Ching t Camposagrado

CHING T. CAMPOSAGRADOATTY. KIT VILLASISSSPRO/ WED 5:30-8:30

G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners, vs.ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.FACTS:1. On January 19, 1955, Respondent Ismaela Dimagiba, submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased.1. Petitioners claim that forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944.1. On June 20, 1958, the Court of First Instance rendered a Decision which found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented."1. On January 11, 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this was done on February 9, 1960.

1. On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of the testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944, subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, had revoked the latter under Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of the Civil Code of 1889), the trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale."

1. Having an unfavorable Decision, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that the same was appealable independently of the issue of implied revocation; that contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants, there had been no legal revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of the legatee herself, and affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance.ISSUE1. whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal; 1. whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final;

1. whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944.

HELDThe Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent base on the following premise:1. Oppositors-appellants contend that the order allowing the will to probate should be considered interlocutory, because it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation propounded in their opposition. The SC conformed with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand is untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.

1. Pursuant to the Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249 doctrine, that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.

1. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by this Supreme Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom.1 Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.

32. GERONA v DE GUZMAN

Facts:Petitioner Gerona heirs are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman. Placida was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife Teodora de la Cruz. After the death of Teodora, Marcelo married Camila Ramos. Their children are herein respondents de Guzman heirs. Marcelo died some time in Septermber 1945 and respondents executed a deed of extra-judicial settlement of his estate. They fraudulently stipulated therein that they were the only surviving heirs of Marcelo although knowing that petitioners were also his forced heirs. They were able to cause the transfer the certificates of 7 parcels ofland each in their names. The petitioners discovered the fraud only the year before the institution of the case. Petitioners seek to annul the extra-judicial settlement as well as have their shares in the said properties reconveyed to them.Contentions:Defendants argue that Placida de Guzman was not entitled to share in the estate ofMarcelo as she was an illegitimate child and that the action of the Petitioners is barred by the statute oflimitations.Rulings:TRIAL COURT: The trial court dismissed the case after finding that Placida was a legitimate child ofMarcelo and that the properties described herein belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo and Camila. It also ruled that Petitioners action had already prescribed.CA: affirmed ruling of the trial courtContentions:Petitioners assert that since they are co-heirs of Marcelo, the action for partition is not subject to the statue of limitations; that if affected, the period of 4 years did not begin to run until discovery of the fraud. They claim that the fraud done by respondents took place in 1956 or 1957 and that it had not prescribed when the present action was commenced.SC: The rule holds true only when the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates from the time the adverse title is asserted by the possessor ofthe property.The defendants excluded the petitioners from the estate of Marcelo when they executed the deed ofextra-judicial settlement claiming that they are the sole heirs thus setting up an adverse title to the estate. An action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations and the action may only be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. In the case at bar, the discovery was made on June 25, 1948 when the deed was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the names of the respondents exclusively. Plaintiffs complaint was not filed until November 4, 1958 or more than 10 years after. Ignacio Gerona as well as Maria Concepcion attained the age of majority in 1948 thus had 4 years from date of discovery within which to file an action. Francisco and Delfin attained the age of majority in1952 and 1954, thus had 2 years after removal of legal incapacity within which to commence their action.

37. G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners, vs. ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

FACTS:1. On January 19, 1955, Respondent Ismaela Dimagiba, submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased.1. Petitioners claim that forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944.1. On June 20, 1958, the Court of First Instance rendered a Decision which found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented."1. On January 11, 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this was done on February 9, 1960.






1. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by this Supreme Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom.1 Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.39. AJERO vs. CA AND CLEMENTE SAND 236 SCRA 488 (1994)

FACTS: Petitioners instituted Special Proceeding for allowance of Holographic will of the late Annie Sand. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.Private respondents noticed the defect, erasures, alteration, and correction which were not duly signed by decedent and the will was procured by through improper pressure and undue influence.However, the trial court still admitted the decedents holographic will to probate.The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the lower court holding that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC. It found that certain dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or signed by not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made had not been authenticated by decedent.ISSUE: WON the CA decision for disallowance to probate the Holographic will of decedent is meritorious?HELD: NO, reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814.Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testators signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally authographic or handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will no result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionable handwritten by the testator.42. Alfonso v. AndresFACTS:The cases is a complaint for accion publiciana with damages filed by the respondent spouses Henry and Liwanag Andres against the petitioners Noli Alfonso and spouses Reynaldo and Erlina Fundialan. The respondents were asked to give their reply with regards to the complaint. But they werent able to file within the reglementary period, and kept on extending. The respondents contested that they werent able to file within the reglementary period due to their indigency and poverty. They submitted that there is no justification for the dismissal of their appeal since PAO had just entered its appearance in their behalf. They also contend that the late filing of the brief should be excused under the circumstances that the case may be decided on the merits not merely on technicalities. Respondents on the other hand contended that the failure to file appellants brief on time is one circumstance where the CA may dismiss an appeal. In the present case they contended that the CA exercised sound discretion when it dismissed the appeal upon the petitioners failure to file their appellants brief within the extended period of 75 days after the original 45-day period. Hence this petition of the petitioners.ISSUE: The dismissal of petitioners' appeal by the honorable court of appeals is highly unjustified, iniquitous and unconscionable because it overlooked and/or disregarded the merits of petitioners case which involves a deprivation of their property rights.RULING: Technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving.The petition of the petitioners has no merit. Failure to file brief on time is the basis. As per Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, the grounds of dismissal of an appeal is based on the following grounds:e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;The petitioners answered that they should be given consideration citing the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. CA, were the late filing of the appellants brief was excused because the Court found the case impressed with public interest. Court however thought otherwise. The case in interest is NOT of public interest, and poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners complacency in allowing months to pass before exerting any effort to file it. Furthermore, the failure to file a brief on time was due primarily to petitioners' unwise choices and not really due to poverty. Petitioners were able to get a lawyer to represent them despite their poverty. They were able to get two other lawyers after they consented to the withdrawal of their first lawyer. But they hired their subsequent lawyers too late. Also, the disregarding of technicalities is not convincing. The Rules of the Court were constructed for the swift justice to be given upon those who deserve it. If it will be disregarded, Rules of Court will have no effect whatsoever then. It will only be relaxed for the benefit of the deserving and for justice, to which this case doesnt have.32. GERONA v DE GUZMANFacts:Petitioner Gerona heirs are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman. Placida was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife Teodora de la Cruz. After the death of Teodora, Marcelo married Camila Ramos. Their children are herein respondents de Guzman heirs. Marcelo died some time in Septermber 1945 and respondents executed a deed of extra-judicial settlement of his estate. They fraudulently stipulated therein that they were the only surviving heirs of Marcelo although knowing that petitioners were also his forced heirs. They were able to cause the transfer the certificates of 7 parcels ofland each in their names. The petitioners discovered the fraud only the year before the institution of the case. Petitioners seek to annul the extra-judicial settlement as well as have their shares in the said properties reconveyed to them.Contentions:Defendants argue that Placida de Guzman was not entitled to share in the estate ofMarcelo as she was an illegitimate child and that the action of the Petitioners is barred by the statute oflimitations.Rulings:TRIAL COURT: The trial court dismissed the case after finding that Placida was a legitimate child ofMarcelo and that the properties described herein belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo and Camila. It also ruled that Petitioners action had already prescribed.CA: affirmed ruling of the trial courtContentions:Petitioners assert that since they are co-heirs of Marcelo, the action for partition is not subject to the statue of limitations; that if affected, the period of 4 years did not begin to run until discovery of the fraud. They claim that the fraud done by respondents took place in 1956 or 1957 and that it had not prescribed when the present action was commenced.SC: The rule holds true only when the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates from the time the adverse title is asserted by the possessor ofthe property.The defendants excluded the petitioners from the estate of Marcelo when they executed the deed ofextra-judicial settlement claiming that they are the sole heirs thus setting up an adverse title to the estate. An action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations and the action may only be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. In the case at bar, the discovery was made on June 25, 1948 when the deed was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the names of the respondents exclusively. Plaintiffs complaint was not filed until November 4, 1958 or more than 10 years after. Ignacio Gerona as well as Maria Concepcion attained the age of majority in 1948 thus had 4 years from date of discovery within which to file an action. Francisco and Delfin attained the age of majority in1952 and 1954, thus had 2 years after removal of legal incapacity within which to commence their action.

33. G.R. No. 160530 November 20, 2007

CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER, petitioner, vs.DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER (Deceased), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES and THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI (Branch 59), respondents.

Facts:Here is a petition for Review on Certiorari in the decision of the RTC Makati appealed to the Court of Appeals and hence, this petition.On January 31, 1990,Dr. Werner petition for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letter testamentary to Att. Nogales and the same was allowed. After 4 years Dr Werner died. Hence, Atty. Nogales petition for letter testamentary. However, petitioner moved for the dismissal of the said petition. Alleging among others that RTC Makati had no jurisdiction over the case and she was denied due process of law. Petition of Atty. Nogales was granted.Issue: Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and whether or not the petitioner had been denied due process?Held:Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any province in which he had estate. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las Pias, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Such factual finding, which we find supported by evidence on record, should no longer be disturbed.Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then covered Las Pias, Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.

In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittschers children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondents petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the letters testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. We are convinced petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend her cause. Therefore, petitioners allegation that she was denied due process in the probate proceedings is without basis.

Petition is denied for lack of merit.

37. G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners, vs. ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

FACTS:1. On January 19, 1955, Respondent Ismaela Dimagiba, submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased.1. Petitioners claim that forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944.1. On June 20, 1958, the Court of First Instance rendered a Decision which found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented."1. On January 11, 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this was done on February 9, 1960.






1. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by this Supreme Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom.1 Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.

39. AJERO vs. CA AND CLEMENTE SAND 236 SCRA 488 (1994)

FACTS: Petitioners instituted Special Proceeding for allowance of Holographic will of the late Annie Sand. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.Private respondents noticed the defect, erasures, alteration, and correction which were not duly signed by decedent and the will was procured by through improper pressure and undue influence.However, the trial court still admitted the decedents holographic will to probate.The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the lower court holding that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC. It found that certain dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or signed by not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made had not been authenticated by decedent.ISSUE: WON the CA decision for disallowance to probate the Holographic will of decedent is meritorious?HELD: NO, reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814.Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testators signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally authographic or handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will no result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionable handwritten by the testator.40. Joaquina R Infante de Arranz et al.,petitioners,vs. The HON. Nicolas Galing, Presiding Jugde, RTC. Branch 166, and Joaquin R INFANTE,respondents.Facts:On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola. The petition specified the names and addresses of the petitioners as legatees and devisees. The probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearing. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. There being no opposition to this instant case, private respondent presented his evidenceex-parteand placed Arturo Arceo, one of the testamentary witnesses on the witness stand. During the proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor.Upon learning this, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period of ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the probate of the will.Issue: Whether or not the legatees and devisees are properly notified.Held: The court held that Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:SEC. 4.Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator.But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

42. Alfonso v. AndresFACTS:The cases is a complaint for accion publiciana with damages filed by the respondent spouses Henry and Liwanag Andres against the petitioners Noli Alfonso and spouses Reynaldo and Erlina Fundialan. The respondents were asked to give their reply with regards to the complaint. But they werent able to file within the reglementary period, and kept on extending. The respondents contested that they werent able to file within the reglementary period due to their indigency and poverty. They submitted that there is no justification for the dismissal of their appeal since PAO had just entered its appearance in their behalf. They also contend that the late filing of the brief should be excused under the circumstances that the case may be decided on the merits not merely on technicalities. Respondents on the other hand contended that the failure to file appellants brief on time is one circumstance where the CA may dismiss an appeal. In the present case they contended that the CA exercised sound discretion when it dismissed the appeal upon the petitioners failure to file their appellants brief within the extended period of 75 days after the original 45-day period. Hence this petition of the petitioners.ISSUE: The dismissal of petitioners' appeal by the honorable court of appeals is highly unjustified, iniquitous and unconscionable because it overlooked and/or disregarded the merits of petitioners case which involves a deprivation of their property rights.RULING: Technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving.The petition of the petitioners has no merit. Failure to file brief on time is the basis. As per Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, the grounds of dismissal of an appeal is based on the following grounds:e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;The petitioners answered that they should be given consideration citing the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. CA, were the late filing of the appellants brief was excused because the Court found the case impressed with public interest. Court however thought otherwise. The case in interest is NOT of public interest, and poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners complacency in allowing months to pass before exerting any effort to file it. Furthermore, the failure to file a brief on time was due primarily to petitioners' unwise choices and not really due to poverty. Petitioners were able to get a lawyer to represent them despite their poverty. They were able to get two other lawyers after they consented to the withdrawal of their first lawyer. But they hired their subsequent lawyers too late. Also, the disregarding of technicalities is not convincing. The Rules of the Court were constructed for the swift justice to be given upon those who deserve it. If it will be disregarded, Rules of Court will have no effect whatsoever then. It will only be relaxed for the benefit of the deserving and for justice, to which this case doesnt have.

51. IN THE MATTER OF PETITION TO PROBATE LAST WILLS AND TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE LOPEZ, NOVEMBER 12, 2012.FACTS:On June 21, 1999, Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their four legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez (Richard) and the respondents Diana Jeanne Lopez (Diana), Marybeth de Leon (Marybeth) and Victoria L. Tuazon (Victoria) as compulsory heirs. Before Enriques death, he executed a Last Will and Testament on August 10, 1996 and constituted Richard as his executor and administrator. On September 27, 1999, Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before the RTC of Manila with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as required by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of Richard. The said opposition was also adopted by Victoria. Opposition specifically states that in the acknowlegdment, it states that the entire document consist only of seven pages, but the actual pages consist of eight. Respondents contends that the discrepancy is fatal on the validity of the document considering that it is a substanstial defects which is a ground for disallowance of a will. Respondents also move for the denial of the appeal on the ground of non-compliance in the prescribed procedure that the appeal on special proceedings must be through a record on appeal.

ISSUES:1. W/N TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED PETITIONER AN APPEAL?1. W/N THE DISCREPANCY IN THE NUMBER OF PAGES OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT IS A SUBSTANTIAL AND FATAL ERROR AND AS GROUND FOR DISALLOWANCE OF A WILL.HELD:1. YES, Rules of Court is explicit that appeals in special proceedings, as in this case, must be made through a record on appeal. 2. YES, The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the torm of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written cannot be deemed substantial " compliance. The acknowledgment will which actually consists of 8 pages including acknowlegment which discrepancy cannot be explained by its mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence.Petition DENIED.

52. G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners, vs.ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.

Facts: This case is about the probate before Philippine court a will executed by Ruperta C. Palaganas, a foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.Respondent filled with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the probate of Ruperta s will and for his appointment as the special administrator of her estate. However, petitioners oppose on the petition arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

Held: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.6In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.7 The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

JOSEPH CUA, petitioner, vs.GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS, respondents.(G.R. No. 156536 , October 31, 2006)Facts:A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks. On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas and one of respondents herein, she came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale dated November 16, 1994 only when the original house built on the lot was being demolished sometime in May 1995. She likewise claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the same property had been published in the Catanduanes Tribune. After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the property and when the offer to redeem was refused and after having failed to reach an amicable settlement at the barangay level, Gloria Vargas filed a case for annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner and consigned the amount of P100,000 which is the amount of the purchase with the Clerk of Court on May 20, 1996. Joining her in the action were her children with Santiago.After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, dismissing the complaint as well as the complaint-in-intervention for lack of merit, and declaring the Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale valid and binding. The MTC upheld the sale to petitioner because the transaction purportedly occurred after the partition of the property among the co-owner heirs. The MTC opined that the other heirs could validly dispose of their respective shares. Moreover, the MTC found that although there was a failure to strictly comply with the requirements under Article 1088 of the Civil Code for a written notice of sale to be served upon respondents by the vendors prior to the exercise of the former's right of redemption, this deficiency was cured by respondents' actual knowledge of the sale, which was more than 30 days before the filing of their complaint, and their consignation of the purchase price with the Clerk of Court, so that the latter action came too late. Finally, the MTC ruled that respondents failed to establish by competent proof petitioner's bad faith in purchasing the portion of the property owned by respondents' co-heirs. This was affirmed by the RTC but on Appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC declaring that, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the extrajudicial settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon respondents considering the latter never participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent to the same.Issue: Whether or not the extra-judicial settlement is null and voidWhether or not the respondent co-heirs has the right to redeem the subject propertyHeld:The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs. The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned. This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary rights to third persons even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually participated in the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the same. Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were never notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs. Based on the provision, there is a need for written notice to start the period of redemption, thus: Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. (Emphasis supplied.)It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time written notice of the actual sale within which to make up his or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption. Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written notification of redemption, the method of notification remains exclusive, there being no alternative provided by law. This proceeds from the very purpose of Article 1088, which is to keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if, as is often the case, the presence of outsiders be undesirable and the other heir or heirs be willing and in a position to repurchase the share sold. It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves upon the vendor co-heirs because the latter are in the best position to know the other co-owners who, under the law, must be notified of the sale. This will remove all uncertainty as to the fact of the sale, its terms and its perfection and validity, and quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. As a result, the party notified need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation. Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement, there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to petitioner given the former's obvious willingness and capacity to do so.

46. LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, Petitioner, vs.JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent(G.R. No. 157451 December 16, 2005)Facts:Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he married Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE.Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left hand margin.The will provides that Placido Valmonte, upon his death shall give, devise and bequeath to Josefina one half (1/2) portion of a lot and 2 storey building in Makati which he jointly owned with his deceased sister, all the rest, residue and remainder of his real and personal properties, including his savings account bank book in USA. He also appoint his wife as sole executrix of his last will and testament, and said executrix be exempt from filing a bond.The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the ground of Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the will; and Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of senility.RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner but the same was reversed by the CA which admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways"6 did not make him a person of unsound mind.Issue:Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great respect.Held:At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, however, the evidence presented during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this Court when, as in the instant case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial court. The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every will presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and requisites that must be satisfied for the probate of a will. Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states the instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:"Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto."In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmontes will by imputing fraud in its execution and challenging the testators state of mind at the time.Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made." The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented. It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken "the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years." Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, "because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion." More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another. Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public.According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

*****Additional notes: Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, which held thus:"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind." 31. RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL F. MARQUEZ, SALVADORF. MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F. MARQUEZ, and RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ, JR.,petitioners, COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ and BELEN F. MARQUEZ,respondents. [G.R. No. 125715.December 29, 1998]FACTS:Spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez begot twelve children, namely: (1) Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3) Herminigildo; (4) Filomena; (5) Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio; (8) Rafael, Jr.; (9) Belen; (10) Alfredo; (11) Ricardo; and (12) Antonio.Sometime in 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 47572,[1]wherein they constructed their conjugal home.In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an Affidavit ofAdjudication vesting unto himself sole ownership to the property described in TCT No. 47572 thus, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled andTCT No. 33350[2]was issued in his name on June 16, 1982.Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Jr. executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos[3]covering the land described in TCT No. 33350 as well as the house constructed thereon to three of his children, namely: (1) petitioner Rafael Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both private respondents herein, to the exclusion of his other children, petitioners herein. TCT No. 33350 was cancelled by TCT No. 47572, issued in private respondents name.when petitioners learned about the existence of TCT No. 47572 they immediately demanded that since they are also the children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to their respective share over the land in question however private respondents ignored petitioners demands.Petitioners, now joined by Rafael Jr., filed a complaint on May 31, 1991 for Reconveyance and Partition with Damages before the trial court[4]alleging that both the Affidavit of Adjudication and Deed of Donation Inter Vivos were fraudulent since the private respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their father in making him execute the said documents.private respondents argued that petitioners action was already barred by the statute of limitations, since the same should have been filed within four years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud.[5]After due proceedings, the trial court rendered its decision[6]in favor of the petitioners. CA reversed trial court finding and denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not their action for reconveyance had prescribed. No.1. Can Rafael Marquez Sr., as trustee of his wifes share, validly donate this portion to the respondents. No1. Whether he can validly donate the other half of the property which he owns. YesHELD: 1. No. When Rafael Marquez, Sr. misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was established.[11]Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment.They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to holdIn this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribed in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.[13]For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued which was on June 16, 1982.Thus, considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the action.

1. No. Art. 736 of the Civil Code provides:Art. 736.Guardian and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them.Moreover, nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him.1. Yes. Again, the query need not detain us at length for the Civil Code itself recognizes that one of the inherent rights of an owner is the right to dispose of his property.[19]

50. BALTAZAR vs. LAXA

G.R. No. 174489April 11, 2012

FACTS:

Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitledTauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala(Will) in the Pampango dialect executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (JudgeLimpin) and was read to Paciencia twice thereby expressing in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on pages and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino) who attested to the Wills due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof, in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties torespondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children LunaLorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa. Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother. Paciencia lived with Lorenzos family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and itwas she who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will oron September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA). There, she residedwith Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996.

In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin. More than four years afterthe death of Paciencia , Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favour.

Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencias Will on the following grounds:

a. the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law;b. Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution;c. she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats;d. the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit;e. signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged;f. assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and,g. that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will.9. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition and Recommendation reiterating their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead.

ISSUES:1. Whether Paciencia was not of sound mind at the time the will was allegedly executed.1. Whether or not bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.1. Whether or not the absence of the subscribing witnesses and the notary public negates due execution of the Will.

RULING:1. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsoundso as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being ofunsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states: To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.

Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CAs finding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden.

Furthermore, the Court is convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she executed.She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was born after the execution of the will and was not included therein as devisee

1. No. We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son and that love even extended to Lorenzos wife and children.This kind of relationship is not unusual.It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old maids or spinsters to care for and raise their nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children.Such is a prevalent and accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many family discords between those favored by the testamentary disposition of a testator and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.

In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencias relationship with Lorenzo and his family is different from her relationship with petitioners.The very fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even if the latter was already married and already has children, highlights the special bond between them. This unquestioned relationship between Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said document as against petitioners allegations of duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in nature, are not supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record.

1. No. For all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court.Because of this the probate of Paciencias Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpins testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting.It is an established rule that [a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law.

It is an established rule that [a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law.

Danilo Aluad, Leonora Aluad, Divina Aluad, Prospero Aluad, and Connie Aluadvs. Zenaido Aluad

Facts:Maria Aluad and Zenaido Aluad were raised by childless spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad. Crispin owned 6 lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682. After he died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.Matilde executed a Deed of Donation, covering all 6 lots inherited from Crispin, in favor of Maria. The Deed provides that for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR [Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria],the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been brought up by the former the DONOR, by these presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above-described,to become effective upon the death of the DONOR, but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescindedand [of] no further force and effect; Provided, however, thatanytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of landherein donated.Matilde subsequently sold Lot 676 to Zenaido Aluad and executed a last will and testament devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her "remaining properties" including Lot No.674to respondent. Thereafter, Matilde died. The petitioners, childred of Maria Aluad, filed before the RTC a Complaintfor declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos.674and676 against Zenaido Aluad. RTC granted their petition but CA reversed the trial courts decision holding that the Deed of Donation was really a donation mortis causa because of certain clauses provided therein and that it did not comply with the formalities of a will.

Issue:

WON the donation mortis causa is valid.

Ruling:

No. The donation mortis causa was not a valid will. Art. 805 provides that every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. And Article 806 provides that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. These was not followed, hence the will was void.Having said these, the will transmitted no right to petitioners mother. But even assuming that the formalities were observed, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria since the will was not probated. Thus, the sale of Lot 67 was proper. And Lot 674 was properly disposed to respondent by the last will and testament, but subject of course to the qualification that Matildes will must be probated.

Alfonso v. Andres29 July 2010, G.R. No. 166236ISSUE: The dismissal of petitioners' appeal by the honorable court of appeals is highly unjustified, iniquitous and unconscionable because it overlooked and/or disregarded the merits of petitioners case which involves a deprivation of their property rights.RULING: Technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving.The petition of the petitioners has no merit. Failure to file brief on time is the basis. As per Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, the grounds of dismissal of an appeal is based on the following grounds:e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;The petitioners answered that they should be given consideration citing the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. CA, were the late filing of the appellants brief was excused because the Court found the case impressed with public interest. Court however thought otherwise. The case in interest is NOT of public interest, and poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners complacency in allowing months to pass before exerting any effort to file it. Furthermore, the failure to file a brief on time was due primarily to petitioners' unwise choices and not really due to poverty. Petitioners were able to get a lawyer to represent them despite their poverty. They were able to get two other lawyers after they consented to the withdrawal of their first lawyer. But they hired their subsequent lawyers too late. Also, the disregarding of technicalities is not convincing. The Rules of the Court were constructed for the swift justice to be given upon those who deserve it. If it will be disregarded, Rules of Court will have no effect whatsoever then. It will only be relaxed for the benefit of the deserving and for justice, to which this case doesnt have.FACTS:The cases is a complaint for accion publiciana with damages filed by the respondent spouses Henry and Liwanag Andres against the petitioners Noli Alfonso and spouses Reynaldo and Erlina Fundialan. The respondents were asked to give their reply with regards to the complaint. But they werent able to file within the reglementary period, and kept on extending. The respondents contested that they werent able to file within the reglementary period due to their indigency and poverty. They submitted that there is no justification for the dismissal of their appeal since PAO had just entered its appearance in their behalf. They also contend that the late filing of the brief should be excused under the circumstances that the case may be decided on the merits not merely on technicalities. Respondents on the other hand contended that the failure to file appellants brief on time is one circumstance where the CA may dismiss an appeal. In the present case they contended that the CA exercised sound discretion when it dismissed the appeal upon the petitioners failure to file their appellants brief within the extended period of 75 days after the original 45-day period. Hence this petition of the petitioners.

ALABAN VS. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 156021 September 23, 2005

FACTSRespondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado . Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. The RTC allowed the probate of the will and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to the respondent.Four months after the petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings. They also filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent, and the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have been probated because: (1) the signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by force and under duress and improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having included in the will properties which no longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that the letters testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate succession.RTC and CA both dismissed the petitionPetitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA. And that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic fraudISSUE1. Whether or not the petitioners were made parties in the proceedings 1. Whether or not the proceedings in the RTC was tainted by extrinsic fraud

RULING1. Yes the petitioners were made parties to the proceedingsPetitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate proceedings. Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed.Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedentAs parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory. According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same. 1. No. The procedure in the RTC was not tainted with extrinsic fraud. The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.

PEDROSA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS[G.R. No. 118680. March 5, 2001]

FactsMiguel Rodriguez died intestate survived by his wife Rosalina and their legally adopted daughter Maria Pedrosa, the petitioner. Rosalina and Maria entered into an extra judicial settlement of his estate. The other Private respondents, the Rodriguezes, however filed an action an action to annul Marias adoption which the CFI upheld. It was also appealed to the Court of Appeals which also upheld the adoption as legal.In the meantime, Pilar, the sister of Miguel also passed away with no other heirs but her brothers and sisters, the private respondents. Who then entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of his sister, Pilar.Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land covering a total area of 224,883 square meters. These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina. Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein.Petitioner Maria tried to claim their share of the properties and after being unable to do so, filed a complaint to annul the partition. Her complaint was dismissed by the RTC and on appeal was also dismissed by the CA.ISSUES (1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition had already prescribed; (2) whether or not said deed is valid; (3) whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been transferred to the respondent buyers.

RULING1. No. The complaint for the annulment has not prescribedSection 4, Rule 74]provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with,i.e.,that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition.So the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided inGerona vs. De Guzman,11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:[The action to annul] a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud...may be filed withinfour yearsfrom the discovery of the fraud.Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.The rule covers only valid partitions.The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property.Under the rule, no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 19411. No. The deed of partition is not valid.No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.Under Rule 74, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons.The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued beforethe Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon,i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, notafter,which was when publication was done in the instant case.Following Rule 74 and the ruling inBeltran vs. Ayson,since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud.A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina.Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code1. The court ruled that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue.The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties.Well settled is the doctrine that aTorrens Titlecannot be collaterally attacked.The validity of the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.

28. SPOUSES BENATIRO vs HEIRS OF CUYOS

FACTS: Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos had nine children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu.Before the CFI, after filing a petition to have herself appointed admin

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