Charles Taylor’s Criminal Network: Exploiting
Diamonds and Children
Janna Lipman
PUBP 710
Louise Shelley
May 11, 2009
Table of Contents
Introduction......................................................................................................................... 3 Background on Conflicts in Western Africa....................................................................... 4
Conflict in Liberia........................................................................................................... 4 Conflict in Sierra Leone.................................................................................................. 6 International Community Intervention ........................................................................... 7
Charles Taylor’s Criminal Network and Finances.............................................................. 9 Charles Taylor and Allies ............................................................................................... 9 West African Natural Resources: History and Exploitation ......................................... 11 Taylor Financial Operations ......................................................................................... 13 Policy Implications for Taylor’s Criminal Network..................................................... 15 Policy Implications for Conflict Diamonds .................................................................. 18
Backlash for Child Soldiers .............................................................................................. 21 Policy Implications for Child Soldiers.......................................................................... 22
International Criminal Court Case Against Taylor ........................................................... 24 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 25 Appendix........................................................................................................................... 28 Sources.............................................................................................................................. 31
Introduction
Former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, led one of the most prolific criminal
networks throughout Western Africa (see Figure 1), leading to violence and influencing
conflicts throughout Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso.
Through corruption and a desire to obtain wealth, often from natural resources, the state itself becomes a functioning criminal enterprise. In these cases the state, while receiving the international benefits of being a state (the ability to issue recognized diplomatic passports; maintain shipping and airplane registries; control border entry and exit points; and collect taxes), plays host to, and participates with, a variety of non-state actors to achieve its goals (Farah n.d., par. 3).
By asking how certain international policies measure against enhancing capacities to
respond to the failed state and breakdown of rule of law in Liberia, this paper is divided
into five distinct sections. To begin, this paper examines the links between the corruption
of Taylor’s criminal network and diamond trafficking and researches the impact of how
the illicit diamond trade influenced trafficking in humans, specifically the use of child
soldiers and prolonged the West Africa conflicts. Next, this study provides an important
baseline of the brief history of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, reviewing
Taylor’s relationships with non-state actors. “The bureaucratic collapse and elite conflict
in Liberia did not liberate society from oppressive state power, but cleared the war for
individual state officials to regain personal power through new arrangements with
internal and external actors” (Reno 1997, 494). Following the history, the research
analyzes Liberia’s shadow state economy of using natural resources to finance the wealth
and political ambitions of Charles Taylor. This paper will then discuss Taylor’s use of
child soldiers in Liberia and the influence on using child soldiers in Sierra Leone.
Finally, this paper will discuss the international policy implications on the exploitation of
natural resources during conflicts, the illicit weapons trade, and human rights violations
of children.
Background on Conflicts in Western Africa
To gain control of the diamond fields, which are particularly attractive because they are alluvial and require very little investment in order to exploit, Taylor launched two interwoven wars. The first was in Liberia, and the second was in neighboring Sierra Leone, with even richer diamond fields. Both wars were marked by a devastating level of brutality, including ritual executions, the abduction of thousands of children who were drugged and taught how to kill, the widespread use of rape as a weapon of terror and control, and the mutilation of civilians (Farah n.d., par. 7).
As Farah states above, Charles Taylor and his push for power directly influenced two
wars in West Africa so this paper will concentrate on those specific wars in Liberia and
Sierra Leone. Additional wars in West Africa such as Cote d’Ivoire may be mentioned to
demonstrate Taylor’s financial network relationships.
Conflict in Liberia
Violence and conflict proved evident through Liberia’s history, even as Liberia
was considered among one of the most prosperous and stable democracies in Africa
(Farah 2004, 20). However, this paper will concentrate specifically on The Great War
from 1989-2003. During this time, warlord Charles Taylor led the violent efforts to oust
President Samuel K. Doe and eventually led to his election as President.
The brutal civil war that engulfed Liberia, following Charles Taylor’s invasion in December 1989, has left an indelible mark on the history of this West African state. The six-year struggle led to the collapse of what was already an embattled economy; to the almost complete destruction of physical infrastructure built over a century and half of enterprise and
oligarchic rule; to the killing, maiming, and displacement of more than 50 per cent of the country’s estimated pre-war population of 2.5 million; and to an unprecedented regional initiative to help resolve the crisis (Sesay 1996, 395).
In 1989, Charles Taylor, former director-general of Liberia’s General Services
Agency and leader of the National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL), launched an
insurgency against President Doe and within 5 months, the NPFL controlled 90% of the
country (Levitt 2005, 206). Taylor’s attack represented the disgust for Doe’s regime
characterized by sustained levels of brutality, dramatic economic decline, political
immobilization, and purges of real or imagined enemies (Sesay 1996b, 36). The NPFL
gained members through the reconciliation of several ethnic tribes; however, the
insurgency focused on attacking those tribes that benefitted from association with
President Doe, causing intense ethnic violence throughout those first months (Ellis 1999,
78). Doe sought assistance from the international community, calling on the United
Nations, however was unable to received assistance due to NPFL support from the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member states, specifically
Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire (Levitt 2005, 207). ECOWAS ultimately provided
Cease-fire Monitoring Group forces (ECOMOG) to end the conflict and human rights
violations (Ibid.). ECOMOG forces proved ineffective as NPFL’s guerilla splinter group,
the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) kidnapped Doe and then
shot, beat, and mutilated him on September 9, 1990 (Ibid.).
With the assassination of Doe, several Liberian political groups created the
Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) with the backing of Nigeria. Taylor,
backed by Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Libya, still controlled the majority of
Liberian territory and refused to acknowledge IGNU (Ibid., 208). In 1993, the United
Nations established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) while the war
continued. “Taylor’s thirst for state power was unquenchable and far greater than the
international community’s to forestall the conflict. For Taylor, peace without power was
simply not an option” (Ibid., 209). In 1997, after the fourteenth peace agreement,
elections were held where Charles Taylor was declared President in a landslide victory;
however the next years were not peaceful as Taylor’s government and armed forces
committed human rights violations (Ibid., 211).
Conflict in Sierra Leone
In 1991, the conflict in Sierra Leone escalated when the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF) launched a war in the Eastern side of the country to overthrow the
government. For the next five years, fighting continued between the Sierra Leonean
government and the RUF. During this time, the Sierra Leonean military overthrew the
government and control of the diamond mines transferred from government to the RUF
and back. “The RUF had been founded in 1991 as part of the strategy of Libyan leader
Mu’ammar Gadhafi to spread revolution across Africa” (Farah 2004, 10). RUF leader,
Foday Sankoh met Gadhafi in Libya where he trained at the World Revolutionary
Headquarters along with Liberian Charles Taylor (Ibid., 24).
In 1998, the United Nations (UN) established the United Nations Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) “to monitor the military and security situation, as
well as the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants” (UNOMSIL n.d., par.
1). In 1999, the government and the RUF signed the Lomé Agreement, establishing an
international peacekeeping force with the UN and the Economic Community of West
African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and organized the United Nations Mission
in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). UNAMSIL “assist[ed] in the implementation of the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan” (UNAMSIL n.d., par 1). “By early
2002, UNAMSIL disarmed and demobilized more than 75,000 ex-fighters, including
child soldiers” (UNIOSIL n.d., par. 20).
International Community Intervention
Throughout the Liberian civil war, besides Taylor’s allies, there was a lack of
international intervention; however, the civil war had wider regional and international
implications. “One significant issue was external financial and military support for the
belligerent parties” (Sesay 1996b, 38). As previously mentioned, part of this stemmed
from the influence of Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso with the UN Security Council. As
close allies to Taylor, both nations were content to assist Taylor in gaining control of
Liberia.
There is evidence that Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, and Burkina Faso provided the training, money and weapons for Charles Taylor and his rebels. Libya provided most of the weapons, oil and money; Burkina Faso contributed men and training; Cote d’Ivoire was not only Charles Taylor’s major conduit for supplies and reinforcement, but also the country that prevented any discussion of the Liberian conflict in the Security Council in the first year (Ibid.).
While Taylor had the backing of Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso, Doe was
backed by Nigeria and the United States (US), with the US providing military advisors.
However, through hostage takings and killings by both the rebel group and government
troops, outside intervention was discouraged (Ibid.). The UN Charter does not have a
specific provision for peacekeeping missions, however has adapted the Charter to
establish missions only if there is neutrality and impartiality, trained and experienced
multinational forces and the use of force only in self-defense (Ibid., 36). Along with these
provisions, a UN peacekeeping mission must also have the consent or the invitation of
one or all of the disputing parties (Ibid.).
US history with Liberia, Liberia was founded by former US slaves, and US
interest in intelligence apparatuses predicted the US would intervene and stop the fighting
(Sesay 1997, 38). During Doe’s regime, US ties were strained due to the brutality,
mismanagement and corrupt bureaucrats and politicians, yet the US financed Liberia
initially due to Liberia’s support for the US during the Cold War (Ibid., 39). As Liberia
moved to bankruptcy, the US attempted to assist, however the government’s corruption
forced the US to abandon Liberia and decrease assistance, militarily and monetarily
(Ibid.). US policy declared the Liberian conflict to be an internal conflict and required no
direct outside intervention (Ibid., 40).
Through all this, when US and then UN intervention did not occur in Liberia,
intervention was left to ECOWAS, the regional organization in West Africa. ECOWAS
formed a peacekeeping force, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and sent
troops in to maintain security. The UN decided not to intervene, however did impose
sanctions on arms in November 1992 as imposed initially by ECOWAS (Ibid., 41). UN
missions focus on neutrality, regional organizations also strive for neutrality, however in
Liberia, ECOWAS never achieved neutrality. “This regional peacekeeping force was
both corrupt and at times militarily incompetent. It was not neutral and never perceived
as such by the warring parties. Its prowess at looting was such that Liberians began to
say, that ECOMOG stood for “Every Car Or Moveable Object Gone”” (Jett 1999, 134).
Charles Taylor’s Criminal Network and Finances
Through many relations all over the world including West Africa, the Middle East
and the United States, Charles Taylor controlled Liberia for several years. Prior to his
Presidential election, the NPFL controlled many industries within Liberia and the
diamond mines in Sierra Leone. Once in power, Taylor maintained power over the
natural resources, increasing his influence and wealth. Throughout the civil war, Liberia
existed as a shadow state, state defined by personal rule and the ruler’s manipulation of
external actors’ access to formal and clandestine markets through global recognition of
sovereignty allowing government institutions to be undermined (Reno 2000, 434-35).
Charles Taylor and Allies
Charles Taylor was born in 1948 to an Americo-Liberian family, the elites of the
freed slaves who founded the country (PBS n.d., par. 3). After finishing college in the
United States, Taylor returned to Liberia in 1980 and worked under President Doe as the
director for the General Services Agency controlling Liberia’s budget. Accused of
embezzling between $900,000 and $1million, Taylor was sent to prison in the United
States (Ibid., par. 13). After escaping from prison, Taylor was next found to be in Libya,
trained in Gadhafi’s World Revolutionary Headquarters, where he befriended Cote
d’Ivoire ruler Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore, RUF
leader Foday Sankoh, and a gallery of local and foreign businesspersons (Ibid., par. 15).
These relationships provided important links that allowed Taylor’s criminal enterprise to flourish. The network was also crucial in providing entrée to criminal elements from Liberia into other state structures. One of his closest confidants, Ibrahim Bah, escorted diamond buyers and weapons merchants to Burkina Faso, Niger, Cote d’Ivoire and elsewhere to do business (Farah, n.d., par. 6).
Taylor embraced these relationships, which provided his armies with the necessary
weapons to maintain control in Liberia. “The Liberian civil war was launched from
neighboring Cote d’Ivoire, and that country and Burkina Faso were the conduits for most
of the weapons used by at least one of the rebel factions” (Jett 1999, 59). Additionally,
“Charles Taylor helped found and train the RUF and let Sierra Leonean rebels use Liberia
for its resupply routes” (Farah 2004, 17). Through Taylor’s patronage, the RUF
successfully kept Sierra Leone in conflict for ten years of destruction and brutality. “The
RUF became infamous for maiming and killing by chopping off the arms, breasts, hands,
legs, tongues, and heads of their victims, and it was responsible for the deaths of untold
thousands of innocent people” (Rosen 2005, 60).
Besides neighboring countries, Taylor garnered relationships with different
businesspersons throughout the world. Some of these businesspersons included Russian
weapons dealer, Viktor Bout, also known as the “Merchant of Death”.
[Bout] had two important assets that set him apart from other traffickers: a private fleet of about 50 aging Russian-made aircraft, acquired as the Soviet bloc crumbled, and the ability to procure not only weapons, but advanced weapons systems (anti-aircraft, anti-tank systems, attack helicopters), on short notice (CIJ 2005, 23).
Taylor and Bout started working through Sanjivan Ruprah, a Kenyan in Taylor’s inner
circle, when Taylor decided he needed attack helicopters to challenge the newly formed
rebel group, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) (Farah 2004,
39). Besides working for years in West Africa, Bout also had connections to the Taliban
in supplying weapons and also running and maintaining Ariana Airlines, the Taliban’s
official airline (CIJ 2005, 24).
Under Taylor’s patronage, international arms dealers operated along side al Qaeda operatives, Israeli mercenaries, Hezbollah diamond merchants, Russian and Balkan organized crime figures and South African mercenaries. Because he controlled the borders, Taylor and his security apparatus were able to guarantee that even wanted criminals could enter and exit with impunity (Farah n.d., par. 5).
Other connections Taylor developed included Leonid Minin, a Ukrainian-Israeli citizen
who specialized in surplus weapons stock from Kiev; Aziz Nassour and Samih Osailly,
Lebanese diamond merchants with connections with former Israeli military officers and
Russian merchants; Balkans’ weapons trader, Slobodan Te_ic; and Iranian weapons
dealer Ali Kleilat (CIJ 2005, 27).
West African Natural Resources: History and Exploitation
West Africa is rich in many different natural resources. Liberia boasts resources
including diamonds, bauxite, timber, coffee, iron, gold, and rubber. Additionally, Sierra
Leone is ripe with diamonds minds. During the conflict in Liberia, President Doe and
then Charles Taylor benefitted from the natural resources, creating wealth for the banks
and themselves. “Taylor’s associates preside over an export trade in diamonds, timber,
gold and agricultural products. Taylor pioneered a network of foreign forms to exploit
and market these resources, to finance military conquests and to control economically
useful territory” (Reno 1995, 113). Additionally in Sierra Leone during the 1980s, former
President Siaka Stevens allowed several Lebanese merchants a monopoly on diamond
mining; however, Stevens controlled the merchants through tax collections and
provisions of security, increasing funds in the government’s bank accounts (Snyder and
Bhavnani 2005, 582). However as time went on and the Lebanese merchants increased
their wealth, they stopped seeking government assistance for security and instead hired
their own personal armies, declining to pay taxes and leading to Stevens’ downfall
(Ibid.).
Table 1 depicts different conflicts from 1990-2000 that were linked to resource
wealth. “Many observers have suggested that resource wealth can lengthen a conflict if it
enables the rebels to fund themselves and hence continue fighting instead of being
crushed or forced to the negotiating table” (Ross 2004, 43). As Reno (2000) states, the
economy in Liberia is a shadow economy, where the warlords hired foreign firms or non-
state organizations to perform services originally allotted to state bureaucracies.
Between June 1990 and August 1996, the combatants signed fourteen peace accords, thirteen of which failed. One important reason for these failures was that the warring parties – or at least, significant factions within them – feared they would lose access to Liberia’s resource wealth. This fear reduced the incentive of the parties to comply with the terms of the agreements (Ross 2004, 53).
The wealth obtained by the warring parties in controlling the economic resources was
greater incentive for them than obtaining peace (Adebajo 2002, 47). This wealth gave
them power over others and they were content to keep things that way.
The same was not true for Sierra Leone as peace negotiators included provisions
for rebel leaders to continue to control portions of the nation’s wealth under a unity
government (Ibid., 54). However, even with the provisions of resource control, the RUF
did not sign the accords at that time due to encouragement from Liberia to continue the
conflict, retain control of the natural resource wealth and allow Liberia to have access to
the diamond mines (Ibid., 56). “Rebel groups in Sierra Leone and elsewhere enrich
themselves through the sale or exchange of diamonds, economic interests not only shape
the conflict, but, if the economic advantage of fighting outweighs that of peace,
perpetuate it as well” (Ross quoting Sherman 2004, 44).
Table 1. Civil Wars linked to resource wealth, 1990-2000
Country Duration Resources
Afghanistan 1992-2001 Gems, opium
Angola 1975-2002 Oil, diamonds
Burma 1983-95 Timber, tin, gems, opium
Cambodia 1978-97 Timber, gems
Congo Republic 1984- Oil, gold, coca
Colombia 1997 Oil
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1996 Copper, coltan, diamonds, gold, cobalt
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1997-99 Copper, coltan, diamonds, gold, cobalt
Indonesia (Aceh) 1976- Natural gas Liberia 1989-96 Timber, diamonds, iron, palm oil, cocoa,
coffee, marijuana, rubber, gold
Peru 1982-96 Coca
Sierra Leone 1991-2000 Diamonds
Sudan 1983- Oil
Note: Separatist conflicts are listed in italics (Ross 2004,48)
Taylor Financial Operations
Throughout the Liberian conflict, Taylor controlled about 90% of Liberia,
including the natural resource wealth by focusing on commercial enterprises to assist
with financing. It is estimated Taylor made between anywhere between $105-450
million from 1992-2003 (CIJ 2005, 19; Duffield 2000, 82). Focusing first on the sale of
mining machinery from an abandoned German-operated ore company, Taylor then
collaborated with Firestone Tire and Rubber to cooperate in rubber production and
marketing, organizing rubber workers in exchange for communication facilities (Reno
1995, 114). Taylor then turned his attention to the timber trade, swapping arms for
timber. Establishing a “Forestry Development Authority”, Taylor collected cash for
timber licenses and rough log export taxes (Ibid.). Through the timber trade, Taylor
made an estimated $23 million from 1997-2003 (CIJ 2005, 18).
Another major financial operation for Taylor was through a joint venture on the
Liberia-Guinea border, the Nimba Mining Company (NIMCO), a consortium of North
American, European and Japanese mining firms. Through partnerships with the Liberian
American Swedish Minerals Company, the Liberian Mining Cooperation, and the African
Mining Company of Liberia, railroad passage in the port city of Buchanan stayed open
for shipments of iron ore, allegedly netting Taylor $10 million a month for the railroad
services (Reno 1995, 114). Through these connections with transnational foreign
companies, Taylor was able to exercise political authority, generating a “warlord
economy” worth approximately $200-250 million a year. (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin
2004, 190-91). With this wealth, Taylor’s “war effort did not suffer greatly from his
inability to command sovereignty over the Liberian state because he was able to wield a
commercial empire and insulate himself from his enemies” (Ibid., 191). This in turn
helped him to underwrite RUF’s invasion into Sierra Leone and gain additional wealth
through the Sierra Leone diamond mines (Reno 1995, 115).
The diamond business in Sierra Leone started in the 1950s by the Sierra Leone
Selection Trust (SLST), owned ultimately by the South African company De Beers
Consolidated Mines, Ltd (Campbell 2002, 17). After World War II, Sierra Leonean
miners learned of the fortune in diamonds and became independent and illegal operators
in the sale of diamonds. As political tensions increased in Sierra Leone prior to
independence, diamonds increased this tension. “More diamonds were smuggled away
than were exported, robbing the country of taxes and contracts that could have been used
to build roads, utilities, and medical and educational facilities” (Ibid., 21). As the RUF
waged war against the Sierra Leonean government, starting in 1991, they slowly claimed
control over the diamond mines and to the ability to trade the diamonds for weapons.
“Because of their diamond wealth, throughout most of the war the RUF was better armed
than its adversaries. Diamonds bought Kalashnikovs by the hundreds, Browning 12.7-
millimeter heavy machine guns by the dozens, and ammunition in million-block orders”
(Ibid., 63). RUF rebels relied on Taylor to trade their diamonds for weapons and Taylor
in turn sold the diamonds to merchants exporting diamonds to Belgium (Ibid.). From
1997-2003, it is estimated Taylor accumulated approximated $40 million per year from
diamonds (CIJ 2005, 17).
Additional wealth accumulated by Taylor came from the Liberian maritime
registry system. The registry covers a third of the world’s shipping tonnage, more than
1,700 vessels. “The flag of convenience lets American shippers hire crews outside
American wage and labor laws; the ships can be reflagged and made available to the US
military in times of war” (Global Policy Forum 2003, par. 7). In 1999, Taylor fired the
Virginia company that ran the registry for 50 years and set up a new one generating a
steady flow of income averaging about $18 million a year.
Policy Implications for Taylor’s Criminal Network
Taylor’s association with illicit weapons traders and diamond smugglers as well
as the shadow economy within Liberia, demonstrated many policy implications,
specifically with international trade and commerce.
Unlike parallel trade in legal goods, war economies usually link into transcontinental smuggling and other gray commercial networks to satisfy
their special requirements. Today’s so-called warlords or failed states may act locally; but they have to think globally. In this respect, a high level of complicity among international companies, offshore banking facilities, and Northern governments has assisted the development of war economies (Duffield 2000, 84).
Taylor focused on global connections, using companies throughout the world to invest in
Liberia’s natural resources and provided a market for illicit goods including drugs and
weapons; however, Taylor also made sure he maintained final control and profits of the
government backed subsidies. “The absence of agencies that can enforce an autonomous
notion of legality also generates opportunities for politicians to use more innovative
means to control natural resources and translate them into political tools” (Reno 2000,
58). New crime groups, especially in conflict regions, such as Charles Taylor’s network
in Liberia, have forged alliances with terrorist organizations due to inefficient,
nonexistent or corrupt law enforcement agencies and governments (Shelley 2005, 103).
Additionally, as Taylor controlled the borders, smuggling routes were able to remain
intact and undetected.
From the international commerce side, Liberia not only provided resources to be
smuggled, but also provided Liberian corporate identities in one day without the need to
list officers, owners or shareholders (Campbell 2000, 64). Liberia also provided a “safe
harbor for anyone wishing to keep aircraft sheltered from scrutiny. Once an airplane is
registered in Liberia, it can be based in another country and used anywhere in the world,
often leaving little evident of its travels” (Ibid.). This proved extremely useful for Viktor
Bout who owned many airlines and aircraft and was able to easily register them and
thwart regulators (Ibid., 65).
In Sierra Leone, then head of state, Valentine Strasser, sought foreigners
representing state and non-state organizations to manage the shadow state’s global
relations. International organizations sought to help Strasser to keep the RUF from
obtaining power through provisions of debt relief (Reno 2000, 503). Sierra Leone
represents a wide range of formal and informal roles for external actors – among them
Strasser’s and Taylor’s foreign backers – that exploit changes in post-cold war global
commerce (Ibid., 504-05).
Most sanction against Liberia, specifically during Charles Taylor’s regime did not
occur until the end of the conflict. “The United Nations slapped bans on Liberian
diamond exports in 2001 and on timber two years later, saying the resources were being
used to fuel war in the region” (Global Policy Forum 2006, par 2). Weapons embargo
sanctions were initially issued in 1992 and additional sanctions freezing assets and travel
restrictions on those that posed threat to the peace process were introduced in 2003
(Global Policy Forum n.d., par.2).
Additional policy implications follow the lack of communication among US
government agencies, the lack of research into terrorist group financial networks from
regular commercial goods to illicit trade of weapons and drugs and the lack of resources
to interconnect the financial networks. Douglas Farah, a journalist from the Washington
Post, points out the lack of intergovernmental agency communication and coordination in
his book Blood From Stones (2004). While in West Africa in 2001, Farah discovered the
links between conflict diamonds, Charles Taylor, Viktor Bout, the Taliban, al Qaeda and
many others. While most of the US government focused on counterterrorism efforts
before and after 9/11, al Qaeda was laying the groundwork of establishing foundations in
the US to finance their efforts. “Al Qaeda’s resourcefulness allowed its financial
structure to survive a near complete military defeat in Afghanistan. The size of al
Qaeda’s bankroll after 9/11 remains a mystery. Estimates range from $30 million to
$300 million” (Farah 2004, 7). However, the “terrorist-transnational crime relationship
extends beyond the generation of profits or provisions of logistics, but goes to the heart of
the relationship between crime groups and the state” (Shelley 2005, 104). In Liberia,
Taylor’s regime is the crime group, exploiting legal norms and procedures and enhancing
the only functioning economy, the shadow economy (Ibid., 105).
In the aftermath of 9/11 and in recent years, more efforts have been made to
“follow the money”, however there is a long way to go. “Still, knowledgeable sources
say, more than two years after 9/11 the United States remains far behind in the race to cut
off the flow of money, the lifeblood of terrorism, although cooperation among some
government agencies has improved” (Ibid., 198).
Policy Implications for Conflict Diamonds
In 2001, the UN issued sanctions against diamond exporting in Liberia, as the
international community recognized diamonds were fueling the conflict, providing goods
for the trade of weapons. At this time, about thirty-five countries began meeting to
discuss the economic impact of buying and selling conflict diamonds. Previously, “the
practice of selling rough stones outside the boundaries of established taxes and exporting
structures for the sake of funding insurgencies against legitimate African governments
was well established and accepted by the diamond-producing and –importing countries of
the world, but it was never, ever discussed in public” (Campbell 2004, 114-15). However
due to the brutality seen in the West African countries, diamonds were being viewed in a
different light, becoming “synonymous with death and mayhem” (Ibid., 115).
As the conflicts and diamond trafficking in Liberia and Sierra Leone forged on, in
December 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recognizing diamonds as
a direct contribution to prolonged conflict and increased prosperity within the conflict
zone and throughout the world (UN n.d., par. 1). Additionally, negative marketing
within the diamond industry sprang to public attention as Amnesty International –France
developed advertisements focused on Valentine’s Day and making sure people do not
buy “blood diamonds” (IANSA 2006, par. 6).
The result from the negative marketing and the meeting of the thirty-five
countries was the establishment of the Kimberley Process. The Kimberley Process
became the procedure for certifying diamonds as “clean” or not from conflict zones and
also sought a plan to cut off the flow of diamonds from rebel group (Ibid., 115-16). In
2003, the group adopted the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which
developed the requirements for certification including country of origin, alpha code
number, date of issuance, date of expiration, validation of certificate from exporting
authority, among others (KP 2003, par. 2). In 2006, the Kimberley Process conducted a
review of the KPCS resulting in significant contributions to the end of diamond
trafficking in certain post-conflict areas.
In the case of Sierra Leone, the KP review visit found that that the certification system had facilitated greater control over the diamond industry and reduced smuggling through the monitoring and control of diamond exports. The review visit estimated that the official system is now capturing up to 80 percent of production. According to Sierra Leone’s official export statistics, the total value of exports increased from US$26 million in 2001, to US$155 million in 2004, and US$142 million in 2005 (KP 2006, 23).
Overall, the Kimberley Process has 49 members representing 75 countries, accounting for
99.8% of the world’s rough diamond production (KP n.d., par. 3).
Recent reviews of the KP demonstrate that while some countries have improved
the certification process and government controls, most nations have a long way to go.
“An analysis of the United Nations’ (UN) Commodity Trade Statistics (Comtrade)
database reveals that an illegal trade in rough diamonds worth $10.2 million may be
taking place between Kimberley Process participant and non-participant countries,
allowing illicit diamonds to evade regulatory controls aimed at keeping out conflict
diamonds” (Global Witness 2007, 1). .Several organizations call for stronger processes
and controls for the Kimberley Process, including stronger government controls, regular
cross checking of statistical data within different systems, better coordination between
law enforcement and customs and border control, and better requirements for diamond
companies to track their data and have regular audits (Ibid., 1-2).
With the call for more oversight, the Kimberley Process has implemented a few
measures such as the expulsion of Congo-Brazzaville from the KP after the country could
not account for millions of exported diamonds. However, the expulsion of a country
from the process does not address the problem of illicit diamond trade, but may
potentially increase diamond trafficking. As of 2008, Cote d’Ivoire is the only country
since the KP conception that it has addressed. “The KP has tried to address the issue
through field visits and through additional recommendations to participants, but none of
these measures have put an end to the illicit flow. There has been strong reluctance by
governments and industry to meaningfully increase oversight and monitoring of the trade
in Ivorian conflict diamonds” (Global Witness 2008, 2). KP members are not reporting
infringements and are not auditing records as they should (Ibid., 4). Again, members of
the KP need to focus efforts on enforcement and pushing for better government controls
and legislation. Without the buy-in of the member state governments, the illicit diamond
trade will continue to prosper. .
Backlash for Child Soldiers
One of the heart wrenching consequences of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra
Leone included the use of child soldiers in both conflicts. As per the United Nations, the
definition of a child soldier includes:
Any child - boy or girl - under 18 years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to: cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups other than family members. It includes girls and boys recruited for sexual purposes and/or forced marriage. The definition, therefore, does not only refer to a child who is carrying, or has carried weapons (UNICEF 1997, 8).
In addition, Wessells (2006) “emphasizes war as a source of opportunities for
children, who willing[ly] join armed groups to obtain things – protection, a sense of
family, education and training, power, money, or a sense of purpose, among others-
denied to them in civilian life” (31). Children are vulnerable and easily malleable and in
times of conflict, additional factors can contribute to their recruitment as soldiers
including poverty, education and employment, family and friends, politics and ideology,
and culture and tradition (Brett and Specht 2004, 4).
Adolescence is a time of vulnerability with the uncertainties and turbulence of physical, mental and emotional development. It is also a time of opportunities with greater freedom, developing understanding of one’s own identity and place in the community and society, and a new capacity to make choices and to take on responsibilities (Ibid., 3).
In 2005, the Coalition to Stop Child Soldiers reported 8,000 children were fighting as
soldiers with 20,000 more estimated to be involved in DDR programs throughout West
Africa (Coalition 2006, 1). In Liberia, NPFL and the United Liberian Movement for
Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) consistently used children under the age of eighteen,
including thousands of children, including thousands of children under fifteen (Human
Rights Watch 2004, 1). The estimate of child soldiers used in Liberia is between five and
fifteen thousand with children making up anywhere between 25-75% of the fighting
forces (Pan 2003, par. 8). In Liberia, “enterprising strongmen find that cultivating a
personal following among people exploited in the past, especially youth, offers them
better prospects for personal gain than does loyalty to old patrons” (Reno 1997, 494).
“Modern-day conflicts are particularly lethal for children because little or no
practical distinction is made between combatants and civilians” (Machel 2001, 1).
Taylor used child soldiers to form a special unit called the “Small Boys Unit” (Pan 2003,
par. 7). In Sierra Leone, these small boys units were recruited into both the RUF and the
government forces (Kuper 2004, 219). In both countries, children were also forced to
work in the diamond mines.
Policy Implications for Child Soldiers
In 1989, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (1989 CRC) resulting in legal and policy initiatives that cover child trafficking,
labor, prostitution, abduction, imprisonment, health, education, discipline, family
relations and freedom of expression (Ibid., 3). Besides the 1989 CRC, additional policies
should consider International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights
Laws (IHRL), specifically the fundamental rules that protect civilians in situations of
armed conflict (Ibid., 23-24). While IHL and IHRL focus on all civilians, the 1989 CRC
details guidelines for special treatment for children civilians, giving them additional
protection and assistance against indecent assault, health, and family rights (Ibid., 35-37).
Additional provisions within the 1989 CRC focus on child combatants and ensuring they
are not subject to the “death penalty for offences related to the conflict which were
committed when they were under 18” (Ibid., 47).
In 2000, the UN adopted the Optional Protocol on the Rights of Children,
specifically Child Soldiers and children in armed conflict, designed to protect children
from the recruitment into armed forces and labor trafficking (UNHCHR n.d., Article 2).
Besides highlighting children’s rights during and after conflict, the 1989 CRC also
developed rules for the prevention of the use of child soldiers in conflict, specifically
focused on recruitment.
“Although strictly speaking, neither conscription nor deployment of children aged 15 to 17 is illegal (except in those countries that have ratified treaties such as the 2000 Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers), such activities could be in breach of the prohibition on employing children in work harmful to their health or dangerous to life” (Ibid., 49).
On the first day the Optional Protocol was adopted by the General Assembly, 61
countries signed the protocol. “Currently, 126 countries have ratified the Optional
Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict; and 130 States have ratified
the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography”
(HREA 2009, par. 12). With signing the Optional Protocol, nations agree to look at
national legislation is guaranteed the rights as outlined in the protocol such as the right to
life, education and special treatment (Ibid., par. 2-4).
International Criminal Court Case Against Taylor
After the ceasefire, the government of Sierra Leone and the UN established
Special Court for Sierra Leone to try people accused of war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Initially thirteen indictments were issued, however two were withdrawn after
the death of the accused and five have been completed (SC-SL n.d., par. 2-3). The
indictment of former Liberian President Charles Taylor is currently in the prosecution
phase, having started in 2007 (Ibid., par. 4). Taylor is facing eleven charges relating to
terrorizing the civilian population, murder, sexual violence (rape and sexual slavery),
physical violence (cutting off limbs), using child soldiers (under the age of 15),
enslavement (forced labor) and looting (Reynolds 2007, par. 13). The prosecution
brought in former government officials under Taylor as well as former RUF rebels to
testify against Taylor and describe occurrences of the eleven different charges in the
Sierra Leone conflict (Trial 2008, par. 1-20).
The International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 2002 based on the Rome
Statute for a “permanent, independent Court to investigate and bring to justice individuals
who commit the most heinous violations of international law and human rights, namely
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide” (Arieff, Margesson, and Browne
2008, 1-2). The ICC has ongoing investigations for Northern Uganda, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and the Darfur region of Sudan. On July 14, 2008, the ICC requested
a warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (Ibid., 1). Precedent for ICC cases was
set by International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as
the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials after World War II, however there is a distinction
between the tribunals and current ICC cases in that the ICC was established by
multilateral treaty and is a permanent tribunal; it is not a UN entity (Ibid., 5). While the
ICC follows past tribunals for precedent, the ICC can also learn from Sierra Leone’s
Special Court case of Charles Taylor. A concern for cases of ongoing or recently
resolved conflicts centers around the tenuous peace process and whether the cases may
upset the fragile peace process (Ibid., 26). However, with the case of Charles Taylor, he
is the first former African head of state to stand trial (Hudson 2008, par. 5). Perhaps
because he is not the former head of Sierra Leone, but the head of state for Liberia, the
trial has been proceeding smoothly, with minimal challenges.
Conclusion
During his regime, Charles Taylor exploited Liberia and neighboring West
African countries, people and resources, for his own power and wealth. These countries
suffered not only tremendous lose of life, as many hundreds of thousands were killed
throughout the conflicts, but the countries also suffered from providing many basic
human rights needs including shelter, security, healthcare, and education. Taylor retained
his power and wealth through cultivated relationships with other heads of state and
commercial organizations assisting in the exploitation of his people and resources. These
relationships provided not only resources to sell goods, but also provided weapons to
rebel groups, prolonging the conflict and influencing armed groups to use children as
soldiers.
Revenues from the African diamond trade have been used to find weapons acquisitions and have contributed to the devastating prolonging of conflicts and hostilities to such an extent that the trade has destabilized other governments. Not only do these conflicts result in disruption of economic activity and political instability, but also these conflicts rely on
the recruitment of child soldiers to fill the ranks of armies and militias (Grant 2007, 121).
International policies for diamond trafficking, weapons trafficking, and child
trafficking have provided meager measures and controls to governments and the
international community to implement such as the Kimberley Process and the Optional
Protocol on the Rights of the Child. Without stronger and cohesive international policies
and enforcement for illicit trade and trafficking, warlords like Charles Taylor will
continue to exploit countries, people, and resources increasing the chances for conflict
and weak governments and economies.
As a result of the above research, formal and informal institutions need to mitigate
the fragmented policy decisions by failed nation-state governments, especially once
conflict ends. However, this is an ongoing debate within the international community,
who is responsible for providing cohesion to policies? The United Nations? The United
States? Would the ICC or the World Bank affect change in policies as well? Overall, it is
a combination of all these organizations to assist failed nation-states, economically,
socially and politically. The United Nations has a job unto itself to coordinate its own
efforts and understand the dynamics of power within its own organization as analyzed by
the lack of international intervention in Liberia. When states fail, they lose exclusive
boundaries and central authority as demonstrated in Liberia and the neighboring countries
of West Africa. How can this be avoided or enforced in the future? Further research
needs to investigate social transformation of new wars to understand how common
beliefs, perspectives and interests make conflicting parties want to change and endorse
rule of law, liberal economics, and governance structures and end potentially end
conflict. This is a challenge when faced with transnational crime and corruption,
especially in shadow economies such as Liberia, where warlords are content to maintain
their power and wealth and do not need to change.
Appendix
Figure 1: West Africa
http://www.mytravelguide.com/g/maps/West-Africa-map.gif
Figure 2: Diamond Mining in African Conflicts
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/754788.gif
Figure 3: Diamond Mines in West Africa
http://www.allaboutgemstones.com/images/map_conflict-diamonds_w-africa.jpg
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