Chapter Seven

Conclusion

134

Conclusion and Recommendations

Since 20"’ century, there has been a conceptual shift in the concept of national

security. Earlier, this concept was based on state centric military oriented security,

according to which, territorial boundary of a nation has to be protected from external

aggression by means of war. Thus, the efforts have always been taken to improve the

military capability of the country in order to protect the country. However, in the late

20“’ century, the concept of national security has transformed from the state centric

military oriented security to security of groups and individuals. This has been

observed when it was argued that the concept o f national security needs a holistic

approach, which would cover the wider areas of national security, such as, environment,

food, social, political and cultural rights ot individuals At the same time, it has been

widely accepted that the military capability is essential in pursuit of national security

when and where required.

Today, the key objective of national security is not only to protect the country

from external aggression but also to maintain peace and harmony within the country by

fulfilling the aspirations of the people and checking the internal security threats to the

country originating within the country itself. However, the Northeast region of India,

which is a union of eight states, has been suffering from insecurity since the

independence of the country. There are many complex sets of issues, which ended into

insurgency, are responsible for constant disorder in the region. The roots of this constant

chaos perhaps are found in the historical and geographical aspects of the region.

The Northeast region of India has immense geostrategic significance as it is

surrounded by five countries viz. Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal and China.

Similarly, within a geographical circle of around 1000 kms including Shillong and

Guwahati as the hub, it encompasses important cities like Calcutta, Lhasa, Kunming,

Mandalay, Chittagong and the border areas of Vietnam, Laos and Thailand etc. The safety

of the Northeast region is significant from a viewpoint of national security as it has vast

natural resources and close proximity to international borders. This has become a cause of

concern for India, especially when India had fought wars against China and Pakistan

since 1962. Moreover, ethnic groups of this region have close resemblance with their

counterparts in neighbouring countries.

CHAPTER VII

135

Historically, the region could not annexed by any Indian emperor. However,

British were successful to take over the whole region. They had entered into this region

by the treaty of Yandaboo and gradually they annexed the region. Perhaps it may be said

that the term ‘Northeast’ came into existence after the British had occupied the region.

Even though, they had successfully annexed the region, they did not administer over the

region but they could manage the region by formulating various policies. While

formulating such policies, they had kept tribal people of the hills aloof from the plain

politics and allowed them to practice their traditional way of life. On the other side, the

British had initiated tea plantation to secure their economic interests. They brought in the

labourers from British India and administrative staff especially educated Bengalis for this

very purpose. Meanwhile, Christian missionaries spread into the hill areas of this region

with the help of British. They were engaged in many welfare activities of the people of

hill areas. For instance, they provided education to the hill people. The inhabitants of this

region have close cultural similarity with the people of Far East, as people of this region

had earlier migrated from the Far East. However, the borders were closed at the time of

partition of the country. The close borders and the emergence of new countries across the

borders have cut the age-old railway, road and cultural links of this region. This has made

a huge impact on the entire region. The gravity of this impact was multiplied when the

then Indian leadership followed the British policy of keeping tribal people of the hills

aloof from plain politics.

During post independence era, revolt was broken out in Naga Hills, which later

ended into the insurgency movement. It was the incidence of insurgency erupted in

the region. Since then, the insurgency movement at different points of time has engulfed

many other parts of the region. Perhaps, it is relevant to mention that until 1962, the

region could not receive any attention from the central government. However, after the

Indo-China war, many administrative changes had taken place in the region and breakup

of undivided Assam is an outcome of one of such changes. The economic capability of

these states has not been taken into consideration while breaking up undivided Assam and

carving out states from Assam. Hence, these states have been dependent on the central

transfer of resources. The huge natural resource potential has yet to be fully utilized for

the development of this region. The economy of this region is still primarily agrarian;

however, there has been no sufficient development in the agricultural sector. The

condition of the industrial sector of this region is poor, whereas service sector has been

enriching. The funds generated by service sector have come from the public

136

administration. Infrastructural development in this region is also poor. The demography

of this region has been witnessing a constant increase in the growth rate of the population

since the early twentieth century. The popu% ion of this region is heterogeneous. It is due

to the migration that had taken place in the early centuries and in the nineteenth and

twentieth century’s. Later, demographic transformation became the cause of concern as it

was identified as one the reasons of insurgency movement.

The term ‘insurgency’ has been defined as an armed struggle against the authority

by group of people to fulfill their aspirations. However, nowadays insurgents are often

mistaken with terrorists because their method of operation is similar with the terrorist.

The insurgency that initially began in Naga Hills spread like epidemic all over the region.

At present, though all major insurgent outfits have been brought under ceasefire

agreement with Indian army, the insurgency in the region has claimed 20,881 lives

including civilians, security forces and insurgents since 1992. The root causes o f the

insurgency movement differ from state to state. Insurgent outfits have not only been

fighting against the Indian security forces but they have also been fighting against the

communities from mainland of Indian states and within the region. For example, Bodo -

non-Bodo conflict in Assam. anti-Chakma movement in Arunachal Pradesh, anti-outsider

movement in Meghalaya, Naga-Kuki and Kuki-Paite clashes in Manipur, Tripuri-Bengali

conflict in Tripura and issues of illegal migration in Assam, etc.

Over the years, insurgencies in the region have sustained due to the

criminalization of insurgency, criminalization of politics and role played by the

neighbouring countries in the region. Criminalization of insurgency has taken root

because of the dilution of their original agendas for which the insurgency movement had

initiated. The insurgent groups began to measure their success in terms of financial gains

rather than their political rights.' Extortion, kidnapping and unlawful trafficking in small

arms together with narcotics are a few of the primary activities of the criminalized

insurgents in the region. It provides huge profits to them. It is believed that there is a

complex collusive arrangement among various political parties, administrators and

officials, on one hand, and different insurgent outfits, on the other.^ Insurgent outfits in

the Northeast region have entered regional politics in a manner similar to the role of

organized crime being played in other Indian states. In Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and

Ajai Sahani, "Survey of Conflicls and Resolution in India’s Norlheasl" http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume 12/Artivle3.htm accessed on 24.09.10 ‘ Dhruv C Katoch, "A Viable Strategy to Fight Insurgency in the North East". httD://www.ndc.nic.in/pdf/44-kotach.pdf. accessed on 19.01.10

137

Tripura, implicit associations have appeared between political parties and insurgent

outfits.^ Moreover, the countries that are unfavorable to India have played an important

role at various points of time by providing support to various insurgent outfits in the form

of safe sanctuaries, training facilities, weapons and financial and moral support.

Insurgency took place in the state of Assam due to various factors, such as,

emergence of Assamese nationalism, economic exploitation, political distortion and

illegal migration in the state. Assam was geographically a large state in the region before

reorganization of the Northeast region. The newly emerged middle class of this undivided

Assam wanted to restrain the influence of Bengali-speaking people and to rule over the

minority classes of undivided Assam such as Bengalis, Bodos, Khasis, Mizos, Nagas and

Chakmas. Thus, attempts were made to gain such control by playing language politics.

They also encouraged the M uslim rice cultivators and peasants from East Pakistan to

settle in Assam with a condition that they should declare Assamese language as their

mother tongue. However, this language politics had disturbed other minority ethnic

communities. However, in the 1971, the Bengali-sp)eaking immigrant Muslims refused to

declare Assamese as their mother tongue. Later in 1972, reorganization of the region

limited the influence of Assam. Consequently, Assamese middle class and rural masses

felt threatened because of the changing demography and transfer of land ownership to the

Bengali migrants. They also noticed economic exploitation that was taking place in the

state. They had raised the issue of economic exploitation through the protest at oil

refinery. As a result, Assamese initiated a mass agitation against the illegal migrants with

a feeling of economic exploitpfir>n, linguistic issue and a fear that the Assamese would

one day become foreigners in their own land. This mass agitation ended with Assam

accord in 1985.

The success of Assamese students’ leaders in sustaining prolonged campaign and

acquiring the political power had inspired other student movements in the state. Thus, the

situation became worse than before. In 1987, Upen Brahma, a Bodo leader made a

demand to divide Assam and initiated a Bodo movement for Bodo land due to the non­

implementation of Clause 10 of the Assam Accord, which says to evict the illegal

migrants from tribal belt. This movement was marked by widespread violence.

Meanwhile, ULFA, which was formed in 1979, grew stronger after 1985 and began to run

a parallel administration in many parts of Assam. The ULFA advocated decentralization

Bethany Lacina. “Does Counter Insurgency Theory Apply in Northeast India?”, (Indian Review), vol.6 , no.3., July-September, 2007, p. 174.

138

of ethnic communities to ensure that they have accepted the broad goals of Assamese

nationalism. The ULFA had promised to implement scientific socialism to build

Assamese society after the liberation from Indian colonial rule. Due to the growing

influence of ULFA and Bodo movement, law and order of the state was collapsed and

hence the president rule was imposed on the state. Thereafter, the negotiations were made

with the ABSU-BPAC, which resulted into Bodo Accord of 1993. Bodo accord had

conferred Bodo Autonomous Council to the Bodo community. However, neither Bodos

nor non-Bodos were satisfied with this accord. Hence, NDFB and BLTF began their

operatid^ip in mid 1990s. The goals of these outfits were different. NDFB had a

secessionist agenda whereas BLTF wanted a separate homeland for Bodos within India.

Consequently, they acted against each other. The ULFA has never had a rival that could

challenge its dominance in Assam’s separatist politics; however, when BLTF challenged

NDFB, it resulted into conflicts between them. The arguments have been made that the

Indian military had used BLTF to check the NDFB militarily. Subsequently. NDFB w a s

alienated and forced to enter into the ceasefire agreement with the Indian government.

The then Indian government had settled the issue of Bodoland with the BLTF by signing

an accord in 2003. This accord gave autonomous Bodo Territorial Council with the

powers of local self government to the Bodos. The NDFB did not accept this deal but it

has more or less maintained a ceasefire with the government since 2004. However, the

anti-talk faction of NDFB had challenged the ceasefire. Meanwhile, hill tribes such as

Karbis and Dimasas, like Bodo movement, began a movement for separate homeland.

The DHD has been ^ghting for separate homeland for Dimasa tribe whereas insurgent

outfit like UPDS has been struggling for separate homeland for Karbi tribe. Both outfits

carried out an armed struggle because of the failure of the earlier generation of Karbi and

Dimasa leadership, who had used agitation as a method to secure autonomy but lost their

trustworthiness due to the large-scale corruption. These two outfits have become weak

due to the splits within the outfit and because of entering into ceasefire agreement with

the government. However, anti-talk factions of these outfits are still active in this area.

The scope of the Dimasa and the Karbi insurgent outfits may be limited because of their

smaller population base, but with the right kind of alliances, they can still create a

problem.

The emergence of Muslim Fundamentalist Organizations (MFOs) added a new

dimension in the insurgency of Assam. Assam police listed seventeen MFOs, which came

into existence as a result of a fear that the administration is not sensitive to the troubles of

139

the Muslim community. These MFOs have a strong hold in the border areas dominated by

illegal Muslim immigrants. The long-term aim of MFOs is to destabilize Assam,

Northeast and India. Hence, they work in collusion with terrorist organizations like

Harakt-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HuJI), Jamma’atul Mujahideen (JuM) and Laskar-e-Taiba

(LeT).

All outfits from the state have maintained close nexus among them for the

operational purpose. In addition, they have maintained close contacts with the

neighbouring countries for arms and training. These outfits have generated the funds

through extortion, kidnapping, robberies etc. The insurgent outfits from the state, like

other insurgent outfits from the region, have diluted their original agenda and lost the

support of local population.

The central and state governments have taken the counter insurgency measures to

counteract against the insurgent outfits. Counter insurgency involves military and non­

military measures adopted by the government to control the insurgency. According to old

doctrinal definition, “Counter Insurgency acts are those military, paramilitary, political,

economic, psychological and civic actions, which are taken by a government to defeat

insurgency”. In this context, it wouid be relevant to mention that the measures adopted

by the government depend on the nature of the insurgency. Hence, the nature of counter

insurgency is not fixed, but it always changes and evolves in response to the changes in

the form of insurgency. Thus, no universal or operational technique applies to all

insurgencies or remains valid for any single insurgency through its life cycle.

‘Or'eration Bajarang’ was the first counter insurgency operation against the ULFA

in Assam. The operation could not achieve much because the insurgents came to know

about the possibility of an army attack. However, Operation Bajarang had exposed

ULFA’s ability to stand up as an organized force. In this operation, the lack of

intelligence was the main obstacle. The methodology, the common mode of barricade and

search operation had caused hardship in rural areas and there was no co-operation from

the rural people.'* This operation had continued until April 20, 1991. The second counter

insurgency operation was ‘Operation Rhino’. It had achieved better success than earlier

operation because it was based on firm intelligence and the security forces could hunt out

the actual members without any barrier and search operation.^ This operation had

destroyed the ULFA to a great extent. As a result, the ULFA declared unilateral ceasefire

■* The Sentinel, 16 February 2005." Ibid.

140

on 17“’ December 1991 * The operation had continued till January 1992. The prospects of

peace-talks between the government and the ULFA resulted into temporary suspension of

army operations. Moreover, the then Chief Minister Saikia had successfully split the

ULFA and encouraged them to surrender. The army operation had resumed in six districts

in April 1992. Army had particularly targeted the local ULFA leaders as they were

against the surrender of arms and negotiation. Operation Rhino was suspended in April

1993. However, the operation Rhino was resumed on 7‘ May 1996, just before the

elections when two electoral candidates were killed allegedly by ULFA.’

It is relevant to mention that different huge forces were involved in the Northeast

region, which had become the major hurdles for the Indian military operations. For

instance, Indian army troops, paramilitary forces, special units, regular law enforcement

agencies and even armed civilians were involved in counter insurgency operations. The

unified command was set up in 1997 to overcome this situation. While setting the unified

command, the then Union Home Secretary K. Padmanabh had preposed setting up of a

Unified Headquarters, which would be under the chairmanship of GOC IV Corps with

operational control over all forces, including central paramilitary and state police

employed on counter-insurgency duties, for coordinating the entire operation. However,

this proposal was criticized on the ground that the introduction of Unified Command

structure would lead to destruction of the democratic system in the state when an elected

government would come in power.** Despite the criticism, the then government employed

the counter insurgency strategy under unified headquarters. Another major counter

'n^'.'.rgency operation was ‘Operation All Clear’, which was conducted with the help of

Bhutan in the year 2003. The then Indian government had employed this operation in

coordination with Royal Bhutan Army. Besides this, many small counter insurgency

operations were carried out in Assam against various insurgent outfits since the Operation

Bajarang. The efforts were also taken through diplomatic strategies with neighbouring

countries to pull out various camps of different insurgent outfits from their territories.

The central government had initiated peace-talks with these outfits while

employing army against the insurgent outfits in Assam. In Assam, the first peace-talk

began in mid 1990s, soon after the Operation Bajarang was over. Since then, numbers of

peace-talks were held and are still held between various insurgent outfits from Assam and

Chandra Bhushan, Terrorism and Separatism in Northeast India. (Delhi, 2004), p. 135. Sanjib Baruah, India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality (New Delhi, 1999), p. 158.

** Ibid. and Assam Tribune. 22 January 1997.

141

Government of India. The Government of India has taken various peace initiatives other

than counter insurgency operations to tackle with the insurgency problem in Assam, such

as, surrender and rehabilitation policy, reimbursement of security-related expenditure,

raising of reserve battalion, modernization of police force, construction of roads and

fencing along the border, etc. In addition, various development initiatives were also taken

with a viewpoint that the development would help to restrain the insurgency problem

form Assam and the Northeast region. These initiatives include the establishment of

Northeast Council, Ministry o f Development of Northeast Region and formation o f Look

East policy, etc.

The insurgency violence has claimed several human lives in Assam. It has also

dislocated several thousands of people from their homes. This has disturbed their

livelihood for many years. The violence against the minorities has alienated the minority

classes from the mainstream. For example, the attacks by Bodo insurgents to unsettle the

refugees from Char lands created fear and deep sense of insecurity among the minority

community. This fear has added fuel to the Muslim fundamentalist groups from

Bangladesh and insurgent outfits, especially in Assam.’ Consequently, the outfits like

Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA), Muslim United Liberation Tiges of

Assam (MULTA), Harkat - Ul- Mujahideen (HuM) and Muslim Liberation Army (MLA)

have come to the forefront and gained importance in Assam.

The citizens have restricted their movements due to the fright of insurgents as well

as security forces. The curfews, bandhs and strikes, which are often found in the

Northeast region in general and in Assam in particular, have disturbed the routine life of

the people and social atmosphere. Such an atmosphere has made its impact on economic

and social development.*** The violence of insurgency has affected the infrastructure and

investment in Assam. For instance, the attacks by the insurgents on tea and petroleum

plants have conveyed a negative signal to the prospective investors. The qual'ty of

developmental work has also deteriorated. Many a times, delay in the execution and

completion of development projects in time has led to the increase in the cost of the

Krishna Gopal, •‘Islamic Fundamentalism in Bangladesh and its Role in Northeast Insurgency”, in Dipankar Sengupta and Sudhir Kumar Sing, ed.. Insurgency in North-East India: The Role of Baneladesh (New Delhi, 2002), p. 191.

Economic development is considered to the foundation of society. Hence, security and economic development have a symbiotic relationship, without security there can be no economic development and without economic development security has no meaning. Development is an over-arching term encompassing economic growth through agricultural improvement, industrialization and national- integration. Anything that comes in the way as hindrance of such development is a threat to the national security

project. Sometimes, the projects were abandoned due to insecurity. For instance, 201 kms

long Silchar-Lumding broad gauge conversion project in Assam was stopped due to

insurgency.^* The project was sanctioned in 1996 with a budget of Rs. 648 crore;*^

however, due to the violence made by Dimasa insurgents - the Dima Halam Daogah

(DHD) and its archrival the Black Widow, the said project was halted. These insurgents

had kidnapped and killed workers employed in this project.*^ Thus, the project could not

be completed in due course i.e. in 2006 and the cut-off date was extended to 2009, which

resulted in the increase of the cost of a project to Rs. 1,823 crore.*'*

The natural and economic development of the region is quite slow as the large

funds are spent to tackle insurgency problem of the region. Thus, it imposes additional

financial burden on the state and the central governments. Moreover, the deployment of

army for internal security adversely affects the army’s preparation for its main task. It

imposes an extra burden on the defence budget. In addition, the morale of the army

personnel is affected due to the daily causalities.

7.1 Findings of the Present Study :

1. The concept of national security has transformed from traditional mode to more

broad and deep concept. Its scope has expanded from the security of nations to

security of groups and individuals. Now it is considered as multidimensional,

multilevel and multi-sectoral. Therefore, in this globalised world, the objective of

national security is not only to protect the country from external attacks but also to

ensure the welfare of citizens of the country. This suggests that proper efforts

must be taken to maintain territorial integrity and to utilize available resources for

the prosperity of the people of the country. However, failure to do so creates the

external threats to the nation’s integrity and well-being of the citizens. Such

situation highlights the significance of internal and external security environment

of the country. It creates a link between internal and external security

environment, which is always crucial in the changing international scenario. The

challenges before India’s national security suggest that the internal environment

holds a key position for the security and stability of the country and well-being of

the people of the country as well. Insurgency is one of the serious issues that has

142

" M. Amarjeet Singh, “Insurgency and Development in India’s North-East States: A Study of Assam”, in Rakhee Bhattacharya and Sanjay Pulipaka, Perilous Journey: Debates on Security and Development in Assam, ed., (New Delhi, 2011), p. 170.'-Ibid. " Ibid.

Ibid.

143

created a challenge to national security, which India is facing today in Northeast

region of India.

2. Northeast region has an immense geostrategic significance due to its vast natural

resources and its geographical location. However, policies formulated by British,

partition o f the country, the succesive Indian governments’ policies and the

economic dependance of the region made a negative impact on the people of this

region, who are ethnically, culturally and linguistically diversed. This further

helped to sow the seeds of insurgency in the region.

3. The term insurgency has been widely used by different strata o f the society but it

is less understood in its multidimensional spectrum. It came to be understood as

an armed movement against the authorities of the state, which is carried out by the

people, who have been neglected and deprived of their rights. In the context of

Northeast region, the insurgency is an outcome of dissatisfaction, deprivation,

frustration and lack of positive response from the state, which ultimately alienated

the inhabitants of this region. Today, with some exceptions, the whole region is

engulfed with insurgency related violence. The causes of insurgency differ from

state to state in the region with some exception. Situations in two different states

are not alike. Today, insurgent outfits attempt to project themselves like extremist

group. Thus, violence and extremism have become the main tools of insurgency in

achieving political and economic power. However, the insurgency has sustained

and multiplied due to varied factors. Some of the important contributory factors

are criminalisation of insurgency, drug trafficking and small arms proliferation,

and criminalisation of politics and role of neighbouring countries in the region.

4. Various factors are responsible for the outbreak of insurgency in the state of

Assam, such as, language politics, awareness of economic exploitation, political

distortion and illegal migration. Insurgencies in Assam began after the Assam

Acccord, which was signed in 1985. Initially, insurgency movements were carried

out on ethnic lines; however, later insurgent outfits began to operate on communal

lines. Thus, Assam witnesses insurgency on ethnic and communal lines. There are

some hazardous insurgent groups in Assam, such as, ULFA, BdSF - NDFB, BVF

- BLTF, DHD, UPDS, MULFA and MULTA. ULFA, which was formed in 1979,

had emerged as a prominent insurgent outfit in the state after Assam accord. They

almost ran a parallel government in the state. Other insurgent outfits are

prominent in their respective areas, such as, Bodo Insurgent outfits in Bodo

144

dominated area, DHD in North Cachar Hills and Karbi Anlong districts, UPDS in

Karbi Anlong districts and Muslim Fundamentalist Organisations (MFOs) like

MULFA and MULTA are prominent in Muslim-dominated areas. They have

formed an alliance with other insurgent outfits within and outside the state and the

region. The Muslim Fundamentalist Organizations are working in collusion with

other the insurgent outfits and discontented elements of the society to act against

India. Most o f the problems in the state have become apparent due to the

unhealthy politics. Many insurgent outfits gain strength through secret support

from the politicians and also from the illegal gains acquired mainly through

extortion. Moreover, it has been found that the hostile neighbours are more willing

to create uneasy situation for India by aiding and abetting insurgent groups from

the Assam. Countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan have played very significant

role by providing aid and support to the insurgent outfits in the state. Besides

Pakistan and Bangladesh, the role of neighbouring countries like Bhutan and

Nepal has remained supplementary. These two nations have provided safe shelter

as well as transit facilities to the insurgent outfits of the state

5. Both central and state governments have been taking counter insurgency measures

to contain the insurgency from Assam,. The term ‘counter insurgency’ implies an

action that is taken to defeat insurgent or rebellious forces. The action taken could

be military, diplomatic, and psychological. In Assam, while tackling with the

insurgency, during the initial period army was continuously deployed to counter

the ULFA. Later BVF was used against the ULFA. However, it has gained little

due to lack coordination among the security forces and due to lack of coordinated

policy of the government. At the same time, peace initiatives and surrender and

rehabilitation policies were introduced to curb the insurgency in the state.

Presently all the major insurgent groups from the state are under the ceasefire

agreement but violence still persists. It is because important leaders of those

groups did not accept ceasefire agreement and formed another insurgent group.

Therefore, although the central government had initiated negotiation with them,

the anti - talk groups were engaged in violent activities. Moreover, talks at

diplomatic level were initiated with the neighbouring countries for not assisting

Indian insurgent outfits. In spite of such diplomatic attempts, many insurgent

outfits in the state received help and support from the neighbouring countries like

Bangladesh and Pakistan. Number of reserved battalions was augmented.

145

Modernization programme of the forces was undertaken and efforts were taken for

the management of borders. W hile taking these initiatives, army has been

continuously deployed in small counter insurgency operations. Moreover, various

attempts were made for the development of the state. Though, the central

government of India has been spending a lot of money and a lot more is likely to

flow to the Northeast region, the desired result is not appropriate with the money

spent. This is due to the fact that money was probably drained off by the corrupt

politicians, bureaucrats and insurgents.

6. The insurgency in the state o f Assam has made its impact on all modes of life in

the region in general and in the state in particular. It has disturbed social,

economic and political life of the region. Moreover, the insurgency-related

violence has largely shrunk the democratic space of the civil society.

7.2 Conclusion of the Study :

The conclusion of the study consists of the process of verification of the claim, the

supportive data and the validation of the hypotheses stated in the beginning of the study.

1. The army had been continuously deployed during the initial period while dealing

with the insurgency. However, it has gained a little due to lack of coordination

among the security forces and due to lack of coordinated policy of the

government. Political interference has affected the efficiency of the security forces

adversely in dealing with the insurgents. In this context, a roie of the army was to

create a situation that could bring the insurgent outfits for the negotiation resulting

in a ceasefire declaration and peace talks. However, peace initiatives did not

produce any desired results as the prominent leader of insurgent outfit like ULFA

and NDFB were kept away from the peace talks. Hence, these leaders acted

against the state. Moreover, huge funds have been provided for the development

in the state. However, very little development could take place in the state due to

malpractice of corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and the insurgents.

On the basis of the supportive data presented in the fifth chapter of the present

study, it can be concluded that the first hypothesis stands validated. The validated first

hypothesis is therefore confirmed as below:

• The continued dependence on the security forces for the maintenance of law and

order in the state of Assam, and short-term peace settlement for narrow political

gains has not produced the desired results.

146

2. It has been observed that the external powers, which are contrary to India, have

always taken a special interest in the Northeast region. They have taken

disadvantage o f the ethnic, religious and linguistic diversities of the region in

general and in Assam in particular while giving support to the insurgents to

destabilize the country. Although, the neighbouring countries like Bangladesh,

Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar except Pakistan, have apparently stopped helping the

insurgent outfits in the state; at one point of time, they had played a significant

role in assisting the insurgent outfits in the Northeast region. They have provided

sanctuaries, training, funds, arms and ammunition to the insurgent outfits in order

to achieve their desired goals. Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) is the

prominent agency, which searches for the disturbed groups of insurgents. In the

month of February 2000, the Ministry of Home Affairs, in a booklet “Bleeding

Assam” has accused Pakistan’s ISI for offering training to the Northeast insurgent

•outfits. Besides Pakistan and Bangladesh, the role of neighbouring countries like

Bhutan and Nepal is mostly of supportive nature. These two nations have

provided safe heavens as well as transit facilities lo the insurgent outfit of the

state. Recently, it has been reported that the leaders of anti-talk outfits, such as,

ULFA are asking help from China. Up till now, Pakistan is helping the insurgent

outfits in the Northeast region in general and in Assam in particular.

This supportive evidence verifies the validity of the claim made in the second

ijypothesis. The validated hypothesis is stated below:

• The neighbouring states of the Northeast region of India have not ceased the

violence as a state policy against India.

7.3 Recommendations:

Some necessary steps have been suggested at micro and macro level to control

violence and establish and maintain peace in the state and the Northeast region. Some of

these steps are mentioned and explained below :

Steps to be taken at Micro L evel:

1. Win Hearts and Minds :

The central and state governments must take confidence-building steps and

establish trustworthiness among the tribal people of the Northeast region. Moreover,

while taking any efforts to restore peace, the government must protect and promote the

historical rights and political identity of the indigenous people of Assam.

147

2. Dealing with Ethnic Groups :

There should not be settlement policy while dealing with ethnic groups. Dealing

with one underground group at a time would merely create distrust among the ethnic

communities, which would develop a feeling that the centre is following divide, and rule

policy in the region.

3. Observation of religious activities at border areas :

It should be made mandatory to seek the district authority’s approval for

establishing any religious institution at the border areas and keep continued vigilance on

the border to prohibit illegal activities.

4. Role to be played by private sector :

Private sector from the region must take the responsibility to carry out community

welfare activities and provide financial support to social and educational institutions,

besides generating employment for the youth of the state.

Steps to be taken at Macro L evel:

1. Good Governance :

Good governance is essential for the implementation of drawn policies to establish

harmony in the region. There should be proper decision-making and implementation of

those decisions should be in a transparent, accountable and in participatory manner.

2. Development:

The government should form a comprehensive policy to ensure security and

development in the region. Moreover, there should be optimal utilization of natural

resources of the region and dissemination of the developmental activities in the rural

areas. The feeling of negligence can be removed through development that would bring

the region reasonably to the same level of development as in the rest of the country.

3. Opening of Border :

India needs to open and develop its border trading routes, which would gradually

create a regional economy that would go beyond international borders. Moreover, India

needs to put more emphasize on her ‘Look East’ policy, which could bring about the

market access and trade with the neighbouring countries.

4. Enhanced cooperation with neighbours :

India must develop her strategic relations with her neighbours and look for full

cooperation from the governments of Bangladesh, Myanmar and other countries for

effective check on the movement of insurgents through borders. India should also create

barriers for smuggling of drugs through international borders with the help of

neighbouring countries.

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5. Education :

The universities of the region must ensure the balance between quality and

quantity education, as more and more technical work-force would be required to exploit

available resources.

6. Counter Insurgency Force :

The employment of the army for internal security duties or CION must be reduced

and the role of paramilitary forces to tackle internal security problems should be

upgraded. Education on human rights and constitutional rights must also be given to the

security forces.

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