CHAPTER V

THE INCLUSION OF THE DOCTRINES OF BOTH NYXYA AND VAISESIKA IN TARKASAMGRAHA

AND OTHER MANUALS OF LOGIC

Ny5ya philosophy gives more importance to epistemology and

Valiesika philosophy gives more importance to ontology. In

Tarkasamgraha Annambhafra adopted the epistemology of Ny5ya

system and accepted the ontological structure of the Vai6.esika system.

The combination of these two branches viz. epistemology and ontology

helps us attain the highest values. Tarkasaygraha deals with the

pad art ha^' (objects of right knowledge) mentioned in the Vaiiesika

philosophy and the 'pramanas' (means of right knowledge) in the Nyaya

~ o l y AIIII~II!I~~III!!II ~ I V O N OCIIIIII NII.ONN OII COINIUIIIO~O~Y and

ontology in Tarka.wmgnnha Hut the fusion ofthc two systems i snd felt.

In Annambhatta's . . hand both systcms have mingled into one.

Ny5ya-Vaiksika, like all other schools of Indian philosophy, a i m

at realizing the highest good. In order to achieve this end, these syskms

havc presented an analytical demonstration of the universe, and also the

1 84

mcans to comprehend the phenomenal world. As such, Nygya has

classified the positive objects of the universe into sixteen categories, and

is pre-eminently concerned with epistemology and Logic. Vaihika on

thc contrary, is mainly a system ofphysics and metaphysics. Its doctrine

has seven categories and embraces all reality. These two systems were

separate in their origin and early development, but were, blended into a

single syncretic system later on because of logical and intellectual

ncccssity .

Nysya, in the course of its development took a considerable help

from Vaihegika. In the ancient and mediaeval period, both the

philosophies contributed each other for their development. Hace Nyiiya

and VaGqika were treated as sarniinatantra or allied systems. And in

d~lr coltrsc of tinlc. hot11 tllc N Y N ~ C I I I N 1110rg~d togotlt~r 10 tt gmit ox(O111.

I'hc six or scven categories of VaiAesika became the pari of Nyiya

j~hilosophy. Likcwise Nyiya category of prdmsna in its developed form,

actually was absorbed in the treatise on Vaihesika philosophy.

We can cite the cases of Tgrkikarak~a by Varadariija and

Tarkabh@a by Kekiva Miira for Nyiiya's absorption of Vaibsika

185

categories. VaradarZja, an exponcnt of Nyiya, takes into his account

not only thc sixtccn categories, but also the six categories of Vaihesika

such as dravya, etc. m the second category of prameya under NyZya.

I.,ikcwise KeSava Miira also brings six categories of Vaksika under

'artha' which is one of the twelve objects included in the second Nyiiya

category, prameya.

Let us have an overview of both of the works. NyZya, the science

of reasoning, demonstration, debate and critical study, stresses

predominantly intellectual and analytical methods. Vaiiqika is poorer

In rts epistemological interest a. lt is prc-eminently a metaphysical system.

The system is so designated because, according to it, diversity and not

unity is at the root of the universe.

Thc scvcn catcgorics of thc Vaikgika and thc sixteen categories

ol' thc Naiyiyika arc basically thc same. According to Allnebha! ja

;irtcl Visvanitha thc sixtccn catcgories mcntioncd in thc Ny3ya-sutra are

rncludcd in the seven categories of the Vaise~ika philosophy.'

The inclusion of the sixteen categories in the seven categories as

follows:-

1. Means of right knowledge - p d n a

(a) Perception (pratyakp) - is included in substance

(b) Inference (anumiina)

(c) Comparison (upamgna) 7- arc included in quality.

(d) Verbal testimony (babda)

2. The objects of right knowledge - prameya

(a) Soul (Stma)

(c) Senses (indriya)

are included in substance

(d) Objects of senses (artha) 1 (c) Intellect (huddhi) &arc included in quality

(f) Mind (manas) - is included in substance.

(g) Activity (praviitti) 1 (h) Fault (do~a)

(i) Transmigration (prctyi~bhiiva) irrc included in quality

(j) Fruit (phala)

(li) Prrin (dul~kl~u)

( I ) Emancipation (apvarga) - is included in negation

3. Doubt (.sam.bya)r - is included in quality.

4. Purpose (prayojana) 1 5. Example (diiggnta) are included in substance, quality, etc. I- 6. Tcnent (siddhznta) J

7. Members of syllogism (avayava) 1 8. Confutation (taka) I 9. Ascertainment (niqaya) t 10. Discussion (vgda)

1 I . Wrangling Galpa)

12. Cavil (Vitandg)

-are included in quality

13. Fallacy (hetvBbhas5) - is included in substance, quality, etc.

14. Quibble (cha1a)l

1 5 Analogue (jati) - 1- are included in quality

1 6 . A p in t of defeat (nigrahasthgna) - is included in substance, quality,

Tarkasamgraha

In 7kIkasam~Taha Annambha!ta accepts all the seven categories

of the Vaikesika philosophy without any change. Substance, quality.

;~cticm, gcncfi~lity, p;~rth~larity, inhcrcncc and ncgiition arc thc rrevcn

catcgorics. Quitlity is of twcnty-four kinds, of which buddhi (knowledge)

is one. Buddhi is of two kinds, experience (anubhava) and sm@i

(recollection). Anubhava or experience may be right or wrong. The

right experience is of four kinds, viz. (1) perceptual knowledge

(pratyaksa), (2) inferential knowledge (anumiti), (3) comparative

knowledge (upamiti) and verbal knowledge (Qbda). The means by which

these four kinds of knowledge are derived are called respectively ( 1 )

perception (pratyak.,~a), (2) inference (anumsna), (3) comparison

(upamsna) and verbal testimony (&Ma).

The scheme of incorporation is shown below:-

r ( I ) dtavya (2) guqa (3) karma (4) sZmHnya (5) v ikw (6) samavZya (7) abhiiva

----by ( I ) nipa ( 16) buddhi (24) samsksta

I I anubhava 1

smIfi

189

In Vaike?ikasG&a, Ka~Zda have keenly described seventeen

q~aiities.~ But the commentators have described twenty four qualities5

which has been accepted by Annambhatta also.

The Vaiiesikas have classified the siimiinya into two kinds viz.

para and apara. Para means satt5. But according to Navya NaiyHylkas

this classification is inunrect.6 However both para and apara classification

is accepted in Tahsapgxslja.

According to Navya NaiyHyikas particularity is not a separate

category.' But Annambhaita accepts it as a separate category.

The Vaiiesikas say that there isonly one inherence. But according

to Navya there are a number of inherence.' Annambhatia accepts the

Vaiiqika view.

Ncgstion in two-hlil: n~~~~~w~rgiiM~iivn iuul unyonyiibhiivu.

Aga~n samsargibhiiva is three-fold: antecedent negation, desmctive

negation and absolute negation.' In Tdasamgraha, Amwbharfa does

not divide negation as samsargZbhZva and anyonyHbhZva. He simply

mentions negation is four-fold.

190

Prdht2p%da classifies thc non-eternal air into four kinds viz. body,

organ, object and prSna." Where as Annambhatta classifies it into three

viz. body, organ and object.

According to Vaik;esika, iik%sa is that which is characterized by

the distinctivc quality of sound. Navya Naiyiiyikas say that God is the

cause of sound not iikiisa." But Annambhafta accepts the view of

Vaiiesika.

The theory of Piika

The Vaiksika theorists are known as ~?lu~5kav%dins. They say

that when a pot or ghata is baked at fmt the pot is destroyed into atoms

and then once again the atoms joined together produce a new one.

The atoms of the pot become red colour bccause of the contact

\\,i111 1110 I I O I I ~ . '111~ IIOW pol I N o ~ ~ t i ~ v l y t l i f ~ c r 0 1 1 1 t1o111 it10 fii)rrw-r OIIC.

This transformation is impcrccptible. becausc the destruction and the

rcfomation of thc pot happcn in a very short duration of time. This

theory of Vaikesika is known as p~lupiika.

The NaiyTiyyikas differ in this aspect and object this theory of

Vaiiesika. They establish the theory of PifharapIika. According to them,

191

thc change in the wlour, etc. of the atomq and in the product, come into

cxistence at the same time. Due to the speed of the fire the atoms of fire

enter the different particles in the ghala and destroy the colour etc. and

the ncw colour etc. are produced. There is no need of accepting the

destruction of whole. If the f i t pot is destroyed and new one substituted

we shall not be able to identi@ it as the old pot. We see the same pot as

before except for the difference in colour etc.

In ~ a k a ~ ~ ~ r a h a n e i t h e r pllup~ka nor pifhara~iika is described.

Annambhaffa says that the four qualities beginning with colour are

produced in earth through the application of heat, and are noneternal.

In other substances (i.e. water, light and air) they are not produced by the

application of heat (i.e. natural) and so are eternal and also non-eternal;

in c1crn:lls (i.c. in atotnx) fhcy :rrc ctcrnnl; :~ncl in non-domrlr (i.c. in

prt'ducts) t l~cy arc nonctcmal."

'l'hc Navya Naiysyikas say that pghaktva is mutual negation and

not a separate quality." But Annqbhaf fa accepts pmaktva as a distinct

quality.

192

Inference is of two kinds: for thc knower himyelf and for others.

n i s type of classification is not acceptcd by the ~racTna Naiygyikas.

Annaqbhaita accepts this type of classification.

In Vaibe@ka~iThaand hashasas@p~dabhii~yathe number of fallacies

arc threei4 and four" respectively. Five fallacies are included in Nygya-

,sGtrdh and NyZyabh5$a Like in Ny5ya Annambhaffa also accepts

five fallacies of reason.

Both the Ny5ya and the VaiBesika systems recognize the reality

of God, individual souls and minds, physical things, atoms of earth, water,

light and air, space, time and ether. They hold the same view of the

nature of the individual soul and its liberation. They both propound

realism and pluralism. They advocate the similar deistic view of God.

n111 fhcsc systemti diffcr f m ~ t ~ cc~ch nthar in ccrtt~in rcwpccta. Fimt. Nyiiya

r~cognizcs lour rncans of valid knowlcdgc viz. pcrccption, infcrcncc,

comparison and vcrbal testimony. Nyiiya giws a vivid description of

the criteria of truth, validity of knowledge and different kinds of inference

and fallacies. It b-eats the problems of logic and epistemology in the

most comprehensive manner. VaGqika, on other hand, admits perception

193

and inference only as pramgqas and deals with these pramgqas in

peripheral way.

Secondly, these systems differ in their treatment of categories.

NyZya recognizes sixteen categories which mostly refertothe ba.ic points

of a theory of knowledge. The Vaiksika on the other hand, divides the

wholc reality into seven padiirthas which present an analytical

demonstration of this phenomenal world.

BhSsarvajha's NyiiyasSra

Nyzyasgra, the essence of logic was a highly acclaimed logical

treatise of BhSsarvajiia. It had a distinct status in the history of Indian

Logic. He gave importance to pramspa which was the current subject at

that time. It was divided into three types viz. perception (praty*),

r ( I I ) I v c r l c n i y ( I I I ~ U ) . I t WIIN i t 1

contradiction to Akyapgda where in a fourth type named comparison

(upamha) was mentioned. This lead Bh5sawaj6a7s work to be similar

to that of SZmkhyas and Jainas who also divided pramSva into three

kinds. This is different h r n that of Buddhists who classified it into only

two viz. perception and inference. He divided inference into two -that

for one's self (sv%rlh%num%na) and that for the sake of others

(parirthiinumiina). Salvation (moky) was described by himas the soul's

attainment to eternal pleasure. Quibble, analogue, etc. which had been

prominent topics in the NyTyasfitra, were not altogether overlooked by

BhrTsarvajiia who dealt with them in connection with an inference for

the sake of others.

The scheme laid down in the NyZyas5iq for the reduction of

sixteen categories into one, may be exhibited in the tabular form thus:-

Pramana I

(the means of establishing prameya, (2) without a stain sam.saya, and

( 3 ) Viparyaya

I- 1 I

& A 'I 0g1 Luu~IJUL Svilriha I'wartha

carried on through Seilvidlia h '

'I'uhta Ayukta I

Avayava (7)

4-7 which includes hetvabhasa (1 3) and leads to

nirnaya (9), through the channels of tarka Arsa Anarsa (8), vada (lo), jalpa ( I I) , vitanda (12), chala

(14), jati (IS), and nigrahasthana (16).17

Varadariija's Tiirkikaraksa

TI.TrkiGaraAwas mainly divided into three chapters. Among them

thc initial one deals with the fourteen categories of NySya such as (1)

Pramspa, (2) Prameya, (3) Samkaya, (4). Prayojana, (5) D~liinta, (6)

Siddhiinta, (7) Avayiva, (8) Tarka, (9) Niqaya, (10) VSda, (1 1) Jalpa,

( 12) vital?@), (1 3) HetvgbhSsa and (14) Chala. The second chapter covers

the fifteenth category such as jati, while the last chaptm deals with the

sixteenth category vlz. nigrahasthiina.

Prameya according to NyZyasElmrefers to atman, &&-a, indriya,

artha, buddhi, manas, pravpi, dosa, pretyabhiivi, phala, d u w a and

apavarga,18 but VaradaGja includes the six predicaments of the Vaiksika

philosophy also. They are substance, quality, action, generality,

p:trl ~c-~tl:trity rtltcl inltcmncc.

I'hc catcgorics of Nyiya and Vai.ks~ka are thus combined together,

but thc combination is far from being satisfactory. It is evident that the

categories of the Vaibika and objects coming under prameya of the

Ny*Zya overlap each other. Moreover there is hardly any truth in the

s~atcment'~ that the knowledge of the sixteen categories of Ny5ya is the

direct means of our attaining emancipation. Whereas that of the seven

categories ofthe Vaiksika is only an indirect means, because atman (the

soul), manas (the mind), buddhi (intellect or knowledge), duhkha (pain),

etc. are included both the NyZya and Vaiksika system.. .

Scheme of representation of Varada5ja's incorporation of NyZya

and Vaikesika systems:-

PadZrtha

Pram5na, Prameya, Samiaya, Prayojana, D n f Snta, SiddhZnta, Avayava,

Taka, Niqaya, VZda, Jalpa, Vitqda, HetviibhSsa,Chala, JZti, NigrahasthHna

L r I I i'wclve objects of Ny5ya 2. Six categories of the Vai@ikaZ0

197

Valid knowledge (Pramii~a)

Varadariija in his TZrkikarakp introduces some unique

d~scuss~ons. For example, the Buddhists define valid knowledge

(pramiina) as that which is not non-correspondent with our practical

activ~ty?' e.g. my knowledge of a cup of water is valid if the activity

prompted by it is fruitful. Varadariija criticizes this defmition by saying

that it is too narrow. We can test the validity of our knowledge only of a

thing that exists in the present time. With regard to a past or future

thin&* we can draw an inference, but cannot judge the validity of the

~nfcrence in a? much a. there is no practical activity prompted.

Inference (anumiina)

Varddariija opines that 'inference is the knowledge of a thing

derived through its ~nvariable concomitance with another thing'.=

lnvar~able concomitance (vyiipti) also called inseparableness

(av~n$bh%va), is that relation which is devoid of condition (ufldhi).

Nuiyiiyikw say thut thc invariublc concomitilnw ofonc thing with

:~nothcr thing is basc on thcir uniform agrwrncnt in prcscnce and absence,

for cxample smoke is in invariable concomitance with fire, because where

there is smoke there is fm and where there is no fm t h m is no smoke.

198

But the Buddhists say that the invariable concomitancc of one

thing with the other thing is really based on their mutual relation of cause

and effect or identity in essence, e.g. thcre is rain, because there was

cloud.

Varddariija strongly criticizsd thc Buddhist view by saying that,

wc Infer the form of an applc from its taste, though between the taste and

form there is neither the causal relation nor the relation of identity in

csscncc.

Kesava Misra's Tarkabhasa

Keiava M i h starts his work hut - 'in order that even dull people

may get admittance into the science of Logic, I bring out this TdabhQa

(Technicality of Logic) replete with concise arguments'.24

7;:1rkabhZ~ incorporates the Vaiiqika categories

Ta&abhi@a deals with the sixteen categories of the Nyiiyasiitra

\ I / . ( I ) I ' M I ~ Y ~ I ~ , (2) t'rarncya, (3) SamSaya, (4) I'rayojana, (5) Dm!.;inta,

(0) SiddhSnt:~, (7) Avi~yi~v:~. (8) T:lrka, (9) Nirnuya, (10) V5&,(l I ) Jalpa,

( 1 2 ) Vitanda. (13) HctvSbhiisa, (14) Chala, (15) Jati and (16)

Nigrahasthiina. The second category viz. prameya, includes ( I ) h ~ a n ,

(2) harTra, (3) Indriya, (4) Artha, (5) Buddhi, (6) Manas, (7) Praytti, (8)

Dop, (9) Pretyabhiiva, (10) Phala, (1 1) D u h a and (12) Apavarga.

In Ny5ya the word artha is signified five objects of sense viz. gandha

(smell), ram (taste), riipa (colour), spa& (touch) and Sabda (sound). In

order to bring the Nyiiya categories with VaiSegika, KeSava MiSra

explained artha a5 dravya, m a , karma, siimgnya, vi6ep and samavZya.

The scheme of combination of the categories Ny5ya and Vaksika

in TarkabhZ~a is shown below:-

( I ) Pramana, (2) Prameya, (3), S d y a , ( 4 ) Prayojana,(S) @stZnta, (6) Siddhiinta, (7) Avayava, (8) Tarka, (9) Niqaya, (10) Viida, (1 1) Jalpa, (12) Vitaqda, (13) Hetviibhiisa, (14) Chala, (15) JZti, (1 6) Nigrahaqthiina

( 1 ) xtman, (2) harira, (3) Indriya, (4) Artha, ( 5 ) Bud@ (6) Manas, (7) hdvfli, (8) Dosa,

(9) Ptretyabhii va, 10) Phala, (1 1 ) W k h a ,

( 12) apavurp.

~ ~ i i ~ a l r l a v a t i of Vallabhiiciirya

While a large number of treatises in which the Nyiiya category of

pramzna was includcd in the Vaiksika category of guna, others bring it

under atman. Some writcrs keep aloof from Nyiiya in the description of

VaiScsika. But VallabhicZrya incorporates Nyiiya category ofpram5ina

on the Vaiksika category of y n a .

~ ~ ~ y a l i l a v a t ~ d e a l s with six categories viz. (1) Substance (dravya), (2)

Quality (guna), (3) action (karma), (4) Generality (siidnya), (5)

Particularity (v ike ) and (6) Inherence (samaviiya). Under the category

ot'guna there comes buddhi which is again subdivided as vidyZi and

I 'l'l~c way to gct right knowledge (buddhi) are perception

(pratyaksa). infcrencc (anumiina), comparison (upamiina) and verbal

testimony (iabda).

20 1

The scheme of amalgamation of Nyiya-Vaiksika in ~~5~afilavatiis

shown below:-

P I-, (3) ~arma , (4) Samanya, (5) Visesa, ((9 Samavaya

7- I ( I ) rupa ....................... (16) buddhi ...................... (24) s a d a m

I- vidya avidya

1 r i pratyaksa anumana

doctrine of ~rarnana*~

ViSwaniitha opens his BhZ~Zpanccheda with a salutation to

SrTkrsna2' ... and his .SiddhZntamukt.Tvalj, which is a commentary of

Bh*.Tpariccheda opens with a salutation to Lord S i ~ a . ~ '

Viiwangtha's work, BhZ?Zpariccheda deals with seven categories

viz. dravya, guna, karma, sgmiinya, v i k ~ , samaviiya and abhgva.

h v y a is subdivided into ksiti (earth) ap (water), tejas (light), marut

(air), vyoma (ether), kiila (time), dik (space), dehi (soul) and manas

(mind). Visvangtha opines that atman (soul) was the seat of intellect

which may of two types viz. apprehension (anubhEti) and

remembmce (smpi). Apprehension includes perception, inference,

co~~~parisorl m ~ d verbal testimony.

The Nyiiya dodrine of pramiina, as represented by perception,

inference, comparison and verbal testimony, is incorporated in the

categories ofthe Vaiksika philosophy. The scheme of incorporation

is shown below:-

(1 ) Dravya, (2) Guna, (3) Karma, (4) Samanya, (5) Visesa, (6) Samavaya (8) Abhava

( I ) Ksiti, (2) Ap, (3) Tejas, (4) Marut, (5) Vyoma, (6) Kala, + 1 (7) dik, (8) Atman, (9) Manas

I - --.l-.-. Pratyaksa Anumana Upamana Sabda

"J the Nyaya Category of Pramanam

TarkFimrta of ~agadiia Tarkiilaikiira

T d Z m @ slatts with a salutation to God V i f q ~ . ~ ~ Accarding to

his view if a man wants to get emancipation should ps!!sfi the

knowledge of soul.

In the first part of Tark&m@, that is known as v@iiy&inda, he

drvides things into two kinds positive (bh5va) and negative (abhqSva).

Thc positive things are substance, quality. action, generality. particularity

and inherence The negative things an. of two kind*, viz. (1) relative

non-existence (samsargsbhiiva) and (2) reciprocal non-existence

(anyonyiibhiiva). The fm kind is subdivided as: ( I ) antecedent non-

existence (pdgabhiiva), (2) subsequent non-existence

(pdhvamsHhhHva) and (3) absolute non-existence (atyanta3Sva).

The second plri of TanGiiLnlrtutbt is known t1.9 JJii:ZnakZn$i, ilcction

of knowledge, treats of right knowledge (prams) which is derived through

four mcans called respectively, perception, infercnce. comparison and

verbal testimony.

205

Tlic lnanncr in which the seven categories of the VaiSesika and the four

pramanas ofthe Nyiiya have been combined, is ingenious and reasonable.

The scheme of combination of the Vaik!ika and Nyiiya categories:

r-I Visayakanda Jnanakanda

kbhava I

1 I I 1 Pratyaksa Anumana Upamana Sabda.

Nyiiya-Vaiksika some comparison

Concept of God

The concept of God is almost the same to the Ny5ya-Vaiksikas.

Thcy believe in God in eternal, omniscient and omnipotent. Kaqada

docs not refer to God in the Vaiksikasiitra. He probably traces authority

of the Vedas to the seers, who perceive supersensible objects like merit,

dcmcrit, etc. But PraCastapSda regard5 God as the efficient cause of the

world and atom as its material cause. They also believe that God is the

author ofthe Vedas, who is fiee from error, inadvertence and deficiency

of the sense-organs. IIe is the promulgator of the moral law.

The atoms ofearth, water, fire and air are the material cause ofthe

world. Their conjunction is its non-material cause. Merits and demerits

<>f tlic ic~di\.idu:~l souls :IW its :111xili:11y CIIIISC. Knowlcd~k: or tllc nix

catcgorlcs is thc causc of libcrdtion. It dcpnds on virtuc which iscnjoyed

by Ciod. Duality and plurdlity arc produced by discriminative intellect.

Large magnitude and length are produced in triads by plurality of dyads,

which is due to the discriminative intellect of God.

207

VStsyZyana regards God as a particular soul endowed with merit,

knowledge, intuition and sovereignty. He is devoid of demerit, false

knowledge and inadvertence. He has eight kinds of supernatural powers

due to his merit and intuition.32

God transcends the atoms, time, space and ether which are

coetemal with Hi. He creates the world out of the atoms in time and

space by conjoining them with one another, and destroys it by disjoining

them from one another. He creates it through His immediate knowledge

of the atoms and the souls, merits and demerits, desire to create and

volition without a body.

God is the moral guide of the individual souls and the dispenser of

thc fruits of their actions. He cannot override the law of Karma. He lays

do\\w inon11 i~~ir~nctions ilnd prnllihi~io~ln Tor tllo yc*,d of ciuuikind uad

livour thcir lira actions with their fruits. Without Hiti favour free human

actions are inetfective."'

Individual self (Atman)

The Nyiiya arguments for the existence of the soul are similar to

the VaiSesika-view. The Naiyayikas accept sixteen categories viz.

208

prc-lrniina, prameya, etc.?' Thcy includc the soul in thc second category

viz. prameya. According to Vaiksikas there are seven categories. They

considered the self a5 a substance - the first category.

The self is too subtle to be perceived. It cannot be perceived

through the external senseargans. It is an object of inference.

Self is the first object of cognition in Gautama's list of prameyas.

It is, says VZtsyiiyana the seer, experiencer, knower and indicator of

cv~rything.~' Our knowledge of the self is a product of two pramZqas,

word and inference. Hut Viitsysyana then goes on to add that the self

can be considered as perceived but not in an ordinary sense. It is perceived

by a yogin through a special kind of mind-self contact. This perception

is the product of yogic Samadhi?'

Ac~wnling to Cric~rtatnlr~, thc rntuks of thc xclfsrc: d~~iI'0. rvmion.

cl.hrt. plcasurc, pain and cognition:" In the slatc of likration the soul

~.cl;~ins its integrity and is not mcrged in God. Thus, the NyZiya-Vahgika

concept of the soul is the same. They recognize the plurality of individual

souls, which is i n f e d from the variety of experiences and conditions

of different souls. Some are happy while others are miserable. Some are

209

hound while others are liberdted. These differences in the status of

~ndividuals prove the existence of many souls. The plurality of individual

souls is confirmed by the Vedas also.

Liberation

All the philosophical systems try to explain the idea of liberation

fiom their own point of view. For example, the C i i ~ s k a philosophy has

a materialistic conception of liberation. They say that liberation is the

destruction of the body.'* In the Buddhist philosophy Nirvana is at least

the arrest of the stream of consciousness leading to the cessation of the

possibilities of future. In Jaina philosophy liberation is the total

deliverance ofthe soul from all karmic-matter which has entered into the

soul. Nirvana is attained by realization of the hue nature of the soul.

According lo Nyaya 1~br:mtion is abisolutc wswtion of pain. The

Iw,tly, tllc scnsc-orguns and mind arc thc causes of pain. Plcarrurc is

~nvar~ably accompanied by pain. At thc timc of dissolution the soul

becomes free from pain. Its merits and demerits remain dormant during

dissolution at the will of God and are active again the time of creation,

210

\vhcn it assumes a lmdy fit for their maturation and consequent enjoyments

and sufferings. So during dissolution the soul has relative freedom from

pain and possibility of its recurrence and rebirth. But liberation is the

soul's absolute freedom fiom pain.

The Nyiiya view of liberation is the same as the Vaisesika view.

According to them liberation is the complete extinction of the ~ i a l

qualities of the soul viz. cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,

volition, merit, demerit and impression. In the state of liberation the soul

1s free fiom all these qualities.

Mind

The Nytiya-Vaigesika view of mind is similar in many ways.

According to them mind is distinct from the self and it is a subtle mattcr.

I hcy illalnlalll that iiund 1s Ulr: u~tcmal organ which is thc instrument of

tl~rcctly knowing pleasure, patn, etc. It is one in each body. It is an

~mmaterial, corporeal, part less, atomic, unconscious, eternal substance,

which is capable of action or movement. The existence of mind is inferred

21 1

from the non-production and production of perception at particular times.

Here, when the mind 1s present there is perception. The conjunctions of

thc self with the mind, of the mind with the sense-organs and of the

scnse-organs with the objects are necessary conditions of perceptions.

Recollections of coloum, sounds, tastes, smells and touches are produced,

cvcn when the external sense-organs do not function. Therefore they

must bc pmduced by the internal organ. The mind is the internal organ,

through which the self recollects, infers doubts and dreams.

The non-simultaneity of the qualities proves that the mind is one

In each body. It has no specific qualities. The non-appearance of

simultaneous cognitions h m the different senses indicates the existence

of mind. The Naiyiyikas include the mind in the second category -

~rarneya?~ while the Vai.kyikas consider it as a substance." In Nygya-

V:II<C.;I~;I vicw of mind is ;in cxtcrnal suhslancc

Atomic the09

Kaniida the founder of Vaiksika system gave the idea of atom to

thc world for the h t time. The Indian philosophies like Nyiiya, Va$qika,

Samkhya, Jaina and Bauddha admitted the theory of atom. Atoms are

212

thc non-spatial, indivisible and eternal units of physical substance. They

arc spherical and supersensible. They can be perceived by Yogins and

God.

According to NySya-VaiSesika, earth, water, fire and air are eternal

as atoms and non-eternal as composite products." The world is created

by the atoms.

The existence o f tom is inferred from experience that finite wholes

like a jar can be lsplit up into smaller pax&. This process of division

cannot be carried on indefinitely, for then it will be impossible to account

for the observed differences in their magnitude as all of them, small or

big, would consist of an infmite number of atoms. If we assume a limit

to the division, the differences in magnitude found in objects like 'a

1llo1111i:tin :lnd :I c~i~ist:irtl ~ccrd"~oi:iy ir cxpl~~inccl hy thc cliffcrcncc in

tllc nurnbcr ol'atolns going to makc than upoftwo things, the small~r in

sizc will contain fcwcr ultimatc parts than thc bigger. It is thc final

constituent of material objects in this process of division and sub-division

that is termed an atom.

213

CONCLUSION

From the opening verse itself it is clear that the T a ~ m ~ a i s

very simple and can be easily studied by the beginners. The way of

presentation and lucid manner are very notable. The treatment of subject

matter is by way of enunciation (uddeia) definition (laksa9a) and

cxamination (parjb). Enunciation is the mere mention of the categories

by name; definition consists in setting forth that character of a category

which differentiates it from other categories; and examination is the

se!tlement, by reasoning, of the question whether the defmition of a certain

category is really applicable to it.

The combination of the principles of Nyiiya and Va&+ika systems

arc in a unique manner. They are allied and nobody can feel it as of the

difti.tr*t~t s y ~ t c ~ i i ~ of itulill~l phito~ophy. III O ~ ~ I C I . ~~n~koru\iugruntlu)n tho

tus~on of Nyiiya and Vaikesika doctrvles arc projected as two different

systcms. For example. in Tarkabhiip, Kcbva MiSra treats of two sects

of categories separately: i.e. the sixteen categories of Ny5piif.m viz.

pramiina (means of right knowledge), prameya (object of right

knowledge), samiaya (doubt), prayojana (the objective or purpose),

214

tirstinta (familiar instance), siddhiinta (cstablishcd tenet), avayava

( rn~nibcr), tarka (disputation), nimaya (ascertainment), vada (discussion).

jalpa (rejoinder), vitqda (cavil), hetviibhiisa (fallacy of the reason), chala

(quibble), j2ti (legitimate objection) and nigrahasthgna (deficiency) and

the six categories of Vaikepkasiitra. viz. dravya (substance), guna

(quality), karma (action), sgmiinya (generality), vikey (particularity) and

samaviiya (inherence).

A notable difference in the concepts of Nyiiya and Vaikqika

systems is secrl while dealing with the theory of 'piika'. According to

Vaiiesika system piika occurs in the parts (atoms) but in Nyiiya system it

occurs in whole as well as in the parts simultaneously. In the classification

of categories Annambhaf {a deals with the seven categories as the base.

11111 \\*r7 t.rarl SLY f l~of 110 ~ ~ I ( : ~ I I ( ~ c N ( I w N ~ X ~ W I I ~ u l ~ g o r i o ~ oflltc NyByutiilln8

anti thc: six c a l e g o n ~ ~ of' the VaI:kstkilsih in these seven catcgories

including thc abhiiva. Annambhatta . . accepts the six categories that are

mcntioncd in the vai&$ikas,T&dwithout any modification or change. In

thc concluding part of Tarlcasamgraha Annambhatta . . states that all the

padarthas in the universe are included in the seven categories.

215

In the presentation of pramii~as also Annambhaffa jsins the

Nyiiya and Vaiiesika principles. In the Vai6e+ikasEtrawe see only two

pramanas viz. perception and inference. In Tarkasamgraha

Annambhatta accepts Nyiiya view i.e. he deals with the four pramiinas

(perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony) sepmtely.

Annambhatta explains the pmmiinas while discussing qualities. Buddhi,

a kind of quality which is divided into valid and invalid. The valid

knowledge is acquired by these pramii~as.

In presenting .some subjects the author includes different opinions

of ancient and modem logic. For example in awhile discussing

thc theory of s p f i and prajaya there is a mention of the principle of

ancient Nyiiya that the dissolution ofthings is always caused by the decay

~ ~ l ' s : ~ ~ ~ u ~ v l S y i k C n ~ ~ i ~ i . Acconli~ig to ~iicnloni Ny6y11 i l i~ tluo (o tl~o Jway

of asainavgy ikgrdna.

'I'arkasamgraha gives equal importance to the principles ofNy2ya

and VaiSesika. Although Nyiiya gives prominence to W q a s and

Vaiksika to prameyas, Annambhaffa gives equal importance to both.

216

The trcatmcnt of ontology and metaphysics of Vaiksika are agreeable

to Ny5ya.

The ultimate aim of both these systems is liberation (nihkeyasa)

hut in Taka.w&athe author never mentions the term libemtion.

Tarkasamgraha is the most popular work among the

prakaranag.mthas. It contains the essence of the NyZya and Vaibetika

systems. All the Universities and Colleges provide Tii~kmqgraha as

thc primary book for the beginners to study Logic. T ~ ' g s & a i s believed

to bc the science of sciences. It helps to study how to think properly.

REFERENCES

T. S. p.52 k$q~arerf:m:-:l'

N S. M., pp. 25-26

2 . S. M , Dkakan; pp.42-46.

3. HLL., p.389.

4. ' W . W ~ ~ - - F :

=if yr: I' VS. 1.1.6.

5. 'r~nl7ql VFIIV<~~- $denhlm& *:~mmr1-2-d- m: &i&q v: I' P. Bh.,p.3.

15. ~ T ~ S ~ ~ ~ . ~ I I ~ I ~ I ~ ~ Y 1 r q 3 6 . *17

P. Bh., p. 189.

16 ' n f i - m: I' MS., 1 . I .32.

17 HLL.,p 359.

18. MS.,l.l.9.

19 c ~ ~ 7 ~ ~ l

a i p f @ ~ q& . && I I' QuotedfonnHLL.,p. 375.

20. ;bid

21. '&p&+?&M~m:l' ibid

22. '3 lkmd%Trn. l -*&I'

;bid p. 376.

23. '-m: Tc rp r i k I q4d$?rl7 ibid.

24. ' d s f % V i w d ~ ~ : &I

~ ~ ~ m ~ m ~ ~ 1 1 ~ TaxkabbZ$Z, open~ng /IRC.Y.

25. HLL., p.382.

26. HLL., p.387.

27 ';im& ikq i4pr ,4~cru I

i T C r t ~ ; r n : ~ ~ l l '

28 '--:I

d ~ m - : l l ' 20 ILLL., p. 393.

30. 'm ~ W I

$ i = d m # - ~ l l '

32. '-:' N Bh., 4.1.2 1 .

****.rfmrrnl * ~ ~ r n ~ l l '

33. ' y i i V m M 5 * f i m ~ - * &

w ; r ~ i m ~ ~ ~ ' A! Bh.,4.1.21.

34. A!S.,1.1.1.

35. ' m ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ g i m i r ~ : ~ ~ ' NBh. , l . l .9 .

36. ' ~ ~ ~ . ~ ? i i h M m m m ' i m ~ ' N Bh., 1.1.3.

37. '-3-d f$q&fal' MS., 1.1.10.

38. '&!kMstW:~' 39. '-:-mnitsql' MS.,

1.1.9.

40. ' - & k s ; r * & t ' V.S.,l.l.lO.

41. TS.,pp.7-10.

42. '- M: I' N S. M.,p. 118.