2011 International Symposium “Ethical Leadership: Issues, challenges and Opportunities” Charismatic Leadership and Governance across the Taiwan Strait: Mythological Perception and Downside Impact Johnny Shaw Department of Public Administration & Management Chinese Culture University [email protected]Biographic Sketch Earned his doctorate in Public Administration from the University of Southern California (USC) in Los Angeles, Johnny Shaw is currently professor of Public Administration & Management at the Chinese Culture University in Taipei, Taiwan. He specializes on Comparative Public Administration, Public Management, and Fiscal Administration & Financial Management with focus on leadership and governance effectiveness, politics-administration dichotomy, and cross-Strait public affairs. His current research projects include government leadership, anticorruption and clean- honest government, and comparative study on democratic governance. Abstract By critically reassessing existing charismatic leadership theoretical perspectives and through the case-analysis method, this paper has revealed the downside impact of charismatic leadership and brought to light the imbedded unethical charismatic leadership’s devastation to the state governances across the Taiwan Strait. To comprehensively analyze the theoretical underpinnings of unethical or pathological charismatic leadership behaviors (e.g., dominance, manipulation, and power abuse) and search for strategies to avoid or mitigate their ill consequences, this paper concludes that once charismatic leadership deviates from institutional objectives, overtakes organizational needs, and moves toward power abuse and manipulation, it will cause irreparable damage to the organization as well as its members. Keywords: Charisma, charismatic leadership, pathological leadership, downside impact of charismatic leadership, leadership failure
Transcript
2011 International Symposium “Ethical Leadership: Issues, challenges and Opportunities”
Charismatic Leadership and Governance across the Taiwan Strait:
Mythological Perception and Downside Impact
Johnny Shaw Department of Public Administration & Management
Earned his doctorate in Public Administration from the University of Southern
California (USC) in Los Angeles, Johnny Shaw is currently professor of Public
Administration & Management at the Chinese Culture University in Taipei, Taiwan.
He specializes on Comparative Public Administration, Public Management, and Fiscal
Administration & Financial Management with focus on leadership and governance
effectiveness, politics-administration dichotomy, and cross-Strait public affairs. His current research projects include government leadership, anticorruption and clean- honest government, and comparative study on democratic governance.
Abstract
By critically reassessing existing charismatic leadership theoretical perspectives
and through the case-analysis method, this paper has revealed the downside impact of
charismatic leadership and brought to light the imbedded unethical charismatic
leadership’s devastation to the state governances across the Taiwan Strait. To
comprehensively analyze the theoretical underpinnings of unethical or pathological
charismatic leadership behaviors (e.g., dominance, manipulation, and power abuse)
and search for strategies to avoid or mitigate their ill consequences, this paper
concludes that once charismatic leadership deviates from institutional objectives,
overtakes organizational needs, and moves toward power abuse and manipulation, it
will cause irreparable damage to the organization as well as its members.
the charismatic leader opposes rational and bureaucratic leadership.
Mitchell (1979) notes that charisma, “which has long been forgotten in the
leadership literature, may be an important and useful concept” for studies of
organizational behavior. Whether for good or ill, charismatic leadership seems to be
an obvious element of political, social, and economic history of a nation (Howell and
Avolio 1992; Conger and Kanungo 1987). Howell and Avolio (1992) cite diverse
figures of charismatic leaders such as Hitler, Mussolini, F. D. Roosevelt, Jesus Christ,
Gandhi, Malcolm X, and Lee Iacocca. The characteristics such figures share are their
force of personality, for they “inspire extraordinary performance in followers who
build their trust, faith, and belief in their leader” (43).
However, what seems obvious here is backed up by relatively little research on
the downside of charismatic leaderships. In fact, much research of charismatic
leadership is contained within analyses of leadership and organization dynamics more
generally (e.g., Weber 1947; Perrow 1972). Other treatments of it outside professional
areas are not necessarily research-oriented but are instead dealing with news coverage
or analysis of charismatic figures and the activities of their institutions. Such coverage
or analysis often results from disaster or disarray surrounding charismatic leaders and
their organizations, e.g., Branch Davidians (in Waco, Texas in 1993), Jonestown (in
British Guyana in 1978), and various political assassinations, to name a few.
Therefore, there appears to be a need to examine and understand the elements and
implications of the effect in the context of downside charismatic leadership.
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Charismatic Leaders’ Influence and Manipulation
House and Singh (1987) list several studies that “expand” Weber’s view of
charismatic leadership and make the important point that meaningful research in the
area has focused on characteristics of followers as much as leaders. Where leader
characteristics are emphasized (e.g., Howell 1985; House 1985), their effect on
followers becomes the main focus. Yukl and Van Fleet (1982) also focus more on
leader characteristic behavior as such. Although charismatic leaders have capability of
motivating followers for effectiveness, they, at the same time, control and manipulate
the followers, which may impede or reduce possibility of free expression of opinions
inside the organization, particularly valuable suggestions or criticisms from the
followers.
While charisma plays a role in effective motivation, it also plays a role with
followers. Singer and Singer (1989) find a marked preference among police officers
for transformational (charismatic) over transactional (incentive-based) leadership.
Burns (1978) finds transformational leadership effective as long as the leader can find
ways to connect emotionally with followers. Mitchell and Scott (1987, 445-452)
discuss the relationship between leadership and the perception by followers of
legitimacy, noting a tendency of people to prefer leaders who are both competent and
“personally compelling and dynamic” individuals, and a tendency of leaders
(particularly in politics or state governance) to foster in themselves such a public
persona even if there is, in fact, no basis for it.
Charismatic Leadership Impact on State Governance
Ryan (1994) cautions against equating leadership that fosters manipulation of
followership with leadership that fosters organizational effectiveness, noting that one-
man rule (i.e., by a powerful or charismatic state leader) is not the same as state
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administration (i.e., by a bureaucracy or government institution). The point is that
charismatic leadership may serve itself at least as much as its organization, and,
sometimes, pathological charismatic leaders even go far more beyond.
The qualities of charismatic leadership behavior of actual or potential leaders
within organizations are discussed by Conger and Kanungo (1987). Their main focus
is on various ways that charismatic leaders consolidate or maintain an actual or
perceived power role inside the organization, again noting that organization objectives
are really secondary to such consolidation. An example of such was once well
documented in a statement made by former Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee
Kuan-Yew (Lee 1987), in response to criticisms of his “strong-man and authoritarian”
leadership style while governing: “We decide what is right. Never mind what the
people think.”
Avolio and Howell (1992, 43-55) go even further for to them charismatic
leadership is a fine line between pathology and creativity. A good leader must have a
combination of forceful personality characteristics: a vision of organizational
objectives, the energy to manage the implementation of objectives, and the ability to
inspire confidence and energy in others so that goals can be reached. The “dark side”
is based on extremes of leadership behavior when forceful personality is combined
with authority over others, resulting in practices that may be ethical or unethical for
leader and followers alike. Meanwhile, Pfeffer (1981) describes ways in which power
can affect outcomes within organizations ranging from allocation of organizational
resources to wholesale reorganization of the entity itself, and adds that within
organizations power may become an end in itself regardless of impact on
organizational efficiency.
Gibson, Hannon, and Blackwell (1998) pose some queries of charismatic
leadership by asking: Is charismatic leadership always a positive quality? Is
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organization destined to either choose between “charismatic” or “non-charismatic”
leadership? Is charismatic leadership an ethical construct, or will the use of charisma
too often lead to manipulative behavior on the leader and blind obedience on the
follower? Through a popular opinion survey on 23 well-known and high-profile
figures in politics, military, corporate world, religion, sports, and entertainment, they
find that:
There is no way to conclude that charismatic leadership is always a good
thing or it is always needed in visionary organizations. It seems to be a good
thing only when and if conditions are right and the intentions or the leaders
are in the best interests of the company and employees (16).
Based on the above connotations on charismatic leadership, it is adequate to
discern that charismatic leadership, whether positive or negative, challenges
traditional theories and normative recommendations that merely recognize positive
connections in-between charismatic leadership and organizational effectiveness. Often
time charismatic leadership impairs organizational efficiency, security, and stability as
well as the interests of its members. Particularly, when charismatic leadership
overtakes the needs of organization and moves toward authoritarianism, dictatorship,
power abuse, mass worship or glorification of the leader, and instability, both the
organization and its members are at extreme risk. Such phenomena have been seen in
various institutions from the past till present and even strikingly evidenced in the state
governances across the Taiwan Strait, where institutional developments have been
mired and hindered.
Charismatic Leadership’s Downside Impact
Unethical or Pathological Charismatic Leadership
There has been evidence of growing instances of dramatic disasters surrounding
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unethical and pathological charismatic leaders that once appeared in various states
since the mid-last century. The most typical and critical figures of such leaders in their
pertinent states were Hitler (former West Germany), Mussolini (Italy), Stalin (former
Soviet Union), Ceaucesceu (Romania), Chiang Kai-Shek (ROC), and Mao Tse-Tung
(PRC), whose unethical or pathological charismatic leadership behaviors once caused
their regimes to collapse or nearly so.
The connection between unethical or pathological leadership and institutional
survival is rather complex, but that very fact points to a need for this analysis. Why
this is so becomes evident in a consideration of reasons for the institutional failure
once evidenced in various cases. One important difference between positive and
negative or upside and downside charismatic leaders is that the fall of an ethical
charismatic state leader does not necessarily mean the fall of the state, while the fall
of an unethical or pathological charismatic leader may very likely lead to the fall of
the state. Consider the difference in charismatic leadership results between the death
of Hitler in World War II and the death of John Kennedy in the U. S. in 1963 as well
as between the erosion of Mao’s leadership in 1960s and the deaths of both Chiang
Kai-Shek in 1975 and Chiang Jing-Kuo in 1987, which may well explains the
distinctions.
Unethical or pathological charisma is associated with institutional dysfunction of
varying degrees. Some examples of leadership pathology seem clear in cases where
the leaders have apocalyptic doomsday visions. Consider the famous cases of Jim
Jones and People’s Temple in 1978 (Robinson 2002), David Koresh and the Branch
Davidians in Texas in 1993 (Rodriguez and Hancock 2000), and Luc Jouret of the
Solar Temple in Canada and Switzerland (Ross 1999). Some institutions may become
dysfunctional due to charisma pathology, even though the doomsday vision may be
absent, as in the cases of John DeLorean (DeLorean Car), Charles Keating (Lincoln
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Savings and Loans Sandal), and Werner Ehrhard (est seminars) in the U. S. The
functionality of some organizations may be in doubt although they may be the
subjects of controversial organization scrutiny because of their charismatic leaders:
Ross Perot of the Electronic Data Systems (EDS) (Posner 1996) and Kenneth Lay of
the Enron Corporation (Healy and Palepu 2003) are relevant examples.
Charisma Pathology and External Pressures
Even in the case of charisma pathology, decline of an institution may involve
external pressures. This poses a potential analytical challenge to making institutional
failure alone the criterion for judging charismatic leadership. To different degrees,
Koresh, Jones, and Perot attributed difficulties in their organizations to external
influences (Lane 1979; Stammer 1994), which thus necessitates a treatment of the fate
of followers as an important variable of analysis.
There are additional variations of complexity in analyzing the downside impact
of charismatic leadership. The fate of late American President Nixon and Watergate
has been described as “erosion of Executive authority” (Kissinger 1979, 986). One
reason that the decline evaluation in respect of charismatic leadership is complex is
the question whether Nixon’s leadership was truly charismatic, plus whether the
“erosion” was a result of Nixon’s leadership pathology or external pressure from
political rivals. In the Romanian case, the fall of Ceaucesceu in 1989 is another
variation on this idea. Ceaucesceu’s power eroded and his reputation for political
pathology became well known. But when he finally fell, he did so at a time when
other Eastern bloc regimes were also falling. Thus interplay of personal pathology and
external pressure is evident.
Evaluating charismatic leadership pathology can also be complex because of the
question whether a leader is positive or negative, or whether his or her leadership is an
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example of motivational skill or pathology. Consider the case of late Yasser Arafat,
once the most visible symbol of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). His
high-profile flamboyant public personality was in the background of PLO’s ruthless,
destructive actions, while external pressures were sharply evident. Moreover, before
his death, Arafat seemed subject to the organizational factionalism inside PLO, with
the fate of the PLO and its members in the balance. Nevertheless, PLO survived
institutionally and even reached historical peace agreement with Israel in 1993.
Although, historically, charismatic leadership can be identified positively such as
the cases of Mohandas K. Gandhi in India, Winston Churchill in Britain, and
Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Martin Luther King, Jr., and John Kennedy
in America, however in these cases mainstream culture connects charismatic
leadership more to personal charm and productivity than to depravation or pathology.
By no means does this denote that the institutions led by positive charismatic leaders
cannot decline. The fall or behavior of a positive charismatic leader may also result in
controversy or destruction of his/her organization from external pressures. Consider
the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., whose leadership was built around the issue of
nonviolence in civil rights. At his death, however, there were many riots in American
cities. And although the American civil rights movement has persisted, it has also
become much more diffuse than ever before.
Available literature on charismatic leadership, as well as this brief discussion of
instances of unethical or pathological charismatic leadership and institutional failures,
suggests how the present analysis can contribute to extant literature.
Charismatic Leadership and Governance Failures across the Taiwan
Strait
There have been typically controversial cases of charismatic state leaderships
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across the Taiwan Strait since last century, such as China’s bitterest Cultural
Revolution, series of political and ideological persecutions, the “June 4th Tiananmen
Square Massacre” and Taiwan’s ridiculous and senseless ethnic identification disputes
and ideological conflicts engendered by former state leaders (Lee Teng-Hui and Chen
Shui-Bian), which have been the foci for this analysis.
Charismatic Leadership Malpractices in China
The leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has been governing the
Chinese mainland for over six decades since its military uprising that seized the
governance power in 1949. Since the founding of the People’s Republic, there had
emerged various charismatic leaders such as: Mao Tse-Tung, Zhou En-Lai, Deng
Xiaoping, and so forth. Among them, the charismata of Mao Tse-Tung and Deng
Xiaoping had been mostly controversial and attracted worldwide attentions. They both
established their high prestige and reputation status during the long-term grueling
Chinese revolution and socialist reconstruction and made great contributions to the
socialist state development.
In fact, with weighty knowledge and astuteness that were rarely seen in other
eastern charismatic state leaders, Mao was viewed as being circumspect and visionary.
During his regime, Mao’s personified power prestige had reached the pinnacle
throughout the modern Chinese history. However, due to his unethical and
pathological charismatic personality (developed in his later years) wanting to sustain
his absolute rule and influence by dictating power, Mao launched the most devastating
and catastrophic political movement in human history of the twentieth century, “the
Great Proletarian Culture Revolution” know as “the Cultural Revolution” that
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seriously hindered China’s economic reconstruction and modernization development
and led to unprecedented devastation and calamity in China.1
Deng Xiaoping, however, followed Mao’s steps for several decades. Despite his
victories from shining battles with illustrious medals in China’s Civil War and being
one of the few Chinese revolutionists with Western education, Deng was ousted three
times from office, but each time he managed to regain power.2 As being a charismatic
leader with revolutionist pioneer halo and economic reform image, Deng pushed for
economic opening in early 1980s and established, for the first time, the path of
“socialist economic development with Chinese characteristics,” which laid a good
foundation for China’s economic takeoff in late 1990s. Yet, in his later years in power,
Deng was subject to both the power struggle inside the “Zhongnanhai” (a residential
compound where China’s high-level decision-making leaders reside) and the external
pressures of domestic political reform. In 1989, in order to retain the CPC’s sole
power of governance and maintain the so-called social stability, Deng and the CPC’s
politburo ordered the troops to crack down the student protest in the Tiananmen
Square, which was known as the “June 4th Tiananmen Square Massacre” that shocked
the world. Not only had this critically impacted China’s economic development but
also indelibly shadowed Deng’s “charismatic leader” halo and “reformist” image.
Charismatic Leadership Shackles in Taiwan
Retrospectively, in Taiwan’s case, under a relatively more stable democratic
system, there have, to some extent, emerged some charismatic state leaders since the 1 Approximately during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), there had been over 20 million people
died of various political persecutions in China (Chirot 1996, 198). Such extreme and ruthless movement had economically caused China to leg about 30 years behind Taiwan.
2 From 1949 to the end of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping had been persecuted and deprived of leadership power in three occasions. The first was at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s when Deng was categorized as a key member of the “Liu-Deng-Tao Capitalist Headquarters”; the second was during the “Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius Movement” in early 1970s when Deng was labeled as “right-wing revisionist”; and the third was in the “April 5th Tiananmen Insurrection” in the mid 1970s when Deng was made the scapegoat as “leading figure of the anti-revolution group” (Yan and Gao 1996)
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ROC’s resettling on Taiwan in 1949. Distinctive leadership figures include: Chiang
Kai-Shek, Chiang Ching-Kuo, Lee Teng-Hui, Chen Shui-Bian, and even Ma
Ying-Jeou, among whom the ex-Presidents Lee Teng-Hui and Chen Shui-Bian have
been the most controversial in terms of their charismatic leadership downside impacts.
Both of them rose up out of popular elections and had great impact on Taiwan’s
political, social and economic developments as well as governing institutions, which
deserves indepth exploration and examination, particularly of the Chen Shui-Bian’s
Administration (2000-2008).
Despite earning the title of “Taiwan’s Mr. Democracy” that recognized his
contribution to Taiwan’s democratization in the 1990s, Lee Teng-Hui, a Cornell Ph. D.
in Agricultural Economics, a member of the Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang
(KMT), and three-term ROC’s president (1988-2000), was later known for ignoring
corruption and blighting Taiwan with rampant “money politics” during his
presidential leadership. Furthermore, after splitting the KMT and resigning from
KMT’s chairmanship for the party’s loss in the 2000 Presidential Election, Lee
formed his own party (the Taiwan Solidarity Union, TSU) and sided with the KMT’s
decade-long political rivalry, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), mainly to
secure his retirement benefits. Whether or not Lee’s peculiar leadership style was
considered as charismatic or pathological, the consequences of his leadership behavior
including his defect from the KMT had caused the island state 8-year grueling
sufferings politically, socially and economically under the rule of the DPP’s Chen
Shui-Bian.
In light of the “young and vigorous” charismatic image established back in his
term as Taipei City Mayor (1994-1998) as well as his high-sounding “anti-money
politics” and “beginning radical reform” campaign slogans, Chen Shui-Bian won the
10th ROC presidency (with 39.2% votes) in 2000, which led to the first governance
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power shift in Taiwan. In 2004, Chen was reelected (with 50.11% votes), which
supposed to mean a compliment over his first 4-year governance. But, to the contrary,
it had not been the case because, since his 2000 victory, Chen’s willful charismatic
leadership style along with his wayward personality stunted Taiwan’s prosperous
economic status that had once been actualized by the KMT government prior to 2000.
The “Good-Old-Days” image of the “Taiwan Miracles” and the first place among,
then, the “Four Asian Economic Dragons” (i.e., Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and
South Korea) had soon faded away within just a few years under Chen’s governance,
seriously setting back Taiwan’s political, economic, and social development and
engendering unprecedented losses and damages.
Under Chen’s willfully dominant leadership style, such phenomena as “one-man
says, one-man decides” and “all in his way” became extremely rampant in the course
of policy making. With the top administrative apparatus and the DPP all taking his
intractable will as the sole norm of decision making and policy implementation, Chen
deliberately ignored all forms of criticisms and dissenting opinions on his governance
leadership. In his first term, Chen had consecutively dismissed 3 premiers because of
constant disturbing events and incidents which sacked Taiwan’s political, economic,
and social stability. His first removal of Premier Tang Fei (a KMT member) as a
“stone in the way” was most striking and peculiar simply because Tang refused to
illegally and abruptly discontinue the contracted and undergoing No. 4 Nuclear Power
Plant construction. Though Tang’s successor, DPP’s Secretary General Mr. Chang
Jun-Hsiung arbitrarily ordered to stop building the nuclear plant immediately after
sworn in, such ruthless and illegal act had, for the record, caused Taiwan tax payers
300 billion dollars in damage reparation, let alone the impact on Taiwan’s stock
market, economic growth, and employment. The stock stumbled from around 12000
points down to as low as nearly 3400 (about NT40 trillion vaporized) in Chen’s first
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term, forcing the government to limit the daily dropping percentage from original 7%
to then 3.5%. While Taiwan’s stock was snail-pacing throughout most of Chen’s
ruling years, the economic growth rate had dropped from 7-8% to once –3% in his
first term and climbed up to questionable 5% by the official record in his second.
Meanwhile, the unemployment rate also went up to 5-6%.
To retain DPP’s political control and electoral interests, Chen easily pandered to
the ideological cry of the few Taiwan independence extremists by turning blind to the
constitutional distortions and violations by his Cabinet members, his party and even
himself in abandoning the Constitutional framework on the nation’s title and identity.
Especially, during the course of executive-legislative interaction, the Executive Yuan
(the Executive Branch) regarded as Chen’s appendage had simply defied legislative
rules and ordinances, human and divine. Evidences of such were: its stopping legally
caucused, reconsidered and contracted critical national constructions, which incurred
tremendous loss of state revenues; acquiescing the Taiwan High-Speed Railway
Corporation’s unilateral breach of agreement with the Eurotrain without reasonable
cause, costing Taiwan another 3 billion NT (about $89 million dollars) in reparation
to the Eurotrain (Taipei Times 2004, 11) ; unscrupulously interfering in the 2004
Presidential Election, simply for getting reelected, by manipulating the referendum
regulations but ignoring the referendum outcomes; and conniving the executive
branch officials to claim an “executive resistance power” by refusing to cooperate
with the Legislature’s investigations on the world-known “March 19th shooting
incident” even before the Supreme Court decisions came out.
Commonalities and Lessons Revealed from the China and Taiwan Cases
As evolving into this century, for China, the so-called “veteran revolutionist”
coronae and influences have basically faded out since after experiencing the
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sufferings and catastrophes caused by the unethical charismatic leaderships (Mao’s
generation). Particularly from the CPC’s ex-Chairman Jiang Zemin’s releasing power
to President Hu Jingtao for full governance in 2003, the decades-long charismatic
dominance of policy mechanisms and the popular mythology of “worshiping leaders,
pledging absolute loyalty to leaders and wishing infinite longevity to leaders” have
notably changed. The traditional “one-man” decision-making by charismatic leaders
in the Zhongnanhai has been gradually displaced by the nine-member politburo’s
“collective decision-making” styles. Although, to some extent, this is still distance
away from the “collaborative” or “collective” leadership style of mature democracies
today, it is not difficult to see that the progresses achieved by the Chinese leadership
in decision-making have been quite impressive after paying incomparable prices
incurred by the extremist charismatic leadership in last century. In fact, “consensus-
oriented” decision process has presently become a typical example of the
government’s leadership and governance in China.
For Taiwan, Chen Shui-Bian flaunted that he was the “money-politics
terminator” and had suffered “generational impoverishments” during his 2000
campaign. Yet, he had also encountered criticisms as well as queries of his once
popular “charismatic leadership capability” because of his close relationship with
Taiwan business tycoons, his family luxury living styles, and the defiance and
violation by his subordinates (even himself and his family) in terms of carrying out
legislative policies and obeying laws and regulations. More gravely, on one hand, his
unbridled pledges to push for Taiwan independence by way of so-called “Taiwan
constitutionalization,” “renaming Taiwan” and “erecting the national title” had
resulted in seriously disturbing ethnic conflicts that were once evident in Taiwan
some 50 years ago. On the other hand, under Chen’s extremely dominant leadership
and control, he gave more weight on his party’s interest than on the state and people’s
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need and willfully intensified the cross-Strait relations to sustain DPP’s governance in
Taiwan, leaving the people’s lives out of account. All such extreme lawless acts
exercised by Chen administration had, indeed, led to severe ethnic conflicts and
clashes causing great social disturbance and insecurity, thus further exacerbating
Taiwan’s economic and institutional development. Chen’s irrational and unethical
charismatic behavior had endangered the cross-Strait stability, leaving his deliberate
mentality in query and his intention to criticisms, and finally causing his governance
satisfaction rate to drop below 38% quite incomparable to the 80% he received at his
2000 presidential inauguration.
Overall, the downside charismatic leaderships evidenced in both China and
Taiwan cases have revealed apparent similarities and provided significant lessons in
terms of the seriousness of destructive consequences by the unethical or pathological
charismatic leaders since last century. Consider the aftermath costs of China’s decade-
long “Cultural Revolution” with political, ideological persecutions and Taiwan’s
DPP’s eight-year perilous rule, both have suffered catastrophic setbacks in their
political, social and economic development as discussed by this analysis. Most
critically, the two cases have reflected a tendency that, while the positive charismatic
leadership effect gradually diminishing, the downside impact of charismatic
leadership is becoming more detrimental to state governance. This has presaged that
any extreme charismatic leadership behavior may very likely hide the shadows of
catastrophic destructions to nations as institutions.
Conclusions
Based on this discussion and analysis of the mythological perception and
downside impact of charismatic leadership across the Taiwan Strait, it is adequate to
discern that the evolutionary trend of charismatic leadership, whether upside or
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downside, challenges traditional theory or normative recommendation that there is a
positive correlation or connection between charismatic leadership and institutional
effectiveness. As a matter of the fact, unethical charismatic leadership nowadays often
weakens the efficiency, security, and stability of an institution as well as its members,
which has clearly been the case in the state governances of both China and Taiwan.
Although charismatic leadership could be a winning strategy when coupled with
leader’s dedication to organizational objectives, it usually brings about short-term
effect in particular period or time of emergency. Once charismatic leader deviates
from organization’s objectives or overtakes organizational needs and moves toward
pathological evolution or power abuse, it will likely cause irreparable losses to the
organization as well as its members.
An important implication of studying the downside impact of charismatic
leadership is whether analysis of the signals of negative examples of the type can
predict the course of institutional development or destruction. In the “best case”
scenario, charismatic leaders who show negative management styles might be
persuaded to alter their behavior. In the “worst case” scenario, as somehow evidenced
in China and Taiwan, where unethical charismatic leadership behavior appears to
predict institutional collapse, it might be possible to use the information discussed in
this analysis as an aid in alerting membership or the public of the potentiality of
disaster and destruction to institutional development.
Given gradual lessening power of charismatic leadership, traditional perceptions
on charismatic leadership power have shifted from focusing on charismatic to
focusing on collaborative leadership (Chrislip 2002; Gardner 1997; Chrislip and
Larson 1994) or shared leadership (Pearce and Conger 2003; Lambert 2002). With
democratic social development, effectiveness of charismatic leadership may turn
weak owing to social progress, institutional culture elevation, as well as
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organizational context transformation. Particularly under the globalization current, the
way and speed people receive new knowledge have become increasingly efficient and
expedient. They begin to learn to question or nullify such charismatic leaderships
actualized in the so-called “personal worship, religious glorification or highly
centralized control” and to reason with political authorities as well as to fortify their
antiauthoritarian control act, which may force traditionally cherished charismatic
leadership to loosen its once dominant superiority in institutional development of the
twenty-first century.
Furthermore, given the incentives in the course of government reinvention and
institutional reorganization, establishment and stabilization of entrepreneurial
government along with market economic systems have greatly reduced the downside
impact of charismatic leadership on state development. Especially, constant
innovation of state institutions as well as gradually improved governance mechanisms
has driven charismatic leadership, which was merely predicated of one-man-centered
power and effect as guidelines, to transform into group-and-community-centered
collaborative or shared leadership, further shaking and disintegrating the traditional
and mythological perceptions on charismatic leadership effectiveness.
To cope with institutional dynamics in the new era, state must depart from
traditional “charismatic leadership” confinement and displace it with democratic
mechanisms so as to enable a government to ensure stable development. In the
context of government reinvention and administrative reform, modern governments
need to profoundly examine and review traditional perspectives of charismatic
leadership style and effectively seize the “collaborative” and “shared” leadership
momenta in order to achieve more efficient and effective governance in the twenty-
first century.
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