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TITLE PAGE
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE NIGERIA-
CAMEROON BOUNDARY DISPUTE: A CASE STUDY OF BAKASSI
PENINSULA
BY
UGWU, ERNEST OSITADIMMA
PG/M.Sc/11/59949
SUPERVISOR: DR. KEN IFESINACHI
JULY, 2012
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APPROVAL PAGE
This research project work has been examined and approved by the Department of
Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, for the award of Master of Science
(M.Sc.) Degree.
By
DR. KEN IFESINACHI PROF. OBASI IGWE
SUPERVISOR HEAD OF DEPARTMENT
EXTERNAL EXAMINER PROF. E. O. EZEANI
DEAN OF FACULTY
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DEDICATION
To God Almighty and my friend Nwoke Ikemefuna (Clinton)
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
A research work of this nature is essentially anchored on seasoned intellectual
works, inspiration, financial and moral support from diverse individuals. First, my
unreserved appreciation go to my supervisor, Dr. Ken Ifesinachi, whose analytic rigour
provided the bearing and touch of scholarly ambience this work depicts.
My profound gratitude go to the scholars whose materials and contributions
formed the basis of our analytic excursion and provided the architectural foundation of
this work. Essentially, I am indebted to lecturers in the Department of Political Science;
Prof Jonah Onuoha, Prof Emmanuel Ezeani, Prof Obasi Igwe, Prof Okechukwu Ibeanu,
Dr Aloysius Okolie, Dr Herbert Edeh, Dr Peter Mbah, V.C Onah, H.C Agbo, S.N
Asogwa, Christian Ezeibe, Raymond Adibe among others. Apparently, their intellectual
expositions have wonderfully drilled me from undergraduate to this M.Sc level.
I must thank my Uncle, Pastor Hyacinth Ononugbor, whose magnanimity and
financial support cannot be adequately described in words. Also, I appreciate the
hospitality and moral encouragement of my Aunt, Eze Innocensia. I am also heavily
indebted to my parents, Mr. and Mrs Ugwu Sylvanus for their unquantifiable financial
and moral support in my academic pursuit. I cannot forget my siblings and cousins:
Ogbonna, Innocensia, Sylvanus, Euphemia, Emeka, Chigbo, Emmanuel, Obumneme,
Nneamaka, Ogechi, Chiboy, Blessing, Nnenna, Emeka Ugbor, Franca, Gloria, Uba, Ojee,
Uju, Chijioke, Ikechukwu, Simeon, Nnamdi, Nwakaego for their encouragement. I love
you all!
My gratitude equally go to my friends and class mates: Ikem (Clinton) Obinna
(Deputy), Okezie, Chikezie,Pius(Sir P) Onyebuchi, Abuchi, Ezike, Amos, Romanus,
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Obele, Francis, Sylvanus, Jumbo, Andrew, Iko, Linus, Ngozi, Vivian, Onyinye, Nne,
Francis,Felix,Steph,Michael,Clement among others.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge the efforts of my computer operators Chinonye
and Charity in making this work worth-reading.
Ugwu Ernest Ositadimma
(Acumen Esq)
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ABSTRACT
The discovery of oil reserves in the waters surrounding Bakassi Peninsula
subjected it to claims and counter-claims for sovereignty, military
occupation and recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On
October 10,2002, the International Court of Justice ruled that the
Peninsula and the territory in the Lake Chad region should be under the
sovereignty of Cameroon. This judgment elicited sensitive scholarly issues
of citizenship and self-determination as fundamental human rights. Also, it
encountered difficulties in implementation, which following intensive
diplomatic activities culminating in the 12 June 2006 Green Tree
Agreement brokered by the United Nations and guaranteed by four world
powers- Britain, France, Germany and United States, set the modalities of
withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Bakassi Peninsula. This work,
therefore, is a product of the study of the role of ICJ in the Nigeria-
Cameroon boundary dispute. To this effect, we ascertained how the ICJ
adjudication on the Bakassi Peninsula constituted the denial of the human
rights of Bakassi citizens; the provisions of the Green Tree Agreement
resolved the difficulties in the implementation of the ICJ ruling; the
interests of external powers affected the adjudication and implementation
of the ICJ ruling. We employed the schema theory of security dilemma as
our analytical framework to provide a conceptual foundation for the study.
Our method of data collection and analysis are qualitative and qualitative-
descriptive methods respectively. In the final analysis, we posited that
although the judgment was based on facts presented by both parties, the
conduct of plebiscite that will take into cognizance the human rights of the
Bakassi citizens would have been more effective in the settlement of the
dispute.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BBC = British Broadcasting Corporations
EPZ = Export Processing zone
ICE = Inventory of Conflict and Environment case Studies
ICJ = International Court of Justice
OAU = Organization of African Unity
PCIJ = Permanent Court of International Justice
UN = United Nations
US = United States
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Logical Data Framework
Figure2: Green Tree Agreement
Figure3: Thirteen ICJ that voted for the ceding of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon
Figure4: Oil Companies and their countries of Origin
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title page … … … … … … … … … i
Approval … … … … … … … … … ii
Dedication … … … … … … … … … iii
Acknowledgement … … … … … … … … iv
List of Abbreviations … … … … … … … … v
List of Figures … … … … … … … … … vi
Abstract … … … … … … … … … … vii
Table of Contents … … … … … … … … viii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study … … … … … … … 1
1.2 Statement of the Problem … … … … … … … 5
1.3 Objectives of the Study … … … … … … … 7
1.4 Significance of the Study … … … … … … … 7
1.5 Literature Review … … … … … … … … 8
1.6 Theoretical Framework … … … … … … … 19
1.6 Hypotheses … … … … … … … … 20
1.8 Method of Data Collection … … … … … … .21
CHAPTER TWO: INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE’S (ICJ)
ADJUDICATION ON THE BAKASSI PENINSULA AND HUMAN
RIGHTS OF BAKASSI CITIZENS
2.1 A Brief Historical Background … … … … … … .28
2.2 The Submissions of The Parties and the Court‟s Proceedings … … 34
2.3 The Human Rights of Bakassi Citizens … … … … … 38
2.3.1 The Right of Self-Determination … … … … … … .39
CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE’S (ICJ) RULING AND THE
PROVISIONS OF THE GREEN TREE AGREEMENT
3.1 Summary of the ICJ Ruling … … … … … … 43
3.2 Difficulties In Implementation Of The ICJ Ruling… … … … 47
3.3 The Green Tree Agreement … … … … … … 51
3.4 Oil as Engine and Fuel for Dispute Situations … … … … 55
CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL POWERS IN THE
ADJUDICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
THE ICJ JUDGEMENT
4.1 Foreign Involvement … … … … … … … 68
4.2 The Colonial Legacy … … … … … … 61
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4.3 Socio-Economic Implications of the Bakassi Dispute Resolutions … .64
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Summary … … … … … … … … … 69
5.2 Conclusion … … … … … … … … 70
5.3 Recommendations … … … … … … … … 71
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
For some decades now, relations between neigbouring Nigeria and Cameroon
have been strained over issues relating to 1,600 kilometer boundary, extending from the
Lake Chad to the Bakassi Peninsula, and maritime boundary into the Gulf of Guinea.
Among issues involved are rights over the oil rich land and sea reserves and the fate of
local populations. For instance, as Lake Chad dried up due to desertification, local
populations relying on the Lake for their livelihood have followed the receding waters,
further blurring the boundary lines. Tensions between the two countries escalated into
military confrontation at the end of 1993 with the deployment of Nigeria military to the
1,000 square kilometer Bakassi(www.bbc.co.uk)
Boundary disputes are generally dicey especially in post-colonial Africa where
their historical origin and geographical location further compounded the problem.
Reflecting on the emergence of many new sovereign states in contemporary Africa,
Davidson (1967:22) observed:
Their history begins a new. They reappear today in the sad
evening of the world of nation-states; yet their own
tradition, one may note was seldom one of narrow
nationality. Their genius was for integration- integration by
conquest as the times prescribed, but also by an ever partful
mongling and migration. They were never patient of
exclusive frontiers …Nineteenth century imperialism cut
across boundaries and peoples and left; for a later Africa,
the problem of redrawing frontiers on a rational plan. As
independence widens across these coming years, will this
plan stop short with the making of nation-states aping
European example?...It remains to be seen.
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It was in recognition of this danger that the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
wasted no time in passing the 1964 resolution. By this resolution, the members pledge to
respect as sacrosanct colonial boundaries as inherited at independence in line with the
principle of “Uti possidetis juris”. Nevertheless, even with the consensus, there has been
no such agreement on the exact location of many inter-state boundaries in Africa
especially between Nigeria and Cameroon.
The delineation of Nigeria‟s international frontiers, according to Asobie (1998),
was best by uncertainty. The eastern boundary was delineated in bits over a long period
and involved several colonial powers, the United Kingdom and Germany and the United
Kingdom and France at different times. And the British that inherited the Nigerian side of
the boundary never seem in a hurry to properly demarcate them on the ground. Apart
from the problem of uncertainty, the sheer length of the boundaries posed it‟s own
difficulty, with a total land border of 4,234 kilometers.
By entering into series of bilateral co-operation agreements in 1963, Nigeria and
Cameroon obviously attempted towards a more harmonious existence as neighbours with
a view to resolving the border disputes but that failed thereby precipitating the occasional
clashes that occurred along Nigeria Cameroon border (Agbemelo and Ibhasebor 2006). In
1994, Cameroon took the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Hague.
The ICJ is the Principal judicial organ of the United Nations to which all member
states are parties. It was established in 1946 by the United Nations (statute of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ statute)), June 26, 1945. ICJ replaced the former
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), which had operated within the
Hague,Netherland since 1922.Like its predecessor, the headquarters of ICJ is also located
in Hague.
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The function of the ICJ is to resolve disputes between sovereign states. Disputes
may be placed before the court by parties upon conditions prescribed by the UN Security
Council. No state, however, may be subject to the jurisdiction of the court without the
state‟s consent. Consent may be given by express agreement at the time the dispute is
presented to the court, by prior agreement to accept the jurisdiction of the court in
particular categories of cases, or by treaty provisions with respect to disputes arising from
matters covered by the treaty.Article36{2} of the court statute, known as the Optional
Clause, allows states to make a unilateral declaration recognizing “as compulsory ipso
facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same
obligation, the jurisdiction of the court in all legal disputes”(Umozurike 1992:191).
For instance, according to the Report of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
(document A/59/4) presented at fifty-ninth General Assembly Plenary in 2008, 191 states
were now parties to the statute of the court, while 65 of them had deposited with the
secretary General a declaration of acceptance of the court is compulsory jurisdiction in
accordance with its statute. Further, some 300 bilateral or multilateral treaties provide for
the court to have jurisdiction in the resolution of disputes arising out of their application
or interpretation.
Many states have accepted the courts jurisdiction under the optional clause. A few
states have done so with certain restrictions. According to ( Ogbu 2008 ), the United
Nation for instance has invoked the self-judging reservation or connally reservation. This
reservation allows states to avoid the courts jurisdiction previously accepted under the
optional clause if they decide not to respond to a particular suit. If a state invokes self-
judging reservation, another state may also invoke this reservation against that state, and
thus a suit against the second state would be dismissed. This is called the rule of
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reciprocity, and stands for the principle that a state has to respond to a suit brought
against it before the ICJ only if the state bringing the suit has also accepted the courts
jurisdiction. Under the ICJ statute, the ICJ in deciding cases must apply:
i. Any international conventions and treaties;
ii. International custom;
iii. General principles recognized as law by civilized nations; and
iv. Judicial decisions and the teachings of highly qualified publicists of the
various nations.
The judgment of the ICJ is binding and (technically) cannot be appealed (Arts.
59,60) once the parties have consented to its jurisdiction and the court has rendered a
decision. However, a state‟s failure to comply with the judgment violates U.N Charter,
article 94(2). Noncompliance can be appealed to the U.N Security Council, which may
either make recommendations or authorize other measures by which the judgment shall
be enforced. A decision by the Security Council to enforce compliance with a judgement
rendered by the court is subject to the veto power of permanent members, and thus
depends on the members‟ willingness not only to resort to enforcement measures but also
to support the original document.
On October 10,,2002, the ICJ citing agreements between United Kingdom and
Germany on March 11th
1913, issued its irrevocable judgment on the entire land and
maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. The decision ruled confirmed
sovereignty over portions of the territory in question to Cameroon and delineated the
border. Nigeria also made certain land gains according to the ruling (Asobie 2007). In
order to facilitate the handing over of the area to Cameroon, the “Green Tree Agreement”
was signed in 2006 by president Obasanjo of Nigeria and Paul Biya of Cameroon.
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There were basically two sets of principles implicated in the territorial dispute
between Nigeria and Cameroon. The first set consists of international legal principles that
reinforce the reason of state. They are such traditional principles as:
- Uti possidetis (as you possess, so will continue to possess)
- Pacta sunt servanda (agreement/obligation reached must be obeyed)
- Rebus sic stantibus.(agreement is valid only if the same conditions prevailing
at time of contracting continue to exist at the time of performance)
The second set of principles comprises human sight norms which pertains to the
worth and dignity of the human person. The second set of principles is fundamental for it
is predicated on the assumption that “the foundation of freedom, peace and justice in the
world” can only be laid with the recognition of the dignity, [as well as] the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family” Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948: Preamble (cited in Asobie 2007:209). Linking these two sets of principles
is the doctrine of self-determination. It is both a legal principle and a human rights
doctrine. It is in the light of the above that this study seeks to ascertain the role of ICJ in
the Nigeria- Cameroon boundary dispute, especially as it concerns the adjudication, the
difficulties in the implementation of the Green Tree Agreement as well as the role of
external powers in the adjudication and implementation of the ICJ ruling.
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
African countries do not embrace a common past and a common culture; they are indeed
the arbitrary creations of colonialist. The manner, in which European nations descended
on Africa during the closing years of the 19th
century in their scramble for territory, was
bound to leave a heritage of artificially controlled border lines, which now demarcate the
emergent African states. (Agbemelo and Ibhasebor 2006)
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The battle over Bakassi peninsula was majorly propelled by external powers,
whereby France tried to protect the interest of Cameroonians and Britain seeking to
protect the interest of Nigerians. Also, the dynamics of the internal politics in both
countries (Nigeria and Cameroon) with regards to Bakassi dispute fanned the embers of
the crisis. A record has it those most military regimes in Nigeria especially that of
Babangida, Abacha and Buhari (to some extent) aggressively expanded Nigeria‟s
frontiers in the Bakassi region (Akinteriwa 2002).
In 1992-1993, the Cameroonian government openly killed some Nigerian
civilians in Cameroon, stemming from multiparty democratic government and growing
militarism for Anglophone autonomy. Other Nigerians were forced out of Cameroon
during harassing tax-drives. This was in reaction to a Cameroonian national radio news
report which states that a Nigerian military patrol army among other things violated
Cameroon‟s territory by infiltrating the peninsula (as for as the Rio del Ray) and opened
fire on the Cameroon army (ICE Case Studies 2005, ).
The Bakassi dispute intensified with two or more serious incidents that provoked
more shooting, casualties and deaths of soldiers in both countries. In 1994 and from
January- May 1996, there were border clashes between Cameroon and Nigeria among
military personnel. As of May 6, 1996, diplomats reported that over fifty Nigerian
soldiers had been killed and a number taken as prisoners (New York Times, June 6, 1996).
There was no information available for Cameroonian causalities.
Consequent upon the above scenarios, the then Secretary General, Kofi Annan led
the United Nations efforts to help resolve the stalements over the peninsula that has been
the subject of intense disputes between the two countries for years. Despite this effort, the
dispute was still claiming victims. On 5th
September 2002, Mr Anan met in Paris with the
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two Presidents (Obasanjo and Biya) who both promised to respect and implement
whatever decision the ICJ might give on the case. Barely a week later, had the court
essentially awarded Cameroon rights to the oil rich peninsula.
After about ten (10) years of this ruling, many issues have remained unresolved;
the implementation of the Green Tree Agreement; the living conditions of several
Nigerian villages who have been residing in Bakassi and even have a local government;
their human right of self-determination among others. Hence, we pose these questions:
Does ICJ adjudication on the Bakassi Peninsula constitute the denial of the human
right of Bakassi citizens?
Is the difficulty in the implementation of the ICJ ruling on Nigeria-Cameroon
boundary dispute resolved by the provisions of the Green Tree Agreement?
Did interests of external powers affect the adjudication and implementation of the
ICJ ruling on the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary dispute?
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The broad objective of this study is to examine the role of International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary disputes. Specifically, the study aims to
demonstrate that:
The adjudication of ICJ on the Bakassi Peninsula constituted the denial of human
rights of Bakassi citizens.
The difficulty in the implementation of the ICJ ruling on Nigeria-Cameroon
boundary dispute is resolved by the provisions of the Green Tree Agreement.
The interests of external powers affected the adjudication and implementation of
the ICJ ruling.
1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
This study will be of enormous theoretical and practical significance. Practically,
it will add to extant literature which serves as a framework for understanding the politics
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of the International Court of Justice ruling over the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary disputes.
Drawing from international judicial precedence (ratio decidendi), this study is significant
in that it presents an accurate picture of the character of international politics, and how it
impinges on the international legal principles, especially on the principles pertaining the
raison d‟etre of a state; dealing with matters of territorial integrity. It will also, stimulate
more scholarly research on the subject of this study.
Also, it will serve as a guide to both statesmen and international diplomats
interested in dispute resolution, especially territorial based one. It will also provide
foreign policy guideline to the Nigerian government since it critique the roles played by
both civilian and military governments.
Theoretically, the study ascertained the role of ICJ in the Nigeria-Cameroon
boundary dispute, with specific focus on the Bakassi Peninsula. Thus, it found out that
the adjudication of ICJ constitutes denial of human rights to Bakassi citizens; that the
Green Tree Agreement provisions resolved the difficulties in the implementation of ICJ
ruling and that interests of external powers affect the adjudication and implementation of
the ICJ ruling.
1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW
The review of extant literature is strictly guided by research question. In other
words, it aims at showcasing scholars‟ contributions and debates over the Nigeria-
Cameroon boundary disputes, especially the role played by ICJ in the resolution. This
enabled us to establish a gap in the literature and consequently fill it. This is because
research does not take place in a vacuum.
A painstaking perusal at cognate literature reveals that scholars have made
enormous intellectual discourses on the subject matter. Dispute is unavoidable in all
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human interactions and relationships, both within and across national boundaries.
According to Asobie (1998), international conflicts are contests between or across nation-
states. The struggle might be between one or more governments to monopolise the
exploitation of resources in disputed territories. It might occur when one state tries to
prevent another from obtaining some resources that are vital to its survival. To him,
international disputes are struggles between or among social groups or more precisely
social classes, clashing cross state boundaries. These social classes usually mobilize and
use the various apparatuses of the state-coercive and non coercive to achieve their ends.
And these contests are invariably, for the control of some productive forces; objects of
labour (land, mineral resources, raw materials); instruments of labour (technology
finance capital), and labour power (trained or specialized human resources).
In his intellectual exposition, Anene (1970), gave a detailed and interesting
account of the international boundaries of Nigeria. The work was not only concerned
with the foreign acts of partition, but with the impact of colonial boundaries on the
peoples in whose history the acts of portion were major intervention. This necessitated a
multi-disciplinary inquiry into the ethnicity at the time the boundaries were made, the
history of the different peoples, particularity the question of the history of political and
economic inter group relationships, the knowledge of these available to the treaty
makers, and the consequences of their decisions. Though he recognized that the boundary
zones of Nigeria and her niegbours, were potential sources of boundary disputes, it did
not put forward the criteria which may afford the best guide to a settlement of an unhappy
legacy of colonialism.
Rouke (1997) assessed at length the legacy of colonialism in Africa. He points out
that the industrialization of the north was one factor that caused the colonization of the
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south in the late 1800s and early 1900s. He showed that Africa was largely controlled by
its indigenous peoples in 1878 but had , by 1914 become almost totally subjected and
divided into colonies by the European powers. The colonial boundaries had little
relationship to the territories occupied by the various indigenous people, grouping nations
together in some cases and dividing them in others. He further points out that within
seven decades, virtually all of the colonies recognized their independence, but many of
the new countries (such as Rwanda) have been troubled by the legacy of trying to get two
or more states to live peacefully in a single state. Though he did not particularly highlight
the Bakassi Peninsula,he however showed the general trend of European colonial
imposed boundaries on Africa.
Akanmode (2000) printed out that the Peninsula which covers a marshy area of
about 1,000 square kilometers and located in Cross River State is occupied by a
population of Nigerians. He further points out that if a judgment delivered by the ICJ on
Thursday October 10, 2002, was anything to go by, the inhabitants of the Peninsula may
well be on their way to changing their nationalities from Nigerians the Cameroonians. In
addition, Akanmode (2002) emphasis was on the paradox of the Peninsula. He
maintained that the Peninsula is a community that subsists in the midst of plenty-plenty
of fish and oil deposits –but is ravaged by poverty. He further traced the dispute in the oil
rich area between Nigeria and Cameroon form 1993, leading to loss of lives from military
aggressions that have been mostly instigated by Cameroon. Although this work deals
extensively on the ICJ judgment, if fails to trace the genesis of the dispute to colonial
imposed boundary in the area.
Sango (2000) gave a critical analysis of the reason behind Nigeria and
Cameroonian dispute over Bakassi. He pointed out that neither Nigerian nor
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Cameroonian ruling elites showed interest in Bakassi Peninsula until it was discovered it
was oil rich. He insisted that any attempt to force the people of Bakassi to belong to
either of the country should be opposed by the labour movement of Nigeria and
Cameroon and that they should defend the right to self-determination of the people of the
peninsula and this he said should supercede the ICJ judgment. He also traced the dispute
over Bakassi to colonial regime in Africa and blamed the inability to redress these
colonial arbitraries and injustice after the colonial rule to the selfish interest and
visionless of the capitalist ruling class of various African countries. He also obsvered that
whether Cameroon or Nigeria gets Bakassi, the proceeds from the oil in Bakassi will
benefit only multinational oil companies and the ruling class. Although, Sango‟s
contributions are very important to this study, especially, his highlights on the right of the
Bakassi people to self-determination which he argued should supercede the ICJ rulings,
but he failed to attribute the courts inability to take it into consideration as a result of the
politicization of international judicial principles.
Shoyele (1995) posits that before 1884 Borhin conference, African continent was
plunged into an apparent anomy by the activities of the European powers who were bent
on carving spheres of influence. This he argues was done haphazardly without the
slightest deference to such important factors in human affairs as tribal or ethnological
clearages. He traced the Nigeria-Cameroon border demarcation to the repletion of treaties
which includes Anglo-German treaty of 1919 and a number at agreements between
Nigeria and Cameroon at independence. He notes that by 1884, the British entered into
treaty with the Obong of Calabar in Council, which owed its loyalty to the kings and
chiefs of Calabar, but Anglo-German of 1913 laded Bakassi to Germany. He observes
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that series of consultative meetings have been held to resolve the dispute as 1970
Yarunde meeting, Ngo/ Coker line of 1971 and Marona declaration of 1975.
Shoyele upholds the validity of treaty of 1884 between the British and the Obong
of Calabar in Council and his chiefs. He argues that Anglo-German treaty of 1913 is
invalid and inefficient since it was not registered in accordance with the provision of the
1945 U.N. charter and also cannot be invoked before any organ of the United Nations. He
also considered the Marona declaration as invalid and opines that the repudiation by
general Mohammed is justified on the ground that president Ahidjo was in breach to erect
oil rig Calabar channel and that Cameroon ought to be aware of the limitation of General
Gowon power. He also points out that to determine who owns the territory, the concept of
occupation as a mode of territorial acquisition and exercise of state functions cannot
escape discourse and this he said Nigeria has demographic superiority over Cameroon.
He further argues that Cameroon hinging its claim on Anglo-German treaty of 1913 and
Marona declaration were quite controversial and out rightly unjustifiable since it violates
the United Nations charter provision and as a result has no locus standi to canvass the
terms of this supposed Anglo-German treaty before the ICJ as an organ of United
Nations.
Armed with the analytical technique of international law, Esimokahal (1991)
recounts the origin of the conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon. After highlighting the
strategic importance of the disputed Bakassi and the surrounding Islands, he argues that
the Anglo-German agreement of 1913 that recognized German control of this area should
be jettisoned, for it was based on misinformed opinions on the part of the negotiators. He
challenged the wisdom of O.A.U. resolution on boundaries and calls for a revision so as
to correct mistakes of the past.
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Okanya (1995) in his own contributions emphasized the importance of boundary
in international relations. He posits that Nigeria and Cameroon boundary is colonial
boundaries and that its delimitation was accompanied by corresponding arbitrariness.
And this he said led to border dispute between the two countries. He traced the historical
antecedents of Bakassi Peninsula dispute to 1885 British-German agreement to define
Nigeria and Cameroon boundary in order to mark their spheres of influence. He further
notes that upon discovery of some fallacy in their agreement, further modifications was
made in 1890, 1893, 1902, 1904 and 1906 and the final and most important agreement on
the subject was concluded on March 11, 1913 and this superceded the earlier ones and
also took care of the inadequacies of the earlier ones.
He notes that as far as Nigeria and Cameroon border relations are concerned, the
section of the border between the rive Akpayafe and the sea has in the recent times
become a source of conflict following Isaac Boro‟s use of the Creeks as operational Base
to wage war of secession and the sudden discovery of oil in the creeks in 1970. This he
said made Cameroonian government begin to make claims over the Bakassi Peninsula
and to terrorize Nigeria towns in the peninsula. The points out that several attempts have
been made in the past to resolve this dispute like consultative commission in 1971,
meeting of two heads of state in 1974 and Marona meeting between Yakubu Gowon and
Alhaji Ahidjo in which Gowon ceded substantial parts of the disputed area. Even though,
Okanya made an important contribution to the understanding of the genesis of the border
dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon, however, he failed to make recommendations on
how to improve the lots of Bakassi inhabitants, 90 percents to which are Nigerians.
Asobie further notes that in pre-colonial times, Bakassi was under the ancient
kingdom of Calabar which, in 191, becomes part of Nigeria under British rule. The
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people of the main settlements in the Bakassi in the Bakassi peninsula owed allegiance to
the Obong of Calabar. It was, therefore, the Obong of Calabar that placed not only the
kingdom of Calabar itself, but also Efiat and Idombi (in the peninsula) under British
protectorate via a treaty of September 10, 1884. The chiefs of Efiat and Idombi were co-
signatories to the treaty. However, subsequently, through a series of bilateral treaties and
other legal instruments, the British ceded the territory, first to Germany, and then placed
it under the mandate of the League of Nations and the trusteeship of the United Nations.
Meanwhile, the British protectorates in Nigeria including the kingdom of Calabar, were
merged with its colonies in the political errors and indifference of Nigerian politicians,
the Republic of Cameroon obtained the Bakassi Peninsula in the process of a plebiscite
conducted by the United Nations in 1959 and 1961.
Rudin (1938), traced the activities of the Germans and British traders in the areas
during her colonial days. He observes that the German administrators in the Cameroon
attached great importance to the Benue and its tributaries as the best, quickest and most
profitable way of gaining access to the hinter land of their colony. He further observes
that the attempts at penetrating this hinter land from the Cameroon coast failed
disastrously. Hence the Germans through their agent Flegel pretended to regard the entire
region north of the latitude of the Cross River rapids‟ as no man‟s land. Though the book
is highly critical on the activities of the Germans and the British during the period, it
failed to highlight the consequences of their actions on the boundary areas and inter-state
relations between the two African states.
In his analysis of the ICJ and its ruling over Bakassi peninsula (Ukhuegbe (2002))
noted that the award of Bakassi to Cameroon was a result not of recent European
“conspiracy”, but one of the 19th
century. With much vigour given by his perfect mastery
15
of the historical fact of Nigeria and international law, he debunk the official statement
that Cameroon got the assurances of their patrons in Paris that they would see to it that
their “boy” at the ICT, manipulates the law in favour of Cameroon.
He also argues that the treaty of 1884 between Britain and kings and Chiefs of old
Calabar was treaty of protection and did not give Britain power to transfer Bakassi to
Germany and this according to him made the Anglo-German treaty unlawful and void.
He pointed that the Bernin Act undermined the treaty of protected territories without the
consent of the kings and chiefs. Thus, it was an error for Nigeria to have relied on it to
support its case rather than to delegitimise it since Africa was not represented nor
participated in the formation of the Act. He further noted that Nigeria‟s argument does
not have the necessary weight for it to be accepted by the ICJ. He actually helps to situate
the dispute though partially as more of European politics than a legal phenomenon, but he
failed to highlight the implication of the ICJ ruling on Nigerians living in the disputed
area.
To Asobie (2005), the dispute over the Bakassi peninsula is the product of a
number of contradictions. First, there is a clash between tradition and modernity; second,
there is the tension between cartographical fact and cultural reality: the map is in conflict
with the people; third, there is a conflict between dictates of abstruse international law
and the existential imperatives of struggling humanity, fourth, there is a gap between the
demands of raison d‟etre and the needs and concern of citizens.
Kolapo (2002), gave a critical analysis of the far-reaching political and economic
implications on the Nigerian state. The points out that the ruling would have adverse
effect on the Nigerian state as a whole. His primary emphasis was on the security
implications, the social structures, the pride of Nigerians and the economic jeopardy on
16
the Nigerian state amongst others. However, he fails to point out how colonial imposed
boundaries had affected inter-state relations in Africa particularly the Bakassi Peninsula
between Nigeria and Cameroon.
Sanusi (2002) pointed out that the judgment made no sense. His question was
“how do you cede a people with different culture, different language and background to
another nation whose background differs completely? He insisted that Bakassi people are
Nigerians who cannot become Cameroonians overnight. He pointed out the need for the
Nigerian government to appeal to the ICJ for a review of the judgment. However the
article did not highlight the genesis of the boundary dispute between Nigeria and
Cameroon. It did not also trace the boundary dispute to colonialism as he was only
interested on the way out of the judgment that ceded the peninsula to Cameroon.
In his own contribution, Mudiaga Odje (2002), offers a collection of documents
on the establishment of boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon. He observed that the
judgment of ICJ is binding but unenforceable in international law and at best is advisory,
that the court has no enforcement powers, lacks the power of compulsion and it can only
assume jurisdiction by consent of the parties. He further noted that for Cameroon to
enforce the judgment of the ICJ, it must get the approval of the Security Council of the
United Nations and also that the United Nations does not allow the use of force for the
enforcement of international law. He recommended that Nigeria should employ
diplomacy and appeal for review of the judgment to protect the interest of the people of
Bakassi, Cross Rivers state and Nigeria at large. His discussion of the problems of ICJ in
enforcing its judgment and the weakened nature of its structure is of great importance,
but he fails to trace ICJ ruling to the nature of its structure.
17
Fumbo (2002), argue that border conflicts between African countries are not
largely as a result of errors of the colonial past, but mainly nationalists calculations of
economic interest inspired by domestic dynamics. This according to him explains why it
was during the leadership of president Ahidjo in Cameroon and Murtala Mohammed and
Abacha leadership in Nigeria that the dispute degenerated, as it was designed to garner
support for a regime suffering from crisis of legitimacy.
He further opines that the ICJ ruling of October 10, 2002 has provided an
enabling environment for the dispute to be resolved. Although, his work contributes
greatly to understanding the causes of border conflicts among African countries and the
importance of ICJ ruling, it fails to highlight the implication of ICJ ruling on the
inhabitants of Bakassi or how it will improve the inter state relations between the two
countries.
In his own intellectual extrapolation, Okolie (2004), points out that it was the
discovery of large deposits of oil and gas in the disputed territories that intensified the
military showdown. He further argues that since conflict is persistent in human
interaction, no matter the conflict management strategies, peace and harmonious
relationship among states can only be guaranteed in atmosphere of constructive
engagement in conflict resolution derived from justice, fairness and truth.
He further notes that Anglo-German Treaty of 1913, Yaounde II and Marona
Declaration of 1971 and 1975 respectively on which ICJ ruling was hinged on are valid
legal instruments and established the right of sovereignty for each of the parties. In his
analysis of International Court of Justice ruling, he argues that it is most objective; that
the court could not have given a ruling different from the evidence before the court which
emanated from the Nigeria government officials. He concluded that permanent peace
18
cannot be guaranteed from such verdict, but through a sustained and constructive
engagement by the two countries over demarcation of the boundaries. This study is of
great importance to the present study, but it failed to highlight the implications of the ICJ
ruling on the inhabitants of neither the Bakassi peninsula nor how to improve their
welfare.
Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor ( 2006) in their own contribution see colonialism as
the source of boundary dispute among African countries. They posit that the Exchange of
Notes of October 1, 1960 between Nigeria and the United Kingdom on treaty obligations
and Diplomatic Note No. 570 of 1962 from the Ministry of External Affairs to the
Embassy of Cameroon show that Nigeria acknowledge that Bakassi peninsula belong to
Cameroon.
The above authors further pointed out that ICJ judgment has social, economic;
security and strategic implications for the Nigerian state, which to them do not enhance
the interest of the nation. They commended both countries for the matured manner with
which they handled the Bakassi issue. In addition, they recommended the delimitation of
the maritime boundary between the two nations in accordance with the 1958 Genera
conventions of the law and sea and Anglo-German agreement. However, they fail to give
suggestion on how to put the welfare of the Bakassi people into considerations.
Specification of gap
The review of extant literature as demonstrated above indicates that a great deal
of scholarly works abound in Nigeria-Cameroon boundary dispute.
To some, domestic dynamics and large deposits of oil and gas field the dispute (Fumbo
2002; Okolie 2004, Asobie 2005). To others, the dispute is a consequence of colonial
legacy (Rudin, 1938, Okanya 2005; Aghemelo and Ibhasebor 2006; among others.)
19
However, not much dwell on the denial of human right of the Bakassi citizens; how the
difficulties in implementation of the ICJ ruling is resolved by the provisions of the Green
Tree Agreement and how interests of external powers affect the adjudication and
implementation of the ICJ ruling. These constitute a gap in literature. Hence, this work
intends to fill it by dwelling essentially on the role of ICJ on the Nigeria Cameroon
boundary dispute with focus on the Bakasssi Peninsula.
1.9 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We adopt the Schema Theory of Security Dilemma to actually capture and
buttress the dynamics of dispute and the function of International Court of Justice in the
Nigeria-Cameroon boundary disputes. This theory was propounded and popularized by
Kanji (cited in Burgess and Burgess 2005). A security dilemma refers to a situation
where two or more states are drawn into conflict, possibly even war over security
concerns, even though none of the states actually desire conflict. Essentially, the security
dilemma occurs when two or more states each feel insecure in relation to other states.
None of the states involved wants relations to deteriorate, let alone for war to be declared
but as each state acts militarily or diplomatically to make itself more secure, the other
stats interpret its action as threatening.
Application of the theory
After the ceding of Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon by ICJ based on its ruling on
October 10, 2002, Nigeria government announced the rejection of that judgment. Hence,
tension was raised in the area and thus created the possibility of a military conflict. This
was based on the background that Nigerian citizens received the judgment with utmost
shock and disbelief.
20
Consequently, both Nigeria and Cameroon stationed troops on the Island. This led
to an ironic cycle of unintended provocations, which almost degenerated to open warfare.
This placed both Nigeria and Cameroon in a security dilemma because. Nigeria felt that
the internal primary dimension of the principle of self-determination was violated and
want to make herself more secure by stationing troops in the Island. On the side of
Cameroon, she felt that her territorial boundary was being violated by Nigeria, hence the
Cameroonian troops equally.
Nigeria security dilemma has obvious implications. The loss of Bakassi to
Cameroon may mean the loss of the entrance to the Calabar port to Cameroon, loss of
Eastern access to the Atlantic; the loss of Bakassi also places the multi-million Naira
Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in serious danger and all infrastructural facilities,
including hospitals, schools, recreational centres, that were originally put in place by
Nigeria will be forfeited resulting in a fruitless effort and loss of income. If adequate care
is not taken, there is a possibility that Nigeria and Cameroon will have future conflict
over security concerns.
1.6 HYPOTHESES
This study tests the following hypotheses
The adjudication of ICJ on the Bakassi Peninsula constituted the denial of the
human rights of Bakassi citizens.
The difficulty in the implementation of the ICJ ruling on Nigeria-Cameroon
boundary dispute is resolved by the provisions of the Green Tree Agreement.
The interests of external powers affected the adjudication and implementation of
the ICJ ruling on Nigeria-Cameroon boundary dispute.
21
1.8 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION
The qualitative method was used to generate data for this work. According to
Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2006), qualitative method is used to obtain in-depth information
and concept/variable clarification so as to facilitate instrument designs. Qualitative
method is most useful when used to glean, illuminate, interprete and extract valuable
information so as to draw inference from the available evidence to reach a conclusion. On
the other hand, Obikeze (cited in Nnabugwu, 2006) argues that the advantage of the
qualitative method lies in the fact that it is able to gain access to organizational structure,
bureaucratic processes and it can more readily lead to the discovery of the unexpected
phenomenon. Additionally, we also relied on secondary sources of data. Asika (1990)
holds that secondary sources of data refer to a set of data gathered or authored by another
person, usually data from the available data, either in the form of documents or survey
results and code books. The study therefore depended on books, journals, articles and
other written works on the same topic in addition to government internet materials that
treat the same topic.
Research Design
We adopt the ex-post-facto research design for this work. Kerlinger (1973)
defines the ex-post-facto research design as a form of descriptive research in which an
independent variable has already occurred and in which an investigator starts with the
observation of a dependent variable, then studies the independent variable in retrospect
for its possible relationship to and effects on the dependent variables. Ex-post-facto or
after-the-fact research design is based on the examination of the independent and
dependent variables after the events have taken place and the data already in existence. In
ex-post-facto research design, the test of the hypothesis involves observing the
22
independent and dependent variables at the same time because the effects of the former
on the later have already taken place before the investigation.
The phrase ex-post-facto means “after the fact” or “retrospectively” and refers to those
studies which investigate possible cause- effect relationships by observing an existing
condition and searching back in time for plausible causal factors. The ex-post-facto or
single-case design assumes the form of an experimental design where an existing case is
observed for sometime in order to study or evaluate it. The single case design is presented
as follows:
23
Where:
= Random assignment of subjects
= Independent variable
= Dependent variable
This has a series of „Before‟ observation and one case (subject) and a series of
„After‟ observation. It is an extension of quasi-experimental design. There is no control
group and no variation group Asika (1990).The analytical routines involved in testing
structural causality on ex-post-facto analysis of the independent variable (X) and the
dependent variable(Y) is based on concomitant variation. This is to demonstrate that(X)
is the factor that determines(Y). This infers that whenever (X) occurs, there is the
likelihood that (Y) will follow later. The criteria for inferring causality have been
summarized by selltiz et‟al (1959) as follows:
a) Covariation between the presumed cause and presumed effect
b) Proper time order with the cause preceding the effect
c) Elimination of plausible alternative explanations for the observed relationship.
R B1 B2 B3 A1 A2 A3
R
x
y
B
A
= Before observation
= After observation
24
Method of Data Analysis
For the purpose of analyzing our qualitative data, we adopt the qualitative
descriptive method of data analysis. According to Asika (1990) qualitative descriptive
analysis is used to verbally summarize the information gathered in research. Through
quantitative descriptive analysis, descriptive explanation is given to statistical data
gathered in our research work, in order to establish the relationship between the variables
under study. Thus the use of this method of analysis is informed by the simplicity with
which it summarizes, exposes and interprets relationships in a given data by giving a
qualitative description or explanation to a statistical information. Also, maps and tables
were used to clarify the researchers points and emphasis.
Figure 1: LOGICAL DATA FRAMEWORK (LDF)
Hypotheses Variables Main Indicators Data/Sources Method of data
collection
The
adjudication of
ICJ on the
Bakassi
Peninsula
constituted the
denial of
human rights
of Bakassi
citizens
X
Adjudication of
ICJ on the
Bakassi
Peninsula
October , 10,
2002 ICJ
judgement.
Books,
journals,
conference
papers,
newspaper,
internet
materials
government
documents
The use of
qualitative
method
Ex-post-facto
research design
Qualitative
descriptive
method of
analysis
25
Y
Denial of
human rights of
Bakassi
citizens.
Articles
3,5,9,12 and 17 of
the Universal
Declaration of
Human Rights
Right to life
and liberty
Freedom of
torture or cruel
treatment
freedom of
arbitrary
deprivation of
property
Books,
journals,
conference
papers,
newspaper,
internet
materials
government
documents
The use of
qualitative
method
Ex-post-facto
research design
Qualitative
descriptive
method of
analysis
The difficulty
in the
implementation
of ICJ ruling is
resolved by the
provisions of
the Green Tree
Agreement
X
The difficulty
in the
implementation
of the ICJ
ruling
Y
Resolved by
the provision of
the Green Tree
Agreement.
the fate of
Nigeria Nationals
living in the
Bakassi Peninsula
the complex
nature of the
boundary
involved
fear of de-
generation into
war.
Article 1.
Nigeria
recognizes the
sovereignty of
Cameroon over
Bakassi Peninsula
Article 2:
Books,
journals,
conference
papers,
newspaper,
internet
materials
government
documents
Books,
journals,
conference
papers,
newspaper,
internet
materials
The use of
qualitative
method
Ex-post-facto
research design
Qualitative
descriptive
method of
analysis
The use of
qualitative
method
Ex-post-facto
research design
Qualitative
descriptive
26
Nigeria
agrees to
withdraw her
armed forces
from Bakassi
Article 3:
Cameroon
assures Nigerian
nationals living in
the Bakassi
Peninsula the
exercise of their
fundamental
rights
government
documents
method of
analysis
27
The interests of
external powers
affected the
adjudication and
implementation of
the ICJ ruling
X
The interests
external powers
Y
Affected the
adjudication and
implementation
of the ICJ ruling
Presence of oil
companies in the
Bakassi Peninsula
France‟s bail out
fund to Cameroon
Britain, France,
Germany, USA,
and Northern
Ireland as
witnesses to the
Green Tree
Agreement
Frenchman was
the president of
the court
Germany and
Britain were
parties to the 1913
treaty
Evolution and
signing of the
Green Tree
Agreement in
New York
Books,
journals,
conference
papers,
newspaper,
internet
materials
government
documents
The use of
qualitative
method
Ex-post-
facto
research
design
Qualitative
descriptive
method of
analysis
28
CHAPTER TWO: INTERNATIONAL COURTS OF JUSTICE’S (ICJ)
ADJUDICATION ON THE BAKASSI PENINSULA AND HUMAN
RIGHTS OF BAKASSI CITIZENS
2.2 A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Map No. 4247, May 2005
After the arrival of European colonialists in Nigeria in the second half of the 19th
century, the king of old-Calabar signed a treaty of protection with the Queen of England
on September 10, 1884. The Bakassi area was at that time under the rule of the Old
Calabar. In signing this accord, he literally ceded his Kingdom to Britain as a
29
protectorate. Britain therefore could do whatever she wanted to do with it. Nigeria itself
became a state by amalgamation three decades later in 1914.
The Bakassi peninsula covers a total area of approximately 1000 sq. km and is located on
the extreme eastern end of the Gulf of Guinea between latitudes 4°25‟ and 1 O‟N and
longitudes 8°20‟ and 9°08‟E. It is largely made up of a cluster of low-lying, swampy and
mangrove covered islands with a population estimated between 150,000 to 300,000
inhabitants. The indigenous inhabitants are predominantly of the Efik tribe, which sees
itself as part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The fact that two great ocean currents,
the cold Benguela Current and the warm Guinea Current meet here provides suitable
conditions for a very large variety of fish and other forms of maritime wildlife. Most of
the inhabitants of the peninsula indulge in fishing.
The causes of many conflicts and disputes on the African continent especially those along
ethnical lines have been attributed to the fact that colonial powers arbitrarily partitioned
the continent among themselves without any meaningful consideration of parameters like
history, demographic realities on the ground, ethnicity, language and socio-cultural
affinities. In many cases, people from the same ethnic groups found themselves on
different sides of the colonial border lines and governed by different European powers.
Lord Robert Salisbury, British Prime minister at the time of partitioning and well known
for his successes in expanding British influence in Africa, described the partitioning
process quite aptly in the following words:
We the colonial powers have engaged in drawing lines upon maps
where no white man‟s feet have ever trod; we have been giving
away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, but we have
only been hindered by the small impediment that we never knew
exactly where those mountains and rivers and lakes were (Ajibola
1994:6)
30
The case of e Bakassi Peninsula is clear proof of this. The European powers involved
were merely interested in protecting their own interests rather than the interests of those
they claimed they were civilizing. While Germany on the one hand was interested in
securing for itself the access to the huge amounts of shrimps in the waters surrounding
the peninsula and the assurance from Britain that she would not seek any further
expansion to the East, Britain on the other wanted an uninterrupted secure sea passage to
Calabar, which at the time was an important commercial post and which today is the
main seaport in east Nigeria. In a series of agreements in 1913, Britain and Germany
sought to establish an exact demarcation of the borders between Nigeria and Cameroon,
which of course did not exist as such. The first treaty entitled: “The Settlement of the
Frontier between Nigeria and the Cameroons, from Yola to the Sea,” put Bakassi proper
under the jurisdiction of the Germans and the second: The Regulation of Navigation on
the Cross River, ceded the “navigable portion” of the offshore border of the peninsula to
Britain. Article 21 of the Anglo-German Treaty of 1913 quoted below states the exact
position of the border:
From the centre of the navigable channel on a line joining Bakasi
Point and King Point, the boundary shall follow the centre of the
navigable channel of the Akwayafe. River as far as the 3-mile
limit of territorial jurisdiction. For the purpose of defining this
boundary, the navigable channel of the Akwayafe, River shall be
considered to lie wholly to the east of the navigable channel of the
Cross and Calabar Rivers.(Article xxi Anglo- German Treaty
1913).
After the First World War, German lost all her colonies in Africa including
Cameroon which was divided into two territories by the League of Nations and
administered as mandates under Britain and France. The France-British Cameroon
31
Declaration of July 1919 placed Bakassi and the rest of the “British Cameroons” under
British mandate. This territory was then under the British system of indirect rule” as part
of Nigeria respecting the borders laid down by the agreements of 1913. A further
agreement between both powers in 1931 was signed to further codify the declaration of
1919.
At the end of the Second World War, the British French League of Nations
mandates over Northern/Southern Cameroon and Cameroon respectively, were succeeded
by trusteeship agreements under the newly created United Nations Organization. The
agreements creating these trusteeship territories re-ratified the Anglo-German and Anglo-
French treaties pertaining to the borders between both countries. Once more maps from
this period place Bakassi under the sovereignty of Cameroon.
In the run-up to independence for both countries in the late 50s, the UN asked
Britain - - to carry out a plebiscite in the territories under her jurisdiction that is British
Northern Cameroon and British Southern Cameroon to ascertain the wishes of the local
population as to which country they would like to become independent with. While
British Northern Cameroons decided to achieve independence by joining the independent
Federation of Nigeria, a plebiscite was not held due to security reasons in British
Southern Cameroons till February 11/12, 1961. Southern Cameroons eventually decided
to join the already independent Republic of Cameroon (General Assembly Resolution
1961). It is worth taking note here of the fact that there were 21 polling stations in
Bakassi and that 73% of the population (casted votes) declared their desire to become
independent by joining the independent Republic of Cameroon.
32
It is apparent that sovereignty over Bakassi itself was not an issue between the
two counties as we have seen in the preceding paragraphs. However, about a decade after
independence and especially after the discovery of large deposits of oil in surrounding
waters and suspicious that Bakassi itself may be swimming over a large oil reserve,
Nigeria started claiming ownership of the peninsula. The big problem can be traced back
to the Anglo-German agreements of 1913, where both colonial powers agreed on a very
vague definition of maritime borders. In the early 1970s, both independent Cameroon and
post civil war Nigeria began making attempts to settle the technical difficulties of the
colonial agreements of 1913. In April 1971, Nigerian Head of State, General Gowon in
the company of a large delegation of advisers traveled to the Cameroonian capital,
Yaoundé, to discuss the issue with Cameroon‟s.
President Ahidjo. What transpired from this important meeting was the signing of the
Coker-Ngo” Line delimiting the “navigable portion” of the offshore border between the
two countries, referred to in the 1913 agreement on British Admiralty Chart6 No. 3433
(Ngang 2007). According to this agreement, the offshore delineation of the approach
channel to the Calabar estuary would be -up to the 3-mile limit on both sides. The then
Nigerian President Gowon emerged happy with the results of the summit meeting but
later on tried to reverse it after realizing that the agreement did not exactly reflect the
provisions of the Franco German Agreement of 1913, which he upon the advice of his
advisers had used as a legal premise for his decision.
In a bid to correct the damage caused by the Coker-Ngo Line referred to in the ICJ I
judgment as compromise line (ICJ 2002), Gowon once again met with Ahidjo in the
Cameroonian city of Maroua in June 1975, barely a month before he was overthrown to
33
discuss an extension of the 1971 agreement. The ensuing Maroua Declaration made some
concessions to Nigeria, which were sustained in the ICJ judgment of 2002. The Bakassi
Peninsula itself was not an issue at this meeting.
Shortly after Gowon was overthrown in a coup in July 1975, the new leader, Gen.
Murtala Muhammed and the apparatus he put in place lulled the bulk of Nigerian citizens
into believing that former President (Gowon had given Bakassi proper to Cameroon as a
gift in gratitude for the role played by Cameroon in the Nigerian Civil War. He
questioned the validity of the 1971/1975 maritime border agreements and repudiated the
Maroua Declaration on the premise that it had not been ratified by the ruling military
organ. Although Gen. Murtala Muhammed died in an unsuccessful coup just a year later,
his sucessesor Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo the Nigerian Head of State and interestingly, the
same person who helped broker the complete withdrawal of Nigerian civil administrators,
police and soldiers from Bakassi at Green Tree, New York in 2006, held on to the same
position. This set the stage for a protracted border dispute between the two countries.
However, a look into Nigerian history books and official maps still located
Bakassi within the territorial confines of Cameroon. It is very interesting to observe that
at the peak of ideological contention over the Bakassi issue, the very first Nigerian atlas
published in 1976 failed to show Bakassi as part of Nigeria. Despite mounting tension
and the outbreak of hostilities between the two countries in the early stages of the I 980s,
Nigeria had to wait more than a decade to see Bakassi officially identified as its own
territory. The first of such maps were printed in 1991 on the orders of President Ibrahim
Babangida in an attempt to re-write history, which Dr. Omoigui describes in a letter to
the editor in of the Nigerian-based Guardian Newspaper in 2002, as „...one of the bigger
34
lies of the modem Nigerian generation -a lie which has affected Nigeria‟s approach over
the years to the Bakassi dispute and has even unnecessarily cost the lives of Nigerian
soldiers”. (Omoigui, 2007).
2.2 THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES AND THE COURT’S
PROCEEDINGS
On 29 March 1994, Camerron filed an application institutioning proceedings
against Nigeria concerning a dispute described as “relating essentially to the question of
sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula” (ICJ 2002). Cameroon further stated in its
application that the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two states has
remained a partial one and that, despite many attempts to complete it, the two parties
have been unable to do so. Consequently, it requested the ICJ, in order to avoid further
incidents between the two countries to determine the course of the maritime boundary
between the two states beyond the line fixed in 1975.
On 6 June, 1994, Cameroon filed an additional application for the purpose of
extending the subject of the dispute to a further dispute described as relating essentially to
the question of sovereignty over a part of the territory of Cameroon in the area of Lake
Chad (ICJ 2002). Cameroon also requested ICJ to specify definitively the frontier
between the two states from Lake Chad to the sea, and asked it to join the two
applications and to examine the whole in a single case.
On the other hand, government of Nigeria, the Federal Republic of Nigeria,
respectfully request that the Court should “as to the Bakassi Pennsula” adjudge and
declare:
(a) That sovereignty over the Peninsula is vested in the Federal Republic
of Nigeria;
35
(b) That Nigeria‟s sovereignty over Bakassi extends up to the boundary
with Cameroon described in Chapter II of Nigeria‟s Counter-
Memorial.
As to Lake Chad, adjudge and declare
(a) That the proposed delimitation and demarcation under the auspices of the
Lake Chad Basin Commission, not having been accepted by Nigeria, is not
binding upon it;
(b) That sovereignty over the areas in Lake Chad defined paragraph 5.9 of
Nigeria‟s Rejoinder is vested in the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(c) That in any event the process which has taken place within the framework of
the Lake Chad basin Commission and which was intended to lead to an
overall delimitation and demarcation of boundaries on Lake Chad, is legally
without prejudice to the title to particular areas of the Lake Chad region
inhering in Nigeria as a consequence of the historical consolidation of title and
the acquiescence of Cameroon;
As to the central sectors of the land boundary, adjudge an declare;
(a) That the court‟s jurisdiction extends to the definitive specification of the land
boundary between Lake Chad and the sea.
(b) That the month of the Ebeji, marking the beginning of the land boundary, is
located at the point where the North-east Channel of the Ebeji flows into the
feature marked „Pond‟ in Nigeria‟s Rejoinder, which location is at latitude
12031 45”N, longitude 14
013” 00”E.
36
(c) That subject to the interpretations proposed in chapter 7 of Nigeria‟s
Rejoinder, the land boundary between the month of the Ebeji and the point on
the Thalweg of the Akpa Yafe which is opposite the midpoint of the mouth of
Archibong Creek is delimited by the terms of the relevant boundary
instruments,
(d) That the interpretations proposed in Chapter 7 of Nigeria‟s Rejoinder, and the
associated action there identified in respect of each of the locations where the
delimitation in the relevant instrument is defective or uncertain, are
confirmed;
As to the maritime boundary, adjudge and declare;
(a) That the court lacks jurisdiction over Cameroon‟s maritime claim from the
point at which its claim line enters waters claimed against Cameroon by
Equatorial Guinea, or alternatively that Cameroon‟s claim is inadmissible to
that extent;
(b) That Cameroon‟s claim to a maritime boundary based on the global division
of maritime zones in the Gulf of Guinea is inadmissible, and that the parties
are under an obligation, pursuant to Articles 74 and 83 of the United Nations
Law of the Sea Convention, to negotiate in good faith with a view to agreeing
on an equitable delimitation of their respective maritime zones, such
delimitation to take into account, in particular, the need to respect existing
rights to explore and exploit the mineral resources of the continental shelf,
granted by either party prior to 29 March 1994 without written protest from
37
the other, and the need to respect the reasonable maritime claims of third
States.
(c) In the alternative, that Cameroon‟s claim to a maritime boundary based on
global division of maritime zones in the Gulf of Guinea is unfounded in law
and is rejected.
After a meeting held by the president of the court with the representatives of
Nigeria and Cameroon, the agent of Nigeria had declared that his government did not
object to the additional application so that the court might examine the whole in a single
case. The court by an order of 16 June 1994, indicated that it had no objection to such a
procedure and fixed the time-limits for the filing of written procedures.
After the filing of claims and preliminary objections by Nigeria challenging the
authority of the court to arbitrate the matter, the court passed judgment on June 11, 1998
dismissing seven of Nigeria‟s preliminary objections and stated that the claims brought
forward by Cameroon were admissible.
On June 30, 1999, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea filed in an application to
intervene in the case to protect the legal rights of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea in the
Gulf of Guinea by all legal means available and to inform the courts decision in the light
of the maritime boundary claims advanced by the parties to the case before the court (ICJ
press release 2002). However, Equatorial Guinea did not seek to become party to the
case.
Public hearings took place between February 13 and 21 March 2002. The final
decision on Bakassi was passed by the court on October 10, 2002. In a verdict of 13 to 3
votes, it was found that sovereignty over the peninsula did rest with Cameroon. Nigeria
38
was requested to expeditiously and without condition withdraw its forces and civil
administration and transfer possession of the peninsula to Cameroon within two years.
Likewise, Cameroon was asked to withdraw its forces and administration from territories
which in accordance to the decision now fell within the Federal Republic of Nigeria (ICJ
Press Release 2002).
2.3 THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF BAKASSI CITIZENS
There are two sets of principles at issue in the dispute between Nigeria and
Cameroon over Bakassi Peninsula. The first set of principles is international legal
principles. They are principles pertaining to the reason of state (raison detre). They deal
with matters of territorial integrity and the mode of interaction between sovereign states.
They are such traditional principles as uti possidetis juris, pacta sent servanda, and rebus
sic stantibus. The other set consists of human rights principles or norms. They pertain to
the dignity and worth of the human person. This set of principles is predicated on the
assumption that the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world can only be
laid with a “recognition of the dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948
preamble).
Linking these sets of principles is the doctrine of self-determination. It is both a
legal principle and a human right doctrine. The principle of the sanctity of boundaries
inherited from the colonial powers (uti possidetis juris) is a status-quo promoting norm. it
is meant to promote stability in a changing world. Similarly, the principle which states.
That agreements are binding (Pacta sunt servanda) serves the same purpose. The idea is
to maintain order and secure a measure of stability in a potentially revolutionary era and
environment. The last-named principle is qualified and, by that qualification,
39
strengthened by the related principle of rebus sic stantibus, that is agreements remain
valid and binding unless and until the conditions under which they were made change.
All these three principles are anti- revolutionary principles. They reflect acceptance of the
orthodox paradigm of the international system as a state system, and of the state as the
basic unit of analysis in international relations, because it is the key and real actor
(Asobie 2005). They are based on the assumption that the reason of state, that is the
security of the state, is the ultimate goal of international action; that the preservation of
the institutional mechanisms of class domination constitutes the supreme value of
contemporary international system. These traditional principles of international relations
are unquestioningly subscribed to by the ruling classes not only in Nigeria and
Cameroon, but also, by those of most of the nations of the world today.
2.3.1 THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
Self determination is recognized by international law as a right of certain
collectives (Suzuki 1976; Bassoni 1978; Mallison 1986). Paust (1980), observes that a
case can be made for self determination as a human right, given Article 21 of the
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (adopted by the UN General Assembly on
December 10, 1948).
The human right norms exposed and highlighted in the dispute over the Bakassi
peninsula are those embodied in Articles 3, 5, 9, and 17 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Article 3 states that every human has the right to life, liberty and security
of person. Article 9 complements this. It states that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile. And article 17 (2) declare that no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property. These rights had been violated with impunity, by soldiers of
both Nigeria and Cameroon operating in the Bakassi peninsula and its environment.
40
Equally violated were the provisions of artIcles 5 and 12. Article 5 stipulates that no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his property, home or correspondence,
nor attacks on his honour and reputation (Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 1948).
Even though newspapers and news magazines in Nigeria and Cameroon contained
accounts of frequent incidences of violation of these rights, yet the governments of
Nigeria and Cameroon gave little attention to the issue of gross violation of the worth and
dignity of human persons so reported. On a very rare occasion when the matter featured
in the discussions between President Ahidjo of Cameroon and General Yakubu Gowon,
the then Nigerian Head of state, not much came out of the talks. Ahidjo promised to look
into Nigeria‟s complaints, while Gowon, promised to caution to Nigerian media that
carried such embarrassing reports on human rights violations (Ate and Akinterinwa,
1992).
The right of self-determination is a crucial democratic principle. It is a legal right
that is now generally recognized in international law. The constituent elements of the
right of all persons to determine, democratically, their own socio-economic system as
well as political system; the right of peoples, nations and nationalities (including
minorities) to freely pursue, develop and preserve their culture, tradition and language;
and the right of the oppressed nations to self-determination, up to, and including their
right to secession, is also now guaranteed in international law (Shivji, 1989). This
represents the internal dimension of the principle of self-determination. In the democratic
political life of a people, there is no other value that is as important as liberty. Liberty is
the essence of self-determination and it is a hugely necessary condition for development.
The external dimension of the principle of self-determination embraces the
following primary components: the right of colonial peoples to independence and
41
establishment of their own sovereign states; and the right of freedom of all peoples from
alien domination, subjugation and exploitation. The principle also has certain derivative
components, namely, the principles of state sovereignty, state responsibility, territorial
integrity and non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state.
With regard to the dispute over the bakassi peninsula, the primary internal
dimension of the principle of self-determination was in conflict with the derivative or
secondary internal dimension. In 1958 and 1961, there had been a UN-sponsored
plebiscite in Northern and Southern Cameroon, of which the Bakassi peninsula was then
a part. It was an attempt to resolve the conflict by democratic means. But the dispute
could not be resolved to the satisfaction of the inhabitants of the chamber of northern
Cameroon and the inhabitants of Bakassi Peninsula in southern Cameroon.
Therefore, economic interest, especially stakes in some valuable natural
resources, rather than concern for human lives and consideration for human welfare,
underlie the judgment. Even when other motives or interests are presented as issues in
dispute, often, but not always, the hidden and real motivating factors are economic, in
particular, contention over the control of some valuable natural resources. In the ease
under reference, it was the discovery of crude oil in the disputed territory in 1967 that
heightened the interests of the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon in the disputed
territories, especially, the Bakassi peninsula. The livelihood opportunities of the people in
the area, their fishing rights and their general welfare were obviously of little or no
interest to successive governments in Nigeria and Cameroon. Even the question of
whether the people in the area wished to be Nigerians or Cameroonians did not bother the
governments of the two countries and ICJ in 2002,
42
The right of self-determination as contained in a number of General Assembly
Resolutions were violated. For example, in GA Res. 1514 of Dec. 14, 1960 and GA Res.
2625 of Oct. 24, 1970, it was stated thus:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their economic, social
and cultural development (Article 1 of the international)
government on civil and political rights passed by the
General Assembly on Dec. 16, 1966.
From the foregoing analysis, we therefore validate our first hypothesis which states that
the adjudication of the International Court of Justice on the Bakassi peninsula constitutes
the denial of human rights of the Bakassi citizens.
43
CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE’S (ICJ) RULING AND THE
PROVISIONS OF THE GREE TREE AGREEMENT
3.1 SUMMARY OF THE ICJ RULING
The International court of justice‟s judgment in the case concerning the
land and maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon ( on October 10, 2002) is a
long one, exceeding 150 pages. Therefore, it will be imperative to give a summary of it
since that will help us in our subsequent analysis. The judgement is as follow:
1. The court first decided that the land boundary between the two countries had been
fixed by treaties entered into during the colonial period and it upheld the validity
of those treaties. It moreover, rejected the theory of historical consolidation put
forward by Nigeria and accordingly refused to take into account the effectivites
relied upon by Nigeria. It ruled that, in the absence of acquiescence by Cameroon,
these effectivities could not prevail over Cameroon‟s conventional titles.
Accordingly, the Court decided that, pursuant to the Anglo-German Agreement of
11 March 1913, sovereignty over Bakassi lies with Cameroon. Similarly, the
Court fixed the boundary in the Lake Chad area in accordance with the
Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 9 January 1931 between France and
Great Britain and rejected Nigeria‟s claims to the Darak area and the neigbouring
villages.
2. Further, the Court drew an extremely precise boundary between the two States. In
this respect, in Lake Chad it reached the same conclusions as the Lake Chad
Basin Commission. As requested by Nigeria, it then turned to 17 sectors of the
land boundary between Lake Chad and pillar 64. In many cases, the solutions
adopted in this respect are Malo Senche, Jimbare and Sapeo, between Namberu
44
and Banglang, and in respect of the boundary between the Akbang River and
Mount Tosso. The adopted solutions are closer to Cameroon‟s positions in respect
of the Kohom River, the area between Mount Kuli and Bourha, the Village of
Kotcha, , the Hambere Range areas and the Sama River. The Court adopted
intermediate or neutral positions in respect of Limani,the sources of the
Tsikakiri,the course from Beacon No.6 to Wamni Budungo, at Tipsan, and from
the Hambere Range to the Mburi River. Finally, the Court indicated the precise
course of the boundary channel of the Akwayafe to the west of the Bakassi
Peninsula.
3. The Court also fixed the maritime boundary between the two States. Here, the
Court, accepting Cameroon‟s contention, began by upholding the validity of the
Declarations of Yaounde ll and Maroua, pursuant to which the Heads of State of
Nigeria and Cameroon had in 1871 and 1975 agreed upon the maritime boundary
between the two countries from the mouth of the Akwayafe to a point G situated
at 8022‟ 19” longitude east and 4
0 17‟00” latitude north.
Next, in respect of the maritime boundary further out to sea, the Court essentially
endorsed the delimitation method advocated by Nigeria. As the line of delimitation, it
adopted the equidistance line between Cameroon and Nigeria, which in its view
produced an equitable result in this case as between the two States, namely a
loxodrome having an azimuth of 1870 52‟ 27”. Noting, however, that the line so
adopted was likely rapidly to encroach on rights of Equatorial Guinea, the Court
confined itself to indicating its direction without fixing
theCameroon/Nigeria/Equatorial Guinea tripoint.
45
The delimitation thus effected for the most part respects existing oil installations. It
preserves Equatorial Guinea‟s rights, as well as those of Cameroon and Nigeria in
regard to their delimitation with Equatorial Guinea.
4. Drawing the consequences of its determination of the land boundary, the Court
first held that Nigeria is under an obligation expeditiously and without condition
to withdraw its administration and its military and police forces from Bakassi
Peninsula, and from the Lake Chad area falling within the sovereignty of
Cameroon. The Court further decided that Cameroon, for its part, is under an
obligation expeditiously and without condition to withdraw any administration or
military or police forces which may be present on Nigerian territory along the
land boundary between Lake Chad and Bakassi. Nigeria bears the same obligation
in respect of any territory in this sector which falls within the sovereignty of
Cameroon. In the reasoning of its judgment, the Court further noted that the
implementation of the judgement would afford the parties a beneficial opportunity
to co-operate in the interests of the populations concerned, in order notably to
enable them to continue to have access to educational and health services
comparable to those they currently enjoy. Such co-operation, the Court added,
would be especially helpful, with a view to the maintenance of security, during
the withdrawal of the Nigerian administration and military and police forces.
5. The Court also took note of the commitment undertaken at the hearings by
Cameroon that, “faithful to its traditional policy of hospitality and tolerance”,
Cameroon would “continue to afford protection to Nigerians living in the Bakassi
peninsula and in the Lake Chad area
46
6. Finally, the Court rejected Cameroon‟s submission seeking to have Nigeria
ordered to repair the injury suffered by Cameroon, in particular as a result of the
occupation of Bakassi. In this respect, the Court noted that Cameroon had secured
recognition of its sovereignty over the peninsula and the disputed area of Lake
Chad. It found that the injury suffered by Cameroon by reason of the Nigerian
occupation was sufficiently addressed by the very fact of that recognition and of
the evacuation of those territories. It also rejected, for lack of proof, the
submissions of Cameroon concerning the implementation of its Order of 15
March 1996 indicating provisional measures and those relating to various border
incidents complained of by the two Parties.
7. In sum, the Court finds in favour of Cameroon in respect of Bakassi and Lake
Chad. Its judgment also settles the other issues concerning the land boundary. It
places each of the Parties under an obligation to evacuate the areas falling within
the sovereignty of the other and to do so expeditiously and without condition, and
at the same time issues a call for co-operation. It fixes the maritime boundary
beyond the territorial sea in accordance with the method advocated by Nigeria.
Finally, it rejects both parties‟ submissions concerning responsibility.
8. I would add that the Court was happy to learn that the Heads of State of
Cameroon and Nigeria met on 5 September 2002, last in the presence of the
United Nations Secretary-General. It welcomed the result of that meeting and
hopes that the judgment which it has delivered will contribute to friendly relations
between the two brother countries.
47
3.3 DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ICJ RULING
When it became difficult to implement the ICJ ruling given the complex nature of
the boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon; the fate of Nigeria nationals living
in the Bakassi Peninsula; fear that the ruling might degenerated into war because Nigeria
rejected it initially, it was clear that a decision from the court alone may not be enough to
bring sustainable agreement between both parties. So, while anticipating these
difficulties, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan facilitated a further meeting between
President Obasanjo of Nigeria and Prisident Biya of Cameroon in Genera on 15
November, 2002. In a joint communiqué, the two leaders agreed to ask the Secretary
General to establish a Mixed Commission of Nigeria, Cameroon and the United Nations,
“to consider ways of following up on the ICJ ruling and moving the process forward”
(United Nations office 2007)
The Secretary-General designated his special representative to West Africa,
Ahmedou. Ould Abdallah to serve chairman of the Nigeria-Cameroon Mixed
Commission.
The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission has met in Abuja and Yaounde
severally on an alternating basis. Chaired by Ahmed Ould-Abdallah, it is composed
of the Delegation of Cameroon, led by Amadon Ali, Senior Minister in charge of
Justice, and the Delegation of Nigeria, led by Bola Ajibola, former Minister of
Justice. The Mixed Commission mandate covers the following areas:
The demarcation of the land boundary between the two counties;
The withdrawal of civil administration, military and police forces and transfer of
authority in relevant areas along the boundary;
The eventual demilitarization of the Bakassi Peninsula,
48
The development of projects to promote joint economic ventures and cross-border
co-operation; and
The reactivation of The Lake Chad Basin commission established the following
subsidiary organs, with experts form the two parties and the United Nation:
A sub-commission on affected populations with a mandate to assess the situation
of these populations and the consider effective ways to ensure protection of their
rights.
A working group on the withdrawal of civil administration and military and
police forces and the transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area, which
completed its work in January 2004.
A working group on the maritime boundary
A working group on withdrawals and transfers of authority in the land boundary
and the Bakassi peninsula.
The Mixed Commission is said to have achieved the following progress since inception:
i. Approved on 5 December 2003, a work programmes relating to the
demarcation of the land boundary, which lasted fro about two years.
ii. On December 2003, the withdrawal of civil administration, military and police
forces and transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area was completed. The
process took places in phases with some 33 villages surrounding Naga‟a,
Tchika, Doron liman, and Durack handed over to Cameroon, and Dombore to
Nigeria.
iii. The mixed commission has also identified possible projects to promote cross-
border co-operation and joint economic ventures to benefit the population in
49
the area. These include reactivating the Lake Chad Basin Commission-
formed in 1964 among neigbouring countries and upgrading, with the
assistance of the African Development Bank, one of the main roads between
the two countries.
iv. A draft protocol for the protection of the rights of the affected population was
submitted. At its ninth meeting in Yaunde in April 2004, the mixed
commission decided to refer it to the bilateral Cameroon-Nigeria joint
commission
v. At its meeting in Abuja on 29-30 October 2003, the mixed commission
reaffirmed its commitment to guarantee the rights of all people affected by the
courts decision, both Cameroonian and Nigerian. In this context, the sub-
commission on affected populations visited the Lake Chad, the affected areas
in the land Boundary (November, 2003) January-February 2004) and the
Bakassi Peninsula in February 2004.
vi. The demarcation sub-commission also joined the sub-commission on
Affected populations during the field visit of the land boundary and the
Bakassi Peninsula in February 2004.
vii. The invitation for the expression of interest contained in the first contract for
the demarcation has been posted on the UN Website.
viii. At the ninth meeting in Yaounde in April 2002, the Mixed Commission
decided that the process of withdrawal and transfer of authority in the land
boundary will start on 15 July 2004. It also decided that the process of
withdrawal and transfer of authority on the Bakassi Peninsula will start on 15
July and end on 15 September 2004.
50
However, two withdrawal time tables were not respected; thousands of Nigerians
in the Bakassi Peninsula were not sure where they stood in terms of citizenship and many
wanted to remain Nigerians since they had more social and economic ties with Nigeria
(Borzello, 2004). Nigeria‟s failure to give Cameroon full control of Bakassi on 15th
September, 2004 was predicated on the argument that their withdrawal would lead to the
collapse of law and order.
In addition, Nigeria submitted that the most democratic manner to decide
Bakassi‟s sovereignty would be to hold a referendum since about 90% of the people on
the peninsula did not want to become Cameroonian (Eboh 2005). Nigeria claimed that
sovereignty of Bakassi was not a matter of oil or natural resources on land or in coastal
waters, but rather the welfare and well being of Nigerians on their land Federal Republic
of Nigriea, 2002). There were calls on the Nigerian government by some Nigerians to go
war over the matter. This school of thought argued that „there is no morality in
international relations‟ and that it is against the national interest of Nigeria in terms of
security and economic interest to accept the ICJ‟s verdict on its totality (Efim-Bassey
2002). However, other Nigerians cautioned against war-arguing that women and children
are the most vulnerable victims of war and that youths are the greatest losers in all social
disputes, domestic or international, not the men who usually ask for war (Asobie 2003).
They further maintained that the principle of good faith in international relations demands
that Nigeria should not disavow her word of honour as evidenced by the diplomatic note
of 1962 (Aghemelo and Iblasebhor 2006).
The above situations posed great difficulties in implementating the ICJ‟s verdict.
There is no doubt that the ICJ has limited capacity to facilitate enforcement because there
51
is a very weak interplay between passing judgment and binding enforcements.
Implementation of the rulings of the ICJ is largely dependent on the goodwill of countries
in dispute. In situations where the countries involved are outward looking and cherish
international credibility, diplomatic pressure can act as a credible tool which can be used
to generate incentives for compliance with international obligations. Because the Nigeria-
Cameroon Mixed Commission could not properly implement the ICJ ruling, the UN
Secretary General (Kofi Annan) convinced the two presidents in signing the Green Tree
Agreement on 12 June 2006.
3.3 THE GREEN TREE AGREEMENT
Following intense diplomatic offensives and the office of the UN Secretary-
General, Cameroon was able to secure the Green-tree Agreement with Nigeria on June
12, 2006, in New York brokered by the UN Secretary-General and witnessed by Britain,
France, Germany, and the United states (Ngang 2007).
52
The agreement which has eight articles are as follow:
FIGURE 2: GREEN TREE AGREEMENT
Article 1 Nigeria recognizes the sovereignty of Cameroon over the Bakassi
Peninsula in accordance with the judgment of the ICJ of 10. October,
2002 in the matter of land and maritime boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria. Cameroon and Nigeria recognize the land and maritime
boundary between the two countries as delineated by the court and
commit themselves to continuing the process of implementation
already begun.
Article 2 Nigeria agrees to withdraw all its armed forces from the Bakassi
Peninsula within sixty days of the date of the signing of this
agreement. If exceptional circumstances so require, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations may extend the period, as necessary,
for a further period not exceeding a total of thirty days. This
withdrawal shall be conducted in accordance with the modalities.
envisaged in annex 2 to this agreement.
Article 3 1. Cameroon, after the transfer of authority to it by Nigeria,
guarantees to Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi
Peninsula the exercise of the fundamental rights and
freedoms enshrined in international human rights law
and in other relevant provision of international law
2. In particular, Cameroon shall:
(a) not force Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi to leave
53
the zone or to change their nationality;
(b) respect their culture, language and beliefs;
(c) respect their right to continue their agricultural and fishing
activities;
(d) protect their property and their customary land rights;
(e) not levy in any discriminatory manner any taxes and other
dues on Nigerian nationals living in the zone; and
(f) take every necessary measure to protect Nigerian
nationals living in the zone from any harassment or harm.
Article 4 Annex 1 and the map contained in Annex 11 to this agreement shall
constitute an integral thereof.
No part of this agreement shall be interpreted as a renunciation by
Cameroon of its sovereignty over any part of its territory
Article 5 This agreement shall be implemented in faith by the parties,
with good offices of the secretary-general of the United
Nations, if necessary, and shall be witness the by the United
Nations, the Federal Republic, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
America.
54
Article 6
1: A follow-up committee to monitor the implementation of
this agreement is hereby established. It shall be composed of
representatives of Cameroon, Nigeria, the United Nations and
the witness states. The committees shall monitor the
implementation of the agreement by the parties with the
assistance of the United Nation observers of the Mixed
Commission.
3. The following-up committee shall settle any dispute
regarding interpretation and implementation of this
agreement.
Article 7 This agreement shall in no way be construed as an
interpretation or modification of the judgment of the ICJ of 10
October 2002, for which the agreement only sets out the
modalities of implementation.
Article 8
This agreement is concluded in English language and French,
both texts being equally authentic.
Source: Ngang (2007)”Understanding the Bakassi Conflict”
According to the then Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, the Green-tree
Agreement was a great achievement in conflict prevention, which practically reflected its
cost effectiveness. Meanwhile, his decision to respect the ICJ verdict met with strong
opposition from some radicals, who felt that Nigeria‟s military might should be used for
55
expansionist ambitions (Baye 2012). He urged that is should represent a .model for the
resolution of similar conflicts in Africa and the world at large. In the same spirit with
President Obasanjo, President Paul Biya of Cameroon underscored the importance of
respecting the ICJ ruling, arguing that their personal credibility and that of UN
dependended largely on its implementation and that it will begin a new era of trust, peace
and co-operation between Cameroon and Nigeria (Forbinake, 2008).
On 14th
August 2006, the Nigerian troops, in a solemn ceremony withdrew from
the Bakassi Peninsula, marking the climax of a long and meandering peace process that
spanned a period of 12 years. The effective withdrawal of Nigerian forces from Bakassi,
according to Baye (2012) is an indication that it is possible for African nations who find
themselves in dispute over territorial rights and other issues to resolve the matter
amicably-thus, avoiding carnage, bloodshed, socio economic and political dislocations,
which many post independent African countries have suffered. The entire process was
graced by the Treaty Calabar between Cameroon and Nigeria on 14 August, 2008 which
marked the complete withdrawal of the Nigerian administration and police as stipulated
in the Green Tree Agreement. Therefore, the provisions of the Green Tree Agreement
properly resolved the difficulties in the implementation of the international court of
justice ruling on October 10, 2002.
3.4 OIL AS ENGINE AND FUEL FOR DISPUTE SITUATIONS
According Klare (2004),the close connection between oil and dispute derives
from three essential features of petroleum:(1)its vital importance to the economic and
military power of nations;(2)its irregular geographical distribution;(3)its imminent centre
of gravity. it is possible that in some cases disputes originated before the discovery of
petroleum, but became interwoven with oil issues as the importance of oil as a factor of
56
production increased. the drivers of such tendencies are territorial disputes, separatist
struggles and factional/dynastic struggles.
Territorial disputes occur in border zones and offshore areas that were thought to
possess no particular value, but suddenly become very valuable with the discovery of oil.
For several decades, neither the Nigerian nor Cameroonian ruling elite showed any
particular interest in the Bakassi Peninsular.Neither showed any concern nor initiated any
programme that was capable of ameliorating the deplorable conditions of mass poverty,
squalor and destitution in which most Bakassi residents live. But struggles over the
ownership of Bakassi by Nigeria and Cameroon began immediately it was discovered in
the eighties that the Peninsula was floating on reserves of crude oil (Sango 2002). It was
only then that the elite of both countries started making serious claims and counter claims
over the territory. Separatist struggles occur when oil is produced or presumed to exist in
an area largely inhabited by an ethnic minority and the bulk of 0 revenues go or are
expected to go to government officials in the national capital. In this context, members of
the ethnic minority often perceive a strong incentive to break away and establish their
own ethnic state, with a view to getting all of the oil revenue. This sort of struggle is
occurring in the southern part of Sudan, where the predominantly Christian population is
struggling for independence and in Cameroon, where the Southern Cameroon National
Council (SCNC) sympathises with advocates for the independence of the Bakassi
Peninsula as „The Republic of Ambazonia‟ (Gumne 2006). In some cases such as the
Delta region of Nigeria, ethnic minorities are fighting to gain greater autonomy (and a
larger share of oil revenues) rather than a separate state.
Factional dynastic struggles occur because whoever controls the government of oil-pro
states also controls the allocation of oil revenues. Those in control will seek to retain
57
power for as long as possible, using heavy-handed repression and election rigging, while
those excluded from power will have a powerful incentive to use any means necessary to
gain control (including armed rebellion, terrorism, or coup d‟etat). These sorts of
factional struggles have been a consistent pattern in countries like Nigeria and Saudi
Arabia, as well as in most oil-rich states. In other countries, especially Venezuela,
disputes over the allocation of oil revenues have taken the form of political violence
between competing parties and interest groups (flare 2004).
58
CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL POWERS IN THE
ADJUDICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE ICJ JUDGEMENT
4.1 FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT
The dispute over Bakassi peninsula between Nigeria and Cameroon has been
suspected to be fueled by external powers. Nigeria, for instances, suspected that foreign
powers like France, Britain and Germany and US mingled into the dispute in favour of
Cameroon (Ngang 2007). First of all, Nigeria never wanted the case to be settled by the
ICJ because she claimed the matter could be solved bilaterally at local level. The truth is
that she feared the president of the court, Gilbert Guillaume, a French citizen and other
European judges like Rosalyn Higgins of Britain and Carl-August Fleischhaver of
Germany would be partial in their judgment in favour of Cameroon.
Figure 3: Names and countries of origin of the Thirteen ICJ judges that supported a
decision on the ceding of Bakassi to Cameroon on 10th
October 2002
S/N NAME COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
1 Guillaume France
2 Shi China
3 Oda Japan
4 Ranjeva Madagascar
5 Herczegh Hungary
6 Fleischhauer Germany
7 Higgins United Kingdom
8 Parra-Aranguren Venezuela
9 Kooijmans Netherlands
10 Al-Khasawneh Jordan
11 Buergenthal United States
12 Elaraby Egypt
13 Mbaye Senegal
Source: Solomon Ukhuegbe, Bakassi at the Bar of politics, http://www.nigerdelta
congress.com/barticles/bakassi at the bar politics retrieved on 01/06/2012
59
In her official response to the courts decision, Nigeria claimed:
The French president of the court and the English and
Germany judges should have disqualified themselves since
the countries which they represent are, in essence, parties to
the action or have substantial stake. These judges, as
citizens of the colonial powers whose action had come
under scrutiny, have acted as judges in their own case and
thereby rendered their judgment virtually null and void
(FGN Statement on the ICJ judgment at the Hague in
2002).
Nigeria was convinced that Cameroon took the case to the ICJ on France‟s
assurance that the decision was going to be in their favour considering that Cameroon had
not been well-treated by the ICJ in the past (Ngang 2007).
Akinjide, who was a member of the Nigerian legal team during the court
proceedings summarized his view on foreign influence as follows:
We must accept that, that ICJ judgment is 50 percent international
law and 50 percent politics. And as far as the case between Nigeria
and Cameroon was concerned, the dispute was really between
Nigeria and France. Cameroon was just the proxy for France.
There is no doubt that in law and in fact Bakassi belongs to Nigeria
because that is supported by a lot of documentary evidence, which
were rendered before the court. But which the court ignored … you
don‟t ask somebody to transfer to you what belongs to you. So, as
far as I‟m concerned, the judgement of the ICJ is a complete fraud
and unacceptable … if indeed Bakassi belongs to Cameroon, how
can Cameroonians be asking them to transfer it to them
(Newswatch, 4 November 2002)
France in particular, was therefore seen at least by Nigeria as an actor in the
dispute fanning the flames of the escalation for economic reasons. According to Asobie
(2005), the government of Cameroon was under domestic and foreign political and
economic pressure (especially from France) to secure effective control over Bakassi
Peninsula. In 1967 when oil was discovered in the swamps of the Calabar River and
60
Cross-River channels, a number of multinational companies then undertook explorations
in the disputed areas on behalf of the Republic of Cameroon. Also, at a time when
Cameroon stood in danger of being blacklisted by the IMF for default in servicing its
external debt, France paid 30 billion CFA France to the IMF to bail Cameroon out
(Asobie 2005).
FIGURE 4: PROSPECTIVE OIL COMPANIES AND THEIR COUNTRIES OF
ORIGIN
Exxonmobil America
Shevron American
Royal Dutch Shell Britain/Netherland
ELF France
Total France
Agip Italy
BP Britain
Source: Constructed by the Researcher
Therefore, it was the position of Nigeria that France believe that the ceding of
Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon will yield gargantuan economic benefits to her since
there has been mutual understanding between Cameroon and France and the possibility
that the latter will dominate in the exploration and exploitation of crude oil deposits in the
Peninsula.
Another foreign country which got involved in the dispute at a much later period
was the republic of Equatorial Guinea, which also filed a case at the ICJ to observe the
legal process at the Ague in order to safeguard her territorial interests but not to directly
get involved in the crisis. We also see the manifestation of external powers when
anticipating the final decision of the court, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan,
invited presidents Biya of Cameroon and Obasanjo of Nigeria to a summit meeting in
61
Paris on September 5, 2002, convinced both presidents to commit themselves to respect
and implement whatever decision the court arrived at.
Also, external powers such as Britain, USA, Germany, France and UN Secretary-
General were instrumental in the formation of the Nigeria Cameroon Mixed Commission
which worked out ways for implementing the ruling of the ICJ. The mixed commission
worked out modalities for:
Demarcation of the land boundary;
Withdrawal of civil administration, military and police forces and the
transfer of authority;
Eventual demilitarization of the Bakassi peninsula;
Protection of the rights of the affected population;
Promotion of joint economic ventures; and
The reactivation of the Lake Chad commission (Ngang 2007). From the
above, one can clearly see that external powers are enmeshed both in the
adjudication and implementation of the ruling of the ICJ.
4.2 THE COLONIAL LEGACY
Before the scramble for Africa, Bakassi was part of the ancient kingdom of
Calabar. The people in the main settlements in the Bakassi Peninsula owed allegiance to
the Obong of Calabar. The Obong of Calabar placed not only Calabar, but also the Efike
and Ibibio (in the Peninsula) under the status of a British protectorate via a Treaty on 10
September 1884. The chiefs of Efike and Ibibio were co-signatories to the Treaty.
Subsequently, through a series of bilateral treaties and other legal instruments, the
territory was ceded by the British in 1913, first to Germany, and later placed under the
62
mandate of the League of Nations in 1919 at the end of the First World War. Finally, it
was ceded to by plebiscite to independent Cameroon in 1961.
The critical legal instruments that changed the status of the Peninsula and its
inhabitants were the following (Aghemelo an Ibhasebhor 2006; omoigui 2006)
The agreement between the United Kingdom and Germany signed in London on
11 March 1913 entitled „(1) the Settlement of the Frontier between Nigeria and
the Cameroons, from Yola to the sea, and (2) the Regulation of Navigation on the
Cross River‟
The Anglo-German Protocol signed in Obokun on 12 April 1913, demarcating the
Anglo-German boundary between Nigeria and from Yola to the Cross River.
Eight maps accompanied this Protocol.
The exchange of letters between the British and German governments on 6 July
1914.
The endorsement, in April 1961, by both the United Nations General Assembly
and the International Court of Justice, of the results of the plebiscites conducted in
Northern and Southern Cameroons in 1959 and on 11 February 1961,
respectively.
The Diplomatic Note, accompanied by a map, dispatched to the government of
Cameroon by Nigeria in 1962, accepting the results of the plebiscites.
For the Bakassi Peninsula in particular, the Germans were interested in getting assurance
that Britain would not seek to expand eastwards. The British were interested in
uninterrupted and secure sea route access to Calabar, a key trading port. Since the
63
Germans already had the option of using the Douala port, they conceded the „navigable
portion‟ of the offshore border to Britain. In exchange, Britain conceded the Bakassi
Peninsula proper to Germany.
In January 1914, „Nigeria‟ was created by amalgamation of the various British
protectorates spanning the North to the South. At the end of the First World War, all
German territories were divided between France and Britain by the Treaty of Versailles.
The League of Nations placed them under French or British mandate. The boundaries
between British and French mandated Cameroon were defined by the Franco-British
Declaration of 10 July 1919. In this agreement, Bakassi and the rest of what became
known as „British Cameroon‟ was placed under British mandate and administered
coterminous with „Nigeria‟ but not merged. The old 1913 border was retained. To codify
this further, other agreements were signed on 29 December 1929 and 11 January 1930
between Britain and France. These declarations were ratified and incorporated in an
Exchange of Notes on 9 January 1931 between the French Ambassador in London and
the British Foreign Minister (Omoigui, 2006).
On 1 January 1960 and on 1 October 1960, the French Cameroon and Nigeria
became independent, respectively. Instruments creating the new countries and exchange
of notes between France and Cameroon rehashed all its colonial boundaries as defined by
previous colonial agreements. A plebiscite was held to clarify the wishes of the people
living in Northern and Southern Cameroon under British rule. The population of
Northern Cameroon still under British rule had earlier- in 1959- decided to achieve
independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroon‟ on 11 February 1961
(United Nations 1961). There were 21 polling stations on the Bakassi Peninsula itself and
64
about 73% of the people living there voted to „achieve independence by joining the
independent Republic of Cameroon‟ (Omoigui 2006).
Moreover, by Diplomatic Note No. 570 of 27 March 1962, the government of
Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria exchanged diplomatic notes with Cameroon acknowledging
the fact that Bakassi was indeed Cameroonian territory (Agbemelo and Ibhasebhor 2006).
In July, 1966, Lt –Col. Gowon came to power in Nigeria. As the Balewa government, he
too committed his government to respect all prior international agreements made by the
Balewa and Ironsi governments.
4.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE BAKASSI DISPUTE
RESOLUTIONS
The socio-economic implications of the Bakassi dispute according to (Menjo
2012) are anchored on the following:
(1) Expenditure-reducing and switching effects
(2) Wealth-generating effects
(3) Cross-border activities
(4) The need for accompanying measures.
In an escalating border conflict situation, the countries involved generally spend
much more on security and military activities. Such military spending often crowds out
social spending on health, education and infrastructure, a practice that negatively affects
the welfare situation of the citizenry. As hostilities are scaled down through a negotiated
settlement, wasteful military spending is scaled down as well, hence the expenditure
reducing effect of peaceful settlement of border dispute. At the same time, there are
potentials and incentives to switch from military spending to social sector spending, a
situation that will enhance the general welfare of the population. In the case of Bakassi
65
Peninsula dispute settlement between Cameroon and Nigeria, both countries will realize
savings in military and associated logistical expenditures. These savings can be more
judiciously used to enhance the standards of living of the various populations through
infrastructural development that generates income and employment opportunities. The
success of these, however, depends on the good faith of the governments in place and the
reduction in corruption.
Also, the peaceful settlement of the Bakassi dispute is said to have increased the
international credibility of both Cameroon and Nigeria. This new found credibility would
act as an incentive to both domestic and foreign investors to invest and create
employment opportunities, which will provoke income-generating activities that are
badly needed to reverse the dismal socio-economic situation of the bulk of the
populations of both countries.
Due to historical and ethno-linguistic ties between Nigeria and Cameroon, it is
expected that with the peaceful handing over of Bakassi to Cameroon, fruitful socio-
economic activities between the two countries will be revamped (Kamige, 2005). Cross-
border activities will be enhanced further if Nigeria and Cameroon push forward their
intentions to initiate a number of political and economic confidence building measures,
and to consider the adoption of a treaty of friendship and non-aggression between them.
Accompanying measures by Nigeria, Cameroon and the international community,
as well as other socio-economic and political developments emanating from the entire
border dispute settlement are needed to enhance the peace dividend. The government of
Nigeria need to collaborate in order to carry out important infrastructural developments in
the health, education, road, water and telecommunication domains in the peninsula. This
will ease the precarious living conditions of the Bakassi citizens and help to discourage
66
any social movements that may be nurturing the intention to instigate the Bakassi
indigenous people to rise against either of the governments.
However, to Aghemelo and Ibhasebor (2006), while Cameroon will reap abundant
benefits from the Bakassi Peninsula, the implications for Nigeria are obvious. First are
fears that losing Bakassi to Cameroon may mean the loss of the entrance to the Calabar
port to Cameroon. This is because the entrance to the Calabar port lies in the Calabar
channel and going by terms of the 1913 agreement between Britain and Germany which
the World court relied upon as the authority for Cameroon‟s claim to Bakassi, the
channel belongs to Cameroon.
Secondly, the loss of Bakassi has also placed the multi-million naira export
process zone (EPZ) in serious danger. This is because the Calabar EPZ depends largely
on this important segment, it would mean that the port belongs to Cameroon out rightly
or Nigeria will have to pay charge. There is also the danger of losing 100 million barrels
of oil deposit and also four trillion cubic feet of gas deposits in the peninsula.
This will be as a result of the oil companies having to leave the area and
relinquish the oil wells to the Cameroonians, the implication of this is that the huge
revenue gotten from “Bakassi oil” will be lost to Nigeria. A nation striving to improve the
lot of its people by adequately utilizing their sources of revenue will surely feel the
severe impact of this type of judgement on the entire economy.
The social implications of the ruling are that Nigerian, who have lived in Bakassi
all their lives, will have to face the sad reality of having to evacuate a region that is part
and parcel of them immediately. Most people living in that areas have their businesses
located there and so leaving the area will mean detaching them from their sourcing of
income. Moreover, all infrastructural facilities, including hospitals, schools, recreational
67
centres, that were originally put in place by the country stands the risks of being forfeited
resulting in a fruit less effort and loss of income.
Another far-reaching implication of the judgement is the strategic or security
implication for the Nigerian state. The victory of Cameroon will make the nation lose its
eastern access to the Atlantic. This implies that without Cameroon‟s approval, Nigeria‟s
naval ships cannot move freely to southern Africa. For security reasons, this is not too
palatable and not in the interest of the nation.
However, it is important to understand that most international disputes are shaped
by three critical factors:
1. The nature and size of the booty that would accrue from the dispute. This
refers to the relative utility and size of the presumed productive resources
that the victor might gain after the struggle.
2. The nature of the relationship between the social classes that constitute the
primary actors in dispute. Once monopolistic capitalistic either on one side
or on both sides of the state territorial boundaries have high stakes in the
outcome of the dispute. The spiral of international disputes will be almost
unending.
3. The nature of domestic politics in the nation-states that form the bases for
the contending parties. This includes the nature of the regime in power.
Authoritarian/dictatorial regimes have the tendency to provoke the
emergence of violent inter-state politics, so as to divert attention from
burning domestic issues and prolong their stay in power.
Generally, when violent conflicts erupt between two contending ruling classes of
two distinct countries, they are extensions of violent intra-state conflicts promoted by the
68
various discontented social groups who may be having international connection&
Hoffinann (1985) observed that one definitely cannot imagine a non-violent diplomacy as
long as violence has not been eliminated from intra-state politics. In this connection,
social movements within territorial boundaries frequently seek to establish links with
similar bodies in neighbouring countries and will spare no effort in taking advantage of a
conflict situation to canvass for international recognition.
Therefore, we validate our third hypothesis which states that interests of external
powers affect in the adjudication and implementation of the ICJ ruling.
69
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 SUMMARY
This study investigates the role of ICJ in the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute, with special
focus on the Bakassi Peninsula. In order to achieve this objective, we raised the following
research questions:
Does the ICJ adjudication on Bakassi Peninsula constitutes denial of human rights
of Bakassi citizens?
Is the difficulty in the implementationof the ICJ ruling on Nigeria/Cameroon
boundary dispute resolved by provisions of the Green Tree Agreement?
Did the interests of external powers affects the adjudication and implementation
of the ICJ ruling?
We used the schema theory of security dilemma as expounded by Kanji (cited in
Burgess and Burgess 2005), which enabled us to explore the security dilemma- a
situation where two or more states are drawn into conflict possibly even war over security
concerns, even though none of the states actually desire conflict.
This theoretical framework become instrumental to the comprehension and
conceptualization of boundary as potential source of interstate dispute in itself because
the intricacy of boundary relations, is based both on internal and international legislation
which constitutes a complicated mixture of interests, actors and actions. In answer to the
research questions posed above, we test the following hypotheses that:
The ICJ adjudication on Bakassi Peninsula constitutes denial of human rights of
Bakassi citizens
70
The difficulty in the implementation of the ICJ ruling is resolved by the
provisions of the Green Tree Agreement.
The interests of external powers affects the adjudication and implementation of
the ICJ ruling.
We adopt qualitative method of data collection and qualitative-descriptive method
of analysis respectively and contend that although the judgment of the ICJ was
based on facts presented before it by both contending parties, the use of
negotiation, mediation and conciliation would have been more effective in the
settlement of the dispute contrary to all known conventions.
5.2 CONCLUSION
The high spate of boundary disputes among Africa states have been associated
with the creation of boundaries in Africa disregarding the relationship between territorial
boundaries and the anthropogenic homogeneity of the various ethnic groupings by the
colonial powers.
When Cameroon instituted a case against Nigeria in 1994, Cameroon was
inadvertently internationalizing the boundary and territorial dispute with Nigeria.
Apparently, Nigeria was hamstrung in a legal dilemma in retrospect because she honored
a number of pre-independence agreements inherited from Britain by virtue of the
Exchange Notes of October 1, 1960, between Nigeria and the United Kingdom on Treaty
obligations. By implication, Nigeria was recognizing the Bakassi peninsula as forming
part of the Cameroon.
It appears the boundary dispute between the two countries was basically a dispute
of right with right; hence a crude piece of ethical analysis should have been involved.
71
Since this was not the case, the question of the precise status accorded self-determination
remains a matter of international politics rather than mere legal principle.
Based on the foregoing, therefore, we accept our hypotheses and reach the
conclusion that although the ruling was based on facts presented by both parties, the
conduct of plebiscite that will take into cognisance the human rights of the Bakassi
citizens would have been more effective in the settlement of the dispute.
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
In view of the above findings and conclusion, we make the following
recommendations:
All boundary disputes, especially in Africa, should be handled according to the
United Nations recommendation in its Charter (UN, 1945: Article 33, Sub-section
I). According to this, parties to any dispute, the continuation of which is likely to
endanger peaceful and warmly relationship should resort to the principles of
negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, and judicial settlement, under the
auspices of regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their
own choice.
The welfare and improvement in the standard of living of the Bakassi citizens
should be of utmost priority to both the Nigerian and Cameroonian government
because they are entitled to their fundamental human rights no matter the
situation.
A sub-regional commission that will chart a course of harmonious relations
among Africa states, especially between Nigeria and Cameroon is also needed.
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