China: Expansion of Military Power in the Asia-Pacific

Richard A. Bitzinger

Overview

Drivers behind the expansion of Chinese military power

Chinese naval developments, 2000- Implications for Southeast Asia

– EEZ disputes– Spratlys and Paracels Disputes– International maritime routes

Chinese Military Modernization: Drivers

China’s quest for “great power” status: attempting to gain “hard power” commensurate with growing “soft power” (economic, cultural)

Create a sustainable expeditionary naval force – Taiwan contingency: isolate island, invade and occupy (if

necessary), be capable of providing anti-access/area denial (to U.S. forces seeking to come to Taiwan’s defense)

– Protect trade routes – Press territorial and EEZ claims in East and South China

Seas

PLA Navy: From Brown to Green to Blue

From coastal defense to open-ocean capabilities– Expand its operating perimeter to the first island chain

(Japan-Taiwan-Philippines)…– …to the second island chain (Guam-Indonesia-Australia)– Eventually be able project sustainable force into the whole

of the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean

Chinese Defense Spending

In 2009, Chinese defense budget totaled US$70.2b– Not counting possible extra-budgetary funds

Defense spending has quintupled since 1997 (after inflation)

– Second-highest military spender in the world (overtook Japan in 2007, UK in 2008)

Equipment (procurement + R&D) budget (about one-third of total spending) = ~US$23.5

– Compared to 1997: US$3.1 billion

PLA Navy, 2009

26 destroyers– Inc. 4 Russian Sovremennyy-class DDGs

51 frigates 58 diesel-electric submarines

– Inc. 12 Russian Kilo-class submarines

8 nuclear-powered submarines ~100 corvettes and FACs ~27 amphibious warfare ships

Chinese Naval Developments, 2000-09

Major surface combatants: – 6 DDGs (Type-051C, Type-052B, Type-052C)– 12 FFGs (Type-053H3, Type-054, Type-054A)– Also acquired 2 Sovremennyy-class DDGs from Russia

Submarines:– 20 diesel-electric subs (Song-, Yuan-class)– 2 Type-093 SSN, 2 Type-094 SSBNs– Also acquired 8 Kilo-class subs from Russia

Expeditionary warfare: – Recently launched first Type-071 LPD (800 troops, two helicopters,

two LCACs), could build up to 8 in this class– LHD-type ship also speculated

Source: Sinodefense.com

New Chinese Warships

Type-052C

Type-054A

New Chinese Warships, cont’d

Yuan-class

Type-071

Type-094

A Chinese Aircraft Carrier?

Growing speculation that China will soon acquire at least one – and perhaps as many as six – aircraft carriers

– Re-commission Varyag? (scrapped and sold to China in 2001)

– Build indigenously designed carrier(s)?– Could have first carrier group by 2020

More than symbolic: multiple Chinese CVBGs is a new, much more aggressive maritime strategy

Costly, time-consuming and risky, however

A Notional Chinese Aircraft Carrier

50,000-60,000 tons Ski-jump deck, conventionally powered Fly either Su-33, MiG-29, or navalized J-10 fighters

PLAN Aviation: New Attack Aircraft

Su-30MKK2 (24 a/c): multirole JH-7A: antiship, ground attack

Growing Chinese Presence – and Assertiveness – in Southeast Asia

Growing economic stakes involving Southeast Asian SLOCs

– Trade– Energy supplies

Increasingly pressing regional territorial claims– Spratly Islands– Paracel Islands– South China Sea EEZ: oil, gas, fisheries

Overall, greater assertiveness in region in promoting its interests – and China has the increased military capabilities to back this up

Critical SLOCs

Malacca/Singapore, Lombak, Makkasar, Sunda straits

– Traffic through South China Sea is 3X Suez Canal and 5X Panama Canal

SEA SLOCs are critical to China– Trade: China is increasingly dependent on trade, and 25%

of the world’s trade passes through Southeast Asian waterways

– Energy supplies: 60% of China’s oil comes through Southeast Asian SLOCs

Oil Trade Flows Through SEA Waterways

South China Sea: Overlapping Territorial Claims

Spratlys: Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan

– 1995: China-Philippines clashed over Mischief Reef in Spratlys– Feb 2009: RP Congress passed “Archipelagic Baselines Act,”

reiterating Philippine territorial claims in the Spratly Led to chill in Sino-Filipino relations

Paracels: competition with Vietnam– 1998: China-Vietnam clashed over Johnson Reef– Increased Chinese naval patrols and military exercises– Chinese pressure on Western oil companies not to participate in

offshore energy projects with Vietnam in waters claimed by China– Attempt to pressure Vietnam into agreeing to joint exploitation of

oil and gas reserves in Paracels?

China in the Spratly Islands

EEZ Enforcement

EEZs in Southeast Asia often overlap and clash– Considerable economic interests at stake: oil, gas, fisheries

(often only potential resources – still considerable unexplored territory)

– China claims most of South China Sea

Chinese Buildup in Southeast Asia

Hainan Island– Yulin (Sanya) naval base: greatly expanded in recent years– Type-052C DDGs– Nuclear sub base– JH-7A attack aircraft

Woody Island– Lengthened runway, added fuel depots– Capable of operating Su-30MKK fighters

Spratlys

“String of Pearls” Argument

Chinese assistance in building deep-water port in Sittwe, Myanmar

Helping to build navy base in Gwandar, Pakistan Provide PLAN with base access through the littorals

of the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf

China: Increasing Resort to Force?

Enforcement can escalate into violence– Chinese harassment of USNS Impeccable in South China

Sea, March 2009: Beijing claimed that the Impeccable was engaged in “illegal activities” in its EEZ

– Beijing also announced that it would send one of its largest patrol boats to protect its vessels in the Paracel and Spratly Islands and to “demonstrate Beijing’s sovereignty over China’s islands”

Increasing potential for South China Sea to become a zone of conflict?

– At the very least, a more important chokepoint