CHAPTER TWENTY TWO

THE SOVIET UNION’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1945 TO DISINTEGRATION

PIETRO UZO MACLEO AND AKE EMMANUEL

INTRODUCTION

Officially the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a socialist state in Eurasia that existed from

1922 to 1991. It was nominally a supranational union of national republics, but its government and

economy were highly centralized in a state that was unitary in most respects. The Union's capital

was Moscow. The Soviet Union had its roots in the October Revolution of 1917, when the

Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, overthrew the Russian Provisional Government that had

replaced Tsar Nicholas II. This established the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic

(Russian SFSR) and started the Russian Civil War between the revolutionary "Reds" and the

counter-revolutionary "Whites." The Red Army entered several territories of the former Russian

Empire and helped local communists take power through workers' councils called "soviets", which

nominally acted on behalf of workers and peasants. In 1922, the communists were victorious,

forming the Soviet Union with the unification of the Russian, Trans-caucasian, Ukrainian, and

Byelorussian republics that is (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan,

Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Russian SFSR, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, Ukraine and

Uzbekistan). At the time of the founding of the Soviet Union (the USSR) in 1922, most

governments internationally regarded the Soviet regime as a pariah one because of its advocacy of

communism, and thus most states did not give it diplomatic recognition. Less than a quarter

century later the Soviet Union became a major player in the international system.

Trachtenberg (2012) posits that according to Soviet theorists, the basic character of Soviet foreign

policy was set forth in Vladimir Lenin's Decree on Peace, adopted by the Second Congress of

Soviets in November 1917. It set forth the dual nature of Soviet foreign policy, which encompasses

both proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence. On the one hand, proletarian

internationalism refers to the common cause of the working classes of all countries in struggling

to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to establish communist regimes. Peaceful coexistence, on the

other hand, refers to measures to ensure relatively peaceful government-to- government relations

with capitalist states. Both policies can be pursued simultaneously: "Peaceful coexistence does not

rule out but presupposes determined opposition to imperialist aggression and support for peoples

defending their revolutionary gains or fighting foreign oppression.

The general foreign policy goals of the Soviet Union were formalized in a party program ratified

by delegates to the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in February– March 1986. According to the

program, "the main goals and guidelines of the CPSU's international policy" included:

Ensuring favourable external conditions conducive to building communism in the Soviet Union;

eliminating the threat of world war; disarmament; strengthening the "world socialist system";

developing "equal and friendly" relations with "liberated" (Third World) countries; peaceful

coexistence with the capitalist countries; and solidarity with communist and revolutionary-

democratic parties, the international workers' movement, and national liberation struggles.

Although these general foreign policy goals were apparently conceived in terms of priorities, the

emphasis and ranking of the priorities have changed over time in response to domestic and

international stimuli. Dauda (2015:5-6) outlines the principles governing the selection of aims and

objectives of foreign policy as promoting national security, integrity of the state, economic interest

and protecting national prestige. Even though the emphasis and ranking of priorities were subject

to change, two basic goals of Soviet foreign policy remained constant: national security

(safeguarding Communist Party rule through internal control and the maintenance of adequate

military forces) and, since the late 1940s, influence over Eastern Europe. In general, Soviet foreign

policy was most concerned with superpower relations (and, more broadly, relations between the

members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact), but during the 1980s Soviet leaders pursued improved

relations with all regions of the world as part of its foreign policy objectives.

During the post-war reconstruction period, Stalin tightened domestic controls, justifying the

repression by playing up the threat of war with the West. According to Leon (2008:186), Stalin

warned of a capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union that could be broken only by resorting to

nationalism. Stalin entreated his followers to build socialism in one country making it impregnable

against its capitalist enemies. In 1946 Andrei Zhdanov, a close associate of Stalin, helped launch

an ideological campaign designed to demonstrate the superiority of socialism over Capitalism in

all fields. This campaign, colloquially known as the Zhdanovshchina ("era of Zhdanov"), attacked

writers, composers, economists, historians, and scientists whose work allegedly manifested

Western influence. Although Zhdanov died in 1948, the cultural purge continued for several years

afterward. In general, a pronounced sense of Russian nationalism, as opposed to socialist

consciousness, pervaded Soviet society and dominated the foreign policy of the USSR.

Mindful of the numerous invasions of Russia and the Soviet Union from the West throughout

history, Stalin sought to create a buffer zone of subservient East European countries, most of which

the Red Army (known as the Soviet army after 1946) had occupied in the course of the war. Taking

advantage of its military occupation of these countries, the Soviet Union actively assisted local

communist parties in coming to power. By 1948 seven East European countries had communist

governments. The Soviet Union initially maintained control behind the "iron curtain" through

troops, security police, and its diplomatic service. Unequal trade agreements with the East

European countries permitted the Soviet Union access to valued resources.

Soviet actions in Eastern Europe helped produce Western hostility toward their former ally, but

the Western powers could do nothing to halt consolidation of Soviet authority in that region short

of going to war. However, the United States and its allies had greater success in halting Soviet

expansion in areas where Soviet influence was more tenuous. British and American diplomatic

support for Iran forced the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from the North-eastern part of that

country in 1946. Soviet efforts to acquire territory from Turkey and establish a communist

government in Greece were stymied when the United States extended military and economic

support to those countries under the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Later that year, the United States

introduced the Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of other countries of Europe. The Soviet

Union forbade the countries it dominated from taking part in the program, and the Marshall Plan

contributed to reducing Soviet influence in the participating West European nations.

Interestingly, for the first few years of the early Cold War (between 1945 and 1948), the conflict

was more political than military. Both sides squabbled with each other at the UN, sought closer

relations with nations that were not committed to either side, and articulated their differing visions

of a post-war world. By 1950, however, certain factors had made the Cold War an increasingly

militarized struggle. The communist takeover in China, the pronouncement of the Truman

Doctrine, the advent of a Soviet nuclear weapon, tensions over occupied Germany, the outbreak

of the Korean War, and the formulation of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization as rival alliances had all enhanced the Cold War's military dimension. U.S. foreign

policy reflected this transition when it adopted a position that sought to "contain" the Soviet Union

from further expansion. By and large, through a variety of incarnations, the containment policy

would remain the central strategic vision of U.S. foreign policy from 1952 until the ultimate demise

of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Successive American presidents and successive Soviet premiers tried to manage the Cold War in

different foreign policy gestures, and the history of their interactions reveals the delicate balance-

of-power that needed to be maintained between both superpowers. Dwight Eisenhower

campaigned as a hard-line Cold Warrior and spoke of "rolling back" the Soviet empire, but when

given a chance to dislodge Hungary from the Soviet sphere-of-influence in 1956, he declined. The

death of Stalin in 1953 prefaced a brief thaw in East-West relations, but Nikita Kruschev also

found it more politically expedient to take a hard line with the United States than to speak of

cooperation.

By 1960, both sides had invested huge amounts of money in nuclear weapons, both as an attempt

to maintain parity with each other's stockpiles, but also because the idea of deterring conflict

through "mutually assured destruction" had come to be regarded as vital to the national interest of

both. As nuclear weapons became more prolific, both nations sought to position missile systems

in ever closer proximity to each other's borders. One such attempt by the Soviet government in

1962 precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis, arguably the closest that the world has ever come to a

large-scale nuclear exchange between two countries. It was also in the early 1960s that American

containment policy shifted from heavy reliance on nuclear weapons to more conventional notions

of warfare in pursuit of a more "flexible response" to the spread of communism. Although

originally articulated by President Kennedy, it was in 1965 that President Johnson showcased the

idea of flexible response when he made the initial decision to commit American combat troops to

South Vietnam. American thinking had come to regard Southeast Asia as vital to its national

security, and President Johnson made clear his intention to insure South Vietnam's territorial and

political integrity "whatever the cost or whatever the challenge."

The United States ultimately fought a bloody and costly war in Vietnam that poisoned U.S. politics

and wreaked havoc with its economy. The Nixon administration inherited the conflict in 1969, and

although it tried to improve relations with the Soviets through detente – and even took the

unprecedented step of establishing diplomatic relations with Communist China – neither

development was able to bring about decisive change on the Vietnamese battlefield. The United

States abandoned the fight in 1973 under the guise of a peace agreement that left South Vietnam

emasculated and vulnerable. Although Nixon continued to negotiate with the Soviets and to court

Maoist China, the Soviet Union and the United States continued to subvert one another's interests

around the globe in spite of detente's high-minded rhetoric.

Leonid Brezhnev had been installed as Soviet premier in 1964 as Kruschev's replacement, and

while he too desired friendlier relations with the United States on certain issues (particularly

agriculture), genuinely meaningful cooperation remained elusive. By the end of the 1970s,

however, the chance for an extended thaw had utterly vanished. Jimmy Carter had been elected

president in 1976, and although he was able to hammer out a second arms limitation agreement

with Brezhnev, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan significantly soured U.S.-Soviet relations.

Seeking to place a greater emphasis on human rights in his foreign policy, Carter angrily

denounced the incursion and began to adopt an increasingly hard line with the Soviets. The

following year, Americans overwhelmingly elected a president who spoke of waging the Cold War

with even greater intensity than had any of his predecessors, and Ronald Reagan made good on

his promises by dramatically increasing military budgets in the early 1980s.

Nonetheless, by 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev had replaced Brezhnev in Moscow, and he quickly

perceived that drastic changes to the Soviet system were necessary if the USSR was to survive as

a state. He instituted a series of liberal reforms known as perestroika, and he seemed genuinely

interested in more open relations with the West, known as glasnost. Although President Reagan

continued to use bellicose language with respect to the Soviet Union (as when he labeled it an "evil

empire"), the Gorbachev-Reagan relationship was personally warm and the two leaders were able

to decrease tensions substantially by the time Reagan left the White House in 1989.

Despite improved East-West relations, however, Gorbachev's reforms were unable to prevent the

collapse of a system that had grown rigid and unworkable. By most measures, the Soviet economy

had failed to grow at all since the late 1970s and much of the country's populace had grown weary

of the aged Communist hierarchy. In 1989, the spontaneous destruction of the Berlin Wall

signalled the end of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, and two years later the Soviet

government itself fell from power.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Soviet Union emerged from World War II devastated in human and economic terms. But

militarily it was one of the two major world powers, a position maintained for four decades through

its hegemony in Eastern Europe. The Soviets enshrined their foreign policies and propagated their

interest through military strength, involvement in many countries through local Communist

parties, and scientific research especially into space technology and weaponry. The Union's effort

to extend its influence or control over many states and peoples resulted in the formation of a world

socialist system of states. Established in 1949 as an economic bloc of communist countries led by

Moscow, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) served as a framework for

cooperation among the planned economies of the Soviet Union, its allies in Eastern Europe and,

later, Soviet allies in the Third World. The military counterpart to the Comecon was the Warsaw

Pact led by the Soviet Russia (Sheriff and Nwokedi, 2016:241).

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1991 and the drive for Global spread of

communist ideology can be better understood and analysed from the stand point of the Defensive

Structural Realist Theory. Defensive realism is an umbrella term for several theories of

international politics and foreign policy that build upon Robert Jervis's writings of (2003) on the

security dilemma and to a lesser extent upon Kenneth Waltz's (2000) balance-of-power theory

(neorealism). Defensive realism holds that the international system provides incentives for

expansion only under certain conditions. Anarchy (the absence of a universal sovereign or

worldwide government) creates situations where by the tools that one state uses to increase its

security decreases the security of other states.

This security dilemma causes states to worry about one another's future intentions and relative

power. Pairs of states may pursue purely security seeking strategies, but inadvertently generate

spirals of mutual hostility or conflict. States often, although not always, pursue expansionist

policies because their leaders mistakenly believe that aggression is the only way to make their state

secure. Defensive realism predicts great variation in internationally driven expansion and suggests

that states ought to generally pursue moderate strategies as the best route to security. Under most

circumstances, the stronger states in the international system should pursue military, diplomatic,

and foreign economic policies that communicate restraint.

According to Walt (2000), ‘in anarchy, states form alliances to protect themselves. Their conduct

is determined by the threats they perceive and the power of others is merely one element in their

calculations’. Walt (2000: 200–201) suggests that states estimate threats posed by other states by

their relative power, proximity, intentions, and the offence–defence balance. Perhaps the best-

known variant of defensive structural realism is Stephen Walt’s ‘balance of threat’ theory as

characterized in the cold war foreign policy affairs of the Soviet Union in relation to the United

States. Even though the constructivists argue (Sheriff 2013:38) that, material resources onlyacquire

meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.

But in accordance with the tenets of defensive structural realist theory the championing and spread

of communism by the Soviet Union was not only a threat to the Western Capitalist Ideology but

also a threat to the stability of the World liberalist system. The United States from being allies with

the Soviets in 1945 and being triumphant in WWII against Nazi Germany within just a few years,

became mortal enemies, locked in a global struggle—military, political, economic, ideological to

prevail in a new "Cold War" with the USSR.

Mearsheimer (2002) argues that the tensions that would later grow into Cold War became evident

as early as 1943, when the "Big Three" allied leaders: American President Franklin D. Roosevelt,

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin, met in Tehran to

coordinate strategy. Poland, which sits in an unfortunate position on the map, squeezed between

frequent enemies Russia and Germany, became a topic for heated debate.

The Poles, then under German occupation, had not one but two governments in exile, one

Communist and the anti-communist, hoping to take over the country upon its liberation from the

Nazis. Unsurprisingly, the Big Three disagreed over which Polish faction should be allowed to

take control after the war with Stalin backing the Polish Communists while Churchill and

Roosevelt insisted the Polish people ought to have the right to choose their own form of

government. For Stalin, the Polish question was a matter of the Soviet Union's vital security

interests; Germany had invaded Russia through Poland twice since 1914, and more than 20 million

Soviet citizens died in World War II. Stalin was determined to make sure that such an invasion

could never happen again, and insisted that only a Communist Poland, friendly to (and dominated

by) the Soviet Union, could serve as a buffer against future aggression from the west. Stalin's

security concerns ran smack into Anglo-American values of self- determination, which held that

the Poles ought to be allowed to make their own decision over whether or not to become a Soviet

satellite. At Tehran, and at the next major conference of the Big Three at Yalta in 1945, the leaders

of the US, UK, and USSR were able to reach a number of important agreements; settling border

disputes, creating the United Nations, organizing the post-war occupations of Germany and Japan.

But Poland remained a vexing problem. At Yalta, Stalin insisting that "Poland is a question of life

or death for Russia" was finally able to win Churchill's and Roosevelt's reluctant acceptance of a

Communist dominated provisional government for Poland. In exchange, Stalin signed on to a

vague and toothless "Declaration of Liberated Europe," pledging to assist "the peoples liberated

from the dominion of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe

to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems." The agreements

allowed Churchill and Roosevelt to claim they had defended the principle of self- determination,

even though both knew that Poland had effectively been consigned to the Soviet sphere of interest

(Roskin and Medeiros, 2008).

In such situations, Countries generally pursue their national interest. This makes international

politics inherently selfish; nations rarely behave like saints. Countries may practice generosity and

altruism, but often with an eye to enhancing their international power and prestige.

In the end, the Yalta agreements were not so much a true compromise as a useful (in the short

term) misunderstanding among the three leaders. Stalin left happy he had won Anglo-American

acceptance of de facto Soviet control of Eastern Europe; Roosevelt and Churchill left happy they

had won Stalin's acceptance of the principle of self-determination. But the two parts of the

agreement were mutually exclusive; what would happen if the Eastern Europeans sought to self-

determine themselves out of the Soviet orbit? Future disputes over the problematic Yalta

agreements were not just likely; they were virtually inevitable and the likelihood of future conflict

only heightened on 12 April 1945, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt unexpectedly died of a

brain hemorrhage.

Vice President Harry S. Truman, a former Missouri senator with only a high-school education,

who had served just 82 days as vice president and had not been part of FDR's inner circle—

suddenly became the President of the United States. Truman, who may not have ever known just

how much Roosevelt had actually conceded to Stalin at Yalta, viewed the Soviets' later

interventions in Eastern Europe as a simple violation of the Yalta agreements, as proof that Stalin

was a liar who could never be trusted. Truman quickly staked out a hard-line position, resolving

to counter Stalin's apparently insatiable drive for power by blocking any further expansion of the

Soviet sphere of influence, anywhere in the world. Under Truman, containment of Communism

soon came to dominate American foreign policy. The Cold War was on.

Evidently as propounded by scholars of Defensive Realism, the threat of the spread of Communism

in Europe and the uncertainty of its impact on the West, America’s interest in Europe and the

World at large informed Truman’s decision to embark on containment policy with the Soviet

Union. The formation of NATO, the enforcement of Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine were all

measures to halt the spread and expansion of Communism.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET UNION’S FOREIGN POLICY, 1945 – 1991

Solovey (2013) accounts that, throughout the war what Stalin wanted most from the Western

Powers was their commitment to a second front, economic aid and their agreement to the

restoration of Russia’s 1941 borders. These objectives did not change. However, his tactics for

achieving them did. Stalin’s agreement with Roosevelt in 1942 of fewer supplies for a second front

shows that he was initially willing to compromise with the Allies. When this was not forthcoming

he became more and more assertive until Overlord was eventually launched in 1944. Regarding

the crucial issue of borders, Stalin’s realization that this could be a stumbling block to long-term

alliance led to the implementation of the National Front Strategy. However, as this clearly failed,

Stalin turned to obstruction and forced to get his own way over Eastern Europe and his buffer-

zone. Stalin wanted continued co-operation, but on his own terms, and ultimately he chose the

Sovietization of Eastern Europe over continued alliance. He was not willing to compromise on

governments that might be unfriendly to Russia, which meant that they had to be picked by Stalin

himself. What Stalin wanted from the West remained the same, even if his methods for achieving

them did not. His quest for regional domination led to Cold War with the United States and several

international clashes from 1945 – 1991.

The Beginning of the Cold War

Sheriff and Umar (2014) argue that the twilight of the Second World War and with the destruction

of the European multipolar structure, the United States emerged the strongest economy in the

world and maintained the Western pole while Russia emerged the strongest in Eastern pole. The

term ‘Cold War’ refers to the period of struggle and conflict between the USA and USSR between

1945 and1991. Each of the Superpowers saw the other as a threat to its continued survival and

adopted strategies to preserve their positions. The two Superpowers never went to war directly

with each other in this period, but became involved in conflicts such as the Korean, Somalia Wars

etc, where each side stood behind the other nations involved. Therefore this conflict is termed as

the Cold War rather than a conventional hot war. There were a number of occasions when it

appeared that a hot war would break out between the Superpowers, but due to the awareness of a

collateral damage and a mutually assured destruction both Nation could inflict on each other’s

territory both Countries never went to war. Halidu and Ukhami (2015: 20) posit that this period

witnessed intense void of the use of biological or chemical weapons. It was an ideological

contestation between the supporters of capitalism (USA and its allies) and the supporters of

socialism (USSR and its allies).

Reasons for the Breakdown of the Wartime Alliance by 1945

The USSR and the USA both joined the Second World War in 1941, the former on June 22nd

following Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa and the latter on December 9th following Japan’s surprise

attack on Pearl Harbour. In the long run both attacks proved fatal to the aggressor nations; sleeping

giants were awoken, the Axis powers were defeated in 1945 and a new world order was created.

The USSR and the USA emerged as by far the most powerful Nations from the Second World

War. The former Great Powers – Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan – were no longer

capable of dominating the rest of the world, only the USA and the USSR, the Superpowers,

remained unbroken. The USA and the USSR were strange bedfellows during the Second World

War. Their alliance was purely strategic. The underlying differences between the supreme

capitalist nation (the USA) and the original communist state (the USSR) were bound to re-emerge

once Germany and Japan had been defeated. It was clear that two states could no longer ignore

each other in a new world of global finance and communication. Both were extremely nervous of

the other nation’s aims; worry led to fear, fear caused the breakdown of the wartime alliance and

turned eventually to hostility and mutual antipathy.

The Emergence of Rivalry between the Superpowers

The USSR was a one party state dominated by Stalin. Individuals did not have the choice to choose

alternative politicians in free elections; industry and agriculture was owned by the state. In the

1930s, Stalin had transformed the USSR into a modern industrial state through the Five Year Plans,

Collectivization and the Purges. The transformation had come at a huge cost in human life, but a

superpower had been born, capable of defeating Nazi Germany and emerging as a world power.

The people of the USSR had experienced foreign invasion in the First World War, during the Civil

War 1918-1921 and the Second World War. Stalin believed that the USA’s long-term ambition

was to destroy communism, therefore he adopted policies, which he believed would prevent this

from happening. The USA was a democratic state, with free elections, freedom of speech and a

capitalist economic system. In the 1930s the American people had experienced the Depression and

a withdrawal from world politics (isolationism). The Second World War helped to regenerate the

USA’s industries to such an extent that people’s standards of living actually went up during the

Second World War. The USA emerged immeasurably more powerful from the war with Germany

and Japan. It was clear that the USA could no longer sit on the side-lines in world politics.

However, the USA was extremely concerned by the spread of communism in Eastern Europe and

the Far East. The USA believed that Stalin wanted to convert the rest of the world to communism.

The USA had fought the fascist ideologies of Germany, Italy and Japan, now it was prepared to

fight the communist ideology of the USSR.

The Beliefs and Attitudes of Stalin and Truman

Stalin’s fear of the USA led him to believe that the USSR needed a barrier of territory between

Soviet territory and the USA’s allies in Western Europe. Stalin feared another anti-communist

invasion of Russia from Europe as had occurred in 1918 and 1941. Stalin wanted to create a barrier

against the West, a barrier made up of communist run countries in Eastern Europe. The new

president of the USA, Harry Truman, saw Soviet domination of Eastern Europe not as an act of

defence on Stalin’s part, but as an act of aggression. Would this communist take-over and spread

to Western Europe too?

The Yalta and Potsdam Conferences

While the war with Germany continued, the wartime allies (USA, USSR and Britain) met to

discuss the post-war future of Europe. The most significant meetings between the allied leaders

were at Yalta in February 1945 and Potsdam in July 1945. Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill agreed

that Germany be divided into four zones to be occupied by USA, USSR, Britain and France. It was

also recognized that Stalin was to have influence over Eastern Europe, but that free elections be

held in them to decide who governed them. The biggest problem was Poland. Stalin had liberated

Poland and a communist government had been established. Stalin insisted that a ‘friendly’

government be established there to protect the USSR from Germany. Stalin refused to allow

democratic elections in Poland.

The Potsdam Conference

By the time the allies met again, the situation had changed considerably. Germany had been

defeated, Roosevelt had died and had been replaced by Truman and Clement Attlee had defeated

Churchill. The allies agreed to divide Germany into zones and to claim reparations for war losses.

However, the USA began to realize that it did not want a weakened Germany in Central Europe, a

perfect breeding ground for communism. Truman wanted to rebuild Germany, while Stalin wanted

to weaken it further by taking equipment and materials as reparations. The pattern for future

conflict between the USA and the USSR had begun.

The Deepening of the Cold War 1945-53

Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe, the Iron Curtain and Western reactions: Advancing allied

and Soviet forces from the West and East defeated Nazi Germany. While American and British

forces liberated France, Italy and the Low Countries, Soviet forces replaced Nazi forces in a string

of countries in Eastern Europe. The Americans and the British could do nothing about this while

Nazi Germany remained undefeated; the USSR after all was an ally at this time. It was clear,

however, that Stalin was very reluctant to relinquish control of Eastern Europe, a Soviet sphere of

influence. President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill did not like the Soviet domination of Eastern

Europe, but they needed the USSR as an ally and they could do very little to prevent Stalin’s

military annexation of this region.

In 1946 Churchill referred to the division of Europe, East and West, communist and capitalist, as

the descending of an iron curtain. A shadow has fallen across the scenes so lately lighted by Allied

victory. From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across

the continent. There was no real physical barrier, but there was a clear division between the

democratic states of the West and the communist states of the East. Many in the West were

concerned that Stalin would not stop in Eastern Europe would he now turn to the West?

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan

Harry Truman replaced President Roosevelt when he died in April 1945. Truman was very

concerned by the growth of Soviet power. Truman realized that the USA could no longer continue

with its policy of isolationism. If the spread of communism was to be halted, Truman believed that

the USA would have to be much more active in world affairs. To defend the USA from

communism, Truman believed that he would have to support other countries militarily and

financially in order to prevent them from potentially becoming communist states. This policy

became known as the Truman Doctrine. The major objective of Truman was to break countries of

both Eastern and Western Europe from having any communist affiliation. In 1947 it appeared that

Greece and Turkey might become communist states. In March 1947 Truman promised that the

USA would help any country threatened by communism. The USA would ‘contain’ Soviet

expansion. Truman believed that Stalin had forced the countries of Eastern Europe into accepting

communist governments; he also believed that it was America’s duty to defend democracy.

Communism was prevented in Greece and Turkey. Truman gave $400 million dollars to the two

countries and in return established missile bases in Turkey.

Truman was concerned to help European countries recover from the war. He believed that

economically strong countries would be unlikely to turn to communism and would become major

trading partners with the USA. To help Europe rebuild after the war, the USA gave millions of

dollars under the Marshall Plan. A fund of $15 billion was set aside for European countries to draw

on. The idea was to allow countries from both East and West to receive Marshall Aid, but Stalin

realised that this would make countries like Poland more dependent upon the USA than the USSR.

Stalin denounced the Marshall Plan, claiming that it was economic imperialism. Stalin forced the

Eastern European countries to withdraw their applications for assistance. Instead, these countries

had to apply for help from the Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). This was

never very effective as the USSR had too little resources to offer.

In all, sixteen countries received Marshall Aid, Britain and France being the major recipients. West

Germany also received just under $1.4 billion. Stalin was very angry with this, he did not want a

strong Germany; in the East he deliberately weakened the Soviet zone of Germany. In the West,

Truman wanted to create a powerful buffer against communism; he did not want Germany to be

weak. By 1952 most Western European countries had recovered to their pre-war levels of

production. The communist parties in France and Italy lost their support as standards of living rose.

The Marshall Plan had been very effective in preventing the spread of communism in Western

Europe and had created economically strong democratic allies for the USA.

The Comin form

In 1947 communist leaders from all over the world were invited to a conference in Warsaw, where

the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was created. This was designed to spread

communism and to protect states from US aggression. In 1948, Stalin ordered Cominform to expel

Tito, the communist leader of Yugoslavia, because he would not give into Stalin’s wishes. This

shows that Stalin wanted total control of the communist world and would allow no opposition. The

USA saw Cominform as a serious challenge to the West. Relations between the superpowers

deteriorated further.

The Post-war Division of Germany and the Berlin Crisis of 1948-49

The first major crisis of the Cold War was over Germany. With Nazism defeated and Germany

occupied by the allies, the question of what to do next became an issue resulting in tension between

the superpowers. As they had agreed at Yalta and Potsdam, Germany was divided into four zones

of occupation. At first relations between the forces were good as all were united in the belief that

Nazism should be crushed. However, the USA, Britain and France saw quickly that Germany

would have to be supported economically if communism was to be prevented. The allies wanted a

strong, democratically Germany acting as a buffer against the communist states of Eastern Europe.

In contrast, Stalin wanted to weaken Germany as a punishment for the war, to help rebuild the

USSR by stealing German industrial technology and to make communism seem more attractive to

the Germans. These conflicting policies soon led to a crisis.

Berlin was also divided into four zones, but the city as a whole was located in the Soviet zone of

Germany. The West depended upon Soviet goodwill to keep open routes to the British, French and

American zones of the city. By 1948 the Western zones of Germany were recovering and the allies

decided to join their zones together. Stalin was very worried by a resurgent and prosperous

Germany; his response in June 1948 was to close all roads, canals and railways leading from the

West to West Berlin. Stalin believed that the West Berliners would be starved into submission.

Truman’s choices were to give into Stalin and lose face, to go to war over the Berlin blockade or

to keep the West Berliners supplied from the air.

The Berlin airlift was the result. To maintain Berlin over 4000 tons of supplies needed to come in

each day; by the spring of 1949, 8000 tons were being supplied daily. Stalin realised that the allies

would not give in. He could order allied supply planes to be shot down, but this would have been

an act of war. In May 1949 Stalin ended the blockade of West Berlin. The allies were now

determined to build up West Berlin as a showcase for capitalism. Many Germans from the Soviet

zone crossed into West Berlin. Any hopes for a united Germany had ended. In 1949 the three

Western zones, including West Berlin, became the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany),

with its own democratically elected government. The USSR responded by turning its zone into the

German Democratic Republic (East Germany), which had a communist government. The

Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine were very successful in creating a strong, democratic

Western Europe. After the Berlin crisis of 1948-49, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) was formed as a military alliance of most of the Western European countries and the

USA. All members agreed to go to war if any one of them was attacked. Stalin tried to respond to

the Marshall Plan with Comecon and to the Truman Doctrine. When Stalin died in 1953 there was

a ‘thaw’ in relations between the superpowers, but when West Germany joined NATO in 1955,

Soviet fears were revived. The Warsaw Pact of 1955 was a military alliance controlled by the

Soviet Union made up of all the communist Eastern European countries. This was the USSR’s

response to NATO. Europe was now divided economically, politically and militarily into two

armed gangs of hostile opponents. Would the Cold War turn into another hot war in Europe?

The Korean War 1950-1953

Japan had occupied Korea between 1910 and 1945. Soviet forces in the North and American forces

in the south replaced Japanese soldiers. Korea became divided in two, in a similar manner to the

division of Germany. Stalin promised free elections in Korea at the Yalta, but he broke his promise.

Instead northern Korea became a communist satellite state under the control of Kim II Sung; in

the south a capitalist state was set up under Syngman Rhee. It proved impossible to reunite the

country. In 1949 China became a communist state. Sheriff and Aliyu (2016: 153) quotes Mao

when he posited that without the effort of the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Communist

as the mainstay of the Chinese people, China can never achieve independence and liberation, or

industrialization and the modernization of her agriculture. Sheriff and Nasiru (2012: 29) further

propounds that the Chinese Communist Party dominates state and society in China, its powers

rests on four pillars: military, bureaucracy, information and control of judiciary. The South

Koreans were very nervous, surrounded by communist states – the USSR, China and North Korea.

Stalin and Mao (the Chinese communist leader) encouraged Kim II Sung to attack South Korea.

They saw a perfect opportunity to spread communism in the Far East, perhaps even to Japan. The

USA was very worried by the so-called domino effect; if one country fell to communism, others

would fall also. When Kim Il Sung attacked South Korea he had the financial support of Stalin,

but not the direct military support of the USSR.

South Korea appealed to the United Nations for help. Sixteen nations, headed by the USA took

part immediately, another sixteen followed later. Under General MacArthur UN forces quickly

pushed back North Korean forces and approached China. The Chinese were very concerned

especially as MacArthur made it clear he was prepared to invade China and use nuclear weapons.

Truman dismissed MacArthur in 1951 and the North Koreans, with Chinese support, were able to

push back UN forces to the 38-degree N parallel, the same division between North and South

Korea that had existed in 1949. When Stalin died in 1953 both sides agreed to a cease-fire. The

Korean War had been a stalemate between the superpowers. Although both had been involved, the

USA and the USSR had not fought directly against each other. In 1954 SEATO (South East Asian

Treaty Organisation) was set up as a copy of NATO. Communism had been prevented in South

Korea and the UN was seen as a success, it had stood up to major aggression, something the League

of Nations had failed to achieve. However, the war also revealed that China was no longer weak

and was prepared to stand up to the West. Was this the emergence of a third superpower?

Changing Attitudes and Policies in the 1950s

When Stalin died in 1953, it appeared that the relationship between the USA and the USSR would

improve. With the emergence of Khrushchev as Stalin’s successor in 1956, this belief seemed to

take effect. However, Khrushchev was an old-school communist, with no wish to diminish the

USSR’s status as a rival superpower to the USA. By the late 1950s, relations between the two

states had deteriorated as a result of a series of crises: the Hungarian Uprising, the Arms Race and

the Space Race.

Khrushchev, the 1956 speech and co-existence

Stalin had been a brutal dictator of the USSR between the late 1920s and 1953, upon his death

many Russians hoped for a less cruel and repressive leader. Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev,

denounced the excesses of Stalin’s’ rule in 1956 in a secret speech made to the Communist Party.

Statues of Stalin were pulled down, cities, towns and streets were renamed, the secret police

became less active and more consumer goods were produced. This policy was known as

destalinization. This was very popular in the USSR and in the West as well. It seemed that

Khrushchev held out the promise of greater freedom for the Soviet people. Khrushchev wanted

also to reduce the Cold War tension between the superpowers – this process was known as the

‘thaw’.

The Hungarian Rising 1956

The communist satellite states of Eastern Europe expected that they too would benefit from de-

Stalinisation and the thaw. This was a mistake. Khrushchev could not allow the Eastern European

states to go through a similar process of de-Stalinisation, he believed that this would undermine

communism in these countries, they might then break away from the USSR and it would lose its

barrier against the capitalist West. Revolts against the USSR had broken out in East Germany in

1953 and in Poland in 1956; these had been put down mercilessly. In 1956 the people of Hungary

also tried to break free from Soviet control. Many Hungarians saw the thaw as an opportunity to

break free from the Soviet Union. In 1956 demonstrations and protests in Budapest led to the

election of Imre Nagy, a known modernizer, as Prime Minister. The Soviet Union was unprepared

for this challenge to its authority and for a few weeks, withdrew its forces and did nothing.

Khrushchev hoped that the situation would calm down in Hungary, but in fact Nagy began to

implement a reform programme. Freedom of speech was allowed, non-communists were allowed

into government, free elections were promised and Nagy demanded Hungarian withdrawal from

the Warsaw Pact.

Khrushchev could not allow this to happen. If the USSR backed down over Hungary, similar

protects might have spread to other communist states in Eastern Europe (This is what happened in

1989 when communism in Eastern Europe came to an end). The USSR invaded Hungary in

November 1956, 30,000 were killed and 200,000 fled to the West. Nagy was arrested and executed

and was replaced by the hard-line communist Janos Kadar. The USA, NATO and the West could

do nothing to aid the Hungarians. To attempt to stop the Soviet Union’s invasion of Hungary would

have been seen as an act of war. Despite all the tension between the USA and USSR, each could

not afford to risk all-out nuclear with each other. Therefore, the USA held back from going to

Hungary’s aid. The result of the Hungarian Uprising was to cause a further deterioration in

relations between the USSR and USA.

The Beginning of the Nuclear Arms and Space Races

Khrushchev wanted to prove that the USSR could hold its own with the USA. In sport, science,

technology, military and diplomatic spheres, the USSR sought to show that it could compete and

do better than the USA. This led to challenges, tension and conflict. The two most important areas

of tension were known as the Arms and Space Races. In 1945 the USA had detonated two nuclear

bombs over Japan to help bring an end to the Second World War. Japan was very nearly at the

point of defeat before the nuclear bombs were used, so some historians believe that the USA

wanted to use their atomic weapons in order to warn the USSR that they had weapons of mass

destruction and were prepared to use them. The attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki happened just

as the Cold War began.

The USSR challenged the West’s lead in nuclear weapons. By 1949 the USSR also had nuclear

weapons. The Cold War became very much more serious in the 1950s as each of the superpowers

built more and more atomic weapons. The growth in the huge stockpile of weapons was known as

the Nuclear Arms Race. The Space Race was connected to the Arms Race. Until the late 1950s,

long-range aircraft would have delivered nuclear weapons. But in the 1950s the USSR and the

USA began to develop missile technology that would be able to put rockets into space. These

rockets would be capable of delivering nuclear warheads across continents and at very high speeds.

Both sides set about building Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMS) capable of travelling

thousands of miles and killing tens of thousands of people.

The USSR took an early lead in the Space Race with the launch of the Sputnik 1 satellite in 1957.

By 1960 the USA had developed a missile system launched from submarines called Polaris. Both

sides tried to locate missiles in friendly countries that neighboured their enemy – the USA had

missiles in Turkey, the USSR tried to put missiles on Cuba in response. By 1963 the Arms and

Space Races had brought the Cold War to the brink of all-out nuclear war. Both superpowers

believed that possessing nuclear weapons would prevent the other powers from going to war. This

was known as nuclear deterrence. For years this brought stability to the world, however, both sides

had nuclear weapons, so there was a chance they might be used. Between 1946 and1962 there

were over 800 disarmament meetings to try to reduce the Arms Race. In 1962 Khrushchev and

President Kennedy pledged to consider disarmament seriously at the Geneva Disarmament

Conference.

Crisis in the 1960s, Their Causes and Results

The U2 Crisis

In May 1960 a summit between the ‘Big Four’ (Khrushchev, Eisenhower of the USA, De Gaulle

of France and Macmillan of Britain) was due to be held in Paris. But, on 1st May a new crisis

erupted to sow further tension between the superpowers. In the late 1950s the USA had developed

the very light U2 spy plane, which was capable of flying at 75,000 feet. It could be picked up on

Soviet radar, but it was thought to be out of range of Soviet planes. Cameras on board the U2

planes were used to photograph Soviet military bases. On 1st May 1960, a U2 plane flown by Gary

Powers was shot down with a SAM-2 missile over the town of Sverdlovsk in the Ural Mountains.

The USA had been caught spying on the USSR; Powers was alive and thousands of photographs

were recovered from the plane. Khrushchev demanded a full apology, but Eisenhower refused

saying that it was the USA’s responsibility to protect itself from surprise attacks. Relations

between the superpowers worsened. Powers was put on trial in Moscow and received a ten-year

sentence. He was eventually released 17 months later in a spy-swap with a Soviet spy released

from a US jail.

The Building of the Berlin Wall 1961

In the 1950s, West Berlin had gone from strength to strength under the economic aid of the

Marshall Plan. Its success was a magnet for people dissatisfied with communist life in the East.

West Berlin was a hue embarrassment to the USSR, an island of democratic capitalism in a sea of

communism. While those in West Berlin enjoyed prosperity, there were few luxury goods in East

Berlin as well as food shortages and bad working conditions. Many East Berliners defected to the

West; by 1961 over 2 million East Germans had crossed into West Germany. In 1961 Khrushchev

demanded that the West should give up West Berlin. President Kennedy refused. In response,

Khrushchev ordered a border of machine guns, barbed wire and concrete to be built along the

demarcation line between the two halves of the city. The Soviets threatened to kill anyone who

tried to cross the wall. Churchill had spoken of an iron curtain descending in 1946; in 1961 a real

wall had been built dividing Berlin in half. Kennedy used the building of the Berlin wall as a

propaganda opportunity: if communism was so great, why did the Soviets need to build a wall to

keep people in? In 1963 Kennedy visited West Berlin and in his speech he said "Ich bin ein

Berliner" (I am a Berliner), this symbolized his support for the city and his determination to prevent

its fall to the communists.

The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962

The most serious event of the Cold War occurred in 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis brought the

USA and the USSR to the brink of nuclear war. The crisis was over the deployment of Soviet

missiles on Cuba, a very near neighbour of the USA. From 1933-1959, a right-wing dictator called

Batista ruled Cuba. The Americans bought sugar, Cuba’s main crop; they also controlled much to

Cuba’s economy. Batista was overthrown by the Marxist Fidel Castro in 1959. The USA did not

like Castro and refused to trade with Cuba as a result Castro seized American assets in Cuba and

made an alliance with the USSR.

The Bay of Pigs 1961

President Kennedy tried to overthrow Castro in April 1961. Cuban rebels, with the support of the

CIA, launched an invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The attack was a disaster and failed

dismally. The fiasco convinced Castro that the USA was enemy; he now turned to the USSR for

protection.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

In 1962 Khrushchev sent aircraft, boats and ground-to-air missiles to Cuba. Medium- range nuclear

weapons were also sent. On 14th October 1962, U2 spy planes confirmed that nuclear missile sites

had been built in Cuba for the Soviets. These missiles had a 2500-mile range and could now include

most US cities as targets. The situation was dangerous; Kennedy had lost face over the Bay of Pigs

and the building of the Berlin wall, he was not prepared to back down again.

On 22nd October Kennedy announced a 500-mile naval blockade of Cuba to prevent nuclear

missiles being delivered. Khrushchev was not prepared to go to war, but he did not want to back

down either. During the next few days a U2 plane was shot down over Cuba and a Soviet cargo

ship was boarded. The world held its breath. On 28th October the USSR agreed to remove its

missiles from Cuba; in return the USA ended its blockade on 20th November.

Results

Both the USA and the USSR realized that they had had a narrow escape. Relations between the

two sides had to improve. In 1963 a Test Ban Treaty was signed, banning the testing of nuclear

weapons in the air or under water. A hot-line was set up between Moscow and Washington. A

much greater spirit of co-operation existed between the superpowers after the Cuban Missile

Crisis, although there were a number of setbacks e.g. the Prague Spring of 1968. In the 1970s the

thaw between the superpowers was known as ‘détente’. Relations worsened after the USSR’s

invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, but in 1989 communism collapsed in Eastern Europe and in

Russia in 1991. Since then relations between the USA and Russia have improved, although a clear

pattern has yet to emerge.

CONCLUSION

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union from 1945 to disintegration was characterized with

communist expansionism, arm race, balance of terror and pursuit of state interest. Three grand

narrative themes have dominated the Soviet role in post-war world politics from 1945 to 1991.

First is the theme of bipolarity. This is the division of Europe after the Second World War of the

cold war polarization of world politics into two opposing armed camps, and the contest between

the Soviet Union and the United States for power, prestige and position. A quest for the

stabilization of this bipolar split as each side came to recognize the need to limit competition and

control conflict, above all to prevent the outbreak of general war involving the use of nuclear

weapons. The USSR and the United States dominated postwar international relations, although

they were by no means the only significant actors in the international system. But bipolarism

finally collapsed only with the decline and then self-destruction of the Soviet superpower.

Second is the theme of ideological competition; Communism versus capitalism, of the struggle

between states, between economies, between political systems and between ideas and values. It is

an insight into the Soviet expansionism and of the spread of communism after WWII. But it is a

contest that was ultimately won by capitalism, which proved to be the more resilient, dynamic and

durable system. The story ends with one side (communism) embracing the liberal ideology and

democratic system of the other side (capitalism).

Third is the theme of system crisis. The focus in this story is on the internal weaknesses,

contradictions and conflicts of the Soviet and communist system. In spite of the Soviet victory in

the Second World War and the Soviet rise in world politics, the USSR was always a fragile

superpower. Its internal regime survived only because it was authoritarian and repressive. The

Soviet-dominated communist bloc was nicked by constant crises and internal divisions. Nor could

the USSR compete militarily with the United States without imposing an intolerable strain on a

relatively weak and inefficient Soviet foreign policy goals. Was the aim of peaceful coexistence

peace and coexistence or was it a means to a revolutionary end? Could East-west detente be

maintained on a permanent basis when the Soviets aimed, in the long run is to subvert the

international order? Gorbachev ended the uncertainty by abandoning the Soviet Union's

revolutionary aspirations. But even he, a true product of the Soviet system sought a revolutionary

transformation of world politics, albeit one based on the practical implementation of liberal and

humanistic values and goals.

The Soviet revolutionary challenge also engendered instability in world politics. But it was in

many ways a predictable instability. Soviet ideological goals were not secret, nor was there any

question of the Soviets forcibly imposing their ideological vision on the whole world. Moscow

generally stuck to the treaties and agreements it made with the outside world. Even when it

abrogated its international commitments the motives were usually reactive and defensive in

character. The Soviet Union as an international actor rarely did anything surprising. Even such

dramatic actions as blockading Berlin and the Cuban missile crisis were designed above all to

provoke negotiation and compromise. Moscow always preferred political solutions to the problems

and crises that it faced; military action was always a last resort. The acuity of the Soviet sense of

the cataclysmic danger of nuclear warfare was second to none.

Now that the USSR no longer exists, the uniqueness of the Soviet state as an actor in the

international political system is becoming ever clearer. It was simply a state with leaders obsessed

by national security who aspired to world revolution. It was a state which sought and achieved

international influence and prestige but whose main goal remained the building of the socialist

system at home. The biggest paradox of all was that the USSR was a state which challenged the

global status quo but did so in a way that contributed to the order and predictability of world

politics.

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