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Interpretations and Misinterpretations of Classical Skepticism
in Western Intellectual Tradition
Chong Ho Yu
(May 3, !!"#
$%stract
According to Frede and Groarke, classical skepticism, represented by Pyrrho and Sextus
Empiricus, has been widely and unfairly confused with dogmatic skepticism by many scholars.
Frede traced this misunderstanding back to icero and St. Augustine, while Groarke related this
problem to the pro!reason and pro!science mentality in "estern culture. As a supplement to these
notions, this article briefly illustrates a wide spectrum of interpretations and misinterpretations of
Pyrrhonism by both hristian and secular scholars throughout "estern intellectual history. #t is
fascinating but pu$$ling to see that Pyrrhonism was adopted by different scholars in supporting
of ri%al claims. For example, early hristian anti!intellectualism employed Pyrrhonism to
denounce secular knowledge. &y$antine scholars re'ected skepticism in order to defend
(rthodox spirituality. )he atholic ounter!*eformation mo%ement saw it as a powerful weapon
against Protestants. Protestants regarded it as a way to challenge the papal authority and to
restore doctrinal purity. #t is argued that the problem of misinterpretation should not be blamed
only on the interpreters. *ather, classical skepticism carries certain properties that make it
%ulnerable to open interpretation. For instance, the skeptic attitude is a disposition rather than an
assertion+ the skeptical goal of mental tranuility is %irtually unattainable. As a result, the tool of
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skepticism is used as an auxiliary instrument to assist other schools of thought in accomplishing
their own goals.
Introduction
Greek skepticism is one of the ma'or achie%ements of Greek philosophy. Skepticism
began with Pyrrho of Elis -/0!120 &3, and thus skepticism is also known as Pyrrhonism.
4owe%er, Pyrrho did not write anything+ his philosophical ideas were presented in Sextus
Empiricus5s Outline of Scepticism.678 Although many branches of Greek Academicians and
Pyrrhonians treated Stoics as a common enemy, Academicians held a more radical position than
Pyrrhonism in terms of epistemology and metaphysics. 9ue to their differences, the former is
regarded as classical skepticism while the latter is associated with dogmatic skepticism.
Expert on ancient skepticism :ichael Frede pointed out that many scholars confused
classical skepticism with dogmatic skepticism. #n opposition to the Stoic %iew that clear and
distinct rational impressions could be the criterion of truth, classical skeptics argued that we
should not take impressions to be true and thus assent should be suspended. ;e%ertheless, we
could still li%e a normal life by following the probable or what appears to be the case while
making no ontological commitment. (n the other hand, dogmatic skepticism is a radical position
which asserts nothing can be known. (b%iously, there is a wide gap between these two %ersions
of skepticism, but Frede found that most people attacked a straw man by misdirecting all
criticism of skepticism to the dogmatic branch.
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According to Frede, this misunderstanding could be traced back to icero and St.
Augustine. As a dogmatic skeptic who wrote in <atin, icero distorted classical skepticism in
support of his world%iew. 4owe%er, most people in the <atin "est were not proficient in the
Greek language, and thus the mistake of mixing classical skepticism and dogmatic skepticism
was unnoticed by many. <ater St. Augustine attacked dogmatic skepticism based upon icero5s
account. Since St. Augustine was a prominent figure in "etsern intellectual history, the "est
European %iew of skepticism was strongly influenced by his %iew throughout the :iddle Ages.
)he uestion of knowledge became an important issue again in the late :iddle Ages due
in part to (ckham5s doctrine of intuiti%e cognitions. (ckham accepted the position that
cognitions are entities that could exist independently from the ob'ect corresponding to our
cognition. #n this context, scholars paid attention to Sextus Empiricus in an attempt to explore
the uestion of the possibility of knowledge. 4owe%er, the "estern Europeans mispercei%ed
classical skepticism as being dogmatic, and e%en worse, the influence of Eastern Europe during
the *enaissance reinforced this %iew. #n brief, Frede concluded that the widespread
misunderstanding of skepticism was partly owing to its :edie%al heritage.618
#n a similar %ein to Frede, Groarke was also disappointed by the fact that many scholars,
such as *ussell, misinterpreted the position taken by the classical Skeptic school as the dogmatic
one. <ike Frede, Groarke asserted that classical skeptics had no difficulty in accepting the
appearance, and not surprisingly, he associated modern anti!realism with ancient skepticism. &ut
unlike Frede, Groarke ga%e a different explanation to the widespread misunderstanding of the
classical skeptic school=
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Gi%en the plausibility of scepticism, one must wonder why it has been so
drastically misinterpreted, misunderstood, and underestimated, and why the
notion that we must defeat the sceptic has become such a central feature of
philosophical inuiry. )he answer has more to do with the social forces that shape
philosophical inuiry that with the logic of sceptic %iews. Scepticism is dismissed,
not because it has been studied carefully and found wanting, but because it goes
against the spirit of "estern thought as modern philosophy has portrayed it. )hat
account glorifies the use of reason, the possibility of science, and the human
ability to establish truth, and has no patience with skeptics to attack these ideas.
#nstead of trying dispassionately to understand the skeptics or the subtleties of
their %iews>philosophers treat them the way most heretics are treated?with
little emphasis on the details of their %iews, with little or no reser%e in exploiting
the misunderstanding this encourages, and with rhetorical appeals to the notion
that truth and reason must be sa%ed. E%en when philosophers argue for positions
that resemble skepticism, they present their %iews as an attack on it. ;ot
surprisingly, the resulting picture of the sceptic is an easy target and a focus of
bad feeling. @)ruth and reason are always %indicated, though the truth and
ob'ecti%ity that the skeptics attack are relinuished in the process, replaced with a
sub'ecti%e notion of belief and a new definition of the word true. 68
"hile both Frede and Groarke, to some certain extent, ga%e plausible explanations of the
widespread misunderstanding of classical skepticism, their account may not adeuately illustrate
the complexity of this issue. )o be specific, although St. Augustine was influential throughout the
:iddle Ages, there was more than one interpretation of skepticism in the <atin "est and the
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Greek East. For example, *omans treated skepticism as an ally of atheism+ hristian apologetics
cited skepticism to support anti!intellectualism. 9uring the reformation, the atholic ounter!
*eformation mo%ement %iewed skepticism as a weapon against Protestantism that emphasi$es
personal 'udgment+ certain Protestants also employed skepticism to promote religious toleration
and to challenge the infallibility of the atholic hurch. :ore importantly, these skeptic
orientations held by hristians were not dogmatic, because it is impossible for hristians, who
ha%e a firm belief in God, to subscribe to a world%iew that nothing can be known. *ather, they
replace the ob'ecti%e notion of truth with the sub'ecti%e one.
E%en though modern science rose in the "est since the 72th century, embracing reason
and science does not seem to be the primary moti%e for re'ecting skepticism or misinterpreting
classical skepticism as being dogmatic. For example, 4ume adopted a naturalistic approach to
re'ect dogmatic skepticism because belie%ing is said to be our undeniable and natural inclination.
#n other words, 4ume misinterpreted and refused classical skepticism on psychological rather
than philosophical ground. #nterestingly enough, in the early 10
th
century thinkers who were
sympathetic to empiricism, logical positi%ism, and anti!realism did not see skepticism as anti!
reason or anti!science. #nstead, classical skepticism was praised as a precursor to the anti!
metaphysic position embraced by empiricism, beha%iorism, pragmaticism, and logical
positi%ism. #n brief, acceptance, re'ection, and distortion of ancient skepticism could not be
simplified to the influence of St. Augustine and its :edie%al heritage or an obsession with
reason, ob'ecti%ity, and scientific knowledge.
)his ob'ecti%e of this article is to illustrate how skepticism was interpreted by different
people throughout different periods of history, including thinkers who were in ri%al parties. #t is
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important to note that it is not the goal of this article to e%aluate which thinker5s interpretation is
closer to the original position of the classical skeptic school, nor will # place an emphasis on
analy$ing why these thinkers tend to misinterpret ancient skepticism. Actually, different eras
generate different central issues, and as a result, different concerns lead to different conclusions
based on the same ancient philosophy. 4owe%er, certain inherent properties of classical
skepticism play a ma'or role in in%iting this wide spectrum of interpretation and
misinterpretation. )o be specific, the skeptic is a disposition rather than an assertion+ the
skeptical goal of mental tranuility is %irtually unattainable. As a result, the tool of skepticism is
used as an auxiliary instrument to assist other schools of thought in accomplishing their own
goals.
Tertullian and $nti&intellectualism
Although the *oman Empire inherited the Greek culture, *omans were much less
interested in intellectual inuiry than Greeks, and not surprisingly, classic texts were not
seriously studied by *omans. Skepticism was mentioned in only a few lines by Emperor Bulian
and was treated negati%ely, since he %iewed skepticism as an ally of atheism.6C8 #nterestingly
enough, certain hristian thinkers did not see skepticism as an ally of atheism. (n the contrary,
)ertullian borrowed the notion of skepticism to downplay the %alue of secular knowledge. 4is
anti!intellectualism was manifested in the following passage=
For philosophy is the material of the world5s wisdom, the rash interpreter of the
nature and dispensation of God. #ndeed heresies are themsel%es instigated by
philosophy> "hat indeed has Athens to do with BerusalemD "hat has the
Academy to do with the hurchD "hat ha%e heretics to do with hristiansD (ur
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instruction comes from the porch of Solomon, who had himself taught that the
<ord should be sought in simplicity of heart. Away with all attempts to produce a
Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic hristianity "e want no curious disputation after
possessing hrist Besus, no inuisition after recei%ing the gospel When we
believe, we desire no further belief. For this is our first article of faith, that there
is nothing which we ought to believe besides -emphasis added3.68
As the preceding passage illustrates, )ertullian was hostile to Stoics and Plato, but not
Pyrrhonians. For )ertullian the state of ignorance of secular knowledge was compatible with the
final aim of ataraxia!!mental transuality?proposed by Pyrrhonians. uriosity is a %ice that
could disturb the mental tranuility achie%ed by knowing nothing except God. 4owe%er, Floridi
pointed out that the differences between classical skepticism and hristiani$ed skepticism are
substantial. (nce doubt has been instilled, classical skepticism steps back into suspension of
'udgment while hristiani$ed skepticism leaps forward into faith. )he hristian thinker did not
deny the full intelligibility of the ultimate reality, which is the spiritual realm+ rather he ranked
the pursuit of secular knowledge much less %aluable than the lo%e and worship of God.6/8 )he
same theme, as illustrated later, recurred throughout the era of *eformation.
$gathias and $nti&metaphysics
At the end of the fourth century, Academic skepticism transmitted in <atin had become
the brand of skepticism known to philosophers and theologians, at the expense of classical
skeptics. Greek texts became inaccessible to most people, and as a result, the classical skeptic
work was largely forgotten by the <atin "est throughout the :iddle Ages. Fortunately, scholars
in the (rthodox East were %ersed in the Greek language, and occasionally the work by classical
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skeptics was cited in intellectual debate. For example, in the / th century &y$antine historian
Agathias -1!03 praised Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus for their dismissi%e attitude toward
useless and endless debates o%er unsol%able uestions.628 Agathias5s academic background and
personal beliefs could help us to appreciate why he endorsed the classical skeptic %iew. At the
age of thirty Agathias turned to the writing of history and composed a fi%e!%olume book entitled
On the Reign of Justinian, which relates to the e%ents of 1!, such as the wars with the
Goths, Handals, and Franks, as well as those against the Persians and the 4uns. As a prudent
historian, he relied on eyewitness accounts as well as other %erifiable sources as the basis of
reconstructing historical facts, and thus he saw the classical skeptic school as his ally in
opposition to metaphysical speculations. (b%iously, he did not read the classical text carefully
enough to learn that e%en eyewitness accounts are doubted as genuine knowledge by classical
skeptics. 4owe%er, it appealed to him because in his lifetime he experienced mass destruction by
wars and to him there were many more urgent matters than metaphysical speculations. Also,
Agathias was a pagan, not a hristian, and there is a good match between the skeptic philosophy
and his suspension of 'udgment regarding non!%erifiable, spiritual matters.68
'rthodo Spirituality and )egati*e +pistemological ogmatism
As Frede mentioned, (ckhamism generated the impetus for studying skepticism during
the 7Cth century. #n (ckham5s %iew, God is omnipotent and thus nothing is as it is necessarily+
e%erything could ha%e been otherwise. )his raised a number of doubts about the nature of reality
and the criterion of truth. #n this academic context ;icholas of Autrecourt worked on the
skeptical theme and subseuently attracted a significant amount of scholarly attention. #n the
same century, &y$antine culture also re%i%ed the intellectual debate about skepticism. *eligious
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contro%ersies and a renewal of literary studies are probably behind the re%i%al of interest in
skepticism.
After studying Sextus Empiricus, )heodore :etochites -7120!713 and his student
;icephorus Gregoras -71I0!73 condemned Sextus5s theses. )hey asserted that doubt, in
contrast to faith, was a disease that could threaten the church. ;e%ertheless, :etochites still
extracted certain notions from Sextus5s philosophy in rendering his own theology. #t is important
to point out that distrust of human rationality and 'udgment by classical skeptics aligns to some
degree with the doctrine of the fall of humanity caused by original sin. ;o wonder :etochites
repeatedly emphasi$ed that the intellect is inseparably connected to the irrational soul, and
constantly hampered by it. :etochites5s epistemological pessimism is tied to his partial defense
of ancient skepticism. 4owe%er, the similarities end there. :etochites misconstrued skepticism
as @negati%e epistemological dogmatism, embracing the notion that nothing can be known. 4e
was a realist who held true the realms of natural phenomena and human life, and maintained that
by di%ine re%elation knowledge of reality is possible.6I8 Another &y$antine scholar, St. Gregory
Palamas -71I/!7I3, argued that knowledge of God can be obtained by grace, and thus he also
disliked the skeptic %iew of Pyrrhon. Palamas promoted a form of spirituality known as
@4esychasm, which means @inner stillness or @inner peace.6708 ;eedless to say, classical
skepticism, which is uninterested in groundless assertions, was at odd with (rthodox mysticism.
Michel Montaigne, Counter&-eformation and Catholic .yrrhonism
#n the 7/th century, atholic scholars such as Gentianus 4er%etus and :ichel :ontaigne
%iewed skepticism as a powerful weapon for religious contro%ersy in defense of atholic
orthodoxy. :ontaigne -7!7I13 was regarded as the most significant figure in the 7/ th century
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re%i%al of ancient skepticism. :ontaigne insisted that true religion can only be based on faith and
that any human foundation for religion, such as rationality, is too weak to enable us to recei%e
di%ine knowledge. #n support of his fideism, :ontaigne uoted St. Paul5s declamation in First
Corinthians 7=7I!17= @For it is written, # will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to
nothing the understanding of the prudent. "here is the wiseD "here is the scribeD For after that
in "isdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of
preaching to sa%e them that belie%e. Along with citation of St. Paul5s text, :ontaigne offered
arguments from Sextus Empiricus and other ancient skeptics to demonstrate how unreliable
human knowledge is and how futile intellectualism is. ontrary to Eastern (rthodox scholars,
not only did :ontaigne not see skepticism as a disease, but he also defended Pyrrhonism with an
explanation of its %alue for religion. )o :ontaigne, Pyrrhonism was different from negati%e
epistemological dogmatism as described by :etochites. Pyrrhonism stated that any assertion, if
successful, shows the opponent5s ignorance+ if unsuccessful, their own ignorance. :ontaigne
asserted that this mentality is the finest of human achie%ements and the most compatible with
true religion.6778
:ontaigne5s skepticism did not arise out of a %acuum. 4e was deeply upset by the
brutality and chaos resulting from religious wars between atholics and Protestants. #n 7/
atholic forces besieged astillon, a Protestant stronghold near where :ontaigne li%ed, and he
found the actions of these plunderers loathsome. Further, :ontaigne was skeptical of al%inists5
insistence upon knowing God5s will. )his situation of anomie fed :ontaigne5s doubt about the
%alidity and legitimacy of the Protestant claims.6718 )o :ontaigne, since the complete skeptic
had no positi%e %iews, he could not ha%e the wrong %iews. And since the Pyrrhonians accepted
the laws and customs of his community, he would accept atholicism. :ore importantly, the
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complete skeptical mind was in the ready mode for recei%ing di%ine re%elation. #n other words,
skepticism was interpreted by him as conser%atism. Since one is incapable of 'udging anything,
the best course of action is to stay in the current position assigned by God. 678
;e%ertheless, according to Schiffman, :ontaigne did not straightly euate the true
religion to the atholic hurch and the Pope. *ather, he tried to make hristians see themsel%es
as nothing but mere creatures incapable of knowing God5s will. Schiffman asserted that
:ontaigne was not a @atholic Pyrrhonist+ actually it was :ontaigne5s followers who identified
with Pyrrhonism,67C8 thinking that they had found the best defense against *eformation. After
the ouncil of )rent in 7/C, Pyrrhonism was employed by atholic scholars like Francoise
Heron as a @machine of war to remo%e two Protestant principles, namely, Sola Scriptura and
personal 'udgment. For atholic Pyrrhonians, indi%idual interpretation of the Scripture was
doomed to open a Pandora5s &ox, while personal 'udgment was unreliable due to our corrupted
intellect. #nterestingly enough, Protestant intellectuals adopted the same philosophy to deny the
notion that atholic authority is the criterion of truth.678 Sextus was doubtful of the existence of
a criterion of truth. 4e further maintained that e%en if such a criterion exists, who should set the
criterion remains an unresol%ed uestion.67/8 4ence, for Protestants, atholic Pyrrhonians
%iolated the principle of skepticism by their self!appointment of sole authority. ;e%ertheless,
:ontaigne5s %ersion of Pyrrhonism strongly influenced the atholic hurch, and to some certain
extent, :ontaignians shared a common thread with Protestants in their belief that a skeptical
attitude depresses our intellectual pride and prepares us to recei%e di%ine gifts. ;ot only did
atholic &ishop Pierre!9aniel 4uey stand firmly in the :ontaigne tradition, but his
contemporary Pierre &ayle, who was a al%inist, also utili$ed skepticism to promote fideism.
6728
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.ierre /ayle, -eligious Toleration and Cal*inism
#n the late 72th century, the re%i%al of skepticism had penetrated both philosophy and
theology. For instance, in philosophy Simon Foucher -7/CC!7/I/3 raised uestions about the
artesian system using the arguments he founding both the Academic and the Pyrrhonian skeptic
schools.678 #n theology, English Protestant thinker "illiam hillingworth -7/01!7/CC3 was also
a fan of skepticism. (nce he left Protestantism for atholicism, and then left the atholic hurch
for the Anglican hurch. #n both con%ersions his Pyrrhonian attitude led him to uncertainty in
religious doctrines. After he re!examined the philosophy of Sextus Empiricus, he reali$ed that
although both Protestantism and atholicism could not be pro%en to be the absolute truth, he
could still 'ustify his inclination toward Protestantism based upon probabilistic inferences. &ut he
re'ected the atholic hurch for its insistence upon certainty and infallibility of doctrines.67I8
French al%inist Pierre &ayle -7/C2!720/3, who was called a @super!skeptic by Popkin,
was a prominent figure in the Pyrrhonian mo%ement.6108 <ike hillingworth, at first &ayle was a
al%inist, but later he abandoned Protestantism for atholicism. A few months later, he returned
to al%inism. 9ue to the French law forbidding con%ersion from atholicism to al%inism under
penalty of death, &ayle was forced to flee from city to city in 4olland. 9uring his exile between
7/C and 7/, his father and brothers died as a result of religious persecution. (wing to his
suffering he de%oted tremendous efforts to writing against superstition, dogmatism, and
intolerance. &ayle presented himself as an ad%ocate of uni%ersal toleration, calling for toleration
of e%en Bews, Juakers, Knitarians, and atheists.6178 After 7/ when tolerance for al%inism
ceased in France, &ayle sought to influence European opinion against <ouis L#H, who wanted to
purge his country of heresy. 4e was also %ocal in opposition to his Protestant friend Pierre
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Burrieu5s attempt to enforce al%inist orthodoxy in his home country. 9ogmatism of religious
fanatics played a %ital role in dri%ing &ayle towards Pyrrhonism, whose theme of suspension of
'udgment pa%es the way to religious toleration.
As mentioned before, &ayle was con%erted from al%inism to atholicism and then
returned to his original sect. &ayle did not switch religious affiliations arbitrarily+ rather, he made
these decisions based on serious intellectual consideration. omparing al%inism to atholicism,
&ayle was con%inced that the al%inist emphasis on the corruptness of human nature, both
morally and intellectually speaking, could help the boastful to be humble. 6118 Following the path
of classical skeptics, he interrogated e%ery argument for all theological claims. 4is strategy was
to analy$e and dissol%e any theory on its own terms. #n doing so, he relied much more on the
anti!metaphysical sections of Sextus5s writings than on the epistemological ones. #n his process,
e%ery aspect of a theory was thoroughly inspected, and after persistent uestioning, the theory
disintegrated into insurmountable contradictions. )o &ayle an intellectual inuiry was like
peeling an onion until at last nothing was left.618 &ut unlike classical skeptics, &ayle offered a
transcendental sal%ation. &ayle agreed with the classical skeptics that reason fails to make the
world intelligible. ;e%ertheless, re%ealed knowledge leads us to reality and truth.
&ayle contended that rational people find the claim @;othing comes from nothing to be
plain truth, but it would be completely refuted by Creation ex nihilo -creation out of nothing3.
61C8 #n addition, by common sense no one would dispute that the summation of @three does not
eual @one, yet the doctrine of the )rinity denies this intuiti%e notion. #n ethics, it seems ironic
that one ought to pre%ent e%il, but God does not stop all e%ils in the world. E%idently, people
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should not be punished for crimes that they did not commit, but the doctrine of (riginal Sin
contradicts the preceding notion.618
#nspired by classical skeptics who had reser%ations about making inferences beyond
appearance, &ayle de%eloped the notion of doctrinal minimalism, an attenuation of formal belief
that sought the barest doctrinal necessities. 4e could say that hrist was the :essiah, but he
would not make further elaboration of what this statement means.61/8
#nterestingly enough, &ayle insisted that he was not ad%ocating Pyrrhonism, but only
orthodox al%inism. (nce the Protestant leader, <a Placette, asked &ayle whether he were a
Pyrrhonist, and &ayle shook his head and replied, @# know too much to be a skeptic and too little
to be a dogmatist. 6128 Put simply, for &ayle, skepticism is the means and al%inism is the end.
)hrough Pyrrhonism the futility of human rationality is exposed, but hristian faith opens a door
to redemption. :oreo%er, Pyrrhonism can help us to strip all erroneous con%entions from
religious institutions. &ayle always compared al%inist doctrinal simplicity and indi%idual
conscience to atholic idolatry, superstition, and autocracy. &ut at the same time, he encouraged
his al%inist colleagues to maintain a skeptical mind to all human teachings and warned them
not to fall into the same traps of atholic corruption.618
a*id Hume, Irrational )ature and .sychological Tran0uility
9a%id 4ume -7277!722/3, a ma'or philosopher in the 7 th century, construed skepticism
in a dogmatic manner. Sextus Empiricus attempted to list a series of arguments and then
suspended 'udgment on them, but 4ume misinterpreted Sextus5s position as dogmatically
holding that all uestions are unanswerable. :oreo%er, 4ume5s rendering of Pyrrhonism omits
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any reference to the basis that Pyrrhonism offers for deciding practical uestions once the
skeptical attitude has been adopted. Sextus maintained that the skeptic could accept appearances
undogmatically and li%e naturally. )his misinterpretation was partly due to the fact that 4ume5s
knowledge of Greek was inadeuate for reading Sextus.61I8 According to (lshewsky, in 4ume5s
time at least two well!written texts on ancient skepticism were a%ailable= )homas Stanley5s he
!istor" of #hilosoph" -7/3 and Pierre &ayle5s $ictionnaire !istori%ue et Criti%ue -7/I3.
(lshewsky asserted that the accounts of both Stanley and &ayle match up well with the contrast
between dogmatic skepticism and classical skepticism in Sextus5s writing, and therefore it is
implausible that 4ume interpreted Pyrrhonism with reference to these texts.608 Actually,
misinterpretation of classical skepticism by 4ume is tied to the intellectual atmosphere in the 72 th
century, maintaining that science and philosophy were enterprises of producing factual
knowledge based on ob'ecti%e inuiry.678 #n reaction to this impassionate attitude, 4ume
identified irrationality as our human essence and refused skepticism on naturalistic and
psychological grounds.
4ume is well known for his doubt of the con%entional notion of causation. )o 4ume
many so!called cause and effect relationships are nothing more mere association. 4ume drew
support from Pyrrhonism in his anti!causation claim= All our e%idence of causation is based upon
a con'unction at a gi%en moment, but there is no rational basis to belie%e that this association
ha%e been constant in the past and will remain so in the future.618 <ike his predecessors, 4ume
attempted to use Pyrrhonism to demonstrate the inadeuacy of human reasoning. &ut 4ume
disagreed with Pyrrhonians that suspension of 'udgment could lead to mental tranuility. #n
contrast, 4ume argued that a complete skeptic will not obtain peace of mind at all, but instead
will be insane+ because humans are led by a natural instinct to suppose that there is an external
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reality existing independently of our sense+ Pyrrhonism goes against our nature. (n one hand,
4ume accepted the gloomy %iew that rationality could not bring any intellectual inuiry to a
conclusi%e closure. (n the other hand, 4ume held that a complete skeptical attitude is not
applicable to common sense beliefs and e%eryday life. 4e maintained that to lead a normal life
day by day we must hold opinions instead of suspending 'udgment since nature forces us to do
the former. #t is not a uestion of what we should do philosophically, but what we ought to do
psychologically. Paradoxically, although we cannot determine the true cause and effect
relationships among e%ents and ob'ects, it is nature and not philosophical reasoning that leads us
to make all causal inferences. 4ume went e%en further to claim that there is something right
about the fact that we function irrationally.68
#nterestingly enough, unlike :ontaigne and &ayle who employed skepticism to defend
religion, 4ume was a consistent anti!religionist. Although he contended that belief in the
existence of God was natural, he characteri$ed all religion as the product of fear and error.6C8
4ume classified religions into two types, namely, popular religion and true religion. Popular
religion de%elops from polytheism to monotheism, not by reasoning, but by a gradual
exaggeration of one of the deities whom people regard as the most powerful and dependable.
)rue religion, in contrast, does not arise from fear or child!like dependency+ rather it arises from
recognition of the order in the uni%erse. ;onetheless, both religions are based upon a uni%ersal
propensity to belie%e in an in%isible and omnipotent being. &esides religious faith, humans also
possess many other irrational beliefs. )o 4ume, our irrational nature supercedes the Pyrrhonian
attitude. &y embracing irrational natural instincts and mechanisms human societies can continue
to perse%ere.68
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+mpiricism, .ositi*ism, .ragmatism, /eha*iorism,
.henomenalism, and +pistemological $narchism
)here is no doubt that many modern philosophers were hostile to skepticism due to
misinterpretation. 4owe%er, many others read Sextus Empiricus correctly and treated him as an
ally. #n the 7Ith century the supposition that Pyrrhonists li%e in accordance with 'ustified beliefs
based on non!epistemic impressions had generally pre%ailed among commentators on Greek
skepticism. For example, in 7/I ;orman :acoll published a work in which he attributed the
notion of accepting the appearance to Pyrrhonism and sub'ected it to a Mantian criticism. <ater
the Pyrrhonian %iew was seen as highly meritorious when it was associated with empiricism.
:ary :ills accepted :acoll5s account of Pyrrhonism but was sympathetic to the Pyrrhonian
position. #n 7I1I she published a book which claimed that the Pyrrhonian way was %irtually
identical to the modern scientific method.6/8 #n 7IC7 *oderick hisholm praised Sextus5s
contributions to philosophy and presented him as a precursor of empiricism, positi%ism, and
other modern schools of thought=
4is most significant contributions are= first, the positi%istic and beha%ioristic
theory of signs which he opposed to the metaphysical theory of the Stoics+
secondly, his discussion of phenomenalism and its relation to common sense
claims to knowledge+ and, thirdly, his account of the contro%ersy o%er the
principle of extensionality in logic, where the anticipation of contemporary
doctrines is perhaps most remarkable.628
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hisholm praised Sextus for his anti!metaphysical position by saying that his theory @was
a clear statement of the essential principles of positi%ism, pragmatism, and beha%iorism.68 )o
him ancient skeptics and *eichenbach shared a high degree of resemblance since both held that
we can make probable assertions about non!empirical ob'ects. Such assertions ha%e an initial
probability if based upon clear and distinct impressions. )his probability can be increased by
corroborating the reports of the different senses and by in%estigating all the conditions under
which the obser%ation occurs. )hus, we can attain a reasonably high degree of probability for
some assertions.6I8
#n philosophy of science, Sextus Empiricus was highly regarded by Alan &ailey.6C08
&ailey compared Sextus to Paul Feyerabend by saying, @Feyerabend, despite claiming to be an
epistemological anarchist rather than a sceptic, is perhaps the 10 th century philosopher who most
closely conforms to the role and strategy of Sextus5 Pyrrhonist.6C78 Feyerabend was skeptical of
scientific progress, but he also re'ected Marl Popper5s philosophy of science by showing that his
falsificationism would actually ha%e hindered science from making progress. A common counter!
argument against Feyerabend is that if he doubts scientific progress, then accusing Popperian
philosophy of science of stalling scientific progress is contradictory. ;e%ertheless, &ailey
asserted that Feyerabend5s position is defensible because it resembles Sextus5s methodology.
Sextus uestioned the criterion of truth, which at first glance is self!defeating, because there
would be no criterion for Sextus to deny other people5s criteria. &ailey argued that Sextus might
deny all criteria but still challenge his opponents because they accept some sort of criteria. #n
short, the game rule applies to opponents only. &y the same token, although Feyerabend
dismissed scientific progress, he could use it to challenge Popper because @progress and
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@falsification are internally consistent within the Popperian system. #n short, to &ailey Sextus
and Feyerabend are allies in terms of epistemological anarchism.6C18
#t is out of the scope of this article to discuss whether classical skepticism is compatible
with modern empiricism, positi%ism, pragmatism, beha%iorism, phenomenalism, and
epistemological anarchism. ;onetheless, it is fascinating to see that :ills and hisholm, unlike
4ume, did not %iew classical skepticism as the end of the possibility of knowledge, and that
modern philosophers from a wide %ariety of schools regarded Sextus as their ally.
iscussion
As illustrated abo%e, interpretation and misinterpretation of ancient skepticism are so
di%erse that not only is a coherent mo%ement absent, but also implications and conclusions made
by different skeptics and anti!skeptics are found to contradict each other. *omans saw
Pyrrhonism as atheistic in essence. Early hristian anti!intellectualism employed Pyrrhonism to
denounce secular knowledge in support of pursing spiritual knowledge. &y$antine scholars
re'ected skepticism in order to defend (rthodox spirituality. )he atholic ounter!*eformation
mo%ement considered it a powerful weapon against Protestants. Protestants regarded it as a way
to challenge papal authority and to restore doctrinal purity. 4ume accepted the skeptics5
implication that there is no certainty of knowledge, but re'ected this attitude in fa%or of
psychological comfort. :odern philosophers found compatibility between Pyrrhonism and
empiricismNpositi%ism, as well as many other schools. #n brief, the entire picture is much more
complicated than Frede5s assertion of St. Augustine5s distortion and :edie%al heritage, or
Groarke5s thesis that scholars re'ected skepticism out of a pro!science and pro!rationality agenda.
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;o wonder after re%iewing theories of skeptics spanning across the 7/th to 7th centuries, Stunkel
made this comment=
#f :ontaigne, &ayle, and 4ume shared one thing in common, it was their
sympathy for a common life and dislike of intellectual rigidity. (therwise, their
agendas seldom con%erged>)hey did not think about the world in the same
frame of reference, except for a common attachment to the sur%i%ing literary
heritage of classical antiuity>"hat they shared was a pro%isional commitment
to reason and a re'ection of absolutes. 6C8
E%en worse is that certain claims made by some skeptics are so ambiguous that modern
scholars cannot tell exactly what they mean. For example, while Popkin considered :ontaigne to
be a atholic Pyrrhonian who defended the hurch orthodoxy, Schiffman saw :ontaignian
skepticism as a tool for self!examination of our inner world+ the apologetic character of atholic
Pyrrhonism was found in his followers instead. Further, &racken pointed out that researchers
could not come to consensus on whether Pierre &ayle was a skeptic or not.6CC8 Similarly,
Menshur uestioned whether &ayle5s fideism was the telos of the skeptical method or an
alternati%e to it.6C8 :oreo%er, although 4ume is said to be a skeptic in causal inferences and
certainty of knowledge, he was a skeptic of skepticism. (n one hand, he claimed to be
pessimistic that the ob'ecti%e of inuiry he identified can be achie%ed. (n the other hand, he was
also seen as a supporter of ;ewtonian system of science and set out to become ;ewton5s
counterpart in modern sciences.6C/8
)he di%ersity of interpretation and misinterpretation of classical skepticism may be partly
due to certain attributes in Pyrrhonism. First, the Academic %ersion of the skeptical notion
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@nothing can be known is self!defeating because this statement seems to be a notion of
knowledge claim. )his statement has the same self!refuting effect as putting up a sign saying
@Please ignore all signs or telling people @9on5t belie%e anything # say. )he Pyrrhonians
attempted to a%oid the paradox of dogmatic skepticism by presenting their idea as a disposition
or wa" of thin&ing rather than a doctrine. "hile this openness frees followers of Pyrrhonism from
dogmatism, it also opens itself to interpretation or e%en abuse. )he character of Pyrrhonism as
dispositional instead of doctrinal makes classical skepticism an auxiliary tool to other thoughts in
philosophy and theology. #t is fascinating to see that no philosopher and theologians mentioned
abo%e adopted Pyrrhonian as their central identity. atholicism was primary to :ontaigne+
skepticism was only secondary to him. &ayle admitted that he was more a al%inist than a
skeptic. Although Sextus Empiricus was considered an ally of empiricism, logical positi%ism,
and anti!realism, philosophers in those camps would rather call themsel%es empiricist, logical
positi%ist or anti!realist than skeptic. &luntly speaking, the notion of suspension of 'udgment
calls for no further course of action. )he skeptical disposition can at most ser%e as a starting
point for thinkers in the process of intellectual inuiry, but other schools of thought must be
introduced in order to lead inuirers to go beyond the point of departure. "hen a branch of
philosophy is used as a tool to support another school of thought, it is expected that the former
will be somewhat twisted to ser%e the latter. )he selecti%e use of skepticism can easily be found
in the preceding scholars. For example, by using Pyrrhonism to humble himself, &ayle regarded
the doctrines of )rinity and (riginal Sin as di%ine re%elation abo%e human intellect. 4owe%er, by
using the same skeptical attitude as a tool to challenge atholic authority, he mocked the
atholic doctrine of )ransubstantiation as absurdity rather than respecting it as di%ine mystery.
6C28
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(ne may argue that Pyrrhonism did offer a goal rather than a starting point or a means.
)o Pyrrhonians the end product of the process of doubt is mental tranuility, also known as
ataraxia, de%oid of contemplating with ri%al claims. 4owe%er, this goal is too unrealistic or too
unnatural to achie%e, and thus it is not surprising to see many scholars subscribing to only the
skeptic way of inuiry, but not the goal of euanimity. Menshur argued that the fact that the
balancing of opposing propositions conduces to the goal of ataraxia would at least seem to imply
a truth claim. "e ha%e to assume that we could e%entually collect adeuate information in
support of making a conclusion that all opposing arguments ha%e been exhausted and hence the
search has to be gi%en up. 4owe%er, if we constantly maintained a skeptical examination of
e%ery claim and e%ery piece of e%idence, the search would go on and on fore%er, and the goal of
mental calmness would ne%er be reached.6C8 As mentioned before, 4ume had pointed out that
the skeptical goal of mental tranuility is so unnatural that the possibility of achie%ing it is
extremely remote. 4ume is not alone. ;iet$sche also pointed out that e%ery skeptical tendency
constitutes a great danger for life and it is better to assert than to doubt. 6CI8 &y the same token,
American pragmaticist harles Sanders Peirce said that we are satisfied with stable beliefs rather
than doubts. Although knowledge is fallible in nature, and in our limited lifetime we cannot
disco%er the ultimate truth, we still ha%e to fix our beliefs at certain points rather than doubting
infinitely.608 Actually, from early hristian anti!intellectualism to al%inism and atholicism
during the *eformation, no hristian thinkers regarded the goal of ataraxia as attainable+ all of
them substituted fidelism for it. "ithout a plausible ultimate ob'ecti%e that can attract undi%ided
commitment, Pyrrhonism remains nothing more than a tool to assist other philosophies and
theologies to achie%e their own goals. )hus, it is not surprising to see such a wide array of
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interpretations and misinterpretations of skepticism when different scholars manipulate it for
different orientations of ultimate concerns.
-eferences
678 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism -ambridge= ambridge Kni%ersity Press, 7IIC3.
618 :ichael Frede, @)he Sceptic5s two Minds of Assent and the Juestion of the Possibility ofMnowledge, 'ssa"s in ancient philosoph", ed. :ichael Frede -:inneapolis, :;= Kni%ersity of
:innesota Press, 7I23, 712!71+ @)he Sceptic5s&eliefs, he Original Sceptics( ) Controvers",
ed. :yles &urneyeat and :ichael Frede -ambridge= 4ackett Publishing ompany, 7II23, 7!1C.
68 <eo Groarke, *ree& Scepticism( )nti+Realist rends in )ncient hought -&uffalo, ;O=:cGill!Jueen5s Kni%ersity Press, 7II03= 7.
6C8 <uciano Floridi, Sextus 'mpiricus( he ransmission and recover" of #"rrhonism -(xford=
(xford Kni%ersity Press= 10013, 7.
68 Juoted by B. Ste%enson, ) ew 'usebius( $ocuments -llustrating the !istor" of the Churchto )$ / -<ondon= SPM= 7I23, 7//!7/2.
6/8 Floridi, 1001, 7.
628 #bid., 17.
68 )homas Shahan, atholic Encyclopedia= Agathias, 6database on!line8 a%ailable from
http=NNwww.newad%ent.orgNcathenN0710Cb.htm -accessed April 12, 100C3.
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6708 Bohn :eyendorff , St. *regor" #alamas and Orthodox Spiritualit" -restwood, ;.O.= St.
HladimirQs Seminary Press, 7III3.
6778 *ichard Popkin, he !istor" of Scepticism( from Savonarola to 2a"le -(xford= (xfordKni%ersity Press, 1003, CC!/.
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6718 Menneth Stunkel, @:ontaigne, &ayle, and 4ume= 4istorical 9ynamics of Skepticism,
'uropean Journal , -7II3= C!/C.
678 Popkin, 100, 7.
67C8 Rachary Schiffman, @:ontaigne and the *ise of Skepticism in Early :odern Europe= A*eappraisal, Journal of !istor" of -deas, C -7IC3= CII!7/.
678 Stunkel, 7II, CI.
67/8 *. B. 4ankinson, he Sceptics -<ondon= *outledge, 7II3, 7I!7I/+ Sextus disputed against
the dogmatist5s claim that man should be the criterion of all things by asking @which manD
6728 Popkin, 100, 12C!11.
678 #bid., 12C!12.
67I8 #bid., /.
6108 #bid., 1.
6178 *ichard Popkin, @)he Skeptical Precursors of 9a%id 4ume, #hilosoph" and
#henomenological Research, 7/ -7I3= /7!27+ Stunkel, 7II, C.
6118 Stunkel, 7II, /.
618 Popkin, 100, 1I.
61C8 #bid., 100, 1!01.
618 Popkin, 7I, /C!/.
61/8 Stunket, 7II, /.
6128 Popkin, 7I, /C!/2.
618 Stunkel, 7II, .
61I8 <eo Groarke and Graham Solomon, @Some Sources for 4ume5s Account of ause, Journalof the !istor" of -deas, 1 -7II73, /C!//.
608 )homas (lshewsky, @)he lassical *oots of 4ume5s Skepticism, Journal of the !istor" of
-deas, 1 -7II73, 1/I!12.
678 Stunkel, 7II, 2.
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618 *ichard Popkin, @9a%id 4ume= 4is Pyrrhonism and 4is ritiue of Pyrrhonism,
#hilosophical 4uarterl", 7-7I73= !C02.
68 Popkin, 7I7, I7!I+ <oeb argued that besides 9a%id 4ume, *ene 9esartes and harlesSanders Peirce also adopted a naturalistic approach to accomplish intellectual tranuility. See
<ouis <oeb, @Sextus, 9esartes, 4ume, and Peirce= (n Securing Settled 9oxastic States, ous, 1 -7II3, 10!10.
6C8 Stunkel, 7II, 0.
68 Popkin, 7I7, I2!C00.
6/8 Alan &ailey, Sextus 'mpiricus and #"rrhonean Scepticism -(xford= larendon Press, 10013,
17C!17.
628 *oderick hisholm, @Sextus Empiricus and :odern Empiricism, #hilosoph" of Science,
-7IC73, 27!C.
68 hisholm, 7IC7, 21.
6I8 #bid., 2!2I
6C08 Alan &ailey, Pyrrhonean Scepticism and the Self!*efutation Argument, #hilosophical
4uarterl", C0 -7II03= 12!CC.
6C78 &ailey, 7II0, C0.
6C18 #bid., C0!C7.
6C8 Stunkel, 7II, C.
6CC8 4arry &racken, @&ayle not a ScepticD Journal of the !istor" of -deas, 1 -7I/C3= 7/I!70.
6C8 (scar Menshur, @Pierre &ayle and the Structure of 9oubt, 'ighteenth Centur" Studies, 17
-7I3 1I2!7.
6C/8 <oeb, 7II, 10/+ Stunkel, 7II, 1!C.
6C28 &racken, 7I/C, 722.
6C8 Menshur, 7I, 1I!1II..
6CI8 ;iet$sche, Friedrich. he *a" Science. )rans. E. S. 9allas -<ondon= hapman and 4all,
7//3.
608 harles Sanders Peirce, @)he Fixation of &elief, #opular Science 0onthl", 71 -7223 7!7.
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http=NNwww.creati%e!wisdom.comNeducationNhpsNskeptic.htm