Chinese Plantation Workers and Social Conflict in Peru in the late

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Chinese Plantation Workers andSocial Conflict in Peru in thelate Nineteenth Century*

MICHAEL J.GONZALES

As the world capitalist system developed during the nineteenth centurynon-slave labour became a commodity that circulated around the globeand contributed to capital accumulation in metropolitan centres. The bestexamples are the emigration of millions of Asian indentured servants andEuropean labourers to areas of European colonisation. Asians replacedemancipated African slaves on plantations in the Caribbean and SouthAmerica, supplemented a declining slave population in Cuba, builtrailways in California, worked in mines in South Africa, laboured onsugarcane plantations in Mauritius and Fiji, and served on plantations insoutheast Asia. Italian immigrants also replaced African slaves on coffeeestates in Brazil, worked with Spaniards in the seasonal wheat harvest inArgentina, and, along with other Europeans, entered the growing labourmarket in the United States. From the perspective of capital, theseworkers were a cheap alternative to local wage labour and, as foreignerswithout the rights of citizens, they could be subjected to harsher methodsof social control.1

* Research for this article was funded by a Ford Foundation Fellowship in 1974-5 andby a Fulbright Fellowship in autumn 1987. 1 would like to thank the staffs of the

Archivo del Fuero Agrario and the Archivo General de la Nacion for granting meaccess to plantation records, and anonymous referees for their useful comments. Anearlier version of this paper was presented at the International Congress ofAmericanists, Amsterdam, July, 1988.

1 Among the many studies on this subject are: Shula Marks and Peter Richardson (eds.),International Labour Migration: Historical Perspectives (London, 1984); Hugh Tinker, ANew System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 18)0—1920 (London, 1974);Manuel Moreno Fraginals, Frank Moya Pons and Stanley L. Engerman (eds.), BetweenSlavery and Free Labor: The Spanish-Speaking Caribbean in the Nineteenth Century(Baltimore, 1985); Peter Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal (London,1982); Watt Stewart, Chinese Bondage in Peru (Durham, 1951); Walter Rodney, A Historyof the Guyanese Working People, 1881-190; (Baltimore, 1981); Lucy M. Cohen, Chinese inthe Post-Civil War South (Baton Rouge, 1984); Thomas H. Holloway, Immigrants on theLand: Coffee and Society in Sao Paulo, 1886-19)4 (Chapel Hill, 1980); and James Scobie,Revolution on the Pampa (Austin, 1964).

Michael J. Gonzales is Associate Professor of History at Northern Illinois Universityand Director of the Center for Latino and Latin American Studies.

J. Lai. Amer. Stud. 21, 385-424 Printed in Great Britain 3°5

Chinese Plantation Workers and Social Conflict in Peru in the late Nineteenth Century*

MICHAEL J. GONZALES

As the world capitalist system developed during the nineteenth century non-slave labour became a commodity that circulated around the globe and contributed to capital accumulation in metropolitan centres. The best examples are the emigration of millions of Asian indentured servants and European labourers to areas of European colonisation. Asians replaced emancipated African slaves on plantations in the Caribbean and South America, supplemented a declining slave population in Cuba, built railways in California, worked in mines in South Africa, laboured on sugarcane plantations in Mauritius and Fiji, and served on plantations in southeast Asia. Italian immigrants also replaced African slaves on coffee estates in Brazil, worked with Spaniards in the seasonal wheat harvest in Argentina, and, along with other Europeans, entered the growing labour market in the United States. From the perspective of capital, these workers were a cheap alternative to local wage labour and, as foreigners without the rights of citizens, they could be subjected to harsher methods of social control. 1

* Research for this article was funded by a Ford Foundation Fellowship in 1974-5 and by a Fulbright Fellowship in autumn 1987. I would like to thank the staffs of the Archivo del Fuero Agrario and the Archivo General de la Naci6n for granting me access to plantation records, and anonymous referees for their useful comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Congress of Americanists, Amsterdam, July, 1988.

1 Among the many studies on this subject are: Shula Marks and Peter Richardson (eds.), International Labour Migration: Historical Perspectives (London, 1984); Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 18jo-1920 (London, 1974); Manuel Moreno Fraginals, Frank Moya Pons and Stanley L. Engerman (eds.), Between Slavery and Free Labor: The Spanish-Speaking Caribbean in the Nineteenth Century (Baltimore, 1985); Peter Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal (London, 1982); Watt Stewart, Chinese Bondage in Peru (Durham, 1951); Walter Rodney, A History of the Gltyanese Working People, 1881-190J (Baltimore, 198 I); Lucy M. Cohen, Chinese in the Post-Civil War SOllth (Baton Rouge, 1984); Thomas H. Holloway, Immigrants on the Land: Coffee and Society in sao Paulo, 1886-19}4 (Chapel Hill, 1980); and James Scobie, Revolution on the Pompa (Austin, 1964).

Michael J. Gonzales is Associate Professor of History at Northern Illinois University and Director of the Center for Latino and Latin American Studies.

J. Lol. Am.,. Slud. 11, 385-424 Prinled in Greol Brilaln

http://journals.cambridge.org


386 Michael ]. Gonâks

Map 1. Peru.

In the case of Peru, approximately 100,000 Chinese indentured servantsentered the country between 1847 an<^ X^1A- They contributed to theexpansion of the export economy by mining guano, building railroads,and, especially, working on cotton and sugarcane plantations. The end ofthe coolie trade in 1874 contributed to the decline of the Peruvian

386 Michael j. Gonzales

N

1

a 100 200 300 miles ~ ____ ~ ______ -LI ______ ~I

a 100 200 300 400 km , I I ! I

Map I. Peru.

In the case of Peru, approximately 100,000 Chinese indentured servants entered the country between 1847 and 1874. They contributed to the expansion of the export economy by mining guano, building railroads, and, especially, working on cotton and sugarcane plantations. The end of the coolie trade in 1874 contributed to the decline of the Peruvian



Chinese Plantation Workers and Social Conflict in Peru 387

economy in the 1870s and 1880s. The crisis was caused by falling guanorevenues, mismanagement of public revenues, the worldwide crisis of1873, and the collapse of financial institutions. Crisis subsequently turnedto catastrophe with Peru's military defeat and occupation by Chile duringthe War of the Pacific (1879-83).2

This article concerns the history of Chinese plantation workers duringthis period of crisis. It focuses on labour recruitment and control byplanters who attempted to maintain production under extremely difficultconditions. It provides a more comprehensive analysis than my earlierwork on Chinese workers on the sugarcane plantation Cayalti3 byincorporating additional primary and secondary sources. Especiallyimportant are the records of the cotton plantation Palto, located nearPisco, and the 140-page report written by a special commission appointedin 1887 to study the condition of Chinese labourers on coastal plantations.By providing detailed analysis of labour conditions in the Condor andSana Valleys the article also makes a contribution to regional history.

Peruvian planters had neither the capital nor the inclination to replaceChinese workers with local wage labourers. Instead, they sought torecontract Chinese labourers under terms similar to contracts ofindentureship and to limit their mobility through debt peonage andcorporal punishment. This worked for several years, but gradually amajority of Chinese completed their contracts and became wage labourers.Some of them continued to work on plantations on a daily basis as so-called chinos libres, while others migrated into the cities. During theChilean invasion many Chinese fled from the plantations, only to returnas members of work gangs organised by Chinese contractors. Theserecruiters supplied the majority of workers to large sugarcane plantationsinto the 1890s. Planters continued to subject Chinese workers to a harshsystem of social control, regardless of their contractual status.

The Chinese resisted total domination through a variety of violent andnon-violent tactics similar to those employed by African slaves andindentured servants elsewhere.4 Resistance was relatively more effective

2 Stewart, Chinese Bondage; Cecilia Mendez, 'La otra historia del guano: Peru1840-1879', Revista Andina, ano 5, num. 1 (ler semestre 1987), pp. 7-46; CarlosCamprubi, Historia de los bancos en el Peru {1860-1879),vo\. 1 (Lima, 1957), pp. 169-211;Ernesto Yepes del Castillo, Peru, 1820-1920: Un sigh de desarrollo capitalista (Lima, 1972),p. 131.

3 Plantation Agriculture and Social Control in Northern Peru, 187J-19)) (Austin, 1985),chs. 5 and 6; 'Economic Crisis, Chinese Workers and the Peruvian Sugar Planters1875-1900: A Case Study of Labour and the National Elite', in Bill Albert and AdrianGraves (eds.), Crisis and Change in the International Sugar Economy 1860-1914 (Edinburgh,1984), pp. 181-99.

4 For the United States see Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll (New York, 1976).Also see Rodney, Guyanese Working People.

Chinese Plantation Workers and Social Conflict in PerIJ 387

economy in the 1870S and 1880s. The crisis was caused by falling guano revenues, mismanagement of public revenues, the worldwide crisis of 1873, and the collapse of financial institutions. Crisis subsequently turned to catastrophe with Peru's military defeat and occupation by Chile during the War of the Pacific (1879-83).2

This article concerns the history of Chinese plantation workers during this period of crisis. It focuses on labour recruitment and control by planters who attempted to maintain production under extremely difficult conditions. It provides a more comprehensive analysis than my earlier work on Chinese workers on the sugarcane plantation Cayalti3 by incorporating additional primary and secondary sources. Especially important are the records of the cotton plantation Palto, located near Pisco, and the 14o-page report written by a special commission appointed in 1887 to study the condition of Chinese labourers on coastal plantations. By providing detailed analysis of labour conditions in the Condor and Sana Valleys the article also makes a contribution to regional history.

Peruvian planters had neither the capital nor the inclination to replace Chinese workers with local wage labourers. Instead, they sought to

recontract Chinese labourers under terms similar to contracts of indentureship and to limit their mobility through debt peonage and corporal punishment. This worked for several years, but gradually a majority of Chinese completed their contracts and became wage labourers. Some of them continued to work on plantations on a daily basis as socalled chinos libres, while others migrated into the cities. During the Chilean invasion many Chinese fled from the plantations, only to return as members of work gangs organised by Chinese contractors. These recruiters supplied the majority of workers to large sugarcane plantations into the 1890S. Planters continued to subject Chinese workers to a harsh system of social control, regardless of their contractual status.

The Chinese resisted total domination through a variety of violent and non-violent tactics similar to those employed by African slaves and indentured servants elsewhere. 4 Resistance was relatively more effective

2 Stewart, Chinese Bondage; Cecilia Mendez, 'La otra historia del guano: Peru 1840-1879', Revista Andina, ano 5, num. I (Ier semestre 1987), pp. 7-46; Carlos Camprubi, Historia de los bancos en el Perri (1360-1379), vol. I (Lima, 1957), pp. 169-211; Ernesto Yepes del Castillo, Perri, 1320-1920: Un siglo de desarrollo capitalista (Lima, 1972), p. 131.

3 Plantation AgriC/lltlire and Social Control in Northern Pem, 137J-19}} (Austin, 1985), chs. 5 and 6; 'Economic Crisis, Chinese Workers and the Peruvian Sugar Planters 1875-1900: A Case Study of Labour and the National Elite', in Bill Albert and Adrian Graves (eds.), Crisis and Change in the International Sligar Economy !S60-1914 (Edinburgh, 1984), pp. 181-99·

4 For the United States see Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordall, Roll (New York, 1976). Also see Rodney, G~anese Working People.



388 Michael J. Gonâles

on small cotton estates than on large sugarcane plantations, as the latterhad large staffs and Chinese contractors who enforced greater vigilance.Within the confines of plantations, the Chinese could steal, run away, fakeillness, strike, or otherwise slow or disrupt production schedules. All ofthese acts of defiance infuriated planters and, on occasion, resulted inconcessions to workers. Resistance also took on violent forms, includingmurder and rebellion, which were significant acts of vengeance andsometimes disrupted local plantation economies. However, these actionsusually resulted in only minor or temporary victories as planters had thesupport of public officials, the army, and virtually all non-Chinese.Resistance was also undermined by economic competition and ethnicdifferences among Chinese and black workers, and by the emergence ofChinese contractors who exploited their countrymen and undercut ethnicsolidarity.

On a more general level, this paper contributes to the debate over theinitial transition to wage labour by documenting the relative effectivenessof debt peonage and extra-economic coercion as well as the significance ofethnic rivalries and class conflict. However, I also seek to define the limitsof social control by analysing workers' resistance and the emergence oflabour markets in coastal valleys which planters failed to manipulate totheir satisfaction. These developments, coupled with the falling pro-ductivity of the ageing Chinese population, necessitated the switch toPeruvian labour and the eventual softening of traditional methods ofsocial control.

The historical significance of Chinese labourers should also be seen inthe context of class formation and survival. Without Chinese workers,Peruvian planters could never have survived the crisis of the 1870s and1880s and emerged as wealthy businessmen and political leaders in the1890s. And without Chinese labourers, Chinese labour contractors, opiumtraders, and others could never have accumulated capital during thisperiod of crisis and emerged as members of the petite bourgeoisie.

Development of the Cotton and Sugar Industries, 1820-70

The history of Chinese workers should be placed in the context of thedevelopment of the sugar and cotton industries where most of themtoiled. Since the colonial period, sugar has been cultivated primarily in thecentral and northern coastal regions, and cotton in Piura on the farnorthern coast and in the Sur Chico region south of Lima.5 The principal5 Frederick P. Bowser, The African Slave in Colonial Peru, i;24—1640 (Stanford, 1974);

Susan E. Ramirez, Provincial Patriarchs: Land Tenure and the Economics of Power in ColonialPeru (Albuquerque, 1986); Nicholas P. Cushner, Lards of the Land (Albany, New York,1980); W. S. Bell, An Essay on the Peruvian Cotton Industry, i82j-i<)20 (Liverpool, 198;),pp. 8-13.

388 Michael J. Gonzales

on small cotton estates than on large sugarcane plantations, as the latter had large staffs and Chinese contractors who enforced greater vigilance. Within the confines of plantations, the Chinese could steal, run away, fake illness, strike, or otherwise slow or disrupt production schedules. All of these acts of defiance infuriated planters and, on occasion, resulted in concessions to workers. Resistance also took on violent forms, including murder and rebellion, which were significant acts of vengeance and sometimes disrupted local plantation economies. However, these actions usually resulted in only minor or temporary victories as planters had the support of public officials, the army, and virtually all non-Chinese. Resistance was also undermined by economic competition and ethnic differences among Chinese and black workers, and by the emergence of Chinese contractors who exploited their countrymen and undercut ethnic solidarity.

On a more general level, this paper contributes to the debate over the initial transition to wage labour by documenting the relative effectiveness of debt peonage and extra-economic coercion as well as the significance of ethnic rivalries and class conflict. However, I also seek to define the limits of social control by analysing workers' resistance and the emergence of labour markets in coastal valleys which planters failed to manipulate to their satisfaction. These developments, coupled with the falling productivity of the ageing Chinese population, necessitated the switch to Peruvian labour and the eventual softening of traditional methods of social control.

The historical significance of Chinese labourers should also be seen in the context of class formation and survival. Without Chinese workers, Peruvian planters could never have survived the crisis of the 1870S and 1880s and emerged as wealthy businessmen and political leaders in the 189os. And without Chinese labourers, Chinese labour contractors, opium traders, and others could never have accumulated capital during this period of crisis and emerged as members of the petite bourgeoisie.

Development of the Cotton and Sugar Industries, J820-10

The history of Chinese workers should be placed in the context of the development of the sugar and cotton industries where most of them toiled. Since the colonial period, sugar has been cultivated primarily in the central and northern coastal regions, and cotton in Piura on the far northern coast and in the Sur Chico region south of Lima. 5 The principal

5 Frederick P. Bowser, The African Slave in Colonial Peril, 1}24-1640 (Stanford, 1974); Susan E. Ramirez, Provincial Patriarchs: Land Tenllre and the Economics of Power in Colonial Peril (Albuquerque, 1986); Nicholas P. Cushner, Lords of the Land (Albany, New York, 1980); W. S. Bell, An Em!)' on the Peruvian Cotton Industry, IS2}-1920 (Liverpool, 1985), pp.8- 1 3·




impetus for the expansion of plantation agriculture in the nineteenthcentury came from the guano boom which injected millions of pesos intothe sagging export economy. The chief beneficiaries of the boom wereBritish merchants, who signed consignment contracts with the state,and the Peruvian government. Nevertheless, Peruvian merchants alsobenefited as business associates of British traders and importers of luxurygoods, and sugar and cotton planters profited from governmentprogrammes designed to help their industries.6

During the 1840s and 1850s the Peruvian state directly or indirectlyaided planters by consolidating the internal debt, indemnifying slave-holders after the abolition of slavery, and paying premiums to planters forimporting non-slave labourers into the country.

The consolidation of the internal debt benefited many Peruvians withpolitical connections. Since independence, the Peruvian state had amasseda huge internal debt, and during the administration of Jose Echenique(1851—4) the decision was made to repay it in cash and bonds. As AlfonsoQuiroz has shown, the principal beneficiaries of consolidation were thebig merchant houses who purchased large blocks of vales de consolidation atbelow market value, and subsequently sold them for substantial gain.Many of these merchants were important creditors of coastal planters andsome planters, as bondholders, received compensation directly from thegovernment.7

Both cotton and sugar planters benefited enormously from theconjuncture of increased capital and favourable prices for their productson the world market. The price for sugar on the London market remainedgood until the 1880s, and demand for cotton increased significantly as aresult of falling production during the US Civil War (1861-5). Sugarplanters invested in mill modernisation8 and cotton producers greatlyexpanded acreage, especially in the Sur Chico region.9 The outlook forcotton appeared so good that Juan Norberto Casanova, who had studied

6 Jonathan V. Levin, The Export Economies (Cambridge, Mass., i960); Heraclio Bonilla,Guano j burguesia en el Peru (Lima, 1974); W. M. Mathew, The House of Gibbs and thePeruvian Guano Monopoly (London, 1981). Some of the early consignment contracts weregranted to Peruvians. The Peruvian government departed from the consignmentsystem in 1869, when it signed an agreement with Dreyfus Brothers & Co. of Paris tosell two million tons of guano in Europe (see Levin, pp. 98—99).

7 Alfonso W. Quiroz, ha deuda dejraudada: consolidation de ISJOJ dominio economho en el Peru(Lima, 1987).

8 Bell, Peruvian Cotton Industry, pp. 16-3 1; Antonio Raimondi, El Peru (Lima, 1965), vol.i, p. 323; George R. Fitz-Roy Cole, The Peruvians at Home (London, 1884), p. 129;Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, p. 54.

9 Bell, Peruvian Cotton Industry, pp. 11-12; Juan Rolf Engelsen, 'Social Aspects ofAgricultural Expansion in Coastal Peru, 1825-1878', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,U.C.L.A. (1977), pp. 96-104; 195-228.


impetus for the expansion of plantation agriculture in the nineteenth century came from the guano boom which injected millions of pesos into the sagging export economy. The chief beneficiaries of the boom were British merchants, who signed consignment contracts with the state, and the Peruvian government. Nevertheless, Peruvian merchants also benefited as business associates of British traders and importers of luxury goods, and sugar and cotton planters profited from government programmes designed to help their industries. 6

During the 1840S and 185 os the Peruvian state directly or indirectly aided planters by consolidating the internal debt, indemnifying slaveholders after the abolition of slavery, and paying premiums to planters for importing non-slave labourers into the country.

The consolidation of the internal debt benefited many Peruvians with political connections. Since independence, the Peruvian state had amassed a huge internal debt, and during the administration of Jose Echenique (1851-4) the decision was made to repay it in cash and bonds. As Alfonso Quiroz has shown, the principal beneficiaries of consolidation were the big merchant houses who purchased large blocks of vales de consolidacion at below market value, and subsequently sold them for substantial gain. Many of these merchants were important creditors of coastal planters and some planters, as bondholders, received compensation directly from the government. 7

Both cotton and sugar planters benefited enormously from the conjuncture of increased capital and favourable prices for their products on the world market. The price for sugar on the London market remained good until the 1880s, and demand for cotton increased significantly as a result of falling production during the US Civil War (1861-5). Sugar planters invested in mill modernisation8 and cotton producers greatly expanded acreage, especially in the Sur Chico region. 9 The outlook for cotton appeared so good that Juan Norberto Casanova, who had studied

6 Jonathan V. Levin, The Export Economies (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); Heraclio Bonilla, Gllanoy burgllesia en el Peru (Lima, 1974); W. M. Mathew, The House of Gibbs and the Perllvian Gllano Monopoly (London, 1981). Some of the early consignment contracts were granted to Peruvians. The Peruvian government departed from the consignment system in 1869, when it signed an agreement with Dreyfus Brothers & Co. of Paris to

sell two million tons of guano in Europe (see Levin, pp. 98-99)' 7 Alfonso W. Quiroz, La dellda defralldada,' consolidacion de rSJoy dominio economico en el Peru

(Lima, 1987). 8 Bell, Pemvian Cotton Indllstry, pp. 16-31; Antonio Raimondi, EI Pertl (Lima, 1965), vol.

I, p. 323; George R. Fitz-Roy Cole, The Perllvians at Home (London, 1884), p. 129; Gonzales, Plantation Agricllltllre, p. 54.

9 Bell, PerllVian Cotton Industry, pp. 11-12; Juan Rolf Engelsen, 'Social Aspects of Agricultural Expansion in Coastal Peru, 1825-1878', unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, U.C.L.A. (1977), pp. 96-104; 195-228.



390 Michael ]. Consoles

the cotton industry in the United States, argued that Peru had all thenecessary ingredients to develop a cotton textile industry.10

The chief impediment to continuing growth for both cotton and sugar,however, was labour shortages. Since the sixteenth century, the sugarindustry, in particular, had relied on African slave labour. However, theslave population of Peru declined significantly during the late eighteenthand nineteenth centuries as a result of the wars for independence, GreatBritain's severing of the slave trade to Peru in 1810, and the failure ofslave families to reproduce in large numbers. Between 1792 and 1854 thenumber of slaves fell from 40,337 to 25,505.n

In 1839 Congress addressed the problem of labour shortages by passingan immigration law subsidising the importation of contract labourers.The legislation authorised payment of 30 pesos per immigrant to anyoneimporting at least fifty workers between the ages of 10 and 40. Between1839 a n d ! ^ 5 J some 450,000 pesos were paid out under this programme.Planters also benefited financially from the abolition of slavery in 1854, asthey received 300 pesos for each slave or liberto12 freed. This sum, whichexceeded the market value of most slaves, generated between 7,000,000and 7,650,000 pesos in additional capital. These monies, added to thosealready in hand from the consolidation of the internal debt, allowedplanters to establish contacts with merchants on the Portuguese colony ofMacao and arrange for the systematic importation of Chinese indenturedservants.13

China had suddenly emerged as an important labour source for theWest as a result of a series of domestic tragedies, culminating in theTaiping Rebellion in which perhaps as many as 30 million people lost theirlives and millions more became refugees. This situation was thenexploited by Chinese warlords, local labour contractors and Portuguesemerchants to funnel the desperate into labour markets abroad. The so-called coolie trade lasted for nearly thirty years, from 1847 t o :^74) an<învolved over one million men.14 Of this total, over 90,000 weretransported to Peru.

The coolie trade ended in 1874 primarily as a result of British andChinese initiatives. The Imperial Chinese government had always opposed10 Ensayo economico-politko sobre el porvenir de la industria algodonera jabril del Peru (Lima,

1849).11 Nils P. Jacobsen, 'The Development of Peru's Slave Population and its Significance

for Coastal Agriculture', unpublished MS. (1974), pp. 11-12, 20, 32-3, 82.12 Libertos were children of slaves born after 28 July 1821, who were technically free but

had to work for their parents' masters up to the age of 20, if female, and 24, if male.13 Jacobsen, ' Peru's Slave Population', pp. 49, 77-9; Pablo Macera, Las plantations

ayucareras en el Peru, 1821-187; (Lima, 1974), pp. lxv, xxii, and ch. 3.14 Arnold J. Meagher, 'The Introduction of Chinese Laborers to Latin America: The

'Coolie' Trade, 1847-1874', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,Davis (1975). PP- 50-5-


the cotton industry in the United States, argued that Peru had all the necessary ingredients to develop a cotton textile industry. 10

The chief impediment to continuing growth for both cotton and sugar, however, was labour shortages. Since the sixteenth century, the sugar industry, in particular, had relied on African slave labour. However, the slave population of Peru declined significantly during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a result of the wars for independence, Great Britain's severing of the slave trade to Peru in 1810, and the failure of slave families to reproduce in large numbers. Between 1792 and 1854 the number of slaves fell from 40,337 to 25,50j,u

In 1839 Congress addressed the problem of labour shortages by passing an immigration law subsidising the importation of contract labourers. The legislation authorised payment of 30 pesos per immigrant to anyone importing at least fifty workers between the ages of 10 and 40. Between 1839 and 18 j I some 4 j 0,000 pesos were paid out under this programme. Planters also benefited financially from the abolition of slavery in 1854, as they received 300 pesos for each slave or liberto12 freed. This sum, which exceeded the market value of most slaves, generated between 7,000,000

and 7,650,000 pesos in additional capital. These monies, added to those already in hand from the consolidation of the internal debt, allowed planters to establish contacts with merchants on the Portuguese colony of Macao and arrange for the systematic importation of Chinese indentured servants. 13

China had suddenly emerged as an important labour source for the West as a result of a series of domestic tragedies, culminating in the Taiping Rebellion in which perhaps as many as 30 million people lost their lives and millions more became refugees. This situation was then exploited by Chinese warlords, local labour contractors and Portuguese merchants to funnel the desperate into labour markets abroad. The socalled coolie trade lasted for nearly thirty years, from 1847 to 1874, and involved over one million men. 14 Of this total, over 90,000 were transported to Peru.

The coolie trade ended in 1874 primarily as a result of British and Chinese initiatives. The Imperial Chinese government had always opposed

10 Ensrryo economico-politico sobre eI porvenir de la industria algodonera fabril del Perri (Lima, 1849).

11 Nils P. Jacobsen, 'The Development of Peru's Slave Population and its Significance for Coastal Agriculture', unpublished MS. (1974), pp. II-IZ, ZO, 32-3,82.

12 Libertos were children of slaves born after 28 July 1821, who were technically free but had to work for their parents' masters up to the age of 20, if female, and 24, if male.

13 Jacobsen, 'Peru's Slave Population', pp. 49, 77-9; Pablo Macera, Las plantaciones azucareras en el Peru, 1321-137J (Lima, 1974), pp. lxv, xxii, and ch. 3.

14 Arnold J. Meagher, 'The Introduction of Chinese Laborers to Latin America: The 'Coolie' Trade, 1847-1874', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Davis (197)), pp. )0-).




Table 1. Chinese emigration to Peru

Year

1850i860i8601861186218631864186;186618671868186918701871187218731874

Total

No. embarkedat Macao

—15,0002,0071,8601,7262,3017,010

4,7946,5432,400

4,7323,006

7,9'71 2 , 5 2 6

14,5057,3033,939

97,5 29

No. dead duringvoyage

—2,000

5944 2 0

718

6736 0 0

2546142 1 6

466

7537374i

1,1147321 1 4

9,7°4

% of totalembarked

—

13-3329.6022.5841.6029.258.;65 . 3 0

9.389.009.852 . 5 0

4.715.927.68

10.022.89

9.91

No. disembarkedat Callao

—13,000

',4131,4401,0081,6286>4io4,54O5,9*92 , 1 8 4

4,266

2,9317,544

11,785

I3.39I6,57i

3,825

87,825

Source: J. B. H. Martinet, Uagriculture au Pe'rou. Resume du memoire pre'sente au Congre'sInternational de Vagriculture (Paris, 1878), p. 32.

the recruitment and shipment of indentured servants, but chaotic politicalconditions had prevented it from taking decisive action. By the 1870s, thegovernment was stable enough to begin executing labour contractorsand enforcing a blockade of Macao. The British government, which hadextensive interests in China, incorporated the coolie trade into its longcampaign to halt the slave trade to the West. London forbade merchantsin Hong Kong to participate in the trade, instructed the Royal Navy toseize coolie ships on the high seas, and pressured Portugal, a traditionalally, to close down Macao as the principal way station. When Lisbonfinally agreed to the last demand, it became impossible to continueshipping indentured servants abroad.15

British efforts to end the coolie trade, however, should not be attributedto humanitarian objections to indentured servitude. British merchantswere simultaneously transporting hundreds of thousands of Indianindentured servants to British colonies in the Caribbean, South America,South Africa, and elsewhere,16 and they later shipped some 63,000 Chineseindentured servants to South Africa between 1904 and 1907.17 When

15 Ibid., pp. 307-10; 324-6, 331; Robert L. lrick, Ch'ing Policy toward the Coolie Trade,iStf-rfyS (Taipei, 1982); Stewart, Chinese bondage, chs. 6 and 7.

16 Tinker, A New System of Slavery.17 Peter Richardson, 'Coolies, Peasants, and Proletarians: The Origins of Chinese

Indentured Labour in South Africa, 1904-1907', in Marks and Richardson (eds.),International Labour Migration, pp. 167-86.

Chil1ese Plantation Workers and Social Conflict in Peru 39 1

Table I. Chinese emigration to Peru

No. embarked No. dead during % of total No. disembarked Year at Macao voyage embarked at Callao

18 50 1860 15,000 2,000 13-33 13,000 1860 2,007 594 29. 60 1,413 1861 1,860 420 22.5 8 1,440 1862 1,726 718 41.60 1,008 1863 2,3 01 673 29. 25 1,628 1864 7,010 600 8.5 6 6,410 186 5 4,794 254 503 0 4,540 1866 6,543 61 4 9.3 8 5,9 29 1867 2,400 216 9.00 2, 184 1868 4,732 466 9. 85 4,266 1869 3,006 75 2.5 0 2,93 1 1870 7,917 373 4.7 1 7,544 187 1 12,526 741 5.92 11,785 1872 14,5 0 5 1,114 7.68 13,391 1873 7.3 0 3 732 10.02 6,57 1 1874 3.939 114 2.89 3,82 5

Total 97,529 9,704 9.9 1 87,82 5

Source: J. B. H. Martinet, L' agriculture au Perou. Resume du memoire prisenti au Congris Illternational de I'agricullure (Paris, 1878), p. 32.

the recruitment and shipment of indentured servants, but chaotic political conditions had prevented it from taking decisive action. By the I 870S, the government was stable enough to begin executing labour contractors and enforcing a blockade of Macao. The British government, which had extensive interests in China, incorporated the coolie trade into its long campaign to halt the slave trade to the West. London forbade merchants in Hong Kong to participate in the trade, instructed the Royal Navy to seize coolie ships on the high seas, and pressured Portugal, a traditional ally, to close down Macao as the principal way station. When Lisbon finally agreed to the last demand, it became impossible to continue shipping indentured servants abroad. I5

British efforts to end the coolie trade, however, should not be attributed to humanitarian objections to indentured servitude. British merchants were simultaneously transporting hundreds of thousands of Indian indentured servants to British colonies in the Caribbean, South America, South Africa, and elsewhere/6 and they later shipped some 63,000 Chinese indentured servants to South Africa between 1904 and 1907.17 When

15 Ibid., pp. 307-10; 324-6, 331; Robert L. Irick, Ch'ing Poliry toward the Coolie Trade, [847-[878 (Taipei, 1982); Stewart, Chinese Bondage, chs. 6 and 7.

16 Tinker, A New System of Slavery. 17 Peter Richardson, 'Coolies, Peasants, and Proletarians: The Origins of Chinese

Indentured Labour in South Africa, 1904-1907', in Marks and Richardson (cds.), International Labour Migration, pp. 167-86.



392 Michael J. Gonâ/es

British economic interests were directly served, the policy was toencourage wholesale exploitation of indentured labour.

Coercion, the State and the Transition to Wage Labour

The end to the coolie trade caused severe labour shortages in the Peruviansugar and cotton industries. Planters also suffered from the disappearanceof credit, lower prices for their products, and the Chilean invasion.18

Many of them did not survive as the Chileans put their estates to the torchor they were forced to sell out after suffering recurring losses. Thoseplanters who did survive signed on former Chinese indentured servants ascontracted and wage labourers. This was the only short-term solution tolabour shortages because planters failed to import more indenturedlabourers and they had neither the capital nor the desire to switch over toPeruvian wage labour.

There was a great deal of official and extra-official coercion involved inkeeping the Chinese on the plantations. The Peruvian government wassympathetic to the interests of planters and it helped them limit thephysical mobility of the Chinese. For example, legislation was passed thatrequired all Chinese to carry a letter from their employer stating that theyhad completed their work contracts.19 All Chinese were also required toregister with local authorities and to purchase a 'boleto de su ocupacidn' for2 paper soles.20

If a Chinese labourer left an estate before his work contract wascompleted, planters could count on local officials, such as subprefects,governors, and police, to help them hunt down the offenders. It was alsocommonplace for planters, with the approval of local authorities, topunish runaways and to force them to work longer to repay the costs oftheir apprehension.21

By comparison, in Cuba the state apparently enforced even stricter

18 Camprubi, Historia de los bancos, vol. i, pp. 169-211; Yepes del Castillo, Perti, 1820-1920,p. 131; and Noel Deerr, The History of Sugar, vol. 2 (New York, 1949), p. 531.

18 This is discussed in Francisco Perez Cespedes to Senores Aspfllaga Hermanos, 27 May1877, Palto to Lima, Archivo del Fuero Agrario, Lima. Much of the information forthis paper comes from the Aspfllaga family's private correspondence, which is nowhoused in the Archivo del Fuero Agrario in Lima. The names of the principalcorrespondents are referred to in the notes by their initials, except in those cases wherethey simply signed the title of the family firm, Aspfllaga Hermanos. The following isa list of all correspondents and titles that are abbreviated:Antero Aspfllaga Barrera AAB Ismael Aspfllaga Barrera 1ABRamon Aspfllaga Barrera RAB Aspfllaga Hermanos AHBaldomero Aspfllaga Barrera BAB Archivo del Fuero Agrario AFA

20 'Expediente sobre el reclamo formulado por varios asiaticos de la provincia', lea, 4Apr. 1884, Biblioteca Nacional, Lima, D11457; 'Expediente relativo sobre el reclamoformulado por la detencion de varios asiaticos en los pueblos de Supe, Chancay yBarranca', Supe, 26 May 1886, Biblioteca Nacional, Lima, D5534.

21 See below, section on planter control.

39 2 Michael J. Gonzales

British economic interests were directly served, the policy was to encourage wholesale exploitation of indentured labour.

Coercion, the State and the Transition to Wage Labour

The end to the coolie trade caused severe labour shortages in the Peruvian sugar and cotton industries. Planters also suffered from the disappearance of credit, lower prices for their products, and the Chilean invasion. IS

Many of them did not survive as the Chileans put their estates to the torch or they were forced to sell out after suffering recurring losses. Those planters who did survive signed on former Chinese indentured servants as contracted and wage labourers. This was the only short-term solution to labour shortages because planters failed to import more indentured labourers and they had neither the capital nor the desire to switch over to Peruvian wage labour.

There was a great deal of official and extra-official coercion involved in keeping the Chinese on the plantations. The Peruvian government was sympathetic to the interests of planters and it helped them limit the physical mobility of the Chinese. For example, legislation was passed that required all Chinese to carry a letter from their employer stating that they had completed their work contracts. 19 All Chinese were also required to register with local authorities and to purchase a 'boleto de su ocupacirfn' for 2 paper soles. 20

If a Chinese labourer left an estate before his work contract was completed, planters could count on local officials, such as subprefects, governors, and police, to help them hunt down the offenders. It was also commonplace for planters, with the approval of local authorities, to punish runaways and to force them to work longer to repay the costs of their apprehension. 21

By comparison, in Cuba the state apparently enforced even stricter

18 Camprubi, His/oria de los bancos, vol. I, pp. 169-211 ; Yepes del Castillo, Peru, [320-[920,

p. 131; and Noel Deerr, The History of Sugar, vol. 2 (New York, 1949), p. 53 I. 19 This is discussed in Francisco Perez Cespedes to Senores Aspl1laga Hermanos, 27 May

1877, Palto to Lima, Archivo del Fuero Agrario, Lima. Much of the information for this paper comes from the Aspl1laga family's private correspondence, which is now housed in the Archivo del Fuero Agrario in Lima. The names of the principal correspondents are referred to in the notes by their initials, except in those cases where they simply signed the title of the family firm, Aspt1laga Hermanos. The following is a list of all correspondents and titles that are abbreviated: Antero Aspl1laga Barrera AAB lsmael Aspl1laga Barrera lAB Ramon Aspt1laga Barrera RAB Aspl1laga Hermanos AH Baldomero Aspt1laga Barrera BAB Archivo del Fuero Agrario AF A

20 'Expediente sobre el reclamo formulado por varios asiaticos de la provincia', lea, 4 Apr. 1884, Biblioteca Nacional, Lima, 011457; 'Expediente relativo sobre el reclamo formulado por la detencion de varios asiaticos en los pueblos de Supe, Chancay y Barranca', Supe, 26 May 1886, Biblioteca Nacional, Lima, 055 34.

21 See below, section on planter control.




controls over non-indentured Chinese. Many were confined in municipaldepdsitos centrales, similar to prisons, which prevented them from freelyselling their labour. These depots also served as contracting agencieswhich hired out Chinese to planters under a system of rigid control.22

Peruvian officials were generally unconcerned with the living andworking conditions of the Chinese on coastal plantations. Nevertheless,according to the terms of the Treaty of Tien Tsing that ended the coolietrade to Peru, the Imperial Chinese government had the right to inspectconditions of Chinese subjects in Peru. In 1887 a special ChineseCommission was formed composed of Chinese and Peruvian officials whotoured several coastal plantations. The Commissioners' report makes clearthat they were only concerned with gross injustices, such as corporalpunishment, illegal imprisonment in plantation jails, contract violations,and wages that fell below the subsistence level. Working in concert withlocal officials, Commissioners were empowered to find solutions to theseproblems. However, there is no mention that violators, no matter howgrievous their offence, were ever prosecuted.23

The situation of contracted workers resembled that of 'classic' debtpeons. By definition, the length of their work contract was determined bythe amount of their debt. Thus, if they were advanced the equivalent ofone year's wage, then their work contract ran for one year. If they receivedadditional loans during the year, additional time was added to theircontract. Work missed because of illness or any other cause was also addedonto their contracts. While under contract, Chinese were not permitted toleave estates without the special permission of planters. Some estates, likethe large cotton and wine plantation Ocucaje in the lea Valley, keptmeticulous accounts of time completed and owed, including notations ofabsences. The Chinese Commission was pleased with such estates andexpressed no concern over limited worker mobility and freedom.24

Such estates were, however, exceptional cases. More commonly,contracted workers complained about a variety of abuses, especiallyunauthorised extensions of their contracts. Whenever this was definitivelycollaborated by estate records, contracted workers were freed. Severalworkers received their freedom in this fashion, including eleven from

22 Rebecca J. Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor, 1860-1899(Princeton, 1985), p. 100.

23 'Expediente sobre la averiguacion practicada por la comision china, asesorada porfuncionarios del gobierno, respecto a la situation de sus connacionales que prestan susservicios en las haciendas', Lima, 9 December, 1887, Biblioteca Nacional, Lima,D11416. Hereinafter cited as Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N.

24 'Oficio del Prefecto del Departamento de Lima al Director de Gobierno remitiendolelos cuadros y las actas de los acuerdos realizados por la comision encargada de visitarlos fundos donde existen asiaticos contratados', lea, 15 June 1888, Biblioteca Nacional,Lima, D5347.

Chinese Planlalion Workers alld Social COllflict in Peril 393

controls over non-indentured Chinese. Many were confined in municipal depositos centrales, similar to prisons, which prevented them from freely selling their labour. These depots also served as contracting agencies which hired out Chinese to planters under a system of rigid control. 22

Peruvian officials were generally unconcerned with the living and working conditions of the Chinese on coastal plantations. Nevertheless, according to the terms of the Treaty of Tien Tsing that ended the coolie trade to Peru, the Imperial Chinese government had the right to inspect conditions of Chinese subjects in Peru. In 1887 a special Chinese Commission was formed composed of Chinese and Peruvian officials who toured several coastal plantations. The Commissioners' report makes clear that they were only concerned with gross injustices, such as corporal punishment, illegal imprisonment in plantation jails, contract violations, and wages that fell below the subsistence level. Working in concert with local officials, Commissioners were empowered to find solutions to these problems. However, there is no mention that violators, no matter how grievous their offence, were ever prosecuted. 23

The situation of contracted workers resembled that of 'classic' debt peons. By definition, the length of their work contract was determined by the amount of their debt. Thus, if they were advanced the equivalent of one year's wage, then their work contract ran for one year. If they received additional loans during the year, additional time was added to their contract. Work missed because of illness or any other cause was also added onto their contracts. While under contract, Chinese were not permitted to leave estates without the special permission of planters. Some estates, like the large cotton and wine plantation Ocucaje in the Ica Valley, kept meticulous accounts of time completed and owed, including notations of absences. The Chinese Commission was pleased with such estates and expressed no concern over limited worker mobility and freedom. 24

Such estates were, however, exceptional cases. More commonly, contracted workers complained about a variety of abuses, especially unauthorised extensions of their contracts. Whenever this was definitively collaborated by estate records, contracted workers were freed. Several workers received their freedom in this fashion, including eleven from

22 Rebecca J. Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cllba: The Transition to Free Labor, 1360-1399

(Princeton, 1985), p. 100. 23 'Expediente sobre la averiguacion practicada por la comision china, asesorada por

funcionarios del gobierno, respecto a la situacion de sus connacionales que prestan sus servicios en las haciendas', Lima, 9 December, 1887, Biblioteca Nacional, Lima, D11416. Hereinafter cited as Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N.

24 'Olicio del Prefecto del Departamento de Lima al Director de Gobierno remitiendole los cuadros y las aetas de los acuerdos realizados por la comision encargada de visitar los fundos donde existen asiaticos contratados', lea, I j June 1888, Biblioteca Nacional, Lima, Dj347.




Table 2.

Region

Far Northern

NorthernCentral

South-Central

Total estimatedlation in coastal

Total estimatedlation in Peru

Chinese population distribution in

Province

PiuraLambayequeLibertadAncashLimalea

popu-Peru

popu-

Numberof

Chinese

744,0878,816

13.97524,290

5,022

46,264

51,186

coastal Peru,

TotalPopu-lation F

135,61586,738

147.336284,850225,80060,255

94°, 5 74

2,699,106

1876

'ercen

0.0

4-76.01.4

10.88.3

4.9

1.9

Source: Peru, Direction de Estadi'stica, Censo General rfyi, vn, Apendix, p. 6.

Table 3. Partial census of Chinese plantation workers in several coastal

provinces, 1887

Province

ChancaySantaChiclayoPacasmayoTrujilloCarietelea

Contractedlabourers

*515

•3382

*5*0

1 j d

Sharecroppers

47°*55

0

0

0

0

0

Wagelabourers"

i , 9 ' 7864

' ,235663748

500

1,206"

Total

2 , 4 1 2

1,1541,368

7451,000

500

1,221

Total 5 " 725 7,133 8,380

0 The Chinese Commission did not generally differentiate between wage labourersprovided by Chinese contractors and wage labourers hired directly by the estates.

6 This figure grossly underestimates the number of Chinese workers in Trujilloprovince, because the Commission did not visit several large estates, including CasaGrande, Cartavio, and Roma.

c This figure only includes Chinese on the plantations Santa Barbara, La Huaca, and LaQuebrada.

d Contracted workers are under-enumerated and wage labourers are over-enumeratedbecause 400 wage and contracted workers were grouped together by the Commission andare represented here as wage labourers. The vast majority of these 400 workers, based ondata from the Commission report and plantation records, were in all probability wagelabourers.

Source: Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N.

Lurifico in the Jequetepeque Valley and six from La Puente in the SantaValley. More frequently, however, plantation records were incomplete orin such disarray that the Commission could not reach a resolution. Thetwo most important cases of this type involved the Chicama Valley estatesof Facala and Tulape.25

25 Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N.


Table 2.. Chinese population distribution in coastal Peru, 1876

Number Total of Popu-

Region Province Chinese lation Percentage

Far Northern Piura 74 135,61 5 0.001 Lambayeque 4,08 7 86,73 8 4·7

Northern Libertad 8,816 147.336 6.0 Central Ancash 13,975 284,83 0 1.4

Lima 24,290 225,800 10.8 South-Central lca 5,022 60,255 8·3

Total estimated popu- 46,264 940,574 4·9 lation in coastal Peru

Total estimated popu- 51,186 2,699,106 1.9 lation in Peru

Source: Peru, Direcci6n de Estadistlca, Censo General [876, VII, Apendix, p. 6.

Table 3· Partial cenSllS of Chinese plantation workers In several coastal

provinces, ISS7

Contracted Wage Province labourers Sharecroppers labourers· Total

Chancay 25 470 1,9 17 2,4 12 Santa 15 255 864 1,134 Chiclayo 133 0 1,235 1,3 68 Pacasmayo 82 0 663 745 TrujIllo 252 0 748 1,OOOb

Canete 0 0 500 500' lea Ijd 0 1,206

d 1,221

Total 522 725 7,133 8>3 80

a The Chinese Commission did not generally differentiate between wage labourers provided by Chinese contractors and wage labourers hired directly by the estates.

b This figure grossly underestimates the number of Chinese workers in Trujillo province, because the Commission did not visit several large estates, including Casa Grande, Cartavio, and Roma.

C This figure only Includes Chinese on the plant\ltions Santa Barbara, La Huaca, and La Quebrada.

d Contracted workers are under-enumerated and wage labourers are over-enumerated because 400 wage and contracted workers were grouped together by the Commission and are represented here as wage labourers. The vast majority of these 400 workers, based on data from the Commission report and plantation records, were in all probability wage labourers.


Lurifico in the Jequetepeque Valley and six from La Puente in the Santa Valley. More frequently, however, plantation records were incomplete or in such disarray that the Commission could not reach a resolution. The two most important cases of this type involved the Chicama Valley estates

of Facala and Tulape. 25





Table 4. Plantations with the largest number of Chinese workers, IS8J

Province

TrujilloChiclayoPacamayo

Canete

Chancay

Chancay

SantaSantaJcaChiclayo

Estate

TulapePatapoLurifico

Santa Barbara,La Huaca, LaQuebrada

San Nicolas

Huayto

San JacintoLa PuenteCaucatoCayalti

Owner

Larco Hnos.Jose RamosLuisa GonzalesVda. deDreyfus

Swayne

Testamentariade D. Laos

Canevaro yCia.

SwayneT. Derteano—Aspfllaga

Crop

SugarSugarSugar

Sugar

Sugar

Sugar

SugarSugarSugarSugar

Contractedlabourers

—

82

—

—

—

——

Wagelabourers

522

418

500

; 00

275

3 0 0

2853 0 0

3 0 0

Total

700*

6 0 0

5 0 0

5 0 0

5 0 0

3 0 0

3 0 0

3 0 0

3 0 0

3 0 0

Source: Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N.* For the plantation Tulape, the Commissioners grouped together contracted and

wage labourers.

Facala was owned by the Pfliicker y Madalengoitia family. It employedover 130 contracted labourers, the second largest number found by theCommission. The Chinese claimed that their contracts had expired andthat Pfliicker had forced them to remain on the plantation. TheCommission discovered that the only standard contracts on file were theoriginal contracts of indentureship, and that contract extensions were onlydocumented by receipts for advances. The Commission considered this ahighly irregular bookkeeping procedure that left the Chinese vulnerableto fraudulent practices. Nevertheless, there was no absolute proof that theChinese were telling the truth and the Commission was forced to leavethe dispute unresolved pending further instructions from the central

OR

government.The plantation Tulape, owned by Larco Hermanos, presented a

different problem. This estate numbered some 700 Chinese labourers, bothcontracted and free. The plantation records were kept in meticulous orderand each contract extension was verified by a signature. The Chineseclaimed, however, that their signatures had been forged. A majority of theCommissioners sided with Larco, but Mr Chen Fun chose to believe hiscountrymen. At that juncture, the Commission decided to suspend itsinspection tour because a majority of the estates in the Chicama Valleypresented similar problems.27

26 Ibid. " Ibid.

Chinese Plantation Workers and Social Conflict in Peril 395

Table 4· Plantations with the largest number of Chinese workers, 1887

Contracted Wage Province Estate Owner Crop labourers labourers Total

Trujillo Tulape Larco Hnos. Sugar 700* Chiclayo Patapo Jose Ramos Sugar 78 j22 600

Pacamayo Lurifico Luisa Gonzales Sugar 82 418 JOO

Vda. de Dreyfus

Caiiete Santa Barbara, Swayne Sugar 500 JOO

La Huaca, La Quebrada

Chancay San Nicolas Testamentaria Sugar 500 500

de D. Laos Chancay Huayto Canevaro y Sugar 25 275 300

Cia. Santa San Jacinto Swayne Sugar 300 300

Santa La Puente T. Derteano Sugar 15 28 5 300

lea Caucato Sugar 300 300

Chiclayo Cayaltf Asp11laga Sugar 300 300

SOllrce: Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N. * For the plantation Tulape, the Commissioners grouped together contracted and

wage labourers.

Facahi was owned by the PAucker y Madalengoitia family. It employed over J 30 contracted labourers, the second largest number found by the Commission. The Chinese claimed that their contracts had expired and that PAucker had forced them to remain on the plantation. The Commission discovered that the only standard contracts on file were the original contracts of indentureship, and that contract extensions were only documented by receipts for advances. The Commission considered this a highly irregular bookkeeping procedure that left the Chinese vulnerable to fraudulent practices. Nevertheless, there was no absolute proof that the Chinese were telling the truth and the Commission was forced to leave the dispute unresolved pending further instructions from the central government. 26

The plantation Tulape, owned by Larco Hermanos, presented a different problem. This estate numbered some 700 Chinese labourers, both contracted and free. The plantation records were kept in meticulous order and each contract extension was verified by a signature. The Chinese claimed, however, that their signatures had been forged. A majority of the Commissioners sided with Larco, but Mr Chen Fun chose to believe his countrymen. At that juncture, the Commission decided to suspend its inspection tour because a majority of the estates in the Chicama Valley presented similar problems. 27

26 Ibid. 27 Ibid.



396 Michael ]. Gonâles

Contradictory evidence was only one reason why the Commissionfailed to resolve these and other disputes. Commissioners were dependenton local authorities, especially subprefects, for enforcement of theirstatutory authority. Local officials were generally reluctant to take anyaction against the interests of planters who were, perhaps withoutexception, the most important members of the local elite. Moreover,planters frequently advised the central government regarding theappointment of local officials and sometimes even held local officethemselves.28

Commissioners also heard a number of complaints from contractedworkers regarding low wages. The Commission was charged withassuring that the Chinese earned a living wage and on several estates itforced planters to increase wages. For example, on the La Puente estateowned by Torcuato Derteano daily wages were increased to 2 paper soles,or an increase of 75 %.29

By 1887 the majority of Chinese workers on plantations were either freewage labourers {chinos libres) or wage labourers controlled by Chineselabour contractors. The Commission's report shows that Chinesecontractors supplied the majority of workers to the large sugarcaneplantations, and that chinos libres were found in smaller numbers on bothlarge and small estates. On several estates, chinos libres complained thatthey were owed back wages by planters. For example, Lucas Ansejo, aChinese hacendado in the Huaura Valley, owed 25 workers on his estate SanYsidro 7,000 paper soles. This represented about 70 days' wages. Ansejoalso owed 100 workers on his plantation Andahuasi between 3,000 and4,000 paper soles. The most notable case, however, involved the Galponestate in the Supe Valley where the owner, Alejandro Zuloaga, admittedowing his 45 Chinese workers 47,000 paper soles! This enormous sum hadaccumulated since the war, Zuloaga explained, because financial difficultiesarising from the conflict had prevented him from meeting his payroll. Inrecent years, his estate had turned a profit and he had repaid his labourersbetween 4,000 and 5,000 paper soles. These episodes suggest that, despitetheir free status, chinos libres had limited mobility. It is difficult to imaginewage labourers remaining on estates where they were not paid, and onesuspects that Zuloaga and Ansejo employed coercion to prevent themfrom leaving. On the other hand, it is also possible that workers werereluctant to leave because planters owned them so much money. From thehacendados' perspective, this would have constituted a more attractivemodel of debt peonage, especially in a country where it would have beenextremely difficult for foreign workers to recover back wages through alawsuit.30

28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.


Contradictory evidence was only one reason why the Commission failed to resolve these and other disputes. Commissioners were dependent on local authorities, especially subprefects, for enforcement of their statutory authority. Local officials were generally reluctant to take any action against the interests of planters who were, perhaps without exception, the most important members of the local elite. Moreover, planters frequently advised the central government regarding the appointment of local officials and sometimes even held local office themselves. 28

Commissioners also heard a number of complaints from contracted workers regarding low wages. The Commission was charged with assuring that the Chinese earned a living wage and on several estates it forced planters to increase wages. For example, on the La Puente estate owned by Torcuato Derteano daily wages were increased to 2 paper soles, or an increase of 75 %.29

By 1887 the majority of Chinese workers on plantations were either free wage labourers (chinos fibres) or wage labourers controlled by Chinese labour contractors. The Commission's report shows that Chinese contractors supplied the majority of workers to the large sugarcane plantations, and that chinos fibres were found in smaller numbers on both large and small estates. On several estates, chinos fibres complained that they were owed back wages by planters. For example, Lucas Ansejo, a Chinese hacendado in the Huaura Valley, owed 25 workers on his estate San Ysidro 7,000 paper soles. This represented about 70 days' wages. Ansejo also owed 100 workers on his plantation Andahuasi between 3,000 and 4,000 paper soles. The most notable case, however, involved the Galp6n estate in the Supe Valley where the owner, Alejandro Zuloaga, admitted owing his 45 Chinese workers 47,000 paper soles! This enormous sum had accumulated since the war, Zuloaga explained, because financial difficulties arising from the conflict had prevented him from ml.!eting his payroll. In recent years, his estate had turned a profit and he had repaid his labourers between 4,000 and 5,000 paper soles. These episodes suggest that, despite their free status, chinos fibres had limited mobility. It is difficult to imagine wage labourers remaining on estates where they were not paid, and one suspects that Zuloaga and Ansejo employed coercion to prevent them from leaving. On the other hand, it is also possible that workers were reluctant to leave because planters owned them so much money. From the hacendados' perspective, this would have constituted a more attractive model of debt peonage, especially in a country where it would have been extremely difficult for foreign workers to recover back wages through a lawsuit. 30

28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.




Table 5. Daily wages received by Chinese plantation workers in iSSj {in soles)

Estate

HuaytoLa PuentePatapo

Pomalca yColiud

Lurifico

Galindo

Barraza

Laredo

Facala

Sausal

Contracted workers

3.3) paper, 1.5 lb rice2.66-3.33 paper13.33 silver centavos,2 lb rice, 1 lb meat

2.88 paper, 1.5 lbrice, 1 lb meat

25-42 silver centavos,1.5 lb rice, 1 lb meat

6 silver centavos,1.5 lb rice

2.31—3.01 paper,2 lb rice

16.60 silver centavos,2 lb rice

1.17-2.50 paper, 2 lb

rice2.50 paper, 1.5 lb rice,

1 lb meat

Free workers

8—12 paper, 1.5 lb rice50—60 silver centavos40 silver centavos,

2 lb rice, 1 lb meat7 paper, 1.5 lb rice,

1 lb meat70 silver centavos,

1.5 lb rice35—60 silver centavos,

1.; lb rice8 paper, 1 lb rice"

8 paper, 1.5 lb rice"



Difference (%)

58.4-72.25P

66.75

58.86

40.00—64.29

82.86—90.00

62.38—71.13

51.82

68.75-85.38

64.2;

0 Wage difference does not include the varying amounts of rations because the price ofrice and meat is unknown.


The Palto and Cayalti Estates

These episodes highlight the importance of coercion in the transition towage labour as well as the ineffectiveness of the state in improving theplight of the Chinese. Plantation records allow us to present a moresystematic and balanced analysis of the transition from contracted to wagelabour. Despite the existence of coercion and debt peonage, chinos libresearned substantially higher wages than contracted workers and sometimesbenefited from limited wage labour markets in coastal valleys. Plantersattempted to control labour markets and to limit worker mobility, butthey were not always successful. There were also significant differences inpatterns of labour recruitment and control depending on the size andmanagement of individual estates.

The following discussion will focus on the Palto plantation, a medium-sized (385 hectares) cotton estate near Pisco, and the Cayalti' plantation, alarge (31,000 hectares) sugarcane estate near Sana. This perspective willprovide a close-up look at the transition to wage labour under tworepresentative systems of production.

Both Palto and Cayalti were owned by the Aspi'llaga family, formermerchants who had made the transition to plantation agriculture in thelate 1850s. Cayalti was their major investment and the key to the family


Table 5. DailY wages received Iry Chinese plantation workers in 1887 (in sales)

Estate Contracted workers Free workers Difference (%)

Huayto 303 3 paper, I.) Ib rice 8-12 paper, I.) Ib rice )8.4-7 2.2) La Puente 2.66-303 3 paper )0-60 silver centavos ? Pitapo 13.33 silver centavos, 40 silver centavos, 66·7)

2 Ib rice, I Ib meat 2 Ib rice, I Ib meat Pomalca y 2.88 paper, I.) Ib 7 paper, I.) Ib rice, )8.86

Collud rice, I Ib meat lib meat Lurifico 2)-42 silver centavos, 70 silver centavos, 40.00-64.29

I.) Ib rice, I Ib meat I.) Ib rice Galindo 6 silver centavos, 3)-60 si I ver cen ta vos, 82.86-9°·00

I.) Ib rice I.) Ib rice Barraza 2.31-3.01 paper, 8 paper, I Ib rice" 62.3 8-71. I 3

2 Ib rice Laredo 16.60 silver centavos, 8 paper, I.j Ib rice" j 1.82

2 Ib rice Facala I. 17-2.) 0 paper, 2 Ib 8 paper, I.) Ib rice" 68·7)-8).38

nee SlUIsal 2.)0 paper, I.) Ib rice, 7 paper, I.j Ib rice" 64· 2 j

lib meat

" Wage difference does not Include the varying amounts of rations because the price of rice and meat is unknown.


The Palto and Cqyaltz' Estates

These episodes highlight the importance of coercion in the transition to wage labour as well as the ineffectiveness of the state in improving the plight of the Chinese. Plantation records allow us to present a more systematic and balanced analysis of the transition from contracted to wage labour. Despite the existence of coercion and debt peonage, chinos libres earned substantially higher wages than contracted workers and sometimes benefited from limited wage labour markets in coastal valleys. Planters attempted to control labour markets and to limit worker mobility, but they were not always successful. There were also significant differences in patterns of labour recruitment and control depending on the size and management of individual estates.

The following discussion will focus on the Palto plantation, a mediumsized (385 hectares) cotton estate near Pisco, and the Cayalti plantation, a large (3 I ,000 hectares) sugarcane estate near Sana. This perspective will provide a close-up look at the transition to wage labour under two representative systems of production.

Both Palto and Cayalt! were owned by the Aspillaga family, former merchants who had made the transition to plantation agriculture in the late 185 os. Cayalt! was their major investment and the key to the family




fortune for three generations. Palto, like most cotton estates, was smallerand less profitable during the nineteenth century. Both estates reliedalmost exclusively on Chinese indentured servants after the abolition ofblack slavery.31

In 1875 Palto had 147 contracted Chinese labourers who periodicallyreceived cash advances which they discounted with their labour. TheChinese were given a daily task {tared) which counted as a day's wage. Ifa worker did not complete his assignment, then he was not credited witha full day's wage.32

With the end of the coolie trade it became increasingly difficult andexpensive to maintain the size of the workforce. By 1877 the number ofChinese had decreased to 121, and two years later it was down to 87.'''' Tohold onto these workers, the estate administrator routinely advancedthem small sums of money, frequently on the eve of Chinese New Yearwhen there was pressure from the Chinese community to contribute to thecelebrations. As the administrator put it, '...their countrymen obligatethem to pay, and they can only comply by taking out a contract...'.'14

Bookkeeping at Palto was not always precise and the Chinese sometimeshad to demand their freedom upon the expiration of their contracts. Forexample, in September of 1877 five Chinese refused to work because theircontracts had expired. The administrator checked his records anddiscovered that four had indeed completed their time, and they were giventheir letters of freedom. The records on the fifth were, however, unclearand he was forced to remain for another two months.35 Later that year itwas discovered that a Chinese had been forced to work for a year beyondthe expiration of his contract. He was freed but apparently withoutadditional compensation.3(l

As the size of the workforce continued to decline, managers wereforced to hire wage labourers. This meant hiring either free Chinese orlocal peasants, who were mostly black. Management was not pleased witheither type of worker because they worked fewer hours and demandedhigher wages than contracted workers. The Aspi'llagas also felt cheatedbecause wage labourers would not always work for long periods of time.The estate administrator registered the following complaint in 1879:

31 O n the Aspfllaga family see Gonzales , Plantation Agriculture, pp . 29-33 .32 Planilla de Trabajadores Chinos , Hacienda Palto, Aug . 1875-Dec. 1878, A F A .33 Francisco Perez Cespedes to A H , 31 July 1877, Palto to Lima, A F A ; Jose Perez y

Albela to A H , 14 N o v . 1879, Palto to Lima, A F A .34 J o s e Perez y Albela to A H , 26 N o v . 1878, Pa l to to Lima, A F A .35 Franc isco Perez Cespedes to A H , 28 Sept. 1877, Pa l to t o L ima , A F A .36 Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 4 Dec. 1877, Palto to Cayalti', AFA.

398 Michael]. Gonzales

fortune for three generations. Palto, like most cotton estates, was smaller and less profitable during the nineteenth century. Both estates relied almost exclusively on Chinese indentured servants after the abolition of black slavery.3l

In 1875 Palto had 147 contracted Chinese labourers who periodically received cash advances which they discounted with their labour. The Chinese were given a daily task (tarea) which counted as a day's wage. If a worker did not complete his assignment, then he was not credited with a full day's wage. 32

With the end of the coolie trade it became increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain the size of the workforce. By 1877 the number of Chinese had decreased to 121, and two years later it was down to 87.!l!l To hold onto these workers, the estate administrator routinely advanced them small sums of money, frequently on the eve of Chinese New Year when there was pressure from the Chinese community to contribute to the celebrations. As the administrator put it, ' ... their countrymen obligate them to pay, and they can only comply by taking out a contract ... '.!l4

Bookkeeping at Palto was not always precise and the Chinese sometimes had to demand their freedom upon the expiration of their contracts. For example, in September of 1877 five Chinese refused to work because their contracts had expired. The administrator checked his records and discovered that four had indeed completed their time, and they were given their letters of freedom. The records on the fifth were, however, unclear and he was forced to remain for another two months. 35 Later that year it was discovered that a Chinese had been forced to work for a year beyond the expiration of his contract. He was freed but apparently without additional compensation. 31i

As the size of the workforce continued to decline, managers were forced to hire wage labourers. This meant hiring either free Chinese or local peasants, who were mostly black. Management was not pleased with either type of worker because they worked fewer hours and demanded higher wages than contracted workers. The Aspillagas also felt cheated because wage labourers would not always work for long periods of time. The estate administrator registered the following complaint in 1879:

31 On the AspI1laga family see Gonzales, Plan/a/ion Agriml/llre, pp. 29-33. 32 Planilla de Trabajadores Chinos, Hacienda Pal to, Aug. 187j-Dec. 1878, AFA. 33 Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 31 July 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA; Jose Perez y

Albela to AH, 14 Nov. 1879, Palto to Lima, AFA. 34 Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 26 Nov. 1878, Palto to Lima, AFA. 35 Francisco Perez cespedes to AH, 28 Sept. 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA. 36 Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 4 Dec. 1877, Palto to Cayalti, AFA.




This week there have been five chinos libres and four peones criollos [blacks]; ofthe criollos, I had to expel two because their work was very bad, [and] of the fivechinos libres two refused to accept today's assignment, alleging that it wastoo large... Such scoundrels are the chinos libres and the peones criollos. It is notpossible to give them a smaller assignment than the one given to contractedChinese.37

The outbreak of the War of the Pacific in 1879 an<^ t n e subsequentChilean invasion of Peru had a dramatic impact on Palto. The Asp/llagasdecided to transfer the majority of Palto's Chinese to Cayalti as a meansof maintaining production on their larger plantation. They also hoped tomaintain production at Palto by finding a Chinese contractor with at least80 workers.38 However, this proved impossible, and from August 1880 toJuly 1882 Palto struggled along with only 26 to 67 men.39

Several of these workers were under the control of the Chinesecontractor Ayate. He first came to Palto as a contracted worker, becamea libre, and later a foreman {caporat). By that point, he had been givenaccess to a plot of land and separate living quarters.40

Ayate first appeared as a labour contractor in 1881, shortly after theChilean invasion. The timing of Ayate's career advance was notcoincidental. Many Chinese fled from the plantations during the Chileanonslaught and were later recruited by fellow Chinese to work onplantations. Contractors generally received part of their workers' wagesand ran stores on the estates where they sold food, clothing, and opiumon credit. These conditions obviously created many opportunities forembezzlement and debt peonage.41

Despite the presence of the contractor Ayate, Palto continued to sufferfrom labour shortages. One reason was that most labour contractorspreferred to do business with larger plantations that paid higher wagesand provided more customers for their stores. On a couple of occasionsAyate failed to recruit additional workers in Pisco and lea because rival

37 Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 21 Nov. 1879, Palto to Lima, AFA.38 AH to RAB, 31 Aug. 1880, Lima to Palto, AFA; AH to RAB, 7 Sept. 1880, Lima to

Palto, AFA.39 J o s e Perez y Albela to A H , 7 Feb . 1881, Pa l to to Lima, A F A ; Jose Perez y Albela to

A H , 9 March 1881, Pal to to Lima, A F A ; I A B to A H , 21 March 1882, Pa l to to Lima,A F A ; Planilla N o . 78 de pagos a los trabajadores, 16 July 1882, Manuel J. Br ihuego,adminis t ra tor , A F A .

40 H u m b e r t o Rodr iguez Pastor, 'Biograf ias de Chinos Cul ies ' , Kimtur, no . 6, J u l y - A u g . ,1987, pp. 11-17.

41 Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N., and below. Although we know little aboutthem, Chinese contractors also existed in Cuba. 'Chinese workers who had served outtheir terms, or had escaped from their masters, were often grouped together intocuadrillas by entrepreneurs, themselves Chinese, and hired out', Scott, p. 99.


This week there have been five chinos fibres and four peones criol/os [blacks]; of the criol/os, I had to expel two because their work was very bad, [and] of the five chinos libres two refused to accept today's assignment, alleging that it was too large ... Such scoundrels are the chinos fibres and the peones criol/os. It is not possible to give them a smaller assignment than the one given to contracted Chinese. 37

The outbreak of the War of the Pacific in 1879 and the subsequent Chilean invasion of Peru had a dramatic impact on Palto. The Aspillagas decided to transfer the majority of Palto's Chinese to Cayaltf as a means of maintaining production on their larger plantation. They also hoped to maintain production at Palto by finding a Chinese contractor with at least 80 workers. 38 However, this proved impossible, and from August 1880 to July 1882 Palto struggled along with only 26 to 67 men. 39

Several of these workers were under the control of the Chinese contractor Ayate. He first came to Palto as a contracted worker, became a fibre, and later a foreman (capora/). By that point, he had been given acc'ess to a plot of land and separate living quarters. 40

Ayate first appeared as a labour contractor in 1881, shortly after the Chilean invasion. The timing of Ayate's career advance was not coincidental. Many Chinese fled from the plantations during the Chilean onslaught and were later recruited by fellow Chinese to work on plantations. Contractors generally received part of their workers' wages and ran stores on the estates where they sold food, clothing, and opium

on credit. These conditions obviously created many opportunities for embezzlement and debt peonage. 41

Despite the presence of the contractor Ayate, Palto continued to suffer from labour shortages. One reason was that most labour contractors preferred to do business with larger plantations that paid higher wages and provided more customers for their stores. On a couple of occasions Ayate failed to recruit additional workers in Pisco and Ica because rival

37 Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 21 Nov. 1879, Pal to to Lima, AFA. 38 AH to RAB, 31 Aug. 1880, Lima to Palto, AFA; AH to RAB, 7 Sept. 1880, Lima to

Palto, AFA. 39 Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 7 Feb. 1881, Palto to Lima, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to

AH, 9 March 1881, Palto to Lima, AFA; lAB to AH, 21 March 1882, Palto to Lima, AFA; Planilla No. 78 de pagos a los trabajadores, 16 July 1882, Manuel J. Brihuego, administrator, AFA.

40 Humberto Rodriguez Pastor, 'Biografias de Chinos Culies', Klmlllr, no. 6, July-Aug., 1987, pp. 11-17·

41 Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N., and below. Although we know little about them, Chinese contractors also existed in Cuba. 'Chinese workers who had served out their terms, or had escaped from their masters, were often grouped together into madril/as by entrepreneurs, themselves Chinese, and hired out', Scott, p. 99.




Table 6. Evolution of the Chinese workforce on the plantation Pal to,1879-1882

Date

May 1879Nov. 1879May 1881July 1882

ContractedChinese

948729

2

FreeChinese

0

55736

Peruvian

0

40

0

Tot:

9496

6738

Source: Jose Perez y Albela to Senores Aspfllaga Hnos., 9 May 1879, Palto-Lima, AFA;Jose Perez y Albela to Senores Aspfllaga Hnos., 7 Nov. 1879, Palto-Lima, AFA; JosePerez y Albela to Senores Aspfllaga Hnos., 14 Nov. 1879, Palto-Lima, AFA; PlanillaNo. 18 a los trabajadores de la Ha. Palto, 27 May 1881, Manuel J. Brihuego, Admor.,AFA; Planilla No. 78 de pagos a los trabajadores, 16 July 1882, Manuel J. Brihuego,Admor., AFA.

contractors had already taken local Chinese to the nearby ChinchaValley.42

Throughout 1882 and 1883 Palto had equal difficulty hiring non-contracted labourers. Managers blamed the problem on the inherentlaziness of workers as well as political and social unrest. There was a greatdeal of banditry and looting by both Peruvians and Chileans in the region.However, planters' frustrations also stemmed from having to contendwith a local wage labour market. For the first time, there was seriouscompetition among growers for labourers and the Aspillagas criticisedboth planters and workers for the resulting difficulties:

Here I have found that there is a profound shortage of labourers, [and] addingto the disorder among the peons is Don Julio Elias of the estate Urrutia, raisingand lowering wages according to his own ideas and whim. Each week we havemore or less 40 men — very few to attend to everything.... There are only a fewchinos libres and the great majority of them are mere bags of bone {unos buenoshuesos)}3

The Aspillagas were upset because chinos libres sold their labour to thehighest bidder and sometimes refused to work as hard as contractedworkers. For example, Palto had difficulty hiring workers during localgrape harvests when wages were at a premium on wine estates. Eventhough the Aspillagas understood the economics of the situation, theypreferred to blame labour shortages on social unrest and lazy labourers.This was a more convenient explanation that betrayed their prejudices as

42 Manuel J. Br ihuego to Senores Prevost & Co. , 8 Sept. 1881, Pal to to Lima, A F A ;Manuel J. Br ihuego to Senores Prevost & Co. , 12 Sept. 1881, Pal to to Lima, A F A ;Manuel J. Br ihuego to Senores Prevost & Co. , 18 April 1882, Pal to to Lima, A F A ;Manuel J . Br ihuego to Senores Prevos t & Co . , 10 April 1882, Pal to to Lima, A F A .

43 1AB to A H , 24 July 1882, Pal to to Lima, A F A .


Table 6. Evolution of the Chinese work force on the plantation Palto}

l879-T882

Contracted Free Date Chinese Chinese Peruvian Total

May 1879 94 0 0 94 Nov. 1879 87 4 96 May 1881 29 37 0 67 July 1882 2 36 0 38

Source: Jose Perez y Albela to Senores Aspillaga Hnos., 9 May 1879, Palto-Lima, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to Senores Aspt1laga Hnos., 7 Nov. 1879, Palto-Lima, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to Senores Aspt1laga Hnos., 14 Nov. 1879, Palto-Lima, AFA; Plan ilia No. 18 Ii los trabajadores de la Ha. Palto, 27 May 1881, Manuel J. Brihuego, Admor., AFA; Planilla No. 78 de pagos a los trabajadores, 16 July 1882, Manuel J. Brihuego, Admor., AFA.

contractors had already taken local Chinese to the nearby Chincha Valley.42

Throughout 1882 and 1883 Palto had equal difficulty hiring noncontracted labourers. Managers blamed the problem on the inherent laziness of workers as well as political and social unrest. There was a great deal of banditry and looting by both Peruvians and Chileans in the region. However, planters' frustrations also stemmed from having to contend with a local wage labour market. For the first time, there was serious competition among growers for labourers and the Aspfllagas criticised both planters and workers for the resulting difficulties:

Here I have found that there is a profound shortage of labourers, [and] adding to the disorder among the peons is Don Julio Elias of the estate Urrutia, raising and lowering wages according to his own ideas and whim. Each week we have more or less 40 men - very few to attend to everything .... There are only a few chinos libres and the great majority of them are mere bags of bone (tInOS buenos hl/esos).43

The Aspillagas were upset because chinos fibres sold their labour to the highest bidder and sometimes refused to work as hard as contracted workers. For example, Palto had difficulty hiring workers during local grape harvests when wages were at a premium on wine estates. Even though the Aspfllagas understood the economics of the situation, they preferred to blame labour shortages on social unrest and lazy labourers. This was a more convenient explanation that betrayed their prejudices as

42 Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 8 Sept. 1881, Palto to Lima, AFA; Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 12 Sept. 188 I, Palto to Lima, AFA; Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 18 April 1882, Palto to Lima, AF A; Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 10 April 1882, Palto to Lima, AFA.

43 lAB to AH, 24 July 1882, Palto to Lima, AFA.




well as their frustration over failure to control the local labour market.'Although there are many idle people, labourers are very scarce here.Currently, because of the grape harvest in Pisco they pay 10 soles a day.Here the current wage is 3 soles a tarea...\M Four months later, IsmaelAspillaga Barrera added: 'The people here have so few necessities and areso lazy that they only work enough to have enough to eat.>45

By 1883, management was forced to raise wages periodically to matchthose paid on neighbouring estates. Higher wages almost always resultedin more workers.46 Nevertheless, management still sought ways ofundermining the local labour market. For example, in October of 1883 theestate administrator attempted to lower wages to offset the rise in thevalue of paper currency. However, he bitterly lamented the lack of localpolitical muscle to enforce such a measure.47 This was clearly a seriousproblem in the Pisco region which had been devastated by the Chileaninvasion and continued to be plagued by bandits, political chiefs incommand of private armies (montoneros),48 and incompetent local officials.49

Unable to rely on public authority to hold down wages, planters struckan agreement among themselves.50 This arrangement broke down almostimmediately, however, because some planters were willing to paycompetitive wages, while other growers, such as the Aspfllagas, hadserious financial problems and sought to reduce their labour bills. TheAspfllagas also placed the future of their large sugar estate Cayalti abovethat of Palto.51 The following comments from Palto's administrationcapture the essence of the problem:

Wages. This hacienda continues to comply with the agreement contracted amongthe hacendados of the valley, however there are two of them who have broken it[those from] Mencia and Urrutia.52

In the three years that I have run this estate there has not been a year when somehacienda in the valley has not disrupted established wages. In San Jacinto thereis a hacendado from Ayacucho who is burning and ploughing under grape vinesin order to plant rice. He pays shovelmen 12 soles a day and it is to be expectedthat when I need day labourers I will have to pay the same.53

44 AH to AH, 21 Mar. 1882, Palto to Lima, AFA.46 IAB to AH, 24 July 1882, Palto to Lima, AFA.46 Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 21 Jan. 1883, Palto to Lima, AFA;

Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 6 Feb. 1883, Palto to Lima, AFA.47 Manuel Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 10 Oct. 1883, Palto to Lima, AFA.48 Rolando Pachas Castillo, 'Impacto de la Guerra del Pacifico en las haciendas de lea,

Chincha, Pisco y Cafiete', in Wilson Reategui et al. (eds.), La Guerra del Pacifico (Lima,1979), vol. i, pp. 197-221.

49 Ibid; I A B to A H , 12 May 1884, Palto to Lima, A F A .60 Manuel J. Br ihuego to Senores Prevost & Co. , 20 Jan . 1884, Pal to to Lima, A F A .51 O n the Aspfllagas' financial p rob lems see Gonzales , Plantation Agriculture, p. 30.62 Manuel J. Br ihuego to Senores Prevost & Co. , 11 Feb. 1884, Pal to to Lima, A F A .63 Manuel J. Br ihuego to Senores Prevost & Co. , 9 Jan . 1884, Palto to Lima, A F A .

Chinese Plantatioll Workers alld Social COIlf/ict ill Peril 401

well as their frustration over failure to control the local labour market. 'Although there are many idle people, labourers are very scarce here. Currently, because of the grape harvest in Pisco they pay 10 soles a day. Here the current wage is 3 soles a tarea ... '.44 Four months later, Ismael Aspillaga Barrera added: 'The people here have so few necessities and are so lazy that they only work enough to have enough to eat. ,45

By 1883, management was forced to raise wages periodically to match those paid on neighbouring estates. Higher wages almost always resulted in more workers. 46 Nevertheless, management still sought ways of undermining the local labour market. For example, in October of 1883 the estate administrator attempted to lower wages to offset the rise in the value of paper currency. However, he bitterly lamented the lack of local political muscle to enforce such a measure. 47 This was clearly a serious problem in the Pisco region which had been devastated by the Chilean invasion and continued to be plagued by bandits, political chiefs in command of private armies (montolleros),48 and incompetent local officials. 49

Unable to rely on public authority to hold down wages, planters struck an agreement among themselves. 50 This arrangement broke down almost

immediately, however, because some planters were willing to pay

competitive wages, while other growers, such as the Aspillagas, had serious financial problems and sought to reduce their labour bills. The Aspillagas also placed the future of their large sugar estate Cayalti above that of Palto. 51 The following comments from Palto's administration capture the essence of the problem:

Wages. This hacienda continues to comply with the agreement contracted among the hacendados of the valley, however there are two of them who have broken it [those from] Mencia and Urrutia. 52

In the three years that I have run this estate there has not been a year when some hacienda in the valley has not disrupted established wages. In San Jacinto there is a hacendado from Ayacucho who is burning and ploughing under grape vines in order to plant rice. He pays shovel men 12 soles a day and it is to be expected that when I need day labourers I will have to pay the same. 53

44 AH to AH, 21 Mar. 1882, Palto to Lima, AFA. 45 lAB to AH, 24 July 1882, Palto to Lima, AFA. 46 Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 21 Jan. 1883, Palto to Lima, AFA;

Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 6 Feb. 1883, Pal to to Lima, AFA. 47 Manuel Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 10 Oct. 1883, Palto to Lima, AFA. 48 Rolando Pac has Castillo, 'lmpacto de la Guerra del Pacifico en las haciendas de lea,

Chincha, Pisco y Canete', in Wilson Reategui et al. (eds.), La Guerra del Pacifico (Lima, 1979), vol. I, pp. 197-221.

49 Ibid; lAB to AH, 12 May 1884, Palto to Lima, AFA. 50 Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 20 Jan. 1884, Palto to Lima, AFA. 51 On the AspI1lagas' financial problems see Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, p. 30.

52 Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., II Feb. 1884, Palto to Lima, AFA. 53 Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 9 Jan. 1884, Pal to to Lima, AFA.




...With respect to the cotton harvest, one still cannot declare a victory. I paidthem i sol per arroba [harvested]; but the next week no one harvested. Workingpeople in this valley are in the most complete state of insubordination. This is theresult of the absurd wages that I have been paying [in comparison to] Urrutia,Mencia, and San Jacinto. Why should they come here and earn 6 soles when theycan earn \z elsewhere for the same work?54

Throughout the remainder of the 1880s Palto had a core ofapproximately 30 Chinese workers. During the cotton harvest, however,20—40 additional Chinese and Peruvian workers were always hired.Among these seasonal workers there were usually several Peruvianwomen who earned the same wage as men and worked just as hard. Forexample, in 1882 the average weekly pick per worker was 411.53 pounds.The four women harvesters picked the following amounts: 717 pounds,474 pounds, 410 pounds, and 226 pounds. Out of 30 cotton harvesters,717 pounds was the most picked, and five Chinese males harvested lessthan 226 pounds.55

In order to find seasonal labour, however, the estate had to paycompetitive wages. Failure to do so even caused labour unrest on theestate on two occasions. In 1885 cotton harvesters stopped work anddemanded an increase in wages to offset the devaluation in paper currency.The administrator agreed to increase wages from S./1.50 paper per arrobato S./2.00 per arroba}* Three years later, ginners and packers complainedthat their counterparts on neighbouring estates received 10 silver centavosa day more. Once again, the manager consented and increased ginners'wages from 40-50 silver centavos a day, and packers' wages from 30-40silver centavos a day.57 Both of these incidents occurred during theharvest when management most feared a shutdown.

In 1892, the Aspi'llagas lectured their manager on a variation of thelabour theory of value:

As a general rule it suits our interests to have peons who work hard for the lowestpossible salary... because it is clear that the less that is spent, not alteringproduction, the more profit will accrue, that is the pragmatic goal of allbusinesses, well directed and administered. In this sense proceed because itconforms with our interests.58

The results, however, were not forthcoming. In 1893 Palto had only 53

54 Manuel J. Brihuego to Scfiores Prcvost & Co., 2 Nov. 1884, Palto to Lima, AFA.55 Hac ienda Pa l to , Planilla N o . 60 de p a g o s a los t raba jadorcs , 12 May 1882, Manue l J .

Brihuego, administrator, AFA.66 Manuel J. Brihuego to AH, 15 Feb. 188;, Palto to Lima, AFA.57 Manuel J. Brihuego to AH, 2 May 1888, Palto to Lima, AFA.68 AH to Jose Velarde, 17 Feb. 1892, Lima to Palto, AFA.


.. , With respect to the cotton harvest, one still cannot declare a victory. I paid them I sol per arroba [harvested]; but the next week no one harvested. Working people in this valley are in the most complete state of insubordination. This is the result of the absurd wages that T have been paying [in comparison to] Urrutia, Mencia, and San Jacinto. Why should they come here and earn 6 sales when they can earn 12 elsewhere for the same work ?54

Throughout the remainder of the 1880s Palto had a core of approximately 30 Chinese workers. During the cotton harvest, however, 20-40 additional Chinese and Peruvian workers were always hired. Among these seasonal workers there were usually several Peruvian women who earned the same wage as men and worked just as hard. For example, in 1882 the average weekly pick per worker was 411.53 pounds. The four women harvesters picked the following amounts: 717 pounds, 474 pounds, 410 pounds, and 226 pounds. Out of 30 cotton harvesters, 717 pounds was the most picked, and five Chinese males harvested less than 226 pounds. 55

In order to find seasonal labour, however, the estate had to pay competitive wages. Failure to do so even caused labour unrest on the estate on two occasions. In 1885 cotton harvesters stopped work and demanded an increase in wages to offset the devaluation in paper currency. The administrator agreed to increase wages from S. / I. 5 0 paper per arroba to S.j 2.00 per arroba. 56 Three years later, ginners and packers complained that their counterparts on neighbouring estates received 10 silver centavos a day more. Once again, the manager consented and increased ginners'

wages from 40-50 silver centavos a day, and packers' wages from 30-40

silver centavos a day. 57 Both of these incidents occurred during the

harvest when management most feared a shutdown.

In 1892, the Aspillagas lectured their manager on a variation of the

labour theory of value:

As a general rule it suits our interests to have peons who work hard for the lowest possible salary ... because it is clear that the less that is spent, not altering production, the more profit will accrue, that is the pragmatic goal of all businesses, well directed and administered. In this sense proceed because it conforms with our interests. 58

The results, however, were not forthcoming. In 1893 Palto had only 53

54 Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 2 Nov. 1884, Palto to Lima, AP A. 55 Hacienda Palto, Plan ilia No. 60 de pagos a los trabajadores, 12 May 1882, Manuel J.

Brihuego, administrator, AFA. 56 Manuel J. Brihuego to AH, 15 Feb. 1885, Palto to Lima, AFA. 57 Manuel J. Brihuego to AH, 2 May 1888, Palto to Lima, AFA. 58 AH to Jose Velarde, 17 Feb. 1892, Lima to Palto, AFA.




workers,59 and 9 of the 38 harvesters picked less than 100 pounds ofcotton a week.60 By this date, many Chinese workers were old andexhausted from years of plantation labour. Rather than pay competitivewages that might attract younger, more productive workers, theAspfllagas and other cotton growers chose to eliminate wage labour in themid-1890s in favour of cotton tenantry. This reduced their labour bills,circumvented local labour markets, and transferred much of the risk ofproduction onto the black peasantry.

The transition from contracted to wage labour in the Aspfllagas' largesugarcane plantation Cayaltf followed a somewhat different course.Cayalti" s workforce numbered 445 in 1877 (see Table 7) and, despite theend to the coolie trade, the Aspfllagas attempted to avoid any significantreduction. They were initially successful at recontracting many of theirChinese workers and at contracting new recruits. To attract new workers,however, they had to advance them the equivalent of half a year's salary,or about 25 paper soles. These workers were required to remain on theestate until their debts had been paid.61 The Aspfllagas also hired severalChinese wage labourers, but did so reluctantly because chinos libresdemanded higher wages. For example, in 1876 a libre earned 70 silvercentavos per day plus meals, or the equivalent of several months' wagesfor a contracted worker.62

As noted, during the Chilean invasion large numbers of Chinese fledfrom plantations into nearby cities and towns where they were mobilisedinto work gangs by Chinese contractors. An indication of how this wasdone comes from a representative of the Chinese community in Lima,Cheng Isao Ju, who accused ten Chinese contractors of 'kidnapping'between 3,000 and 4,000 Chinese during 1881 and 1882 and bringing themto the plantations. During 1883 and 1884, he claimed, many more Chinesewere forced to work on plantations to recover debts owed to contractors.63

50 Planilla No. 636 de los pagos del 3 al 9 de abril, 1893, 9 April 1893, Nestor V. Cerdena;Planilla del pago del recojo de algodon Egipto de la hacienda Palto a treinta centavosla arroba; Planilla del pago del recojo de algodon de Metafice de la hacienda Palto atreinta centavos la arroba, AFA.

60 Planilla No. 636 de los pagos del 3 al 9 de abril, 1893, 9 April 1893, Nestor V. Cerdena;Planilla del pago del recojo de algodon Egipto de la hacienda Palto a treinta centavosla arroba; Planilla del pago del recojo de algodon de Metafice de la hacienda Palto atreinta centavos la arroba, AFA.

81 RAB to AAB, 24 Dec. 1875, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 7 April 1876, Cayalti'to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 14 Nov. 1881, Cayalti'to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 18 Dec.1877, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 28 Aug. I88J , Cayalti to Lima, AFA.

62 AH to AH, 7 April 1876, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.63 In Heraclio Bonilla, 'The War of the Pacific and the National and Colonial Problem in

Peru', Past and Present, no. 81 (Nov. 1978), p. no .


workers,59 and 9 of the 38 harvesters picked less than 100 pounds of cotton a week. 60 By this date, many Chinese workers were old and exhausted from years of plantation labour. Rather than pay competitive wages that might attract younger, more productive workers, the Aspt1lagas and other cotton growers chose to eliminate wage labour in the mid- I 890S in favour of cotton tenantry. This reduced their labour bills, circumvented local labour markets, and transferred much of the risk of production onto the black peasantry.

The transition from contracted to wage labour in the Aspt1lagas' large sugarcane plantation Cayalti followed a somewhat different course. Cayalti's workforce numbered 445 in 1877 (see Table 7) and, despite the end to the coolie trade, the Aspillagas attempted to avoid any significant reduction. They were initially successful at recontracting many of their Chinese workers and at contracting new recruits. To attract new workers, however, they had to advance them the equivalent of half a year's salary, or about 25 paper soles. These workers were required to remain on the estate until their debts had been paid. 61 The Aspillagas also hired several Chinese wage labourers, but did so reluctantly because chinos fibres demanded higher wages. For example, in 1876 a fibre earned 70 silver centavos per day plus meals, or the equivalent of several months' wages for a contracted worker. 62

As noted, during the Chilean invasion large numbers of Chinese fled from plantations into nearby cities and towns where they were mobilised into work gangs by Chinese contractors. An indication of how this was done comes from a representative of the Chinese community in Lima, Cheng Isao J u, who accused ten Chinese contractors of 'kidnapping' between 3,000 and 4,000 Chinese during 188 I and 1882 and bringing them to the plantations. During 1883 and 1884, he claimed, many more Chinese were forced to work on plantations to recover debts owed to contractors. 63

a9 Planilla No.6 3 6 de los pagos del 3 al 9 de abril, 1893, 9 April 1893, Nestor V. Cerdefia; Planilla del pago del recoio de algod6n Egipto de la hacienda Palto a treinta centavos la arroba; Planilla del pago del recoio de algod6n de Metafice de la hacienda Palto a treinta centavos la arroba, AF A.

60 Planilla No.6 3 6 de los pagos del 3 al 9 de abril, 1893, 9 April 1893, Nestor V. Cerdefia; Plan ilia del pago del recoio de algod6n Egipto de la haCIenda Palto a treinta centavos la arroba; Plan ilia del pago del recoio de algodon de Metafice de la haCIenda Palto a treinta centavos la arroba, AF A.

61 RAB to AAB, 24 Dec. 1875, Caya!tfto Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 7 April 1876, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 14 Nov. 1881, Cayaltfto Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 18 Dec. 1877, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 28 Aug. 1885, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.

62 AH to AH, 7 April 1876, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA. 63 In Heraclio Bonilla, 'The War of the Pacific and the National and Colonial Problem in

Peru', Past and Present, no. 81 (Nov. 1978), p. 110.



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Table 7. Composition of the work force at Cayaltt, 1877-82

DateSeptember

1877

October1879

September1881

June1882

Total no.Chinese

424

413

438

407

% totalwork force

95-3

91.6

98.4

91.7

No. contractedChinese

—

375

375

34*

% totalChinese

—

90.8

85.6

84.0

No.libres

—

38

63

65

% totalChinese

—

9.2

14.4

16.0

No.Peruvians

2 1

38

7

37

% totalwork force

4-7

8.4

1.6

8.3

Total no.workers

445

451

445

444

Sources: AH to AH, 11 Sept. 1877, AFA; AH to AH, 14 Oct. 1879, AFA; AH to AH, 27 Sept. 1881, AFA; unsigned letter dated 8 June1882, AFA.

Table 7. Composition of the work force at Ccryalti, 1877-82

Total no. % total No. contracted % total No. % total No. % total Total no. Date Chinese work force Chinese Chinese fibres Chinese Peruvians work force workers

September 424 95-3 21 4·7 445 1877

October 413 91.6 375 90 . 8 38 9. 2 38 8-4 45 1 1879

September 43 8 98-4 375 85.6 63 14·4 7 1.6 445 1881

June 40 7 91.7 342 84. 0 65 16.0 37 8,3 444 1882

Sources: AH to AH, II Sept. 1877, AFA; AH to AH, 14 Oct. 1879, AFA; AH to AH, 27 Sept. 1881, AFA; unsigned letter dated 8 June 1882, AFA.

~ o ~

~ ~ '" ......

<;-.

f l;;-<.,




Table 8. Composition of the workforce at Cayalti, ii8j—po

Date

September188;

March1888

November1890

Sources: AH12 Nov. 1890,

FreeChinese

178

78

56

to AH, 25AFA.

% oftotal

31.6

14.3

1.0

Sept.

Chinesecontracted tocontractors

2 0 2

302

1886, AFA; AH

% oftotal

35.8

39-4

59.0

to AH, 23

Peruvians

184

2 5 2

2 2 4

Mar. 1888,

% oftotal

32.6

46.2

40.0

Totalno. of

workers

564

545

, 6 0

AFA; AH to AH,

Chinese contractors first appeared at Cayalti in 1884. They signedcontracts with the Aspillagas that stipulated working and living conditionsfor their workers and secured substantial benefits for themselves. Workershad to labour io | hours a day for 5 days a week and contractors had topost a bond worth the value of all farm tools issued by the estate. Inreturn, recruiters received two substantial rewards: they were allowed tooperate stores on the plantation, and they received workers' wages. TheAspillagas also agreed to provide ill workers with medical care and toadvance contractors money to find more labourers.64

Such contracts guaranteed the Aspillagas, and other sugar planters,stable work forces during a period of political and social instability.Planters were unconcerned with possible abuses that contractors mightinflict on workers, such as embezzling wages, as long as production levelswere maintained.

As time went on, however, planters grew concerned over fallingworker productivity. This was a reflection of advancing age and the wearand tear of plantation labour. In 1891 the Aspillagas characterised 50% oftheir Chinese workers as 'old and tired men'.65 Only 300 of 420 workersregularly worked and absenteeism became so bad, especially on Mondays,that milling sometimes had to be halted. The following year BaldomeroAspillaga Barrera threatened to shut down contractors' stores unlessabsenteeism rates were reduced. When this failed to bring results, theAspillagas ordered mayordomos to drive the Chinese into the fields withclubs and whips.66

Compounding the problem of absenteeism was the inability of theChinese to do heavy labour. By the end of the decade only the strongest

84 For example, contract dated Oct. 1884, Cayalti Archive, AFA.65 AH to AH, 9 June 1891, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.66 AH to AH, 1 Nov. 1892, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.

Chinese Plantation Workers and Social Conflict in Peru 40j

Date

September 188 5

March 1888

Table 8. Composition of the work force at Cayalti, 188J-90

Chinese Free % of contracted to % of % of

Chinese total contractors total Peruvians total

178 31.6 202 3 j.8 184 32.6

78 14·3 21 5 39·4 25 2 46.2

Total no. of

workers

j 64

545

November 36 1.0 302 59.0 224 40.0 560 1890

SOllms: AH to AH, 25 Sept. 1886, AFA; AH to AH, 23 Mar. 1888, AFA; AH to AH, 12 Nov. 1890, AFA.

Chinese contractors first appeared at Cayalti in 1884. They signed contracts with the Aspillagas that stipulated working and living conditions for their workers and secured substantial benefits for themselves. Workers had to labour IO! hours a day for 5 days a week and contractors had to post a bond worth the value of all farm tools issued by the estate. In return, recruiters received two substantial rewards: they were allowed to operate stores on the plantation, and they received workers' wages. The Aspillagas also agreed to provide ill workers with medical care and to advance contractors money to find more labourers. 64

Such contracts guaranteed the Aspillagas, and other sugar planters, stable work forces during a period of political and social instability. Planters were unconcerned with possible abuses that contractors might inflict on workers, such as embezzling wages, as long as production levels were maintained.

As time went on, however, planters grew concerned over falling worker productivity. This was a reflection of advancing age and the wear and tear of plantation labour. In 189 I the Aspillagas characterised 50% of their Chinese workers as 'old and tired men'. 65 Only 300 of 420 workers regularly worked and absenteeism became so bad, especially on Mondays, that milling sometimes had to be halted. The following year Baldomero Aspillaga Barrera threatened to shut down contractors' stores unless absenteeism rates were reduced. When this failed to bring results, the Aspt1lagas ordered mayordomos to drive the Chinese into the fields with clubs and whips.66

Compounding the problem of absenteeism was the inability of the Chinese to do heavy labour. By the end of the decade only the strongest

64 For example, contract dated Oct. 1884, Cayalti Archive, AF A. 65 AH to AH, 9 June 1891, Cayalti to Lima, AFA. 66 AH to AH, I Nov. 1892, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.




could complete a meagre half (area in the field,67 and the Aspi'llagasbegan to expel the Chinese from Cayalti.68

As the Chinese were driven from Cayaltf and other large sugarcaneplantations they were replaced with Peruvian wage labourers recruitedfrom the highlands.69 As in the case of Palto, the Aspi'llagas found itimpossible to dominate coastal labour markets, despite Cayaltfs huge sizeand the family's considerable political clout. Local peasants may havelost their land and economic independence but they still resisted totaldomination by individual plantations. Instead, they attempted to sell theirlabour to the highest bidder and to avoid the trap of debt peonage. In thisfashion they maintained a degree of physical and economic freedom andfrustrated local planters, as seen in this letter from the Aspi'llagas writtenin 1889:

Those from the coast, or %ambos, are scarce. The Saneros, if you could round upone hundred or so of them, could not be acclimatised in any manner whatsoever,because the majority of them are lazy men who go around looking for a newpatron every week, that is to say looking for where they can do less. At present,with the rice harvest, the work force on the large [sugar] estates alwaysdiminishes because of the attraction that this work has for them, but happily thisis already passing.70

Planter Control and Worker Resistance

The system of social control imposed on Chinese workers by plantersconstituted an essential element of the system of production. The abilityof planters to use extra-economic methods of coercion, such as corporalpunishment, debt peonage, and drugs, helps to explain their success atretaining Chinese workers after the abolition of indentured servitude. Itis, however, also important to recognise that the Chinese resistedlimitations on their freedom and mobility. Forms of resistance resemblethose found on plantations during the period of African slavery, andinclude non-violent tactics, such as avoiding work by feigning illness,stealing from planters, and running away, as well as violent tactics, suchas suicide, murder and rebellion. Such behaviour cut into planters' profitsand hastened the transition of Peruvian wage labour and tenantry.67 A H to A H , 12 O c t . 1889, Cayaltf t o L ima , A F A ; A H to A H , 15 Feb . 1890, CayaltY t o

Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 7 June 1893, Cayalti'to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 11 Nov. 1897,Cayalti to Lima, AFA.

68 AH to AH, 16 Nov. 1895, Cayalti'to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 8 March 1897, Cayalti'toLima, AFA; AH to AH, 24 Jan. 1899, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.

68 Michael J. Gonzales, 'Capitalist Agriculture and Labour Contracting in NorthernPeru, 1880-190;', Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 12, part 11 (Nov. 1980),pp. 291-315.

70 AH to AH, 5 June 1899, Cayalti' to Lima, AFA.


could complete a meagre half tarea in the field,67 and the Aspfllagas began to expel the Chinese from Cayalti. 68

As the Chinese were driven from Cayaltf and other large sugarcane plantations they were replaced with Peruvian wage labourers recruited from the highlands. 69 As in the case of Palco, the Aspillagas found it impossible to dominate coastal labour markets, despite Cayaltf's huge size and the family's considerable political clout. Local peasants may have lost their land and economic independence but they still resisted total domination by individual plantations. Instead, they attempted to sell their labour to the highest bidder and to avoid the trap of debt peonage. In this fashion they maintained a degree of physical and economic freedom and frustrated local planters, as seen in this letter from the Aspfllagas written in 1889:

Those from the coast, or zambos, are scarce. The Sat'ieros, if you could round up one hundred or so of them, could not be acclimatised in any manner whatsocvcr,

because the majority of them are lazy men who go around looking for a new patron every week, that is to say looking for where they can do less. At present, with the rice harvest, the work force on the large [sugar] estates always diminishes because of the attraction that this work has for them, but happily this is already passing. 70

Planter Control and Worker Resistance

The system of social control imposed on Chinese workers by planters constituted an essential element of the system of production. The ability of planters to use extra-economic methods of coercion, such as corporal punishment, debt peonage, and drugs, helps to explain their success at retaining Chinese workers after the abolition of indentured servitude. It is, however, also important to recognise that the Chinese resisted limitations on their freedom and mobility. Forms of resistance resemble those found on plantations during the period of African slavery, and include non-violent tactics, such as avoiding work by feigning illness, stealing from planters, and running away, as well as violent tactics, such as suicide, murder and rebellion. Such behaviour cut into planters' profits and hastened the transition of Peruvian wage labour and tenantry.

67 AH to AH, 12 Oct. 1889, Cayaltt to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 15 Feb. 1890, Cayaltt to

Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 7 June 1893, Cayaltfto Lima, AFA; AH to AH, II Nov. 1897, Cayaltt to Lima, AF A.

68 AH to AH, 16 Nov. 1895, Cayaltt to Lima, AFA; AH to AI-!, 8 March 1897, Cayaltt to

Lima, AFA; AI-! to AI-!, 24 Jan. 1899, Cayaltt to LIma, AFA. 69 Michael J. Gonzales, 'Capitalist Agriculture and Labour Contracting in Northern

Peru, 1880-1905', Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 12, part II (Nov. 1980),

PP·29 1-3 1 5· 70 AH to AH, 5 June 1899, Cayaltt to Lima, AFA.




Standard equipment on Peruvian plantations in the 1870s and 1880sincluded jails, shackles, stocks, chains, bullwhips, clubs, and firearms.These instruments were regularly used by planters and mayordomos toinflict punishment for offences and as symbols of repression and authority.The Peruvian state allowed planters to administer corporal punishment ontheir estates and seemingly took no interest in the civil and human rightsof the Chinese, except superficially during the visit of the ChineseCommission. It should also be stressed that this was a period of politicaland social chaos when public authority was especially unreliable andsometimes non-existent. Under these circumstances, planters gained evengreater control over workers.

The Chinese were routinely punished for offences that threatened theestablished social hierarchy and system of production. Such transgressionsincluded insolent behaviour (e.g. talking back or questioning a workassignment), faking illness, running away, fighting, theft and murder. Onthe south-central coast there also existed considerable animosity betweenthe Chinese and black communities. Both groups were marginalisedmembers of coastal society who competed for jobs in agriculture andtrade. Moreover, blacks sometimes worked as foremen on estates andgained the reputation of being harsh taskmasters. Violent confrontationsbetween Chinese and blacks periodically erupted on plantations and causedgrave concern among planters.

The Chinese Commission found several Chinese working in shackles onthe plantations Tulape, Huayto, Barraza, Pampa, Facala, Chongos andLaredo. In some cases, the chains had been removed shortly before theCommission arrived, but this ruse did not prevent workers fromcomplaining to Commissioners. Most of these estates were large sugarcaneplantations and many of them were located in the Chicama Valley, wherelabour conditions were especially oppressive at that time. Many shackledworkers were being punished for running away and some planters werereluctant to free them for fear that they would immediately escape. On theplantation Chongos, owned by Juan Jose Pinillos, workers complainedthat they were chained for the slightest offence, and the Commissionfound one Chinese who had been shackled and imprisoned for sixmonths.71

Shackled workers were freed by the Commission but they may havebeen reshackled as soon as the Commissioners departed. This problem isunderscored by the reluctance of local officials to challenge planters, whosometimes occupied local offices themselves. For example, the owner of


Chi1lese Plalltatioll [Porkers alld Social COllflict ill Peril 407

Standard equipment on Peruvian plantations in the 1870S and 1880s included jails, shackles, stocks, chains, bullwhips, clubs, and firearms. These instruments were regularly used by planters and mayordomos to inflict punishment for offences and as symbols of repression and authority. The Peruvian state allowed planters to administer corporal punishment on their estates and seemingly took no interest in the civil and human rights of the Chinese, except superficially during the visit of the Chinese Commission. It should also be stressed that this was a period of political and social chaos when public authority was especially unreliable and sometimes non-existent. Under these circumstances, planters gained even greater control over workers.

The Chinese were routinely punished for offences that threatened the established social hierarchy and system of production. Such transgressions included insolent behaviour (e.g. talking back or questioning a work assignment), faking illness, running away, fighting, theft and murder. On the south-central coast there also existed considerable animosity between the Chinese and black communities. Both groups were marginalised members of coastal society who competed for jobs in agriculture and trade. Moreover, blacks sometimes worked as foremen on estates and gained the reputation of being harsh taskmasters. Violent confrontations between Chinese and blacks periodically erupted on plantations and caused grave concern among planters.

The Chinese Commission found several Chinese working in shackles on the plantations Tulape, Huayto, Barraza, Pampa, Facahi, Chongos and Laredo. In some cases, the chains had been removed shortly before the Commission arrived, but this ruse did not prevent workers from complaining to Commissioners. Most of these estates were large sugarcane plantations and many of them were located in the Chicama Valley, where labour conditions were especially oppressive at that time. Many shackled workers were being punished for running away and some planters were reluctant to free them for fear that they would immediately escape. On the plantation Chongos, owned by Juan Jose Pinillos, workers complained that they were chained for the slightest offence, and the Commission found one Chinese who had been shackled and imprisoned for six months. 71

Shackled workers were freed by the Commission but they may have been reshackled as soon as the Commissioners departed. This problem is underscored by the reluctance of local officials to challenge planters, who sometimes occupied local offices themselves. For example, the owner of




40 8 Michael J. Gonâles

Huayto, Octavio Canevaro, doubled as Comisario Rural. Canevaroexplained that he had not shackled his workers in his capacity as 'patron'but in his capacity as a public official. When the Commission refused toaccept this explanation, Canevaro simply said that he would not do itagain.72

During this period workers were routinely shackled at Palto for unrulybehaviour or running away. Frequently, offending Chinese were firstplaced in stocks and then forced to work in chains. On one occasion ashackled worker named Silvestre managed to escape while chained, butwas captured not far from the estate.73

Jails were also typically found on coastal estates. At Palto, Chinese wereimprisoned for malingering, talking back, or minor crimes, while atCayalti jailing more commonly occurred for mistakes on the job.74 EmilioEscobar y Bedoya, the head of the Chinese Commission and a planterhimself, referred to prisons as an 'old custom' on Peruvian estates thatcould not be abolished until better disciplined workers were found.75 Hisattitude helps to explain why the Commission had so little long-termimpact on working and living conditions on plantations. In fact, jailsremained fixtures on coastal estates long after the Chinese Commissionhad been disbanded. In 1893, officials discovered an extreme case ofworker abuse on the La Vinita estate in the Chicama Valley. The owner,Jesus Garcia y Garcia, had imprisoned one Chinese for fifteen years andthree others for nine years. Garcia argued he was free to discipline his ownworkers and he would not release them from jail. Formal charges werebrought against him, but the outcome of the case is unknown.76

In addition to putting workers in jails or chains, planters subjectedthem to whippings and beatings. In 1877 the Aspillagas instructed theiradministrator at Palto to whip workers for 'grave cases', such as 'lack of

72 Ibid.73 Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 1 Nov. 1878, Palto to Lima, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to

AH, 9 Aug. 1878, Palto to Lima, AFA; Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 30 Oct. 1877,Palto to Cayalti, AFA; E. Augusto to Geraldo Perez, 12 March 1876, Palto to Cayalti,AFA; Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 21 July 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA; Jose Perezy Albela to AH, 11 Oct. 1878, Palto to Lima, AFA.

74 Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 11 April 1879, P a ' t o t o Lima, AFA; Francisco PerezCespedes to AH, 30 Oct. 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 9 July1878, Palto to Lima, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 16 July 1878, Palto to Lima,AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 28 March 1879, Palto to Lima, AFA; AH to AH,19 Nov. 1878, Cayalti'to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 25 Nov. 1878, Cayalti to Lima, AFA;AH to AH, 10 Oct. 1888. Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 7 Nov. 1888, Cayalti toLima, AFA.

78 Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N.76 Informe, Chinese consul Ten Ayan, subprefect of Trujillo Lizardo Lavalle, interpreter

P. A. Ponky, Biblioteca Nacional; Jesus Garci'a y Garcia to el ministro de gobierno, 21Aug. 1893, Biblioteca Nacional.


Huayto, Octavio Canevaro, doubled as Comisario Rural. Canevaro explained that he had not shackled his workers in his capacity as 'patron' but in his capacity as a public official. When the Commission refused to accept this explanation, Canevaro simply said that he would not do it again. 72

During this period workers were routinely shackled at Palto for unruly behaviour or running away. Frequently, offending Chinese were first placed in stocks and then forced to work in chains. On one occasion a shackled worker named Silvestre managed to escape while chained, but was captured not far from the estate. 73

Jails were also typically found on coastal estates. At Palto, Chinese were imprisoned for malingering, talking back, or minor crimes, while at Cayalti jailing more commonly occurred for mistakes on the job. 74 Emilio Escobar y Bedoya, the head of the Chinese Commission and a planter himself, referred to prisons as an 'old custom' on Peruvian estates that could not be abolished until better disciplined workers were found. 75 His attitude helps to explain why the Commission had so little long-term impact on working and living conditions on plantations. In fact, jails remained fixtures on coastal estates long after the Chinese Commission had been disbanded. In 1893, officials discovered an extreme case of worker abuse on the La Vinita estate in the Chicama Valley. The owner, Jesus Garda y Garda, had imprisoned one Chinese for fifteen years and three others for nine years. Garda argued he was free to discipline his own workers and he would not release them from jail. Formal charges were brought against him, but the outcome of the case is unknown. 76

In addition to putting workers in jails or chains, planters subjected them to whippings and beatings. In 1877 the Aspillagas instructed their administrator at Palto to whip workers for' grave cases', such as 'lack of

72 Ibid. 73 Jose Perez y Albela to AH, I Nov. 1878, Palto to Lima, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to

AH, 9 Aug. 1878, Palto to Lima, AFA; Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 30 Oct. 1877, Palto to Cayaltf, AFA; E. Augusto to Geraldo Perez, 12 March 1876, Palto to Cayaltf, AFA; Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 21 July 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to AH, II Oct. 1878, Palto to Lima, AF A.

74 Jose Perez y Albela to AH, II April 1879, Palto to Lima, AFA; Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 30 Oct. 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 9 July 1878, Palto to Lima, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 16 July 1878, Palto to Lima, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 28 March 1879, Palto to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 19 Nov. 1878, Cayaltfto Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 25 Nov. 1878, Cayaltfto Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 10 Oct. 1888. Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 7 Nov. 1888, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA.

75 Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N. 76 Informe, Chinese consul Ten Ayan, subprefect of Trujillo Lizardo Lavalle, interpreter

P. A. Ponky, Biblioteca Nacional; Jesus Garda y Garda to el ministro de gobierno, 21 Aug. 1893, Biblioteca Nacional.




respect', 'running away', or 'fighting'.77 For running away, the Chinesewere warned that they could receive 100 lashes.78 At Cayalti", the Chinesewere routinely lashed or beaten for failure to work, running away, orserious crimes. Once the Aspillagas ordered a suspected murderer lashed150 times, a beating that could have resulted in his death.79

The Aspillagas were not the only planters to use the lash. On the estateJaguey owned by Luis Albrecht, the Chinese Commission wasapproached by a worker named Lanquen who had been 'atrociously'whipped and horribly scarred. The commissioners were appalled and gotthe estate manager to indemnify Lanquen 40 paper soles and to release himfrom the estate. On the estate Huayto owned by Octavio Canevaro, theCommission also discovered a case of mutilation. The estate doctor hadsliced off the ear of a Chinese for reasons of 'personal vengeance'.Canevaro, who earlier had punished several Chinese in his capacity asRural Commissioner, had not disciplined the doctor. The latter fled theestate when the Commissioners arrived and his case was left in the handsof the subprefect.80.

Violence sometimes erupted among the Chinese themselves. This is notsurprising considering their difficult living and working conditions. Afterwork was completed, the Chinese were locked into dormitories {galpones)similar to those used to shelter black slaves. In galpones, the Chinesegambled, smoked opium, and some of them engaged in homosexualactivities. Contractors also ran stores in the dormitories and sold food,liquor, and drugs on credit. They also lent money.81

In December 1879 a Chinese foreman at Palto named Achan wasmurdered in a galpon. The estate administrator, Perez, was alerted of thecrime and went to investigate. No one co-operated with him, but he soondiscovered the badly mutilated body. He left the dormitory and returnedwith a revolver and several staff members. A roll call determined that twoChinese, Elias and Finloy, were missing and search parties were organisedto capture them.82

The Aspillagas were especially concerned with determining the cause ofthe murder. They assumed that it was related to personal animosities77 'Orden interior de la Hacienda de Palto', 12 March 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA. Fragment

of document.78 AAB to A H , 30 April 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA. For examples of whippings at Palto,

see: E. Augus to to A H , 7 March 1876, Palto to Lima, A F A ; Francisco Perez Cespedesto A H , 19 June 1877, Palto to Lima, A F A ; Jose Perez y Albela to A H , 11 Oct. 1878,Palto to Lima, AFA.

79 AH to A H , 31 July 1877, Cayalti to Lima, A F A ; A H to A H , 11 Nov. 1892, Cayalti 'toLima, AFA.

80 Chinese Commission Report , 1887, B.N.81 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, pp. 97—103.82 Jose Perez y Albela to A H , 12 Dec. 1879, Palto to Lima, AFA.

Chinese Plantation Workers and Social COllfllCt ill Pert! 409

respect', 'running away', or 'fighting'.77 For running away, the Chinese were warned that they could receive 100 lashes. 78 At Cayalti, the Chinese were routinely lashed or beaten for failure to work, running away, or serious crimes. Once the Aspillagas ordered a suspected murderer lashed 150 times, a beating that could have resulted in his death. 79

The Aspillagas were not the only planters to use the lash. On the estate Jaguey owned by Luis Albrecht, the Chinese Commission was approached by a worker named Lanquen who had been 'atrociously' whipped and horribly scarred. The commissioners were appalled and got the estate manager to indemnify Lanquen 40 paper soles and to release him from the estate. On the estate Huayto owned by Octavio Canevaro, the Commission also discovered a case of mutilation. The estate doctor had sliced off the ear of a Chinese for reasons of 'personal vengeance'. Canevaro, who earlier had punished several Chinese in his capacity as Rural Commissioner, had not disciplined the doctor. The latter fled the estate when the Commissioners arrived and his case was left in the hands of the subprefect. 80.

Violence sometimes erupted among the Chinese themselves. This is not surprising considering their difficult living and working conditions. After work was completed, the Chinese were locked into dormitories (galpones) similar to those used to shelter black slaves. In ga/pones, the Chinese gambled, smoked opium, and some of them engaged in homosexual activities. Contractors also ran stores in the dormitories and sold food, liquor, and drugs on credit. They also lent money.81

In December 1879 a Chinese foreman at Palto named Achan was murdered in a galpon. The estate administrator, Perez, was alerted of the crime and went to investigate. No one co-operated with him, but he soon discovered the badly mutilated body. He left the dormitory and returned with a revolver and several staff members. A roll call determined that two Chinese, Elias and Finloy, were missing and search parties were organised to capture them.82

The Aspillagas were especially concerned with determining the cause of the murder. They assumed that it was related to personal animosities

77 'Orden interior de la Hacienda de Palto', 12 March 1877, Palto to Lima, AF A. Fragment of document.

78 AAB to AH, 30 Aprtl 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA. For examples of whippings at Palto, see: E. Augusto to AH, 7 March 1876, Palto to Lima, AF A; Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 19 June 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to AH, II Oct. 1878, Palto to Lima, AF A.

79 AH to AH, 31 July 1877, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, II Nov. 1892, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA.

80 Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N. 81 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, pp. 97-103.

82 Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 12 Dec. 1879, Palto to Lima, AFA.



41 o Michael J. Gonâks

arising from gambling or homosexual activities, but they also feared thatit arose from worker abuse. Excessive abuse could lead to further violenceand disrupt production. They instructed Perez to question the suspectsand then to deliver them to public authorities.83

When Eli'as and Finloy were captured they were severely beaten,tortured with knives, chained and thrown into the estate jail. They'confessed' to the manager that they had been paid S./200 by fellowworkers to murder the hated foreman, and they named nine Chinesewho had contributed to their fee. Perez refused to believe that there wasany motive for the murder beyond moral depravity,84 but Chineseon Manrique revealed that Achan was murdered because he forcedworkers to buy goods from him and because he harassed them in theirwork.85

In the end, public authorities allowed the Aspi'llagas to decide Hh'as'sand Finloy's fates. They chose to have them whipped, chained and jailed.After their release, they would be forced to do difficult and unpleasantwork while shackled. The Aspi'llagas preferred this to a public trial, whichmight be embarrassing, and to private execution, which seemed justifiedbut harsh.8* This way Eli'as and Finloy would also continue to producecotton without remuneration, presumably for the rest of their lives.Interestingly, Perez also confiscated three horses owned by the two killers.This further benefited the estate and also shows that Eli'as and Finloy werebetter off than the average worker and may have engaged in petty tradein competition with the murdered foreman.87

Several murders also occurred on the Aspi'llagas' sugarcane plantationCayalti. In 1876 a Chinese worker nearly decapitated a Chinese foremanafter his work assignment had been increased. Antero Aspi'llaga Barrera,who was on the estate at the time, ordered mayordomos to capture andexecute the man immediately. He explained that 'there is no otherrecourse so that he might serve as an example to these maliciouslabourers'.88 The Aspi'llagas described the foreman as a 'good and loyalservant' and were convinced that the murderer had acted alone.89 Aftereighteen days the man was captured and experienced the Aspi'llagas'private system of justice:

83 A H to Jose Perez y Albela, 10 Dec. 1879, Lima to Palto, A F A .84 Jose Perez y Albela to A H , 19 Dec. 1879, Pal to to Lima, A F A .85 A H to Jose Perez y Albela, 25 Dec . 1879, Lima to Pal to, A F A .86 A H to Jose Perez y Albela, 15 D e c . 1879, L ima to Pa l to , A F A .87 J o s e Perez y Albela, to A H , 19 D e c . 1879, Pa l to to Lima, A F A .88 A H to A H , 14 A u g . 1876, Cayalti to Lima, A F A .89 A H to A H , 18 A u g . 1876, Cayalti to Lima, A F A .


arising from gambling or homosexual activities, but they also feared that it arose from worker abuse. Excessive abuse could lead to further violence and disrupt production. They instructed Perez to question the suspects and then to deliver them to public authorities. 83

When Elias and Finlay were captured they were severely beaten, tortured with knives, chained and thrown into the estate jail. They 'confessed' to the manager that they had been paid S./200 by fellow workers to murder the hated foreman, and they named nine Chinese who had contributed to their fee. Perez refused to believe that there was any motive for the murder beyond moral depravity, 84 but Chinese on Manrique revealed that Achan was murdered because he forced workers to buy goods from him and because he harassed them in their work. 85

In the end, public authorities allowed the Aspillagas to decide Elias's and Finloy's fates. They chose to have them whipped, chained and jailed. After their release, they would be forced to do difficult and unpleasant work while shackled. The Aspillagas preferred this to a public trial, which might be embarrassing, and to private execution, which seemed justified but harsh. 86 This way Elias and Finloy would also continue to produce cotton without remuneration, presumably for the rest of their lives. Interestingly, Perez also confiscated three horses owned by the two killers. This further benefited the estate and also shows that Elias and Finloy were better off than the average worker and may have engaged in petty trade in competition with the murdered foreman. 87

Several murders also occurred on the Aspillagas' sugarcane plantation Cayalti. In 1876 a Chinese worker nearly decapitated a Chinese foreman after his work assignment had been increased. Antero Aspillaga Barrera, who was on the estate at the time, ordered mayordomos to capture and execute the man immediately. He explained that 'there is no other recourse so that he might serve as an example to these malicious labourers '.88 The Aspillagas described the foreman as a 'good and loyal servant' and were convinced that the murderer had acted alone. 8

!l After eighteen days the man was captured and experienced the Aspillagas' private system of justice:

83 AH to Jose Perez y Albela, 10 Dec. 1879, Lima to Palto, AFA. 84 Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 19 Dec. 1879, Palto to Lima, AFA. 85 AH to Jose Perez y Albela, Z) Dec. 1879, Lima to Palto, AFA. 86 AH to Jose Perez y Albela, 15 Dec. 1879, Lima to Palto, AFA. 87 Jose Perez y Albela, to AH, 19 Dec. 1879, Palto to Lima, AFA. 88 AH to AH, 14 Aug. 1876, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA. 89 AH to AH, 18 Aug. 1876, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA.




The assassin Aijin rests in peace in the same site where Aun [the foreman] isburied. Thanks to God that the malicious person did not escape but, almost ina providential manner, was apprehended. We are closely watching things and wehave in custody the Chinese who gave shelter to the assassin, the muleteer Alan.90

A year later, quarrelling between two Chinese workers over a debtresulted in murder. The creditor had earlier beaten the debtor and thelatter retaliated by clubbing the lender to death. The murderer fled fromthe estate but was quickly captured by mayordomos. This time, theAspfllagas ordered that the man receive 150 lashes, instead of being shot.The milder punishment can be attributed to the difference in the victims'status within the plantation hierarchy.91

There were at least five additional murders on Cayalti involvingChinese, including one where the victim was a Peruvian. Details arelacking about these cases, however one victim was a visiting Chinesemerchant and the murdered Peruvian had lent money to his killer. Oneinteresting development was that in 1888 the Aspillagas began turningaccused murderers over to public officials rather than punishing them onCayalti'.92 This did not occur as a result of a re-evaluation of their moraland legal responsibilities. Rather, it reflects the growing political stabilityof Peru and the possibility that news of a private execution might causea scandal and damage the rising political career of Antero Aspi'llagaBarrera, who was then a cabinet minister.93

Corporal punishment and imprisonment were the most visible methodsof social control on coastal plantations. However, planters also controlledChinese workers through the use of opium. The British cultivated opiumpoppies on plantations in India and supplied huge quantities of the drugto China.94 British merchants, who had strong commercial ties with SouthAmerica, soon realised that the opium market could be expanded toinclude Chinese in Peru.95

The Peruvian government established an official monopoly over opium

00 AH to AH, 1 Sept. 1876, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.01 AH to AH, 31 July 1877, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.92 AH to AH, 2 July 1886, Cayalti' to Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 12 Nov. 1888,

Cayalti'to Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 12 Nov. 1875, Cayalti'to Lima, AFA; AH to AH,7 Nov. 1888, Cayalti'to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 20 Dec. 1888, Cayalti to Lima, AFA;AH to AH, 1 Nov. 1892, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 21 Aug. 1895, Cayalti toLima, AFA.

03 G o n z a l e s , Plantation Agriculture, p p . 32—3.94 Jonathan Spence, 'Opium Smoking in Ch'ing China', in Frederick Wakeman, Jr. and

Caroline Grant (eds.), Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China (Berkeley & LosAnge les , 1975).

9 5 A c c o r d i n g to Pab lo Macera , be tween 1852 and 1879, 7^7. 4 0 1 P o u n d s of o p i u m were

sold to Peru by Britain. See Macera , has plantaciones aûcareras, p . cxviii .


The assassin Aijin rests in peace in the same site where Aun [the foremanl is buried. Thanks to God that the malicious person did not escape but, almost in a providential manner, was apprehended. We are closely watching things and we have in custody the Chinese who gave shelter to the assassin, the muleteer Alan. 90

A year later, quarrelling between two Chinese workers over a debt resulted in murder. The creditor had earlier beaten the debtor and the latter retaliated by clubbing the lender to death. The murderer fled from the estate but was quickly captured by mayordomos. This time, the Aspillagas ordered that the man receive 150 lashes, instead of being shot. The milder punishment can be attributed to the difference in the victims' status within the plantation hierarchy.91

There were at least five additional murders on Cayalti involving Chinese, including one where the victim was a Peruvian. Details are lacking about these cases, however one victim was a visiting Chinese merchant and the murdered Peruvian had lent money to his killer. One interesting development was that in 1888 the Aspillagas began turning accused murderers over to public officials rather than punishing them on Cayaltf. 92 This did not occur as a result of a re-evaluation of their moral and legal responsibilities. Rather, it reflects the growing political stability of Peru and the possibility that news of a private execution might cause a scandal and damage the rising political career of Antero Aspillaga Barrera, who was then a cabinet minister. 93

Corporal punishment and imprisonment were the most visible methods of social control on coastal plantations. However, planters also controlled Chinese workers through the use of opium. The British cultivated opium poppies on plantations in India and supplied huge quantities of the drug to China. 94 British merchants, who had strong commercial ties with South America, soon realised that the opium market could be expanded to include Chinese in Peru. 95

The Peruvian government established an official monopoly over opium

90 AH to AH, I Sept. 1876, Cayalti to Lima, AFA. 91 AH to AH, 31 July 1877, Cayalti to Lima, AFA. 92 AH to AH, 2 July 1886, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 12 Nov. 1888,

Cayaltito Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 12 Nov. 1875, Cayaltito Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 7 Nov. 1888, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 20 Dec. 1888, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, I Nov. 1892, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 2 I Aug. 1895, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.

93 Gonzales, Plan/a/ion AgriCliI/llre, pp. }2-}'

9~ Jonathan Spence, 'Opium Smoking in Ch'ing China', in Frederick Wakeman, Jr. and Caroline Grant (eds.), Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China (Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1975).

95 According to Pablo Macera, between ISp and IS79, 767,401 pounds of opium were sold to Peru by Britain. See Macera, Las planlaciones azucareras, p. cxviii.




imports and sales. Merchants supplied public bids to the Minister of Tradeand Commerce who accepted the most attractive offer. The amount ofopium imported was limited to 50,000 kilograms, which was sold toretailers at 10% profit. Retailers were licensed by the government, andthey were required to keep an accurate accounting of sales. Most retailerswere planters or Chinese merchants. The Aspi'llagas, for example, werethe retailers for Cayalti'. Interestingly, in the late 1880s the Minister ofTrade and Commerce was none other than Antero Aspillaga Barrera. Inaddition to official imports, there was also a lively contraband trade inopium.08

The Aspi'llagas sold between 100 and 150 pounds of opium a month atCayalti which represented a profit of 200—400 silver soles.97 The price ofan ounce of opium at Cayalti rose from 70 to 80 silver centavos in the1870s to S./1.20-S./1.70 silver soles in the 1880s, and then fell slightly toaround S./1.00 silver in the early 1890s.98 I have already published adetailed calculation showing that Chinese labourers at Cayalti could nothave paid for opium with their * meagre wages." Instead, they had toborrow money from either planters or contractors to maintain theirhabits, and their indebtedness bound them to the estate. This was, ofcourse, a considerable bonus to the Aspi'llagas during a period of labourshortages.

It is likely that opium served a similar function on other coastal estates.At Palto administrators also used the drug to reward and punish addictedworkers. For example, on several occasions managers threatened towithhold distribution of opium unless the Chinese completed their (areas.Thus, planters helped turn these men into drug addicts and thencontrolled them through supplying or denying them drugs.100 It is,however, ironic that planters did not see the correlation between opiumconsumption and falling worker productivity and absenteeism, whichwere major preoccupations. It seems likely that planters were primarily96 ' E s t a n c o del o p i o ' , El Comercio, 10 J a n . 1888 ; El Comercio, 11 F e b . 1888 ; El Peruano,

27 Sept. 1877; AH to AH, 19 May 1891, Cayalti' to Lima, AFA.97 AH to AH, 1 May 1885, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 12 May 1891, Cayalti to

Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 18 April 1876, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 24 April1876, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 8 May 1876, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH toAH, 11 March 1879, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 3 Nov. 1891, Cayalti' to Lima,AFA.

08 AH to AH, 7 April 1876, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 18 April 1876, Cayalti toLima, AFA; AH to AH, 8 May 1876, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 11 March1879, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 28 Oct. 1879, Cayalti' to Lima, AFA; AH toAH, 13 Jan. 1880, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 21 July, 1891, Cayalti to Lima,AFA; AH to AH, 11 April 1893, Cayalti' to Lima, AFA.

99 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, pp. 102-3.100 Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 4 April 1879, P a ' t 0 t 0 Lima, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela

to AH, 21 March 1879, P a l t o t 0 Lima, AFA.


imports and sales. Merchants supplied public bids to the Minister of Trade and Commerce who accepted the most attractive offer. The amount of opium imported was limited to 50,000 kilograms, which was sold to retailers at 10 % profit. Retailers were licensed by the government, and they were required to keep an accurate accounting of sales. Most retailers were planters or Chinese merchants. The Aspillagas, for example, were the retailers for Cayalti. Interestingly, in the late 1880s the Minister of Trade and Commerce was none other than Antero Aspillaga Barrera. In addition to official imports, there was also a lively contraband trade in opium. 96

The Aspillagas sold between 100 and 150 pounds of opium a month at Cayalti which represented a profit of 200-400 silver soles. 97 The price of an ounce of opium at Cayalti rose from 70 to 80 silver centavos in the I 870s to S.I 1.20-S'; I. 70 silver soles in the I 880s, and then fell slightly to around S.I I .00 silver in the early I 890s. 98 I have already published a detailed calculation showing that Chinese labourers at Cayalti could not have paid for opium with their' meagre wages. 99 Instead, they had to borrow money from either planters or contractors to maintain their habits, and their indebtedness bound them to the estate. This was, of course, a considerable bonus to the Aspillagas during a period of labour shortages.

It is likely that opium served a similar function on other coastal estates. At Palto administrators also used the drug to reward and punish addicted workers. For example, on several occasions managers threatened to withhold distribution of opium unless the Chinese completed their tareas.

Thus, planters helped turn these men into drug addicts and then controlled them through supplying or denying them drugs. IOO It is, however, ironic that planters did not see the correlation between opium consumption and falling worker productivity and absenteeism, which were major preoccupations. It seems likely that planters were primarily

96 'Estanco del opio', EI Co-"'ercio, 10 Jan. 1888; EI Comercio, 27 Feb. 1888; EI Peruano, 27 Sept. 1877; AH to AH, 19 May 1891, Cayaltt to Lima, AFA.

97 AH to AH, I May 188j, Cayaltt to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 12 May 1891, Cayaltt to

Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 18 April 1876, Cayaltt to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 24 April 1876, Cayaltt to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 8 May 1876, Cayaltt to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, II March 1879, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 3 Nov. 1891, Cayaltt to Lima, AFA.

98 AH to AH, 7 April 1876, Cayaltt to Lima, AF A; AH to AH, 18 April 1876, Cayaltt to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 8 May 1876, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, II March 1879, Cayaltt to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 28 Oct. 1879, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to

AH, 13 Jan. 1880, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 21 July, 1891, Cayaltt to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, II April 1893, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.

99 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, pp. 102-3. 100 Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 4 April 1879, Palto to Lima, AF A; Jose Perez y Albela

to AH, 2 I March 1879, Palto to Lima, AF A.




concerned with having workers securely bound to estates, regardless oftheir physical condition.

Resistance

Considering the harshness of planters' methods of control, it seemsunlikely that the Chinese could have mounted an effective resistance tototal domination. However, the Chinese did resist and their defiancecontributed to falling production and to the transition to alternativeforms of labour.

Chinese resistance was more effective at Palto than at Cayalti and thismay suggest a pattern for similarly structured estates. Cayalti was a bigsugarcane plantation that was efficiently managed by a large staff led byone of the estate owners.101 Moreover, by the 1880s the responsibility forcontrolling Chinese workers was shared by Chinese labour contractors,who supplied the majority of workers. These characteristics were sharedby other large sugarcane plantations.102 Palto, by contrast, was a medium-sized cotton estate. It was almost never managed by the owners, and hiredadministrators were less effective at social contact. A majority of Palto'sworkers were also non-contracted, which gave them more mobility.

Resistance took many forms. The most desperate act was suicide,usually by ingesting large amounts of opium. There were six recordedsuicides at Cayalti during the 1870s, and it seems likely that there weremore.103 In a setting where drug addiction and physical exhaustion werecommonplace many Chinese may have contemplated taking their lives.We know that the 'final straw' came for one man after a whipping andfor another because of his debts.104 Suicides also occurred among Chineseon sugar estates in the Pativilca Valley105 and on the guano islands. Livingand working on huge mounds of bird manure was especially conducive tosuicide as, over a two-year period, 60 Chinese took their lives out of aworkforce of approximately 500.106 High as these figures for Peru were,however, Juan Perez de la Riva claims that the frequency of suicide among

101 G o n z a l e s , Plantation Agriculture, ch . 4.102 Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N.103 A H to A H , 8 May 1876, Cayalti t o L ima , A F A ; A H to A H , 12 May 1876, Cayalti t o

Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 18 July 1876, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 4 Jan.1876, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 25 Jan. 1876, Cayalti'to Lima, AFA; AHto AH, 4 June 1878, Cayalti to Lima, AFA. This was also the most common way forChinese to commit suicide in Cuba: Juan Perez de la Riva, El barracon: Esclavitudycapitalismo en Cuba (Barcelona, 1975), p. 70.

104 A H to A H , 8 May 1876, Cayalti t o Lima, A F A ; R A B to A A B , 4 Jan . 1876, Cayaltito Lima, A F A .

105 H u m b e r t o R o d r i g u e z Pas tor , La Rebelidn de los Rostros Pintados ( H u a n c a y o , Peru ,

•979). P- 34-106 M e n d e z , ' L a o t r a h i s t o r i a ' , p p . 13, 45 .

Chinese Plantation Workers and Social Conflict in Peru 4 i3

concerned with having workers securely bound to estates, regardless of their physical condition.

Resistance

Considering the harshness of planters' methods of control, it seems unlikely that the Chinese could have mounted an effective resistance to total domination. However, the Chinese did resist and their defiance contributed to falling production and to the transition to alternative forms of labour.

Chinese resistance was more effective at Palto than at Cayaltf and this may suggest a pattern for similarly structured estates. Cayaltf was a big sugarcane plantation that was efficiently managed by a large staff led by one of the estate owners. IOI Moreover, by the I 880s the responsibility for controlling Chinese workers was shared by Chinese labour contractors, who supplied the majority of workers. These characteristics were shared by other large sugarcane plantations. 102 Palto, by contrast, was a mediumsized cotton estate. It was almost never managed by the owners, and hired administrators were less effective at social contact. A majority of Palto's workers were also non-contracted, which gave them more mobility.

Resistance took many forms. The most desperate act was suicide, usually by ingesting large amounts of opium. There were six recorded suicides at Cayaltf during the 1870S, and it seems likely that there were more. 103 In a setting where drug addiction and physical exhaustion were commonplace many Chinese may have contemplated taking their lives. We know that the' final straw' came for one man after a whipping and for another because of his debts. l04 Suicides also occurred among Chinese on sugar estates in the Pativilca Valleyl05 and on the guano islands. Living and working on huge mounds of bird manure was especially conducive to suicide as, over a two-year period, 60 Chinese took their lives out of a workforce of approximately 500.106 High as these figures for Peru were,

however, Juan Perez de la Riva claims that the frequency of suicide among

101 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, ch. 4. 102 Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N. 103 AH to AH, 8 May 1876, Cayalti to Lima, AF A; AH to AH, 12 May 1876, Cayalti to

Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 18 July 1876, Cayaltfto Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 4 Jan. 1876, Cayaltfto Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 2) Jan. 1876, Cayaltfto Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 4 June 1878, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA. This was also the most common way for Chinese to commit suicide in Cuba: Juan Perez de la Riva, EI barracon: Esclavitud y capitalismo en Cuba (Barcelona, 197)), p. 70.

104 AH to AH, 8 May 1876, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 4 Jan. 1876, Cayaltf to Lima, AF A.

105 Humberto Rodriguez Pastor, La Rebelidn de los Rostros Pintados (Huancayo, Peru,

1979), p. H· 106 Mendez, 'La otra historia', pp. 13, 4).

16 I.AS 21



414 Michael J. Gonâks

the Chinese in Cuba gave the Caribbean island the highest suicide rate inthe world.107

A more common form of resistance on Peruvian plantations was flight.The Chinese Commission argued that runaways were a serious problemfor Peruvian agriculture and they visited several estates where workershad been shackled for fleeing. In the most extreme case, the plantationLurifico claimed that over 270 Chinese had fled over the years."18 Judgingfrom the experiences of Cayalti and Palto, runaways occurred on a fairlyregular basis.109 Between 1875 and 1882 there were 45 recorded runawaysfrom Cayalti, of whom only 14 could be captured and returned to theestate.110 Only a few Chinese managed to flee during the Chilean invasion,however, as the Aspi'llagas paid their workers early and increasedsecurity.111 Most runaways were contracted workers who were poorlypaid and heavily indebted. A majority sought refuge among the Chinesecommunity in nearby Chiclayo, although one fled to Lima and threeothers to Pisco. On other occasions, the Aspi'llagas believed that runawaysended up working, either through choice or coercion, on neighbouringsugarcane plantations.112

Runaways were always vigorously pursued by mayordomos onhorseback who sometimes rode as far as the sierra in search of Chinese.The Aspi'llagas also offered rewards for information leading to the captureof Chinese, and this brought results on at least two occasions.ll:i When

107 Pe rez d e la R iva , El barraco'n, p . 67 .108 Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N.109 J o r g e Basadre, Historia de la Republics del Per/1, 4th ed., 2 vols. (Lima, 1949), vol. 2,

p . 2 2 ; .110 RABto AAB, 21 Sept. 1875, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 5 Oct. 1875, Cayalti'

to Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 8 Oct. 1875, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 8 May1876, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 21 May 1876, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AABto AH, 19 June 1876, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 18 July 1876, Cayalti'to Lima,AFA; AH to AH, 21 Feb. 1877, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 2 June 1877,Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 6 July 1877, Cayalti' to Lima, AFA; AH to AH,16 July 1878, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 11 Sept. 1877, Cayalti to Lima, AFA;AH to AH, 14 Sept. 1877, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 16 Oct. 188o, Cayalti toLima, AFA; AAB to 1AB, 3 May 1881, Cayalti' to Lima, AFA; unsigned letter dated8 June 1882, Cayalti' to Lima, AFA.

111 RAB to LAB, 26 July 1881, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 4 Oct. 1880, Cayalti'toLima, AFA; AH to AH, 6 July 1889, Cayalti' to Lima, AFA; AAB to AH, 1 Nov.1880, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.

112 AH to AH, 18 July 1876, Cayalti' to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 14 Sept. 1887, Cayaltito Lima, AFA; RAB to 1AB, 26 July 1881, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB,5 Oct. 1875, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.

113 AH to AH, 11 Sept. 1877, Cayalti' to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 18 Feb. 1879, Cayalti'to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 21 May 1876, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 8 Oct.1875, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 2 June 1877, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; RABto AAB, 8 Oct. 1875, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 14 Sept. 1877, Cayalti' toLima, AFA.

4 I 4 Michael]. Gonzales

the Chinese in Cuba gave the Caribbean island the highest suicide rate in the world. 107

A more common form of resistance on Peruvian plantations was flight. The Chinese Commission argued that runaways were a serious problem for Peruvian agriculture and they visited several estates where workers had been shackled for fleeing. In the most extreme case, the plantation Lurifico claimed that over 270 Chinese had fled over the years. lOS Judging from the experiences of Cayaltf and Palto, runaways occurred on a fairly regular basis. J09 Between 1875 and 1882 there were 45 recorded runaways from Cayalt!, of whom only 14 could be captured and returned to the estate. 110 Only a few Chinese managed to flee during the Chilean invasion, however, as the Aspillagas paid their workers early and increased security.lIl Most runaways were contracted workers who were poorly paid and heavily indebted. A majority sought refuge among the Chinese community in nearby Chiclayo, although one fled to Lima and three others to Pisco. On other occasions, the Aspillagas believed that runaways ended up working, either through choice or coercion, on neighbouring sugarcane plantations. 112

Runaways were always vigorously pursued by mayordomos on horseback who sometimes rode as far as the sierra in search of Chinese. The Aspillagas also offered rewards for information leading to the capture of Chinese, and this brought results on at least two occasions. lI

:1 When

107 Perez de la Riva, EI barr'acon, p. 67. 108 Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N. 109 Jorge Basadre, His/oria de 10 Republica del Pmi, 4th ed., 2 vols. (Lima, 1949), vol. z,

p.225· 110 RAB to AAB, 21 Sept. 1875, Cayaltfto Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 5 Oct. 1875, Cayaltf

to Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 8 Oct. 1875, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 8 May 1876, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 21 May 1876, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AAB to AH, 19 June 1876, Cayaltfto Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 18 July 1876, Cayaltfto Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 21 Feb. 1877, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 2 June 1877,

Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 6 July 1877, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 16 July 1878, Cayaltf to LIma, AFA; AH to AH, II Sept. 1877, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 14 Sept. 1877, Cayaltfto Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 16 Oct. 1880, Cayaltfto Lima, AF A; AAB to lAB, 3 May 1881, Cayaltf to Lima, AF A; unsigned letter dated 8 June 1882, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA.

III RAB to lAB, 26 July 1881, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 4 Oct. 1880, Cayaltfto Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 6 July 1889, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AAB to AH, I Nov. 1880, Cayaltf to Lima, AF A.

112 AH to AH, 18 July 1876, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 14 Sept. 1887, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; RAB to lAB, 26 July 1881, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 5 Oct. 1875, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA.

113 AH to AH, II Sept. 1877, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 18 Feb. 1879, Cayaltf to Lima, AF A; AH to AH, 21 May 1876, Cayaltf to Lima, AF A; RAB to AAB, 8 Oct. 1875, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 2 June 1877, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; RAB to AAB, 8 Oct. 1875, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 14 Sept. 1877, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA.




captured, runaways were severely punished and made to repay the cost oftheir apprehension. Ramon Aspi'llaga Barrera once interrogated somecaptured Chinese and demanded to know why they had fled. Theyanswered, 'as they always did', that they 'were receiving insufficientwages for people'. Ramon refused to believe this, however, as hesuspected that they had been forced or paid to leave Cayalti'. Theserunaways were badly beaten by mayordomos and imprisoned on theestate. Ramon later wrote to his brother Antero that he was certain thatGod would punish them even more.114

On the hacienda Palto, which had a work force about one-tenth the sizeof Cayaltfs, there were six recorded escapes from 1876 to 1881.115 Weknow some details about two of these cases. One worker owed 20 solesto fellow Chinese who were pressuring him to pay up. He had requestedan advance of 10 paper soles from the administrator in return for renew-ing his contract. His request had been denied, however, because theadministrator lacked authorisation from the Aspillagas. It is clear that thisworker fled to avoid physical abuse from his creditors.116 Another caseinvolved a determined worker named Silvestre. Within six months of hisarrival at Palto he had run away. Nevertheless, he was captured and forcedto work in chains for eight years. At the end of his contract, he signed onagain in return for 64 soles paper,117 only to run off to Iquique with afemale friend.118

Those Chinese who did not escape from plantations still found ways ofresisting the social order. At Palto and Cayalti, Chinese were responsiblefor several fires and thefts that resulted in serious losses for the Aspillagas.In the absence of testimony by the Chinese themselves it is difficult toknow their motivations. Fires may have been accidents, but they were alsoa traditional form of protest by sugar workers. Thefts seemed designed tohurt planters as well as to make money. On the other hand, there is noindication that thievery was meant to extract additional income becauseplanters had failed to comply with some reciprocal obligation.

There were two major fires at Cayalti caused by Chinese workers. In1878 the Aspillagas blamed fifteen Chinese for burning approximately1,000 acres of sugarcane. This cost them a considerable amount of money

114 RAB to AAB, 5 Oct. 187s, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.115 Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 19 July 1878, Palto to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 10 Sept.

1880, Lima to Palto, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 24 July 1878, Palto to Lima,AFA; Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 17 April 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA; E.Augusto to AH, 31 March 1876, Palto to Lima, AFA; Francisco Perez Cespedes toAH, 27 July 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA.

116 Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 17 April 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA.117 Rodriguez Pastor, 'Biografi'as de Chinos', p. 14.118 E. Augusto to AH, 31 March 1876, Palto to Lima, AFA.

16-2

Chillese Plalltatioll Workers alld Social COllflict ill Peru 415

captured, runaways were severely punished and made to repay the cost of their apprehension. Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera once interrogated some captured Chinese and demanded to know why they had fled. They answered, 'as they always did', that they 'were receiving insufficient wages for people'. Ramon refused to believe this, however, as he suspected that they had been forced or paid to leave Cayaltf. These runaways were badly beaten by mayordomos and imprisoned on the estate. Ramon later wrote to his brother Antero that he was certain that God would punish them even more. 114

On the hacienda Palto, which had a work force about one-tenth the size of Cayaltf's, there were six recorded escapes from 1876 to 1881. 115 We know some details about two of these cases. One worker owed 20 soles to fellow Chinese who were pressuring him to pay up. He had requested an advance of 10 paper soles from the administrator in return for renewing his contract. His request had been denied, however, because the administrator lacked authorisation from the Aspt1lagas. It is clear that this worker fled to avoid physical abuse from his creditors. 116 Another case involved a determined worker named Silvestre. Within six months of his arrival at Palto he had run away. Nevertheless, he was captured and forced to work in chains for eight years. At the end of his contract, he signed on again in return for 64 soles paper,117 only to run off to Iquique with a female friend. 118

Those Chinese who did not escape from plantations still found ways of resisting the social order. At Palto and Cayaltf, Chinese were responsible for several fires and thefts that resulted in serious losses for the Aspt1lagas. In the absence of testimony by the Chinese themselves it is difficult to know their motivations. Fires may have been accidents, but they were also a traditional form of protest by sugar workers. Thefts seemed designed to

hurt planters as well as to make money. On the other hand, there is no indication that thievery was meant to extract additional income because planters had failed to comply with some reciprocal obligation.

There were two major fires at Cayaltf caused by Chinese workers. In 1878 the Aspfllagas blamed fifteen Chinese for burning approximately 1,000 acres of sugarcane. This cost them a considerable amount of money

114 RAB to AAB, 5 Oct. 1875, Cayaltt to Lima, AFA. 115 Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 19 July 1878, Palto to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 10 Sept.

1880, Lima to Palto, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to AH, 24 July 1878, Palto to Lima, AFA; Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 17 April 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA; E. Augusto to AH, 31 March 1876, Palto to Lima, AFA; Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 27 July 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA.

116 Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, I7 April 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA. 117 Rodriguez Pastor, 'Biograffas de Chinos', p. 14.

118 E. Augusto to AH, 3 I March 1876, Palto to Lima, AF A.

16·2



4i6 Michael J. Gonâles

in potential sugar sales and in the cost of clearing and re-planting. Theseworkers were forced to repay these losses with their labour.119 Ten yearslater, a fire destroyed some 55,000 pounds of sugar worth approximately320 pounds sterling on the London market. The Aspillagas blamed aChinese watchman for the blaze, and he was imprisoned for an indefiniteperiod of time.120

Fire and thefts at Palto were more clearly attacks on the estate. In 1876a Chinese was seen running from a fire that did considerable damage to thebuilding where machinery was stored.121 The following year a Chinesestole all of the estate's chickens and, in the process, destroyed the chickencoop. This man was captured, placed in chains, and imprisoned.122 Fouryears later some Chinese disassembled a cotton gin and stole several keyparts. The administrator offered workers a reward of 200 paper soles fornaming the thieves, but they refused. Management strongly suspectedsome contracted Chinese but they were never able to recover the lostmachinery.123 The Aspfllagas had difficulty replacing the parts and effortsto keep the gin running through special rigging proved disappointing.124

Additional forms of resistance occurred on coastal estates. Managers atPalto frequently accused Chinese of feigning illness in order to avoidwork, which could be considered a form of resistance. The difficultycomes in differentiating between the truly ill and the resisters. Healthconditions all along the coast were bad and the Chinese periodically fellseriously ill with malaria, influenza, typhus, typhoid, dysentery, and otherdiseases. Planters recognised this and took steps to prevent epidemics thatcould halt production. Especially noteworthy were the hiring of physiciansand the distribution of medicines (notably quinine).125 In addition to thetruly ill, managers at Palto were convinced that some Chinese were cleverfakers and, in fact, there was an unusually high percentage of ill Chineseat Palto in comparison with Cayalti. For example, during 1876-7 an

119 A H to A H , 19 N o v . 1878, Cayalti to Lima, A F A ; A H to A H , 25 N o v . 1878, Cayaltito Lima, A F A .

120 A H to A H , 10 Oct . 1888, Cayalt i ' to Lima, A F A ; A H to A H , 7 N o v . 1888, Cayalti toLima, A F A .

121 E . A u g u s t o to A H , 31 March 1876, Pal to to Lima, A F A .122 Francisco Perez Cespedes to A H , 30 Oct . 1877, Pal to to Lima, A F A .123 Manuel J. Brihuego to Sefiores Prevost & Co., 30 June 1881, Palto to Lima, AFA;

Manuel J. Brihuego to Sefiores Prevost & Co., 7 July 1881, Palto to Lima, AFA.124 Manuel J. Brihuego to Sefiores Prevost & Co., 9 May 1882, Palto to Lima, AFA.126 See Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, pp. 103-6, for a discussion of health conditions

at Cayalti and along the coast. For Palto see Humberto Rodn'guez Pastor, ' Salud ymuerte en los trabajadores chinos de una hacienda costena', in Humberto RodriguezPastor (ed.), Chinos culies: bibliografia y fuentes, documentosy ensayos (Lima, 1984), pp.150-75.


in potential sugar sales and in the cost of clearing and re-planting. These workers were forced to repay these losses with their labour. 119 Ten years later, a nre destroyed some 55,000 pounds of sugar worth approximately 320 pounds sterling on the London market. The Aspillagas blamed a Chinese watchman for the blaze, and he was imprisoned for an indennite period of time. 120

Fire and thefts at Palto were more clearly attacks on the estate. In 1876 a Chinese was seen running from a nre that did considerable damage to the building where machinery was stored. 121 The following year a Chinese stole all of the estate's chickens and, in the process, destroyed the chicken coop. This man was captured, placed in chains, and imprisoned. 122 Four years later some Chinese disassembled a cotton gin and stole several key parts. The administrator offered workers a reward of 200 paper soles for naming the thieves, but they refused. Management strongly suspected some contracted Chinese but they were never able to recover the lost

machinery.123 The Aspillagas had difficulty replacing the parts and efforts to keep the gin running through special rigging proved disappointing. 124

Additional forms of resistance occurred on coastal estates. Managers at Palto frequently accused Chinese of feigning illness in order to avoid work, which could be considered a form of resistance. The difficulty comes in differentiating between the truly ill and the resisters. Health conditions all along the coast were bad and the Chinese periodically fell seriously ill with malaria, influenza, typhus, typhoid, dysentery, and other diseases. Planters recognised this and took steps to prevent epidemics that could halt production. Especially noteworthy were the hiring of physicians and the distribution of medicines (notably quinine).125 In addition to the truly ill, managers at Palto were convinced that some Chinese were clever fakers and, in fact, there was an unusually high percentage of ill Chinese at Palto in comparison with Cayalti. For example, during 1876-7 an

119 AH to AH, 19 Nov. 1878, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 25 Nov. 1878, Cayalti to Lima, AF A.

120 AH to AH, 10 Oct. 1888, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 7 Nov. 1888, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.

121 E. Augusto to AH, 3 I March 1876, Palto to Lima, AF A. 122 Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 30 Oct. 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA. 123 Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 30 June 1881, Palto to Lima, AFA;

Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 7 July 1881, Palto to Lima, AFA. 124 Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 9 May 1882, Palto to Lima, AFA. 125 See Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, pp. 103-6, for a discussion of health conditions

at Cayalti and along the coast. For Palto see Humberto Rodriguez Pastor, 'Salud y muerte en los trabajadores chinos de una hacienda costena', in Humberto Rodriguez Pastor (ed.), Chinos culies: bibliografia J fllentes, dommentos J ensayos (Lima, 1984), pp. 15 0 -75.




average of 20 of the 150 Chinese at Palto were sick, compared with 20 ofthe 420 Chinese at Cayalti'.126

Palto's managers attempted to solve this problem with force. In 1877the administrator took 24 suspected malingerers to Pisco where a doctorjudged 9 of them to be healthy. They were placed in the custody of thesubprefect who put them to work in the barracks.127 Moreover, on at leasttwo other occasions suspected fakers were either beaten or forced to spendthe night in jail.128 These tactics did not solve the problem, however, asmanagement continued to complain about malingerers.129

Some credence is given to managements' claim by the general tendencyof the Chinese at Palto to resist total domination. For example, managersrepeatedly complained that the Chinese were disobedient and talkedback.130 On one occasion a Chinese stole six sacks of cotton and, whencaught, explained that he was only 'completing his (area in harvesting'.The manager had him whipped and chained, and placed a 24-hour guardon harvested cotton.131 More significantly, the Chinese acted collectivelyto protect individuals and to protest low wages and excessive physicalabuse. I have already noted that twice during the 1880s they stopped workand demanded higher wages,132 and similar protests occurred on fourdifferent occasions during the decade.133 Moreover, in 1876 10-12 Chineserioted after the administrator severely punished a Chinese for insolence.Firearms were used to force the rioters back into the galpon and be-hind locked doors.134 The following year the administrator severelybludgeoned a Chinese who had run away for three days, and two othersfor malingering. The beatings occurred before the assembled workforceand were meant as a lesson for all. Instead, they produced a 'great

126 Rodriguez Pastor, 'Salud y muer t e ' , p . 166. Rodr iguez puts the number of Chinese atCayalti at 8oo, but the true number is closer to 420.

127 Francisco Perez Cespedes to A H , 21 Sept. 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA.128 A A B to A H , 30 April 1877, Palto to Lima, A F A ; Jose Perez y Albela to A H , 11 April

1879, Palto to Lima, AFA.129 For example; 'Peortes libres have been employed in weeding because the contracted

workers left over from ploughing all take turns going to the hospital. There are always; or 6 even 7, this game is played among them, because the truly ill the past two weeksare no more than Matos and Atac flaco.' Manuel J. Brihuego to Muy Sefiores Mfos,30 June 1881, Palto to Lima, AFA.

130 Jose Perez y Albela to A H , n Oct . 1878, Palto to Lima, AFA.131 Jose Perez y Albela to A H , 5 April 1878, Palto to Lima, AFA.138 Cf. p . 18.133 Manuel J. Brihuego to Muy Sefiores Mt'os, 9 June 1881, Palto to Lima, AFA; Manuel

J. Brihuego to Sefiores Prevost & Co., 16 Aug. 1881, Palto to Lima, AFA; ManuelJ. Brihuego to Sefiores Prevost y Co., 9 May 1882, Palto to Lima, AFA: Manuel J.Brihuego to Sefiores Prevost y Co., 24 Aug. 1884, Palto to Lima, AFA.

134 E. Augusto to AH, 7 March 1876, Palto to Lima, AFA.


average of 20 of the 150 Chinese at Palto were sick, compared with 20 of the 420 Chinese at Cayalti. 126

Palto's managers attempted to solve this problem with force. In 1877 the administrator took 24 suspected malingerers to Pisco where a doctor judged 9 of them to be healthy. They were placed in the custody of the subprefect who put them to work in the barracks. 127 Moreover, on at least two other occasions suspected fakers were either beaten or forced to spend the night in jail.128 These tactics did not solve the problem, however, as management continued to complain about malingerers. 129

Some credence is given to managements' claim by the general tendency of the Chinese at Palto to resist total domination. For example, managers repeatedly complained that the Chinese were disobedient and talked back. 130 On one occasion a Chinese stole six sacks of cotton and, when caught, explained that he was only 'completing his tarea in harvesting'. The manager had him whipped and chained, and placed a 24-hour guard on harvested cotton. 131 More significantly, the Chinese acted collectively to protect individuals and to protest low wages and excessive physical abuse. I have already noted that twice during the 1880s they stopped work and demanded higher wages,132 and similar protests occurred on four different occasions during the decade. 133 Moreover, in 1876 10-12 Chinese rioted after the administrator severely punished a Chinese for insolence. Firearms were used to force the rioters back into the galprfn and behind locked doors. 134 The following year the administrator severely bludgeoned a Chinese who had run away for three days, and two others for malingering. The beatings occurred before the assembled workforce and were meant as a lesson for all. Instead, they produced a 'great

126 Rodriguez Pastor, 'Salud y muerte', p. 166. Rodriguez puts the number of Chinese at Cayalti at 800, but the true number is closer to 420.

127 Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 2 I Sept. 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA. 128 AAB to AH, 30 April 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA; Jose Perez y Albela to AH, I I April

1879, Palto to Lima, AF A. 129 For example; 'Peones fibres have been employed in weeding because the contracted

workers left over from ploughing all take turns going to the hospital. There are always l or 6 even 7, this game is played among them, because the truly ill the past two weeks are no more than Matos and Atac Raco.' Manuel J. Brihuego to Muy Senores Mios, 30 June 1881, Palto to Lima, AFA.

ISO Jose Perez y Albela to AH, I I Oct. 1878, Palto to Lima, AFA. lSI Jose Perez y Albela to AH, l April 1878, Palto to Lima, AFA. 132 Cf. p. 18.

ISS Manuel J. Brihuego to Muy Senores Mias, 9 June 188 I, Palto to Lima, AFA; Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost & Co., 16 Aug. 1881, Palto to Lima, AFA; Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost y Co., 9 May 1882, Palto to Lima, AF A: Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost y Co., 24 Aug. 1884, Palto to Lima, AFA.

IS4 E. Augusto to AH, 7 March 1876, Palto to Lima, AF A.



4i 8 Michael J. Gonâles

disturbance' that forced the manager to retreat to the casa hacienda. Hebarricaded himself in the dining room and grabbed a rifle while themayordomos gradually calmed down the workers. The Aspi'llagas weresufficiently concerned to make a special trip to the estate. Antero judgedthat the malingerers should not have been beaten, but that the runawayshould have received ioo lashes. He admonished the Chinese to respecttheir patrones and threatened to send 60 soldiers to Palto to enforceorder.135

This incident highlights a general problem in labour control at Palto.The Aspi'llagas, as patrones and members of the elite, were more importantauthority figures than hired administrators. This was something thateveryone recognised, but the owners were still reluctant to reside at Paltobecause it was not their major investment and had uncommodious livingquarters.136

The Chinese also demonstrated solidarity in defence of individuals.Two examples can be taken from their contentious relationship with thelocal black community. In 1876 a black came to Palto and accused aChinese of stealing his horse. The entire Chinese workforce rallied behindtheir countryman and forced the manager to insist that the black identifythe horse's brand and provide an exact description of the animal. Whenthe black was unable to do so, he was forced to leave the estate. He soonreturned, however, accompanied by several soldiers and with a letter fromthe governor demanding the return of the horse. The administrator nowagreed to return the horse in exchange for 20 soles to repay the cost ofboarding the animal. Although the Chinese were on the verge of rioting,the payment of the 20 soles calmed them down.137

A year later a black worker from Urrutia accused one of Palto's Chineseof stealing his horse. When the Chinese denied it, the black threw him tothe ground and took the horse. When news of the incident reached Palto60—70 Chinese grabbed their farm tools and began searching for the black.The administrators of the two estates sought to calm down the workersand to solve the dispute. They determined that the black owed the Chinese50 soles and that the Chinese had taken the horse when the black refusedto pay. Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera finally intervened and had the horsereturned in exchange for 40 soles.138

In all probability, the Chinese moneylenders were contractors whocould garner the support of workers. Horses were probably a black135 A A B to A H , 30 April 1877, Pal to to Lima, A F A .136 Francisco Perez Cespedes to A H , 21 July 1877, Pal to to Lima, A F A .137 E. Augusto to AH, n April 1876, Palto to Lima, AFA.138 Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 10 July 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA; AH to Scfior

Representante del Propietario de la Hda. de 'Urrutia', 23 Aug. 1877, Palto to Lima,AFA.


disturbance' that forced the manager to retreat to the casa hacienda. He barricaded himself in the dining room and grabbed a rifle while the mayordomos gradually calmed down the workers. The Aspfllagas were sufficiently concerned to make a special trip to the estate. Antero judged that the malingerers should not have been beaten, but that the runaway should have received 100 lashes. He admonished the Chinese to respect their patrones and threatened to send 60 soldiers to Palto to enforce order. 135

This incident highlights a general problem in labour control at Palto. The Aspfllagas, as patrones and members of the elite, were more important authority figures than hired administrators. This was something that everyone recognised, but the owners were still reluctant to reside at Palto because it was not their major investment and had uncommodious living quarters. 136

The Chinese also demonstrated solidarity in defence of individuals.

Two examples can be taken from their contentious relationship with the local black community. In 1876 a black came to Palto and accused a Chinese of stealing his horse. The entire Chinese workforce rallied behind their countryman and forced the manager to insist that the black identify the horse's brand and provide an exact description of the animal. When the black was unable to do so, he was forced to leave the estate. He soon returned, however, accompanied by several soldiers and with a letter from the governor demanding the return of the horse. The administrator now agreed to return the horse in exchange for 20 soles to repay the cost of boarding the animal. Although the Chinese were on the verge of rioting, the payment of the 20 sales calmed them down.I:17

A year later a black worker from Urrutia accused one of Palto's Chinese of stealing his horse. When the Chinese denied it, the black threw him to the ground and took the horse. When news of the incident reached Palto 60-70 Chinese grabbed their farm tools and began searching for the black. The administrators of the two estates sought to calm down the workers and to solve the dispute. They determined that the black owed the Chinese 50 sales and that the Chinese had taken the horse when the black refused to pay. Ramon Aspt1laga Barrera finally intervened and had the horse returned in exchange for 40 soles. 138

In all probability, the Chinese moneylenders were contractors who could garner the support of workers. Horses were probably a black

136 AAB to AH, 30 April 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA. 136 Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, ZI July 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA. 137 E. Augusto to AH, I I April 1876, Palto to Lima, AF A. 138 Francisco Perez Cespedes to AH, 10 July 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA; AH to Senor

Representante del Propietario de la Hda. de 'Urrutia', 23 Aug. 1877, Palto to Lima, AFA.




peasant's most valuable possession, and by stealing a debtor's horse amoneylender could apply considerable leverage. The majority of thevalley's peasantry was black and Chinese contractors and merchants wereprobably a major source of small, short-term loans. The ad hoc and violentnature of these transactions, which vaguely resemble how one might geta loan on a big city street corner, illustrate one reason why the two ethnicgroups were at odds.

Other forms of violence also occurred on the plantations. We havealready seen that two mayordomos were killed by the Chinese at Palto andCayalti'.139 Mayordomos were, in fact, frequently the objects of Chineserage. The foreman's job was to push workers as hard as possible, andsome of them were especially brutal. At Cayalti, a mayordomo onceadministered 100 lashes to a Chinese simply because he did not like theman,140 and at Palto a foreman named Gutierrez was so violent that hismere presence made it difficult to recruit workers.141 According to theknowledgeable contemporary J. B. H. Martinet, black mayordomos wereparticularly cruel to the Chinese:

Black mayordomos, the majority reared under the lash of slavery, enjoyadministering the blows, that before had caressed [acariciado] their backs, toothers, like the Chinese, who are under their orders and who they view withsupreme contempt [soberano desprecio].142

There is, of course, an important psychological dimension to thiscontentious relationship which lies beyond the scope of this paper.

The most significant homicide committed by the Chinese was themurder of the owner of Pucala, a large sugarcane plantation inLambayeque. The contemporary British traveller George R. Fitz-RoyCole described the incident:

The father of one of the writer's companions in this expedition [Jose Maria Izaga]was killed by his own Chinamen in an outburst of vindictive passion, when thecoolies conspired together to revenge the harsh treatment they had received, andbreaking into the house, beat their master to death with their farm tools. This wasafter long endurance; for one of the punishments this man had imposed on anycoolie whom he had caught in the act of escaping was to hobble him with aniron chain, forcing him to work as usual with this heavy weight added, until heconsidered his punishment sufficient. For lighter offences he used to beat themunmercifully, and curtail their rations to the starvation point. This went on tilleven the long-suffering Chinaman's patience was exhausted, and, rousing himselfone morning, he avenged himself in the summary fashion already related.143

139 Cf. p p . 25-7 .140 Aspillagas y Cia. to Senores Zaracondegui y Cia., 6 Sept. 1865, Cayalti to Lima, A F A .141 Manuel J . Br ihuego to Senores Prevos t Co. , 11 July 1882, Pal to to Lima, A F A .142 Q u o t e d in Macera, Las plantations aûcareras, p. cxxi.143 Cole, Peruvians, pp . 139-40, 200.

Chinese Planfation Workers and Social Conflict in Peru 419

peasant's most valuable possession, and by stealing a debtor's horse a moneylender could apply considerable leverage. The majority of the valley's peasantry was black and Chinese contractors and merchants were probably a major source of small, short-term loans. The ad hoc and violent nature of these transactions, which vaguely resemble how one might get a loan on a big city street corner, illustrate one reason why the two ethnic groups were at odds.

Other forms of violence also occurred on the plantations. We have already seen that two mayordomos were killed by the Chinese at Palto and Cayalti. 139 Mayordomos were, in fact, frequently the objects of Chinese rage. The foreman's job was to push workers as hard as possible, and some of them were especially brutal. At Cayalti, a mayordomo once administered 100 lashes to a Chinese simply because he did not like the man,140 and at Palto a foreman named Gutierrez was so violent that his mere presence made it difficult to recruit workers. l41 According to the knowledgeable contemporary J. B. H. Martinet, black mayordomos were particularly cruel to the Chinese:

Black mayordomos, the majority reared under the lash of slavery, enjoy administering the blows, that before had caressed [acariciado J their backs, to others, like the Chinese, who are under their orders and who they view with supreme contempt [soberano desprecioJ.142

There is, of course, an important psychological dimension to this contentious relationship which lies beyond the scope of this paper.

The most significant homicide committed by the Chinese was the murder of the owner of Pucala, a large sugarcane plantation in Lambayeque. The contemporary British traveller George R. Fitz-Roy Cole described the incident:

The father of one of the writer's companions in this expedition [J ose Marfa Izaga J was killed by his own Chinamen in an outburst of vindictive passion, when the coolies conspired together to revenge the harsh treatment they had received, and breaking into the house, beat their master to death with their farm tools. This was after long endurance; for one of the punishments this man had imposed on any coolie whom he had caught in the act of escaping was to hobble him with an iron chain, forcing him to work as usual with this heavy weight added, until he considered his punishment sufficient. For lighter offences he used to beat them unmercifully, and curtail their rations to the starvation point. This went on till even the long-suffering Chinaman's patience was exhausted, and, rousing himself one morning, he avenged himself in the summary fashion already related. 143

139 Cf. pp. 2j-7.

140 AspnIagas y Cia. to Senore5 Zaracondegui y Cia., 6 Sept. 186j, Cayaltf to Lima, AF A. 141 Manuel J. Brihuego to Senores Prevost Co., I I July 1882, Palto to Lima, AFA. 142 Quoted in Macera, Las plantaciones azucareras, p. cxxi. 143 Cole, Peruvians, pp. 139-40, 200.




On two occasions the Chinese rose en masse and severely tested localauthority. The first uprising occurred in 1870 when 1,200-1,500 Chineseoverran the Pativilca Valley and attacked urban areas. The revolt beganon the hacienda Araya where Chinese killed the estate administrator, hisfamily, and all mayordomos. Rebels successfully overran several valleyestates, killing administrators and mayordomos and sacking stores andhouses. In the meantime, surviving property owners regrouped to defendthe town of San Ildefonso de Barranca, and President Jose Balta senttroops from Lima under the command of Colonel Antonio RodriguezRamirez. The Peruvians defending Barranca were well armed andmanaged to repulse the Chinese, who had very few firearms. The rebelsdispersed with the main group falling back on the plantation Upaca,which had been occupied by armed Peruvians from Supe. The Chinesesuffered over 100 casualties at Upaca and the rebellion was crushed.144

When troops arrived from Lima they hunted down Chinese and shotmany on sight. The survivors were subsequently rounded up anddistributed to planters. Three important growers were appointedgovernors of local districts and Lima was asked to establish a comisariorural. Local notables blamed the rebellion on chinos libres, who wereconsidered agitators, and the Chinese's lust for opium. However, theypresented no evidence to substantiate their interpretation.145 Chinos libreswere disliked because they demanded higher wages and were harder tocontrol. Moreover, the Chinese did not have to steal to buy opium, theycould buy it on credit from planters. The rebellion is best explained as aprimitive outburst of anger directed at planters and mayordomos.

The Chilean invasion of Peru in 1880 was the second occasion for theChinese to rebel. The war caused the temporary collapse of the oligarchicstate and ushered in a period of political, military, and class conflict. TheChileans, led by General Patricio Lynch, 'the red prince', burnedplantations, demanded ransom from survivors, and occupied Lima.148

The Aspfllagas lost several head of livestock at Palto and Cayalti to theinvaders147 but, on balance, suffered far less than other planters. Theymanaged to transport the majority of Palto's workers to Cayalti, andtemporarily transferred ownership of their estates to one of their majorcreditors, Prevost & Co. of the United States. This ruse saved Cayalti and

144 Rodr iguez Pastor , L a Rebelidn.146 Ibid., pp . 72 -9 .146 Basadre, Historia, vol. 2, p. 225; Gonzales , Plantation Agriculture, p p . 3 1 - 2 ; Bonilla,

' T h e War of the Pacific' , pp . 92-119 .147 Jose Perez y Albela, 'Razon de los animales perdidos y muertos de la Hda. Palto',

28 March 1881, AFA; RAB to IAB, 26 July 1881, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH,4 Oct 1880, Cayalti to Lima, AFA, AH to AH, 6 July 1889, Cayalti to Lima, AFA;AAB to AH, 1 Nov. 1880, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.


On two occasions the Chinese rose en masse and severely tested local authority. The first uprising occurred in 1870 when 1,200-1,500 Chinese overran the Pativilca Valley and attacked urban areas. The revolt began on the hacienda Araya where Chinese killed the estate administrator, his family, and all mayordomos. Rebels successfully overran several valley estates, killing administrators and mayordomos and sacking stores and houses. In the meantime, surviving property owners regrouped to defend the town of San Ildefonso de Barranca, and President Jose Balta sent troops from Lima under the command of Colonel Antonio Rodriguez Ramirez. The Peruvians defending Barranca were well armed and managed to repulse the Chinese, who had very few firearms. The rebels dispersed with the main group falling back on the plantation Upaca, which had been occupied by armed Peruvians from Supe. The Chinese suffered over 100 casualties at Upaca and the rebellion was crushed. 144

When troops arrived from Lima they hunted down Chinese and shot many on sight. The survivors were subsequently rounded up and distributed to planters. Three important growers were appointed governors of local districts and Lima was asked to establish a comisario rural. Local notables blamed the rebellion on chinos libres, who were considered agitators, and the Chinese's lust for opium. However, they presented no evidence to substantiate their interpretation. 145 Chinos libres were disliked because they demanded higher wages and were harder to control. Moreover, the Chinese did not have to steal to buy opium, they could buy it on credit from planters. The rebellion is best explained as a primitive outburst of anger directed at planters and mayordomos.

The Chilean invasion of Peru in 1880 was the second occasion for the Chinese to rebel. The war caused the temporary collapse of the oligarchic state and ushered in a period of political, military, and class conflict. The Chileans, led by General Patricio Lynch, 'the red prince', burned plantations, demanded ransom from survivors, and occupied Lima. 146

The Aspt1lagas lost several head of livestock at Palto and Cayalti to the invaders147 but, on balance, suffered far less than other planters. They managed to transport the majority of Palto's workers to Cayalti, and temporarily transferred ownership of their estates to one of their major creditors, Prevost & Co. of the United States. This ruse saved Cayalti and

144 Rodrfguez Pastor, La Rebelion. 145 Ibid., pp. 72-9' 146 Basadre, Historia, vol. 2, p. 225; Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, pp. 31-2; Bonilla,

'The War of the Pacific', pp. 92-119. 147 Jose Perez y Albela, 'Razon de los ani males perdidos y muertos de la Hda. Palto',

28 March 1881, AFA; RAB to lAB, 26 July 1881, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 4 Oct 1880, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA, AH to AH, 6 July 1889, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AAB to AH, I Nov. 1880, Cayalti to Lima, AF A.




Palto from destruction.148 Neither did the Aspfllagas suffer much damageat the hands of their workers. During the confusion surrounding theinvasion, the Chinese at Palto stole some livestock and three workersmanaged to escape from Cayalti,149 but that was insignificant in relationto the losses suffered by others.

Many Chinese saw the Chilean invasion as an opportunity to avengeyears of abuse by planters. In Pacasmayo 600-800 Chinese helped theChileans sack sugar estates and casas haciendas, and this scene was repeatedin the Chicama, Lambayeque and Canete Valleys.150 The Chinese alsofought alongside the Chileans during the battles of San Juan andMiraflores,151 and there was also rioting and looting by non-Chineseworkers in coastal cities. As Heraclio Bonilla has observed, oligarchs sooncame to fear the popular classes more than the Chileans, and this was animportant reason why they sued for peace.152

Unfortunately for the Chinese, the Chilean invasion did not result intheir liberation. Following the devastating defeats of the Peruvian armyon the outskirts of the capital, the troops fell back on Lima and beganlooting the city. Among the victims were 70—80 Chinese merchants wholost their lives as well as their businesses.153 For their part, the Chileanssent many Chinese to work in the occupied guano and nitrate fields andforced 2,000 more to bury fallen soldiers.154 The Chinese in the CaneteValley even fell victim to a massacre by black peasants in 1881. Accordingto the British consul, anywhere from 700 to 1,500 Chinese were killed.155

Pedro Paz Soldan y Unanue, writing shortly after the slaughter, has leftus with a graphic description that depicts the deeply scarred hatred thatdivided the two marginalised ethnic groups:

The mob of armed and mounted blacks and cholos, with nobody to resist them— since they had always made up the entire population of the valley — went roundone hacienda after another. The Chinese, taken by surprise, lacking any defenceand sure of their innocence, were killed with clubs, knives, stones, machetes, ina thousand ways. Some subaltern estate dependents - the only men in charge ofthe abandoned properties at the time - locked the labourers into their quarters.The attackers burned these down, or broke down the doors to reach and kill theinnocents within.148 RAB to IAB, 26 July 1881, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 4 Oct. 1880, Cayalti

to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 6 July 1889, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AAB to AH, 1 Nov.1880, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.

148 Jose Peiez y Albela, 'Razon de los animales perdidos y muertos de la Hda. Palto',28 March 1881, AFA; RAB to IAB, 26 July 1881, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AH to AH,4 Oct. 1880, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 6 July 1889, Cayalti to Lima, AFA;AAB to AH, i Nov. 1880, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.

160 Bonilla, 'The War of the Pacific', pp. 107-8.141 Rodriguez Pastor, Le Rebe/io'n, p. 95.152 Bonilla, 'The War of the Pacific1.153 Ibid., p . 105. 164 Ibid., p . 107. 155 Ibid., p . 109.


Palto from destruction. I48 Neither did the Asplllagas suffer much damage at the hands of their workers. During the confusion surrounding the invasion, the Chinese at Palto stole some livestock and three workers managed to escape from Cayalti,149 but that was insignificant in relation to the losses suffered by others.

Many Chinese saw the Chilean invasion as an opportunity to avenge years of abuse by planters. In Pacasmayo 600-800 Chinese helped the Chileans sack sugar estates and casas haciendas, and this scene was repeated in the Chicama, Lambayeque and Caiiete Valleys.I50 The Chinese also fought alongside the Chileans during the battles of San Juan and MiraAores,151 and there was also rioting and looting by non-Chinese workers in coastal cities. As Heraclio Bonilla has observed, oligarchs soon came to fear the popular classes more than the Chileans, and this was an important reason why they sued for peace. I52

Unfortunately for the Chinese, the Chilean invasion did not result in their liberation. Following the devastating defeats of the Peruvian army on the outskirts of the capital, the troops fell back on Lima and began looting the city. Among the victims were 70-80 Chinese merchants who lost their lives as well as their businesses. 153 For their part, the Chileans sent many Chinese to work in the occupied guano and nitrate fields and forced 2,000 more to bury fallen soldiers. I54 The Chinese in the Caiiete Valley even fell victim to a massacre by black peasants in 188 I. According to the British consul, anywhere from 700 to 1,500 Chinese were killed. 155 Pedro Paz Soldan y Unanue, writing shortly after the slaughter, has left us with a graphic description that depicts the deeply scarred hatred that divided the two marginalised ethnic groups:

The mob of armed and mounted blacks and cholos, with nobody to resist them - since they had always made up the entire population of the valley - went round one hacienda after another. The Chinese, taken by surprise, lacking any defence and sure of their innocence, were killed with clubs, knives, stones, machetes, in a thousand ways. Some subaltern estate dependents - the only men in charge of the abandoned properties at the time - locked the labourers into their quarters. The attackers burned these down, or broke down the doors to reach and kill the innocents within. 148 RAB to lAB, 26 July 1881, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 4 Oct. 1880, Cayaltf

to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 6 July 1889, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AAB to AH, I Nov. 1880, Cayaltf to Lima, AF A.

148 Jose Perez y Albela, 'Razon de los animales perdidos y muertos de la Hda. Palto', 28 March 188 I, AFA; RAB to lAB, 26 July 188 I, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 4 Oct. 1880, Cayald to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 6 July 1889, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; AAB to AH, I Nov. 1880, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA.

160 Bonilla, 'The War of the Pacific', pp. 107-8. 161 Rodriguez Pastor, Le Rebelion, p. 95. 162 Bonilla, 'The War of the Pacific'. U3 Ibid., p. 10j. 164 Ibid., p. 107. 155 Ibid., p. 109.




Some sought safety in the sewers; but the blacks waited for them at the outletsand killed them as they came out. Other unfortunates, who still believed in whatwas traditionally sacred, sought asylum in the Casagrande school. ...There, theywere also killed by the renegades, bent on vengeance and rapine. As they stormedthrough, they smashed furniture, windows, doors, destroying everything andmaking bonfires in the very heart of the homes of their former and apparently'dear masters'.

The corpses of the Chinese were dragged out into the courtyards of the masters'houses. There, before being left to be torn to pieces by the birds, they were thesubjects of savage profanation, as in some Bacchic carnival, by the women andthe boys. The very black women who had once been the paid concubines of theirvictims, now mutilated their bodies, cutting off their bleeding and palpitatingorgans and placing them into their open mouths, as with a cigar. 'Leave this onefor me!', the black women screamed, quarrelling over the victims, drunk withblood like the women who tore Pentheus limb for limb 156

Conclusion: Chinese Labourers and the Grande and Petite Bourgeoisie

The deep-seated animosity that divided blacks and Chinese obviouslyhindered the ability of both groups to resist domination by the Peruvianbourgeoisie. The ability of the Chinese to rebel during the war was alsohurt by the eagerness of the Chileans to exploit their labour. Classdivisions among the Chinese themselves also undermined their ability toresist, and helped planters enormously. No group contributed more toplanters' survival of the war than Chinese contractors who rounded upthousands of their countrymen and brought them back to the plantations.Contractors were members of an emerging Chinese petite bourgeoisie thatalso included merchants and landowners. Like Peruvian planters, they allprofited from the labour of Chinese workers.

The Chinese Commission of 1887 reserved special criticism forcontractors, whom they accused of undermining traditional patron-clientrelations on plantations. According to Commissioners, contractorscollected Chinese and hauled them up and down the coast looking for thebest deal for themselves. They also accused contractors of withholdingworkers' wages and keeping them submissive through allotments ofopium. The Commission even cited a case in La Libertad where acontractor had shot two escaped workers in cold blood.157

As dramatic as these examples of abuse are, many more could bementioned involving Peruvian planters and mayordomos.158 Moreover,

166 J u a n de A r o n a [Pedro Paz-Soldan y U n a n u e ] , L a inmigracion en el Peril: Monografiahistorico-critica, 2nd ed. (Lima, 1947), p p . 9 9 - 1 0 2 . Also q u o t e d in Bonilla, p p . 109-10.Translation is by Eric J. Hobsbawm.

167 Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N.158 See above, section on planter control.


Some sought safety in the sewers; but the blacks waited for them at the outlets and killed them as they came out. Other unfortunates, who still believed in what was traditionally sacred, sought asylum in the Casagrande school. '" There, they were also killed by the renegades, bent on vengeance and rapine. As they stormed through, they smashed furniture, windows, doors, destroying everything and making bonfires in the very heart of the homes of their former and apparently 'dear masters'.

The corpses of the Chinese were dragged out into the courtyards of the masters' houses. There, before being left to be torn to pieces by the birds, they were the subjects of savage profanation, as in some Bacchic carnival, by the women and the boys. The very black women who had once been the paid concubines of their victims, now mutilated their bodies, cutting off their bleeding and palpitating organs and placing them into their open mouths, as with a cigar. 'Leave this one for me!', the black women screamed, quarrelling over the victims, drunk with blood like the women who tore Pentheus limb for limb .... 156

Conclusion: Chinese Labourers and the Grande and Petite Bourgeoisie

The deep-seated animosity that divided blacks and Chinese obviously hindered the ability of both groups to resist domination by the Peruvian bourgeoisie. The ability of the Chinese to rebel during the war was also hurt by the eagerness of the Chileans to exploit their labour. Class divisions among the Chinese themselves also undermined their ability to resist, and helped planters enormously. No group contributed more to planters' survival of the war than Chinese contractors who rounded up thousands of their countrymen and brought them back to the plantations. Contractors were members of an emerging Chinese petite bourgeoisie that also included merchants and landowners. Like Peruvian planters, they all profited from the labour of Chinese workers.

The Chinese Commission of 1887 reserved special criticism for contractors, whom they accused of undermining traditional patron-client

relations on plantations. According to Commissioners, contractors collected Chinese and hauled them up and down the coast looking for the

best deal for themselves. They also accused contractors of withholding

workers' wages and keeping them submissive through allotments of opium. The Commission even cited a case in La Libert:l.d where a

contractor had shot two escaped workers in cold blood. 157

As dramatic as these examples of abuse are, many more could be mentioned involving Peruvian planters and mayordomos.158 Moreover,

156 Juan de Arona [Pedro Paz-Soldan y Unanue], La inmigracion en el Pmi: Monografia histrfrico-critica, wd ed. (Lima, 1947), pp. 99-102. Also quoted in Bonilla, pp. 109-10. Translation is by Eric J. Hobsbawm.

167 Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N. 168 See above, section on planter control.




the traditional patron-client relations idealised by the Commissionersexisted under even more unequal systems of production, namely slaveryand indentured servitude. Ultimately, it was the system of production thatcreated opportunities for exploitation, and the lack of concern among thePeruvian bourgeoisie that allowed abuses (crimes) to go unpunished.

Chinese contractors had found an avenue of social mobility within aracially divided and repressive society. By the late 1880s, a few Chinesehad even become planters. For example, the heirs of Pablo Ansejoowned three estates in the Huaura Valley, and Wing On Fay rented mostof the huge sugar estate Pucala.159 It is also apparent that some Chinesehad become established merchants by the 1880s. Wing On Ching & Cia.of Piura sold opium to planters,160 a major wholesaler in Pisco was aChinese named Jose Eli'as,161 and the Aspillagas commented that Chinesewere acquiring wholesale and retail businesses.162 More commonly,however, Chinese became petty capitalists in coastal towns and citieswhere they established small stores, restaurants, vegetable stands andartisanal trades.163

Despite their success, these individuals were still vulnerable to abuse byPeruvians, as witnessed by the sacking of Chinese stores during the Warof the Pacific. For the majority of Chinese, these years were spentlabouring on the plantations. Their productivity allowed several plantersto survive the crisis of the period and to develop their estates in the 1890s.The Aspillagas acknowledged that they treated the Chinese as virtualslaves, but explained that it was common practice as well as necessary fortheir economic survival and glorious future:

It is not necessary to think of slavery since it exists for but short periods of time,besides we are not the only ones, although they say that to follow the bad exampleof several is to take the advice of fools, but some need others and this brings us

forward as heroes who search for a sure death in order to live eternally in thepages of history.164

The Aspillagas also believed that the Chinese were racially inferior andtherefore undeserving of better treatment. This was a common beliefamong Peruvians who were generally ignorant of Asian culture andhistory. The Aspillagas frequently characterised Chinese workers asperverse, lazy, degenerate, and vice-ridden. They concluded that these

158 Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N.160 AH to AH, 12 May 1876, Cayalti' to Lima, AFA; AH to AH, 12 May 1891, Cayalti

to Lima, AFA.101 Gerardo Perez to AH, 21 Oct. 1884, Palto to Lima, AFA.102 AH to AH, 24 Jan. 1893, Cayalti' to Lima, AFA.

Engelsen, 'Social Aspects', pp. 355-95-AH to AH, 28 May 1878, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.

103

104


the traditional patron-client relations idealised by the Commissioners existed under even more unequal systems of production, namely slavery and indentured servitude. Ultimately, it was the system of production that created opportunities for exploitation, and the lack of concern among the Peruvian bourgeoisie that allowed abuses (crimes) to go unpunished.

Chinese contractors had found an avenue of social mobility within a racially divided and repressive society. By the late 1880s, a few Chinese had even become planters. For example, the heirs of Pablo Ansejo owned three estates in the Huaura Valley, and Wing On Fay rented most of the huge sugar estate Pucala.159 It is also apparent that some Chinese had become established merchants by the 1880s. Wing On Ching & Cia. of Piura sold opium to planters,160 a major wholesaler in Pisco was a Chinese named Jose Elias, l6l and the Aspillagas commented that Chinese were acquiring wholesale and retail businesses. 162 More commonly, however, Chinese became petty capitalists in coastal towns and cities where they established small stores, restaurants, vegetable stands and artisanal trades. 163

Despite their success, these individuals were still vulnerable to abuse by Peruvians, as witnessed by the sacking of Chinese stores during the War of the Pacific. For the majority of Chinese, these years were spent labouring on the plantations. Their productivity allowed several planters to survive the crisis of the period and to develop their estates in the 1890s. The Aspillagas acknowledged that they treated the Chinese as virtual slaves, but explained that it was common practice as well as necessary for their economic survival and glorious future:

It is not necessary to think of slavery since it exists for but short periods of time, besides we are not the only ones, although they say that to follow the bad example of several is to take the advice of fools, but some need others and this brings us forward as heroes who search for a sure death in order to live eternally in the pages of history.164

The Asptllagas also believed that the Chinese were racially inferior and therefore undeserving of better treatment. This was a common belief among Peruvians who were generally ignorant of Asian culture and history. The Asptl1agas frequently characterised Chinese workers as perverse, lazy, degenerate, and vice-ridden. They concluded that these

159 Chinese Commission Report, 1887, B.N. 160 AH to AH, 12 May 1876, Cayaltf to Lima, AF A; AH to AH, 12 May 1891, Cayaltf

to Lima, AF A. 161 Gerardo Perez to AH, 21 Oct. 1884, Palto to Lima, AFA. 162 AH to AH, 24 Jan. 1893, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA. 163 Engelsen, 'Social Aspects', pp. 355-95. 164 AH to AH, 28 May 1878, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA.



424 Michael J. Gonâks

characteristics stemmed primarily from opium consumption and gam-bling. This analysis was not altogether nattering to the Aspillagas,however, because they were opium retailers and racehorse owners.165 Theinherent contradiction in the Aspillagas' view of the Chinese is perhapscaptured best in this statement:

The Chinese not only trouble us as racial degenerates, but also because they cancreate with time very serious social problems, since they, be it because of theirintelligence, or their habits, are absorbing all wholesale and retail businesses, evenhaciendas. They do so without leaving any permanent benefit for the country,since they, although they could be over eighty years old, once they have moneythey take it to their country.166

For a Chinese to succeed in business during these troubled times requiredthe skill and intelligence easily equal to that of a western capitalist.

In the end, Peruvian planters stayed in business because of theirexploitation of Chinese labour. None of their contradictory justificationscan avoid this conclusion. For the Aspillagas, as ambitious sons of anemigre Chilean merchant, profits from Cayalti and Palto bought thementree into elite society and national politics. Other planters, some ofthem cited for horrendous abuses of Chinese workers by the ChineseCommission, also emerged as important members of the elitist Civilistaparty during this period. Victor Larco, Jose Ignacio Chopitea andOctavio Canevaro are examples. As for the Aspillagas, all four brothersserved as Civilista congressmen and Antero served as Minister of Tradeand Commerce, four times as president of the Senate, and twice stood asCivilista candidate for president, both times losing in disputed elections.167

166 O n o p i u m , cf. p p . 27 -9 .166 A H to A H , 24 Jan . 1893, Cayalti to L ima , A F A .167 Gonza le s , Plantation Agriculture, ch. 2 ; D e n n i s Gi lbe r t , The Oligarchy and the Old Regime

in Peru (I thaca, N e w Y o r k , 1977), p p . 1 7 0 - 1 .


characteristics stemmed primarily from opium consumption and gambling. This analysis was not altogether flattering to the Aspillagas, however, because they were opium retailers and racehorse owners. 165 The inherent contradiction in the Aspillagas' view of the Chinese is perhaps captured best in this statement:

The Chinese not only trouble us as racial degenerates, but also because they can create with time very serious social problems, since they, be it because of their intelligence, or their habits, are absorbing all wholesale and retail businesses, even haciendas. They do so without leaving any permanent benefit for the country, since they, although they could be over eighty years old, once they have money they take it to their country.166

For a Chinese to succeed in business during these troubled times required the skill and intelligence easily equal to that of a western capitalist.

In the end, Peruvian planters stayed in business because of their exploitation of Chinese labour. None of their contradictory justifications

can avoid this conclusion. For the Aspl1lagas, as ambitious sons of an emigre Chilean merchant, profits from Cayalti and Palto bought them entree into elite society and national politics. Other planters, some of them cited for horrendous abuses of Chinese workers by the Chinese Commission, also emerged as important members of the elitist Civilista party during this period. Victor Larco, Jose Ignacio Chopitea and Octavio Canevaro are examples. As for the Aspillagas, all four brothers served as Civilista congressmen and Antero served as Minister of Trade and Commerce, four times as president of the Senate, and twice stood as Civilista candidate for president, both times losing in disputed elections. 167

165 On opium, cf. pp. 27-9. 166 AH to AH, 24 Jan. [893, Cayalt{ to Lima, AFA. 167 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, ch. 2; Dennis Gilbert, The Oligarchy and the Old Regime

in Peru (Ithaca, New York, 1977), pp. 170-1.


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Chinese Plantation Workers and Social Conflict in Peru in the late

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