1NC China Disadvantage [1/3] A. Uniqueness – China’s the world leader in ocean exploration in the status quo
Fan 7-3[Wei. “China takes lead in underwater exploration” 7/3/14 http://www.ecns.cn/2014/07-03/122159.shtml]
The Jiaolong submersible won the 2014 Hans Hass Fifty Fathoms Award in Sanya, Hainan province, in June. The award is jointly given by the Historical Diving Society Hans Hass Award Committee and Swiss watchmaker Blancpain.¶ The submersible, independently developed in China, reached as deep as 7,062 meters in the Mariana Trench in the western Pacific Ocean in 2012, setting a new record among Chinese divers.¶ The committee initiated a double prize for Cui Weicheng, deputy chief designer of Jiaolong, for his individual achievements, and the State Oceanic Administration for its support in building the submersible.¶ The award has been honoring individuals for excellence in underwater science and technology since 2003. Previous recipients include renowned film director and diving pioneer James Cameron and Stan Waterman, pioneering underwater film producer and photographer. This is the first time a Chinese project has won the award.¶ "Today, it is China that is leading the world in its commitment to manned deep ocean exploration," says Krov Menuhin, chairman of the award committee and advisory board member at the Historical Diving Society, an international non-profit organization that studies man's underwater activities and promotes public awareness of the ocean.
1NC China Disadvantage [2/3] B. [INSERT A PLAN-SPECIFIC LINK]
C. Internal Link – Competition over oceanic influence hurts Chinese credibility and undermines overall relations
Yoshihara and Holmes 2009[Tosh and James. Chair of China Maritime Studies and Professor of Strategy, both at the Naval War College. “Chinese Soft Power in the Indian Ocean” 2009. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450481]
Beijing‘s use of Zheng He as a diplomatic tool is also motivated in part by the relative paucity of the country‘s “hard” power. A striking example followed the December 2004 tsunami, when countries such as the United States, Japan, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand dispatched maritime assets to Indonesia to help in recovery operations off Aceh and the Sumatran coast. Beijing demurred from deploying naval forces to aid relief efforts—underscoring its inability to use military power to influence regional and world events. The goodwill generated by the U.S. Navy‘s exemplary tsunami relief effort was a particularly jarring episode for Beijing. In their surprisingly unsparing appraisals, Chinese analysts vividly portray Beijing's sense of helplessness when it witnessed—on the sidelines—America's impressive conversion of its hard- edged power projection capabilities into a humanitarian vehicle. As Qu Zhaowei laments: Although China had long wished to give full play to its own soft power in the region, because it did not possess adequate capabilities, it could only watch the United States reverse its negative image in the Asia-Pacific region since the Iraq War. According to Qu, Chinese fears that America's "overwhelming soft power influence" might negate China's engagement strategy in Asia spurred the PLAN to build large hospital ships as a strategic counter move. The tsunami experience, then, painfully demonstrated a harsh reality: hard power must play an effective role in underwriting soft power. As Bruce Elleman notes: When viewed in terms of the Confucian concept of ren, or “humaneness,” Washington was able to outshine Beijing by far. China is clearly aspiring to become a regional superpower by using a whole range of government powers, including its military forces, but when put to the test its naval forces failed. Beijing‘s lingering military weakness, inexperience in overseas environments, and deployment of forces to assure internal security in provinces such as Tibet and Xinjiang and regain control of Taiwan have prevented the PLA from building up forces in regions of real and growing interest. These strategic impediments and pressing priorities explain the inaction in 2004. Without hard power in these regions, Beijing has turned to Zheng He as a stopgap, deftly proliferating an admirable idea of China through its sophisticated historical narrative. This allows Chinese diplomats some say in Southeast and South Asian affairs while Beijing remains weak at sea. It also helps Beijing mold diplomatic conditions in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean basin in anticipation of a future buildup of naval power in regional waters, should Chinese leaders decide their interests warrant such a buildup. And its invented soft power may give rise to an innocuous impression of China, helping make the increasing Chinese political and military presence in coastal Asia palatable if not welcome to regional governments. History, then, influences China‘s outlook on maritime affairs, imbuing Beijing‘s oceanic aspirations with a sense of destiny. China‘s leadership routinely connects its grand strategy to past endeavors while attempting to conciliate its maritime neighbors. In short, China‘s leaders are sculpting an impressive program of public diplomacy, using the deeds of a venerated historical figure, backed by tangible signs of good faith, to rally domestic and international support behind today‘s oceanic ventures.
1NC China Disadvantage [3/3] D. The Impact – A healthy US-China relationship that values both sides equally is vital to stave off a host of global threats
Gross 2013[David. Senior Associate at the Pacific Forum of CSIS. “Seizing the Opportunity to Improve US-China Relations” 3/19/13 The Huffington Post, available via Lexis-Nexis]
Better relations with China would support wide-reaching political reform and liberalization. They would undercut the repressive internal forces that legitimize one-party authoritarian rule as a means of protecting the country against foreign military threats, particularly from the United States. In the field of national security, through an ongoing process of mutual threat reduction, the United States can ensure that China is a future partner and not a danger to the interests of America and its allies. The greatest benefit is that the U.S. would avoid a military conflict for the foreseeable future with a country it now considers a major potential adversary. Other critical security benefits to the United States and its allies include: • Significantly reducing China's current and potential military threat to Taiwan, thus securing Taiwan's democracy; • Utilizing China's considerable influence with North Korea to curb Pyongyang's nuclear weapon and missile development programs; • Increasing security cooperation with China on both regional and global issues, allowing the United States to leverage Chinese capabilities for meeting common transnational threats such as climate change, energy insecurity, pandemic disease, cyberterrorism and nuclear proliferation; • Curtailing cyberattacks by the Chinese military on U.S.-based targets as well as enforcing stringent measures against private individuals and groups in China that engage in cyber-hacking; • Having China submit its maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas to an independent international judicial body to prevent festering conflicts over uninhabited islands and energy resources from escalating to armed conflict; and • Reducing the scope, scale, and tempo of China's military modernization programs by discrediting the rationale for conducting a focused anti-U.S. buildup, especially since the country has so many other pressing material needs. In his second term, President Obama should seize the opportunity created by the emergence of China's new leadership to stabilize U.S.-China relations -- by pursuing a diplomatic strategy that minimizes conflict, achieves greater mutually beneficial Sino-American cooperation, and significantly expands trade and investment between the two countries. This approach would enable the United States to maintain an effective military presence in the Asia Pacific in coming years, despite defense budget cuts, while also rebalancing economic and political resources to the region to ensure stability and mutual prosperity.
Plan-Specific 1NC Link: Aquaculture [1/1] ( ) US aquaculture expansion trades off with China’s market share
Bondie and Wolf 2013[Marcella and Anna – U of I – Chicago. “Planning for Sustainable Aquaculture” 2013 http://www.uic.edu/cuppa/upp/research/research/Student%20Pages/pdf/bondie_wolf_project.pdf]
As many studies assert, the United States is the largest Western importer of tilapia, China is the ¶ largest global exporter of tilapia, and both will continue to be so into the future. This suggests that ¶ contemporary food systems are primarily influenced by global market forces and large food distributors, ¶ such as Wal-Mart and Costco. These distributors, though in a position to incentivize aquaculture ¶ producers to practice sustainable methods, merely react to current unsustainable practices, rather than ¶ taking a proactive approach to avoiding unsustainable practices at the start. ¶ To counter this trend of importing unsustainably farmed fish, countries that have the economic means ¶ and the need to increase food security should encourage legislation that enables municipalities ¶ and regional areas to participate in the creation and support of local aquaculture systems. The growth ¶ of small, local aquaculture operations will allow consumers a healthy supply of fish protein and may ¶ reduce the global market share of Chinese aquaculture. This is likely to result in reducing the often-¶ unavoidable unsustainable practices that stem from large-scale production and export of fish product.
Plan-Specific 1NC Link: Offshore Wind [1/1] ( ) China’s a global leader in wind energy – the plan undermines their market
Zoninsein 2010[M. Staff Writer for the New York Times. “Chinese Offshore Development Blows Past US” The New York Times, 9/7/10 available via Lexis-Nexis]
As proposed American offshore wind-farm projects creep forward -- slowed by state legislative debates, due diligence and environmental impact assessments -- China has leapt past the United States, installing its first offshore wind farm. Several other farms also are already under construction, and even the Chinese government's ambitious targets seem low compared to industry dreaming. "What the U.S. doesn't realize," said Peggy Liu, founder and chairwoman of the Joint U.S.-China Collaboration on Clean Energy, is that China "is going from manufacturing hub to the clean-tech laboratory of the world." The first major offshore wind farm outside of Europe is located in the East China Sea, near Shanghai. The 102-megawatt Donghai Bridge Wind Farm began transmitting power to the national grid in July and signals a new direction for Chinese renewable energy projects and the initiation of a national policy focusing not just on wind power, but increasingly on the offshore variety. Moreover, "it serves as a showcase of what the Chinese can do offshore ... and it's quite significant," said Rachel Enslow, a wind consultant and co-author of the report "China, Norway and Offshore Wind Development," published in March by Azure International for the World Wildlife Fund Norway.
Plan-Specific 1NC Link: Oil Drilling [1/1] ( ) Increased access to domestic oil creates energy conflicts between the US and China
Herberg 2011[M. Research Director on Asian Security at the National Bureau of Asian Research. ‘China’s Energy Rise and the Future of US-China Energy Relations” 6/21/11 http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/china_s_energy_rise_and_the_future_of_us_china_energy_relations ]
Moreover, the potential to view our energy security problems as shared challenges continues to be undermined by the chronic overlay of distrust at a strategic level. Beijing’s leaders suspect that the U.S. seeks to use its energy vulnerabilities as part of a broader effort to contain China. Criticism of the impact of China’s overseas oil investments in pariah states and elsewhere is seen as a cynical ploy to weaken China’s access to vital oil supplies. Pressure from Washington to reduce carbon emissions is seen as a thinly veiled attempt to slow China’s economic growth and frustrate it from achieving its rightful economic role in the world. Washington, on the other hand, sees China’s energy expansion globally as built on predatory collaboration between Beijing and its national oil champions to carve out privileged access to petroleum supplies, an approach that many believe undermines future U.S. access to needed supplies. This strategic suspicion casts a pall of a “zero-sum” atmosphere of national competition over energy access and security that is repeatedly reinforced by rhetoric on both sides. The 2005 episode when China’s CNOOC sought to acquire Unocal and was forced to withdraw its bid due to a firestorm of criticism of China’s strategic energy intentions epitomized the toxic mix of bilateral energy suspicions and mirror-imaging.¶ Further, to the extent that the U.S. might encourage China to take a stronger leadership role on global energy security cooperation, it is still very unclear what role Beijing would want to take on the world energy stage. This is a corollary to the broader lack of clarity over what role Beijing wants to play in other global issues, from currencies to nuclear proliferation. Beijing remains largely inwardly focused and driven by its domestic search for stability, economic development, and territorial integrity. Consistent with its traditional broader foreign policy of “keeping a low profile”, Beijing has shown relatively little serious interest in multilateral energy cooperation.5 Conversely, assuming China were to show interest in a strategic energy partnership, it is not clear to what extent Washington is truly ready for a “shared global energy partnership”. This would require accommodating very different Chinese views on the role of energy markets and pricing, policies toward key petroleum producers and regions, the role of the IEA and multilateral cooperation, and responsibility for reducing carbon emissions. Washington tends to view a partnership as China simply joining in and becoming enmeshed and integrated into a set of U.S.-sponsored and led energy institutions and policy agendas established by the west. This is highly unlikely to be acceptable to Beijing’s leadership.
Plan Specific 1NC Link: Coral Reefs [1/1] ( ) China hates ocean protection efforts – they would be angered by the plan because they perceive it as infringing upon their development efforts.
DSO 2012[Der Speigel (Prominent German publication) Online. “Saving the Southern Ocean: China, Russia Block Plan to Protect Antarctic Waters” 11/2/12 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/china-and-russia-block-plan-to-create-ocean-sanctuaries-in-antarctica-a-864962.html]
Proposals to establish marine reserves in two critical areas of the Southern Ocean were stymied by Russia, China and Ukraine at the end of a two-week international summit in Australia on Thursday. Commercial fishing restrictions in the proposed sanctuaries proved to be the main sticking point. ¶ A meeting of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in Hobart, Australia ended in deadlock on Thursday when member nations failed to reach agreement on new protected areas across Antarctica, home to the world's most intact marine ecosystem.¶ The two-week CCAMLR talks, attended by representatives from 24 nations and the European Union, were geared at establishing giant marine sanctuaries in two critical areas of the Southern Ocean.¶ One of the most pristine ocean regions in the world, its waters are home to penguins, seals, whales and seabirds, whose food sources are increasingly under threat from climate change and overfishing. At stake are the region's stocks of krill, a valuable crustacean which is the keystone species of the Antarctic ecosystem. The growing global demand for animal feed and fish bait is causing a rapid decline in its numbers.¶ "Antarctica is home to unique ecosystems," said German Agricultural Minister Ilse Aigner ahead of the talks, pledging that Germany would "actively support protection of its oceans."¶ A US-New Zealand plan foresaw a 1.6 million square kilometer protected area in the Ross Sea, while nations led by the EU and Australia had proposed a series of reserves encompassing 1.9 million square kilometers -- an area bigger than Alaska.¶ Commercial Versus Conservation Interests¶ But these efforts were thwarted by resistance from China, Russia and Ukraine, which raised objections to fishing restrictions in the proposed reserve on the grounds they would have too much impact on their annual hauls.¶ "(Establishing marine reserves) is a complex process involving a large amount of scientific research as well as international diplomacy," said CCAMLR in a statement. "It was decided … that further consideration of the proposals is needed." Amid the lack of consensus, the decision on the ocean sanctuary was postponed until a special session to be held in Germany in July 2013.¶ Environmentalists expressed their concern at the outcome of the CCAMLR talks. "We're deeply disappointed," Steve Campbell of the Antarctic Ocean Alliance told Reuters. "Members failed to establish any large-scale Antarctic marine protection because a number of countries actively blocked conservation efforts."¶ "CCAMLR has behaved like a fisheries organization instead of an organization dedicated to conservation of Antarctic waters," railed Farah Obaidullah of Greenpeace.¶ Gerry Leape from the Pew Environment Group agreed, telling AFP that "In 2011, participating countries agreed to work together to protect and conserve the unique marine life that thrives in the ocean surrounding Antarctica. Instead, they are heading home and leaving the door wide open to unchecked commercial fishing in these areas."
2NC / 1NR Extensions: A/T #1 – “Relations Low” [1/1] 1. US-China cooperation over the ocean is expanding in the status quo. Our MecroPress evidence says China is becoming a global oceanic leader and investing key resources in further exploration and development.
2. China’s expanding influence over ocean exploration and development – this is proven by recent actions in the South and East China seas.
Dutton 2014[Peter. Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College. “China’s Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas” The Naval War College Review, January 2014. Available via Ebsco]
China's many operational actions in the near seas and its use of the language of international law to seek legitimacy for these actions represent the steady unfolding of China's strategy to develop an arc of maritime control across those seas. Accelerated Chinese activities around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the aDIZ announcement, and the Cowpens incident are just the most recent "battles" in China's security campaign in the region. Unless current trends change, there is no reason to believe that China's campaign will stop short of achieving its aims.
2NC / 1NR Extensions: A/T #2 – “No Link” [1/1] 1. China’s the global leader in ocean exploration. They are investing in new submersible technology that can explore further beneath the ocean’s surface than any other country in the world. The plan’s increase in US exploration would encroach on Chinese priorities. That’s our 1NC Fan evidence.
2. China’s investing significant financial and political capital into ocean exploration. National pride proves they’d react negatively to the plan.
Marlow 2013[Jeff. Reporter for Wired. “Ocean Exploration: The Deep Space Age” Vision: Perspectives from Dubai, March, http://vision.ae/en/life/articles/ocean_exploration_the_deep_space_age]
The race is on to discover what lies at the bottom of the world’s final undiscovered frontier: its seas. Far from being a pursuit of wealthy celebrities or curious scientists, oceanography has become a key geopolitical consideration, with marine conservation and the securing of resources new priorities for global powers ¶ On 26 March of last year, a large green submersible touched down gently on the sea floor. Plumes of silt billowed across the surface – which had likely been undisturbed for centuries – while spindly crabs and slithering eels peered out warily at their unusual visitor. On the water’s surface, 11,000 metres above the isolated sea craft, the visit to the ocean bottom was creating substantially more attention. After all, the pilot was Hollywood mogul James Cameron, and he had just become the first man to glide solo to the world’s deepest point.¶ Cameron may be the most high-profile deep-ocean explorer of recent years, but he’s certainly not alone among billionaires in pursuit of glory, adventure and scientific discovery on the sea floor. Virgin Oceanic – funded by Virgin Group founder Sir Richard Branson – is developing a submersible to visit the deepest point in each of the planet’s five oceans. Amazon’s CEO, Jeff Bezos, used advanced deep-sea sonar instruments to locate the discarded engines of Nasa’s Apollo 11 spacecraft, and is planning an expedition to retrieve them from the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean. Eric Schmidt, the Executive Chairman of Google, who is estimated to be worth US$7bn, is bankrolling the Schmidt Ocean Institute. The ocean’s depths – the final unexplored frontier on Earth – are suddenly getting rather crowded.¶ Exploration resurgence¶ In China, the Jiaolong submersible (capable of 7,000-metre dives) has access to a larger proportion of sea floor than all other manned research vehicles. Last June, three Chinese oceanauts at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean placed a call to their countrymen in space, who were piloting their Shenzhou 9 spacecraft through complex docking manoeuvres. The message was clear: China is investing significant financial and political capital in deep-sea exploration, which fuels the duel fires of national pride and technological advancement in much the same way as its fledgling space programme.¶ So why is deep-sea exploration seeing a resurgence? What is so fascinating about the darkness beneath the waves that has billionaires and governments racing to develop new capabilities?¶ Among private oceanographic benefactors, the combination of enhanced submersible technologies and the urge to distinguish themselves from their caviar-slurping, mansion-building, peers have fuelled the race to the bottom.¶
1. Cooperation isn’t impossible – their evidence just says that the US and China will never fully trust one another. Even if that is true, it doesn’t disprove our argument that the US and China can effectively cooperate on key global issues. Our Gross evidence says that the US-China relationship is improving in quality and number of cooperative initiatives.
2. Cooperation’s not impossible – the US and China are making strong progress
Pellerin 2014[C. Staffer for the Armed Forces Press Services. “Hagel, China’s Defense Minister Build Military Relations Model” AFPS 4/9/14 Available via Lexis-Nexis]
Hagel met with Chang and then a larger group of defense officials before he and Chang revealed during a news conference a new model for U.S.-China military-to-military relations.¶ The secretary’s visit to Beijing comes in the middle of a 10-day trip to the Asia-Pacific region, during which he visited Japan and will travel to Mongolia later this week. The trip began in Hawaii with the first meeting for defense ministers of the 10 member countries of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations to be held in the United States.¶ “One focus of our discussion today was how we develop a new model of military-to-military relations,” Hagel said about his meeting with Chang. “We’ve just finished a very good meeting,” the secretary added, “during which I restated that the United States is committed to continuing to build a constructive and productive relationship with China.”¶ Hagel explained that the United States believes its approach should be to build a sustained and substantive dialogue, deepen practical cooperation in areas of common interest, and manage competition and differences through openness and communication.¶ In each area, he added, there is much work to do, but the nations are making strong progress.¶ “As General Chang announced, we agreed today on several new ways to improve our military-to-military relationship,” Hagel said. First, the U.S. and Chinese defense agencies will establish an army-to-army dialogue as an institutionalized mechanism within the framework of the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship.¶ Second, the secretary added, “we agreed to participate in a joint military-medical cooperative activity. This will build on experiences gained at the 2014 Rim of the Pacific exercise, a U.S.-hosted multilateral naval exercise that China will participate in for the first time this summer.”¶ Third, Hagel said, the defense agencies will establish an Asia-Pacific security dialogue between the assistant secretary of defense for Asia-Pacific security affairs and the director of the Chinese Defense Ministry’s foreign affairs office to exchange views on a range of security issues.¶ “This dialogue will build on the discussions Gen. Chong and I had today on regional security issues,” the secretary said, “including North Korea and the growing threat posed by its nuclear and missile programs.”
2NC / 1NR Extensions: A/T #4 – “Relations Resilient” [1/1] 1. Relations may typically bounce back, but the affirmative forecloses on meaningful cooperation for the foreseeable future. Our 1NC link evidence explains the reasons that China would be very upset by the plan, and our 1NC Yoshihara and Holmes evidence says that oceanic disputes risk unraveling the entire relationship due to the importance China places on all things maritime.
2. Relations aren’t resilient in the case of ocean policy – resource tensions are too high for cooperation to sustain
Klare 2010[Michael T. Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and the author, most recently, of Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet. “China Shakes the World” September 19, 2010 http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175297/tomgram%3A_michael_klare%2C_china_shakes_the_world]
Rarely has a simple press interview said more about the global power shifts taking place in our world. On July 20th, the chief economist of the International Energy Agency (IEA), Fatih Birol, told the Wall Street Journal that China had overtaken the United States to become the world’s number one energy consumer. One can read this development in many ways: as evidence of China’s continuing industrial prowess, of the lingering recession in the United States, of the growing popularity of automobiles in China, even of America’s superior energy efficiency as compared to that of China. All of these observations are valid, but all miss the main point: by becoming the world’s leading energy consumer, China will also become an ever more dominant international actor and so set the pace in shaping our global future.¶ Because energy is tied to so many aspects of the global economy, and because doubts are growing about the future availability of oil and other vital fuels, the decisions China makes regarding its energy portfolio will have far-reaching consequences. As the leading player in the global energy market, China will significantly determine not only the prices we will be paying for critical fuels but also the type of energy systems we will come to rely on. More importantly, China’s decisions on energy preferences will largely determine whether China and the United States can avoid becoming embroiled in a global struggle over imported oil and whether the world will escape catastrophic climate change.¶ How to Rise to Global Preeminence¶ You can’t really appreciate the significance of China’s newfound energy prominence if you don’t first grasp the role of energy in America’s rise to global preeminence.
Plan-Specific Link Extensions: Aquaculture [1/1] ( ) Aquaculture is a major component of the Chinese economy – the plan undermines a key market
Manta 2013[Manta Consulting – a global investment firm. “Financing Aquaculture” Manta Consulting, 2013 http://www.mantaconsultinginc.com/wp-content/uploads/Manta_FinancingAquaculture.pdf]
The aquaculture market is worth about $120 billion per year at the farm level, producing 60 million tons of seafood. That's about 41% of the world's seafood in 2012. At current consumption rates, an additional 23 million tons of seafood per year will be needed worldwide by 2030.1 ¶ Asian production dominates. China accounts for 62% of global product- ion. Demand for seafood produced locally, safely and sustainably creates opportunities for other countries to capture market share.
( ) US aquaculture development creates a direct tradeoff with the Chinese market
MacMillan 2006[John. Ph.D., President, National Aquaculture Association, “OFFSHORE AQUACULTURE”, US Government Printing Office, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg64138/html/CHRG-109shrg64138.htm]
IV. Aquaculture Development in a Global Market¶ Large-scale marine aquaculture of the type likely to be considered ¶ for development in the U.S. exclusive economic zone is being undertaken ¶ in many other countries as we speak. In fact, we must recognize that ¶ this type of operation will be a much larger scale and more capital ¶ intensive than most other forms of aquaculture in the United States. As ¶ such, many of those who would consider undertaking these projects will ¶ readily evaluate foreign development locations as alternatives to ¶ development in the United States. To the extent that we create ¶ obstacles to development in this country, marine aquaculture projects ¶ will be located in Australia, Belize, Canada, Chile, China, Mexico, ¶ Norway, New Zealand, Scotland, Spain, Vietnam and other countries. The ¶ transportation requirements do not present a significant barrier to ¶ U.S. markets from these locations, particularly when we consider the ¶ disparity in labor costs and regulatory costs.¶ If we are to have any hope of creating a commercial offshore ¶ aquaculture industry in the United States, and addressing food security ¶ requirements and the current seafood trade imbalance, we will have to ¶ eliminate existing unwarranted barriers to development and create a ¶ reasonable program for evaluation and approval of offshore aquaculture ¶ projects.
Plan-Specific Link Extensions: Offshore Wind [1/1] ( ) US increases in renewable energy directly trade off with China’s market share.
Schoen 2012[Lucas – Energy for the World Resources Institute. “Clean Tech’s Rise, Part 1: Will the US and China Reap the Mutual Benefits?” 2012 http://www.chinafaqs.org/files/chinainfo/ChinaFAQs_IssueBrief1_MutualBenefits.pdf]
China itself, meanwhile, is becoming a critical market. In¶ recent years, it has become the world’s largest source of,¶ and destination for, investment in clean energy.¶ 9¶ China is¶ expected to invest at least $300 billion in domestic clean¶ energy technologies over the next five years¶ 10¶ as part of its¶ drive to curb greenhouse gas emissions, gain economic¶ benefits, and improve energy security, in pursuit of¶ aggressive renewable energy deployment targets in its¶ 12¶ th¶ Five-Year Plan¶ 11¶ (see table).¶ “There is no doubt that the¶ country remains committed to the ongoing development¶ of its renewable energy sector,” notes a recent analysis¶ from Ernst & Young.¶ 12¶ The investment race, meanwhile,¶ is heating up. In 2010, China invested a world-leading $45¶ billion in clean energy, while the U.S. slipped to second¶ place with about $33.7 billion.¶ In 2011, however, the U.S.¶ recaptured the lead, with investment surging to¶ $48 billion, while China invested $45.5 billion.¶ 13¶ China’s clear commitment to clean energy has made it¶ “attractive to U.S. and international investors” because it¶ offers “the certainty they are looking for before investing,”¶ notes Deborah Seligsohn, a China specialist with the ¶ World Resources Institute and WRI’s ChinaFAQs project.¶ Companies including First Solar, GE, Duke Energy,¶ American Electric Power, and many other U.S. firms have¶ all invested or expressed interest in investing in China,¶ and “increasingly entrepreneurs with new ideas are¶ looking to China to make those ideas become a reality.”
Plan-Specific Link Extensions: Oil Drilling [1/1] ( ) The United States and China fall prey to aggressive energy disagreements
Herberg 2011[M. Research Director on Asian Security at the National Bureau of Asian Research. ‘China’s Energy Rise and the Future of US-China Energy Relations” 6/21/11 http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/china_s_energy_rise_and_the_future_of_us_china_energy_relations ]
Another underestimated constraint is the limited institutional capacity in either Washington or Beijing to carry out a strategic discussion on energy. It’s not clear who would be talking to whom. Beijing’s energy policymaking agencies, the National Energy Administration and the NDRC, are extraordinarily thinly spread and are not really at the center of decisions on China’s overseas oil and gas acquisition and investment strategy, its regional foreign policy, or decisions that drive oil demand and security. China’s NOCs and the State Council are at the center of the major policies in those areas. Energy policymaking in China is deeply fragmented and horizontal coordination is very weak. In Washington, much of the same description applies. While there is the huge Department of Energy this is largely geared to work at the expert and technical level regarding clean energy, renewables, and other new energy issues rather than strategic concerns. The State Department has established several new middle level positions to focus on energy security concerns but still has very limited ability to support such a strategic energy dialogue. Policymaking is diffuse and fragmented. Edward Morse, one of the most trenchant energy analysts today, has described the U.S. international energy policy as “mostly brawn, not much brain”.¶ ¶ What seems more plausible, then, is something more like an approaching “E-Zero” era of energy geopolitics, to borrow from Eurasia Group’s Ian Bremmer.7 China’s raw global energy impact, the gravitational force of its booming energy and oil demand, and its global energy footprint are growing rapidly. In energy, as in a growing number of other policy arenas, China is simply too big to stand on the sidelines any longer. Yet there is little evidence Beijing is ready to take on broader international responsibilities to help strengthen multilateral energy cooperation, working to maintain the open energy markets that have helped fuel Chinese economic prosperity, and working collaboratively towards stability in key energy exporting regions, most importantly the Persian Gulf. Beijing remains intent on a decidedly national and narrow view of its energy security. But U.S. power to shape and sustain an open and stable global energy environment is clearly on the wane and, in any event, it isn’t clear the U.S. is ready to share leadership in a way that would be sufficiently meaningful to Beijing. ¶ ¶ In the meantime, global oil markets are tightening sharply again: supply growth is slow and structurally constrained, oil demand growth has resumed, and oil prices are rising dramatically threatening the fragile global economic recovery. Other rising petroleum powers and big importers, including Saudi Arabia, Russia, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Iran, Venezuela, and India, are driving the development of an increasingly statist, politicized, and balkanized global oil market.
Plan Specific Link Extension: Coral Reefs [1/1] ( ) Chinese ocean exploration efforts are expanding – the plan would create competition
Kashyap 2014[Arjun. Chinese Environmental Trends analyst for the International Business Times “China-Led International Ocean Exploration Mission To Look For Oil In South China Sea, Including In Disputed Regions” The International Business Times, 1/27/14. Available via Lexis-Nexis]
In a first-of-its-kind exercise for the world’s second-largest economy, an international scientific expedition to look for oil in the South China Sea will set sail from Hong Kong on Tuesday, according to the South China Morning Post.¶ The trip is part of the latest edition of the decade-long International Ocean Discovery Program that will run from 2013 to 2023. The IODP was launched by the U.S. in the 1960s, and its latest effort will include 31 scientists from 10 countries drilling at three different sites for two months.¶ "Oil and gas fields lie close to the coast, but the key is to open the treasure box buried beneath the basin," Wang Pinxian, a marine geologist and member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, told the Post Monday.¶ The IODP invited proposals from 26 member nations and, while a proposal to drill in the controversial South China Sea -- first proposed by China in 2008 -- was not the most popular one, it was reportedly mainly chosen because the Chinese government agreed to pick up 70 percent, or $6 million, of the mission’s tab. The NSF, which used to contribute 70 per cent of the Joides Resolution's expenses, cut its annual ocean drilling budget to $50 million last year, David Divins, director of the IODP’s ocean drilling program.¶ The expedition will sail aboard the American scientific drill ship, Joides Resolution, operated by the National Science Foundation, or NSF, the Post reported, adding that the voyage will take the team to waters claimed variously by China, the Philippines and Vietnam.¶ So far, the ship has received permission from the Philippines and Beijing but is waiting for a response from the Vietnamese government to drill at a site in the southwest part of the South China Sea, the Post reported, citing Divins, adding that the expedition may have to opt for an alternative site.¶ Tensions stemming from China's energy interests are a constant undercurrent to the region's geopolitics. For instance, in May 2012, China began drilling to new depths in the South China Sea, 200 miles southeast of Hong Kong, with the launch of its first deep-water oil drilling rig, triggering tensions between Manila and Beijing. In December 2012, China had asked Vietnam to stop exploring for oil in disputed areas of the South China Sea and demanded that the latter not harass Chinese fishing boats.
China Disadvantage Affirmative China Disadvantage Affirmative 17
2AC Frontline: China DA [1/3]...........................................................................182AC Frontline: China DA [2/3]...........................................................................192AC Frontline: China DA [3/3]...........................................................................20Plan-Specific Link Answers: Aquaculture [1/2].................................................22Plan-Specific Link Answers: Aquaculture [2/2].................................................23Plan-Specific Link Answers: Offshore Wind [1/2]..............................................25Plan-Specific Link Answers: Offshore Wind [2/2]..............................................27Plan-Specific Link Answers: Oil Drilling [1/2]...................................................29Plan-Specific Link Answers: Oil Drilling [2/2]...................................................30Plan-Specific Link Answers: Coral Reefs [1/1]..................................................31
2AC Frontline: China DA [1/3] 1. Non-Unique – the US is cracking down on illegal fishing in the status quo. This will undermine US-China relations.
MP 7-12[The MecroPress: A South-Atlantic News Agency. “Obama pledges to crack down on illegal fishing and enforce traceability” 7/12/14 http://en.mercopress.com/2014/06/18/obama-pledges-to-crack-down-on-illegal-fishing-and-enforce-traceability]
The Obama administration announced on Tuesday an initiative to track every fish sold in the United States, a move designed to crack down on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, mislabeling of seafood and related problems.¶ Secretary of State John Kerry, who is leading the push for new ocean conservation measures, said the measures will “ensure all seafood sold in the U.S. is both sustainable and traceable, meaning all customers will know exactly who caught it, where and when.”¶ The United States plays a big role in the world's seafood market; it's the largest importer after Japan. But an estimated 20% to 32% of the wild-caught imports are illegal and unreported, according to a study published this year in the journal Marine Policy.¶ Tuesday's announcement, delivered in a taped message from the president and in person by Kerry at an “Our Ocean” conference in Washington, was well-received by a crowd representing 80 countries and several environmental organizations.¶ Among the ocean plan's most ambitious and controversial steps would be expansion of the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument southwest of Hawaii. In January 2009, President George W Bush gave monument status to nearly 87,000 square miles around uninhabited islands, an area that is home to thousands of migratory birds, fish and mammals.¶ A White House fact sheet states that the administration is considering an expansion of the reserve, but plans to first consider input of fishermen, scientists and other stakeholders.¶ Ray Hilborn, a marine biologist and University of Washington professor who spoke at the conference, said he is skeptical of the reserve's purpose, adding that he is not aware of any significant fisheries that would be shut down as a result of the expansion. However, the proposal could eventually more than double the area of ocean protected by the United States, environmental groups said, and block the incursion of future fisheries.¶ The president also established a task force of at least a dozen federal agencies to develop recommendations to better combat seafood fraud and IUU fishing. The administration did not offer details on how the fish might be tracked.¶ The United States imports more than 90% of its seafood, and most fish is flown or shipped from China and Thailand, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.¶ Meanwhile, more than 85% of the world's fisheries are fished beyond sustainable limits, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO. Much of that is due to illegal fishing practices.¶ “Traceability is essential to a good management system,” says Eric Schwaab, chief conservation officer of Baltimore's National Aquarium and former acting assistant secretary for conservation and management for NOAA. “You can't have a management system without a way to distinguish the illegal from the legal imports.”
2AC Frontline: China DA [2/3] 3. China’s oceanic credibility is low in the status quo
Heydarian 2014[Richard. Specialist on Asian Economic Issues. “The End of China’s Soft Power?” Al Jazeera, 4/12/14 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/end-china-soft-power-japan-terr-201441014352559758.html]
"Will China invade its neighbors?" This is a question I tend to be bombarded with whenever I present lectures or attend talks on East Asian affairs. From Tehran to Tokyo, one can sense the growing anxiety towards China's international influence. People are beginning to pay more attention to China's military budget than its trade and investment relations with the developing world. In sanctions-hit Iran, many merchants have been complaining about China's allegedly opportunistic business practices, while industrialists and consumers have raised concerns over the macroeconomic and safety implications of cheap imports from China. In Japan, many are worried about their country's ability to defend itself against a rising China, with the ongoing dispute in the East China Sea sparking a national debate over the proposed revision of Japan's post-War pacifist constitution. In countries such as the Philippines, popular views towards China have turned dramatically negative, particularly due to the ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Worryingly, the antipathy towards China has assumed even an ideological colour, with many Filipinos - including some top-level officials I have come across - rehashing Cold War paranoia vis-a-vis communist countries. In fellow communist countries such as Vietnam, China is increasingly seen in pejoratively historical terms: as an aggressive imperial power to the north.
4. Their internal link is inevitable – the US and China will never meaningfully cooperate
Mazza 2013 [Michael. Asian Policy Expert at AEI. “Why America and China can’t trust each other” 4/23/13 http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/23/why-america-and-china-cant-trust-each-other/]
The release of China’s biennial defense white paper has been getting some press for its revelations about the People’s Liberation Army’s force structure. Chinese media outlet Xinhua, for example, reported that “the Chinese government on Tuesday declassified the designations of all 18 combined corps of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as the latest step to increase transparency of its armed forces.”¶ While it is difficult to applaud the PLA for declassifying information that was already common knowledge (see, for example, the sinodefence.com page on army organization, last updated four years ago), more transparency is certainly better than less. Still, the American focus on Chinese transparency is misplaced. Of course, the Pentagon would like to see its Chinese counterpart be more candid about PLA capabilities and investments; to the extent the United States can coax China towards such candor, it should do so. But disclosures like those in the Chinese white paper do little to address the underlying problem in the U.S.-China relationship: a dearth of strategic trust.¶ Although more Chinese transparency can enhance that trust on the margins, it cannot by itself redress the bilateral relationship’s great deficiency. Nor is it possible for that deficiency to be satisfactorily redressed, at least not in the near- to medium-term. Why not? American distrust of China is intimately linked to the very nature of the People’s Republic, and the reverse is true as well.¶ Because the Chinese political system is a closed one, foreign observers can never be sure that Chinese pronouncements on foreign policy, strategy, and intentions are genuine. There is no free press or independent legislature to call Chinese leaders to account or challenge their
public statements. Unlike in democracies, it is much easier for China’s leaders to keep the results of their internal deliberations secret and to control the message that is delivered publicly. Due to the nature of the Chinese political system and Beijing’s propensity for secrecy, it would be folly for any country – let alone the United States, which China clearly views as potential adversary – to take Chinese words at face value. Indeed, in his 2011 book, A Contest for Supremacy, Aaron Friedberg quite clearly explained the link between transparency and China’s closed political system:¶ “Even if Beijing were suddenly to unleash a flood of information, American analysts would regard it with profound skepticism, scrutinizing it carefully for signs of deception and disinformation. And they would be right to do so; the centralized, tightly controlled Chinese government is far better able to carry off such schemes than its open, divided, and leaky American counterpart.”
2AC Frontline: China DA [3/3] 5. The importance of US-China cooperation is overstated – relations will never fully collapse
Dongxiao 2012Chen. VP of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies. “China-US Relations in 2012: Caution Ahead” ChinaFocus 1/5/12 http://chinausfocus.com/slider/no-reason-for-chagrin-over-china-us-relations-but-cautious-management-needed-in-2012]
The year of 2011 brought many unexpected, globally altering events. This year, non-stop crises and sea changes in the international arena; chaos and revolution in the Middle East and West Africa; catastrophic Tsunami and nuclear-leak crisis in Fukushima; paralysis of leadership of EU confronting the evolving debt predicament in Euro-Zone; and the sudden death of Kim Jong-il and its unpredictable repercussions on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia were just a few of the tumultuous events that led global economic and political instability this year. Bilateral relations between China and the US, in contrast have been relatively stable, and increasingly positive. Three driving forces have contributed to the improvement in US-China relations in 2011: mutual commitment, multi-function mechanisms, and increasing interdependence. Beijing and Washington both stressed their commitment to building a cooperative partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit following a rocky year of bilateral relations in 2010. Both sides have stressed that the relationship between China and the United States should be cooperative and mutually beneficial rather than zero-sum, and that the two sides should stand together in the face of difficulty and carry out cooperation on an equal footing. The mutual commitment between China and the US has been bolstered by an increasing number of bilateral mechanisms with policy communication, coordination, and implementation functions (“C2I”). 2011 has seen of the growth of “C2I” mechanisms intensify. with a number of new initiatives, including High-level Consultation on People-to-People Exchanges, the US-China Governors Forum, and the Strategic Security Dialogue and Asia-Pacific Affairs Consultation under the framework of Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). While the former two initiatives have either reflected thriving interaction in cross-cultural domains or tapped the huge potential of sub-national cooperation across the Pacific, the latter two mechanisms have greatly upgraded capacity to address difficult and sensitive military and security issues in bilateral relations n and build confidence in US-China relations. The 60 plus bilateral mechanisms, plus frequent exchanges of informal visits and workshops between senior officials have built an impressive level of institutionalization in US-China bilateral relations that has enhanced the predictability of relations between the two countries and helped consolidate the foundation of the relations. The substance of the bilateral relationship, in essence, is not to follow the two presidents’ agreements in words, but to follow the roadmap in action, and those bilateral mechanisms have built significant capacity to do this. Thirdly and perhaps most fundamentally, the growing interdependence across the
Pacific and emerging agenda of global governance has served as the “ballast” in the bilateral relationship. Despite numerous trade disputes between the two countries, economic interdependence has been steadily enhanced, manifested either by the hike of bilateral trade and investment volume, symbiotic financial relations, or the economic restructuring now underway in both countries. This interdependence has transcended economics, and is growing increasingly comprehensive in nature.
Plan-Specific Link Answers: Aquaculture [1/2] Chinese aquaculture practices are unsustainable -- that should make the disadvantage inevitable
NBSO 2010[The Netherlands Business Support Office. “An Overview of China’s Aquaculture” 2010 http://china.nlambassade.org/binaries/content/assets/postenweb/c/china/zaken-doen-in-china/import/kansen_en_sectoren/agrofood/rapporten_over_agro_food/an-overview-of-chinas-aquaculture]
7.2 Conclusion¶ Aquaculture is a very important industry in China’s ¶ agricultural development. The industry has grown ¶ rapidly in terms of culture area, production and export ¶ in recent years. However the food safety and quality ¶ issue still remain an inhibiting issue in the industry. ¶ In order to really improve all the separate linkages ¶ in the whole supply chain, it is need to be critically ¶ reviewed starting from the strain, the feed, culture ¶ method to processing and transportation etc. The ¶ technology and innovation also play important roles ¶ closely to solve the problem of how to improve the ¶ food quality and safety. Chinese research institutes ¶ and bigger companies do not have enough capable research to ¶ transfer their R&D results in the area of aquaculture, ¶ the challenge remains how to disseminate all these ¶ technologies to the small farmers who is now still a ¶ majority of engaged in aquaculture with not much ¶ technological insight. ¶ Another important issue concerns the sustainability ¶ of the industry. Much of the expansion of the industry ¶ till now has been depenced on depleting natural ¶ resources, while pollution in the waters of China ¶ caused serious threat to sound aquaculture. New ways ¶ of aquaculture and new technologies are therefore ¶ not only needed in order to enhance the quality, ¶ quantity and safety of the aquatic products, but also ¶ much needed to steer the further development of ¶ aquaculture in China into a sustainable way, so that ¶ the industry can indeed fulfill its promise and provide ¶ good products to meet the rising demands both in the ¶ domestic as the worldwide marketplace.
Plan-Specific Link Answers: Aquaculture [2/2] China’s aquaculture decline is caused by a number of other factors
Shifflett and Turner 2008[Susan and Jen. Director and Program Associate at the China Environmental Forum. “Fishing Murky Waters: China’s Aquaculture Challenges Upstream and Downstream” Wilson Center Report, October 2008. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/fishing-murky-waters-chinas-aquaculture-challenges-upstream-and-downstream]
China has a 2,000-year history of cultivating fish, making it the first civilization to do so. Of China's total seafood output, 64 percent comes from aquaculture, making it the only country in the world where aquaculture outstrips wild catch. Since 1978, China's aquaculture production has increased 490 percent, elevating it to the largest producer of farmed seafood in the world, accounting for 57 percent of global output. Aquaculture—including a wide variety of freshwater and saltwater finfish, shellfish, crustaceans, and aquatic plants—is a vibrant industry in China. Local governments promote aquaculture as a poverty alleviating industry and have therefore subsidized production of lucrative species. As incomes rise, China is turning from herbivorous fish, such as carp, to carnivorous fish, such as grouper, which require greater inputs of wild caught "trash fish"—often imported from Chile as China's own wild fish stocks disappear. This trend is both a threat to global fisheries and to local waterways, as "trash fish" are a major source of pollution.¶ China supplies 70 percent of the tilapia imported to the United States and is also its fourth largest supplier of shrimp. Due to the retention of pollutants and chemicals in the flesh of fish, food safety has become a major challenge for Chinese aquaculture. International concern about food safety has cost China's aquaculture dearly, as countries ban species they discover to be contaminated. In 2007, the industry was hit by a U.S. ban on 5 species of Chinese seafood. Chinese consumers also are increasingly concerned about the safety of the fish they eat due to water pollution, dangerous farming practices, and poor processing in the aquaculture industry. In terms of ecological impacts, the rapid development of China's aquaculture industry has seriously polluted rivers, lakes, and coastal waters and the increasing demand for fishmeal is driving stock depletion in the oceans.¶ Upstream: Challenges and Incentives¶ "The challenges facing the aquaculture industry in China are similar to those facing the Chinese food industry in general" and result in crises like the recent milk scandal, stated speaker David Barboza of The New York Times. Based on interviews with farmers, aquaculture experts and scientists, Barboza concluded that China's water pollution is the major problem facing aquaculture—and food products in general—because it afflicts virtually every part of the country. Rapid economic growth has created environmental degradation on an unimaginable scale, and among other problems, lack of clean water will inevitably mean a lack of healthy seafood. While researching a story on aquaculture in China in 2007, Barboza specifically targeted heavily polluted areas to see if there was fish farming there—there always were.¶ In fact, pollution forces many fish farmers to inoculate their fish with dangerous illegal veterinary medicines, leading to a cycle in which massive aquaculture operations contribute to the pollution that harms fish through unnatural population densities, chemicals and antibiotics and overfeeding. This leads not only to fish disease—which in some cases can spread to wild fish—but also to nutrient and chemical pollution in already dirty water.¶ A weak and often corrupt regulatory system is also a challenge to China's aquaculture. Powerful local government officials often partner with businesses, and therefore have an incentive to reign in regulators, or at least give their business partners some kind of advantage or protection. While regulation and enforcement in coastal areas of China are improving, like factories, many of China's aquaculture facilities are beginning to move west in search of friendlier
CDL Core Files 2014/2015 2AC Topicality Frontline: Coral Reefs AffirmativeTopicality AFFAFFregulators and cleaner water.¶ Another, oft overlooked challenge to improving the environmental and food safety impacts of China's aquaculture is the farmer-entrepreneur seeking wealth in an increasingly competitive system. With rampant uncertainty stemming from a rapidly changing business environment and property rights, farmers investing in this sector think short-term for their business deals and land use. Every farmer is competing with other farmers who they know are willing to cheat and break the law to provide a cheaper product. When combined with weak regulation and legislation, such deals can prove very costly for human and environmental health both in China and abroad.
Plan-Specific Link Answers: Offshore Wind [1/2] Turn: The plan enhances US-China cooperation over energy
Conrad 2011[B. PhD Candidate at the University of Trier. Holds a MA in Chinese Studies and Public Policy from Harvard. “Catching a Second Wind: Changing the Logic of International Cooperation in China’s Wind Energy Sector.” The Global Public Policy Institute, Paper No 12. Feb 2011]
China’s wind energy sector presents a vivid case of the fundamental dilemma of climate technologies. On the one hand, the rapid development and global dissemination of climate technology is highly desirable and necessary as part of an effective strategy to tackle global climate change. On the other hand, these¶ technologies are commercial products, developed and sold by companies on¶ a fiercely competitive market . The logic of climate protection favors the open¶ exchange of technological expertise between corporations. Contrarily, the logic of the market sets narrow boundaries for the sharing of profit-making innovation. Finding ways to reconcile these two aspects will be a decisive challenge faced on¶ the way to solving the global climate crisis.¶ The case of wind energy in China presents a crucial illustration of the effects of this dilemma . The development of international cooperative structures that are able to provide innovative answers to pressing climate challenges has been hampered by the perception of today’s partners as tomorrow’s competitors in an economic zero-sum game. Chinese players tried to use partnerships as a means to gain a technological edge without an intention to grant their partners a long-term stake in its domestic market. International business actors tried to use partnerships as a means to gain access to China’s domestic wind power market without any real incentive to improve their partners’ long-term technological advancement. Ultimately, neither side got what it wanted. As a result, China’s wind sector stayed below its potential regarding its contribution to global climate protection.¶ Opportunity - International cooperation could catch a second wind in China’s renewable energy sector. China’s wind market is on the verge of a new development phase heralding a possible shift in the logic of international technology cooperation; the times of China simply “catching up” to foreign technologies are coming to an end. To maintain its growth, China’s wind sector will depend on original technological solutions to manage mounting problems of efficiency, transmission and intermittency. Current technological obstacles threaten the swift expansion of China’s wind power capacity, putting the achievement of China’s ambitious¶ renewable energy targets for the year 2020 at risk. This creates strong political pressure to explore viable solutions such as smart-grid transmission systems and offshore wind power generation. The technological bottleneck of its wind energy sector significantly increases China’s incentives to revisit structures of international cooperation as a means to create urgently needed innovation. This situation in turn opens new opportunities for foreign political actors, specifically the European Union, to promote the emergence of cooperative structures that can make a tangible contribution to global climate protection. ¶ From the business perspective, the growth of complementary capabilities between¶ Chinese and international wind power companies increases the attractiveness of balanced and mutually beneficial partnerships. Chinese companies can benefit greatly from strategic alliances with international firms in their search for needed tech nological solutions, while foreign companies can take advantage of the uniquely favorable conditions that China offers for producing cutting-edge innovation¶ in wind power tech nology. At the core of this mutually beneficial cooperative¶ model lies the creation of shared innovation based on the joint exploration and joint ownership of original tech nological solutions. Joint development, however, requires a mode of cooperation radically different from the model of international partnerships that have characterized China’s wind sector in the past. It calls for deep
CDL Core Files 2014/2015 2AC Topicality Frontline: Coral Reefs AffirmativeTopicality AFFAFFworking relationships and long-term strategic alliances rooted in mutual¶ interests . Looking at the sobering experiences of the past, both sides will have to radically break with the current logic of interaction in order to redefine¶ international partnerships .
Plan-Specific Link Answers: Offshore Wind [2/2] Turn: The plan creates new opportunities for US-China cooperation
Hopkins 2012[Robert. Partner at Duane Morris LLP with a concentration on Transportation Issues. “Offshore Wind Farms in US Waters would Generate both US and Foreign Maritime Jobs” Renewable Energy World, 7/12/12 http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/07/offshore-wind-farms-in-u-s-waters-would-generate-both-u-s-and-foreign-maritime-jobs ]
With no offshore wind energy farms yet built off U.S. coastlines, various states over the last few years have proposed offshore wind energy legislation as a future investment in renewable energy as well as a vehicle for American job creation. The immediate future of U.S. offshore wind farms may depend on whether Congress renews certain tax credit and federal loan guarantee programs. In the event that offshore wind farms move forward, it is likely that both U.S. maritime and foreign maritime workers will be involved in construction and maintenance. ¶ A recent study by The National Renewable Energy Laboratory estimated the potential generating capacity from offshore wind farms located off U.S. coastlines to be 4 times the present total U.S. electrical generating capacity. The construction and maintenance of offshore wind farms to tap into even a small percentage of this potential will demand a robust and competent maritime workforce. The U.S. understandably wants to avoid the situation that occurred in England with the installation of the Thanet Wind Farm, currently the largest operating offshore wind farm in the world (300 megawatts). The Thanet project received criticism for its lack of significant British job creation.¶ U.S. wind farm developers, green energy advocates and some U.S. politicians have stressed that offshore wind farms will create jobs for both U.S. maritime and U.S. shore-based workers. In addition, some have pointed to a federal statute known as the Jones Act, to assert that foreign-flagged vessels crewed by foreign maritime workers may not even be involved in U.S. offshore wind farm projects. However, such a broad statement is not entirely accurate, and the issue is somewhat complex.¶ The Jones Act, which was enacted in 1920, establishes a system for protecting American maritime jobs and requires that U.S.-flagged vessels be used to transport merchandise between points in U.S. territorial waters (i.e., up to 3 nautical miles off the coastline). Moreover, this requirement is extended 200 miles offshore to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) in certain scenarios involving man-made objects that are affixed to the seabed.¶ Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the federal agency that enforces the Jones Act, has issued a number of rulings that conclude that the Jones Act in certain situations does not apply to the actual installation of wind turbines by large-scale vessels known as jack-up lift vessels. Moreover, there has been some debate on whether the Jones Act would apply to vessels travelling to an established wind farm located over 3 miles off the coastline in the OCS for such things as maintenance and repair. A bill clarifying that the Jones Act would apply in this maintenance/repair scenario (HR 2360) has recently passed the U.S. House of Representatives and is now awaiting a vote in the U.S. Senate. Thus, at present, from a purely legal standpoint, foreign-flagged vessels would likely be able to participate in the installation of the proposed wind farms, but there is some uncertainty as to whether foreign-flagged vessels would be able to participate in maintenance/repair work.¶ Complicating all of this is the dearth of U.S.-flagged jack-up lift vessels capable of undertaking much of the very heavy work involved in the installation of offshore wind turbines. To further confound matters, with a boom in offshore wind farm construction in Europe and China, many foreign-flagged jack-up lift vessels capable of such work are now booked for the next several years.¶ Factoring in all of the above, it is likely that large foreign-flagged vessels will play a significant role in the initial installation of
CDL Core Files 2014/2015 2AC Topicality Frontline: Coral Reefs AffirmativeTopicality AFFAFFwind turbines off U.S. coastlines, with an opportunity for smaller U.S.-flagged vessels to render assistance. However, with the lack of available large scale foreign-flagged vessels, there are obvious long term investment opportunities for the construction of large U.S.-flagged vessels or for the conversion of other large U.S.-flagged vessels to undertake much of the above heavy work. One possible option is to convert U.S.-flagged vessels now working in the oil and gas fields in the Gulf of Mexico for this purpose. Such investment opportunities will obviously become more attractive if a large number of wind farms move forward in the U.S..
Plan-Specific Link Answers: Oil Drilling [1/2] Turn: Oil scarcity creates US-Sino tensions – drilling for more resolves this
Reynolds 2010[Lewis Reynolds is author of America the Prisoner: The Implications of Foreign Oil Addiction and a Realistic Plan to End It. He has spent years as a financial advisor and consultant to a wide range of companies, particularly in the energy industry. “Seven Dangerous (and Surprising) Side Effects of the U.S. Dependency on Foreign Oil” August 4, 2010 http://www.amerisurv.com/content/view/7708/]
It creates strained foreign relations and sets the stage for an unstable future. The entire U.S.-Middle East foreign policy has been structured around the obvious importance of the region for the world’s oil supply. Policy makers don’t like to discuss it openly, but oil is always the elephant in the room when it comes to U.S. foreign relations—even with nations outside the Middle East. ¶ One of the great questions in the context of geopolitical struggle for oil is whether the great oil consuming nations—which will soon include the U.S., China, Russia—will view one another as allies, competitors, or some combination of both. The U.S. has love-hate relationships with both countries. There is historic rivalry between the U.S. and Russia leading back generations. The relationship with China is murky at best. ¶ Events are already in motion that could set the stage for a U.S.-Chinese confrontation. Oil consumption continues to grow modestly in the U.S., but in China it is exploding. On a global scale, oil consumption will certainly continue to grow into the foreseeable future, yet there are considerable questions as to whether global production can be increased much beyond current levels if at all. With both the U.S. and China needing oil, competition is inevitable. Responsibility lies with both sides to take actions to avoid the long progression toward a conflict. A Sino-American energy war is far too likely if both countries continue on their present courses without developing substantial alternative energy sources.
Plan-Specific Link Answers: Oil Drilling [2/2] Turn: Energy competition occurs because oil is finite and scarce – domestic drilling eases US-China tensions Mead 2012[Walter Russell. Senior Foreign Policy Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Energy Revolution 3: The New American Century” 7/18/12 http://www.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/18/energy-revolution-3-the-new-american-century/]But on the bigger stage of world politics, it’s the United States that benefits most from the energy revolution. To begin with, the core objective of the United States—a reasonably stable, orderly and liberal global system—is a lot easier to achieve in an era of energy abundance than in one of tough resource competition. Oil is a lubricant, and the more the world has, the more smoothly things are likely to run. A world in which jealous, competing states are trying to elbow each other aside to access the last few remaining pools of oil is a much nastier place than one in which the whole oil question is a lot more laid back.¶ Abundant energy will also promote global economic growth, an effect that strengthens and stabilizes the world system. It is easier for countries to cooperate when their economies are doing well. There is less nationalist pressure inside countries driving political leaders to take confrontational stands, and it is easier to negotiate win-win solutions and build functioning international institutions when all parties are relatively optimistic about their prospects.¶ On the whole, a world of energy abundance should be particularly good for U.S.-China relations. If both China and the United States have large energy reserves at home, and if new discoveries globally are making energy more abundant, there is less chance that China and the U.S. will compete for political influence in places like the Middle East. More energy security at home may also lessen the political pressure inside China to build up its naval forces.¶ Oil may calm the troubled waters around China’s shores. The maritime disputes now causing trouble from Korea and Japan to Malaysia and the Philippines will be easier to manage if the potential undersea energy resources are seen as less vital to national economic security. Nationalist passion will still drive tough stands on the maritime issues, but nationalism is a much stronger force when powerful economic arguments share the agenda of radical nationalist groups. If the South China Sea issue is seen as both a question of national pride and, because of perceived energy supply issues, a vital national interest, Chinese policy will be much tougher than if it is simply a question of pride.¶ Depending on the size of China’s unconventional domestic reserves (and some analysts think the country could have something like the equivalent of double Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves), China will feel marginally less constrained by Washington’s global naval supremacy. As it now stands, in any serious clash with China, the U.S. could bring Beijing to its knees with a naval blockade. With much larger domestic energy production, China would be less vulnerable to this threat. This could translate into a greater willingness to take a hard line on international issues.
Plan-Specific Link Answers: Coral Reefs [1/1] Turn: The plan creates new platforms for cooperation
Fan 2011[Gaoyue. China Maritime Expert at CSIS. “Maritime Interests: China-US Cooperation and Conflicts” Summer 2011 http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_vol11no10_English.pdf]
To maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and promote shared maritime interests,¶ China and the US should cooperate in the following areas: (10)¶ Increase high -¶ level exchanges to deepen strategic mutual trust. At present, there is a lack¶ of strategic trust between leaders in both countries. Both China and the US should try to¶ increase president/chairman¶ -¶ level and secretary/minister¶ -¶ level exchanges to understand¶ each other’s strategic intentions on certain world events and issues and find out better¶ solutions for important world affairs. For example, when there is a financial crisis, there¶ should be more finance minister meeting¶ s; when there is a energy crisis, there should be¶ more energy minister meetings.¶ (11)¶ Increase exchanges between the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration¶ (NOAA) and the China State Oceanic Administration (SOA) to consult on, strengthen¶ maritime co¶ operation, and develop a maritime cooperation roadmap.¶ (12)¶ Increase exchange visits of working¶ -¶ level maritime officials and visits of each other’s¶ maritime law enforcement vessels to improve maritime governance.
The US and China cooperate over coral reefs
SCSIO 2009[The South China Sea Institute of Oceanology. “China-US Workshop on Coral Reef Ecosystem Held in Sanya” August 2009 http://english.scsio.cas.cn/ic/ic/201012/t20101208_62689.html]
The China-US Workshop on Coral Reef Ecosystem was held in Sanya, Hainan province from Aug. 23 to 25.¶ ¶ Dr. Huang Liangming, the secretary of Party Committee of the workshop host South China Sea Institute of Oceanology, Chinese Academy of Sciences (SCSIO, CAS), extended a warm welcome to the US guests and made a brief introduction to SCSIO’s progress in frontiers of marine science. SCSIO researchers also discussed the institute’s pharmaceutical research on coral reefs, the situation of and challenges to coral reefs in China, the impact of ocean environment on coral reefs, and the related scientific policies.¶ ¶ The US Coral Reef Long Term Ecological Research (LTER) Delegation, headed by Prof. Russell J. Schmitt from UC Santa Barbara, went to particulars about the plan of the Moorea Coral Reef Long-Term Ecological Research (MCR-LTER), discussed the potential impact of coral reefs on climate change, and expressed hopes for more cooperation and exchanges with the Chinese side.¶ ¶ With the support of organizations including Bureau of International Co-operation and National Science Foundation of America, the workshop concluded successfully and both sides agreed to take further cooperation in marine science observation and coral reef ecosystem.
