Children’s Trust in Adults’ Testimony Paul L. Harris

Children’s Trust in Adults’ Children’s Trust in Adults’ TestimonyTestimony

Paul L. HarrisPaul L. Harris

CollaboratorsCollaborators

• Fabrice Clément (University of Geneva)Fabrice Clément (University of Geneva)

• Melissa Koenig (University of Chicago)Melissa Koenig (University of Chicago)

• Marta Giménez (Open University, Spain)Marta Giménez (Open University, Spain)

• Francisco Pons (Aalborg University, Denmark)Francisco Pons (Aalborg University, Denmark)

• Elizabeth Meins (University of Durham)Elizabeth Meins (University of Durham)

CollaboratorsCollaborators• Elisabeth Pasquini (Harvard University)Elisabeth Pasquini (Harvard University)

• Rita Astuti (LSE, London) Rita Astuti (LSE, London)

• Suzanne Duke (Harvard University)Suzanne Duke (Harvard University)

• Jessica Asscher (University of Amsterdam)Jessica Asscher (University of Amsterdam)

• Kathleen Corriveau (Harvard University)Kathleen Corriveau (Harvard University)

CollaboratorsCollaborators

• Rémi Torracinta (Cycle de Drize, Geneva)Rémi Torracinta (Cycle de Drize, Geneva)

OverviewOverview

• The scope of testimonyThe scope of testimony

• The early development of selective trustThe early development of selective trust

• Parallel testimony: The case of deathParallel testimony: The case of death

• Testimony and ontologyTestimony and ontology

The Scope of Testimony:The Scope of Testimony:Coady’s ParableCoady’s Parable

• ““My first morning in Amsterdam I wake uncertain My first morning in Amsterdam I wake uncertain of the time and ring the hotel clerk to discover the of the time and ring the hotel clerk to discover the hour, accepting the testimony of his voice...I read hour, accepting the testimony of his voice...I read a paperback history book which contains all a paperback history book which contains all manner of factual claims that neither I nor the manner of factual claims that neither I nor the writer can support by personal observation or writer can support by personal observation or memory or by deduction from either: the deeds of memory or by deduction from either: the deeds of a man called Napoleon Bonaparte...I reflect that a man called Napoleon Bonaparte...I reflect that on arriving at a strange city a day or so earlier, I on arriving at a strange city a day or so earlier, I had only the aircrew’s word that this was had only the aircrew’s word that this was Amsterdam...”Amsterdam...”

The development of trust and doubtThe development of trust and doubt

• When children are given information that When children are given information that they cannot check for themselves, do they they cannot check for themselves, do they accept information from any informant?accept information from any informant?

• Alternatively, do they select among Alternatively, do they select among informants? informants?


• Do they keep track of an informant’s past Do they keep track of an informant’s past reliability?reliability?

• Do they prefer information from reliable as Do they prefer information from reliable as opposed to unreliable informants?opposed to unreliable informants?

Koenig, Clément & Harris (2004)Koenig, Clément & Harris (2004)

• 3- and 4-year-olds received:3- and 4-year-olds received:• Familiarization trialsFamiliarization trials• Judgment trialsJudgment trials• Test trialsTest trials


• Familiarization trialsFamiliarization trials: children observed : children observed two adults: two adults: – a reliable adult who consistently named a reliable adult who consistently named

familiar objects accurately. familiar objects accurately. – an unreliable adult who consistently named an unreliable adult who consistently named

objects inaccurately.objects inaccurately.

“That’s a …shoe”

“That’s a ….ball”


• Children then received Judgment Trials:Children then received Judgment Trials:

• Judgment TrialsJudgment Trials: “Did either of them say : “Did either of them say anything right/wrong? …Who?”anything right/wrong? …Who?”


• Children then received Test Trials:Children then received Test Trials:

• Test TrialsTest Trials: An unfamiliar object was : An unfamiliar object was introduced and each informant named it introduced and each informant named it differently.differently.

“That’s a wug”.

“That’s a dax”.


• Children were asked: “What do you Children were asked: “What do you think it’s called?”think it’s called?”


• Children were divided into two groups:Children were divided into two groups:– Judgment not perfectJudgment not perfect– Judgment perfectJudgment perfect


• We then asked how these two groups We then asked how these two groups performed on test trials.performed on test trials.

• How often did they choose the more How often did they choose the more reliable informant?reliable informant?

Selection of more reliable informant on Selection of more reliable informant on test trials by age and judgmenttest trials by age and judgment

0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

3 years 4 years

Judgment notperfectJudgmentperfect

Next StepsNext Steps

• How long does selectivity last?How long does selectivity last?• Are preschoolers only sensitive to consistent Are preschoolers only sensitive to consistent

accuracy versus consistent inaccuracy?accuracy versus consistent inaccuracy?• Do preschoolers prefer familiar informants?Do preschoolers prefer familiar informants?• Does attachment have an impact?Does attachment have an impact?

Corriveau & Harris (2006)Corriveau & Harris (2006)

• Given that 3- and 4-year-olds are selective, Given that 3- and 4-year-olds are selective, how long does their selectivity last?how long does their selectivity last?

• Day 1: Familiarization + Judgment + Test Day 1: Familiarization + Judgment + Test trialstrials

• One Day Later: Test TrialsOne Day Later: Test Trials• One Week Later: Test TrialsOne Week Later: Test Trials

Selection of more reliable informant on Selection of more reliable informant on test trials by time and judgmenttest trials by time and judgment

0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

Sameday

After 1Day

After 1Week

Judgment notperfect

Judgmentperfect

Pasquini et al. (2006)Pasquini et al. (2006)

• 3- and 4-year-olds again observed two adults: 3- and 4-year-olds again observed two adults:

– An adult who was more reliable over four trialsAn adult who was more reliable over four trials

– An adult who was less reliable over four trialsAn adult who was less reliable over four trials

Pasquini et al. (2006)Pasquini et al. (2006)• 100% versus 0%100% versus 0%

• 100% versus 25%100% versus 25%

• 75% versus 0%75% versus 0%



Pasquini et al., (2006)Pasquini et al., (2006)

0

0.5

1

100% vs.0%

100% vs.25%

75% vs.0%

75% vs.0%

75% vs25%

3-year-olds

4-year-olds


• 3-year-olds were above chance only when one 3-year-olds were above chance only when one informant was 100% correct. They were informant was 100% correct. They were ‘unforgiving’ of even one error.‘unforgiving’ of even one error.

• 4-year-olds were systematically above chance 4-year-olds were systematically above chance on all conditions. Their trust was undermined on all conditions. Their trust was undermined more gradually.more gradually.


• 3-year-olds display an all-or-nothing 3-year-olds display an all-or-nothing response.response.

• 4-year-olds display a graded response.4-year-olds display a graded response.

All-or-nothingAll-or-nothing

• 3-year-olds3-year-olds

All-or nothingAll-or nothing


GradedGraded


GradedGraded


GradedGraded


GradedGraded


Corriveau et al. (2006)Corriveau et al. (2006)• Do children trust familiar more than Do children trust familiar more than

unfamiliar informants?unfamiliar informants?• 3- and 4-year-olds were given test trials 3- and 4-year-olds were given test trials

with one familiar and one unfamiliar with one familiar and one unfamiliar caregiver at Centers 1 and 2.caregiver at Centers 1 and 2.

• Children were shown an unfamiliar object Children were shown an unfamiliar object and each caregiver gave a different name.and each caregiver gave a different name.

Caregiver 1Caregiver 1 Caregiver 2Caregiver 2



Choice of informant by Age and Choice of informant by Age and Caregiver at Center 1Caregiver at Center 1

0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

Caregiver 1 Caregiver 2

3 Years

4 Years

Choice of informant by Age and Choice of informant by Age and Caregiver at Center 2Caregiver at Center 2

0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

Caregiver 1 Caregiver 2

3 Years

4 Years

Corriveau, Meins & Harris (in preparation)Corriveau, Meins & Harris (in preparation)

• Children falling into four attachment Children falling into four attachment groups groups (avoidant, secure, groups groups (avoidant, secure, ambivalent and disorganized) were given ambivalent and disorganized) were given test trials in which their mother and an test trials in which their mother and an unfamiliar experimenter gave different unfamiliar experimenter gave different names for an unfamiliar object.names for an unfamiliar object.

MotherMother StrangerStranger



Choice of informant (mother versus Choice of informant (mother versus stranger) by attachment statusstranger) by attachment status

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

Avoidant Secure Ambivalent Disorganized

MotherStranger

Summary of early selective trustSummary of early selective trust

• 3- and 4-year-olds monitor for accuracy and prefer 3- and 4-year-olds monitor for accuracy and prefer reliable informants.reliable informants.

• They remember errors for at least one week.They remember errors for at least one week.• Whereas 3-year-olds display mistrust after a single Whereas 3-year-olds display mistrust after a single

error, 4-year-olds are more forgiving.error, 4-year-olds are more forgiving.• 3- and 4-year-olds prefer familiar informants, 3- and 4-year-olds prefer familiar informants,

unless they have an avoidant attachment.unless they have an avoidant attachment.


• Children will regard many adults as Children will regard many adults as trustworthy because:trustworthy because:

• They will have made accurate claims They will have made accurate claims • They will be familiar to the child.They will be familiar to the child.• Children will trust these adults – even when Children will trust these adults – even when

they cannot check their claims.they cannot check their claims.

Parallel Testimony:Parallel Testimony:The Case of DeathThe Case of Death

• Standard developmental approach: children Standard developmental approach: children gradually consolidate a biological ‘theory’ of gradually consolidate a biological ‘theory’ of death as a terminal point for all processes.death as a terminal point for all processes.

• Yet most children probably receive two parallel Yet most children probably receive two parallel accounts of death: a biological and a religious accounts of death: a biological and a religious account.account.

• Do children assimilate both different accounts?Do children assimilate both different accounts?

Harris & Giménez (2005)Harris & Giménez (2005)

• Spanish children aged 7 and 11 Spanish children aged 7 and 11 years were given two stories about years were given two stories about the death of an elderly person:the death of an elderly person:

Biological StoryBiological Story

• “In this picture you see Juan’s grandfather. At the end of his life Juan’s grandfather got very ill and died. He was taken to a hospital where they tried to help him he was too old and they could not cure him. The doctor came to talk to Juan about what had happened. He said to Juan: “You grandfather is dead now.”

Religious StoryReligious Story

• “In this picture you see Marta’s grandmother. At the end of her life Marta’s grandmother got very ill and died. She was taken to a hospital where they tried to help her but she was too old and they could not cure her. The priest came to talk to Marta about what had happened. He said to Marta: “Your grandmother is with God now.”


• After each story, children were asked questions about After each story, children were asked questions about the bodily and mental functioning of the dead person:the bodily and mental functioning of the dead person:

• Example of question about bodily functioning: “Have Example of question about bodily functioning: “Have his eyes stopped working?”his eyes stopped working?”

• Example of question about mental functioning: “Can Example of question about mental functioning: “Can he still see?”he still see?”

Proportion of ‘does not work’ replies by Story Proportion of ‘does not work’ replies by Story and Process Type (Spain)and Process Type (Spain)

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Biological Religious

BodyMind


• More ‘does not work’ judgments given:More ‘does not work’ judgments given:

– For body than for mindFor body than for mind

– For biological story than for religious storyFor biological story than for religious story


• Having made a ‘does not work’ or ‘does work Having made a ‘does not work’ or ‘does work ‘judgment, children were asked for a ‘judgment, children were asked for a justification.justification.

• Children generally backed up a ‘does not Children generally backed up a ‘does not work’ judgment with a biological justificationwork’ judgment with a biological justification

• They generally backed up a ‘does work’ They generally backed up a ‘does work’ judgment with a religious justification.judgment with a religious justification.


• Biological: Biological: – ““He has been eaten by worms, he has no body. He has been eaten by worms, he has no body.

He just has bones” He just has bones” – ““If he is dead, nothing can work.” If he is dead, nothing can work.”

• Religious: : – ““In heaven everything can work even if she is In heaven everything can work even if she is

dead” dead” – “ “The soul keeps working.” The soul keeps working.”

Astuti & Harris (in press)Astuti & Harris (in press)

• Are two conceptions of death also found in Are two conceptions of death also found in a non-Christian culture?a non-Christian culture?

• Rita Astuti repeated the Spanish study with Rita Astuti repeated the Spanish study with the Vezo people of Madagascar.the Vezo people of Madagascar.

• The Vezo worship their ancestors - who The Vezo worship their ancestors - who may bring misfortune on the family if they may bring misfortune on the family if they are angry or displeased.are angry or displeased.

Biological StoryBiological Story

“ “This is the picture of a man called Rampy. This is the picture of a man called Rampy. He worked very hard all the time. And one He worked very hard all the time. And one day when it was very hot, he had a serious day when it was very hot, he had a serious malaria attack, and his body and head ached malaria attack, and his body and head ached a lot. His children and wife took him to the a lot. His children and wife took him to the hospital, where he was given four injections. hospital, where he was given four injections. Nonetheless, after three days from the time Nonetheless, after three days from the time he arrived at the hospital, he died.”he arrived at the hospital, he died.”

Religious StoryReligious Story

““This is the picture of a man called Rapeto. He had This is the picture of a man called Rapeto. He had many children and grandchildren. On the day when many children and grandchildren. On the day when he died, many of his grandchildren were with him in he died, many of his grandchildren were with him in his house. And now that he is dead, he is often in the his house. And now that he is dead, he is often in the dreams of his grandchildren. Rapeto’s family has dreams of his grandchildren. Rapeto’s family has built the cross for him, and his children and built the cross for him, and his children and grandchildren are happy because the work for his grandchildren are happy because the work for his tomb has been completed well.”tomb has been completed well.”

Proportion of ‘does not work’ replies by Story Proportion of ‘does not work’ replies by Story and Process Typeand Process Type

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Biological Religious

BodyMind

Proportion of participants in four categories:Proportion of participants in four categories:Biological storyBiological story

0

20

40

60

80

100

Total CessationBody>MindBody=MindBody<Mind

Proportion of participants in four categories:Proportion of participants in four categories:Religious storyReligious story

0

20

40

60

80

100

Total CessationBody>MindBody=MindBody<Mind

Astuti & Harris (in press)Astuti & Harris (in press)

• A similar pattern to Spain:A similar pattern to Spain:• More ‘does not work’ judgments given:More ‘does not work’ judgments given:

– For body than for mindFor body than for mind

– For biological story than for religious storyFor biological story than for religious story

– Two co-existing conceptions of deathTwo co-existing conceptions of death

Harris et al. (in preparation)Harris et al. (in preparation)

• Are these two conceptions universal?Are these two conceptions universal?

– Harvard Student BelieversHarvard Student Believers

– Believers at a Catholic CollegeBelievers at a Catholic College

– Harvard Student Non-BelieversHarvard Student Non-Believers

Number of ‘does not work’ Number of ‘does not work’ judgments by process and groupjudgments by process and group

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

HarvardBelievers

CatholicBelievers

Harvard Non-Believers

Body

Mind

SummarySummary

• Children and adults typically display two different Children and adults typically display two different conceptions of death: A biological conception and conceptions of death: A biological conception and a religious conception.a religious conception.

• The religious conception may be parasitic on the The religious conception may be parasitic on the consolidation of the biological conception. consolidation of the biological conception.

• Most people display no cognitive tension between Most people display no cognitive tension between the two conceptions.the two conceptions.

• Only non-believers seek to reconcile them.Only non-believers seek to reconcile them.

Testimony and Ontology:Testimony and Ontology:

• In making ontological judgments children In making ontological judgments children might adopt:might adopt:

• An empirical strategy – “What exists is An empirical strategy – “What exists is what I have observed or could observe.” what I have observed or could observe.”

• A strategy based on testimony – “What A strategy based on testimony – “What exists is what I have been told about.”exists is what I have been told about.”

Harris, Pasquini, Duke, Asscher Harris, Pasquini, Duke, Asscher & Pons (2006)& Pons (2006)

• 4-5-year-olds and 7-8-year-olds were asked about three 4-5-year-olds and 7-8-year-olds were asked about three different types of entity:different types of entity:

• ““Impossible” entities (e.g., Flying Pigs, Barking Cats)Impossible” entities (e.g., Flying Pigs, Barking Cats)

• ““Real” entities (e.g. Rabbits, Giraffes)Real” entities (e.g. Rabbits, Giraffes)

• ““Scientific” entities: (e.g., Germs, Oxygen)Scientific” entities: (e.g., Germs, Oxygen)

Harris et al. (2006)Harris et al. (2006)

• Children were asked:Children were asked:– ““Are there really _____?”Are there really _____?”

Predicted number of ‘yes’ responses to Predicted number of ‘yes’ responses to existence question: Empirical Strategyexistence question: Empirical Strategy

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

ImpossibleRealScientific

Predicted number of ‘yes’ responses to Predicted number of ‘yes’ responses to existence question: Testimony Strategyexistence question: Testimony Strategy

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3


Actual number of ‘yes’ responses to Actual number of ‘yes’ responses to existence questionexistence question

00.5

1

1.5

2

2.53

4-5 Years 7-8 Years


Do children differentiate among Do children differentiate among unobservables?unobservables?

• Children accept scientific claims about the role of Children accept scientific claims about the role of the brain.the brain.

• Children accept religious claims about the Children accept religious claims about the afterlife.afterlife.

• Do children differentiate among such claims? Do Do children differentiate among such claims? Do they have equal confidence in every type of they have equal confidence in every type of unobservable?unobservable?

Harris et al. (2006): Experiment 2Harris et al. (2006): Experiment 2• All unobservables are equal: All unobservables are equal:

Mermaids = God = GermsMermaids = God = Germs• Some unobservables are fictional; others Some unobservables are fictional; others

(special beings + scientific entities) do exist: (special beings + scientific entities) do exist: Mermaids < God = GermsMermaids < God = Germs

• Some unobservables are fictional; some Some unobservables are fictional; some special beings probably exist; some special beings probably exist; some scientific entities definitely exist:scientific entities definitely exist:

Mermaids < God < GermsMermaids < God < Germs

Experiment 2Experiment 2

• 5-6-year-olds were asked about three different 5-6-year-olds were asked about three different types of unobservable entity:types of unobservable entity:

• ““Non-endorsed” entities (e.g., Mermaids, Ghosts) Non-endorsed” entities (e.g., Mermaids, Ghosts)

• ““Endorsed” entities: (e.g., Endorsed” entities: (e.g., God, Tooth Fairy)God, Tooth Fairy)

• ““Scientific” entities: (e.g., Germs, Oxygen)Scientific” entities: (e.g., Germs, Oxygen)

Experiment 2Experiment 2

• Children were asked:Children were asked:• ExistenceExistence: “: “Are there really _____?” Are there really _____?” • ConfidenceConfidence: “: “Are you very sure about that Are you very sure about that

or not very sure?”or not very sure?”

Experiment 2: Mean Number of Experiment 2: Mean Number of ‘Yes’ Judgments‘Yes’ Judgments

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

Mermaids God Germs

ExistenceConfidence

Children’s justifications for Children’s justifications for ‘existence’ judgments‘existence’ judgments

• Encounter (or Lack of Encounter)Encounter (or Lack of Encounter): “I saw them at : “I saw them at the zoo” or the zoo” or “My uncle has one” or “I’ve never seen “My uncle has one” or “I’ve never seen one”one”

• SourceSource: : “Because I know that – my mum and dad “Because I know that – my mum and dad told me that” or “I learnt that at school”told me that” or “I learnt that at school”

• GeneralizationGeneralization: : “Because animals can have germs” “Because animals can have germs” (non-causal) or “They give (you) diseases” (causal)(non-causal) or “They give (you) diseases” (causal)

Experiment 2: JustificationsExperiment 2: Justifications

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

Mermaids God Germs

EncounterSourceGeneralization

Experiment 2: ConclusionsExperiment 2: Conclusions

• Children differentiate sharply between Children differentiate sharply between Mermaids on the one hand and God + Mermaids on the one hand and God + Germs on the other.Germs on the other.

• They differentiate both for judgments and They differentiate both for judgments and justifications.justifications.


• In many ways, children conceptualize In many ways, children conceptualize ‘endorsed’ special beings such as God and ‘endorsed’ special beings such as God and ‘scientific’ entities such as germs similarly.‘scientific’ entities such as germs similarly.– They often judge that each type of entity existsThey often judge that each type of entity exists– They often express confidence in that judgmentThey often express confidence in that judgment– They often justify their belief by offering They often justify their belief by offering

generalizations – and by invoking a causal generalizations – and by invoking a causal sequencesequence


• Yet children are also beginning to differentiate between Yet children are also beginning to differentiate between ‘scientific’ and ‘endorsed’ special beings. Children’s ‘scientific’ and ‘endorsed’ special beings. Children’s judgment about the two types differ. Even if their judgment about the two types differ. Even if their pattern of justification is similar,pattern of justification is similar,– They more often judge that ‘scientific’ entities existThey more often judge that ‘scientific’ entities exist– They express more confidence in their judgment about They express more confidence in their judgment about

‘scientific’ entities‘scientific’ entities

Summarizing:Summarizing:

Mermaids << God < GermsMermaids << God < Germs

Abarbanell (2006)Abarbanell (2006)

• interviewed children aged 10-13 years of interviewed children aged 10-13 years of the Tseltal-speaking Mayan community of the Tseltal-speaking Mayan community of Tenejapa, Mexico.Tenejapa, Mexico.


• impossible impossible (e.g., flying pigs, barking cats)(e.g., flying pigs, barking cats)

• realreal (e.g., squirrels, chickens) (e.g., squirrels, chickens)

• scientificscientific (e.g., germs, oxygen) (e.g., germs, oxygen)

• endorsedendorsed (e.g., ch'ulelal, ijk'al ) (e.g., ch'ulelal, ijk'al )


• Dead souls (ch’ulelal ) – Dead souls (ch’ulelal ) – thethe spirits or souls spirits or souls of the dead; a visit from the ch’ulelal can of the dead; a visit from the ch’ulelal can cause illness. cause illness.

• Cave spirits (ijk’al) – Cave spirits (ijk’al) – small, black, cave-small, black, cave-dwelling creatures that allegedly assault dwelling creatures that allegedly assault people at night. people at night.


0

0.5

11.5

2

2.5

3

Flying pigs

Dead Souls

Chickens Germs

10-13 years

Summarizing:Summarizing:

Flying Pigs < Dead Souls < Germs = ChickensFlying Pigs < Dead Souls < Germs = Chickens

Explanations:Explanations:

• Why are children more confident about Why are children more confident about germs than God (or dead souls)? germs than God (or dead souls)?

• Three explanations:Three explanations:– Children are scientists – they assess claims Children are scientists – they assess claims

for their causal plausibilityfor their causal plausibility– Children are sociologists – they sample Children are sociologists – they sample

public opinion public opinion – Children are linguists – they are sensitive to Children are linguists – they are sensitive to

the pattern of speech actsthe pattern of speech acts

Children are scientists – they assess Children are scientists – they assess claims for their causal plausibilityclaims for their causal plausibility

• Children grasp that special beings, unlike scientific Children grasp that special beings, unlike scientific entities, have extraordinary properties, e.g., God is entities, have extraordinary properties, e.g., God is omniscient (Barrett, Richert & Driesenga, 2001); omniscient (Barrett, Richert & Driesenga, 2001); immortal (immortal (GiménezGiménez, Guerrero & Harris, 2005); and the , Guerrero & Harris, 2005); and the Creator of species (Evans, 2000).Creator of species (Evans, 2000).

• Arguably, these extraordinary properties lead children Arguably, these extraordinary properties lead children to wonder if special beings really do exist.to wonder if special beings really do exist.

Children are sociologists – they Children are sociologists – they sample public opinionsample public opinion

• Children might keep track of the degree of Children might keep track of the degree of consensus surrounding a given entityconsensus surrounding a given entity

• They notice that everyone believes in germs They notice that everyone believes in germs but some people doubt the existence of but some people doubt the existence of special beingsspecial beings

• Louis: “Some families believe in God”Louis: “Some families believe in God”

Children are linguists – they are Children are linguists – they are sensitive to the pattern of speech actssensitive to the pattern of speech acts

• Affirmation versus presuppositionAffirmation versus presupposition

Belief in special beings is often Belief in special beings is often affirmed - rather than presupposedaffirmed - rather than presupposed

• ““I believe in God”I believe in God”

• ““There really is a There really is a Tooth fairy” Tooth fairy”

• ““Don’t touch that – it has Don’t touch that – it has germs” vs. “I believe in germs” vs. “I believe in germs” (?)germs” (?)

• ““You need oxygen to You need oxygen to

breath” vs. “There really is breath” vs. “There really is oxygen” (?) oxygen” (?)

How to test?How to test?

• Suppose that in a traditional, isolated Suppose that in a traditional, isolated community, children encounter unanimity community, children encounter unanimity rather than diversity of opinion about special rather than diversity of opinion about special beings and they encounter presuppositions beings and they encounter presuppositions (rather than assertions of faith) about such (rather than assertions of faith) about such beingsbeings

PredictionsPredictions

• Children are scientists: Children are scientists: – Ancestors < ChickensAncestors < Chickens

• Children are sociologists:Children are sociologists:– Ancestors = ChickensAncestors = Chickens

• Children are linguistsChildren are linguists– Ancestors = ChickensAncestors = Chickens

Ontology: ConclusionsOntology: Conclusions• Children display no sharp discontinuity between Children display no sharp discontinuity between

the way they conceive of unobservable ‘scientific’ the way they conceive of unobservable ‘scientific’ entities and the way they conceive of entities and the way they conceive of unobservable special beings, including God.unobservable special beings, including God.

• Yet there are clear signs of a differentiation.Yet there are clear signs of a differentiation.• How universal is that differentiation.?How universal is that differentiation.?• What drives it?What drives it?

The Cautious Disciple?The Cautious Disciple?

• Preschool children are cautious about whose Preschool children are cautious about whose information they accept.information they accept.

• Children - and most adults - are ‘disciples’; they Children - and most adults - are ‘disciples’; they believe not only in biological death but in an believe not only in biological death but in an afterlife.afterlife.

• Children accept the existence of scientific and Children accept the existence of scientific and religious entities that they cannot see.religious entities that they cannot see.

• Yet they show some caution with respect to Yet they show some caution with respect to religious entities.religious entities.

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Children’s Trust in Adults’ Testimony Paul L. Harris

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