59 Appendix C THE TWO SIDES OF GROZNY Arthur L. Speyer, III Marine Corps Intelligence Activity CHECHNYA: Urban Warfare Lessons Learned Marine Corps Intelligence Activity—Arthur Speyer The strategies and tactics employed by the Chechen resistance in the battle of Grozny offer outstanding lessons for future urban opera- tions. Grozny, the capital of the breakaway Russian republic of Chechnya, is the site of the largest urban warfare operation since the end of World War II. The Chechen resistance that continues to fight a prolonged conflict against Russian forces provides a model of the 21st-century urban insurgency. Chechen tactics are being studied by
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Appendix C
THE TWO SIDES OF GROZNYArthur L. Speyer, III
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
CHECHNYA:Urban Warfare Lessons Learned
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity—Arthur Speyer
The strategies and tactics employed by the Chechen resistance in thebattle of Grozny offer outstanding lessons for future urban opera-tions. Grozny, the capital of the breakaway Russian republic ofChechnya, is the site of the largest urban warfare operation since theend of World War II. The Chechen resistance that continues to fighta prolonged conflict against Russian forces provides a model of the21st-century urban insurgency. Chechen tactics are being studied by
60 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
insurgent groups worldwide and may one day be used against U.S.forces in the streets of Kosovo, Bosnia, Indonesia, or Liberia.
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 61
Why Chechnya Matters
• Largest urban battle since WorldWar II
• Russia employed all aspects ofconventional military power withinan ubran environment
“The future of war is notthe son of Desert Storm,but the stepchild ofChechnya.”
−General KrulakUSMC (ret.)
The Chechens keenly demonstrated how a small, decentralized, andlightly-armed insurgency can defend against a larger, conventionallyorganized military in an urban environment.
62 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
The Chechen Resistance
• Textbook example of themodern urban guerilla
• Conducted asymmetricwarfare
• Nationalistic/religious/political
• Ties to internationalorganizations
The Chechens knew they could not defeat the Russians in a directconflict. To counter Russian strength, the Chechens attacked Rus-sian weaknesses. They moved throughout the city and denied theRussians a true front line. The Chechens attacked again in the Rus-sian rear and denied the Russians a decisive battle. The Chechensalso used contacts abroad, mainly in the Middle East and Turkey, toacquire equipment and seasoned fighters.
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 63
The Chechens are an Islamic, clan-based ethnic group that inhabitsthe mountainous Caucasus region of southern Russia, one of themost ethnically diverse areas of the world. The group is fighting forindependence from Russia for a mix of political, cultural, religious,and economic reasons. The Russians and the Chechens fought twomajor battles for control of Grozny; one during the winter of 1994–95and the second during the winter of 1999–2000.
64 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
Background to the Conflict
• Chechnya is part of the RussianFederation
• Long history of resisting Russiancontrol
• Began latest drive forindependence in 1990
The Chechen people have a long history of resisting Russian control.Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, they began in earnest toseek full independence. In 1994, Chechnya became a civil war bat-tleground between pro-independence and pro-Russian factions.
In December 1994, Russia sent approximately 40,000 troops intoChechnya to restore Russian primacy over the breakaway republic.
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 65
Grozny—Pre-War
50,000 people
68 square miles
High risesIndustrial areasSuburbs
Modern bySovietstandards
The Chechens
• Clan-basedmountain people
• Long history offighting Russianaggression
• Islamic
• Trader/dealerculture
66 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
• Inflict Russiancasualties
• Extend the conflict
• Attack in rearareas
• Bring the fight toadvantageousgeography
Chechen Strategy
The Chechens had no illusions about fighting the Russians. Theyknew they could not conduct conventional combat operationsagainst them and win. However, they believed they could inflictserious damage if they could draw the Russians into the urban envi-ronment. As the battles for Grozny progressed, the Chechens beganto realize the distinct advantages the urban environment gave totheir decentralized operations.
While the Russians concentrated on securing territory, the Chechensaimed to inflict Russian casualties and extend the conflict. Chechenleadership sought to cause one hundred Russian casualties daily; theChechens believed if they could continue the war and inflict highnumbers of Russian casualties, Russia would eventually pull out.
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 67
Russian Strategy
• Seize and hold key terrain• Destroy Chechen resistance
• End war quickly
The Russian strategy was simple and direct: gain control over theterritory of Chechnya and destroy Chechen resistance.
68 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
Order of Battle
Russians
45,000 men—199595,000 men—2000
Chechens
15,000 men
During the first war in 1995, the Russians deployed over 45,000troops from across the wide range of Russian security services to theChechen theater. In 2000, that number doubled to approximately95,000 troops. Chechen numbers are hard to judge due to the largenumber of part-time fighters. The Chechens likely had 15,000 menunder arms though they rarely had more than 2,000–3,000 fighters inthe city of Grozny at any one time.
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 69
The Chechen Defense of Grozny
• Chechens plannedcity defense fortwo years
• City managerand city engineerinvolved
• Intimate knowledge of streets, buildings,and strategic intersections
The Chechens knew that the Russians would send armor unitsdirectly into Grozny to destroy the Chechen resistance. TheChechens used the urban geography to plan their defense. City offi-cials who controlled Grozny’s roads, telephones, and power advisedthe Chechen military leadership. The Chechens drew on their inti-mate knowledge of local streets, buildings, and key intersections todefeat their enemy.
70 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
Basement
Ammo, Food, Supplies
Hand-DugSub-BasementConical Shelter
1st Floor Entrances Blocked
Attack Positions
Top FloorEmpty
Chechen Urban Modifications
Underground
The Chechens would use urban structures as defensive positions. Asthe conflict progressed, they became expert at further modifyingurban structures to give themselves extra protection against Russianforces. The Chechens would board up the first floor windows anddoors to prevent their use by Russian ground troops. The top floorwould be left empty for fear of Russian artillery or air attack. TheChechens would use basements and dig sub-basements to storesupplies and survive massive Russian artillery strikes.
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 71
Initial Assault
• December 31, 1994
• City approached fromeast, west, and north
• Light resistance forNorthern Group
• Northern Groupconvoys to centerof city at dusk
• Long armored columns,no supporting infantry
After reaching the Chechen capital of Grozny, approximately 6,000Russian soldiers mounted a mechanized attack into the urban area.The attack was launched simultaneously from three directions andfeatured tanks supported by infantry riding in BMP infantry fightingvehicles (IFVs). Instead of the anticipated “cake walk,” Russianforces encountered heavy resistance from Chechen forces armedwith large quantities of antitank weapons. The Russian attack wasrepulsed with shockingly high Russian casualties. It took anothertwo months of heavy fighting and adapting Russian tactics to finallycapture Grozny.
72 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
• Attacked at sundown
• Chechens drewRussian forces intocity center
• Chechen scoutsmonitored progressthrough suburbs
• Russian forces panicked
Russians lost 102 of 120 APC/IFV and 20 of 26 tanks
The Chechen Counter-Attack
The Russians used a combination of vehicles during the first attack toinclude BMPs, BTRs, and MTLBs. The Chechens monitored Russianmovement through the city using small, hand-held, off-the-shelfMotorola radios. They intentionally drew the Russians into urbancanyons where they could ambush them and reduce Russian combatadvantages.
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 73
Russian Combined Arms
STORM GROUPMotorized Infantry Company
Tank PlatoonArtillery Platoon
Mortar PlatoonAGS-17 Platoon
Engineer Platoon
Chemical Troops
RussianInfantry/Conscripts
• Young, unhealthy, untrained• Over 2/3 had less than
6 months military experience
• Low morale
• Basic fire and maneuverskills lacking
• NCO and junior officerleadership weak
• Many hid, ran, panicked,or deserted
74 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
Infantry Fighting Vehicles
• High attrition rates• Many lost at point-blank
ranges to RPGs and heavymachine guns
• Increased ammunition needsdue to nature of urban warfare
76 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
RussianObjective:Bridge
RussianArea ofControl2km
RussianArtilleryBarrage
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 77
Semi-RubbleizedUrbanCorridor
RussianStorm Group
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Intelligence
• Limited accurate maps
• Underestimated threat
• Cultural arrogance
• Did not conduct properreconnaissance of city
• Value of imagery limited
Throughout the conflict, the Chechens had a well-developed humanintelligence (HUMINT) network in the city. Chechen fighters rarelywore military uniforms and could easily blend into the city popula-tion. The locals were an excellent information source for theChechens; they would routinely report Russian movements usingsmall hand-held radios and couriers. Young women were particu-larly useful intelligence agents as they could easily move throughoutthe city.
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 79
Rotary Wing
• Employed weapons atstand-off range on cityring
• Would rarely ventureinto urban canyon forfear of attack
• Mainly used for logisticsupport
Airpower
• Hampered by poor weather
• Little direct support of ground troops
• Used free-fire zones
• Employed laser-guided bombsagainst high value targets
80 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
Why Chechnya 1999?
• Internal Security and the “Near Abroad”
• The military wanted to avenge loss in 1996
• Re-establish Russia as a legitimatesuperpower
• Stabilize/control oil region
• Fight “terrorism”
• Election year politics
Mozdok
Urus Martan
GroznyGudermes
Kizlyar
Khasavyurt
Botlikh
Prokhladny
Malgobek
Nadterechnaya
Kalinovskaya
Kamyshev Kargalinskaya
Chervlennaya
Argun
Shali
KirovauyaSovetskoyeVladikavkaz
Alagir
BeslenTerek
Terek
Terek
Novyy Terek
Staryy Terek
Assa
Sunzha
Argun
Sulak
Andiyskoye Kaysu
October–December 1999
Vedeno
Serzhen-Yurt
Russians in Region
MoD 40-55K
MVD 30-45K
West Army Group
East Army
Bamut
Shatili
PHASE ONE
Light Resistance
North Army Group
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 81
Mozdok
Urus Martan
GroznyGudermes
Kizlyar
Khasavyurt
Botlikh
Prokhladny
Malgobek
Nadterechnaya
Kalinovskaya
Kamyshev Kargalinskaya
Chervlennaya
Argun
Shali
KirovauyaSovetskoyeVladikavkaz
Alagir
BeslenTerek
Terek
Terek
Novyy Terek
Staryy Terek
Assa
Sunzha
Argun
Sulak
Andiyskoye Kaysu
January–February 5, 2000
Vedeno
Serzhen-Yurt
Russians in Region
MoD 40-55K
MVD 30-45K
West Army
Bamut
Shatili
PHASE TWO
East Army
Intense Urban Fighting
North Army
TOS-1 in Chechnya
• Mounted on T-72chassis
• 220mm rocket tubes
• Unguided
• 4 warheads: napalm,FAE, thermobaric,thermite
Russian More-Than-Lethal
82 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
These graphics depict the Chechen counterattack on New Year’s Eve1994. The Russians were moving in a single column through the citywith no supporting infantry. The Chechens attacked the front andrear vehicles. Once they were disabled, the other vehicles had littleroom to maneuver. The Chechens then moved down the line de-stroying the remaining Russian vehicles. The Russian forces pan-icked and could not launch a counterattack.
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 83
`
84 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
• Would attack Russianunits and break them intosmaller pieces
• Owned the night
The Chechens made use of (and sometimes discarded) the oftenplentiful stock of captured Russian equipment. This included Rus-sian Night Vision Devices (NVDs) for maneuver at night, maneuveroften completed while under Russian bombardment. The Russiansnormally did not move at night or during periods of heavy fog whileoperating in the city. The Chechens used fog to mask their move-ment. They also keyed on the Russian use of smoke as an obscurant,taking it as an indicator of Russian movement. The Chechens wouldfire into the smoke with positive effect during Russian displace-ments.
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 85
Chechen TacticalFormations
8-Man Fighting Group
2 Heavy Machine Guns2 RPGs1 Scout/Sniper1 Rifleman/Medic1 Rifleman/Radioman1 Rifleman/Ammo
Highly MobileNo Body Armor
25
8 88
The Chechens centered their eight man subgroups (armor hunter-killer teams—squad equivalent) on the RPG (“Chechnya’s nationalweapon”). Each subgroup contained three riflemen/automaticriflemen/ammunition bearers, two RPG gunners, one sniper, andtwo machine gunners. The sniper was also often employed as aspotter.
86 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
Chechen Urban Ambush Tactics
8
8
8
8
2525
8
= Landmine
In the conduct of armor and personnel ambushes, the Chechensconfigured their forces into 75-man groups. These were further bro-ken down into three 25-man groups (platoons). These platoons werefurther broken down into three equal-sized teams of six to eightfighters each (squads). Each squad had two RPG gunners and two PK(machinegun) gunners. The 75-man unit (company) had a mortar(82mm) crew in support with at least two tubes per crew. TheChechens did not move by flanking maneuvers against the Russiansbut instead incorporated chess-like maneuvers to hit them. Theyused buildings and other structures as navigation and signal pointsfor maneuvering or initiating ambushes/assaults against the Rus-sians.
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 87
Chechen Urban Ambush Tactics
8
8
8
8
2525
8
Attack Russian Group
BlockRe-enforcements= Landmine
The Chechens only occupied the lower levels of multistory buildingsto avoid casualties from rockets and air-delivered munitions comingthrough the upper levels. One 25-man platoon comprised the “killerteam” and set up in three positions along the target avenue. Theyhad responsibility for destroying whatever column entered their site.The other two 25-man platoons set up in the buildings at theassumed entry points to the ambush site. They had responsibility forsealing off the ambush entry escape or interdict efforts to reinforcethe ambushed unit.
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Chechen “Hugging”
• Stayed close toRussian infantry inurban areas, usuallyless than 50 meters
• Would rather takechances with infantrythan suffer fromRussian artilleryor air
The Chechens utilized “hugging” techniques to reduce casualtiesfrom indirect fires. They would set up positions within 25 to a maxi-mum of 100 meters of Russian positions in order to render Russianartillery and rocket support ineffective.
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 89
Chechen Infrastructure
• Relied heavily on stolen, captured,or purchased Russian supplies
• Every 8-man team had a Motorolahand-held radio
• Constructed extensive bunkersthroughout the city
The primary communications device used by the Chechens was asmall hand-held Motorola radio. It was used at all levels below“Headquarters” (national equivalent). At this higher level they hadaccess to INMARSAT for communications with the outside world butkept these communications to a minimum because of the monetarycost involved. The Chechens had a ratio of about six combatants toeach Motorola radio—but had they been able to afford more radiosthey would have issued every fighter one during the conduct ofurban operations. The Chechens did not use any encryption or sepa-rate tactical nets. They maintained communications security byusing their native language. Every Chechen could speak Russian butfew Russians understood Chechen.
90 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
The National Weapon ofChechnya: The RPG
• Widely used in Grozny
• Two dedicated RPG gunners per 8-manteam
• Disable first then destroy
• Engaged armor with multiple weapons
• Best RPG gunners 13–16 years old
• Effectiveness greatly increased in urbanenvironment
The standard Russian Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) warheadneeded four rounds on target to penetrate a tank—the Chechensaltered the RPG-7 round by removing the detonator cap and increas-ing the explosive components in such a way that they could pene-trate a tank’s (to include the T-72) armor and “blow the turret off” inone shot. The Chechens found the RPG to be an extremely effectiveweapon in urban warfare. Its simple use and wide availability earnedit the nickname “The National Weapon of Chechnya.” The Chechensemployed the RPG against a wide range of targets, including bunkers,vehicles, personnel, and buildings. The RPG was successfully firedfrom multiple launchers against Russian armor. The Chechens tar-geted the thinly armored areas in the rear, top, and sides of Russianvehicles.
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 91
4 STORY BUILDING
3 STORY BUILDING
Machine Gun Fire
Sniper Fire
4 STORY BUILDING
3 STORY BUILDING
Machine Gun Fire
92 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
4 STORY BUIDLING
3 STORY BUILDING
4 STORY BUILDING
RPGs
4 STORY BUIDLING
3 STORY BUILDING
4 STORY BUILDING
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 93
Urban Sniping
• Widely used by both sides in Grozny
• Second most deadly urban weapon forthe Chechens
• Used as scouts as much as for sniping
• Russians employed in support of infantry;Chechens also depl oyed independently
• Best source of tactical intelligence inurban area
The most effective Chechen weapon system employed against “pure”Russian infantry was the SVD sniper rifle employed by a trainedChechen sniper. The SVD was not only effective as a casualty pro-ducer, but also as a psychological weapon that reduced moraleamong Russian ground troops. The Russians diverted significantcombat power to search for Chechen snipers but were unsuccessful.A major reason for this was that the Chechens had prepared infantrypositions to provide supporting/covering fire against Russian forcesengaged in countersniper operations.
94 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
Chechen Weaknesses
• Internal divisions hindered effort
• Could not conduct an extensiveengagement
• Many part-time fighters
• Limited supplies of ammunition
• Could not replace large battlefield losses
Despite tactical success in the streets of Grozny, the Chechens hadseveral weaknesses. The Chechens’ greatest weakness was theirinability to conduct an extensive engagement. The small size of theChechen units, coupled with their limited ammunition supplies,caused them to avoid large-scale battles. The Russians discoveredthat the Chechens could be defeated by forcing the rebels intodrawn-out engagements, surrounding their positions, and usingoverwhelming fire support. The Chechens were unwilling to sustainthe level of battlefield losses the Russians experienced and wouldretreat following a strong Russian counterattack.
The Chechens are a clan-based culture that only bands together tofight foreign invasion. Without a common enemy, the Chechensoften turn against each other. The Chechen General Staff did nothave complete control over all Chechen forces. Many were indepen-dent groups that decided themselves when, where, and how longthey would remain in combat. The Russians never learned to suc-cessfully exploit these vulnerabilities and simply viewed all Chechensas terrorists.
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 95
Chechens with Stingers?
This is an example of possible Chechen deception or informationwarfare. It was found on a Chechen Web site and shows severalChechens in possession of Stinger anti-aircraft systems. TheChechens may or may not have working Stinger systems, but thepossibility of their having them affected the way Russians employedtheir aircraft during the conflict.
96 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century
Lessons from Chechnya
• The urban environment leveled the playingfield between forces
• Detailed planning was essential
• Prior urban warfare training was critical tobattlefield success
• Russians did not understand unique aspectsof urban warfare (urban canyon, RPGs, etc.)
• Russians failed to understand culturalaspects
The first thing you must do—and it is priority number one—is studythe people. You must know the psychological makeup of not onlythe combatants you might face but that of the local populace as well.Understand your enemy in detail—but not only from a military andpolitical perspective—but also from a cultural viewpoint. If youunderestimate the importance of this, you are on a road to decisivedefeat. The Russians—given 400 years of conflict with theChechens—have not learned this lesson. It is a matter of under-standing your foe’s mentality.
Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 97
Lessons from Chechnya(Cont.)
• The key to victory in the streets of Groznywas the human will to fight
• Troops must be prepared to withstandlong periods of intense combat in achaotic environment with limitedresupply or rest
• Technology and equipment weresecondary
While it is unlikely the United States will conduct an operation simi-lar to the Russian invasion of Chechnya, there are lessons of valuethat can be learned. Victory in the streets of Grozny was based ontroops’ ability to withstand long periods of intense combat with lim-ited resupply and rest. A significant Russian failure was their inabil-ity to conduct effective small unit infantry operations in a MOUTenvironment. While the Russians captured Grozny in January 2000,the city is now unlivable due to the massive destruction caused byRussian artillery.
The battle of Grozny illustrates the type of urban insurgency thatmay dominate the 21st-century battlefield. Understanding theChechen strategy, tactics, and weapons is essential in preparing U.S.forces for future urban battles.
