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FNI Report 9/2012 China’s Climate-Change Policy 1988-2011: From Zero to Hero? Iselin Stensdal
FNI Report 9/2012
China’s Climate-Change Policy
1988-2011: From Zero to Hero?
Iselin Stensdal
China’s Climate-Change Policy
1988-2011: From Zero to Hero?
Iselin Stensdal
July 2012
Copyright © Fridtjof Nansen Institute 2012
Title
China's Climate-Change Policy 1988-2011: From Zero to Hero?
Publication Type and Number
FNI-rapport 9/2012
Pages
25
Authors
Stensdal, Iselin
ISBN
978-82-7613-651-7
(online version)
ISSN
1893-5486
Abstract
This report describes the evolution of China’s domestic climate-change policy
over the period 1988-2011, using the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to
explore the policy change. Policy development has been gradual, with the most
notable change occurring in 2007, when the National Climate Change
Programme elevated climate change to a national policy issue. Within the
climate-change policy subsystem there emerged an advocacy coalition - the
Climate Change Advocacy Coalition - urging that climate change should be
taken into consideration in relevant policies. The ACF points to socioeconomic
development and the Climate Change Advocacy Coalition’s policy-oriented
learning as explanations for the development of climate-change policy in China.
Key Words
China, climate change policy, domestic politics, Advocacy Coalition
Framework
i
Contents
Contents i
List of Acronyms ii
Abstract iii
Introduction 1
The ACF and China’s climate-change policy 2
China’s climate-change policy subsystem 3
Climate-change policies: from scientific topic to priority policy issue 4
1988–1997: Global warming is a developed-country issue,
economic development a Chinese issue 5
1998–2006: From global issue to more national concern 6
2007–2011: Elevation of climate change to a national priority 8
The Climate Change Advocacy Coalition – the Expert Coalition 12
Explaining policy change – Socioeconomic development and the role
of knowledge 15
ACF explanation: Socioeconomic development 15
ACF explanation: Policy-oriented learning 16
Concluding remarks – Will China become a low-carbon hero? 19
References 21
ii Iselin Stensdal
List of Acronyms
ACF – Advocacy Coalition Framework
CAS – Chinese Academy of Sciences
CASS – Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
C-CAN – China Climate Action Network
CCICED – China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and
Development
CDM – Clean Development Mechanism
CMA – China Meteorological Administration
CNCC – Chinese National Climate Committee
COP – Conference of Parties
CYCAN – China Youth Action Network
ENGO – environmental non-governmental organization
ERI – Energy Research Institute
GDP – gross domestic product
GHG – greenhouse gas
IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MEP – Ministry of Environmental Protection
MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOE – Ministry of Energy
MOST – Ministry of Science and Technology
NACCC – National Advisory Committee on Climate Change
NCCCG – National Climate Change Coordination Group
NDRC – National Development and Reform Commission
NLWGACC – National Leading Working Group on Addressing Climate Change
NPC – National People’s Congress
NRDC – Natural Resources Defence Council
SDC – Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SEPA – State Environmental Protection Agency
SPDC – State Planning and Developing Commission
SSTC – State Science and Technology Commission
STC – State Planning Commission
UNCED – United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WMO – World Meteorological Organization
WRI – World Research Institute
China’s Climate-Change Policy 1988-2011 iii
Abstract
This report describes the evolution of China’s domestic climate-change
policy over the period 1988–2011, using the Advocacy Coalition
Framework (ACF) (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1994; Sabatier 1998) to
explore the policy change. Policy development has been gradual, with the
most notable change occurring in 2007, when the National Climate
Change Programme elevated climate change to a national policy issue.
Within the climate-change policy subsystem there emerged an advocacy
coalition – the Climate Change Advocacy Coalition – urging that climate
change should be taken into consideration in relevant policies. The ACF
points to socioeconomic development and the Climate Change Advocacy
Coalition’s policy-oriented learning as explanations for the development
of climate-change policy in China.
Keywords: China, climate change policy, domestic politics, Advocacy
Coalition Framework
1
Introduction
Over the past 20 years, climate change has become a hot topic world-
wide, also in China. Interest in the issue of global warming increased
gradually within the Chinese bureaucracy and decision-making bodies
from 1988 onwards, but it was not until 2007 that the National Climate
Change Programme made climate change a national policy issue. Since
2007, climate change has been given rapidly increasing attention, also on
subnational government levels. What brought about this change in
climate-change policy? Here I employ Sabatier’s (1998; Jenkins-Smith &
Sabatier 1994) Advocacy Coalition Framework’s (ACF)1 parameters to
explain the policy change. I will argue that the ACF points to the
socioeconomic development that has unfolded between 1988 and 2011 as
an important catalyser that has contributed to change in the Chinese
climate-change policy subsystem. Further, ACF draws attention to the
advocacy coalition of this policy subsystem: the Climate Change
Advocacy Coalition, consisting mostly of climate-change scientists and
environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGO). A further
explanation provided by ACF is the Climate Change Advocacy
Coalition’s policy-oriented learning. The ACF is often used to describe
policy changes in a democratic context, but the assumptions can be
adapted to suit other political contexts as well. In particular, it seems a
promising tool for illustrating some mechanisms in the Chinese policy
process. This is a work-in-progress, and the argument could be further
refined.2 The data for this text come from a range of written primary
sources – policy documents, statistics, published texts and videos from
ENGOs and scientists – and from personal communications with ENGO
employees, bureaucracy officials and climate-change scientists in 2011
and 2012. Secondary sources like research publications, news articles and
reports have also been used as material.
This report is structured as follows: In the next section I explain the basic
principles of the ACF and how it can shed light on the case of China’s
climate-change policy. Next, I recount the emergence of Chinese climate-
change policies, as well as the development of the climate-change policy
subsystem and the Climate Change Advocacy Coalition. The next part
takes a closer look at the explanatory power of the ACF. In the
concluding section I briefly discuss what the future may hold for China’s
climate-change policy.
1 Many thanks to Tor Håkon Inderberg for introducing me to the ACF and his comments
on this case. I would also like to thank Steinar Andresen, Guri Bang, Gørild Heggelund
and Arild Underdal for helpful comments. However, any remaining errors and
shortcomings are solely my own. 2 I intend to employ the ACF on this particular case in a future publication.
2 Iselin Stensdal
The ACF and China’s climate-change policy
In explaining policy change, the ACF takes the policy subsystem as the
most useful unit of analysis. Such a subsystem consists of actors from the
state, as well as private organizations. The governmental actors come
from all levels of government, and there also might be actors from
international or foreign organizations within the subsystem. These actors
deliberately work to influence the policies within the subsystem, and can
be grouped into advocacy coalitions. The agents of an advocacy coalition
hold shared normative and casual beliefs, and over time come to
participate in coordinated activities (Sabatier 1998:99,103–104).
Public policies can be read as belief systems, with value priorities and
perceptions of concerning policy aspects. Likewise, an advocacy
coalition’s views on a policy issue can be seen as beliefs. Mapping out
these beliefs provides a chart that can be used to determine the influence
of various actors over time: the more similar policies become to actors’
beliefs, the more power over policy formation those actors are considered
to have. These beliefs can be arranged hierarchically: Policy core beliefs
are held coalition-wide and are the glue that holds a coalition together.
Such beliefs concern causal assumptions and normative perceptions of
the issue in question, and value priorities like the relative value of
economic development as opposed to environmental protection.
Secondary aspects are beliefs concerning the details of the issue, e.g. as
to the measures to be taken in response. Secondary aspect beliefs may
vary within a coalition. The ACF assumes that, due to the nature of the
beliefs, actors will be most prone to change their secondary aspect
beliefs, but that it is harder to change policy core beliefs (Sabatier
1998:99–104).
The role of technical information in the making and dispute of policies
holds special importance within the ACF (Sabatier 1998:99).
Modification of the beliefs of members of an advocacy coalition is
referred to as policy-oriented learning, and is understood as: ‘…[the]
relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioural intentions which
result from experience and are concerned with the attainment or revision
of policy objectives’ (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1994:182). Such learning
is instrumental to the members as they seek to become more
knowledgeable to help advance their policy objectives (ibid). The
prospects of policy subsystem actors for influencing the policies are
dependent on two types of exogenous variables. The first kind, relatively
stable parameters, includes factors like basic features of the policy
problem in question and essential sociocultural values. The second kind
of variable includes more dynamic events external to the subsystem, like
changes in socioeconomic conditions and impacts from decisions made in
other policy subsystems. Changes in the exogenous variables generate
alterations in the constraints and resources of the actors within the
subsystem (Sabatier 1998:103–104). Members’ reactions to the altered
situation may lead them to alter their perception of the policy issue at
hand. Also their use of the opportunities presented can result in policy
change. At any given time, an advocacy coalition will try to modify
policies toward its objective goals, employing strategies that involve the
China’s Climate-Change Policy 1988-2011 3
use of guidance instruments such as changes in information, rules or
personnel (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1994:182). To fully assess the
progression of the policy change, it is essential to follow a policy issue
over the timespan of at least a decade (Sabatier 1998:99–104).
One methodology challenge for collecting data for this article has been
that the policy debates in China tend to be less transparent than in other
countries, which makes it harder to find relevant information. Although
government entities are increasingly disclosing information,3 decisions
are still often communicated with little information as to which parties
were consulted or the discussion that led to them. The political situation
is a further reason why it can be difficult to find public statements that
show disagreement or discrepancy with official government policies and
conduct. Accordingly, cooperation and setting a good example by
pioneering projects are strategies often employed by the Climate Change
Advocacy Coalition. In piecing together the puzzle that makes up the
Climate Change Advocacy Coalition and the policy subsystem, I have
examined actions where statements were not available, keeping in mind
that a sober evaluation of such material is always advisable. In this report,
the influence of advocacy coalition members on policies is measured by
two aspects, on a two-tier level similar to the policy beliefs hierarchy of
policy core beliefs and secondary aspects. First, there is agenda-setting:
the degree of convergence between the basic topics of the policy and the
stance advocated by coalition members. This form of influence is
measured to indicate to which degree the coalition members manage to
create attention around an issue and convince policy-makers of the
importance of dealing with the issue through policy regulation. Second,
there is the aspect of policy-measure decisions: the accordance between
the government’s specific policy measures adopted and the coalition
member’s advised measures or earlier implemented actions. Just as
secondary aspects do not need to be held coalition-wide, the measure in
question does not necessarily have to be promoted by all members of the
coalition. Implicit in these assessment parameters is the assumption of a
causal relationship between the advocacy coalition members’ activism
and ensuing policy change. Having presented the basic premises of the
ACF, I now turn to the subsystem studied here.
China’s climate-change policy subsystem
The Chinese climate-change policy subsystem has evolved and expanded
since global warming became an international concern, much along the
lines of what has happened under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). As Karen Litfin (2000:236–
37) points out, climate change is an internationalized issue with local and
regional effects and causes: one can hardly study domestic policies
3 Such as publishing the State Council’s communications online: see
http://www.gov.cn/xxgk/pub/govpublic/ Last accessed 20.12.2011. For a survey of city-
level environmental information disclosure, see Finamore (2010:5-6)
4 Iselin Stensdal
without taking the international process into account. This applies for
Chinese climate-change policies as well. Chinese climate-change policy
texts often feature references to the importance of international
cooperation, the UNFCCC in particular. Additionally, China chose to
announce its first-ever carbon-measure target, the carbon-intensity target,
in the run-up to the 15th UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP) in 2009.
This indicates a link between the progress of Chinese domestic climate-
change policies and the development of the international bargaining and
cooperation on climate change.
In the late 1980s, global warming was an issue studied by only a few
scientists: today it has now come to encompass a wide range of agents.
Within the climate-change policy subsystem I will focus on one grouping,
the Climate Change Advocacy Coalition, which works for greater
attention to be given to climate change within the economic growth
objectives established for the nation. Economic growth and poverty
alleviation have been the paramount aims since Deng Xiaoping
announced China’s ‘open door’ policy in 1979. In tandem with the
transition to a market-based economy, the number of businesses has
increased, and economic development has been the general guideline for
all policies. As there must be active participation on the policy issue of all
hierarchical levels of the government for a subsystem to be deemed fully-
fledged (Sabatier 1998:111), the Chinese climate-change policy sub-
system can be said to be fairly recent. It is as recently as 2007 that sub-
national levels of government became significantly involved in climate
change (Qi et al. 2008:380). On the other hand, there have been
individuals and organizations involved with climate change for more than
20 years. To my knowledge, the earliest Chinese journal mention of
anthropogenic climate change dates from 1979 (Fu & Hu 1979:28–29).
Further, from purely scientific research on climatic conditions to more
conventional energy improvements to carbon trade, a speedy increase of
complexity of climate-change policies occurred after 2007. The inclusion
of other issues into the larger climate-change policy subsystem has made
the policy issue more multifaceted and unruly, with numerous latent
subsystems nested within the larger climate-change policy subsystem, as
we shall see below.
Climate-change policies: from scientific topic to
priority policy issue
In the late 1980s, Chinese climate-change policies were limited to
scientific investigations. Gradually, the policies expanded. A first sign of
change came when China ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. By
ratifying, China signalled acceptance that mitigation actions were to be
dealt with inside China, as well as in the developed countries. The
watershed for domestic climate-change policy came five years later in
2007, with the National Climate Change Programme. The next phase of
domestic climate-change policies occurred in 2009 with the announce-
China’s Climate-Change Policy 1988-2011 5
ment of a carbon-intensity target, followed in the 2011 by the 12th 5-year
plan’s widening of policies, in measure and in scope.
1988–1997: Global warming is a developed-country issue,
economic development a Chinese issue
In 1988 China had started its large-scale reforms from planned economy
to a market-based one, struggling to eradicate poverty (Liu 2011:73). The
pace of the economic growth became rapid indeed in this period, with
most years showing two-digit GDP growth rates (World Bank database).
However, this economic expansion came at a price: it led to a rapid
increase of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and took a great toll on the
environment.
Climate change as a policy issue was brought to China from the
international arena, when the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
founded the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988.
Then in 1989 it was decided to start international negotiations for a
framework convention on climate change. Initially, the Chinese govern-
ment viewed climate-change policy as a highly scientific issue mainly
from the realm of foreign affairs. The first institutionalization of climate
change in China came in 1987 when the then State Science and
Technology Commission (SSTC) founded the Chinese National Climate
Committee (CNCC) with the objective of coordinating research on
climate change (Beuermann 1997:225). In 1990, the State Council’s
Environmental Protection Commission issued a statement on China’s
position on the global environmental problems, emphasizing the
responsibility of the developed countries for the deterioration of the
global environment, and the sovereignty of developing countries over
their natural resources and their rights to economic development (Jeon &
Yoon 2006:850–1). Climate change was viewed in this context. In 1992,
then Premier Li Peng stated at the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro that where
the goal of environmental protection came into conflict with the goal of
economic growth, priority was to go to the economy (Beuermann
1997:226). According to the ensuing agreement from the UNCED,
‘sustainable development’ was henceforth incorporated into national
policy programmes – but, as Li Peng stated, economic growth took
priority, and as far as climate change was concerned, the policy was to
explore the ramifications for China.
At this time the Chinese government still upheld views on the scientific
uncertainties of climate change. However, it also instigated two national
research projects between 1991 and 1995 in order to reduce the
uncertainties and explore the possible consequences of climate change for
the country (Ren 1997). In the 1990s the policy subsystem was beginning
to develop: the first state climate-change organs were established, and
advocacy agents emerged. Within the government’s National Climate
Change Coordination Group (NCCCG) – set up in 1990 with members
from relevant governmental organs – the Ministry of Energy (MOE) and
6 Iselin Stensdal
the State Planning Commission (STC) argued for prioritizing economic
development over energy restructuring (Liu 2011:70–1). Likewise, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Science and
Technology (MOST) focused more on economic development than
possible abatement efforts (Heggelund et al. 2000:14). At the same time,
however, there were a few ENGOs working with local governments on
local energy projects, providing examples of how energy consumption
patterns could be altered (China Environmental Series 1998:90; Chen
2001:14). Two environmental newspapers, China Environmental News
and China Green Times, supported the ENGOs’ work by reporting on
their activities and spreading information (Jin 2001:7). Some scientists
reported on changes already evident in agriculture and the threat of rising
sea levels to economic output in coastal regions (Chen 1992:68–70).
Several scientists collaborated with international or foreign institutions on
research projects and also received funding from abroad (Ren 1997). The
mechanism whereby the government made policy decisions based on
advice from experts and scientists started early, and has since become an
important channel of communication for scientists. An epistemic
community of scientists developed in China, with close contact to their
foreign counterparts (Economy 1997:21). On the international climate
arena, the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997. China was sceptical to
the flexible mechanisms that would enable the developed countries to
receive credits for actions implemented on Chinese territory. One of these
flexible mechanisms was later to become known as the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (CDM) (Lewis 2008:163–4).
In short, from the late 1980s until the Kyoto Protocol came into
existence, China’s policies on climate change reflected the government’s
view of climate change as a scientific issue, introduced from abroad, and
far removed from the concerns of everyday life.
1998–2006: From global issue to more national concern
From the late 1990s to 2006, economic development contained at a rapid
pace, bringing more wealth but also increasing the demand for natural
resources and energy sources, which in turn meant more GHG emissions.
Between 2000 and 2007, coal consumption doubled in China (Turner
2010:2). When Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao became President and Prime
Minister in late 2002 they had to respond to the poor condition of the
environment and the rising scarcity of natural resources, while still
maintaining economic growth (Hallding et al. 2009:123). As climate
change became more a domestic issue the Climate Change Advocacy
Coalition took shape within the policy subsystem.
In 1998 the Chinese government initiated its most comprehensive
bureaucracy restructuring to date. This also had consequences for the
policy issue of climate change. The NCCCG secretariat was moved from
the China Meteorological Administration (CMA) to the State Planning
China’s Climate-Change Policy 1988-2011 7
and Developing Commission (SPDC).4 The membership constellation of
the NCCCG was also reshuffled in an attempt to broaden the coordination
of climate-change polices. This change reflects the shift in the
government’s perception of climate change from a scientific issue, to one
of development (Liu 2011:78). Moreover, to strike a balance between the
sometimes contradictory goals of economic growth and environmental
conservation, the Chinese leadership in 2003 introduced the guiding
principle of ‘scientific outlook on development’. The concept was
formally endorsed by the National People’s Congress (NPC) the
following year (Hallding et al. 2009:124). According to this principle, the
future development of China is to be guided by science and scientific
advice.
During the eight years of this period, climate change emerged gradually
in national polices, no longer merely as part of an international
negotiation process. Although the term ‘sustainable development’ often
appeared in policy documents as a desirable direction, Chinese reality
was unmatched economic growth with accompanying environmental
degradation. In 2001 China embarked on the period of the 10th 5-year
plan (2001–2005), the first 5-year plan where climate change was
mentioned. The term occurred once in the plan, in connection with
affirmation of China’s active participation in global environmental and
developing issues that would contribute to mitigating climate change.
However, ‘climate change’ was also mentioned in two of the specialized
5-year plans for the period.5 While the Environmental 5-year plan
confirmed the country’s international dedication, the Meteorological 5-
year plan specified that the country’s meteorological staff should
continue to support climate-change decision-makers, and also strengthen
their own knowledge base on the implications of climate change in China
(NDRC 2001a; NDRC 2001b). In a similar vein, the National Medium-
and Long-Term Plan for Science & Technology Development (2006–
2020) declared international cooperation and domestic research on
various aspects of climate change in China as a priority (State Council
2006). Hallding et al. (2009:125) argue that climate change became a
security issue on the leadership agenda around 2005, and that top
government began to pay attention to the Chinese research on the grave
impacts of climate change for the nation. Liu (2011:90) underscores how
the macroeconomic views of NDRC have come to dominate policy-
making on climate change since 2003.
The first Chinese ENGOs6 were set up in the 1990s, often by educated
individuals, many of whom had seen the work of ENGOs abroad
4 The SPDC was renamed the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in
2003. 5 At least since the 9th 5-year plan, in conjunction with the main 5-year plan there has
been an increasing tendency to issue other long- or short-term strategies or specialized
5-year plans as well. Many can be found (in Chinese) at
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgh/ghwb/default.htm Last accessed 18.10.2011 6 In investigating social organizations in China, the degree of ‘non-governmental’ can be
discussed. Here I use the term ENGO for many types of organizations – some are more
network-based, some resemble think-tanks. For discussions on non-governmental
organizations in China, see Zhang (2001), Yang (2005) and Ru & Orlanto (2009).
8 Iselin Stensdal
(Economy 2005). The Chinese ENGOs worked mainly with nature and
species conservation, often in collaboration with local governments,
communities and research institutions (Turner & Wu 2001:33–9). The
ENGOs aimed at cooperating with the government because the
environmental activists genuinely wanted to help the government (Turner
& Wu 2001:2). Collaboration with the media, such as Southern Weekend
and 21st Century Business Herald, was an important way for the ENGOs
to spread information and insights (Economy 2005). From the late 1990s
a significant number of international ENGOs also started conducting
environmental or energy-saving projects in China (Economy 2005;
Zusman &Turner 2005:132). It was not unusual that the funding for the
Chinese ENGOs came from international sources (Economy
2004:158,163). These international ENGOs joined the Climate Change
Advocacy Coalition. In 2001 the IPCC released its 3rd
assessment report,
which concluded that there was now less uncertainty as to whether
climate change is a man-made phenomenon (IPCCC 2001:60). Also, the
environmental costs of the economic development, such as soot and dust
emissions, were given more attention and addressed by the Chinese
central government (OECD 2007:18).
Yet another development came with the integration of the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol into Chinese
jurisdiction, which allowed GHG-mitigating actions to be implemented
within China. China ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, and by extension
agreed to the principle of implementing emissions-reduction activities in
China, a developing country. Previously, China had maintained that
emissions reduction should be conducted in the developed countries. The
authority overseeing CDM projects in China were instituted in 2004 and
the State Council adopted rules for CDM administration the following
year (Lewis 2008:163–64). In 2005 the Renewable Energy Law was
adopted, promoting the expansion of renewable energy such as solar,
hydro and wind power. The advantages of using renewables instead of
coal are not limited to reducing GHG emissions, but include reduced
local environmental pollution and availability of the energy source as
well. The latter two factors were important for the Chinese central
government in incorporating renewable energy sources in the national
electricity generation structure (Zhao et al. 2010:24).
To sum up, during this period the central leadership had to tackle the
environmental problems brought about by China’s rapid economic
development. At the same time, the central government’s view of climate
change as a purely scientific issue was altered to an understanding of its
being more of a development issue, in line with the concepts ‘sustainable
development’ and ‘scientific outlook on development’.
2007–2011: Elevation of climate change to a national priority
In 2007, the same year as China became the largest GHG-emitting
country and the IPCC released its 4th assessment report, climate change
became a domestic policy issue in its own right – no longer merely as
part of the larger ‘environmental protection’ umbrella. From this year on,
China’s Climate-Change Policy 1988-2011 9
the central government moved up the priority of climate change, making
it a more important part of domestic policies. Despite the turbulence in
the world economy beginning with the 2008–2009 financial crisis, China
was able to maintain respectable economic growth rates – which also
contributed to its increasing GHG emissions. Environmental degradation
and now also consequences of climate change were concerns the central
government prioritized.
In 2007 the NCCCG was altered again; it was renamed the ‘National
leading working group on addressing climate change ‘ (NLWGACC),
structured directly under the State Council, with Premier Wen Jiabao as
the head of the leading group and the NDRC’s Climate Change
Department as its secretariat (Liu 2011:85). The restructuring of the
NCCLWG, directly under the State Council, China’s highest political
organ, was a premonition of the growing importance climate change
would come to have. Also in 2007, the National Climate Change
Programme, a 60-page document, was issued. In recounting China’s
efforts to abate its GHG emissions in the years prior to 2007, earlier
afforestation measures and the efforts made to reduce China’s energy
consumption were now depicted as climate-change activities. Equally, the
measures spelled out in the programme for future GHG mitigation were
not in fact new, but a continuation of earlier efforts of energy
restructuring and strengthening of laws and institutions, particularly in
the energy sector (NRDC 2007a:7–10,30–33). Saving energy is beneficial
both to the environment and for using energy sources most economically,
and has been a stated goal in national polices for decades.7 Even so, from
2007 on energy policies became explicitly connected to the reduction of
GHG emissions and climate change. The term ‘save energy, reduce
emissions’ (节能减排) has since become a staple reference in policy texts
where issues of climate change or energy are addressed, reflecting how
entwined the two areas are. The Mid- and Long-Term Plan for
Renewable Energy issued in 2007, put forward a goal of increasing the
share of non-fossil fuels in the primary energy consumption to 15 % by
2020 (NDRC 2007b:18). The Law on Energy Saving was revised the
same year and made energy conservation a national policy (Jiang et al.
2009:4261).The elevation of climate change as a policy issue meant that
it became a recognized part of future development. In an official report in
2008, China’s view of climate-change policy was explained as follows:
‘Address climate change in the context of sustainable development.
Climate change arises out of development, and should thus be solved
along with development’ (State Council 2008:11). In 2008 the ‘scientific
outlook on development’ was incorporated into the Chinese constitution
(Hallding et al. 2009:124), consolidating the advisory position of science.
China has in recent years experienced increased extreme weather such as
droughts, floods and other natural disasters. Both the National Climate
Change Programme (NDRC 2007a:16–19) and the first White Paper on
Climate Change (State Council 2008:7–10) point to China’s vulnerability
from the negative consequences of climate change; the two texts cite
7 See for example the 6th 5-year plan (1981-85) ch. 1,1.4 and 8th 5-year plan (1991-95)
ch. 2,2
10 Iselin Stensdal
examples like the fact that the runoff from China’s six largest rivers has
decreased over the past 40 years and that the sea level has been increasing
for the last 30 years. The costs incurred can become considerable. The
drought in northeastern China in the winter of 2008/2009 caused
economic losses of USD 2.3 billion and led to water shortages for more
than 10 million people (Nature 2011:293). Extreme natural phenomena
have also directly affected China’s energy supply. In the summer of 2011
a NDRC representative indicated that the country would experience a
serious energy shortage, as areas in the southwest and central regions
usually served by hydropower had suffered severe droughts (China Daily
2011). Increasingly, extreme natural phenomena and disasters have been
linked to climate change – by the media, by scientists and by the
government. Thus adaptation and capacity building on managing future
natural disasters have been given increased attention in climate-change
polices.
The 2007 domestication of policy on climate change also spurred activity
among the actors in the subsystem. For example, the volume of research
articles on climate change in Chinese publications has grown from about
1000 articles published in 2006 to more than 8000 in 2010 (Wübbeke
forthcoming). International ENGOs like Greenpeace and the Climate
Group have not only continued working in China, but have also set up
offices there. In 2007, several Chinese ENGOs youth groups established
the first Chinese youth climate association, China Youth Action Network
(CYCAN). It was also not before 2007 that subnational governments’
handling of climate change became institutionalized. In 2007 most of the
province governments established climate-change task forces and
developed province-level policies on climate change (Qi et al. 2008:380).
Earlier, a few local governments, among them Guiyang city government
and Shaanxi province government, had initiated some activities related to
climate change (PECE 2009:17–23; 2011:20–22), but activity level
depended on the initiative of the government in question, not
institutionalized management. The past few years have seen a dramatic
rise in the activity level of lower-level governments in low-carbon
projects. Moreover, climate-related activities conducted in China with
foreign participation have increased significantly since 2007. For
example, in collaboration with Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation (SDC), Baoding, Dezhou, Jianchuan, Kunming, Meishan,
Yinchuan city governments and Dongcheng District in Beijing
Municipality have joined in what is known as the Low-Carbon City
China Alliance (LCCC Alliance 2011).Britain’s Chatham House,
working together with local governmental organs, made an assessment of
the provincial-level city Chongqing’s low-carbon development (Preston
et al. 2009:6). In 2010, the Climate Group surveyed cities that had started
low-carbon activities. At least 18 cities had embarked on low-carbon
projects, many in cooperation with both foreign ENGOs and Chinese
universities and scientific institutions (Climate Group 2010:7). The
various projects have approached the low-carbon concept in various
ways, but all take their starting point in each city’s unique situation, and
seek to identify opportunities within these conditions. In 2009, a research
team from the China Council for International Cooperation on
China’s Climate-Change Policy 1988-2011 11
Environment and Development (CCICED)8 and a task force of Chinese
and foreign scientists and researchers issued a report on low-carbon
development in China. This report indicated that a transition to a low-
carbon economy is both feasible and profitable, citing the costs of the
negative consequences of climate change, and the possibilities for China
to become a leader on the world market for renewable energy technology.
The report also underscored that a transition towards a low-carbon
economy is consistent with the country’s scientific outlook on
development (CCICED 2009:2–8). The UNDP’s China Human
Development Report for 2009/2010, China and a Sustainable Future:
Towards a Low Carbon Economy and Society, in collaboration with
Renmin University, argued strongly for a turn towards a low-carbon
development, warning that the development already achieved by China
might be set back by future climate changes unless emission reductions
were attended to (UNDP 2010: 99–101). The Chinese central government
also has amassed a portfolio of bilateral collaboration on climate-change
work, including the EU–China Partnership on Climate Change, a climate-
change partnership with the Australian government and the US–China
Partnership for Climate Action.
The year 2009 saw further expansion of climate-change polices in China.
Prior to the 15th UNFCCC COP in Copenhagen (COP15), which was
intended to complete the Bali Road Map, China’s State Council adopted
the country’s first carbon-specific goal. The State Council decided that
China would lower its carbon intensity9 by 40–45% by 2020 compared to
2005 levels (Reuters 2009). Earlier reduction measures in China had been
measured in terms of energy saved, not in terms of emissions as such. In
2009 Premier Wen Jiabao declared: ‘In the years ahead, China will
further integrate actions on climate change into its economic and social
development plan…’ (NDRC 2009:4). The term ‘low-carbon’ (低碳)
began to appear in official statements, reports and policy texts. Together
with the continued emphasis on long-term research and energy
conservation efforts, there has been a slow but steady diversification of
China’s policies on climate change, often using pilot projects to test the
water for various policy measures. New market-based measures were
tested. In 2008 China’s first carbon exchange was set up in Tianjin, with
more exchanges established in the following years. Then in 2010 the
government announced five provinces and eight cities for low-carbon
pilot projects.10
Shenzhen, both a low-carbon pilot city and a pilot for
carbon trading, set up a carbon exchange in 2010, with British funds
(Caixin Weekly 2011).
The most recent elaboration of China’s climate-change policies came
with the 12th 5-year plan (2011–2015), published in 2011. The plan
confirmed an increase in earlier energy saving measures, such as
8 As early as in 1992 the Chinese government established CCICED, a high-level
international advisory body on key environmental and development issues in China, to put
forward policy recommendations to the Chinese leadership (CCICED 2008). 9 Amount of carbon emitted per unit of GDP. 10 The cities are Tianjin, Chongqing, Shenzhen, Xiamen, Hangzhou, Nanchang, Guiyang
and Baoding; the provinces are Guangdong, Liaoning, Hubei, Shaanxi and Yunnan
(NDRC 2010).
12 Iselin Stensdal
expanding the 11th 5-year plan’s Top 1,000 Energy Consuming
Businesses Programme to Top 10,000 Energy Consuming Businesses
Programme under this period, as well as a further policy diversification in
dealing with climate change. Among main aims of the 12th 5-year plan is
to reduce carbon intensity by 17 % by 2015, as against 2010 levels. This
was the first time a 5-year plan included a carbon-specific target. The
plan further stipulated that a trial carbon market would be implemented
during the plan period; resource taxes would be improved and standards
established for energy conservation. Also in 2011, preparations were
undertaken for a climate-change law (Legal Daily 2011).
Table 1. China’s GHG emissions and GDP
Year CO2
emissions,
MtCO2e1
Place
on emitting
country
ranking
Percentage of
world total
emissions
GDP, million
RMB2
1988 2,191.9 4th 10.71 1,504,280
1998 3,423.4 3rd 14.87 8,440,200
2008 7,200.1 1st 24.01 31,404,540
1 = Million tonnes CO2 equivalents,
2= local currency unit.
Sources: Emissions data: World Research Institute Climate Analysis Indicators
Tool, GDP: World Bank database
All in all, there have been massive changes in China’s economic
situation, its GHG emissions and climate-change policies over the past 20
years. During these years, China has shown astonishing growth. Its CO2
emissions grew 3.5 times, whereas GDP increased more than 15 times in
the same period (see Table 1). In the late 1980s, climate change was
treated as a scientific issue bound up with foreign affairs. Gradually it
began to feature in policy documents as a national concern, and in 2007
received its own national programme. Since then, its priority nationally
has been moved up further, always in line with the objective of future
economic development. This increased attention to climate change as a
policy issue was promoted by the Climate Change Advocacy Coalition, to
which we now turn.
The Climate Change Advocacy Coalition – the Expert
Coalition
The Climate Change Advocacy Coalition is made up of individuals and
groups that share a concern for the consequences of climate change in
China, and who want China to step up efforts in GHG emissions
abatement. The composition of the coalition has changed over time, with
China’s Climate-Change Policy 1988-2011 13
the emergence of ENGOs from the mid-1990s and international ENGOs
in the 2000s, but it has always remained strong on scientific expertise.11
In 1989 the Chinese government organized a research programme
involving 500 experts (Economy 2004:183). The US National Research
Council pointed in 1992 to the personal engagement of Ye Dunzheng,
former special advisor to the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and
chairman of the Chinese National Committee for the International
Geosphere-Biosphere Programme, as one reason for the international
involvement and activity of Chinese climate-change scientists
(Beuermann 1997:224). Scientists and researchers make up a large part of
the advocacy coalition. Closest to China’s decision-makers are members
of the National Advisory Committee on Climate Change (NACCC),
advising the NLWGACC. Scholars and scientists belonging to this
coalition can be also found at the NDRC’s Energy Research Institute
(ERI), the CMA’s National Climate Center, the CAS, the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and universities such as Peking
University, Renmin University and Tsinghua University (Wübbeke
2010:27–36). Scientists and experts have warned of China’s vulnerability
to the threat of climate change and presented policy recommendations
that go beyond official policies in reports, written statements and
increasingly through the media, whether in interviews or by publishing
articles (Chen 1992:68–70; Li 2009; Wübbeke 2010:27; Point Carbon
2011).
Chinese ENGOs have included the climate-change issue in their work
portfolios. Friends of Nature, Global Environmental Institute, Global
Village of Beijing, China Climate Action Network (C-CAN) and China
Youth Action Network (CYCAN) are all examples of Chinese ENGOs
working with climate change. WWF has been operating in China since
1980, whereas a significant number of international ENGOs and think-
tanks set up offices in China after 2000. Greenpeace, the Climate Group,
the Nature Conservancy, World Research Institute (WRI) and the Natural
Resources Defence Council (NRDC) are all examples. These offices are
often staffed by a mix of foreigners and Chinese nationals. It is mostly
international large ENGOs that have the funding needed for larger
climate-related projects. Parts of the media also belong to this coalition,
promoting awareness and spreading information to the general public.
Example here include China Environmental News and China Green
Times, with their long history of collaboration with ENGOs. As to the
subnational governments, one example is the city government of
Guiyang, which published the ‘Action Plan for Low-Carbon
Development in Guiyang (Outline) 2010–2020’ in 2010. Here it is stated
that, despite having to rely on coal for the foreseeable future, Guiyang
will use its advantages to achieve a low-carbon city while maintaining
economic development (Government of Guiyang 2010:6–7). Further,
Guiyang city is among the 2010 appointed eight low-carbon pilot cities.
Selection of these cities was not arbitrary; quite a few of the governments
had already initiated actions to reduce GHG emissions (Climate Group
2010). On the business side, China Renewable Energy Industries
11 The coalition closely resembles an ‘epistemic community’, as described by Peter Haas
(1992:3). I am indebted to Steinar Andresen for pointing this out.
14 Iselin Stensdal
Association (CREIA) is an example of a representative of climate-
friendly businesses. What all the actors within this coalition have in
common is that they often work together. One recurrent pattern is that the
international ENGO or a company funds a project, coordinated by an
ENGO and executed in collaboration with expertise and local
government. One such project is the Global Environment Institute’s
(GEI) project Identifying Opportunities and Key Stake Holders to
Mitigate the Energy and Environment Crisis in Southern China, started in
2007, which brought together research centres, independent enterprises,
government organs, financing bodies and ENGOS in the search for
market-based solutions to improve the energy efficiency and increase the
share of renewable energy sources in Guangdong province (GEI
2008:16).
Table 2. Climate Change Advocacy Coalition 1988–2011
Actors:
Climate-change scientists, ENGOs, environmental media such as China Green
Times, some officials from SPDC/NDRC’s Climate Change Department, parts of
State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA)/ Ministry of Environmental
Protection (MEP), some officials from MOST, a few subnational governments,
such as Guiyang city government, some CMA employees, some businesses.
Policy core beliefs:
Causal beliefs: Trust in IPCC reports; climate change is a threat to China and its
development.
Normative beliefs 1988–1997: Climate change should be handled primarily by
the by developed countries. China should actively do its best at its current stage
of development to reduce its GHG emissions.
Normative beliefs 1998–2011: China should do its utmost to reduce its GHG
emissions and focus on capacity building, all in accordance with its current stage
of development. Abating climate-change consequences should be a guiding
premise for China’s future development.
The ACF assumes that in addition to policy-oriented learning, variables
external to the policy subsystem may serve as catalysts of policy change.
Such exogenous variables can alter the constraints and resources of the
subsystem actors and coalition members’ perception of status quo poli-
cies, in turn inducing them to change their strategies (Sabatier 1998:102,
104). How can this be linked to the changes that taken place in China’s
policies on climate change? As the next part will show, the socioeco-
nomic development and the strong scientific competence of the members
of the Climate Change Advocacy Coalition have both been significant.
China’s Climate-Change Policy 1988-2011 15
Explaining policy change – Socioeconomic
development and the role of knowledge
When we look at the evolution of climate-change policies in China, is the
change in 2007 particularly stands out. What can explain the shift?
Within the ACF explanations, the exogenous variable events external to
the subsystem changes in socioeconomic conditions and the policy-
oriented learning of members of the Climate Change Advocacy Coalition
can shed light on the mechanisms that resulted in policy change.
ACF explanation: Socioeconomic development
In line with the ACF theory that changes in relevant socioeconomic
conditions can lead to policy changes (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier
1994:183), we have seen that China’s deliberate and conscious change
from being a poor developing country to becoming a middle-income
country over the past 30 years has had an unfortunate and unintentional
consequence: China currently ranks the top GHG-emitting country in the
world. As the economy grew, China’s GHG emissions followed suit. This
socioeconomic development has altered both the resources and con-
straints of the policy subsystem actors – and so the calls from the Climate
Change Advocacy Coalition to adopt climate-change policies and start
abatement measures became increasingly relevant from around 2000.
Around this time, the central government’s attention to the general
environmental degradation – also a consequence of the rapid economic
growth – began to grow. The fact of environmental degradation combined
with the GHG emissions prospects gave the Climate Change Advocacy
Coalition more clout. It seems highly likely that this situation has had an
effect on the Climate Change Advocacy Coalition’s agenda-setting in
Chinese policies.
As to the resources and constraints of subsystem actors, socioeconomic
development has brought a general sophistication in most areas of society
since 1988, public or private. The actors have matured. Advancing from a
low- to middle-income country has also made the Chinese government
capable of handling increasingly complex policy matters. Several rounds
of bureaucracy restructurings and a general improvement of the official
system, together with the fact that officials have become increasingly
knowledgeable, have enabled the government to take on climate change
as a policy issue in recent years and to refine the country’s fiscal policies.
The socioeconomic development has opened up for additional actors to
emerge and join the policy subsystem. Also, since 1988, the arrival and
development of ENGOs as part of the loosening of state control has been
important for how climate change has been handled. And finally, as
China has developed, so has the level of Chinese expertise on matters of
relevance to climate-change policies. Just like climate change, knowledge
knows no borders, and the Chinese expert community have worked
closely with foreign counterparts, in IPCC committees and on local
projects in China. Project partners and funding for various projects are
16 Iselin Stensdal
sometimes international as well. Thus, the core policy beliefs of the
Climate Change Advocacy Coalition are not without foreign influence.
With new stages of economic development come new opportunities.
Sometimes solutions to curbing GHG emissions coincide with develop-
ment objectives, such as improving the energy consumption structure of
industries. Could it be that low-carbon development is regarded as having
economic benefits, and is promoted because of economic self-interest? In
answering criticism that the ACF does not adequately account for inte-
rests, Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994:195–196) admit that differentiat-
ing between beliefs and interests gives rise to issues of both methodology
and theory. Economic development has been and still is the ultimate
objective of the Chinese government. Hence, it is to be anticipated that no
other official policy may conflict with this objective except under very
special circumstances, such as when a natural disaster strikes. Thus it
seems plausible that one underlying motivation for the government’s
intensification of climate efforts involves the assessment of the costs and
benefits of taking mitigation actions now, against the costs of adaptation
later on. China’s vulnerability to the consequences of climate change is
often cited internationally as a reason why China has come to regard
climate change as important. The Second National Assessment Report on
Climate Change, a collaborative venture involving MOST, CMA, CAS
and other relevant ministries and published in November 2011, warned,
inter alia, of rising costs of food production as a climate change conse-
quence (Reuters 2011; NDRC Climate Change Department 2011). The
UNDP 2010 Human Development Report pointed out that achieving
reductions in carbon intensity will incur incremental costs (UNDP
2010:63–64). With the limited finances available to the Chinese govern-
ment for covering services and policy areas, it might be a reasonably
priced insurance to instigate mitigation actions now and thereby lessen
the future consequences of climate change. By extension, safeguarding
future energy security, future food security and other development
concerns may also have been crucial concerns for the central leadership
when deciding to steer China down the low-carbon path.
Self-interest is not unimportant for the other subsystem actors either, but
this depends on the different organizational positions. For ENGOs, which
view the world through ‘green lenses’, it is easy to promote more far-
reaching mitigation policies; for a business, promoting the most cost-
effective high-emitting option is a no-brainer; but for a governmental
official with responsibility for juggling many important policy issues the
choice might not be as clear-cut. In such a situation, receiving counsel
from expertise can prove pivotal, as the next paragraphs will show.
ACF explanation: Policy-oriented learning
The ACF anticipates that technical information and knowledge will have
a special role in policy change (Sabatier 1998:99)–– and China’s climate-
change policy subsystem confirms this assumption. The mechanisms of
climate change may be the same now as they were in 1988, but infor-
mation and knowledge about the phenomenon have certainly evolved.
China’s Climate-Change Policy 1988-2011 17
Most probably, the accumulated knowledge about climate change that
climate scientists have amassed and the Climate Change Advocacy
Coalition members have drawn attention to, has had a considerable effect
on the agenda-setting of Chinese policies. When the first national policy
document to mention climate change was issued in 2001 – the 10th 5-year
plan – Chinese climate scientists had been researching climate change
and reporting to the government for more than 10 years. Also in 2001 the
IPCC’s 3rd
report was published, concluding that previous uncertainties
surrounding climate change were now significantly reduced. The Climate
Change Advocacy Coalition members’ policy-oriented learning has
brought a better understanding of the phenomenon of climate change, its
impacts on China and on ways of dealing with the various aspects of
climate change. For the climate change scientists, gathering knowledge
has also been their designated task. The coalition’s policy core beliefs
have not changed, but have more probably deepened as the uncertainties
about climate change have been reduced. With continued accentuation of
the consequences of climate change for China, highlighting challenges
related to extreme weather and to food security concerns, among other
challenges, scientists of the Climate Change Advocacy Coalition have
convinced the country’s central leadership that climate change must be
figured into the equation when national policies are designed. The degree
to which the coalition has influenced agenda-setting of Chinese policies
becomes apparent in the content of the 2007 National Climate Change
Programme, which summed up the most recent scientific findings on
apparent climate change, the anticipated impacts, and policy measures for
dealing with future challenges.
Moreover, the various collaborations within the Climate Change
Advocacy Coalition have been a frequently used strategy to show the
government that the policy options supported by the coalition are
feasible. The Climate Change Advocacy Coalition has had some
influence on the policy-measure decisions. The carbon intensity target
was announced by the government in 2009, but it was being discussed on
the draft level already in 2007 (Herzog 2007). NACCC proposed the
carbon intensity target to the NLWGACC after months of deliberation,
but the proposal was originally formulated by the Low Carbon
Laboratory at Tsinghua University (Wübbeke 2010:28–31). Another
example is the Guangdong Environmental Partnership programme’s
project the Green Guardian Education Initiative. The initiative had in
2010 trained 400 schoolchildren to become ‘energy-saving guides’ for
their local community. The children’s volunteering had already reduced
energy use in the residential area by 10 % (DeGroot 2010:89–91). In
2011, the NDRC’s Climate Change Department and the MEP information
office initiated a kick-off tour Cool China, around the chosen low-carbon
pilot areas, to spread information on low-carbon development. And as
part of the larger Cool China programme in 2011 and 2012, one activity
has been training schoolchildren to become ‘low-carbon managers’. They
are to record their households’ monthly carbon emission levels, which
can be plotted into an online tool to generate spread-sheets and graphs,
enabling them to analyse household emissions (People’s Daily 2011).
Thus there are signs of Climate Change Advocacy Coalition’s persuasive
efforts as regards climate-change policies in the growing attention
18 Iselin Stensdal
devoted to climate change since 1988 by the government, and also in the
adoption of more specific policy measures after 2007.
Table 3. Changes in Chinese climate-change policies 1988–2011
Early beliefs Changes
Policy core:
Climate change is a foreign
policy issue
Climate change is primarily a domestic issue
Climate change is a scientific
issue
Climate change is a development issue
Economic development
outranks other policy goals
Climate change is taken into consideration
when the future direction of China’s economic
development is decided
Secondary aspects:
Natural science research on
possible consequences for
China, strengthen climate-
change observations
Expanded areas of research: in disciplines
(natural sciences and other fields, such as
economics) - and in research topics (future
scenarios, adaptation issues, mitigation models
etc.)
Climate change is a matter to
be dealt with by developed
countries
Great expansion of domestic policies:
mitigation/energy restructuring, adaptation &
capacity building, awareness efforts
The paragraphs above give some indications as to how the Climate
Change Advocacy Coalition has had some sway over Chinese climate-
change policies. Here, however, we should note a caveat regarding the
explanatory power of the ACF. Although the ACF may illustrate how
various actors join in and try to influence government policies, it is im-
portant to bear in mind that central political decisions in China are still
largely top–down exercises. As China has developed in recent decades,
the government has gradually shifted from keeping a tight grip on most
issues in society to looser forms of control. Although there is commun-
ication between coalition members and the decision-making government
entities, evidence of actual persuasion is hard to find. The ACF’s method
of breaking down policy texts into beliefs and seeing which coalition it
most resembles can be a useful explanation, but there might be other
reasons for the change in addition to pressure from the advocacy
coalition. Looking at the development of policy, I have found evidence to
indicate that the central government makes informed decisions based on
advice from the coalition, but we must be careful not to jump to con-
clusions as to the de facto power of the Climate Change Advocacy
Coalition.
In short, the ACF points to two reasons for changes in China’s climate-
change policy. First, the socioeconomic development of the past 20 years
served both to mature the policy subsystem actors and bring about the
large increase in China’s GHG emissions. Secondly, the Climate Change
Advocacy Coalition’s active use and communication of the knowledge
China’s Climate-Change Policy 1988-2011 19
amassed through policy-oriented learning have had impacts on both
agenda-setting and the policy- measure decisions of China’s climate-
change policies.
Concluding remarks – Will China become a low-
carbon hero?
From 1988 to 2011 there was a remarkable development in China’s
climate-change policies. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, such policies
were limited to investigating the future implications for China. Gradually,
climate change began to appear in policy texts, as in the 10th 5-year plan
in 2001. However, the kick-off for climate change as a policy issue in its
own right came in 2007 when the National Climate Change Programme
made climate change a national policy issue. Since then the climate-
change policy subsystem has grown to encompass a variety of issues,
from mitigation-based legislation on personal vehicles and regulations of
energy source, to plans for adaptation. Concurrently with the develop-
ment of the policies, the Climate Change Advocacy Coalition emerged,
made up of concerned individuals from ENGOs – Chinese and inter-
national –, climate-change scientists, and sections of the media. After
2007, more subnational governments actively joined in collaborating with
members of the advocacy coalition.
In explaining the change in climate-change policies, the Advocacy
Coalition Framework (ACF) shows how the socioeconomic development
experienced by China has acted to change the policy subsystem. In the
late 1980s China was a low-income country, with few climate-concerned
individuals or groups, and a bureaucracy less capable of dealing with
such a complex matter as climate change. In the course of the following
20 years new actors, such as ENGOs, emerged and other actors matured.
Today, Chinese officialdom is far better geared to tackling this policy
issue. One reason for this advance is the expert advice channelled to
government officials, which links in with the second ACF explanation for
policy change: the policy-oriented learning of the Climate Change
Advocacy Coalition, followed by dissemination of its new-found
knowledge. By conveying information and knowledge about climate
change and its consequences for China, the Climate Change Advocacy
Coalition has had effect on the agenda-setting of policies, such as in the
National Climate Change Programme. Further, the Climate Change
Advocacy Coalition has had some influence on policy-measure decisions,
with the carbon-intensity target as one notable example.
From merely investigating the prospects for China, the central govern-
ment now actively deals with the many aspects of climate change. The
development since 2007 is indeed praiseworthy. What then can we say as
to the future? The 2011 diversification of climate-change policies –
introducing market-based mechanisms into national policies – points to a
future with a more comprehensive arsenal of climate policies. The world
probably has yet to see the end of the various measures that China will
20 Iselin Stensdal
initiate to abate its emissions, making it too early to deliver a final verdict
on China’s climate-change policies. While putting the ‘hero’ title on hold
for now, it seems likely that the subsystem will continue to grow in the
coming years, so the number of nested subsystems within the larger
climate-change subsystem can also increase. Market mechanisms can be
expected to play a greater part in future policies on climate changes. The
commitment to greater use of renewable sources of energy caters to
energy-security concerns as well as GHG-emissions concerns.
That said, however, the coming years may also bring fluctuations that are
difficult to predict today. The world economy, for instance, could
certainly impact on the Chinese climate-change policy subsystem. There
are some actors not discussed in this report who profit or will come to
profit from climate-change policies and low-carbon initiatives, such as
the renewable energy industries. On the other hand, there are also actors
who do not benefit from new climate-change policies, but may have to
bear the rather heavy costs of the transition to a low-carbon development,
such as the energy-intensive industries. If and how these actors join in
actively and react in the future can impact on policies. Policy develop-
ment has proceeded rapidly in 2007. Revisiting the subsystem in five to
ten years will be a valuable exercise. When we consider policy develop-
ments up until now, however, we may conclude that any climate-change
policy which also helps economic growth and development is much more
likely to be sustained in the future than are policies that do not entail such
win–win opportunities.
21
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Sharpe
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