11 th Grade United States History California State Standard 11.3 Trace the rise of the U.S to its role as a world power in the 20 th century Sister Chinas at War: Using 20 th Century Foreign Diplomacy to Make Sense of What Role the U.S. Should Pursue in the Event of a Chinese against Chinese War Essential Question: What Role Should America Play In Global Affairs? Overview Students assume the role of presidential advisors to counsel the U.S. president on what role the U.S. should play in the event that the Chinese Republic of China (Taiwan) is attacked or invaded by the People’s Republic of China. Using various primary sources, including past presidential stances on foreign affairs (George Washington’s Farewell Address, James Monroe’s The Monroe Doctrine, Theodore Roosevelt’s Big Stick diplomacy William Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy, Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and Bill Clinton’s Hawaii Apology) as a lens through which to tackle and draw conclusions on present day arguments (from David Lampton and Kurt Campbell, two Chinese specialists; Erik Eckholm, Beijing bureau chief of The New York Times; Sen. Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.), a China critic; Yang Jiechi, Chinese ambassador to the U.S.; Zhu Bangzao, spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry; and Dr. Joseph Wu, deputy director of the Institute of International Relations in Taiwan) on what role should the U.S. pursue in the event of a Taiwanese-Chinese conflict. Students will present their findings first in a Socratic seminar and secondly through a well argued essay. Objectives Students will compare present day tensions between Taiwan and China with the past American involvement in foreign affairs evaluating the consequences of past events and decisions and determining the lessons that were learned and how they might be
Transcript
11th Grade United States History
California State Standard 11.3 Trace the rise of the U.S to its role as a world power in the 20 th
century
Sister Chinas at War:Using 20th Century Foreign Diplomacy to Make Sense of What Role the U.S. Should Pursue
in the Event of a Chinese against Chinese War
Essential Question: What Role Should America Play In Global Affairs?
Overview Students assume the role of presidential advisors to counsel the U.S. president on what role the U.S. should play in the event that the Chinese Republic of China (Taiwan) is attacked or invaded by the People’s Republic of China. Using various primary sources, including past presidential stances on foreign affairs (George Washington’s Farewell Address, James Monroe’s The Monroe Doctrine, Theodore Roosevelt’s Big Stick diplomacy William Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy, Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and Bill Clinton’s Hawaii Apology) as a lens through which to tackle and draw conclusions on present day arguments (from David Lampton and Kurt Campbell, two Chinese specialists; Erik Eckholm, Beijing bureau chief of The New York Times; Sen. Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.), a China critic; Yang Jiechi, Chinese ambassador to the U.S.; Zhu Bangzao, spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry; and Dr. Joseph Wu, deputy director of the Institute of International Relations in Taiwan) on what role should the U.S. pursue in the event of a Taiwanese-Chinese conflict. Students will present their findings first in a Socratic seminar and secondly through a well argued essay.
Objectives
Students will compare present day tensions between Taiwan and China with the past American involvement in foreign affairs evaluating the consequences of past events and decisions and determining the lessons that were learned and how they might be applied to a modern day Taiwanese – Chinese conflict. Using various sources, including newspaper articles and opinion pages, students will distinguish between valid arguments from erroneous arguments and interpretations. Students will also learn to identify bias and prejudice in historical interpretations as well as to evaluate interpretations of the past, including analysis of authors’ use of evidence and the distinctions between sound generalizations and misleading oversimplifications. Lastly, students will construct a hypotheses based on the collection, evaluation, and employment of information from multiple primary and secondary sources and it apply it in oral and written presentations.
Day 1: Introduction to California State Standard 11.3 Trace the rise of the U.S to its role as a world power in the 20th century, modern day Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Essential Question “What Role Should America Play In Global Affairs?”
(a.)Warm-up: Students using the Know-Want to Know-Learned (KWL) method will write independently as much as they can for 5 minutes, regardless of accuracy about Taiwan. In groups of 3-4, students will share out what they wrote. Lastly, the teacher will fill out a KWL chart on the white board using students’ comments. The teacher will conclude by asking the students to silently contemplate, whether it matters or not if they know about Taiwan. 15 minutes
(b.)Group Activity: Working in groups of 3-4 students will read, summarize, and analyze a series of pamphlets on Taiwan (The Republic of China at a Glance, 2011, The Republic of China-Striding Into Its 2nd Century: Essential Partner for Global Solutions, A Cultural Treasure Trove, A Land of Wonders, Leader in the Global Economy, A Land of Wonders, Beacon of Democracy, Bastion of Liberty, as well as Popular Food Culture in Taiwan, Music in Taiwan, Education in Taiwan and Taiwan Greening Your Life). Then using the pamphlets, students will create their own poster size pamphlets highlighting Taiwan. 20 minutes
(c.) Class Share-out: Every group will present to the class their posters in a one minute presentations. 10 minutes
(d.)Teacher Guided Presentation (The Human Element of Taiwan and China): The teacher will highlight Taiwan’s strides towards democratization and use of green and alternative energy sources in the last few years as well as to highlight general and geographical information about Taiwan. Students will be given a map to find Taiwan and China as well as other respective Asian nations. The teacher will draw on photographs and video footage taken in Taiwan and China lending the presentation a human element and crating a greater interest in both nations. The teacher also presents Taiwanese-Chinese relations since the inception of the founding of both modern nations. Students actively participate by taking notes and asking questions. Remainder of Class time
(e.) Homework: In the event that the tiny-island democratic nation of Taiwan is attacked by a foreign aggressor, what should America’s response be to the conflict? Students will come in the next day ready to share their responses.
Day 2: Students are introduced to the foreign policy concepts of isolationism, moral internationalism, collective security, and imperialism and asked to determine what concept could be applied to nine different American foreign actions, keeping in mind a modern day attack on Taiwan.
(a.)Warm-up: In their groups of 3-4, ask students to share-out their homework with each other and note on their homework what other students said about what the U.S. should do in the event that Taiwan is attacked. Students will then share with the class their responses, as the teacher notes answers on the white board. 5 minutes
(b.)Teacher Guided Presentation: The teacher presents the concepts of isolationism, moral internationalist, collective security, and imperialism as 20th century American foreign policies. The teacher also explains to the class that using historical examples they will act as advisors to the American president, advising him what to do in the event that Taiwan is attacked. Students are told that their evaluations of what to do in such a scenario will be historically based on the foreign policies of 4 past presidents. Students take notes as the teacher presents. 5 minutes
Gallery Walk (Tracing the rise of the U.S to its role as a world power in the 20th century)
(c.) : Students in groups of 3-4 walk through a classroom gallery walk on (1.) America’s acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands, (2.) The Spanish American War and (3.) the Filipino insurrection that followed, (4.) America’s participation in the quelling of the Boxer Rebellion and (5.) the Open Door Policy, (6.) America’s role in the Panama Revolution and (7.) America’s subsequent acquisition of the Panama Canal, and (8.) America in the First World and (9.) the peace negotiations that ensued. As students walk through the gallery walk, they keep track of information on both a time-line and a graphic organizer. 50 minutes
(f.) Homework: Using the information form their time-lines and graphic, students evaluate the 9 events from the Gallery Walk by ascribing them as either isolationist, moral internationalist, collective security, or imperialistic. Students will come in the next day ready to share their responses.
Day 3: Students through a series of activities will review the 9 events and 4 foreign policies they have learned about in the last 2 days. Students will also articulate what foreign policy they think is best for America to pursue.
(a.)Warm-up: In their groups of 3-4, ask students to share-out their homework with each other and note on their homework what other students said about each event and how they determine what policy America pursued in each action. 10minutes
(b.)Short Writing Reflection: Using their notes on the Gallery Walk, and their fellow students’ comments on the homework, students will decide what are the pros and cons of pursing the foreign policies of isolationism, moral internationalism, collective security, or imperialism. 10 minutes
(c.) Graphic Organizer: In their groups of 3-4, students will all fill out a graphic organizer determining under what foreign policy concept the nine events they studied the pervious day, fall under and what the pros and cons where are pursuing that foreign policy in that given moment. 20 minutes
(d.)Four Corners: The teacher asks students to go to one of four corners (each corner has a sign noting isolationism, moral internationalism, collective security, or imperialism) and argue why that foreign policy is best role for America to play in the world.
(e.) Homework (Flashcards): Students make flashcards for the nine events that they learned about in the Gallery Walk (1.) America’s acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands, (2.) The Spanish American War and (3.) the Filipino insurrection that followed, (4.) America’s participation in the quelling of the Boxer Rebellion and (5.) the Open Door Policy, (6.) America’s role in the Panama Revolution and (7.) America’s subsequent acquisition of the Panama Canal, and (8.) America in the First World and (9.) the peace negotiations that ensued as well as flashcards for the foreign policy concepts of (1.) isolationism, (2.) moral internationalism, (3.) collective security, and (4.) imperialism. One flashcard for modern day Taiwan.
Day 4: Students Summarize, analyze, and evaluate excerpts of George Washington’s Farewell Address, James Monroe’s The Monroe Doctrine, Theodore Roosevelt’s Big Stick diplomacy William Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy, Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and Bill Clinton’s Hawaii Apology and apply lessons from each as to what America should do in the event of a Taiwanese attack.
(a.)Warm-up: Based on what has been leaned in the last 3 days, what foreign policy do you think America should pursue towards Taiwan in the event that it is attacked. Ground your answer with historical precedence. Had your original stance changed? Explain. 5 minutes
(b.)Summarize, analyze, and evaluate: Students working in pairs will first annotate excerpts of George Washington’s Farewell Address, James Monroe’s The Monroe Doctrine, Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and Bill Clinton’s Hawaii Apology. Students also determine what foreign policy concept each excerpt fall under. 35 minutes
(c.) Group Evaluation: With their groups, students will evaluate what each of the four American presidents would have done in regards to an attack on modern day Taiwan. 10 minutes
(d.)Four Corners: Drawing on the excerpts from George Washington’s Farewell Address, James Monroe’s The Monroe Doctrine, Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and Bill Clinton’s Hawaii Apology, students will argue which presidential foreign policies they most agree with in regards to what should be done in the event of an attack on Taiwan.
(e.) Homework: Study for quiz and create flashcards on George Washington’s Farewell Address, James Monroe’s The Monroe Doctrine, Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and Bill Clinton’s Hawaii Apology
Day 5: Quiz and gathering evidence for Socratic seminar
(a.)Warm-up: Short multiple Quiz 10 minutes(b.)Gathering Evidence: Students break up into one of four groups (but still working in
groups of 3-4) according to one of four presidential foreign policies studied about in class. Once in groups, students will read through interviews from David Lampton and Kurt Campbell, two Chinese specialists; Erik Eckholm, Beijing bureau chief of The New York Times; Sen. Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.), a China critic; Yang Jiechi, Chinese ambassador to the U.S.; Zhu Bangzao, spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry; and Dr. Joseph Wu, deputy director of the Institute of International Relations in Taiwan as well from Los Angeles Times and New York Times articles on Taiwanese-Chinese relations. Using their readings, students gather information to use in a Socratic seminar to determine what America’s role should be in the event that Taiwan is attacked, as well as an essay with the same topic. As students, read through the various sources, they may switch to another foreign policy if they are convinced otherwise. 50 minutes
(c.) Homework: Students further prepare over the weekend to come back on Monday to a Socratic seminar advising the president (played by an unconvinced teacher) what role America should play in the event that Taiwan is attacked. Students should draw upon all material and sources covered in class.
Day 6: Socratic Seminar
(a.)Warm-up: Students prepare final remarks for Socratic Seminar 10minutes(b.)Socratic Seminar: Students functioning as presidential advisors counsel the president
what he/she should do in the event that friendly, democratic Taiwan is attacked by mainland China. 45 minutes
(c.) Debrief: Student reflections on findings of Socratic Seminar. 5 minutes(d.) Homework: Write thesis for essay
Day 7: Timed Essay
Timed Essay: Essay Prompt: Whether an attack on Twain by China is possibility or not, the United States needs to have a plan in the event that such occurrence takes place. What lessons can we learn from the past to deal with this present day issue? Using 3 out of the 4 documents we have covered in class from the time period between 1880 to 1920 write a persuasive essay arguing what role the United States should Taiwan be attacked by China. Should the United States take a collective security, moral Internationalist, Isolationist, or an imperialist stance in such an event?
Drawing on all the materials, content, and arguments, student will write an essay arguing what role the U.S. should play in the event that Taiwan is attacked by China. Students should draw upon the 9 historical events covered in class (America’s acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands, (2.) The Spanish American War and (3.) the Filipino insurrection that followed, (4.) America’s participation in the quelling of the Boxer Rebellion and (5.) the Open Door Policy, (6.) America’s role in the Panama Revolution and (7.) America’s subsequent acquisition of the Panama Canal, and (8.) America in the First World and (9.) the peace negotiations that ensued) as support for their foreign policy of choice (isolationism, moral internationalism, collective security, or imperialism) supported with quotes from the presidential excerpts of George Washington’s Farewell Address, James Monroe’s The Monroe Doctrine, Theodore Roosevelt’s Big Stick diplomacy William Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy,Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and Bill Clinton’s Hawaii Apology. Essay introductions should use the Taiwanese pamphlets.
Documents Used
George Washington’s FAREWELL ADDRESS, (Excerpt) September 17th, 1796
To the People of the United States….
Observe good faith and justice towards all Nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all…
The Nation, which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest…
So likewise, a passionate attachment of one Nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite Nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest, in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or justification. It leads also to concessions to the favorite Nation of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the Nation making the concessions; by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been retained; and by exciting jealousy, ill-will, and a disposition to retaliate, in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld…
The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop…
James Monroe’s (The Monroe Doctrine) Annual Message to Congress, December 2, 1823 (Excerpt )…the rights and interests of the United States are involved that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers…
In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers…
We should consider any attempt on their part [European nations] to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States…
Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars [Napoleonic Wars] which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe [Europe], nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents [of the Western Hemisphere], circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different…It is impossible that the allied [European] powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent [North and South American] without endangering our peace and happiness…
Theodore Roosevelt’s The Roosevelt Corollary (Excerpt) 1904
Big Stick diplomacy
It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger... as regards the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society [however], may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.... While [our Southern neighbors] obey the primary laws of civilized society they may rest assured that they will be treated by us in a spirit of cordial and helpful sympathy.... It is a mere truism to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence can not be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it. We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations.
William Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy (Excerpt) 1909-1913
The diplomacy of the present administration has sought to respond to modern ideas of commercial intercourse. This policy has been characterized as substituting dollars for bullets. It is one that appeals alike to idealistic humanitarian sentiments, to the dictates of sound policy and strategy, and to legitimate commercial aims.
In Central America the aim has been to help such countries as Nicaragua and Honduras to help themselves. They are the immediate beneficiaries. The national benefit to the United States is twofold. First, it is obvious that the Monroe Doctrine is more vital in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal and the zone of the Caribbean than anywhere else. There, too, the maintenance of that doctrine falls most heavily upon the United States. It is therefore essential that the countries within that sphere shall be removed from the jeopardy involved by heavy foreign debt and chaotic national finances and from the ever present danger of international complications due to disorder at home. Hence, the United States has been glad to encourage and support American bankers who were willing to lend a helping hand to the financial rehabilitation of such countries because this financial rehabilitation and the protection of their customhouses from being the prey of would-be dictators would remove at one stroke the menace of foreign creditors and the menace of revolutionary disorder…
I wish to call your especial attention to the recent occurrences in Nicaragua, for I believe the terrible events recorded there during the revolution of the past summer - the useless loss of life, the devastation of property, the bombardment of defenseless cities, the killing and wounding of women and children, the torturing of noncombatants, to exact contributions, and the suffering of thousands of human beings - might have been averted had the Department of State, through approval of the loan convention by the Senate, been permitted to carry out its now well-developed policy of encouraging the extending of financial aid to weak Central American states, with the primary objects of avoiding just such revolutions by assisting those republics to rehabilitate their finances, to establish their currency on a stable basis, to remove the customhouses from the danger of revolutions by arranging for their secure administration, and to establish reliable banks.
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, January 8, 1918 (Excerpt)
I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants. III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.
IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.
XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.
In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.
United States Public Law 103-150 - The "Apology Resolution" (Excerpt)
Passed by Congress and signed by President William J. Clinton, November 23, 1993
Whereas, prior to the arrival of the first Europeans in 1778, the Native Hawaiian people lived in a highly organized, self-sufficient, subsistent social system based on communal land tenure with a sophisticated language, culture, and religion;
Whereas, from 1826 until 1893, the United States recognized the independence of the Kingdom of Hawaii, extended full and complete diplomatic recognition to the Hawaiian Government…
Whereas, on January 14, 1893... the United States Minister assigned to the sovereign and independent Kingdom of Hawaii conspired with a small group of non-Hawaiian residents of the Kingdom of Hawaii, including citizens of the United States, to overthrow the indigenous and lawful Government of Hawaii;
Whereas, soon thereafter, when informed of the risk of bloodshed with resistance, Queen Liliuokalani issued the following statement yielding her authority to the United States Government rather than to the Provisional Government:
"I Liliuokalani, by the Grace of God and under the Constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the Constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom."That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America whose Minister Plenipotentiary, His Excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed a Honolulu and declared that he would support the Provisional Government."Now to avoid any collision of armed forces, and perhaps the loss of life, I do this under protest and impelled by said force yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representatives and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the Constitutional Sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands."- Queen Liliuokalani, Jan 17, 1893
Whereas, the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people or over their national lands to the United States, either through their monarchy or through a plebiscite or referendum.
Whereas, the health and well-being of the Native Hawaiian people is intrinsically tied to their deep feelings and attachment to the land;
Whereas, the long-range economic and social changes in Hawaii over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been devastating to the population and to the health and well-being of the Hawaiian people;Whereas, the Native Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territory, and their cultural identity in accordance with their own spiritual and traditional beliefs, customs, practices, language, and social institutions;
Now, therefore, be itResolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,The Congress- apologizes to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the people of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893... and the deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination;- expresses its commitment to acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, in order to provide a proper foundation for reconciliation between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people; and- urges the President of the United States to also acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii and to support reconciliation efforts between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people.
Chinese Premier Warns Taiwan Against Pursuit of Independence
THE WORLD
During his annual meeting with the press, Wen Jiabao also vows to aid his nation's peasants.
March 14, 2006|Ching-Ching Ni and Mark Magnier | Times Staff Writers
BEIJING — Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao warned Taiwan on Tuesday against making more provocative moves that heighten cross-strait tensions but also offered an olive branch to the island's leadership for dialogue in exchange for giving up activities that promote independence.
"As long as they are committed to the one-China principle we are ready to have dialogues and negotiations, including with the Democratic Progressive Party, as long as the party is willing to give up its platform for Taiwan independence," Wen said during his annual meeting with the press at the end of the National People's Congress.
Wen slammed the administration of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian for "going all-out to pursue their goal of independence," including proposing constitutional changes and scrapping policy guidelines leading toward eventual unification with the mainland.
The moves "seriously undermined peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait," Wen said. "The Taiwan authority will lose all public support for his unjust cause."
"We are fully prepared for all eventualities," said Wen, referring to Beijing's threats to take Taiwan back by force if it tries to declare formal independence.
The Chinese premier's other main concern during this year's parliamentary meetings was the nation's peasants. The government made sweeping promises to bring welfare and prosperity to the long-neglected Chinese countryside.
"I myself am the son of a farmer," Wen said. "What saddens me the most is that over the past three years I have not been able to find better solutions for issues most important to the public, such as the high price of healthcare, education and housing."
The premier vowed to do more to solve such problems. "I'd like to assure you, once you know the difficulties and the problems, the problems are no longer so difficult," Wen said. "Failure is not an option."
Most analysts give the administration of President Hu Jintao and Wen relatively high marks for their performance three years after coming to power. They seem to have put their stamp on
policy and have consolidated their power at the upper reaches of the Communist Party, analysts say.
What sets the pair apart from their political predecessors is a commitment not just to economic development but also to bridging the country's yawning rich-poor gap.
Beijing plans to invest more than $40 billion in rural areas this year to build a "new socialist countryside."
The big task ahead, however, will be to implement Hu and Wen's rural development programs at the local level, reduce layers of government and staff local ranks with their allies. These are essential steps for maintaining political momentum.
Many residents of the countryside feel that too much wealth was channeled to Beijing, Shanghai and a handful of rich eastern provinces under the policies of past leaders Jiang Zemin and Deng Xiaoping.
"China's economic development is very imbalanced," said Yang Zhaohui, a Communist Party history professor at Peking University. "These local governments are not happy that they didn't benefit more."
Western analysts say the administration shows little sign of significant movement in the areas of political reform and land reform, at a time when corruption is rife and unrest tied to farm seizures is growing.
Wen admitted that land is the core issue concerning the Chinese peasantry. But there are no plans to change the ownership rights for rural land, which belongs not to individual farmers but rather to village collectives. But Wen stressed the importance of protecting farmers' rights, especially during land seizures for commercial development. Any illegal land grab must be harshly punished, he said.
During the premier's meeting with the press, he mentioned that he had found thousands of questions and suggestions from the public on the Internet and that cyberspace is a tool that can help the government improve its work. Asked about Internet censorship in China, the premier said that freedom comes with responsibilities.
"As the people's government we welcome the democratic supervision of the people," Wen said. "Every citizen has the right to use the Internet. But they must also follow the law and safeguard our national interest."
U.S. Should Support Taiwan's Independence
By David Holcberg (Los Angeles Times, March 31, 2005)
The United States should openly declare its support for the hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese who took to the streets in defense of their freedom. President Bush should take the opportunity to denounce the totalitarian nature of the Chinese regime and its threat to attack Taiwan. And Bush should clearly state that Taiwan--as a free nation--has a moral right to its independence and that any attack on Taiwan would be unacceptable to the United States.
Taiwanese Pro-Independence Politician Visits China
by VOA News
Frank Hsieh, the former chairman of Taiwan's pro-independence party, is touring China for a visit that he says is aimed at building mutual trust.
Hsieh, the most-senior official from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to tour China, is attempting to facilitate his party's relation with the mainland after it lost elections against the incumbent pro-Beijing candidate.
"Hopefully, footprints I make today will become a trail for future travelers," Hsieh said before leaving Taiwan, according to local media.
Hsieh and other DPP politicians, are seeking distance from more extreme pro-independence factions, after Taiwan voters confirmed their support for Ma Ying-jeou, champion of a more conciliatory stance with the mainland.
Although Hsieh said his visit is "in a private capacity" and that he will not meet with Chinese officials, many consider this an attempt to soften his party's China policy.
"The Democratic Progressive Party faces a very big challenge," says Jia Qingguo, a political science professor at Beijing University.
"If the cross-strait relation continues to develop like it has been, people in Taiwan will benefit from it, thus they will not support the pro-independence stance anymore," Jia says. "This is what Hsieh has in mind as he comes to China."
Beijing considers Taiwan a breakaway province and has pursued a policy of progressive economic engagement with the overt goal of reunification always in sight.
Hu Jintao, whose term as China's president and Communist Party chief is likely to end next month when the Party Congress will appoint new leaders, has subscribed to this approach.
Under his tenure, and with the help of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan and the mainland have negotiated unprecedented trade deals that reduced tariff barriers and are thought to have greatly benefited the Taiwanese side.
Huang Jing, director of the Center on Asia and Globalization at the Singapore-based Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, says the mainland, where business with Taiwan accounts for only four percentage points of China's entire international trade, has the upper hand in its negotiations with Taiwan.
"At least half of Taiwan's international trade is done with China," Huang says. "The trade with China has been so substantial in Taiwan's economy that they cannot afford to let this go."
Ever since 1949, when the nationalists retreated to Taiwan, Mao Zedong and the top Communist leaders that succeeded him have maintained a tough re-unification stance, which Huang believes, Hu Jintao revised.
"If you cannot achieve re-unification, at least you should close the door on Taiwan's independence," he says. "That is what Hu Jintao's policy is all about."
Both Jia Qingguo and Huang Jing believe that in dealing with Taiwan, exiting leader Hu Jintao has crafted a successful policy model, which will be followed by China's next collective of rulers.
"We have an old saying: if unbroken, why fix it?" Huang says. He adds that by increasing the mainland's economic clout over Taiwan the new leadership might further undermine the prospects of the island's independence, thus laying grounds for a peaceful re-unification down the road.
Huang acknowledges that there could be factors of instability.
Taiwan's alliance with the United States is both a military assurance and a potential hazard, should territorial disputes with Japan escalate to military conflict. China's economic slow down might negatively impact Taiwan, and growing Chinese nationalism in the mainland might force Chinese leaders to act more forcibly across the strait.
That is why, Huang says, maintaining the status quo is a priority for both governments.
"Any premature attempt from China's side to seek unification, or any premature attempt from Taiwan's side to reach independence is counterproductive and dangerous not just for China and Taiwan but for the whole regional peace," Huang says.
Frank Hsieh's first stop is in the Southeastern province of Fujian, where he will visit the coastal city of Xiamen, and his ancestral hometown. In Beijing, he will tour the Olympic stadium, attend an international cocktail contest, and meet with various academics from different research centers on Taiwanese studies.
The value of 'strategic ambiguity' has run its course. As long as China believes the U.S. will abandon democratic Taiwan to avoid going to war, the danger of conflict increases.
August 20, 2010|By Joseph A. Bosco
In August 1995 and March 1996, China fired missiles across the Taiwan Strait, closing it to international commerce.
On both occasions, President Clinton sent aircraft carriers to deter Chinese escalation, the first time directly through the Taiwan Strait. China condemned this "violation" of its sovereignty (just as it now objects to planned U.S.-South Korea naval exercises in the Yellow Sea) and threatened "a sea of fire" for the next battle group entering the strait.
The ships stayed out, China stopped firing missiles, and the crisis dissipated.
That time.
Fast-forward to a just-released Defense Department assessment that describes China's continuing military buildup and its potential to enforce territorial claims on Taiwan, in the South China Sea and elsewhere in the region.
The anti-Western hostility and paranoia of Chairman Mao's years have resurfaced in fresh charges of U.S. "containment" and "encirclement" of China. But now that sense of grievance and resentment is backed by the massive economic and military power the West helped China build.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has openly questioned Beijing's defiant approach to international norms. And Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently stated: "I have moved from being curious about what [the Chinese] are doing to being concerned about what they are doing."
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton correctly warned Beijing against cutting off freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The Obama administration worries that Beijing is defining its claims there as "core interests" on a par with Tibet and Taiwan, and if unchallenged, that could lead to dangerous Chinese adventurism.
Yet, on the Taiwan flashpoint, President Obama's team has unwisely perpetuated the policy of "strategic ambiguity" followed by every administration since Richard Nixon's.
Under that policy, Washington periodically sells Taipei weapons for minimal self-defense against an overwhelming Chinese attack. But Washington does not commit the United States to intervene, or not to intervene. We rely on American unpredictability to stay Beijing's hand.
The missile incidents of the mid-1990s were the closest the U.S. and China had come to open conflict since the Korean War.
At the time, Chinese military officials asked Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Nye how the U.S. would respond if China were to attack Taiwan.
He replied: "We don't know and you don't know. It would depend on the circumstances."
U.S. officials have repeated that mantra ever since, while Chinese generals have twice suggested that a U.S. defense of Taiwan could result in nuclear war reaching the American mainland.
Beyond harsh rhetoric, China further shaped the circumstances for a future Taiwan confrontation by acquiring more submarines and anti-ship missiles that could sink an aircraft carrier steaming anywhere near Taiwan. The Defense Department's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review confirms the strategy's success in complicating U.S. planning.
Both countries now prepare for war in a classic deterrence/counter-deterrence dynamic, a formula for catastrophic mutual miscalculation.
Neither Beijing nor Washington wants war, but as long as China believes the U.S. will ultimately abandon democratic Taiwan to avoid it, the danger of conflict increases.
It is time for U.S. clarity on Taiwan; strategic ambiguity has run its course.
Washington should declare that we would defend democratic Taiwan against any Chinese attack or coercion, and that we also welcome Taiwan's participation in international organizations (starting by inviting President Ma Ying-jeou to Honolulu for the December meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group).
In return, Taiwan must forgo formal independence for now, even though that result is ultimately consistent with American values.
In exchange for China's renouncing force, Washington should also pledge not to recognize formal Taiwan statehood and discourage others from doing so, while also insisting that China's use of force would trigger instant recognition.
Finally, Clinton should reconsider her reluctance to challenge China's sorry human rights record. A more principled stand in support of Chinese democracy is the best long-term solution to the cross-strait conundrum. Two democratic peoples could peacefully manage the question of unification, independence or association. There would be no intractable Taiwan problem if there were no enduring Communist China problem.
Joseph A. Bosco, a national security consultant, specialized in China-Taiwan-U.S. relations at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service. He worked for the China desk in Asia- Pacific Security Affairs at the office of the secretary of Defense.
China-Taiwan rivalry causes headaches for leaders of Los Angeles' Chinese community
Trying to navigate between the two sides without offending either can be tricky. Seating arrangements, even a karaoke performance, can cause tensions and walkouts at events.
January 23, 2011|By Ching-Ching Ni, Los Angeles Times
Derek Ma was feeling pretty good after successfully co-hosting a banquet for China's National Day with more than 600 guests, a 10-course dinner, a parade of entertainers and more than $10,000 in prizes.
Then he got a call from the top local representative of Taiwan, who put a damper on his mood.
"He basically said, 'We are supposed to be old friends. Why did you guys do such a nice job helping the other side? It makes us look bad,'" said Ma, a restaurateur who used to be president of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Assn., which is like being mayor of Chinatown.
Soon Ma had signed up to help throw an even bigger party — with 900 guests — to celebrate Taiwan's birthday.
In the world of Chinese Los Angeles, the choice between China and Taiwan once was simple. People supported Taiwan. Never mind that many of them had roots in mainland China and that Taiwan is a tiny island state, ruled separately since a civil war in 1949. Taiwan stood for freedom and democracy — and was friendly. China was a communist one-party state — and uninterested in wooing the local community.
But times have changed. China has transformed itself into an economic powerhouse. It's a major trading partner for the U.S. and economically important to the Los Angeles region. It also has started reaching out.
As the longtime conflict between China and Taiwan plays out on the world stage, Los Angeles Chinese leaders find themselves caught in the middle, trying to navigate between the two without offending either.
They attend events on both sides. They invite both sides to their events. But headaches are inevitable.
Autumn is the most treacherous time. Both China and Taiwan celebrate their national days in October. That means two separate flag-raising ceremonies, two separate national day banquets, two cocktail receptions. Each side uses these high-profile events as opportunities to outdo the other — with larger crowds, fancier spreads, more elaborate entertainment.
The two flag-raising ceremonies were held this fall at the same bandstand in Monterey Park. But the tone of the festivities was decidedly different. Taiwan went for a display of military strength — complete with color guard, salutes and a tightly choreographed flyover. China tried to downplay the country's size and power — with children dancing and an American high school band playing a traditional Chinese folk song.
Still, cozy image or no, China's stand on Taiwan is clear-cut.
Although economic relations between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan are warming, China still insists — and most major nations, including the United States, agree — that there is only one China and that Taiwan (which calls itself the Republic of China) is a part of it.
"Our protocol is you can't promote two Chinas," said Liwen Yue, an official at the Consulate-General of the People's Republic of China in Los Angeles. "Even the U.S. government recognizes there is only one China."
A couple of years ago at a dinner for Chinese American elected officials in Los Angeles, which happened to include fundraising for Taiwanese typhoon victims, a Chinese government delegation stormed out in protest while Chung-Chen Kung, director general of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, was invited onstage to address the crowd.
"The mind-set on the other side is still very fossilized. If I show up, I don't have the right to speak," Kung said. "I wasn't even going to say anything about politics. I merely wanted to thank the donors on behalf of the flood victims."
But things were tense even before Kung stood up to speak, thanks in part to a seating arrangement that put both delegations at the same table. From the start, Kung felt a little slighted. He considers himself a higher-ranking official than his mainland Chinese counterpart, so he was upset to find her sitting on the right of the host — where he thought he should be. Then, he said, he tried to pour tea for her, but she politely refused and avoided looking at or talking to him all night.
"I've definitely heard often about these awkward situations," said Sue Zhang, president of the Roundtable of Chinese-American Organizations, a power broker in the Chinese community. "If both sides are invited, then we usually try to seat them far away from each other to avoid a confrontation."
Astute event organizers also try to avoid Taiwan's official name — the Republic of China — because those words could prompt the Chinese to walk out, she said.
But problems can occur despite the most careful planning.
At one banquet, said Ma, a guest got up to sing a karaoke tune. But he turned it into a pro-Taiwan statement by changing the words of a popular song to make reference to the Republic of China. Members of the Chinese delegation threw down their napkins and left.
In the competition for local recognition, China's size and strength obviously give it an edge. But in winning over hearts, community leaders say, it still has some work to do.
Chinese officials don't disagree.
"We come from very different systems," said Yue of the Chinese Consulate-General. "For historic reasons, maybe we are not as good as we should be in certain areas such as public relations. But we are learning, and we don't mind learning."
Opposition narrows the scope of measure giving the president authority to call a referendum.
November 28, 2003|Tyler Marshall | Times Staff Writer
HONG KONG — After a long, emotional debate that included scuffles between legislators, Taiwan's parliament passed a highly controversial law Thursday that gives the island's president limited powers to call a national referendum on independence.
The new law, which declares that such a referendum may be used only as a defensive move in case of an imminent attack by mainland China, is far less than what President Chen Shui-bian had pushed for. It appeared to ease the possibility of provoking an immediate crisis with Beijing over the issue.
Chen's Democratic Progressive Party failed to win support for other potentially provocative measures that would have allowed changes in Taiwan's constitution, its flag and its name by plebiscite.
Those provisions were defeated by the main opposition Nationalists, who hold a slim majority in the parliament. With the idea popular among Taiwan's electorate and a presidential election only four months away, the Nationalists were forced to abandon their opposition to the referendum legislation this month. However, in the end, they used their clout to sharply reduce the law's scope and political importance.
Those tracking the presidential campaign believe that Chen had hoped to use the referendum initiative as part of a high-risk strategy to catapult himself ahead of his Nationalist opponent, Lien Chan, by showing himself to be a Taiwanese patriot prepared to confront Beijing. Although trailing badly in public opinion polls earlier this fall, recent surveys indicate he has closed the gap to within a few percentage points of Lien.
Political analysts also believe that Chen is hoping to provoke Beijing into the kind of intense saber-rattling that generated a public backlash in Taiwan and helped him win the presidency four years ago.
"Chen knows he needs a high-risk strategy to win, but this [the referendum law] is no victory for him," said Andrew Yang, head of the Chinese Council of Advanced Political Studies, a Taipei-based think tank.
Others, initially concerned that the Nationalists' sudden swing behind the referendum idea would make a confrontation with Beijing inevitable, now see the switch as a clever maneuver that has robbed Chen of a key campaign weapon.
Mainland China's official China Daily newspaper on Friday quoted a state-backed group as criticizing the legislation but saying it had been watered down.
"The extremely irresponsible move, which goes against the fundamental interests of Taiwanese people, will be finally cast aside by the public," the newspaper quoted Wang Kebin, secretary-general of the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification, as saying.
Last week, a senior mainland official warned of a "strong response" if the referendum law carried provisions for a vote on independence. Mainland China considers Taiwan a breakaway province that belongs under Beijing's control.
The Nationalists have historically subscribed to a "one-China policy" in which Taiwan is part of mainland China but support maintaining the status quo for now.
THE RE-UNIFICATION OF TAIWAN AND CHINA
Speech Outline
Speech
California State University, Hayward
Fall 1995
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Specific Purpose: To inform the pros and cons of reunification of Taiwan and China
Thematic Statement: Discuss why some people advocated the reunification and some people urged the necessity of Taiwan’s independence from Chinese historical, economical, and political points of view, and global point of view.
Introduction
I. Maybe most of you have heard that the Quebecers had a vote for their independence last week. The voter did not permit its government to declare the independence by very tiny margin of votes (50.6 % vs. 49.4%.)
II. (show map) To be unification or not to be unification is a question to most Chinese. This issue is concerned not only by the people in the Great China region but also other neighborhood countries, like Japan and Philippines, and other countries which have close business or diplomatic relationship with Chinese, like the United States.
III. (show chart) In my lecture I will discuss why some people advocated the reunification and some people urged the necessity of Taiwan’s independence.
Transition: The China’s President, Jiang Zemin, has said that ‘ China does not consider Taiwan as a foreign country. ’ Why does China think Taiwan one of its province?
Body
I Those who in favor of Taiwan-China reunification argue that (show text)
A. Historical and Social:
1. Taiwan is one part of Chinese Empire from Ming Dynasty, 300 years ago. Except 2% of Natives, most settlers came from China around 18th and 19th century or 40 years ago after the Chinese Communist taking over the mainland China in 1949.
2. Emotionally, Chinese don’t want to cut off their roots from mainland China. They built temples for their ancestors and keep their tradition, culture, custom and language from China.
B. Economic:
1. Mainland China has various kinds of nature resources. The reunification will help Taiwanese to access these resources.
2. Many Taiwanese businessmen have built a lot of manufacturing business in China. The unification will be more convenient to the transportation of the merchandise and communication of people. (Change Text)
C. Political:
As China has repeated many times that it will attack or ‘protect’ Taiwan when Taiwan claim its independence. Unification will protected Taiwan being invading from its strong neighbor which has the 3rd powerful military force in the world. Because Taiwan will be that strong neighbor.
D. Global View:
1. All presidents in the United States practiced the ‘One China Policy.’ For example, Clinton just emphasized it a month ago. But the existence of Taiwan made his government difficult to carry out this policy. In this June, the Congress urged the government to grant a personal visit to Taiwanese President to the United States. This action endangers the China-U.S. relation. The reunification helps to establish the stable diplomatic and economic relationship between America and China.
2. A stability U.S.-China relations help the U.S., the biggest developed country, and China, the biggest developing country, working for the peace of East Asia.
Transition Before you believe that Taiwan should reunite with China. I would like to tell you why so many Hongkongnese immigrated to other countries? And why the surveys done by Gallup poll show that the percentage of Taiwanese agree with the independence from 8.2% in 1989 raising to 27.3% in 1994? (show chart) Now, I would like to tell you the reason.
II. Those who do not favor of Taiwan-China reunification argue that: (show text)
A. Social:
1. Taiwan has separated from China for more than 100 years. During these years, Taiwan has developed into a totally different country from China. Taiwan has a higher GNP, a better living quality, and a more democratic government.
2. The reunification may destroy or effect Taiwanese stable and prosperity life which has been established step by stop over past 50 years.
3. The democracy and prosperity of Taiwan can influence the people and the ruling party in China to become more and more open to the world.
B. Political:
1. Taiwan is democratic country but China has no much concerned in human rights and democracy. Since Taiwan is different from China in many respects, Taiwanese need a government that really represents themselves.
2. Like American, during 1770s most England colonies wanted to be independent because they wanted to manage the country by themselves instead of European.
3. Taiwan is a top 20 country in the world counting by population, economic, or military power. And I believe most people in the world have experience using the products made in Taiwan. But can you imagine that there is no representative that represents Taiwan in the UN? Because Taiwan is considered one province of China and can’t be a member of the UN.
C. Economic:
When Clinton was the governor of Arkansas, he only went abroad 5 times for diplomatic visits. During these 5 times visiting, he went to Taiwan 4 times because Taiwan was one of the important economic partners for Arkansas. Taiwan has higher average gross income than China. The reunification would make Taiwan’s economic future unpredictable.
D. Global View:
1. East Asia’s peace is very important to the world. (show chart) Next to the U.S. and Russia, China has the 3rd largest military power in the world. The competing relations between Taiwan and China help the peace of East Asia. If Taiwan re-unite with China and make China another military superpower, it could be dangerous if any ambitious leader mis-use the power.
2. Taiwan has the 2nd largest investment abroad in Asia. It help the economic development of these countries. The improved economic situation bring their demand to American products and technology. At the same time, those countries’ inexpensive labors also provide American cheaper merchants.
Transition: The other important reason is that if Taiwan become part of China, Taiwan would not purchase the expensive F16 fighter plane from the United States. Concluding my speech today.
Conclusion
I. Whether reunification or not is a very tough question for Chinese. No one has found a way to solve this problem. China and Taiwan have discussed this issue officially more than five years. Not any concrete result came out.
II. No matter it is end-up by the independence or unification of P.R.O.C. and R.O.C. We all wish it will help the peace and prosperity of the world.
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March 12, 2008
Taiwan’s Independence Movement Likely to Wane
By EDWARD WONG
TAIPEI, Taiwan — No matter who wins Taiwan’s fiercely contested presidential election on March 22, the fervent independence movement that has so agitated relations with mainland China in recent years seems destined to suffer a significant setback.
Both candidates, Ma Ying-jeou and Frank Hsieh, want closer ties with Beijing, differing only in how quickly and to what degree they would strengthen relations. By calling for closer economic cooperation with China and rejecting any notions of separatism, they are repudiating the tough nationalist policies of the departing president, Chen Shui-bian, whose confrontational stance has angered officials in Beijing and Washington and has stirred anxiety among many Taiwanese.
“Both sides will try to seek common ground and seek engagement across the straits,” said Philip Yang, a political scientist at National Taiwan University who has advised the Ma campaign. “If Ma is elected, the pace will be faster, and with bigger expectations.”
Mr. Ma, a Harvard-educated lawyer, is favored in polls and by political commentators to beat Mr. Hsieh, who is from the Democratic Progressive Party, or D.P.P., of Mr. Chen and is campaigning in his shadow.
Mr. Ma’s party, the Kuomintang, governed Taiwan for 51 years, often with an iron grip, before Mr. Chen was elected in 2000. The Kuomintang’s revival this year is rooted in widespread disenchantment with Mr. Chen, whose party took power on a wave of optimism.
Mr. Chen initially tapped a vein of support among many Taiwanese for steps to promote Taiwan’s separate identity. Those feelings ran especially deep among people whose families had lived in Taiwan for generations and did not have close political ties to mainland China. Many Taiwanese also hoped that Mr. Chen would end the corruption and authoritarianism associated with the Kuomintang.
Instead, Mr. Chen has been mired in corruption scandals involving close relatives. Also, his tireless efforts to promote independence created constant tension with the mainland and led to disagreements with the United States, which has helped guarantee Taiwan’s security but has discouraged unilateral steps by either side to change the island’s political status.
In the end, Mr. Chen alienated people in the broad center of the electorate who say they support the status quo and who depend on strengthening economic ties across the Taiwan Strait. As he finishes his second term, his popularity ratings are in the 20s.
Despite his troubles, he has prepared a parting shot: a nonbinding referendum on March 22 that asks Taiwanese whether they want to apply for the United Nations under the name Taiwan rather than the island’s formal name, the Republic of China. Taiwan left the United Nations in 1971 when the General Assembly recognized the Communists as China’s legitimate government.
Mr. Ma, in trying to establish himself as a centrist voice, has criticized the referendum and other government policies aimed at stoking nationalist sentiments. “The D.P.P.’s drive toward de jure independence led only to Taiwan’s internal decay and international isolation,” Mr. Ma, 57, said at a recent news conference. “It is therefore high time for both Taiwan and the mainland to revert to what I call the three noes: no talks on reunification during my term of office, no pursuit of de jure independence and no use of force by either side.”
Many of the policies proposed by Mr. Ma and Mr. Hsieh, 61, are similar, though Mr. Ma appears more willing to engage directly with Beijing. Mr. Ma has said he will increase the number of charter flights across the straits and explore opening up commercial flights, all to spur the economy, which voters see as a major issue. He has also said he supports increasing tourism in Taiwan from the mainland and lifting many government limits on cross-straits investment.
Mr. Ma said he would ensure that the defense budget was equal to at least 3 percent of Taiwan’s gross domestic product. The military needs “to be strong enough to deter an initial attack from the mainland,” he said.
Since campaigning began in earnest, Mr. Ma has been dogged by issues of character, with Mr. Hsieh relentlessly questioning him on having received United States permanent residency. Critics of Mr. Hsieh, also a lawyer, say raising the character issue is a sign of his desperation, as his party tries to battle back from a painful defeat in legislative elections in January. The vote, in which the Kuomintang won almost three-quarters of 113 parliamentary seats, was generally seen as a referendum on Mr. Chen’s leadership.
“We’re operating against the tide,” said Hsiao Bi-khim, a former legislator and a spokeswoman for Mr. Hsieh, who has declined to meet with foreign journalists. “Our defeat in the parliamentary elections on the one hand has brought our party spirits to a low point, but has also brought on a sense of urgency.”
To distance himself from Mr. Chen, Mr. Hsieh has called for maintaining the status quo, rather than pushing for independence, and has proposed allowing direct Chinese investment in Taiwan and lifting limits on Taiwanese investment in China. He has also said little about the United Nations referendum, although many party members continue to say it is important.
“We see China as a giant with its hands around our neck, trying to suffocate us, trying to shut off our space on the international stage,” Ms. Hsiao said. The referendum, she added, “is an expression of the desire of the Taiwanese people for its space, to be part of the international community, to join international organizations. It’s not about declaring independence. It’s not about changing the legal status of Taiwan.”
Nevertheless, American officials continue to warn Taiwan not to provoke China. In Beijing on Feb. 26, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, “this referendum is not going to help anyone, and, in fact, it shouldn’t be held.”
Shelley Rigger, a professor of political science at Davidson College in North Carolina, who wrote a book about the D.P.P., said that because of Mr. Chen’s policies, “U.S.-Taiwan relations are about as bad as they’ve ever been.”
“The U.S. is very eager for the new administration to take office because there’s considerable concern in Washington that Chen Shui-bian could still destabilize matters even before inauguration,” she added.
In Mr. Chen’s tenure, the government, besides pushing for controversial foreign policies, also carried out domestic policies centered on Taiwanese nationalism, such as promoting a Taiwanese dialect.
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TAIPEI — After decades of tension in Taiwan's relations with the mainland, the island's political class is beginning to consider a settlement with China that would defer the question of the island's formal status for up to 50 years.
The initiative to formalize the status quo in relations across the Taiwan Strait is linked to figures within the opposition Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang, but the idea is gaining currency among scholars, policy planners and analysts outside the party.
While the governing Democratic Progressive Party and its leader, President Chen Shui-bian, remain committed to the concept of formal independence, they are now being forced to engage the emerging debate on the prospect of an accord with the mainland.
Senior officials in the Chen administration remain publicly adamant about the president's position on independence. "Any agreement with China now is not realistic," said Joseph Wu, who heads the cabinet-level Mainland Affairs Council. "There's nothing to negotiate."
The prospect of an accord stabilizing cross-strait ties has been obscured this year by Chen's recurring political troubles. No such accord is expected while he remains in office.
Taiwan's electorate, which overwhelmingly supports stable relations with Beijing even as it desires more international respect and recognition for Taiwan, is gradually tilting away from the notion of formal independence.
Coming to lasting terms with China is increasingly seen as an economic imperative. Direct investments on the mainland from Taiwan grew by more than 40 percent in the first half of this year to nearly $3 billion, according to official Taiwan figures.
There are now up to a million Taiwan citizens living on the mainland, roughly half of them permanently. Business ties across the Taiwan Strait have become so strong that the government can hardly risk threatening them.
"We're looking at a 30- to 50-year peace accord," said Joanna Lei, a Kuomintang legislator who is a prominent theorist in the party's younger generation. "This is the direction public opinion is taking — slowly, like a cargo carrier, but absolutely it is changing."
A "status quo agreement," as the concept has come to be known, appears likely to emerge as a substantial issue as Chen's second and final term draws to a close in 2008.
Taiwan's voters are shying away from the assertive stance on independence that propelled Chen to office six years ago. While a strong sense of a separate identity remains, there is growing impatience with cross-strait tensions and anxiety over the island's future.
Surveys show that about 60 percent of people favor maintaining the status quo in relations with China.
A strong sense of Taiwan's economic accomplishments and identity has long been a feature of local political culture, and until recently this tilt had put the Nationalists at a disadvantage.
A turning point came last year, however, when Lien Chan, the Kuomintang chairman at the time, traveled to China for the first of two visits. Both visits — the second was last April — were seen as a sign that healthier relations with the mainland were possible and that the Nationalists might be able to reduce tensions that had grown since Chen took office.
"Lien Chan's visit changed the climate," said Emile Sheng, a political scientist at Soochow University. "The Nationalists are now much more confident talking about 'economic integration.' It's no longer considered disloyal."
The shift in public sentiment may have influenced mayoral elections in Kaohsiung, the island's large port city, where pro-independence views are traditionally strong and where Chen's Democratic Progressive Party draws its core support. The election was seen as a bellwether of voter sentiment and is likely to strengthen the determination of those advocating a deal with Beijing.
The governing party candidate won by the smallest margin in Taiwan's political history: fewer than 1,200 votes out of more than 770,000 cast. A recount appears likely after the Kuomintang contested the results, although most expect the result to stand.
Kaohsiung voters soundly rejected both the People First Party, which advocates a scheme for reunification with China, and the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which calls for an immediate declaration of Taiwan independence.
The Kuomintang, while retaining reunification with China as a guiding principle, now emphasizes its ability to bring stable relations with the mainland and defend the status quo, which has brought prosperity to the majority of Taiwan's 22 million people and allowed the island's rambunctious and highly participatory democracy to thrive.
The Kuomintang's probable presidential contender in 2008, Ma Ying- jeou, who is also party chairman, has been increasingly assertive over the past year in advocating economic integration with China while leaving the nature of the relationship undefined for now.
"We're now openly calling for status quo maintenance," said Su Chi, a senior Nationalist legislator. "This means no independence, no unification."
In any negotiations with Taipei, Beijing could prove reluctant to see Taiwan enter international organizations under its own name or allow it to sign treaties on its own behalf. Nonetheless, China may be prepared to discuss the kind of agreement now being debated in Taiwan, analysts here say.
"China has its ear to the ground now and is learning what people are actually saying," said Andrew Yang, who heads the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, a research institute. "It's clear that an agreement is realistic from Beijing's perspective. For China, the issue is how to accommodate Taiwan people's needs. It's no longer a question of principle."
Other observers are more skeptical.
"There's theory and there's practice, and on the functional questions there could be big differences," said Lo Chi- cheng, who heads the political science department at Soochow University. "How do you divide territorial waters? How do you divide air space? Can we join the World Trade Organization?"
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January 12, 2012
Why Taiwan’s Future Matters
By SU CHI
FOR most of its history, Taiwan’s destiny was determined by three great powers — China, Japan and America. Now, as the 18th-largest economy in the world and a thoroughly democratized nation, Taiwan is still perceived by some in Washington as a potential bargaining chip in crafting a new relationship with China. This is a mistake.
It is true that Taiwan’s status is the only dispute today that is likely to drag America and China into war. Similarly, a democratic Taiwan worries “realist” strategic thinkers who fear the consequences if it declares independence. But since 2008, when Taiwan began to stabilize its once volatile relations with China, it has become an even greater asset for the United States — and an inspiration for democratizing forces in mainland China.
After years of saber-rattling in Beijing and Taipei’s drive for independence, President Ma Ying-jeou’s May 2008 declaration of “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” calmed all sides. Taiwan and China have since engaged in numerous de facto government-to-government talks and greatly expanded people-to-people exchanges. With $130 billion worth of trade and seven million visits annually across the Taiwan Strait, the impact on both societies could be enormous.
Indeed, as China and Taiwan have grown ever more economically integrated, Taiwan has also become a model for China’s future. No longer perceived as a menace to China’s national unity, Taiwan’s value as an example for China began to emerge, particularly when it came to market reforms, popular culture and press freedom. And this new model arrived at a fortuitous juncture.
After 1949, Communist China’s first 30 years were engulfed in revolutionary fervor, internal power struggles and poverty. Its second 30 years witnessed rapid economic growth, which catapulted the country to the second largest economy in the world. The third stage, which may well last another 30 years, given China’s huge size, is most likely to be marked by a race between popular demands for participation in the political process and the Communist Party’s response to these demands.
This is a bumpy path Taiwan has trod. In the past three decades, Taiwan has discarded authoritarianism and moved from martial law to the rule of law, experiencing impressive economic growth and political liberalization. Authoritarian China now finds itself uncomfortably strained as inland provinces are struggling for economic growth while urban areas are boldly stretching out to explore the boundaries of political control, forcing the Communist Party to experiment with limited reforms.
Herein lies Taiwan’s new value. While China’s economic influence on Taiwan is growing, many in China find Taiwan’s experience with democratization, warts and all, instructive. Long resentful of prevalent corruption at home, they have watched Taiwan tackle corruption within its government, even at the highest levels. They have seen how successfully Taiwan combined modernity with Chinese traditions. And they have observed how Taiwan’s people freely express their will through noisy public discussion and regular elections. Last month, debates among Taiwan’s presidential candidates were even carried by social media inside China.
Taiwan will of course need to resolve its internal political disagreements. After all, some in Taiwan are not yet convinced that a push for independence would be misguided. However, such a move would court disaster, incur disfavor with the international community, and seriously undermine Taiwan’s newfound attraction to many Chinese people as a democratic model.
The winner of Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 14 should therefore strive to forge a new domestic consensus between opposing camps on the island’s political relationship with China while ensuring Taiwan a more dignified place in world politics commensurate with the contributions it can make.
Long locked in indignant isolation but enormously proud of their democratic achievements, Taiwan’s people must now accept that democracy endows them with greater responsibility for regional stability. They could start by playing a more constructive role in the evolving American-Chinese relationship by becoming an interlocutor on issues that affect all three parties, like disputes over the South China Sea.
All of this will require innovative thinking and skillful management. If either side or the United States mishandles the relationship by attempting a diplomatic or even military shortcut, it could spell disaster for all parties. But if China and Taiwan establish a sufficient degree of mutual trust, Taiwan can remain an indispensable ally for the United States and a model for China’s future.
Su Chi, the chairman of the Taipei Forum, served as secretary general of Taiwan’s National Security Council from 2008 to 2010
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BEIJING — Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China crossed swords Monday with President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan, rejecting any step toward independence for the island a day after Chen said it should be a separate country.
In a speech at the opening of the National People's Congress in which he pledged to upgrade China's massive but largely outdated armed forces, Wen reiterated that Beijing was committed to reunification with Taiwan, which separated from the mainland in 1949 as the Communists won the Chinese civil war.
"We will unite with Taiwan compatriots in firm opposition to all forms of secessionist activities such as calls for Taiwan independence through legislation," Wen said.
Wen's remarks on stopping Taiwan independence received the loudest applause of any sentence in his two-hour and 15-minute speech in the cavernous Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
On Sunday, Chen told a pro-independence group representing his political base that "Taiwan should be independent. Taiwan is a country whose sovereignty lies outside the People's Republic of China."
Chen has repeatedly upset China since he was elected president in 2000 by playing up symbols of Taiwan's sovereignty and pouring scorn on Beijing's goal of unification.
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing of China was quick to denounce Chen's comments. "Whoever wants independence will become a criminal in history," he told reporters.
The comments from both were not new, but took on added emphasis because China announced Sunday that it would increase its defense budget by 17.8 percent — the biggest jump in more than a decade.
Beijing claims sovereignty over the island, and has repeatedly threatened war if Taiwan takes steps to formalize its de facto independence.
China's military spending is largely oriented toward Taiwan, and some delegates to the legislature said Monday that the increase was not enough.
"Because China's national defense development is too outdated and still needs some necessary equipment, the military expansion is really small compared to our nation," said Li Lanfang, vice director of the standing committee of the Guangdong provincial legislature.
Excerpts from FRONTLINE's interviews with David Lampton and Kurt Campbell, two China specialists; Erik Eckholm, Beijing bureau chief of The New York Times; Sen. Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.), a China critic; Yang Jiechi, China's ambassador to the U.S.; Zhu Bangzao, spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry; and Dr. Joseph Wu, deputy director of the Institute of International Relations in Taiwan
David Lampton He is director of China studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
How dangerous is the Taiwan issue?
... prior to the World Trade Center bombing and its aftermath, if you asked where in the world could two major nuclear powers come into conflict, I would have said that the only probable place -- and it is probably still the only probable place -- where two big nuclear powers could come into conflict would be the Taiwan Strait.
In effect, the prevention of Taiwan going independent is absolutely critical to the legitimacy of the Chinese communist regime. Chinese leaders believe that, if they were to let Taiwan go independent and not respond, they would probably be overthrown by their own nationalistic people. Therefore, I think they would be willing to engage in what we might call "self-defeating military adventures" in order to prevent that result, even if they knew they were going to lose.
So in my view, the key problem for the United States is how to deter the PRC from using force against Taiwan. We have to be very clear about that, because I think the United States would intervene if force were used under most circumstances I can imagine. But on the other hand, we have to deter Taiwan from engaging in such risky behavior that they precipitate an attack that will be destabilizing to Asia, destroy the Taiwan economy and drag the United States into a regional conflict.
And what would provoke this -- for China?
They have a list of things that would provoke, but basically, certainly a ... declaration of independence would be one of those things. I would think it would probably mean war. It would certainly mean some form of military conflict or economic embargo or an attempt by the PRC to
destabilize Taiwan's economy. But let's put it this way: It would mean a substantial escalation of conflict ... the inevitable result of that...
So how long is China prepared to wait to make sure that Taiwan becomes part of China?
...As long as they have confidence that Taiwan is not going to go independent and that the forces of economic integration are gradually pulling Taiwan towards the mainland, I think they can be very patient; and by "very patient," I mean decades.
Why do they have this extraordinary military buildup of missiles opposite Taiwan?
I'm not quite sure that the word "extraordinary" is justified. But it is significant. They're probably adding maybe 50 a year short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles in the area of the Taiwan Strait in coastal China, and that's a significant threat.
But in the end, these missiles are, in effect, just large bombs. And if you start using those missiles against the people of Taiwan, does anyone seriously think this is going to increase the willingness of the people of Taiwan to join in any significant political union with the PRC?
...So my general advice to the PRC is find more positive reasons that the people of Taiwan should want to be in some closer political association with you. You might be able to prevent them declaring independence with military force, but you will never achieve reunification with those means.
Does America have an obligation to defend Taiwan if it's attacked?
We no longer have a treaty obligation to come to the defense of Taiwan. What we have is what's called the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. This obligates the United States to sell weapons of a defensive character to Taiwan. It obligates us to be concerned about the situation in Taiwan and the region. And it obligates the president of the United States to consult with Congress about what to do. So, in a sense, we are obligated to be concerned and give Taiwan the means by which it can defend itself, but we are not obligated to come to the direct rescue.
He is Beijing bureau chief of The New York Times.
What the Chinese are most afraid of is a real movement toward independence. Which they have to stop. They have to continually warn Taiwan - and the United States - that "hey, don't push us too far. Or we will be forced to react militarily." That doesn't mean they want to invade Taiwan. They have a short timetable. The number one principle--if you are a Chinese leader--is not that you have to regain Taiwan in the next five years. It's that you can't lose Taiwan.
Why do they worry about a small island, like this?
It's their unfinished civil war. It just looms very large in the history and mythology of the People's Republic of China. They fought a civil war with this nationalist government. They essentially defeated them. The nationalists escaped to an island which they consider an integral part of China. And then, because of American support and other intervening factors, they never finished. And I think especially for the military, this is the main reason for being--is to prevent Taiwanese independence and some day retake Taiwan. ... I think preventing Taiwanese independence is sort of a core principle of politics here. And no politician could go against that. ...
Erik Ecklom The Republican senator has been a critic of China over the years.
How important is the Taiwan Strait? How dangerous is that area?
It is potentially very dangerous. One of the things that we picked up on our delegation in August when we were in China,is the constant theme from them that "This is important to us. Taiwan is important to us. We don't want to wait forever. We want unification." And it's difficult for the average American to understand why something like that could be so important and why a little small place like Taiwan would be so important to the PRC. But the fact of the matter is, it is true, it is real, it is very important, and therefore very dangerous.
So our policy there has to be has to be sophisticated and very courageous. I'm glad that we've got people like George Bush and Colin Powell and Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney and people like that on the job, quite frankly, because I think that our relationship with China over the next few decades is probably the single most important issue facing our country.
Why is that?
Because of the potential threats, misunderstandings and conflict that we have there ... right now, they pose the greatest potential. Hopefully, we can build bridges, but we also have to draw lines. And when we draw lines in the sand with regard to certain basic things that are vital to our interest and to the interest of democracy and our friends around the world, we have to be willing to back that up. If you're willing to back it up, there is potential danger; there is potential conflict.
From your knowledge, can you give me a picture of their military forces opposite Taiwan?
We know that they have 300-plus missiles along the coast there, pointed toward Taiwan. And we know that they're doing training exercises on those islands in the Strait. We know, for example, that they're using American ships and submarines as enemies in their training exercises. And they know that we know that; they're sending a signal to us; they're sending a signal to Taiwan. They're going to wait and see how we react to all of that. But it's not like that there's any particular buildup right now. ... It's what the potential there is over the next few years, and then over the next several years.
Could it just be a bargaining chip to make America and Taiwan listen?
Could be, could be. But when you're playing poker, you don't know the answer to that until after the cards are laid down, and then it's too late. So if you look back over the long history of China, they've never tried to take over the world, but they've been quite aggressive in their own neighborhood ... in carrying out their own purposes and interests in their sphere of the world....
Kurt Campell He is senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
How dangerous is the Taiwan Strait area?
There are many factors associated with the Taiwan Strait that makes it quite dangerous. ... Probably the most important factor is that you have forces at work that appear to be almost inexorable.
Over the last several years, [there has been] a really sort of determined Chinese military build-up aimed at Taiwan that neither scolding from Western diplomats, nor appeals to their own self interest had any success in blunting or lessening. At the same time, there is an inexorable process in Taiwan of greater democratization, sort of a greater identity of seeing themselves as more Taiwanese than Chinese. And perhaps, most importantly, a lack of clarity in the United States about what precisely are our strategic interests, and perhaps more importantly, how to achieve them.
So it is a potential flashpoint?
Oh, it's undoubtedly a potential flashpoint. I would say that the interesting thing about the world today is that every major challenge to peace and stability that has the potential to erupt on a global scale is found in Asia. There is nothing in Europe. You can't really imagine a scenario that would lead to a global war ... overnight in Europe. I can imagine three, in Asia.
Yang Jiechi He is China's ambassador to the United States.
Why does China feel so strongly that Taiwan independence would be an act of war by Taiwan?
Because Taiwan is part of China. It has been part of China since ancient times, and it's just because of some of the separatist attempts of certain people on Taiwan and the interference from foreign forces that Taiwan is still separated from the motherland.
I think that people can understand that when a country is divided its people will like to see the country reunite, especially in the case of China, which has suffered so much in the past. So I believe that what we are doing has the support of the peace-loving people in the world and we are seeking peaceful unification -- one country, two systems, is our basic policy.s. Of course, we
will not make a commitment to go to the use of force. We do not make this kind of commitment precisely because we want to see the peaceful reunification of the country.
And there are some events in Taiwan which really cause us grave concern. Some people are openly campaigning for Taiwan independence and, of course, we have also been concerned by U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and other things. We have urged the American side to abide by the three joint communiqués between the two countries and to stop selling weapons to Taiwan.
There are still tents that stand on the Korean peninsula. The increasingly delicate and complicated relationship across the Taiwan Strait and, of course, the ... nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan. The Taiwan Strait issue is most complicated, because the United States does not have a firm and clear role in terms of what it would do in a military crisis. The unusual thing, from the perspective of the security planner, or strategic thinker, is that if you span the globe ... you see a strong U.S. role in trying to bridge gaps and bring peace, literally everywhere. ... The Taiwan Strait ... is the only place in the world where we, at the outset, have forsaken an active diplomatic role. But it is also a place that, overnight, we might find U.S. forces thrust into the mix.
So that is potentially severe for America?
And for the world. Before the tragic bombing [9/11/01] it was the one convening issue that American policy makers and strategists were spending more and more time thinking about behind the scenes. Our military establishment and our intelligence organizations do these war games ... often recreating the tensions associated with major international dilemmas. I think it would be fair to say that, in the last couple of years, probably a hundred of these run on some facet of Asia, generally associated with the Taiwan Strait.
The foreign policy towards Taiwan, and China ... they call it "strategic ambiguity." Do we really not know what we would do if there was conflict between Taiwan and China?
... I think, increasingly, the United States does have a sense of what it would do in a crisis in the Taiwan Strait ... and I think that notion has been more refined over time. I think you saw earlier signs of that in the first Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995, 1996, when the United States sent two aircraft carriers and their associated ... ships and submarines with that group to the Western Pacific. That's a pretty strong statement of the U.S. will to preserve peace and stability.
Taiwanese authorities say openly Taiwan is an independent nation, or a sovereign nation. In your view, is that a very dangerous statement for Taiwanese authorities to make?
It is a very dangerous statement.... And the overwhelming majority of the people in Taiwan now have come to understand that precisely because of this kind of a statement and corresponding
actions, they have caused instability across the Taiwan Strait and instability in Taiwan. And people have lots of complaints about this policy.
Can I ask you, then, why has there been a missile build-up on China's southern coast pointing towards Taiwan?
The kind of defensive measures that we take on the mainland are really for our national security and territorial entirety. If people look at the text of the three joint communiqués, [Editor's Note: see FRONTLINE's chronology] according to the August 17 communiqué, the United States has pledged to the Chinese side that it does not seek to carry out long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan and its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed the level of those in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States... and then the United States will reduce its arms sales to Taiwan over the period leading to a final resolution. So you can see that the United States has not really abided by its own pledge.
We have made very strong representation to the American side for these acts. We think that these acts should not have happened...
Dr. Joseph WU
He is a deputy director of the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University in Taiwan.
How dangerous is the Taiwan Strait for America and the rest of the world?
I would say it's quite dangerous, because there is a high degree of competition in terms of military build-up across the Taiwan Strait. China already has 60, 70 submarines in the area and Taiwan only has four. So in that area China has significant power if they decide to have a blockade against Taiwan.
In terms of air force, China has been acquiring 150 SU-27s. They are in the process of having SU-30s and more advanced Russian-made aircraft. In the area of our naval forces, they are having four mini-class destroyers equipped with SSM-20 missiles. Currently they seem to be no defense against those missiles, and those missiles have a range of 120 sea miles. So China is adding more and more to its weapon inventory in terms of more traditional weaponry and in terms of strategic weaponry.
They are adding 50 missiles more per year to their deployment, and currently they have about between 350 to 400. And they're still adding on and there's nothing seems to be able to slowing them down. They also developing cruise missiles and the multi-warhead missiles. Currently, even though people are talking about missile defense, there's no defense against cruise missiles or MERVs.
So the situation is developing into something that worries a lot of people here in Taiwan, a lot of decision-makers in the United States as well. The way we see it is that China is developing all these kinds of weapons very rapidly and deploying them so that they can have a total overwhelming force against Taiwan by the year 2005 or 2010. Then Taiwan will be subsumed, because if Taiwan is not able to keep up with this kind of pace of military competition against each other, then Taiwan is not likely to sustain a blockade or military attack. ...
Of all the conflicts in the world, as you look at the Taiwan Strait, how do you rate that as a potential flashpoint?
I would say it's probably the most dangerous flashpoint in the entire world, because once a war erupts here, then many countries are going to be drawn in. The United States is probably not going to sit idle. Japan and other countries in the area might have to react, because Taiwan Strait happens to be a very important sea link communication channel. The channel cannot afford to be shut down. So many countries will be drawn into the situation.
Zhu Bang-Zao
He is a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
...Why do you not renounce your use of force [against Taiwan]? ...
I know there are people in the United States who use China's failure to renounce the use of force against Taiwan as an excuse for the U.S. to support Taiwan and sell arms to Taiwan. But their arguments cannot hold water.
Can I just say that that gives the impression to the Americans that China is a bully? It is a threatening power. It's a communist power which is threatening a small, tiny island. That, for an American, is a very disturbing prospect.
Your impression, if you will permit me to say so, is totally wrong. It suggests that the United States is very keen on a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue, while mainland China wants to use military force. I think this is a misunderstanding which gives a totally wrong impression.
Actually, no one in the world is more eager than China to find a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question. We have always advocated peaceful reunification on the principle of one China, two systems. Even after the tremendous changes last year in Taiwan, we still advocate this principle, and hope to try our best to seek a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question. This is our basic principle and it has remained unchanged.
It is just because we want to solve the Taiwan question peacefully that we cannot give up the use of force. If we give up the use of force, that will only make a peaceful solution impossible. For instance, if the Taiwan separatists declare Taiwan independent, then how do we react? ...
Furthermore, it's entirely China's own internal affair if we deploy military equipment on our own soil.
If they do declare independence, what will China's response be?
...The key thing at the moment is that the leaders of the Taiwan government do not adequately recognize the one-China principle. They deny the 1992 oral understanding between us, which states that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should both use oral
expression to maintain the principle of one China.
Actually, if the Taiwan leader can acknowledge the one-China principle, and recognize the 1992 consensus, then talks across the Taiwan Strait can be resumed immediately. However, if he's bent on having his own way, and denies the principle of one China -- or even goes as far as what you said and declares independence -- then our answer is very clear-cut. We will not allow it to happen.
The final solution of the Taiwan question and the ultimate reunification of the motherland is in the common interest of the people of China -- that is the 1.3 billion Chinese people, including those on Taiwan Island. No force can stand in the way of this.
If the leadership in Taiwan declared independence, you say you could not let that happen. The U.S. Defense Department worries that if that did happen, your response would be to use the many missiles you have got along the coast opposite Taiwan, and that would be much more devastating than the bombardment of the islands that happened in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Is that the sort of response you would have?
I have made our stand quite clear: Taiwanese independence is equal to war. That's why the United States should not support this movement; should not support independence for Taiwan. We, the two sides, should make joint efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue.
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