84
CHAPTERV THE RULE OF THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-1979
CHAPTERV
THE RULE OF THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-1979
The year 1975 marks yet another significant phase in the
history of modern Cambodia. For the first time in its history the
country came under Communist rule which turned out to be
aggressive towards its own people due to the unique revolutionary
model it followed which resulted in privation and loss of life.
During its forty-~our month rule the new regime pursued a hostile
foreign policy towards the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRVN)
leading to acute tension in their mutual relations. In the rift
that grew and in the clashes that occurred between the two
countries, the USSR and the people's Republic of China (PRC) took
sides, the former supporting the SRVN and the latter supporting
Cambodia. Cambodia thus was drawn into the vortex of a proxy war
between the USSR and the PRC leading enentually to the overthrow
of the pro-Chinese Pol Pot regime and the establishment of Heng
Samrin regime favourable to the USSR and the SRVN.
EVACUATION OF PHNOM PENH
The new regime, immediately after ousting the Lon Nol
regime, ordered all the people of Phnom Penh City numbering about
three million, irrespective of age and sex, to leave the city for
the countryside. 1 Even the sick and wounded, numbering about
20,000 who were in the hospitals, were virtually forced to the
city to accomodate the wounded soldiers of the National United
1. Peter A. Poole, "Cambodia 1975 The GRUNK Regime", Asian Survey, Berkeley, California, vol.XVI, no.,1 January 1976, p.21. see also Kampuchea Dosser, no.III, Hanoi, 1979, p.24. Observer, London, 18 May 1975.
232
Front of Cambodia (NUFC) . 2 The evacuees were not allowed to use
motor vehicles in order to save petrol and thus avoid dependence
on foreign aid. The population of Cambodia was divided into two
major categories those of the rural areas whom they had
controlled during the struggle against the Lon Nol regime and who
were considered to be loyal to the new regime and the rest urban
population who were under the Pro-US regime of Lon Nol were
considered to be hostile to the new regime. 3 The latter was
asked to leave the city. The war-time rural refugees, who
constituted the bulk of the population of the capital city were
sent back to their original homes. Having reached their assigned
destinations the evacuees were asked to work in the field to
increase food production. Similar measures were imposed on the
pvovincial captials held by the supporters of the Lon Nol regime.
Besides the capital city, all the provincial capitals were also
evacuated within three days leading to the death of hundreds of
thousands of people in the process. The aged, the sick and
children were the worst hit. Phnom Penh City presented a
deserted look. It was a lurid picture all around. Pech Lim
Kuon, a pilot who had served the Khmer Rouge and defected to
Thailand in 1976 said that the capital was controlled by
2. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, London, vol.no.XXI, 1-7 December 1975, p.27469. see also Tribune, Chandigarh, 22 May 1975. John Barron and Anthony Paul, Murder of a Gentle Land, Reader's Digest, Bombay, February 1977, pp.144-46.
3. Ye. Vasilkov, "Kampuchea The Maoist 'Experiment' that Failed", Far Eastern Affairs, Moscow, no.3, 1979, p.44.
233
the Khmer Rouge and it had no shops, hotels, restaurants and
currency. Few Communist countries had their embassies in Phnom
Penh without freedom of movement. The Chinese experts were
helping in factories. He further said. "The Khmer Rouge want to
destroy everything and everyone from the old regime and create a
new generation. ~hey want all this to be kept secret from the
outside world"."
Regarding the evacuation of Phnom Penh and other provincial
cities, there were no clear orders to the units. The top brass
of the party maintained some secrecy about this till the dawn of
17 April. It is better to give the example of the occupation of
Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975 by three or four different zonal
forces and it witnessed the loose co-ordination at the top. 5 But
the zonal forces operated independently in different parts of the
country. The idea of evacuation was not known in some of the
zones and in some other zones, it was known before 17 Apr i 1.
Though the commander of the battalion said that it was planned to
search out Lon Nol officers, the plan changed between 15 and 17
April. The soldiers were instr.cuted not to loot or kill the
civilians provided there was no resistance. The execuation list
was not known to the cadres. In contrast to Southwest, Northern
zone knew about the evacuation of Phnom Penh city and that all
the Lon Nol officials from the rank of Lieutenant and all
4. International Herald Tribune, Paris, 11 May 1976. 5. Michael Vickery, Cambodia, 1975-1982, Sydney, 1984, p.69.
234
important civilian officials were to be killed. 6 In the Eastern
zone, the villagers were told that they had to be ready to
receive the people from Phnom Penh and its policy towards enemy
officers was not known clearly. 7
Henri Becker, a French technician, who had served in the
Ministry of Information in Phnom Penh even after the liberation
in April 1975 felt that Phnom Penh was divided into five sectors.
Each sector was held by different forces under autonomous
commanders. On the first day of the occupation conflict took
place between autonomous and unco-ordinated units. 8
Several reasons have been given by the Government circles as
well as by knowledgeable individuals for the abrupt evacuation of
the people. One was that it was yet another incident in the long
tradition of Cambodia of a new ruler trying to build a new
capital after he came to power in order to sanctify his rule. 9
Secondly, there was lack of adequate medical facilities to meet
the needs of the people who moved into the cities including the
capital city of Phnom Penh where there was a threat of
epidemics. 10 Thirdly, the evacuation was aimed at resolving the
problem of the minorities, notably the Vietnamese and the Chinese
who constituted about seven per cent of the total population of
6. Ibid., p.70. 7. Ibid. 8. SWB FE/4881/AJ/1-2, 18 April 1975. 9. In Asia, the fall of a dynasty was followed by the
abandonment of the capital. see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.2, p.27469.
10. Ibid., vol.no.xxv, 4 May 1979, p.29581.
235
the country. If the cities and towns were emptid the minority
problem, it was argued, would get automatically resolved which
otherwise might pose a problem in Cambodia's future relations
with the SRVN and the PRc. 11
These 'reasons' appear to be specious and less convincing.
The first reason ~hich claims to reflect the Khmer tradition is
an old notion which lost credibility in the history of modern
Cambodia. Monarchy was abolished after the March 1970 coup and a
Republic was proclaimed in Cambodia. After the liberation of
Phnom Penh in April 1975, the Khmer Rouge who took control of the
city were against urban centres. Therefore, the construction of
a new capital had no validity. The second reason may not be the
real cause because mere deportation of people to the countryside
would not solve automatically the shortage of medical
facilities. 12 That the minority issue would get resolved by the
evacuation of the towns and cities is also not true because when
the trouble started a large number of Vietnamese returned to
Vietnam where life was comparatively more tolerable than in the
11. Mean Sangkhim, 11 Democratic Kampuchea : An Updated View 11, in
Kernial S. Sandhu ( ed.) , South East Asian Affairs 1977, Singapore,1977, p.94.
12. Medical teams began manufacturing drugs and Vitamin supplements from local herbs. Despite this, Cambodia purchased DDT worth US $450,000 in November 1976. Laura Summers, 11 Consolidating the Cambodian Revolution" I Current History, Philadelphia, vol.69, no.411, December 1975, p.219, see also Nayan Chanda, 11 Cambodia in the Market", Far Eastern Economic Review, Hongkong, hereafter FEER, vol.88, no.40, 7 October 1977, p.113.
236
Cambodian countryside. 13 The Chinese residents in Cambodia did
not suffer as much hardship as the Cambodians did because Peking
happened to be the seat of the RGNUC regime during the 1970-75
period. The minority issue also was not the real cause for the
evacuation of Phnom Penh. Hence, the real reasons were the acute
food problem, the. urban-rual dichotomy, and the fear of the new
regime of counter-revolution. Apart from these reasons, the
ideology of the Khmer Rouge was the foremost in evacuating the
cities and towns.
FOOD PROBLEM
Owing to the US bombing raids on the Cambodian countryside
during the Lon Nol regime, there was a large-scale influx of
people into the towns and cities in order to escape death. Their
number rose from 600, ooo to 3, 000,000. It became practically
impossible for the new government to feed them with its own
means . 14 It had to seek external aid for which the Khmer Rouge
regime was unwilling to do. So, it forced the people from the
13. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, War and Hope : The case for Cambodia, Paris,1979, pp.44-45. Both Lon Nol and Pol Pot group followed anti-Vietnamese policy. Lon Nol organised government supported demonstrations against the embassies of North Vietnam and the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam in Phnom Penh follwed by attacks on the Vietnamese in Cambodia. Pol Pot also followed a similar policy towards the Vietnamese during the civil war period of 1970-75. Attacks intensified after 1977. see Malcolm Caldwell and Len Tak, Camobdia in the Southeast Asian War, New York, 1973, p.300,
14. Mean Sangkhim, no.11, p. 93, see also Timothy Carney, "The unexpexcted victory" in Karl D.Jackson (ed.), Cambodia 1975-1978 : Rendezvous with Death, New Jersey, 1989, p.33.
237
urban centres to move into rural areas. !eng Sary, Deputy Prime
Minister of the RGNUC regime, stated on 6 September 1975
We had estimated the population of Phnom Penh at two million, but we found alomst three million people in the city, when we entered it. The Americans had been bringing 30,000 to 40,000 tons of food into Phnom Penh daily. We had no means of transporting such quantities of supp~ies to the capital. So, the population had to go where the food was. We had to feed that population and at the same time preserve our independence and our dignity without ~sking for help from any other country. 15
The evacuation also was aimed at rehabilitating the
country's agriculture which was greatly ruined by the us
bombings. During the Lon Nol regime Cambodia lost more than ten
per cent of her population : 800,000 were killed, 240,000 became
invalid of whom 40,000 lost all ability to work. 16 In order to
reconstruct the much-needed infrastructural base for increasing
food production and other basic necessities of life, the new
government aimed at mobilising all its available man power. Ieng
Sary said "We gave a special importance to the works of
production. The whole population takes part in it. Kampuchea is
entirely a large workyard 11 •17
15. As quoted in Francois Ponchaud, Cambodia Year Zero, Nancy Amphoux trans, London, 1977, p. 36, see also Poole, n.l, p.25.
16. Mean Sangkhim, n.11, p.95. 17. Ibid, see also Report submitted to the committee on Foreign
Affairs us House of Representatives and committee on Foreign Relations US Senate, Country Reports· on Human Rights Practices for 1979, Washington D.C., 1980, p.463.
238
Besides, the majority of Cambodian Peasants were bound by
indebtedness to the urban traders and money-lenders, many of whom
were of Chinese or Vietnamese origin. In the mid-1960s the
growing urban bourgeoisie began to invest in cheap agricultural
land and became, in effect, absentee landlords.
Thus, the polarity between the Cambodian town and countryside was already very marked before the war, which turned the towns into proAmerican command centres for the bombing of the countryside. . . It is the 'Comprador capitalists' (those dependent on foreign business) who have thrived with American aid, mainly in the import and service sectoii which contribute nothing to the new economy.
Prince Sihanouk too affirmed on 18 April 1975 that Phnom
Penh a 'bourgeoisie' stonghold, should be weeded out. 19
supported the evacuation of Phnom Penh and said :
It was absolutely necessary to make a cleanup ... Phnom Penh had really become such a den of vice and corruption. There was no other solution but to empty it. After working with the peasants, former residents returned, most of them honestly regenerated. 20
THREAT OF ~ COUNTER-REVOLUTION
He
Far more immediate reason which compelled the new regime was
the fear that the cities would afford ideal hiding places to its
opponents. During the five years of civil war Phnom Penh became
an abnormally over-populated city. It was, therefore, felt that
18. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.2, p.27469. 19. Asian Recorder, New Delhi,vol.XXI, no.21, 21-27 May 1975,
p.l2592. 20. "Sihanouk The Proud Prince", FEER, vol.90, no.46, 14
November 1975, p.13.
239
evacuation would help shatter the prospect of the city serving as
hiding dens for those opposed to the new regime. The Government
alleged that captured enemy documents revealed details of a
secret politico-military plan of the American CIA and the deposed
Lon Nol regime to foment trouble for the new regime. The alleged
plan had three ~acets Such as creating disturbances by
infiltrating agents among the people, using weapons hidden by the
troops of the overthrown Lon Nol regime to attack the new regime,
and corrupting its troops through immoral practices. 21
Pol Pot said that the decision to evacuate Phnom Penh was
taken in February 1975. The Khmer Rouge held the view that the
US was going to bomb the city in order to convince the people and
but the military and organisational weakness of the Khmer Rouge
put up difficulties to control the over populated city. He
clarified that they did it "because we knew that before the
smashing of all sorts of enemy spy organisation, our strength was
not strong enough to defend the revolutionary regime". 22
It was also rumoured at that time that Long Boret, Sirik
Matak, Cheng Heng and General Fernadez were reported to have been
sending overtures to Prince Norodom Sihanouk for negotiations and
also requesting him to return to Phnom Penh. 23 Prince Sihanouk
confirmed that he receivd such proposals, sent through his mother
21. Ponchaud, n.15, p.35 22. Nayan Chanda, "The Pieces Begin to Fit", FEER, vol.98,
no.42, 21 October 1977, p.21. 23. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XXI, 2-8 .June
1975,p.27150.
240
Queen Kossamak, expressing their desire to switch over to the
side of the Prince. In November 1974 Long Boret is said to have
sent proposals to the Prince through Abdel Aziz Boutefilka, the
Algerian Foreign Minister. While Gen.Fernandez denied the
allegations, the other three refused to comment. Therefore,
Ieng Sary stated· that "when we dispersed the people out of
Phnom Penh this plan has been completely destroyed 11 •24
The reasons for the evacuation of Phnom Penh and other
provincial cities, according to the Khmer Rouge, was the food
problem, the urban-rural dichotomy and the fear of a counter-
revolution. In the early days of the liberation, the Khmer Rouge
argument was accepted as reasonable. But the evacuation wa not
temporarily proclaimed by the Khmer Rouge. The real reason for
the evacuation was the ideological cult the Chinese Cultural
Revolution had made on the Khmer Rouge leadership.
INfLUENCE OF MAO's THOUGHT
Above all else the Khmer Rouge leaders, more significantly
Pol Pot, in their policies and action were influenced by Mao's
Thought. Pol Pot declared "The most precious aid given by
Chairman Mao to the Karnpuchean Revolution was his ideas". 25 They
24. Mean Sangkhim, n.11, p.94. see also "Khmer Rouge Envoy in Peace Talks", FEER, vol.87, no.12, 21 March 1975, p.10.
25. "Secretary Pol Pot's Speech", Peking Review, vol.20, no.41, 7 October 1977, p.22-30. see also Vladimir Simonov, Kampuchea : Crimes of Maoists and their Rout, Moscow, 1979, p.ll.
241
wished to build a society without industry, trade, science,
education and culture, towns, personal property and private life.
Thus, they tried to erect a 'classless society' quickly and
efficiently in Cambodia based on the principles of Mao's great
'Cultural Revolution'. 26
They were equally influenced by Mao's dictum that "poverty
prompts a desire for a change, for action, for revolution ... 11 •27
They portrayed poverty as a virtue. According to them,
elementary education was sufficient enough for any person to grow
rice. They tried to imitate Mao's method of 'big leap'. Mao's
idea, copied by Pol Pot, was to create ideal conditions for the
mobilization of a labour force that would not have to be paid
wages and could be deprived of all human rights. The guiding
principle was "If we have rice, we shall have everything
else". 28 Therefore, right from 1972 onwards they organised
solidarity groups in the liberated zones to serve as base units
for agricultural work in the place of the family. In the course
of time these production solidarity groups were organised into
30,000 agriculutral co-operatives 11•29 The effect of this was the
disintegration of family life. The Chinese-style 'big leap' was a
total failure in Cambodia because, according to Yugoslav press
26. Simonov, n.25, p.11. 27. Ibid., p.16. 28. Ibid., p.23. 29. Malcolm Caldwell, Kampuchea : Rationale for a Rural Policy,
Hyderabad, 1979, p.25.
242
estimates, the harvest could barely reach 60 - 70 per cent of the
old leve1. 30 To maintain the essential services, such as water
and electricity the Government had to retain almost 10,000 to
15,000 workers and technicians in the capital city. Phnom Penh
city which lost all its previous grandeur was described as a
'ghost city'.
EXECUTION OF REPUBLICAN LEADERS
The NUFC on 24-25 February at its National Congress approved
a list of seven traitors to be executed for treason. They were :
Lon Nol, Son Ngoc Thanh, Gen. Fernandez, Cheng Heng, In Tam, Long
Boret and Gen. Sirik Ma.tak. 31 Of these seven, first five left
the country and the reaaining two surrendered to the Khmer Rouge.
Other functionaries, officers and soldiers would be spared
provided they ceased to serve the enemy. 32
Long Boret, Sirik Matak, Lon Non, the brother of Lon Nol and
several high-ranking officials were executed later. 33 Even
30. Simonov, n.25, p.16. 31. "Second National Congress in Liberated Zone", Peking Review,
Peking, vol.18, no.10,7 March 1975, p.23. see al;so FBIS IV, 5 May 1975, H-3-4.
32. Denzil Peiris, "Peace Deal from Sihanouk", FEER, vol. 87, no.11,14 March 1975, pp.12-13. see also Ibid., n.24, 21 March 1975, p.14.
33. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.2, p.27469. see also International Herald Tribue, 14 October 1975, President Ford said that eighty or ninety former Cambodian officials and their wives were executed. see Department or State Bulletin, Washington D.C., 26 May 1975, p.679, Ben Kiernan, "Social Cohesion in Revolutionary Cambodia", Australian Outlook, Melbourne, vol.30, no.3, December 1976, p.371.
243
though the ordinary solidrs were spared, affluent sections of the
society were attacked. In Battambang and Siem Reap violence took
place. 34 The civil servants of Lon Nol were also killed. 35
EVACUATION OF FOREIGNERS
The Khmer Rouge immediately after the capture of Phnom Penh,
placed several foreigners under house arrest pending enquiry. 36
The Cambodians who feared reprisals along with the Embassy staff
of the Soviet Union, East Germany, India and Pakistan took
shelter in the French Embassy in Phnom Penh. 37 As the Embassy
was overcrowded with about 1,500 persons, food, water and medical
supplies were in acute shortage. 38 Finally, on 30 April the
Khmer Rouge decided to evacuate all the foreigners including
those who sought shelter in the Embassy. They were sent to the
Thai frontier in lorries. 39 The Khmer Rouge troops, as a protest
against the Soviet Union's failure to extend recognition to the
RGNUC regime sacked its Embassy. On 38 March 1975, the Soviet
Union recognised the RGNUc. 40 The Government, in essence, was
reluctant to permit the foreigners to reside in Cambodia. It
said:
Our policy is not to allow foreigners to remain in our country, but this is only a temporary measure. We shall reconsider the question after the reestablishment of
34. Kiernan, n.33, p.377-78. 35. International Herald Tribune, 11 May 1976, see also
Kampuchea Dossier, n.1, p.26. 36. Neil Davis, "The Aftermath of Defeat", FEER, vol.88, no.18,
2 May 1975, p.16. 37. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.2, p.27469. 38. Summers, n.12, p.221. 39. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.2, p.27469. 40. Ibid.
244
diplomatic, economic and commercial relations with other countries. 41
AIMS ~ POLICIES OF THE GOVERNMENT
A special National Congress was convened in Phnom Penh on
25-27 April 1975 under the Chairmanship of Khieu Samphan, Deputy
Premier. It was attended by 311 delegates. The representation
was as follows : . RGNUC-13, People's Organisation-125, Cambodian
People's National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF) - 112, NUFC-
41, and members of the Buddhist clergy-20. 42 It was decided that
Prince Sihanouk would remain as Head of State and Penn Nouth as
Prime Minister as a gesture "because of their role as great
revolutionary leaders and nationalists". 43 It also endorsed a
neutral independent and non-aligned foreign policy and stated
that no foreign bases would be allowed on Khmer territory. It
seems that it was a warning to the Vietnamese whose troops
numbering about 20,000 were on Cambodian soi1. 44
On domestic front the Congress resolved to create
an independent, peaceful, neutral, sovereign, non-aligned Cambodia with territorial integrity, and a National Community living in happiness, equality, justice and genuine democracy, without rich or poor, without oppressing and oppressed classes, a community in which all the people live harmoniously in complete national unity and work to increase production and to build and defend the nation together. 45
41. Ibid. 42. "After Victory : Pointers to a Neutral Future", FEER,
vol.88,no.19,9 May 1975, p.20. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. Keesing's Contempora~y Archives, n.2, p.27469.
245
Its foreign policy aimed at maintaining the
independence, peace, neutrality and nonalignment, absolutely prohibiting any country from establishing military bases in Cambodia and struggling against all forms of foreign interference in Cambodia's internal affairs against all forms of subversion and aggresion against Cambodia from outside, whether militay, polit1ial, economic, cultural, social or diploi'I_latic.
With this, the Khmer Rouge made it clear that they would not
fall under any outside domination. At the same time they would
not be subservient and puppets of Hanoi. Khmer Rouge has
maintained good relations with the PRC. The countries like,
France, Soviet Union, Japan and the ASEAN were kept at arms-
length. On 29 April 1975, the Prince in a message to Khieu
Samphan expressed his complete approval of the decisions of the
Congress. 47
ECONOMIC POLICY
The days that followed the liberation of Phnom Penh
witnessed the tough and traumatic character of Cambodian
revolution. To quote In Dunbar, "the Khmer Rouge would be the
most ruthless bunch of peasant ideologues ever to seize power in
Asia. Their policies clearly follow the Chinese model, in their
emphasis on countryside over cities. 48 All the Cambodians were
46. Ibid. 47. Patriot, New Delhi, 2 May 1975. 48. Ian Dunbar, "Following Peking's Revolutionary Model", FEER,
vol.88, no.21,23 May 1975, p.22.
246
called to take part in rebuilding the centrally planned national
economy on socialist principles to create more employment
opportunities. Circulation of money was abolished. In the
absence of marketing system internal trade disappeared from the
country. 49 Prince Sihanouk said "They took back a 11 the
commercial and financial organs, all the agricultural plantations
and properties from the foreign and domestic exporters and
capitalists • • • II • 50 Exploitation and the division between the
rich and the poor declined in the process. All items of daily
use were rationed. 51 Rubber plantations and private enterprises
were also nationalised. Individuals, who were offered jobs by the
Government could not refuse them. All the officials and soldiers
were required to work in the fields. 52 It was estimated that the
country needed two years to be self-sufficient in food
production. The provincial borders were used for obtaining rice
and petrol supply only, and individuals were not allowed to cross
the borders. Both Thailand and cambodia agreed for a barter
trade. The Thais provided petrol, rice and salt in exchange for
Cambodian fish and timber. 53 Certain things were also purchased
from the smugglers on the Thai order. The Prince was not willing
to accept economic aid from the US because of its 'crimes' in
49. "Sihanouk The Proud Prince", Ibid., vol.90, no.46, 14 November 1975, pp.l2-13.
50. New Straits Times, Kuala Lumpur, 20 October 1975. 51. Summers, n.12, p.219. 52. Tribune, Chandigarh, 24 September 1976. 53. Mike Snitowsky, "Phnom Penh's Trade Door Slightly Ajar",
FEER, vol.90, no.48, 28 November 1975, p.20.
247
Cambodia. The Government due to shortage of food agreed to
accept aid provided it was not given "for the purpose of espionage
or interference in our internal affairs". 54 The Government also
maintained economic relations with the PRC in the form of
bilateral aid and with Thailand on terms of barter trade.
Reviewing the economic position Khieu Samphan claimed
We have managed to supply food to the people throughout the country, of course, it is not abundant, but it is enough .... All of us from Minister's down to village cadres, from highranking officers to the men and women fighters, merge with the people from all walks of life and take part in production •.• within a year or two cambodia will be ample in the economic field, particularly in the supply of food, and will be able to export some of her products. By mid-July we repaired all the major highways. Traffic has also been resumed on medium and small higways. We have basically solved the question of transport of rice, salt, cloth and farm tools. Rail and water transport is to a great extent under our control. Despite the grave damage done to industry by the enemy, a great number of factories an1 workshops have resumed production ...• 5
FORMATION OP THE CABINET
The RGNUC regime, which had been established on 5 May 1970
in Peking, continued with minor changes even after liberation.
The Cabinet was re-organised on the eve of the visit of Cambodian
delegation to the PRC on 15-18 August. Both the Prince and Penn
Nouth continued as head of State and Prime Minister
respectively. 56
54. "Waging War on land", Ibid., vol.91, no.13, 26 March 1976, p.24.
55. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.2, p.27470. 56. SWB FE/4981/B/1, 14 August 1975.
248
PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK RETUNRS TO CAMBODIA
The Special National Congress held in April 1975 requested
Prince Sihanouk to return to Cambodia both as Chief of State and
as Chairman of the NUFC. 57 The Prince declined to return to
Phnom Penh immediately because of the bad health of his mother,
queen Kossarnak (71) who lived with him in Peking since 1973. 58
His mother died on 27 April 1975 and cremated in Peking on 5 May
1975. 59 The Prince wished that her ashes to be buried at Angkor
wat but he was asked to wait for sornetirne. 60 The Prince, instead
of corning back to Phnom Penh, left for North Korea on 18 May to
obtain some guarantee from the Khmer Rouge. 61 His departure to
North Korea gave a sigh of relief in Peking. He retunred to Phnom
Penh on 9 September 1975, six months after the Khmer Rouge
victory.
The delay in the return of the Prince to Phnom Penh due to
his suspcicion about his real position in the country's politics.
After the liberation the real power was held by the Khmer Rouge.
As they had not informed him about the victory the Prince was
doubtful about the sincerity of the Khmer Rouge. 62 When his
mother expired Cambodia did not observe even state mourning. 63
57. Asian Recorder, vol.XXI, no.25, 18-24 June 1975, p.12635. 58. He expressed his doubt about the possibility of his return
because he felt that the Khmer Rouge may not request him to return. see New Straits Times, 24 April 1975.
59. "Remains of Queen Kssarnak cremated at Peking Ceremony", Peking Review, vol.18, no.19, 9 May 1975, p.26.
60. Asian Recorder, n.57, p.12635. see also Indian Express, New Delhi, 18 June 1975.
61. The Hindu, Madras, 26 May 1975, 7 June 1975. 62. Nouth Cheourn (Interview), "Sihanouk's Return Death of a
Dream", FEER, vo1.90, no.43, 24 October 1975, p.S. 63. Ibid.
249
The Prince was not happy about the Policies of Khmer Rouge and he
was not willing to return unless reasonable terms were offered to
him by the Khmer Rouge. "There were deep rooted differences
between the non-Marxist, Buddhist ex-ruler and the tough, narrow
minded dogmatists who had won control of the Cambodian
revolution 11•
64 Since the Prince was popular in cambodia majority
people wanted him to return to Cambodia. The emergence of
factional rivalry within the Khmer Rouge 65 led to Purging and
disgracing of many NUFC. So, until the Khmer Rouge consolidated
their position, they were not prepared to allow the Prince to
come back. 6 6 Apart from this, the Khmer Rouge leaders were
doubtful whether the Prince wanted to remain titular or exercise
real power. 67 The Guardian commenting on 30 September 1975 on
the long delay of Prince's return stated
64.
65. 66. 67.
"Is
The nearly six months since the fall of Phnom Penh have already seen a process of long-range bargaining between the Prince and the Khmer Rouge victors... Sihanouk allowed the time between the end of the war and his return to drag out to the point where it became more embarrasing to the Khmer Rouge leadership than it was to him... According to one account, he even implied that he would consider resigning all his functions unless reasonable terms for his return and his future role were offered by the Khmer Rouge. The tactics worked, for their connection with Sihanouk represents the Khmer Rouge only claim to legitimacy and legality... In addition, Sihanouk retains considerable popularity in
Sihanouk's Exile Coming to an End", Ibid.,, no.31, 1 August 1975, p.22.see also Poole n.1, p.26. Indian Express, 18 June 1975. Nouth Choeum, n.69, pp.B-9. "Is Sihanouk's Exile coming to an End", n.64, p.22.
250
vol.89,
Cambodia. Further, he has the backing of the Chinese. 68
Finally, the Prince was officially requested to come back to
Penh on 18 July 1975. 69 On his return to Phnom Penh on 9
September 70 his suspicion proved right when he was not allowed
to speak in the cabinet meeting presided over by him. 71 "He
signs whatever papers are put in front of him, but he cannot even
decide what part of the country he wants to visit 11 •72 Throughout
his stay in Phnom Penh, the Prince and his followers were
confined to the palace. 7 3 After witnessing the situation in
Phnom Penh he wept in privacy in his own quarters. 74 At the same
time, a minority group of extremists in Phnom Penh wanted to
eliminate him. Pham Van Dong, the Premier of Vietnam, supported
him as Head of State. Even the Chinese were not happy with the
Khmer Rouge and they felt that the Khmer Rouge 'walk too fast'. 75
ADOPTION Q[ NEW CONSTITUTION
A Constitutional Committee was set up by the Special
National Congress held in April 1975 to draft a constitution for
the country. The committee consisted of "all the cabinet members,
68. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.2, pp.27470-71. 69. Nouth Cheoum, n.62, p.9, see also SWB FE/4986/1, 20 August
1975,Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 21 August 1975. 70. "Warm Farewell to Distinguished Guests Returning Home",
Peking Review, vol.18, no.37, 12 September 1975, p.3. 71. Guardian, London, 10 September 1975, see also Indian
Express, 12 September 1975. 72. Nouth Choeum, n.62, p.10. 73. Poole, n.1, p.28, see also "The Bitter Truth" (Editorial),
FEER, vol.90, no.43, 24 October 1975, p.7. 74. International Herald Tribune, 21 October 1975. 75. Nouth Choeum, no.62, p.10.
251
who (were) in Phnom Penh, 300 worker's representatives, 500
farmer reprsentatives, and 300 representatives of the Cambodian
Revolutionary Army". 76 The Committee produced the document and
it was submitted to the Third National Congress held in Phnom
Penh on 14 December 1975 for its approval. 77 The First and
Second Congresses were held in July 1973 and Febrauary 1975
respectively. It w.as attended by 1, 115 delegates. After the
cabinet's approval, the promulgation of the world's most radical
constitution was announced by Hu Nim, Minister for Information
and propaganda on 5 January 1976. 78 Khieu Samphan said that the
constitution was "in conformity with the basic sacred desires of
Cambodian people".79 Terms like, 'Sir', 'please', which linked
with hierarchical tendencies were banned from using. 80 The Prince
said
The New Constitution conforms entirely with the People's wishes and her international status. This constitution is clear, easy to understand and concise. It conforms entirely with our goal of democratic, popular revolution. This constitution is excellent. I sincerely and totally approve it. 81
The Constitution consisted of 16 Chapters containing 21
76. David P.Chandler, "The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia) : The Semantics of Revolutionary Change", Pacific AL~airs, New York, vol.49, no.3, Fall 1976, p.507.
77. Laura Summers, "Defining the Revolutionary State in Cambodia", Current History, vol.71, no.422, December 1976, p.214.
78. For the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea (Text), see Ponchaud, n.15, pp.219-226.
79. Chandler, n.76, p.507. 80. Ibid., p.508. 81. Mean Sangkhim, n.11,p.95.
252
articles. The country was renamed as Democratic Kampuchea. It
was an 'independent, unified, peaceful, neutral, non-aligned,
sovereign and democratic state enjoying territorial integrity'.
The newly framed constitution claimed that the country belonged
to the people, workers, peastans and all other Cambodian working
people. 82 Monarchy was abolished for ever and Buddhism no longer
enjoyed the status of state Religion. Equality of rights to all
people and right to live and work were also provided in the
Constitution. Polygamy was abolished. 83 Right to religion was
provided, but "reactionary religioins which are deterimental to
the people were forbidden 11•84
Legislative power was vested in People's Representative
Assembly composed of 250 deputies, elected for a five year term
by direct and secret vote. The representation was as follows :
150 peasants, 50 workers and 50 soldiers. 85 It was to hold one
plenary session every year and it was empowered to legislate and
define the internal and external policies of the government. A
Permanent Committee, appointed by the Assembly was supposed to
implement the resolutions and mandates of the Assembly The
Representative Assembly would also elect the State Presidium and
appoint judges to the "People's Court". 86
82. 83. 84. 85. 86.
Ponchaud, n.15, Chapter one, Article one, p.220. Ibid., p.223. Ibid., Chapter Fifteen, Article 20, p.225. Ibid., Chapter Five, Article 5 and 6, p.221. Ibid., Chapter Five, Article 7, Chapter six, Chapter seven, article 9 and 10, chapter eight, pp.221-223.
253
Article 8, article 11,
The Executive, appointed by the Assembly, was the key organ
which gave effect to the laws and the guidelines laid down by the
National Assembly. It was the responsibility of the Executive to
implement the internal and external policies of the country. 87
The judiciary, i.e., the 'People's Court', appointed by the
Assembly, was the principal judicial organ in the country. The
Judiciary had t~ defend people's justice and protect their
democratic rights. Anti-government activities were dealt with
severly. 88 Peasants, workers and members of the army constituted
the ruling proletariat class. The means of production was the
'collective property' of the state and people.
economic enterprises were expropriated. 89
All private
The new constitution wanted Cambodia to strive to maintain
friendly relations with all neighbours and it was 'committed to
policy of independence, peace, neutrality and non-alignment'.
It did not permit any foreign country to maintain military bases
on its territory and opposed all forms of subversion and
aggression from outside. 9 0 The Constitution proclaimed an
informal alliance between Democratic Kampuchea and the 'great
family of non-aligned nations'.
The new constitution failed to mention the specific rights
of citizens, in such spheres as family, inheritance, health, law
and the obligations and institutions of the government though it
87. Ibid., Chapter Six, Article 8, p.222. 88. Ibid., Chapter Seven, Article 9 and 10, p.222. 89. Ibid., Chapter Four, Article 4 and 5, p.221. 90. Ibid., p.226, Chapter 16, Article 21, p.226. see also SWB
FE/5134/B/1-2, 14 February 1976.
254
mentioned the rights of a citizen to work and believe in any
religion. The duty of the government was to execute the laws and
the decisions of the National Assembly and the Primary duty of
the people was to 'defend and build' the country. There was no
mention of term 'socialism', the friendly socialist states or any
friendly country.91
The national.emblem of Democratic Kampuchea consisted of a
network of dikes and canals symbolizing modern agriculture, and a
factory symbolizing industry, framed by an oval garland of rice
ears with the subscription 'Democratic Cambodia•. 92 The flag of
Democratic Kampuchea was red, with a yellow three-towered temple
in the centre and it was described as a symbol of the "national
tradition and the people of Cambodia". 93 It was in tune with the
recognition of representation of Angkor Wat. It closely
resembled the flag used by the Khmer Viet Minh in early 1950's.
"The absence of a five-pointed star (and perhaps the absence of
the words "Party", "Socialism" and "Communism", among others,
from the Constitution as a whole) might have intended to create
some ideological distance between Cambodia and its more
conventional revolutionary neighbours. Interestingly, the
reference to "national traditions" was the only one in the
Constitution to Cambodia's pre-revolutionary past although the
natonal anthem... refers to the events of 1975 as "more
glorious ••• then the Angkorean era 11 ,94
91. Chaldler, n.76, pp.SlJ-515. 92. Ponchaud,n.lS, Chapter Tw~lve, Article 17, p.224. 93. Ibid., Chapter Eleven, Article 16. 94. Chandler, n.76, p.SlO.
255
~ ~ PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY
On the basis of the new Constitution, elections were held on
20 March 1976 to the 250 member People's Representative Assembly.
All those who completed 25 years of age with 'a good record of
revolutionary struggle' and approve! of the Election Committee
were eligible to contest in the elections and all citize·1s over
18 years of age who had not committed any crime since 17 April
1975 were eligible to vote. 95 There were no political parties in
Cambodia during this period and 515 candidates were approved by
the Election Committee to contest in the elections. They
comprised 150 farmers grouped by regions, 50 soldiers and 50
workers. 96 Of the 3,635,581 eligible voters, 3,462,868, i.e., 98
per cent participated in the elections. 97 The only government
representatives elected to the Assembly were Ms !eng Thirith
(Education), Hu Nim (Information) and Toch Phoeun (Public works).
They were returned as Phnom Penh Factory Workers.
details are given below. 98
The Election
95. Kenneth M. Quinn, "Cambodia 1976 Internal Consolidation and External Expansion", Asian Survey, vol.XVII, no.l,. January 1977, p.44.
96. Norman Peagan, "Anniversary Facelift for Khmer Rouge", FEER, vol.92, no.18, 30 April 1976, p.37. see also "Democratic Cambodia : Delegates to Peoples Congress Elected", Peking Review, vol.19, no.l4, 2 April 1976.
97. Quinn, n.95, p.45. 98. Ibid.
256
Table I 20 March 1976 Election Results -----------------------------------------------------------------
Number Elected -----------------------------------------------------------------Workers
Phnom Penh factory workers Transport workers Railway workers Dock workers Provincial f~ctory workers Rubber plantation workers Mine workers Salt processing workers Energy workers Fishing workers
Total
Peasants Eastern Region peasants Southwestern Region peasants Northwestern Region peasants Northern Region peasants Western Region peasants Preah Vihear Sector peasants Kratie Sector peasants Ratanakiri-Sung Treng Sector peasants Mondolkiri Sector peasants Siem Riep-Oddar Meanchey Sector
Total Cambodian Revolutionary Army
Total
21 5 3 2 4 8 1 2 3 1
50 50
30 30 30 20 15
3 5 3 2
12 150 150
50 50 250
No elections were held at the village and hemlet levels. 99
In many of the villages only the fighting forces exercised their
franchise. The voter was given a slip of paper bearing the name
of a single candidate to elect about whom he had never heard
before. Be that as it may, the 'elections' represent a definite
phase in the internal politics of Cambodia.
99. Ibid.
257
RESIGNATION OF PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK
Ever since the formation of the RGNUC regime in 1970 in
Peking, Prince Sihanouk frequently hinted at his desire to step
down voluntarily from active politics, especially after the
liberation of Phnom Penh in April 1975. 100 In a declaration on 2
April 1976 the Prince said:
When the coup d' etat of Lon Nol and his clique took place in Phnom Penh on 18 March 1970, I swore to myself and to the Cambodian people that after I had accompanied my countrymen to complete victory over US imperialism and the traitorous clique and after the opening of the new revolutionay era, I would retire completely and for ever from the political scene, fo[ my role could logically come to an end. 10
He stated that all his wishes were realised beyond his
imagination and concluded:
I wish to assure you that everywhere and under all circumstances I shall remain a valiant supporter for Cambodian people, the revolution, the people's Representative Assembly, the Government, the Presidium, the Revolutionary Angkar and t~e Revolutionary Army of Democratic cambodia. 1 2
The cabinet accepted his resignation on 4 April 1976 "out
of respect for his highest wishes 11 •103 In recongni tion of his
services to the Nation it conferred on him the high title of
'Great Patriot' and also decided to build a monument on which his
100. Indian Express, 30 April 1975. 101. For the Text of the Prince's Declaration
n.l5, p.228. 102. Ibid., p.229. 103. Guardian, 6 April 1976.
258
see in Ponchaud,
good deeds would be inscribed. It was decided to provide a
retirement pension of US $ 8,000 per annum 104 and the Prince was
not allowed to maintain foreign conacts.lOS The Prince
thereafter went into seclusion. By this the six years of
Prince's leadership came to an end. On 7 April the RGUNC was
dissolved. 106 Th~ National Assembly met during 11-13 April and
approved Khieu Samphan's appointment as"chairman of the State
presidium'. The Prince and his family members became prisoners
in the former royal palace. The Khmer Rouge allowed him to "live
there until he dies".107
In 1970 both the Prince and the Khmer Rouge came together to
fight against Lon Nol. The Prince was popular in the country and
had the Chinese backing. He lacked the cadres to fight. On the
other hand, the Khmer Rouge had no legitimacy, but had the
cadres. Therefore, both came together. Even Princess MoniQue and
Pham Vam Dong requested him to join and fight against the us. 108
After liberation Princess Monique and Chou En-lai persuaded
him to return to Phnom Penh and work with the Khmer Rouge. But
the Khmer Rouge used Chou En-lai' s death to dispense with the
Prince and thereby not allowed to become a rallying point for
opposition to the Khmer Rouge. The Prince said to his close
104. Norman Peagan, n.96, p.37. 105. Summers, n.77, p.213. 106. Quinn, n.95, p.45. 107. International Herald Tribune, 11 May 1976. 108. Edith Lenart, "Power Behind he Throne", FEER, vol.92, no.22,
28 May 1976, p.14.
259
aides on 30 December 1975 thus: "As long as the Khmer Rouge
permit me to remain as Head of State, you will know that I am
still alive". 109
Even prior to the defeat of Lon Nol regime, differences
arose between them. Ideologically the Khmer Rouge were staunch
supporters of C~mmunism and were against Monarchy. In the
countryside the Khmer Rouge changed their tactics to towards the
Prince. When the Prince visited the 'liberated zone' in February
1973, he saw the growing discord between the Khmer Rouge and the
Khmer Roumdas, i.e., his supporters. 110 After this event, in the
countryside the style of the revolutionary propaganda changed,
and Sihanouk became the target of their ciriticism. 111 Even in
Peking the Prince and Khmer Rouge leaders did not stay
together. 112 It may be noted that the 'Sihanoukists' were being
eliminated from the RGNUC regime right from its establishement in
1970. The last of the 'Sihanoukists' were eased out from the
positions when the government of Democratic Kampuchea was formed
on 14 April 1976. 113
The Prince was not informed immediately of the Khmer Rouge
victory on 17 April 1975. They no longer need him. His delay in
neturn was due to lack of specific prospects for his role in the
109. Ibid. 110. Ponchaud, n.15, p.189-90. 111. Ibid. 112. Ibid. 113. Ibid., see also New Straits Times, 15 April 1976.
260
country. He was not even allowed to take his mother's ashes to
Angkor Wat. 114 Even his visit to New York to attend the UN
General Assembly during 3-8 October 19 7 5 was conducted under
strict supervision and he 'gave a sparsely-attended news
conference at the airport'. The reason for the changed behaviour
of Prince Sihanouk was due to the ticklish relations between him
and the Khmer Rouge.115 His position in the set up thus became
nominal, and real power was exercised by the Khmer Rouge leaders.
From the date of his resignation on 4 April 1976 and until
his release from confinement on 6 January 1979, he was permitted
to appear before audience only once and that too at the time of
eighteenth anniversary of the CPK in September 1978. 116 During
this period the Prince was in seclusion. He was not not allowed
to meet visitors and have correspondence with outside world. He
was not allowed to attend the funeral ceremony of Chou En-lai,
who died on 8 January 1976 and to sign the book of condolence at
the Chinese Embassy in Phnom Penh after the death of Mao Tse-
tung.117 The Prince lost whatever hold he had over the Khmer
Rouge. As noted above, the Khmer Rouge no longer needed his
support. His resignation became necessary for the Khmer Rouge to
consolidate their power.
114. Nouth Cheoum, n.62, p.8. 115. Louis Halasz, "Grey Verbiage from the Prince", FEER,
no.43, 24 October 1975, p.15. 116. Bangkok Post, 2 October 1978. see also "Phnom
Greetings from Samdech Sihanouk", Peking Review, no.41, 13 October 1978, p.27.
117. Ponchaud, n.15, p.195.
261
vol.90,
Penh vol.21,
Relatives and friends appealed to Kim Il Sung, North Korean
President, Houari Boumedienne, the Algerian President and Mike
Mansfield, the US Senator to Persuade the Khmer Rouge to allow
the Prince to leave the country118 In October 1977 the Prince
wrote three letters, two to Pol Pot and one to the Central
Committee praising the Government for its all round development
including the establishment of friendly relations with world
powers. 119 The visit of Mrs Teng Ying-Chao, the wife of late
Chou En-lai to Phnom Penh in January 1978, was expected to help
to restore Prince Sihanouk to some position of authority. The
SRVN welcomed Prince Sihanouk to return to power in order to end
the conflict between the two countries. 120
FORMATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT
After the acceptance of the Prince Sihanouk's resignation on
4 April 1976, Penn Nouth announced the dissolution of the RGNUC
Cabinet. On 14 April 1976, the State Presidium appointed Penn
Nouth, after resignation to the honourary post of High Councillor
in recongnition to the great services he had rendered to the
Nation. After this the Khmer Rouge elected Khieu Samphan as
President of the State Presidium and So Phim and Nhim Ros as
First and second Vice-Presidents respectively. A new government
was formed by Pol Pot as Prime Minister who was elected to
118. Statesman, 9 June 1976. 119. Bangladesh Times, Dacca, 26 October 1977. see also "Samadech
Sihanouk Letters to Kampuchean Party", Peking Review, vol.20, no.49, 5 November 1977, p.47.
120. Times, London, 20 January 1978.
262
the Assembly as a representative of the plantation workers. The
new cabinet was dominated by the followers of Pol Pot.121
Under the Ministry of Economic Affairs, there were six
Committees. The Chairman of these committees held the rank of a
Minister. 122 The changes of personnel in the government was
believed to be· aimed at eliminating the last of the
'Sihanooukists' from the Government and replace them with the
Khmer Rouge leaders. 12 3 Pech Lim Kuon, a pilot defected to
Thailand said that the country was run by five men of hardline
Communists such as Pol Pot and four others. 124
Even though the other groups found place in the government,
viz., So Phim, Nhim Ros, Non Suon Phuong, Nuon Chea, Mat Ly Chou
Chet and Vorn Vet in the cabinet, Presidium and Standing
Committees of the National Assembly, Pol Pot group enjoyed good
share through the persons like, !eng Sary, Son Sen, !eng Thirith
and Yun Yat. Vorn Vet and Kang Chap of the Tribunal Committee
also belonged to the Pol Pot group at that time. Both So Phim and
Nhim Ros with their positions in the Politburo and Central
Committee and with their own armed forces and with a different
party background have been seen as rivals to Pol Pot. 125 Hou
Youn, former Minsiter of the interior, was not included
121. New Straits Times, 15 April 1976. 122. Vickery, n.5, pp.146-47. 123. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XXII, 4 June 1976,
p.27757. see also New Straits Times, 15 April 1976. 124. International Herald Tribune, 11 May 1976. 125. Vickery, n.5, p.147.
263
in the new cabinet because he was arrested by Pol Pot group in
August 1975 due to ideological differences. Khieu Samphan, is
ended up as Presi?ent of the State Presidium, which was largely a
ceremonial position. Others received positions where there was
little scope for the exercise of power.126
Before becoming the Prime Minister, Pol Pot held the post of
Secretary-General of the CPK. After being Prime Minister for
about six months, Pol Pot took 'temporary leave' from his
premiership on 25 September 1976 "to take care of his health,
which has been bad for several months. n127 The vacancy was
filled by Nuon Chea, Chairman of the Standing Committee. After
on year of absence Pol Pot returned to the post of Prime Minister
just before his visit to the PRC on 28 September 1977.
Pol Pot revealed to the nation about the CPK's existence on
its seventeenth anniversary on 27 September 1977. 128 Until then
it was stated that 'Angkar' or 'Organization' was the Key organ
that directed the government. Pol Pot in his five-and-a-half
hour radio broadcast traced the party history, its failures and
126. Quinn, n.95, p.46. 127. Although reasons of health were stated to be the cause of
the temporary retirement of Pol Pot from public life, the real reason was that he tried to link Cambodia with Communism which was against the policy of the Government. see Ibid., pp.46-47, Times of India, 28 September 1976, New Straits Times, 28 September 1976.
128. "The Communist Party of Kampuchea : 17 Militant Years", Peking Review, vol.20, no.41, 7 October 1977, p.46.
264
achievements, ideology and policies of the Democratic Cambodia.12 9
Pol Pot gave two reasons which prevented him from revealing
about the existence of CPK. They were:- (1) To fulfil the desire
of the people "who have waited for this occasion of the open
proclamation of the CPK... to express their gratitude to the
party" and (2) to satisfy 'foreign friends' who wanted to hear
that the Communist victory in Cambodia was due to the CPK
leadership. 130 May be, the PRC convinced the Pol Pot group to
conduct itself as a Marxist-Leninist Party may have convincedx
them. Another possibility was to create the self-confidence of
the CPK after establishing a tight grip on the country. Others
felt that the premature revelation might invite resistance from
the anti-communists who may rally around Prince Sihanouk.
Moreover, the Prince treated the Khmer Rouge as agents of
Vietnam, a foreign power. To avoid the accusation, the CPK
prevents itself as the defender of national independence and
sovereignty of the country. Pol Pot said that Cambodia was
independent for the first time in its 2, 000 year history
Credit goes to the CPK. He further said that the CPK would
"prevent the constant loss of Cambodia's territory which used to
happen in previous eras when the country was under various
exploiting classes.131
129. For Pol Pot's Speech see BBC, SWB FE/5629/C2/1-9, 1 October 1977, FF/5631/C2/1-6, 4 October 1977, FE/5632/C/1-20, Octobter, 1977.
130. Nayan Chanda, "The Pieces Begin to Fit", FEER, vol.98, no.42, 21 october 1977, p.20.
131. Ibid., p.20-21.
265
THE POLICIES OF THE KHMER ROUGE AND THE GROWTH OF OPPOSITION
The Khmer Rouge even before the liberation of Phnom Penh in
April 1975, began to implement their policies of self-reliance,
the dictatorship of the proletariat, revolution in agriculture
and the change of social values, in the 'liberated zones' in
Cambodia. After April 1975, they vigorously implemented their
policies. 132
Pol Pot felt that even after 1954 Cambodia was dominated by
foreign powers and ruthlessly exploited. On this pol pot said:
At that time (1960), Cambodia was a satellite of imperialism, of us imperialism in particular. This meant that Cambodia was not independent, Cambodia did not enjoy freedom, Cambodia was in the state of being half-slave and half-satellite of imperialism •••. Economically, culturally, socially, and even politically speaking, Cambodia was not independent .•.• Thus, though in form it was independent and neutral in essence it was not, since its economy was under the blanket of US imperialism .•• a semi-colonial country •.. Cambodia was a victim of foreign aggression in the economic, cultural, social, and political and military fields .... Imperialism did not commit armed aggression against us but it launched economic, cultural, social, and military ai';&ression by taking control of everything.
To overcome the weakness of Khmer revolutionary movement,
132. Karl D.Jackson, "The Ideology of Total Revolution", in Karl D.Jackson (ed.), Cambodia 1975-1978 : Rendezvous with Death, New Jersey, 1989, p.39.
133. SWB FE/5631/C2/1, 4 October, 1977.
266
Pol Pot wanted to apply indigenous goals and methods. He said:
Now that we have established that we need a line, what kind of a line is it? A line copied from other people will do no good. This line should be based on the principles of independence, init~ative, self-determination, and self-reliance. 1 4
The Khmer Rouge claimed that they won the war against Lon
Nol through their 'self-reliance' policy and the Vietnamese
assistance was 'only supplementary'. Pol Pot further clarified
that inspite of the shortage of necessary military weapons they
could win the war.135
Even though the Khmer Rouge wished to establish friendly
relations with all the countries, they feared most about the
SRVN, because the former suspected that the latter may colonize
Cambodia. Hence, they rejected the 'special relationship' sought
by Vietnam. They began killing the Vietnamese from the beginning
of the civil war and they were also against formal alliance with
any outside power. 136
The Khmer Rouge felt the country's "problems stemmed from
its subordinate position in an international system controlled by
others. They feared not only established enemies such as the US,
Vietnam and Thailand but also on foreign dependency and the
impact in the spheres of economy and culture. Khieu Samphan also
134. Ibid. 135. FBIS IV, 19 January 1977, H.4. 136. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.2, p.27469, see also FBIS
IV,24 January 1977, H.2, 3 January 1978, H-8-10, Kampuchea Dossier, no.1, Hanoi, 1978, p.12.
267
felt that the international "economic integration ... is the root
cause of underdevelopment of the Khmer economy". 137 Therefore,
"the limiting of international integration would allow a genuine
reconversion movement to take effect 11•138 They were also against
foreign aid. The Khmer Rouge, witnessed in the capital
penetration of American culture which they feared would destroy
Khemer culture' . 139 The Khmer Rouge in order to purify their
culture, resorted to empty the cities, abandoned Western consumer
goods, spoiled books, liquidated western educated, cut off links
with many foreign powers, abolished currency, markets,
established state control over trade and scrapped trade links
with foreign power.140
The Khmer refugees, Vietnamese, Sino-Khmer, the institution
of monarchy, bourgeoisie and foreign embassies dominated the
Cambodian cities. It could be solved by emptying the cities. Pol
Pot attributed this for their success after April 1975. 141 By
this, the Khmer Rough felt that it would give fillip to the
traditional crafts and nascent industrial establishments. They
also wanted to achieve self-sufficiency by increasing food
137. Khieu Samphan, "Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development", (Ph.D. thesis, Paris, 1959), Laura Summers trans Ithaca, New York, Cornell University, South East Asia Program Data paper no.111, 1979, p.44.
138. Ibid., p.55. 139. SWB FE/4905/A3/4, 16 May 1975. 140. Keesing's Contemporay Archives, n.2, p.27469, see also Ian
Dunber, n.48, p.22, New Straits Times, 20 October 1975, Summers, n.12, p.219.
141. BBC SWB FE/5631/A3/6, 4 October 1977.
268
production. They claimed that "if we have rice we can have
everything."
In 1975, the Khmer Rouge were reluctant to accept aid from
others except from the PRC. They began producing medicines
through local herbs. 142 But they were forced to buy DDT worth us
$450,00 to fight the spread of malaria. 143
The lack of sufficient quantities of rice stocks in the
early days of liberation led to starvation and death. Even in
that critical juncture they were unwilling to accept food from
outside. The fundamental principle of the Khmer Rouge was to
become "masters of our destiny and to rely on our own strength,
on our own resources". 144
The Khmer Rouge before liberation divided the Cambodian
society into five distinct classes: the working class, the
peasant class, the bourgeoisie, the capitalist class, and the
feudal class. The Pol Pot group wanted to win over the workers,
peasants, bourgeoisie, intellectuals, students, national
capitalists, Buddhist monks, patriotic and progressive forces and
eliminate the feudal land owner class. 145 But Pol Pot relied on
the illiterate peasant forces numbering about sixty thousand
after liberation.
142. Vickery, n.5, p.167. 143. Nayan Chanda, "Cambodia in the Market", FEER, vol.88, no.40,
7 October 1977, p.113. 144. Jackson, n.132, p.49. 145. SWB FE/5631/C2/2,4 October 1977.
269
After April 1975, the Khmer Rouge divided the population
into three categories: (1) Individuals with full rights (2)
candidates for full rights and (3) those who had no rights. The
first category was a privileged group entitled for full food
rations and were allowed to join any organization, including the
party or army. They were poor, uneducated and joined the
revolution at an early stage. The second category was entitled
for rice rations and permitted to hold minor political offices.
They came from rural areas. The third category or depositees, had
no rights including rice ration. They were former land owners
army officers bureaucrats, teachers, merchants and urban
people. 146 As a result of the characterization of the people into
three categories, the "depositees" suffered most in the hands of
the Khmer Rouge.
As noted above, only those who had revolutionary and the
army background were allowed to contest in the elections. 147
Those who were under Lon Nol during the civil war period were not
allowed to vote. By terrorizing the educated, monks, former
officials and affluent sections, they aimed to creating a "new
class". Pol Pot said "The essence of our revolution is to
crush oppressor classes ... The party should serve and represent
the true interes,ts of the poor classes" . 148
146.
147. 148.
Timothy Carney, "The Organisation D.Jackson (ed.), Cambodia 1975-1978 : New Jersey, 1989, pp.82-84. Quinn, n.95, p.44. BBC SWB FE/5631/A3/5, 4 October 1977.
270
of power", in Karl Rendezvous with Death,
The Khmer Rouge, by abolishing money, markets, evacuating
people from cities, exterminating people with the background of
wealth, education, occupation and lineage, wanted to establish an
egalitarian society. "The new Cambodian society is a community
in which man is no longer exploited by man''.149 Thus, the Khmer
Rouge established a classless society where there was no
exploitation and oppression.
The people, who had supported the Prince till 1970 and Lon
Nol during 1970-75 period, were not treated as Cambodians. The
Khmer Rouge: regarded the counter-revolutionary elements which
betrayed and tried to sabotage the revolution as enemies of
Democratic Cambodia, of the Cambodian revolution, and of the
Cambodian people. 150 Hence, the corrupt sections of pre-1975
Cambodia were being eliminated. Moreover, the Khmer Rouge lacked
the trained bureaucracy to run the administration. It's 60,000
troops were mostly illiterate. In the words of Pol Pot: "Our
strength was not strong enough to defend the revolutionary
regime.n151 Thus, Pol Pot organized purges in order to preserve
the dictatorship of the proletariat and to cover its weakness.
The Khmer Rouge wanted to establish a rural society by
149. FBIS IV, 21 July 1975, H.3. 150. SWB FE/5632/C/13, 5 October 1977. 151. FBIS IV, 4 October 1977, A-23.
271
rejecting both colonial and capitalist tendencies of and aimed at
developing Cambodia from "under development into modern
agricultural country". 152 For this purpose they aimed at
increasing the level of dam water in order to double or even
triple the harve~t. The troops also involved in repairing old
bridges and highways which had been destroyed due to war. They
also assisted the farmers in agriculture. 153
They laid emphasis on rice production. By exporting rice,
they could machinery, and they could rapidly change the Cambodian
agriculture. For this, the Khmer Rouge effectively used the work
force in agriculture and construction of dikes. There were only
communal kitchens. To increase production, solidarity teams were
created and communes were established throughout the country. 154
It was thought that the boycott of foreign goods would help
the rebirth of local crafts and small industries. They wanted to
achieve the targets rapidly by engaging their workers, peasants,
the revolutionary troops and the people effectively in every
district and every establishment by working hard to bring about a
socialist society.lSS
152. SWB, FE/4934/B/1, 20 June 1975. see also Ibid., FE/5632/ C/18, 5 October 1977.
153. Ibid., FE/4906/AJ/15, 17 May 1975. 154. FBIS IV, 25 July 1975, H-3, see also Ibid., 14 July 1975, H-
2, 12 May 1975, H-7. 155. Khieu Samphan, n.137, p.44. see also FBIS IV, 10 June 1975,
H-6.
272
The policies pursued by them had drastic repercussions. Even
though they had claimed self-sufficiency in food, it was far from
truth. It was claimed that rice was ready for export in 1977. But
the people who had supported the revolution got disillusioned as
they found lot of differences between theory and practice.
The Khmer Rouge aimed at altering the Khmer social values,
including the purification of the cities and the society.
Attempts were made to purify language, religion, family life and
work habits. In Bathambang the revolutionary army on 17 April
1975 closed down gambling dens, and markets. 157
After 17 April 1975 a clean social system was established.
"This new social system is sound, clean, free of corruption,
hooliganism, graft, embezzlement, gambling, prostitution,
alcholosim, or any kind of hazardous games". 158 For the army a
twelve-point code was enforced. Accordingly, they had to respect
the labourers and peasants, had to be free from corruption, they
were not supposed to stea 1 to people's property and engage in
gambling, drinking and improper behaviour towards women. The
government wanted from the army full dedication and sacrifice for
the sake of people.l59
In Democratic Kampuchea, husbands were separated from wives
for long periods. Angkar granted the permission for marriages and
156. FBIS IV, 20 April 1977, H-4. 157. FBIS IV, 14 May 1975, H-7. 158. FBIS IV, 9 May 1975, H-1. 159. Jackson, n.132, p.67.
273
premarital sex received severe punishment including death
penalty. Drinking and gambling were also prohibited. It is
alleged that Khmer Rouge decided to ruin Buddhist religion. They
termed the monks as bloodsuckers and oppressors of the people.
Therefore, food was forbidden to them. Those who gave food
secretly to them were punished severely. 160 Thus, the monks were
punished. In the name of egalitarian collectivism, rapid economic
growth and the dictatorship of the proletariat, monks were
executed and defrocked. Buddhist monasteries numbering around
2, 500 in the countryside became the targets of attack. 161 They
laid the emphasis on learning by participation by the pupils in
the fields and not in the schools. 162 The leaders had no respect
for literate sections in the society. In Cambodia everyone was a
worker or peasant and managerial jobs were scrapped because they
contributed nothing to production. 163 The urban people were
sent to rural areas "to learn from the people" through manual
labour. ·students were given the education through hard labour. 164
Even in medicine, the "party has founded the revolutionary
medical corps made up of people. Medicine is produced from local
ingredients". 165
The worker-peasant class grasped the technical expertise and
160. Ibid., p.69. 161. Kampuchea Dossier, no.1, n.136, pp.28-29. 162. SWB FE/5632/C/18, 5 October 1977. 163. FBIS IV, 6 January 1976, H-7. 164. FBIS IV, 29 September 1975, H-3-4. 165. SWB FE/5632/C/19, 5 October 1977.
274
began to work in factories. Ports were maintained far better than
before. To develop irrigation system, people had to work everyday
for longer periods, i.e., twelve to fourteen hours a day.166
There were no newspapers. The special camps set up were used to
execute the former officials rather than re-educated them. This
is how the Khmer Rouge wanted to achieve revolution by reforming
the Cambodian social system to suit their radical ideology.
CONDITIONS OF LIFE IN CAMBODIA
Due to the extreme methods and policies of the Khmer Rouge,
life in ·cambodia became hazardous and miserable. There was
wholesale killing of officers, soldiers, police and officials of
the former regime during the first few months after the war,
particularly in the North Western Battambarg and Siem Reap
provinces . 167 Many of these belonging to the educated middle
class were executed. 168 Senator George McGovern claimed that the
Khmer Rouge killed two million. 169 Nearly four million, as noted
before, were forced into the countryside from the capital as well
as from the provincial capitals. The regime "bent on destroying
virtually every vestige of the existing society in order to
impose its will upon the population. 170 The Khmer culture became
a victim. The traditional songs, festivals and religion were
166. FBIS IV, 2 April 1976, H-6. 167. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XXII, 4 June 1976,
p.27758. see also Department of State Bulletin, June 1978, p.38.
168. Department of State Bulletin, 5 September 1977, p.323. 169. US Congestional Record, 25 August 1978, p.s.14397. 170. Department of State Bulletin, February 1978, p.32.
275
forbidden. The pagodas, which used to be the cultural and social
centres of the villages, were used as store houses for rice. The
areas around the temples were used as pigsties. 171 The monks lost
their traditional role. 172 The Cham Muslims were harassed and
their religious books were destroyed and they were asked to raise
pigs and not allowed to wear their habitual clothes. 173
Doctors, lawyers, dentists and professors became the objects
of eradication. 174 A classless society was sought to be erected
by eliminating the 'exploiting class'. All people were herded
into communes and children were separated from their parents and
sent to other communes. Many families were forced to live
together in barrack like grass huts. 175 The working hours were
unlimited. There was neither the required tools nor farm animals.
Therefore, human beings were used to pull makeshift ploughs. 176
In Phnom Srok area, 1,500 people died due to starvation at
the end of 1975. 177 In Battambang strict rationing continued even
after the first harvest. As much of the rice they grew was taken
away by the Khmer Rouge human suffering was enormous. 178 The
human loss during the Khmer Rouge rule was variously estimated
171. 172. 173.
174. 175. 176. 177. 178.
Kampuchea Dossier, no.1, n.136, pp.28-30. Department of State Bulletin, 5 September 1977, p.323. Kampuchea Dossier, no.1, n.136, pp.30. see also The Destruction of Islam in Former Democratic Kampuchea, Phnom Penh, 1983, pp.8-12. Barron and Paul, n.2, pp.158-61. Ibid., p.168-171. Kampuchea Dossier, no.3, n.1, pp.62-68. Kiernan, n.33, p.380. Kampuchea Dossier, no.3, n.1, pp.14-15.
276
ranging from three lakhs to thirty three lakhs. 179 In the absence
of foolproof population estimates, it is difficult to arrive at a
consensus figure. After 1962, census were not conducted. Basing
on the 1962 figure (5.7 million), the population was estimated at
7.5 million in 1975. 180 In 1979, the population of Cambodia was
estimated between 4. 2 to 5. 2 million claiming 2-3 million
deaths. 181 Pol Pot claimed eight lakh, but Khieu Samphan claimed
on million. Amnesty International claimed 1. 4 million, whereas
private estimated 1.5 million. The us Senate sub-committee
estimated at 1. 5 million. 182 Heng Samrin government claimed
3,314,768 deaths. 183 At Tuol Sleng more than 20,000 people were
exterminated. 184 During civil war period nearly 6-800,000 died
and 200,000 Vietnamese either killed or expelled. To some extent
2.2 per cent growth rate was difficult due to the prevailing war
conditions. Some fled to neighouring countries. Hence, the death
179. Craig Etcheson,The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea, London, 1984, p.148. see also News from Cambodia, New Delhi, Embassy of the PRK, vol.11, no.lO, 10 August 1989, p.4.
180. Ea Meng-Try, "Kampuchea : A Country Adrift", Population and Development Review, vol.7, no.2, June 1981, p.217. see also UN Statistical Year Book for Asia and the Far East 1971, Bangkok, 1972, p.188.
181. Etcheson, n.179, p.148, see also News from Cambodia, n.179, p.4.
182. Report Submitted .... , n.17, p.463. 183. Eva Mysliwiec, Punishing the poor : The International
Isolation of Kampuchea, Oxford, 1978, p.2. see also Etechson, n.179, p.148.
184. Elizabeth Becker, When The War Was Over : The Voices of Cambodia's Revolution and its People, New York, 1986, p.272, see also Hindu, Madras, 22 November 1991.
277
toll was estimated around one million under Pol Pot rule. Those
surviving, in order to save themselves from the brutality of
their rulers, fled to Thailand and Saigon as refugees. According
to the September 1977 estimates of the UN, twenty-nine thousand
Cambodian refugees either sought refugee in Thailand or passed
through Thailand since mid-1975. 185 After the end of the war in
Cambodia, the Vietnamese community, numbering about 600,000 also
left the country. The relations between Vietnam and Cambodia
deteriorated leading eventually to the overthrow of the Pol Pot
regime.
All the educational institutions were closed down in order
to mobilize manpower for the reconstruction of the country. But
the government claimed that it was determined to eradicate
illiteracy as soon as possible.186
In Battambang, Pursat, Kompong Cham, Prey Veng and Takeo
people were forced to work in building irrigation canals and
dams. 187 Agricultural co-operatives were organized. 188 After
abolishing private property. Communal kitchens were introduced.
Money trade, postal, telegraph, newspapers, modern medicine and
185. Karl D.Jackson, "Cambodia 1977 : Gone to Pot", Asian Survey, vol.XVIII, no.1, January 1978, p.90.
186. SWB FE/5632/C/18, 5 October 1977. 187. "Kampuchea Water Conservancy Projects", Peking Review,
vol.19, no.23, 4 June 1976, p.23. 188. SWB FE/5632/C/14-15, 5 October 1977.
278
consumer items were non-existent. In short, primitive rural
agricultural society was established. 189
RESISTANCE 7Q POL POT GOVERNMENT
The recorded history of the mankind has several examples of
resistance, coups, counter-coups and purges. They kept every
thing in secret.· Cambodia was no exception to this type of
secrecy and controversial policies of the party in power. Hence,
there was every possibility of coups, purges and mass killings.
During the Khmer Rouge rule, the person at the helm of
affairs in Cambodia was Pol Pot. The policies of the Khmer Rouge
and the way the ideology was implemented in Cambodia was a
controversial topic. It is difficult to arrive at a consensus
even after thirteen years of the Khmer Rouge defeat to obtain an
unanimity regarding the excess among the left ideologues.
The peace loving people of cambodia resented the way the
Communism was implemented in Cambodia. Some sections within the
CPK opposed the policies of the government. There was resistance
to the Government and moves to overthrow leading to a series of
coups followed by a number of purges including the top brass of
the ruling party members. Cambodia provided a good example where
the policy makers and the ideologues failed to forecast in
advance the problems that might arise after the forceful
implementation of the ideology. It is necessary to search for
189. Report Submitted ... , n.l7, p.463.
279
/
causes and when and where such coups occurred and who led the
resistance to the Pol Pot policies.
In the CPK, a series of massive purges took place between
April 1975 and December 1978. This period witnessed nine or more
attempted coups and disappearance of senior members of the
government. It is"alleged that they were executed. 190
By the end of 1978, Cambodia was in the hands of Pol Pot,
Ieng Sary, Son Sen, Khieu Ponnary, Khieu Thirith, Yun Yat, Nuon
Chea and Khieu Samphan. Yugoslav journalists who had visited
Cambodia said that the party membership remained secret. The
internal struggles were due to the attempts made by Pol Pot group
"to impose a policy of nationalist revivalism on a socialist
organization". 191
Ideologically, there were three groups. The first group led
by Pol Pot was a national chauvinist in nature which wanted to
build Cambodia rapidly into a developed industrial country with
great strength for national defence through a super great leap
forward. Its slogan was 'build and defend' Cambodia. 192 Thus it
worked for 'a millennial corporate State'. Main source of its
190. They were : Hou Youn, Koy Thuon, Non Suon, Toch Phoeuon, Hu Nim, Nhim Ros, So Phim, Mey Prang, Sua Doeum, Cheng An, Phuong and Tiv 01. see Le Monde, Paris, 2 June 1979.
191. Ben Kiernan, "Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement", in Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua {ed.), Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-81, London, 1982, p.227. see also Vickery, n.S, p.148, Carney, n.146,pp.105-107.
192. Chandler, n.76, p.513.
280
strength was agrarian economy and it was a policy of the
government not to bowdown to foreigners. New Cambodia could
create fear in its neighbours and demand for the return of its
lost territories. Pol Pot group was based in the Northeast during
the 19 60s extended its influence to the Northern and the
Southwest zones and then over all control over the country by
1977. The second group led by Phouk Chhay and Hu Nim were the
leaders of the Khmer-Chinese Friendship Association in 1966-67.
They were attracted by the mass democracy ideology of the Chinese
Cultural Revolution. Others, like Tiv 01 who wanted to
reinvigorate Khmer culture were well-educated but not well
organized. They can be called revolutionary independents. During
the 1970-75 war, they were active in the Southwest zone. In 1977,
Phouk Chhay, Hu Nim and Tiv Ol were executed. 193 Both these
groups were committed to rapid and radical change of the country
with an emphasis on the rural areas. The admirers of the Cultural
Revolution while treating Vietnam as 'revisionist' clearly saw
themselves as part of the international revolutionary movement.
Whereas the Pol Pot group considered foreign countries including
the PRC as not trust worthy194 and therefore, treated them as
enemies of Cambodia. The leaders of the third group directly
influenced by the Vietnamese Socialist model were Heng
193. Anthony Barnett, Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, "Kampuchea A Special Report", New Statesman, London, vol.99, no.2563, 2 May 1980, pp.669-70, 76.
194. Kiernan, n.191, p.229.
281
Samrin and Pen Sovan trained by Vietnam during the Khmer Issarak
Movement, or in Vietnam during 1954-70 period or in Cambodia in
early 1970s. Well-known members of this group executed between
1976 and 1978 were Keo Moni, So Phim, Chou Chet and Non suon. The
Eastern zone, (So Phim was party secretary until 1978) was the
centre of the Vietnam-influenced activity. It was also popular in
the Southwest until 1975 through Chou Chet and Non Suon and
retained some influence in Battambang from the Khmer Issarak
period. Thus the third group possessed long standing
revolutionary experience. Like the second group, the third group
also saw the Cambodian struggle as part of an international one.
"Their contacts and superior numbers also gave them a kind of
semi-organized political cohesion, despite the fact that the
degree of Vietnamese influence on them varied.
Many the first to be eliminated, mostly between 1971 and
1975 shared Hanoi's view of the need for a co-ordinated
Indochina-wide struggle for independence and socialism, while
others were more inclined to implement orthodox Vietnamese-style
Marxism in Kampuchea independent of any direct Vietnamese
invo1vement. 195
The ideological approaches separated them into three groups.
Before 1975 Khieu SamPhan shared views with both Pol Pot and the
supporters of Cultural Revolution Hou Youn shared with the
195. Ibid.
282
Cultural Revolution and the Vietnam-influenced tendency group.
Finally, Khieu Samphan somehow survived by adjusting with the Pol
Pot group Hou Youn sided with the third group and was
eliminated. 196
The three tendencies within the CPK were responsible for the
trouble in Cambodia during the 1975 and 1980 period and the
ouster of Khmer Rouge from power in January 1979 by Heng Samrin
group. Besides this, the nationalist and expansionist tendencies
of the Pol Pot group also played their role in this process.
The Khmer Rouge wanted to revive the glory of Angkor period
by restoring the lost territories. It eliminated the minority
races like Chams197 and followed anti-Vietnam policy and treated
the Vietnamese race as Yuon and dubbed as aggressor and
annexationist.
Pol Pot maintained close links with the hill tribe
dissidents of the anti-Hanoi section of the Fulro group. 198 In
1975, Pol Pot government expelled two lakh ethnic Vietnamese from
Cambodia. Hence, the Eastern zone was earlier attacked on the
pretext that they have 'Khmer bodies with Vietnamese minds'.
In October 1975, in Souor district in the Preah Vihear
province 'Sihanoukists' were alleged to have killed local Khmer
196. Ibid. 197. Ponchaud, n.15, p.187 Kampuchea Dossier, Part I, Hanoi,
1978, The Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict : A Historical Record, Hanoi, 1979, pp.28-30,
198. Kiernan, n.191,pp.231-32.
283
Rouge officials, and set up their own administration. The Muslim
uprising which took place in the Krauchana district in October
was suppressed. In the Kompong Speu area a strong force was
organized by Brigadier-General Chantarangsay, a cousin of Prince
Sihanouk. He was killed in an ambush in January 1976.
The resistance was confined to Battambang, where the rebels
could receive aid from Thailand and to 'small frontier
incidents'. 199 In February 1976 the government allowed diplomats
and technicians from the PRC I the SRVN and North Korea and a party of diplomats from Sweden, Afghanistan, Egypt, Tunisia,
Zambia and the PLO to visit the country in order to show them
that the regime had established firm control over Combodia. 200
ATTEMPTED COUP PLOT
During and immediately after the.war, because of the dive~se
composition of the Khmer Rouge,. many analysts believed that there
was serious fractional rivalry within the leadership. Speculation
focussed upon assumed pro-Hanoi and pro-Peking groups, as well as
upon French-educated and veteran resistance groups. Speculation
about factionalism was revived during the Cambodia's border
disputes with Thailand and Vietnam in the summer of 1977 when
frontier attacks were seen as a distraction from "convulsive
seizures of sedition, factional revolts and purges within the
199. Kampuchea Dossier, no.J, n.1, p.48-54. 200. Quinn, n.95, p.48.
284
party". 201 Coups were organized in Kompong Thorn, Siem Reap, Oddar
Meanchey and Battambang in February and April 1977 against the
government. Following this, certain provincial and district
cadres were reported to have been executed, and some lower-
ranking members of the army and militia were disarmed and sent to
other regions, and a shake-up of the remaining personnel was
effected. Although the reasons for the purge remain obsure,
several explanations have been offered. They were: i) the old
cadres, who were not zealous in ferreting out the class enemies
were purged. ii) the local cadres who were engaged in barter
trade near Thai frontier were believed to have involved in
sabotage activities in Cambodia apart from its alleged links with
the CIA. iii) The regional party officials, distressed by the
harshness of the Central leadership and concerned by the
disaffection of the people in this region, organized a coup
plot. 202 On 19 August 1977 Gen. Kriangsak Chamanan, Deputy
Supreme Commander of the Thai forces, confirmed about the
occurrences of the plot. North Korean President Kim II Sung in
his message to Pol Pot on 29 September 1977 on the eve of the 17
anniversary of the CPK said that the heroic Cambodian people have
Wiped out some time ago the counterrevolutionary group of spies who had committed subversive activities and sabotage, worming themselves into the revolutionary ranks from a
201. Joseph J.Jasloff and MacAlister Brown, Communist Indo-China and us Foreign Policy : Post War Realities, Colorado, 1978, p.l33.
202. Ibid., p.l34.
285
long time ago at the instigation of the foreign imperialists.2°3
The speculation gained credence when several prominent Khmer
Rouge leaders viz., Hou Youn Hu Nim and Chhoeur Doeun were not
heard of from April 1976. They were purged. 204 After the
diplomatic relations were finally broken off with Vietnam on 31
December 1977, a Cambodian Statement said: "In 1975 and 1976,
Vietnam ... carried out criminal activities in an attempt to stage
a coup d'etat overturning Democratic Cambodia through a handful
of traitorous forces which were Vietnam's agents. 205 The purge
widended the gulf between the leaders though the top party
leadership wanted to maintain party discipline through this
process.
FOREIGN POLICY
Though more than sixty nations recognized the Democratic.
Kampuchea government, the diplomatic missions functioning in
Phnom Pehn remained restricted to the PRC, North Korea, the SRVN
(till December 1977), Laos, Cuba, Albania, Rumania, Yugoslavia
and Egypt. Cambodia maintained em}:)assies only in Peking,
Pyongyang, Hanoi and Vientiane. The Cambodian mission in Paris
continued to operate without diplomatic status. By calling back
the last Cambodian representative from Moscow, relations
203. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XXIV, 3 Febraury 1978, p.28805.
204. Indian Express, Bangalore, 12 August 1981. 205. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.203, p.28805.
286
diminished with the USSR. No diplomatic relationship whatsoever
existed with the US.
Cambodia's two major international supporters continued to
be Peking and Pyongyang. The Chinese supplied communication and
other essential equipment. There was official air link between
Phnom Penh and Peking. 206 In August 1975, Khieu Samphan visited
Peking and signed an agreement with the PRC. Peking had agreed to
provide free and unconditional aid in the form of engineering
goods and commodities badly needed by Cambodia for the
reconstruction of its war-devasted economy. 207 The PRC promised
to supply some military goods also. An interest free loan of
about US $ 1,000 million repayable in five to six year period was
also granted. The Chinese technicians began the repair work of
Pochentong air port. 208
Pol Pot, Ieng Sary Vorn Vet paid visits 'to Peking and
Pyongyang in late September and early October 1977, where they
received a warm welcome. 209 The Chinese leaders repeatedly
mentioned the importance they had attached to the deepening of
relationship with Cambodia. An agreement on the establishment of
206. Ian Dunbar, n.48, p.23. 207. "Deputy Prime Ministers Khieu Samphan and !eng Sary visit
China", Peking Review, vol.18, no.34, 22 August 1975, pp.3-4.
208. Nayan Chanda, "Cambodia Funds to Repair the Economy", FEER, vol.89, no.39, 26 September 1975, pp.47-48.
209. Hsinhua News Agency News Bulletin, Peking, no.10485, 29 September 1977, pp. 32-33. see also "Kampuchean Party and Government Delegation visits China", Peking Review, vol.20, no.41, 7 October 1977, pp.9-12.
287
Telecommunication link between Cambodia and the PRC was signed in
Phnom Penh on 10 November 1977. 210
On the invitation of the Cambodian government Chen Yung-
Kuiei, Chinese Deputy Premier and a member of the politburo,
visited Cambodia on 5-15 December 1977. 211 A Cambodian delegation
held talks with ·President Kim Il Sung and other leaders in
Pyongyang. On 7 October Pol Pot and President Kim addressed rally
of 100,000 people in Pyongyang where the former acknowledged the
material and political help of North Korea during and after the
Cambodian revolution. An agreement on the opening of an air
service between Cambodia and North Korea was signed in Phnom
Penh on 14 November 1977. 212
France supported the Khmer Republic and had maintained
diplomatic relations. Hence, the Khmer Rouge threatened not to
establish diplomatic relations after the liberation of Phnom
Penh. During the civil war period, the RGNUC through a decree
expropriated all French property, rubber plantations and banks.
After the liberation of Phnom Penh as a sequel of Khmer Rouge
actions on French embassy in April 1975, France forcibly closed
·the Mission of the RGNUC in Paris at the end of July 197 5,
accusing the Cambodians of ignoring requests to resume normal
210. 211.
212.
SWB FE/5666/AJ/1-2, 14 November 1977. Ibid., FE/5695/AJ/2-4, 17 December 1977, premier Chen Yung-Kuei visits kampuchea", vol.20, no.52, 26 December 1977, p.5,9. SWB FE/5668/AJ/3, 16 November 1977.
288
see also "Vice Peking Review,
diplomatic relations. The Khmer Rouge feared to resume normal
diplomatic relations with France in order to avoid neo-colonial
tendencies of France towards Cambodia. 213 The Prince also
opposed the French request for their oil exploration on
Cambodia's offshore oil deposits. Laos maintained normal
relations with Cambodia. Cambodia agreed to provide a small
quantity of rice as aid to Laos. During 12-22 December 1977,
president Souphanouvong and Foreign Minister, General Siprasuth,
paid an official visit to cambodia. 214
Though the USSR was socialist country, the Khmer Rouge had
not shown much enthusiasm to normalize their relations with them.
On 17 April 1976, the first anniversary of the Khmer Rouge
Victory, the USSR, East Germany, Hungary, Romania,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland sent messages of
congratulations to Democratic Kampuchea. The USSR maintained
diplomatic relations with the Khmer Republic till the middle of
April 1975. In May 1977, the Khmer Rouge recalled the new
Cambodian Attache in Moscow. The USSR's request to open an
Embassy at Phnom Penh was turned down. 215 Moreover, the USSR had
serious doubts about the policies of the Khmer Rouge and
213.
214. 215.
Summers, n.77, p.228, see also "Sihanouk Prince", FEER, vol.90, no.46, 14 November 1975, SWB FE/5700/A3/1-2, 23 December 1977. P.C.Pradhan, Foreign Policy of Kampuchea, New p.187.
289
The p.12.
Delhi,
Proud
1985,
the treatment of their people. Besides, the Khmer Rouge leaders
were pro-Peking and anti-Hanoi in their attitude.
The Cambodian authorities claimed that the US F-111 jet
fighter-bombers conducted two bomb raids on Siem Reap on 25
February 1976 resulting in the killing of 15 civilians and
injuring 30 others. The raids also caused extensive damage to a
hospital and kindergarten. After the raids, the jets flew towards
Thailand. But the US officials denied the involvement of the us
planes in the incident. 216 Thailand also denied the alleged
attack as the F-111 jets left the area in June 1975. Both the PRC
and the SRVN criticized the US bomb raids. 'Black cobra
commandos' or young Thai Army Officers might have involved in
these acts in order to create conflict between Thailand and
Cambodia. 217
It had not asked for US aid for reconstruction and was
unwilling to normalize its relations due to the problems of MIAs.
Despite this, the US approved the sale of DDT to Cambodia
manufactured by a us company. The Khmer Rouge branded the US as
responsible for the extensive damage caused in Cambodia and
treated her as arch enemy of the third world. 218 The US efforts
216. summers, n.77, p.213. see also Asian Recorder, vol.XXII,no.13, 25-31 March 1976, p.13077, SWB FE/5146/A3/1-2, 28 February 1976.
217. Nayan Chanda, "The Barbarous Raid Mystery", FEER, vol. 91, no.11, 12 March 1976, p.14.
218. Quinn, n.95, p.51.
290
to normalize relations were not favoured by the Khmer Rouge. The
US request to permit a delegation to visat Cambodia was also
rejected. 219
Cambodia expressed its desire to expand its foreign
relations by establishing diplomatic relations and by sending and
receiving foreign. delegations. In February 1976, the ambassadors
of Zambia, Sweden, Egypt, Tunisia, Afghanistan and the PLO
representative stationed in Peking were invited to visit
Cambodia. They were followed by the special Envoy of Mauritania,
the PRC's trade Minister Li Chang, Cuban, Laotian and a special
emissary from Iraq.220
Cambodia also expressed its desire to expand its ties with
non-Communist states. Between 23 April and 12 May 1976, cambodia
had established diplomatic relations with Malaysia, Peru, the
Philippines, Burma, Mexico, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and
Singapore. 221 In August diplomatic relations were established
with Greece, Japan, UK, England and Austria. Ambassador of Egypt
and a permanent representative of Romania arrived in Phnom Penh
in September 1976. Thiounn Prasith led a delegation to the Law of
the Sea Conference in New York in April and visited Africa in
May. Ieng Sary attended the Non-aligned Conference in Lima in
August 1975. In August, both Khieu Samphan and Ieng sary attended
219. Asian Recorder, vol.XXIII,no.19, 7-13 May 1977, p.13721. 220. Quinnn,n.95, p.48. 221. Ibid., p.49.
291
the Non-aligned meeting in Colombo. Ieng Sary attended the Group
of 77 conference in Mexico city in September and attended the UN
in October. A Trade delegation visited Eastern Europe in
September and visited Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania and then
went to Pyongyang, Peking, Canton and Shanghai. 222
On 23 July a· delegation from East Timor visited Phnom Penh
followed by the visits of special Envoys from Senegal, Guinea and
the Pakistani ambassador to Peking, Ambassadors of Mali and
Tanzania. 223 In March 1977, !eng Sary made formal visits to the
PRC, Burma, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Singapore and Malaysia. He
attended the UN General Assembly meeting in New York in
October. 224
While Cambodia's relations strengthened with the PRC and
North Korea, its relation.s deteriorated with Thailand and the
SRVN. Ever since the victory of the Khmer Rouge in April 197 5,
conflict arose with Thailand on the North Western frontier over
the question of the border.
In 1975, both Thailand and Cambodia agreed to set up joint
trade liason offices. The Thai Foreign Minister Chatichai
Choonhavan met Ieng Sary near Poipet. The Thais agreed to provide
oil and salt in exchange for Cambodian fish and timber. 225 In
222. Ibid. 223. Ibid. 224. Jackson, n.185, p.81. 225. Mike Snitowsky, n.53, .P-20.
292
exchange for medical supplies, the Khmer Rouge gave some
quantities of coffee, soyabeans. 22 6
In order to normalize their mutual relations and to settle
the border issue a Cambodian delegation led by Ieng sary visited
Thailand during 28 October-! November 1975. In the Joint
Communique issued.on the occasion the parties agreed to exchange
ambassadors, undertook to respect each other's sovereignty and
territorial integrity, to maintain non-interference in each
other's internal affairs, and to develop closer economic and
trade relations. 227 The parties agreed not allow foreign military
bases on their soil. As a first step to improve their relations
liason offices were to be set up along the border. They also
signed the mutual non-aggression pact in November 1975. 228 In
June 1976 a joint border commission was setup and further
commercial agreements were signed. Cambodia agreed to release the
detained Thai fishermen and also agreed to consider to allow the
High Commission for refugees to open an office in Phnom Penh for
the repatriation of Khme.r nationals exiled in Thailand. 229
The allegation of us air raid on Cambodia was however, denied by
the thai Prime Minister, Kukrit Pramoj as well as by the US State
Department. 230 Similar incidents occurred in the Gulf of Thailand
226. New Strait Times, 9 September 1976. 227. "Cambodia-Thailand Agreement to Establish Diplomatic
Relations", Peking Review, vol.18, no.45, 7 November 1975, p.28.
228. Summers, n.77, p.228. 229. Ibid. 230. Asian Recorder, n.216, p.13077.
293
also in January and February 1976. Therefore, the meeting fixed
for 27 February for peace talks was postponed at the request of
the Cambodian Government.
In July 1976 several military clashes occurred between
Cambodia and Thailand on the southern part of the border. A
Cambodian raid on three border villages near Aranyaprathet left
thirty men, women and children dead. 231 In September a positive
step was taken to open for trade at Aranyaprathet. But fighting
along the border and the Thai fishermen violating the Cambodian
waters remained a source of conflict between the two. Seventeen
Thai soldiers were killed in a day-long battle which broke out in
Siem Reap. Shortly afterwards, a second massacre occurred in
which 31 villagers were killed, and a few more clashes took place
near Aranyaprathet later in the year. On 5 November, a serious
clash took place near Trat between Thai and Cambodian forces. 232
In 1977 on the Thai Cambodian border more than 100 incidents
took place. During these conflicts a few hundred Khmer Rouge
regulars were involved. 233 The Khmer Rouge were unable to make
any distinction between combatants and non-combatants, women and
children. In an attack on Thai border, eleven unarmed villagers
were rounded at gun point from their rice-fields and later they
231. Harold Crouch, "South East Asia in 1977 Overview", in Kernial S. Sandhu ( ed. ) , South Affairs, 1978, Singapore, 1987, p.5.
232. Quinn, n.95, p.50. 233. Jackson, n.185, p.82.
294
A Political East Asian
were all found dead. 234
Maintaining at least working relations with Thailand was
advantageous to Cambodia because the border was used for barter
trade. After Pol Pot's visit to Peking in September 1977,
Cambodia adopted a conciliatery attitude towards Thailand. 235
Meanwhile, Ieng ·sary met the Thai Foreign Minister Upadit
Pachariyangkun at the UN in October 1977 and agreed to sortout
their differences. 2 36
CAMBODIA ~ VIETNAM
Cambodia's foreign policy towards Vietnam was aimed at
avoiding the prospect of the latter's dominance in her internal
affairs and recovering the border areas, which were in dispute,
by maintaining cordial relations with the PRC, Thailand, and with
the opponents of Vietnam. The unresolved border problem
bedevilled the Cambodia-Vietnam relations leading to violent
clashes which eventually led to the open armed intervention of
Vietnam and the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge regime and the
installation of the People's Republic of Kampuchea headed by Heng
Samrin.
After the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk in a March 1970 coup
by Lon Nol, the Pol Pot group joined hands with the Prince and
the Vietnamese agreed to fight against the pro-US Lon Nol
234. Bangkok Post, 13 November 1977. 235. Bangkok Post, 29 October 1977, 5 November 1977. 236. "Democratic Kampuchea For Friendly relations
Thailand", Peking Review, vol.20, no.48, 25 November p.29.
295
with 1977,
government, both Cambodia and Vietnam which had worked together
were at war with each other over the question of their national
borders. As noted above, like Thailand, Vietnam too began to
control the eastern territories of Cambodia from the beginning of
mid-seventeenth century. Thus, Cambodia lost much of the fertile
and strategic ar~a to Vietnam. Since Cochin-China contained a
majority of Khmer speaking people, Cambodia continued to lay
claims.
Similarly, the question of sovereignty over the islands in
the Gulf of Thailand remained unresolved and the urge for them
became acute with the discovery of offshore oil in some of these
islands. The right over the islands of Phu Quoc became a bone of
contention between Cambodia and Vietnam because the latter began
to administer the greater part of the Phu Quoc island as part of
the arrangement made in 1939, by Brevie, the then French
Governor-General of Indo-China. 237 In 1960, South Vietnam claimed
seven islands located in the north of the line.
In 1964, Prince Sihanouk asked Nguyen Huu Tho, the then
President of the NLF of South Vietnam to guarantee the
territorial integrity of his country. 238 The meeting between the
two in Peking in October and December 1965 ended in a deadlock.
Again the Prince asked for the recognition of his country's
237. "Islands in the Gulf of Siam", (Document) Kampuchea Dossier, no.1, n.136, pp.139-43, see also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. no. XXIV,_ 27 October 1978, p. 29269.
238. Kampuchea Dossier, no.1, n.136, p.58.
296
existing borders on 9 May 1967 and it was granted by NLF and the
DRVN in June 1967 and endorsed in April 1970 by them at the
Summit Conference of the Indo-Chinese people. 239
The conflict is also linked with political and ideological
considerations. Due to certain circumstances, Vietnam moved into
Soviet camp. The ~hinese influence increased in Cambodia as there
was every possibility of spreading to other states. The Khmer
Rouge on the other hand, feared that Vietnam may dominate
Cambodia through its strategic desire to absorb Cambodia into the
Vietnam-dominated 'Indo-chinese federation'. In support of their
argument they cited the domination of the Communist movement in
Cambodia by the Vietnamese from 1930 onwards. 240 The Khmer Rouge
claimed that Vietnam was also trying to establish 'special
relationship' with Laos. When Cambodia complained of Vietnam's
interference, Vietnam stated.
To preserve and develop the special relationship between the Vietnamese people and the peoples of Laos and Cambodia, strengthen the militant solidarity, mutual trusts, long term co-operation and mutual assistance in all fields in accordance with the principle of complete equality, for each other independence sovereignty and territorial integrity, and respect for each other's legitimate interest and independence. 24 1
239. Kampuchea : Dossier II, Hanoi, 1978,p.l41. see also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XVI, 30 September -7 October 1967, p.22284.
240. Karl D.Jackson, "Cambodia 1978 : War, Pillage, and Purge in Demcratic Kampuchea", Asian Survey, vol. XIX, no. 1, January 1979, p.74.
241. As quoted in Ibid., pp.74-75.
297
Vietnam made it clear that it wanted only a special
relationship in order to return to the traditional solidarity
'that existed during the Wars against the French and the
Americans'. IT also affirmed Cambodia's continued independence
and said: "Vietnam and Cambodia are two neighbours and fraternal
countries. Histor~cal and geographic circumstances require that
our two countries unite and maintain friendly relations with each
other. 242 The Vietnamese intervention, it seems, was mainly
intended to destroy the main-stay of Pol Pot's support and to
restore their cadres into the government organization rather than
claim Cambodian territory. This became necessary to the
Vietnamese after the constant elimination of pro-Vietnamese
cadres from the government. When the Vietnamese interests were
not fulfilled they began to infiltrate and train guerrilas and
establish bases in Cambodia. Thus they desired almost for a war
with Cambodia when their interests were not realised through
peaceful means.
By the end of 1977 Cambodia created a negative image of
itself in the world press because of the regime's mass killings.
Further, Cambodia did not permit any foreign journalist into
Cambodian territory to report on the border situation whereas the
Vietnamese allowed them freely to see and to report on the
activities of Cambodian forces of damaging villages and
242. As quoted in Ibid.
298
livestock. 243 No Vietnamese aggression was seen by any foreign
correspondent inside Cambodia. This favoured the Vietnamese
version of events. Cambodia thus gave to herself the image of
aggressor on neighbour's territory.
An additional and most significant cause behind the Khmer-
Vietnamese struggle was the wider Sino-Vietnamese struggle for
influence in the region. 244 Hanoi gave up its soft attitude
towards the PRC and became openly critical and accused her of
'expansionist and hegemonistic ambition' in the region. It
accused that China was trying to hamper Vietnam's economic
development and also of attempts to tarnish its image by pushing
the Khmers to fight Vietnam and when it acted in self-defence it
was accused of aggression. In order to dominate South-East Asia,
Hanoi argued, China could not afford the emergence of a
prosperous and powerful Vietnam.
The PRC, for her part, openly accused Vietnam as an Asian
Cuba, which tried to establish regional hegemony in Indo-China at
Moscow's behest. 245 It stopped its aid to Vietnam particularly
243. Far Eastern Economic Review Year Book 1979, Hongkong, 1979, p. 321.
244. Ibid., p.319. see also Gareth Porter, "Vietnamese policy and the Indo-China Crisis", in David W.P.Elliot (ed.), The Third Indo-China Conflict, Colorado, 1981, pp. 72-86, "Why Vietnamese Authorities provoked Vietnam-Kampuchea Border Conflict", Peking Review, vo1.21, no.29, 21 July 1978, pp.S-8 1 26 •
245. "Resolute Support for Kampuchea", Peking Review, vol.2, no.2, 12 January 1978, p.3.
299
after Vietnam took measures to check the private business houses,
including those of the Chinese origin in Saigon and tried to
maintain a balkanized, super-power free South-East Asia as part
of its security on the southen flank. The willingness of Moscow
to back Vietnam of its ambition made it even more unpalatable to
the PRC.
The developing friendship between the PRC and the US was a
great concern to the Soviet Union. Therefore, to protect its
interests and to put a halt to further expansion of Chinese
influence in the region, Moscow and Hanoi signed a 25 year Treaty
of Friendship and Co-operation in November 1978. 246 By this
treaty the signatories assumed for themselves an international
obligation to assist each other in the consolidation and
preservation of the Socialist achievements. 247 Thus all these
factors in one way or the other, contributed to aggravate the
tension between Cambodia and Vietnam.
CAMBODIA ~ VIETNAM AT WAR
No sooner the Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia than it
resumed its activities along the borders with Vietnam. The
246. Justus M.Van Der Kroef, "The Cambodian-Vietnamese War : Some Origins and Implications", Part-!, Asia Quarterly, (Burxelless}, no.2, 1979, p.84.
247. Far Eastern Economic Review Year Book ~979, n.266, p.320.
300
Vietnamese Government complained that the Cambodian troops
encroached on its territory at a number of places from Ha Tien to
Tay Ninh on 1 May 1975 resulting in heavy casualties.248 But
Cambodia claimed that the Vietnamese troops shelled its border
areas and had set up bases on its soil in the north-eastern
pr_ovinces of Ratnakiri and Mondolkiri. 249 On 4 May 1975 the
Island of Phu Quoc was occupied by the Cambodian troops. Then 1
the Vietnamese Island of Tho Chu was attacked. Meanwhile 1
Vietnamese expelled the Cambodians on 25 May from the Tho
Chu. 250 The situation remained calm for six months after Pol
Pot's visit to Hanoi in June 1975. 251 The temporary truce
between the two countries was broken when the Cambodian troops
attacked Gia Lai Kontum and Dac Lac provinces in December
1975. 252 The conflict was renewed in the early months of 1976. In
April the two parties agreed to hold discussions in June 1976 to
prepare for the signing of a border treaty. In their preliminary
talks during 4-8 May 1976 they agreed to follow the map of the
land border used by the French before 1954 and to set up liason
committees to investigate and settle border differences which
arose over the sea border. Cambodia proposed that the Brevie
line should be retained as the border but the Vietnamese
248. Kampuchea Dossier, no.1 1 n.136 1 p.125. 249. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.237 1 p.29270. 250. Ibid. 251. Kampuchea Dossier, no.1 1 n.136 1 p.149. 252. Ibid., p.68.
301
refused to regard it as the demarcating line of the territorial
waters. 253 Cambodia withdrew from the preliminary meeting and the
talks scheduled for June 1976 did not take place.
The Cambodian authorities alleged that the Vietnamese were
engaged in a series of criminal activities to smash the Khmer
Rouge leaders. 254 . Even though there was no specific evidence in
support of the allegations certain changes in the Cambodian
Government coincided with the government statement. Penn Nouth
was replaced by Pol Pot as Prime Minister in April 1976. In
September 1976, Pol Pot temporarily stepped down and resumed
charge a year later.
In April 1977, there was an attempted coup d'etat in Phnom
Penh which was described by the Khmer Rouge as a Pro-Vietnamese
activity. It was a prelude for Cambodian violent activities on
Vietnamese border. Since the beginning of 1977 pro-Vietnamese
activities grew intense. Therefore, Hou Youn, Minister of Co-
operatives and Interior, was executed in order to check pro
Vietnamese activities.2 55
From March 1977 onwards, there was constant Cambodian
attacks in the provinces of Hatien and Chau Dac. Hence, on 7 June
1977 Vietnam urged for a meeting to solve the border
problem but Cambodia argued that the time was not ripe for such
253. Ibid., pp.68-69. 254. "Statement of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea to its
Friends Far and Near Across the Five Continents and to world Opinion", Kampuchea Dossier, no.1, n.136, p.148.
255. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.237, p.29271.
302
a meeting. 256 In the months of June and July, the Cambodian
troops attacked again Ha Tien, Chau Dac and Kien Giang. During
August and September Tay Ninh and Long An were also attacked. In
the second half of September the ferocity of Cambodia
increased257 after Pol Pot returned to Premiership and it went
further after his visit to the PRC and North Korea. The
Vietnamese replaced their local militia by regular army and after
the Cambodian attack on Tay Ninh, they launched a general
offensive along the entire Cambodia-Vietnam border. 258 About
50,000 troops penetrated into Cambodian territory along the
widest possible area and as deep as 35 miles into the Parrot's
Bea Karea. By December 1977, nearly 60,000 to 70,000 of its
troops were active inside the Cambodian northeastern provinces of
Kratie, Mondolkiri and Ratnakiri. 259
On 31 December 1977 the Cambodian Foreign Minister Ieng Sary
announced the decision of his Government to break off diplomatic
relations with Vietnam and stated that normal relations would be
restored only if the Vietnamese forces withdrew from the
Cambodian territory. 260 The Embassy personnel of Vietnam were
asked to vacate by 7 January 1978. The Cambodian embassy
256. Kampuchea Dossier, no.1, n.136, pp.69-71. 257. "Press and Information Department of Vietnamese Foreign
Ministry Issues Statement", Peking Review, vol.21, no.2, 13 January 1978, p.24.
258. VanDer Kroef, n.246, p.87, see also Marian Kirsch Leighton, "Perspectives on the Vietnam-Cambodian Border Conflict", Asian Survey, vol.XVIII,no.5, May 1978,p.448.
259. "Statement of the .... ", n.254, pp.144-45. 260. "Statement of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea",
Peking Review, vol.21, no.1, 6 January 1978, pp.25-26.
303
personnel also left Hanoi. Air services were also suspended on 7
January 1978. The war situation was almost at sight. The idea of
peaceful co-existence became a mere aspiration. 261
In order to avoid the situation going from bad to worse
Vietnam urged Cambodia to hold discussions. 262 In reply cambodia
stated that Vietnam should withdraw her troops and respect
Cambodia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in
order to make negotiations possible.
Cambodia mounted successful attacks on Vietnamese forces in
Kompong Cham, Kampot, Takeo and Svay Rieng On 8 January 1978,
Vietnamese forces wiped out Cambodian incursions. During 1-3
January 1978, the Khmer Rouge attack on Dong Tap, An Giang and
Kien Giang provinces compelled the Vietnamese to defend the
territory and to drive away the enemy forces from its soil. 263
Cambodia suffered bloody defeat. The war had a brief interval by
8 January 1978. The PRC added fuel to the fire by supplying anti-
tank rockets, heavy mines and long-range artillery to
Cambodia. 264 Subsequently, On 19 January Cambodia shelled Chau
Dac and Tay Ninh areas for the first time.
261. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, n.237, p.29272. 262. "Vietnamese Government's Statement on Vietnam-Kampuchea
Border Issue", Peking Review, vol.21,no.1, 6 January 1978, p.26.
263. "Statement by the Government of Democratic Kampuchea", Peking Review, vol.21, no.2, 13 January 1978, p.23. see also Stephen P. Heder, "The Kampuchean-Vietnamese Conf 1 ict", in Kernial s. Sandhu ( ed.) , South East Asian Affairs 1979, Singapore, 1979, p.172.
264. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.237, p.29272.
304
As the conflict was intensifying Cambodia sent a note to the
U.N. Secretary-General, Dr. Kurt Waldhiem alleging that the aim
of Vietnam's aggressive policies was 'to make Kampuchea
participate in an Indo-China Federation under the Vietnamese
thumb' and charged that Vietnam was behaving like a 'Big
Brother'. 265
Brezezinksi, National Security Adviser to the u.s.
President, described the conflict as 'the first instance of a
proxy war between the Soviet Union and China'. He said that the
Vietnamese were supported by the Soviet Union politically and
militarily and the Cambodians were supported politically and
'perhaps militarily' by the Chinese. 266
REJECTION OF VIETNAMESE PEACE PROPOSALS BY CAMBODIA
On 5 February 1978 Nguyen Co Thach, Vietnamese Deputy
Foreign Minister, put forward the following peace proposals:
(1) An immediate end to all hostile military activities in the border region and stationing of the armed forces of each side within their respective territory 5 KM from the border.
(2)
265. Ibid.
Meeting of the two sides at once in Hanoi or Phnom Penh or at a place on the border to discuss and
266. Asian Recorder, vol.XXIV, no.9, 26 February-4 March 1978, p.l4195.
305
conclude a treaty in which they will undertake to ( i) respect each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, (ii) refrain from aggression, from the use of force or the threat to use force in their relations with each other, from interference in each other's internal affairs, and from subversive activities against each other, (iii) treat each other on an equal footing and (iv) live in peace and friendship in a good-neighbourly relationship and to sign a treaty on the border question on the basis of respect of each other's territorial sovereignty within the existing border.
( 3) Reach agreement on an appropriate form of internat~onal guarantee and supervision. 267
A copy of the statement was sent to the U.N. Secretary-
General with a request to forward it to all U.N. member-
countries. Nguyen Duy Trinh, Vietnamese Foreign Minister, also
sent copies of it to the foreign Ministers of the 25 members Co-
ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries hoping that they
would take appropriate measures for early talks between Vietnam
and Cambodia. On 8 February 1978 Cambodia dismissed the
Vietnamese peace plan as merely "a propaganda gesture to mislead
International opinion".268
On 7 April Vietnam appealed for peace talks. It said that
the question of Indo-China Federation was dropped as early as in
267. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.237, p.29273. see also Stephen P.Heder, n.227, pp.l75-76.
268. Ibid.
306
1951 following the dissolution of the Indo-Chinese Communist
Party. Cambodia rejected the offer on the ground that Vietnam had
not abandoned the idea of Indo-China Federation. Pol Pot affirmed
his country's claims to Cochin-China and to certain offshore
islands held by Vietnam and maintained that his government had
every right to ask Vietnam for revision of the border.
On 15 May Cambodia sent a note demanding that Vietnam should
comply with the following conditions:
(1} To Stop carrying out acts of aggression, invasion, annexation, provocation and violation, machine-gunning, bombing and air raids against the territory, territorial waters and air space of democractic Cambodia.
(2) To stop sending spying agents to gather intelligence in the territory, territorial waters and islands of Democratic Cambodia, to stop carrying out any act of subversion and interference in the internal affairs of Democratic Cambodia and to stop carrying out attempts at coup d'etat or other activities aiming at overthrowing the government of Democratic Cambodia.
(3) To abandon definitely the strategy aimed at putting Cambodia under the domination of Vietnam in the 'Indo-China Federation' following the doctrine of 'one party, one country and one people' in the 'Indo-China' belong to Vietnam.
(4) To respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Democratic Cambodia and the rights of the Cambodian
307
people to ~ecide their own destiny for themselves. 69-
Vietnam described the Cambodian proposals as 'slanderous'
and 'absurd' and put forward the following proposals:
(1) The two sides should issue a joint statement or each side should make a separate statement to cease all hostile military activities in the border regions at the earliest date possible to be agreed upon by the two sides and to station their armed forces within their respective territories 5 KM from the border.
(2) The diplomatic representatives of Vietnam and Cambodia should meet in Vientiane or in another mutually acceptable capital to discuss and quickly reach agreement on the date, place and level of meeting between representatives of the Vietnamese Government and the Cambodian government to settle problems ~n relations between the two countries.2 7 0
Cambodia again felt that the Vietnamese proposals were aimed
at misleading world public opinion and permitting Vietnam to
'carry on more easily its acts of violation and aggression
against Cambodia'.
In May 1978 a Vietnamese instigated Coup organised to
overthrow the Government was suppressed. The Cambodian Government
complained that in the event of failure of this plan, they aimed
269. Ibid., see also "Democratic Kampuchea Vietnam Must stop its Aggression", Peking Review, vol.21, no.26, 30 June 1978, p.28.
270. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.237, p.29274.
308
to take over the eastern region and establish a new state power
and use as a spring-board to attack and snatch whole Cambodia.
From April 1978 onwards, Vietnam appealed to the Cambodian
troops to revolt against the government and it stressed that a
section of the army had already revolted against the government.
On 26 May 1978 there were uprisings in Kompong Cham, Prey Veng,
Svay Riegn, Kampot, Takeo, Kratie, Kompong Thorn, Siem Reap and
Battambang provinces. The mutineers were followed by the
peasants, workers and civil servants. Sou Phim led a resistance
movement against Pol Pot Government. A number of leading
political figures took part in the resistance mov~ment. The
resistance force was estimated during middle of 1978 to be
between 25 to 30 thousand. 272 The Government took prompt
measures to suppress the resistance movement resulting in the
killing of thousands of soldiers in these unsuccessful
surpris~ngs. In July nearly 1, 000 officials and soldiers were
killed by the government on suspicion of having contact with the
rebel forces.
The Vietnamese took control on the areas around Krek, Memot
and Snoul. The fighting gradually spread to Svay Rieng, Ratnakiri
and Dong Thap provinces. On 13 December 1978, Nguyen Duy Trinh
said that Cambodian troops had intruded into Vietnamese territory
271. Ibid. 272. Ibid.
309
in more than ten places whereas Vietnamese troops were engaged
only in the defence of their country. 273
As the struggle was intensifying the support of the PRC and
the Soviet Union to the parties in the conflict grew apace. Ieng
Sary visited Peking on 14 June 1978 and again during 31 July 5
August. On 29 July Son Sen, the Defence Minister, led a military
delegation to Peking. The Cambodian delegation was assured all
military aid by China. 274 The Chinese aid enabled Cambodia to
increase its army from three to about twenty divisions.
On 5 June 1978, Hanoi described Cambodia as just a black
pawn on the chess board of sinister powers and declared that the
imperialists and international reactionaries who are very
malicious and ruthless are using the bones and blood of the
Cambodian people to dig a deep abyss to divide the peoples of
Cambodia and Vietnam. 275 At the U.N. sessions in December 1978
both the PRC and Cambodia blamed Vietnam for the conflict
accusing as an aggressor. The Vietnamese accused China for its
backing of Cambodia which, in turn, invaded Vietnamese territory.
FORMATION OF THE KNUFNS
The formation of the Kampuchean National United Front for
National Salvation was not accidental. The leading figures of the
273. Ibid. 274. Heder, n.263, p.183. 275. Ibid. see also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.237,
p.29275.
310
KNUFNS were the former Khmer Rouge leaders. Within the Khmer
Rouge organization, the pro-Chinese faction led by Pol Pot was
opposed by the pro-Vietnam faction. It criticized the genocidal
policies and the anti-Vietnamese activities of Pol Pot. It
founded the Kampuchean National United Front for National
Salvation (KNUFNS) under the aegis of Vietnam with the aim of
ousting Pol Pot. 276
On 2 December 1978 over 200 representatives of the KNUFNS at
a meeting held in the 'liberated zone' in Cambodia, elected a
Central Committee with Heng Samrin as President, Chea Sim as
Vice-President and Ros Samay as General Secretary. Heng Samrin, a
former political commissar in the Cambodian army and Communist
Party officials and Chea Sim, a member of the People's
Representative Assembly elected in 1976, joined the resistance
movement against the Khmer Rouge regime. Other members of the
Committee included representatives of the Buddhist monks, ethnic
minorities, peasant and intellectual organizations.
The KNUFNS in its manifesto promised to implement the
aspirations of the people concerning democratic freedoms, freedom
of religion, the right to work, to rest and to education, to
respect the dignity and privacy of all citizens and establish
276. "Manifesto of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council" , in K.V.Kobeler (compiled) Kampuchea : From Tragedy to Rebirth, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1985, pp.89-90.
3l.l.
equality of both sexes and equality to other nationalities living
in Cambodia. 277 It would pursue "a foreign policy of peace,
friendship and non-alignment, striving to contribute to the cause
of peace, stability and prosperity in South-East Asia and to the
cause of peace and progress the world over. 278 The Front started
its official news agency, the SPK, and its Radio, the voice of
Cambodian People and it adopted a red flag with five golden
towers located in the middle of it. 279
On 9 December the Khmer Rouge regime denounced the United
Front as a 'Vietnamese political organization with a Khmer name'
which the Vietnamese government was forced to set up by "the
Soviet International Expansionists."
The KNUFNS forces, aided by Vietnam, mounted armed attacks
on the Khmer Rouge forces. On 25 December 1978 two Vietnamese
divisions supported by aircraft attacked along Highway 19 and
penetrated deeply into Cambodian territory. Another two divisions
penetra~ed deeply into Kratie along Highway 7. The Vietnamese
conducted air raids over Ratnakiri, Stung Treng and Mondolkiri
provinces. The attacks spread to Kompong Cham, Svay Rieng, Takeo
and Kampt provinces. The Front forces 'liberated' the South and
North of Highway 19. On 3 January 1979, Lorn Phat and Stung Treng
277. 278. 279.
Ibid., p.89. Ibid., p.90. It was used by the against the French. vol.XXV, 25 May 1979,
Khmer Issaraks see Keesing's p.29613.
312
during their Contemporary
struggle Archives,
and on 5 February Takeo fell to them. By 4 January the entire
area lying between the east of the Mekong and the North of
Highway 19 was controlled by the Front forces. 280
The United Front troops numbering 20,000 led by 100,000
strong Vietnamese army advanced into Cambodia in several
directions simult~neously. One force which penetrated from Laos
along Highway 13 occupied Stung Treng. Kratie was occupied from
Snoul area. From the west the third force advanced towards Takeo
and Kampot in order to capture parts of Kampong Som and encircle
Phnom Penh in an attack by two converging forces. 281 The
'Parrot's Beak' and the 'Fish hook' were heavily bombed and
encircled by the Front forces. The Vietnamese forces advanced so
rapidly and by 6 January 1979 the encirclement of Phnom Penh was
virtually completed. Road and rail links between the capital and
Kompong Som had been cut. on 7 January (At 12.30 P.M) Phnom Penh
was captured by the Vietnamese-backed KNUFNS almost unopposed
because·the city was vacated by the Khmer Rouge forces. 282 On 8
January 1979 a People's Revolutionary Council was established in
Phnom Penh with Heng Samrin as its president. The new government
was recognized by Vietnam, Laos and the Soviet Union.
The fall of Phnom Penh to the KNUFNS on 7 January 1979,
within two weeks of its armed conflict, is no doubt a historic
280. Ibid. 281. Ibid. 282. Becker, n.184,
Archives, n.279, p.438. see p.29613.
313
also Keesing's Contemporary
event in the history of Cambodia. The fall of Khmer Rouge
government was an end to Maoist 'experiments' in Cambodia which
cost more than one million lives. Cambodia was drawn into the Big
Power rivalry. Prince Sihanouk's policy of keeping Cambodia away
from big power rivalry and remain neutral appeared difficult. The
overthrow of the Khmer Rouge, with external arms, even though a
violation of the U.N. Charter, was felt as a necessity by the
Soviet Union and Vietnam and also by the like-mined nations but
was bitterly opposed by several non-Communist powers all over the
world. The PRC vhemently criticized the Vietnamese role in
ousting the Khmer Rouge. 283 The struggle for power between the
new regime and the Khmer Rouge was over in October 1981 by which
all the warring factions agreed to participate in general electi-
ons scheduled to take place in early 1993 under the UN
supervision.
283. "Statement of Government of PRC", Peking Review, vol. 22, no.2, 12 January 1979, p.11.
314
