized by the various
outfits like the All Tripura People's Liberation Organisa
tion (APLO), the Tribal National Volunteers (TNV), All
Tripura Tribal Force (ATTF) , National Liberation Front of
Tripura (NLFT) .
Commonly, they pursue the objective of independence
with no time-frame limit for its achievement. Yet, it is
the guiding force which continue to determine the course of
the insurgency movements.
INSTALLATION OF PARALLEL GOVERNMENTS:
The insurgents reject the authority of the Indian
Government over them; and they established their own govern
ment, commonly known as 'parallel' government. The exist
ence of 'parallel' government gave the movement an organised
and visible power. It also provided the requisite and
official authority to carry out and execute measures and
plans which were binding. The leaders, through the 'govern
ment' were given the moral right to issue orders and in-
166
structions.
The Naga Federal Government was set up on 22 March,
1956. It was based on democratic pattern of government
which encouraged private enterprise and free trade. The
government was represented by the Prime Minister known as
the Ato Kilonser and by the Ministers known as Kilonsers.
The Parliament was called the Tartar Hoho. The President of
the NFG was known as Kedhage. The aim and objective of the
government was to unify the different tribes into a collec-
tive whole and to bring about a united Naga nation, through
proper representation in the Tartar Hoho. The flag of the
NFG was first raised at Phenshunyu, a Rengma village.
The NFG, in a letter to the President of India, on 18
September, 1954 stated that, we believe your Excellency
have never been told by anybody that the Nagas of free
Nagaland have had an uninterrupted traditional history of
1700 years, as a free and independent nation and no Foreign
Nation had ever conquered and occupied our territory. We
Nagas have always been democratic people and a change of
ruling cliques had never known to us.• 7 The NFG was deter-
7. The declaration of the Naga sovereignty further stated: 'In 1880, the British challenged our sovereignty and we successfully defended our country and our existence in the Independent country is the proof of our conscious effort to keep alive as a separate and distinct nation .... '
167
mined to function as a legitimate government body. An army
organisation known as the 'Naga Home Guard' was set up to
help the government defend the country when the need arose.
The 'Naga Home Guard' was later renamed 'Naga Army'.
In Mizoram, the shadow government was known as Mizoram
Sawrkar' or Government of Mizoram. It was based on the US
form of government. The organisational set-up was hierar-
chical, in which powers were centralised at the top. The
Government was headed by the President and supported by the
Vice-President. The post of Defence Secretary, Foreign
Secretary, Finance Secretary, Home Secretary and Chief
Justice were also created to perform their respective func-
tions as designated. 8 The Government also fixed the rates
for taxes which were duly imposed. 9
8. Mizoram was further categorised into four administrative regions and each region was under the supervision of a Chief Commissioner. The four administrative regions and respective Chief Commissioners were:
1. Nbrthern Region 2. Southern Region 3. Western Region 4. Eastern Region
Tlangchhuaka Hyangchhinga P.B. Rosanga Ngunchhina.
9. The tax driving was named Mizoram Liberation Fund and a fixed amount of taxes were levied accordingly -
{i) All Government Servants - 2 p.c. from their mon
(ii) Contractors
(iii) Every House (iv) Permanent non-Mizo
businessmen of
thly salary - 2 p.c. of their tender
amount - Rs.20 per month.
(a) Special Class Rs.10,000/(b) A Class Rs.S,OOO/-
168
M.N.F. was particularly concerned for the economic and
social development of the people. Due importance was given
to cottage industries, employment opportunities, preserva-
tion of Mizo customs and culture and improving the general
standard of life for a11. 10 The M.N.F. declared that the
Indian Government had enslaved the Mizo people and had
denied them the basic rights and dignity to live and thereby
the only way out for them was to break free from Indian rule
and live freely under their ov.rn government.
The ULFA i~ Assam announced its opposition to the
'Indian system which has failed to provide justice to the
people and the basic human requirements. 11 The writ of the
... Continued ...
(v)
Mizoram had to pay accordingly: Rich men (Mizos had to pay annually:
(c) B Class Rs.2,000/(d) C Class Rs.1,000/-(a) Special Class Rs.S,OOO/(b) A Class Rs.3,000/-(c) B Class Rs.1,000/-(d) C Class Rs.500/-(e) D Class Rs.200/-(f) E Class Rs.100/-.
10. The MNF Government's three basic aims in their words were -A. Zalenna Sangber Neia Mizo Hnam Zawng Zawng Sorkar Kha ta Inzawm Khawm (To Achieve The Highest Freedom And To Unite All Mizos Under One Political Rule) .
B. Mizo Dinhmun Chawi San Leh Tihhmasaum (To Uplift The Mizo Way Of Life And To Bring Progress
And Development) .
C. Kristian Sakhua Hum Halh That (To Protect And Safeguard Christianity)
11. Statesmen (New Delhi), January, 1990.
169
ULFA runs strong in the Brahmaputra valley and the common
man. ULFA's supporters and cadres fanned out in the country
side and organised camps and programmes that emphasised
self-help. 12 ULFA also commanded fervent support in vil-
lages where it introduced adult education, health camps,
community farming and similar schemes. The welfare measures
adopted by them were successful in winning the loyalty of
the people.
The ULFA called their government, a people's govern-
ment' and said, 'The state machinery is helping us by stand-
ing there as a measuring rod by which the people can judge
us' .13 The 'government' is led by the Chairman, who is
supported by a Vice-Chairman, a General-Secretary, a Chief
Organising Secretary, Publicity Secretary and other office
bearers. In toto they form the Central Executive Council,
the highest authority.
The programmes of the ULFA in eradicating social ills,
coupled with the persuasive nature of their propaganda, has
elevated it to an efficient organisation within a short span
of time.
In the Imphal valley of Manipur, the familiar saga
12. Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers in the Mists, Viking, New Delhi, 1994, p.188.
13. Deccan Herald, 24 December, 1989.
170
continues. The parallel government run by the PLA controls
much of the day-to-day activities and has shown effective
results in dispensing justice, enforcing prohibition and
enforcing a strict sense of moral code. Besides the PLA,
the other organisations like UNLF and PREPAK conduct their
own rules and regulations which are to be strictly enforced.
It is at one's own risk to negate their orders and instruc-
tions. 14 The people also contribute to the funds·of the
'governments' which are at times voluntary and sometimes
under the shadow of the gun. 15
Thus, the effectiveness of the 'parallel' governments
set up is governed to a large extent, through the voluntary
and willing disposition of the people who are assured of a
better deal by the leaders under their rule. On the other
hand, intimidation also forces them to pledge their loyalty
to them.
14. In October, 1992 the Director of Health and Medical Services, Dr. Th. Surchand Singh was shot dead by the UNLF for his alleged involvement in the procurement and sale of spurious drugs. Mr. Iboyaima Singh, a contractor was killed for his immoral activities and in March 1993, Mr. Surendra Singh, Vice-Principal of a college was shot for indulging in favouritism.
15. In Imphal Valley, the underground agents collect cash from government servants in the beginning of the month. The amount is usually earmarked earlier. The total amount is collectively kept and is picked up later by the insurgents. There appears to be nothing alarming about the whole process - it has come to be accepted as the 'done thing'.'
171
POPULIST REFORMS UNDER THE ~PARALLEL GOVERNMENTS': '
The most striking feature of the ~parallel or shadow'
governments set up by the insurgents is to take up measures
and reforms which are populist by nature. It is of utmost
necessity to embark on such measures to endear themselves to
the peopl·e, whose support must be obtained to consolidate
their movements. The absence of popular support would fail
to justify their existence and in its absence would reduce
them to the category of ~armed robbers', ~bandits' or any
disrespectful outfit. It is the mass based support which
gives legitimacy to the movement.
To win over the support of the people, the insurgents
initiate populist measures by targetting the prevailing
social ills, such as corruption, smuggling, unethical
business practices, intimidation of the poor people by those
in authority and a general objective of making the lives of
the common man much better. There is the subtle campaign to
convince the people of their dedication in ushering a new
order by introducing and enforcing welfare measures.
The ULFA's first and foremost task was to bring reforms
within the Assamese society. It was a clear cut attempt to
legitimise their activities and cause. Anti-social elements
like bootleggers, drug-peddlers, poachers, smugglers and
172
corrupt officials were duly warned and punished according to
their own terms of judgement. 16 The business community who
were suspected of unfair practices were also severely warned
and action taken when deemed necessary. 17 On running a
'parallel government' they said, "We don't call it a 'paral-
lel government' but a 'people's government. All we have to
do is to expand this. The state machinery is helping us by
standing there as a measuring rod by which the people can
judge us. •18 It clearly indicated the policy of projecting
the outfit at an advantageous position compared to that of
the government.
The MNF, in the pursuit of its aims and objectives were
gravely concerned of the general condition of life amongst
the Mizos and they were eager to improve the lot of the
people. They clearly identified important areas which
required prompt attention -
1. Khawsak theihna dinhmun (Basic standard of living),
16. According to ULFA, "We have never deliberately killed an innocent person. Before handing out punishment, we arrest and bring the wrong doer before a people's court for trial. The cases were investigated by Districts Councils and referred to the Central Executive Council which decides on the 'extreme punishment'. Deccan Herald, December 24, 1989.
17. A trader was asked to shave off his head for allegedly indulging in black-marketeering. Indian Express, 10 December, 1989.
18. Deccan Herald, 24 December 1989.
173
2. Vantlang nun dan (community moral code),
3. Hnam nunzia (cultural life),
4. Vantlang hriselna lam (Community Health),
5. Kalkawng lam (Road and Transport),
6. Zirna lam (Education).
Much emphasis was also laid in the preservation and
promotion of Mizo culture and traditions. 19 They stiuck the
right chord by exploiting the ~religious card' and embarking
on a sustained campaign of ~anti-Indian' rule and its threat
to their way of life, particularly their religion. They
accused the Indian Government of -
(a) Visits by high ~hindu' officials were deliberately
fixed on Sundays, so as to prevent the Christian Mizos
from attending church services.
(b) Christmas and Good Fridays are not given due importance
with holidays declared only for· one day each whereas
hindu festivals like Durga Puja and Kali Puja are
accorded more than a week's holiday.
(c) Christian teachings are completely ignored in
educational text books, whereas it is not so regarding
other religion.
19. ~Mizote hian kan incheina thuamhnawah chuan bengbeh, Thihna, Thival Puanchei, Ngetekherh, Puandum, Hmaram, pawn-fen te leh incheina thildangte an ni ... mi teh ngaih-san thamin kan titha thei ang. MNF, Aims and Ojbectives, 16 November 1972, p.31.
174
(d) There is no freedom to profess and propagate Christian
ity. 20
The 'shadow'. government of the MNF sought to nullify
such measures which was adopted to hold the Mizos in 'Slav-
ery'.
In Manipur, 'the writ of the insurgents run large and
no one dares to oppose their diktat openly. The insurgents
have also forced down the sale of liquor and warned against
the sale of drugs and other intoxicants. Social values in
society are also sought to be restored and tough actions are
taken against those who do not heed their warnings. 21
Thus, the people of the northeast are caught between
the insurgents and counter-insurgents on one hand, and at
the same time have to comply with the demands of a 'paral-
lel' government with that of the state government. The
ongoing tussle is to win over the common man and his sup-
port, but he gains nothing for he is against two mighty
20. ibid., pp.44-45.
21. In October 1992, Dr. Th. Surchand Singh, Director of the Health and Medical Services was shot dead by UNLF. He was held responsible for the procurement and sale of spurious and time-expired drugs. In December 1992, Mr. Iboyaima Singh, a special contractor was shot dead. The 'crime' against him was that he had married too many women and thus insulted the womenfolk of the state. In March 1993, Mr. Surendra Singh, VicePrincipal of a college was abducted and shot. He was accused of indulging in favoritism among students.
175
opponents.
UNIFICATION OF THE TRIBES UNDER DIFFERENT POLITICAL AUTHORITY
Unification has always been an important issue with the
people of the northeast, especially in the hill areas. The
insurgents have accorded much importance to this, and set up
a sustained campaign to unite the tribes who are of the same
ethnic origin, and yet are under different political divi-
sions.
Historical and political process have been responsible
for the dislocation of tribes in contiguous areas but under
different political authority and administration. The
separation of their tribes has been viewed as a deliberate
and calculating attempt to weaken their tribal structure,
and the insurgents seek to rectify through their own means
and measures.
The MNF had vowed to unite all Mizos and their
inhabited areas and live under common authority and
boundary. The various Mizo tribes were separated by geo-
graphical and political boundaries in Assam, Manipur, Myan-
mar and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) . The MNF called for
'Greater Mizoram' which would comprise all the Mizo inhabit-
ed areas. They wanted to unify the tribes under the banner
of the Mizoram Sawrkar and to be free under their own
176
rule. 22 They were determined to remove the 'artificial'
barriers and create an independent state for the people.
The Nagas, since pre-independent days, have been
pursuing their goal for a Naga Nation, integrating all the
Naga tribes. The N.N.C. submited a four-point memorandum to
the Cabinet Mission and stated that, 'This Naga National
Council stands for the solidarity of all Naga tribes, in-
eluding those in the unadministered areas'. The educated
and advanced tribes were concerned for the less developed
tribes elsewhere in other polit~cal boundary. The present
Tuensanga Area was placed under North East Frontier Agency
(NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh) and it was only to counter the
growing popularity of the N.N.C. that the Government formed
the 'Naga Hills Tuensang Area' which comprised the Naga
Hills District of Assam and the Tuensang Division of NEFA
and placed it under the Ministry of External Affairs. The
move to some extent was a step in the right direction for it
brought the Naga tribes together.
However, the numerous Naga tribes inhabit areas in
adjoining states of Manipur and Assam and the complete
22. The question of the unification of Mizo inhabited areas of other states to form one administrative unit was raised by the MNF delegation during the negotiations for the Mizo Accord (1986). It was pointed out to them, on behalf of the Government of India that Article 3 of the Constitution of India prescribes the procedure in this regard but that the Government could not make any commitment in this regard.
177
unification of all the tribes is one of the objective of the
N.N.C. The split within the N.N.C. has not changed the
stand the Naga leaders have taken on this issue. The NSCN
(I-M) leader, Thuengaling Muivah and his men has not deviat-
ed from the goal of uniting all the Naga tribes under what
is termed as ~Great Nagaland' which includes ~eastern Naga-
land' in Myanmar, parts of Manipur and the present state of
Nagaland. 23
Tribal loyalty runs deep and is very strong which mere
political divisions cannot divide. It is on the strength of
this affinity, which tribes from across the borders harbour
that the insurgents of the northeast continue to fight for
unification.
INTERNATIONAL CONNECTION:
The insurgents after consolidating their base among the
people and setting up a government of their own, attempt to
focus international attention to their cause. Recognition
of their ~independent' status and government must be ob-
tained from other independent nations as per international
law.
23. The four districts of Manipur pati, Chandel and Tamenglong. districts (1991) accordingly 70,734 and 85,572.
178
includes Ukhrul, SenaThe population in these are 109,952; 206,933;
Besides legal recognition, it is imperative for the
'governments' to secure an ally, preferably from across the
borders to provide the necessary aid and assistance to their
cause. Waging a war from within, the insurgents require
arms, ammunition, finance, safe havens, and training which
can be provided by countries sympathetic to their cause.
Besides, the support rendered to them furnish the insurgency
movement the necessary thrust, moral support and encourage-
ment. The movements in order to sustain and survive in the
face of harsh realities must have the backing of powerful
nations.
The N.N.C., M.N.F., NSCN, ULFA, PLA, ATTF have had much
success in establishing links with India's close neighbours,
China, Pakistan, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Since the early
breakout of armed insurgency, there has been active involve
ment of the neighbouring countries in abetting the seces
sionist movements in the northeast. They provided material,
financial and moral support to the insurgents which gave the
insurgency movements the required armour to wage their war
against the Indian union.
In their endeavour to rally support from the Western
world, the insurgents in the northeast were not very suc
cessful. The MNF were keen to enlist the support of the USA
to their cause. Lalthangliana, the MNF Ambassador played a
179
significant role in contacting the ,American Consul in Dacca I
and later a CIA agent, who informed him that the Mizoram
problem was 101st in the White House list of foreign prob
lems.24 The CIA agent further suggested that some M.N.F.
personnel visit the USA to approach influential persons to
help them organise the 'Friendship Society of the Mizos' to
create public opinion. 25
A.Z. Phizo stay in London was to continue the N.N.C. 's
effort to internationalise the Naga issue, and win the sup-
port of the Western world. Today, the NSCN (I-M) has set up
a few liaison offices in various parts of the world, includ-
ing the USA and Japan in addition to those already existing
in the Philippines, Netherlands and Bangladesh. 26 The
NSCN(IM) has further joined the Unrecognised Nations' Peo-
ple's Organisation (UNPO) . 27 The UNPO, in its Fourth Gener-
24. Lalthangliana, MNF Movement.
25. The meeting however failed to achieve constructive results because Laldenga refused to send any MNF personnel to the USA, unless he, as President was able to go. His critics construed Laldenga's argument as baseless and it was an inherent fear that he would be outdone in the political field, if other high-ranking MNF officials were to go to the USA.
26. Asia News Agency, News Behind News, 22 January 1996.
27. UNPO is a self-styled international organisation which was formed in 1991 and provides a sort of moral leverage to what it calls 'unrepresented and oppressed' people in their fight for democratic and human rights. This world body is gaining strong status with 26 members currently on list, representing around so million
180
al Assembly (Hague, 20-26 January 1995) recognised the
'historical sovereignty of the Naga people over their terri-
tory, the right of the Naga people to determine their own
government, and the illegality of the invasion and continued
occupation of Nagaland by the Indian and Myanmar armed
forces.' A resolution was further passed 'to continue its
support for Nagaland and the Naga people'.
The UNPO has provided the NSCN (IM) the international
platform to draw attention to the Naga issue and has been
more effective than receiving clandestine support from
individual countries. The UNPO and its support has enabled
it to openly air their demands, grievances and atrocities
committed on the Nagas on the international stage.
The foreign support also enabled them to set up secure
base and sanctuary through which they could operate freely
to work out their strategies. It was a vital link for the
success of their struggle and the pattern continues today .
. . . Continued ...
people. The UNPO gets strong patronage from diplomats and world leaders. The third general Assembly was addressed by Lord Annals, Member of the British House of Lords and former British M~nister or Foreign Affairs and Defence, HSH Prince Adam II of Liechenstein, Nobel Laureate Ms. M. Carigen Magnire of Ireland, Belfast President of the Peace People. Eastern Panorama, June 1993.
181
Targets of the Insurgents
The protracted ~war' in the northeast has been an
ongoing process for decades and a permanent solution contin-
ues to evade any attempts. The ~war', in simple terms has
been fought between the secessionists on one hand and the
Indian Government on the other. It has passed through
various stages of high and low intensity, depending on the
spurt of activities of the insurgents.
The insurgents and the Indian forces have been pitched
against one another in a seemingly endless cycle of vio-
lence. The insurge~ts continue to challenge the military
strength of the Indian and local state police forces. They
are the main visible targets of the insurgents, whose main
adversary is the Indian state, against whom the demand for
independEnce has been made. The security forces are regard-
ed as "tools of the government and are the main targets of
ambushes and attacks carried out by the insurgents. 28
28. The insurgents have carried out numerous daring attacks on security personnel: 20 February 1985, fifteen security personnel were killed at Mingching (Ukhrul district); 19 July 1987, nine Assam Rifles personnel were killed at Oinam in Senapati District; 24 April 1983, ten CRPF Jawans killed. Most recently, on 16 May 1996 the Superintendent of Tinsukia (Assam) was shot dead along with two security personnel. The ULFA were the chief suspects in the daring ambush. In yet another major ambush on 9 April 1996, 12 police personnel and civilians which included the Superintendent of Bishenpur district. The underground militant took away 11 weapons from their victims, which included three AK 47,
182
The insurgents armed with AK-47, M16, portable rocket
launchers, LMG's, etc. have continued to test the Indian
forces. They are equipped with the latest weaponry avail-
able in the arms market in Pakistan, Thailand, Bangladesh
and China. The major weapons bought are Kalashnikovs, LMG,
Chinese M-22 and automatic rifle fetches upto Rs.2 lakh. 29
The demand for weapons has encouraged smuggling in and
around the border areas. Consignments from Thailand are
believed to reach Cox's Bazar in southern Bangladesh and
smuggled across the northeast. 30 The foreign powers also
... Continued ...
three self-loading rifles and three carbinedents. Times of India, 10 April 1996.
29. TOI (New Delhi), 10 April 1993.
30. ibid. The arms market within India is also operational on a large scale. According to the report of the All India Arms Markets can be classified accordingly.
ALL INDIA ARMS MARKET
Centre Source Weaponary/seized traded Causes
Calcutta Mostly from Bihar pil- Country-made fire-arms, hand-made Self-protection gang-rivalry ferage from police bombs
Ahmedabad lSI-trained gun-runners Rocket launchers AK-47, AK-56 through Kutch/Banaskan- rifles; Machine guns Chinese ta border, local manu- automatic pistols facturing
Tamil Nadu LTTE (IPKF) AK-47, automatic pistols
Maharash- North (country-made); AK-47, AK-56 RDX, Czech-made tra Pakistan-controlled 9 mm pistols
mafia; underworld
183
To send for Punjab inter-gang rivalry
For buyers in Bangalore, Kerala, A.P.
Drug-smuggling, gold/silver smuggling, Punjab terrorism
provide them the means to ~urchase weapons in the interna-
tional arms market. In September, 1991, ~the Pakistanis
took ULFA men to Darrah, the hill town in the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP}, one of the world's biggest·, open,
illegal arms bazaars. 31 The ULFA has considerably widened
... Continued ...
Amritsar Cross·border Explosives AK-47, AK-56 For militancy in U.P., other areas
Assam (NE) Smuggled from China, Thailand (through Myanamar), Bangladesh (Tripura) also storm· ing police arsenals
Kalashnikovs Light machine-guns, Insurgency commercial Chinese M-22 Automatic weapons
Srinagar Across the border AK·47, AK-56, Rocker launchers etc.
Insurgency, for Punjab militancy
Bihar Punjab ultra Chinese assault rifle, AK-47 For Dhanbad mafia
U.P. Nepal border AK·47, AK-56, grenade launchers Heroin trade
Sur at Internal
Punjab
Ahmedabad
North-east
Sur at
Patna
Bombay
Madras
Srinagar
AK-47, AK-56, crude bombs, gela· Self-protection tine sticks
PRICE OF AK-47
Rs.15,000 (locally made}, Rs.40,000 (Chinese/ French) imported
Up to Rs.1 lakh
Up to Rs.2 lakh
Rs.1.25 to 1.50 lakh
Rs.60,000 to Rs.80,000
Rs.1.5 lakh to Rs.2 lakh
Rs.25,000 to Rs.SO,OOO
Rs.27,000
31. Sanjoy Hazarika, n.21, p.173.
184
its contacts, branching out as far as to the southeast Asian
countries. The Central intelligence agencies and the state
police were aware of five hard core militants who had gone
to Malaysia in early 1995 for the purpose of 'advanced
training in the operation of rocket launchers, land-mines
and explosives presumably from some ultra Left Cambodian
underground outfit' . 32 The force behind the whole operation
were believed to be a few Non Resident Indians of Assamese
origins who had settled in Malaysia.
Thus, the well armed and trained insurgents enjoy
considerable success and an edge over its main foe. With
the terrain to their advantage, they hold the trump card
over their main target.
Besides the Indian forces, the insurgents focus their
attention against those who are opposed to their cause, aims
and goals. The existence of parallel governments enable
them to disperse with their kind of justice against those
who do not toe their line. They carry out select killings
against civilians, business class, bureaucrats and politi-
cians who oppose them openly. Usually, warnings are given
to those who are critical of them and final action is taken
when their warnings are ignored and unheeded.
32. Debashis Mitra, 'ULFA Back on Warpath', Statesman (Calcutta), 15 August, 1993.
185
Clearly, it is seen that the insurgents do not hesitate
to eliminate those who oppose them. The life of an insur
gent is precarious as they operate under tense and stressful
conditions which requires extreme caution and high risk,
leaving nothing to chance. Thus, it is a reflex and natural
reaction on their part to clear all obstacles in their path.
Their motto is based on 'survival of the fittest' and to
fulfil their goals, they must emerge the winner.
THE QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE: ITS CONSISTENCY
The demand for independence has been heard from almost
all corners in the northeast. The seven states are highly
volatile by nature with states like Nagaland, Manipur, Assam
and Tripura continuing to experience full-blown insurgency
outbreaks; Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya lying dormant,
but with the potential towards armed breakouts always
present. To date, Mizoram has emerged as the only state
without any insurgent outfit. However, it would be wrong to
conclude that peace has finally been established in the
state. It continues to be rocked by sporadic but portent
clashes of 'Mizos vs. non-Mizos'.
The all too familiar word 'independence' has been the
backbone of the insurgency groups ever since the Nagas
raised the banner for self-determination, followed by the
186
mizos, Meiteis, Tripuris and the Assamese. It is a matter
of keen interest to understand the reasons as to ~hy the
demand for ~independence' is so contagious amongst the
numerous insurgent groups operating in the northeast. In
the pursuit of their aims and objectives, ~independence' has
featured in varying degrees in the growth and development of
the movements.
In the state of Nagaland, it has been most vocal and
most determined pursued. The N.N.C. and the NSCN (IM) has
not waivered from the call for a separate Naga Nation ever
since the movement was started. The dogged determination
has cost the state any lasting peace. 33 Independe~ce and
its achievement is not a mere illusion for the NSCN (IM) and
its followers, it is a reality which is possible to attain.
The Nagas were soon followed by the Mizos under the
leadership of Laldenga and the MNF. The movement for
independence spanned more than two decades until the
restoration of peace with the signirig of the Mizo Accord
(June 1986). Unlike the N.N.C. which spearheaded the demand
33. The Shillong Accord (11 November 1975) was doomed from solving the Naga issue because the hardliners. Isak Chishi Swu, Th. Muivah rejected it as a sell out to the Government of India as the question of independence had been compromised. The National Assembly held on 15th-17th August 1976 rejected the accord ~as the work of the sole traitors once and for all'. Cf. A Brief Political Account of Nagaland, published by Government of People's Republic of Nagaland.
187
for secession, the MNF, in the c,ourse of its history did not
plunge directly into an underground movement with independ-
ence as its sole objective. The M.N.F. involved itself in
state politics after its conversion into a political
party. 34 In February'1962 District Council elections the
MNF entered the fray but failed to get its candidates, John
F. Manliana and R. Vanlawma elected. Howeyer, this setback
did not deter the MNF who campaigned vigorously and began to
gradually infuse 'Mizo sentiments' into their campaign which
caught the imagination of the people. 35 In the by-elections
to the Assam Legislative Assembly, held on 24th April 1963,
the MNF bagged two seats which was a great boost to their
growing popularity which was based mainly on secessionist
demands.
This was a turning point in the growth of the MNF. Its
growing popularity encouraged it to openly campaign for
secession from the Indian Union. Thus, there was a growing
shift in the priority of the MNF, who was now clearly
34. The Mizo National Famine Front (MNFF) was its parent body which was initially set up to meet the demands of the havoc the famine (1959-60) had produced. The MNF was formed on 22 October 1961.
35. The MNF unleashed its propaganda of 'anti-India' sentiments and the threat India posed to the very existence of the Mizos. The slogan for 'independence' was gradually raised on the grounds that only selfdetermination would enable the Mizos to live as free people.
188
gearing up for an armed uprising to consolidate its hold
over the Mizo Hills.36 The declaration of independence
followed soon after the armed outbreak on 1 March 1966 and
the MNF abandoned its earlier pledge to achieve independence
through non-violent means altogether. The mid-sixties saw
the complete change of gear and the main objective became
independence.
The emergence of ULFA as a major. insurgent force in
Assam was the outcome of the students' led agitation against
foreigners whose names were on the electoral rolls. The
initial ULFA members were the radicals within the AASU who
were impatient with the slow progress the agitation was
heading. They had advocated a stronger course of action to
press their demands. 37 During the early phase, the ULFA
concentrated more in its efforts to win over the people to
its fold. They stated, "Our long term goal for a sovereign
Assam remains. But we have a short-term objective which is
36. According to R.N. Prasad, ~the MNF's participation in the democratic and constitutional elections was merely a plank for fulfilling the political and extraconstitutional objectives they had promised to the people. p.167.
37. In April 1979, at Sibsagarh, the young men spoke of their belief that the All Assam Students Union (AASU) 's proposed agitation against the immigrants would not work, that a long-term solution was needed and that Delhi would not listen to mere satyagrahas but a more militant voice. Sanjoy Hazarika, n.12, p.168.
189
part of our revolution. We call it armed propaganda.38
There was no doubt about the demand for an independent
Assam. The consequent army operations against ULFA did
succeed in driving them into the defensive but they were not
out. 39 The momentum slowed down but the demand was never
abandoned.
The ULFA is not the only insurgent outfit to dominate
in Assam. Over the years, the malaise of insurgency had
spread to the plains tribal areas, affecting the Bodes who
are up in arms against the ~Assamese domination'.
The demand for ~Bodoland' 4 0 comprising the Bodo areas
of Dhubri, Kokrajhar, Barpeta, Nalbari, Darrang and Sonitpur
has come a long way. It has taken its twists and turns and
in the present circumstances. The demand of the Bodo Secu-
rity Force is most omnimous-independence. However, matters
38. Deccan Herald, 24 December 1989.
39. A strong statement was issued from Bangladesh following the so-called surrender of ULFA cadres in March 1991. It was stated, ~ULF~ was born with the aim of coming out an independent, sovereign Assam. We are still firm in this goal. We condemn the Indian state machinery for trying to isolate the ULFA from the people and weaken it by creating rift within its ranks'. Hazarika, n.12, p.227.
40. The Bodos are the plains tribals of Assam and consists of Barmans, Bodo-Kacharis, Hojais, Kacharis including Sonowals, Lalungs, Meches and Rabhas. They are the indigenous people of Assam having ruled ~kingdom in the Middle Ages stretching from Cooch Behar in Bengal to the Naga Hills with Dimapur as its capital'. Hazarika, n.d12, p.152.
190
did not begin this way. In the early phase~ the Plains
Tribals' Council of Assam demanded as early as 27th February
1967 in a memorandum submitted to the President of India,
full autonomy for the areas in Goalpara, Kamrup, Darrang,
Sibsagarh and Lakhimpur Districts of Assam which were domi
nated by the plains' tribals. This was followed by a demand
for a separate autonomous region within Assam and the fail
ure to come to a settlement pushed the agitation to more
ambitious objective of a separate state and finally under
the aegis of the BSF - an independent homeland. It is the
emergence of the last demand that has further plunged Assam
into a hot-bed of insurgency. The Bodo Accord (1993) has
not, in reality brought about peace in the state with the
BSF continuing its operations single-handedly. The mid-
1980's onwards saw the marked escalation of violence and
predictably, peace is still as elusive as ever.
The continued demand for independence has not filtered
out over the years. The Northeast is a burning couldron and
the insurgents have not compromised on their demand. Yet
the Mizo Accord (1986) has given hope to the Government that
all is not lost with the continued efforts to find solutions
and lasting peace.
191
CO-OPERATION AND CO-ORDINATION AMONG INSURGENCY GROUPS
The Insurgency has emerged as a significant threat to
the security and stability of the entire northeast. The
groups like NSCN, ULFA, BSF, PLA, PREPAK, ATTF, UNLF and
others have produced strike capabilities which has ~ampered
·measures towards reconciliation. They are confident,. daring
and undeterred in their struggle and these characteristics
strengthened by the support they enjoy from foreign powers
have greatly elevated their capabilities in confronting the
security forces.
The states reeling under the onslaught of insurgency
are threatened with a bigger foe - the combined activities
of the different groups. The insurgents operate in their
own areas but the dictates and compulsions of their activi-
ties compel them to operate outside their zone. This
necessity has forged a common link between them and has
given rise to a united front amongst the different groups.
The NSCN (I-M) has been the toughest and most deter
mined group to have surfaced in the northeast horizon. The
cadres are experienced and well versed in the art of guer
rilla warfare and have had years of fighting experience
behind them. These combined factors have enabled them to
attract fledgling insurgent groups to their fold who require
assistance in training and procurement of arms and sophisti-
192
cated weapons. Moreover, the 'contacts' the NSCN (I-M) has
come to establish with foreign powers has made it the most
formidable factor for the other insurgent grou~s to approach
in order to further their own contacts.
The NSCN (I-M) has established links with smaller
groups like Hmars People Convention (HPC), Dima Nalam Dao-
gah, Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam, Hyniewtrep Achik
Liberation Council (HALC) and with the bigger groups also,
ULFA, BSF. 41 It is the united combination with the larger
groups which has been most dangerous to the already explo-
sive situation.
The NSCN (I-M) has formed an umbrella organisation
41. The links with the group Dima Nalam Daogah is of equal importance to the NSCN who has established bases in the thick jungles of the North Cachar Hills to escape from the counter-insurgency forces in Manipur and Nagaland. The N.C. Hills provide ideal grounds for it has a high population of Nagas (50%) and the terrain is also suited to their activities. It is also an important route through which arms are smuggled to Nagaland and Manipur from Cox Bazar in Bangladesh.
The alliance with the Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam is a dangerous trend, because MLTA has been created with the objective of attaining Jihad for the creation of a sovereign Islamic republic. The NSCN (IM) has agreed to train about 50 MLTA cadres inside Nagaland according to newspaper reports.
HALC has been brought under its wings primarily to get easy access to Bangladesh via Meghalaya border. NSCN(I) provided training to the cadres and were paid each in return. Confessions of arrested HALC members, Arizona Dunn and Lambha Thangkhiew revealed the HALCNSCN (IM) connection.
193
known as 'Self-Defence United Front of South-East Himalayan
Region' ( SDUFSEHR) It was set up in Manipur· on 3 0
November, 1994. The Bodo' Security Force is a party to this
organisation. 42 Its rival, NSCN (K) has set up the 'Indo-
Burma Revolutionary Front' and its members include ULFA and
UNLF. 43 In Manipur, the trend has continued with the forma-
tion of the Revolutionary Joint Committee (RJC) which is
composed of the three major militant outfits - the PLA,
PREPAK and KCP.
Besides the close nexus between the northeastern
insurgents, there was a dangerous trend which was emerging.
There were evidence of the possibility of links havihg been
established between the ULFA and LTTE. On the first day of
Operation Bajrang (November 28), unsuspecting Army-men
advancing towards the ULFA's General Head-Quarters had come
under the impact of improvised exposure devices (!ED),
detonated electrically by the rebels.
The GOC-in-Command, Eastern Command, Lt. General K.S.
Brar, had then said that the IEDs were very similar to those
42. The BSF has called for 'national liberation -of the Indo-Burma region'.
43. The confessions of arrested ULFA cadres, Manoj Hazarika andBhaskar Barrea revealed that ULFA visited Kachin Hills via NSCN (K) Headquarters. Organiser, (New Delhi), 24 November 1991.
194
used against the IPKF by the LTTE in Sri Lanka. 44 There
were further evidence to prove the nexus, with the raid
carried out on six ULFA camps in Tamil Nadu. 45 The impact
of such an alliance between the ULFA and LTTE is of grave
concern. The LTTE commandos have emerged as one of the most
deadly outfit and the possibility of the ULFA receiving arms
training and the use o~ explosives has caused grave concern
to the State and Central Government.
The understanding and support between the numerous
insurgency groups has made the task of the Government and
the counter-insurgency forces much more difficult. Combat-
ing them individually has by itself, taken its toil en the
state machi'Ilery and their combined activities has demora-
lised the security forces to a large extent. Their co-
ordination makes it easier them to move about freely outside
their safe areas when they have to escape the security
forces' operation against them.
Morever, the psychological factor also plays an impor
tant role. The combined strategy has encouraged them to
confront the security forces, who are at a great disadvan
tage given the inhospitable terrain and an 'invisible ene-
44. Telegraph (Calcutta), 6 January 1991.
45. ibid.
195
my' . 46 The lack of adequate knowledge about the land,
people and social set-up has been the main drawback for the
forces. Mere military power has proved grossly insufficient
to break the vast tangled network of the insurgents which
has come to span the entire northeast.
46. The NSCN (IM) carried out a daring ambush in N.C. Hills, and killed six Punjab commandos in August 1995. It bears out the observation that when it comes to guerrilla warfare, the NSCN holds the whip hand. It is not that the elite comandos are unequal to the task, what they lack is the knowledge, understanding and experience of fighting in the unfamiliar and inhospitable terrain.' Statesman (Calcutta), 9 August 1995.
196
