CHRI Report 2014

FrontCover

A study of police oversight in India

CHRI 2014

Bringing Little to the Table

State Security Commissions:

working for the practical realisation of human rights in the countries of the Commonwealth

Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative



The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) is an independent, non-partisan, international non-governmental organisation, mandated to ensure the practical realisation of human rights in the countries of the Commonwealth. In 1987, several Commonwealth professional associations founded CHRI. They believed that while the Commonwealth provided member countries a shared set of values and legal principles from which to work and provided a forum within which to promote human rights, there was little focus on the issues of human rights within the Commonwealth.

CHRI’s objectives are to promote awareness of and adherence to the Commonwealth Harare Principles, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other internationally recognised human rights instruments, as well as domestic instruments supporting human rights in Commonwealth Member States.

Through its reports and periodic investigations, CHRI continually draws attention to progress and setbacks to human rights in Commonwealth countries. In advocating for approaches and measures to prevent human rights abuses, CHRI addresses the Commonwealth Secretariat, Member Governments and civil society associations. Through its public education programmes, policy dialogues, comparative research, advocacy and networking, CHRI’s approach throughout is to act as a catalyst around its priority issues.

The nature of CHRI’s sponsoring organisations allows for a national presence and an international network.* These professionals can steer public policy by incorporating human rights norms into their own work and act as a conduit to disseminate human rights information, standards and practices. These groups also bring local knowledge, can access policy makers, highlight issues, and act in concert to promote human rights.

CHRI is based in New Delhi, India, and has offi ces in London, UK and Accra, Ghana.

International Advisory Commission: Yashpal Ghai - Chairperson. Members: Alison Duxbury, Neville Linton, Vivek Maru, Edward Mortimer, Sam Okudzeto, Wajahat Habibullah and Maja Daruwala.

Executive Committee (India): Wajahat Habibullah – Chairperson. Members: B. K. Chandrashekar, Nitin Desai, Sanjoy Hazarika, Kamal Kumar, Poonam Muttreja, Ruma Pal, Jacob Punnoose, A.P. Shah, B.G. Verghese and Maja Daruwala - Director.

Executive Committee (Ghana): Sam Okudzeto – Chairperson. Members: Akoto Ampaw, Yashpal Ghai, Wajahat Habibullah, Neville Linton, Edward Kofi Quashigah, Juliette Tuakli and Maja Daruwala - Director.

Executive Committee (UK): Neville Linton – Chairperson. Members: Richard Bourne, Meenakshi Dhar, Derek Ingram, Claire Martin, Syed Sharfuddin, Joe Silva, Michael Stone and Sally-Ann Wilson.

* Commonwealth Journalists Association, Commonwealth Legal Education Association, Commonwealth Parliamentary

Association and Commonwealth Broadcasting Association.

ISBN: 978-93-81241-13-4

© Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2014. Material from this report may be used, duly acknowledging the source.

CHRI Headquarters, New Delhi CHRI United Kingdom, London CHRI Africa, Accra B-117, Second Floor Institute of Commonwealth Studies House No.9, Samora Machel Sarvodaya Enclave 28, Russell Square Street Asylum Down New Delhi - 110 017 London WC1B 5DS opposite Beverly Hills Hotel INDIA UK Near Trust Towers,Accra, Ghana Tel: +91-11-4318 0200 Tel: +44-020-7-862-8857 Tel: +00233-21-271170 Fax: +91-11-2686-4688 Fax: +44-020-7-862-8820 Tel/Fax: +00233-21-271170 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]


A study of police oversight in India

State Security Commissions:Bringing Little to the Table

Researched and Written by:

Anirudha Nagar

August 2014

Edited by:

Devika Prasad

We would like to express our gratitude to Mr. Jacob Punnoose and Ms. Navaz Kotwal who read drafts of the report and provided valuable comments.

This report has been produced with the fi nancial assistance of the European Union. The European Union is made up of 27 Member States who have decided to gradually link together their know-how, resources and destinies. Together, during a period of enlargement of 50 years, they have built a zone of stability, democracy and sustainable development whilst maintaining cultural diversity, tolerance and individual freedoms. The European Union is committed to sharing its achievements and its values with countries and peoples beyond its borders.

The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative and can under no circumstances be regarded as refl ecting the position of the European Union.

State Security Commissions: Bringing Little to the Table | 3

Table of ContentsForeword 5

Executive Summary 6

Aim of the Report 8

Methodology 8

Chapter 1: Improving Police-Executive Relations in India 11

Introduction 11 The National Police Commission 14 Supreme Court Prakash Singh Judgement 17 Model Police Act, 2006 19 Compliance Efforts 21 The Present Situation 21

Chapter 2: State Security Commissions on Paper: Upsetting the Balance Struck by the Supreme Court Directive 23

Delayed Establishment 23 Compromised Compositions 25 (i) Dominating Political Executive 25 (ii) Undermining Impartiality 26

i. Leader of the Opposition and a Retired Judge 28 ii. Independent Members 28 iii. Selection of Independent Members 30 Weakened Mandates 33 Accountability to the Legislature Denied 35 Binding Powers Frustrated 36 Conclusion 39

Chapter 3: State Security Commissions on the Ground: An Unsatisfactory Record of Implementation 41

Frequency of Meetings: Few and Far Between 41

4 | State Security Commissions: Bringing Little to the Table

Substance of Meetings: Strong Policy-Making, Weak Performance-Evaluation 42

(i) Policy-making 42 i. Andaman & Nicobar Islands 42 ii. Assam 43 iii. Chhattisgarh 45 iv. Delhi 45 v. Goa 47 vi. Gujarat 48 vii. Himachal Pradesh 48 viii. Kerala 49 ix. Lakshadweep 50 x. Meghalaya 51 xi. Punjab 53 xii. Sikkim 53 xiii. Tamil Nadu 55 xiv. Tripura 55 (ii) Performance Evaluation 59 (iii) Policing Plans 61

Procedure of Meetings 62

Conclusion 65

Chapter 4: Recommendations 67

Annex: National Overview of Compliance 71


ForewordPolicing in India cannot go on as it is. A major cause of poor policing lies in the blurring of lines between the political executive and the police establishment. The intrusion by elected politicians and bureaucrats into the everyday management and functioning of the police weakens its leadership, creates uncertainty of direction, breaks chains of command, obscures accountability, destroys discipline and divides loyalties all down the line.

Fine policing – policing that is unbiased, responsive and lawful – requires the overall policy and performance parameters to be laid down by the political executive. Meanwhile, operational responsibility to deliver good policing should be left squarely in the hands of the police leadership. State Security Commissions are designed to achieve this separation of power and function. They are intended to be an aid to political authority, the highest levels of which are represented on the Commissions. This body neither derogates from the pre-eminence of the elected representative nor diminishes the political executive’s supervision over the police machinery. Instead, its presence is meant to give precise defi nition to the relationship between the two.

To be true to their functions, State Security Commissions must be pro-active, timely and disciplined in their approach. They must be composed of the constitutional supervisors of the police and be balanced by diverse expertise.

All this has long been understood by policy makers. Several committees and commissions – from the National Police Commission (1979-1981), Julio Ribeiro Committee (1998, 1999), Padmanabhiah Committee (2000) and the Model Police Act of the Soli Sorabjee Committee (2005) – have consistently recommended the creation of a body that insulates everyday policing from political overreach and unwarranted interference. Finally, in 2006 the Supreme Court in the Prakash Singh case directed that such bodies be set up in each state and at the Centre within three months. The creation of State Security Commissions was a keystone of the Court’s holistic remedy to present day ills.

Eight years on, this report assesses the extent to which the Court’s directive has been complied with. It gives a snapshot of the performance and impact of existing State Security Commissions and offers an evidence base for discussion in the hope that future improvements will be built on the lapses of today.

Police reforms are too important to neglect and too urgent to delay. Too much time has been lost in half-hearted attempts, inadequate capacity and limited political will. The time has come for compliance in earnest.

Maja Daruwala Director, CHRI


Executive SummaryThis is the second national-level report on State Security Commissions (SSC) in India by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI). CHRI’s fi rst report on SSCs was published in 2011 following the Supreme Court’s Prakash Singh judgement in 2006, which ordered their creation. This report provides an update since the fi rst report, and is based largely on data gathered in 2013. The report is divided into two main parts: fi rstly, to what extent have state governments and the Centre complied with the Supreme Court’s directive on paper? Secondly, what have these commissions achieved on the ground in terms of policy-setting and performance evaluation? Ultimately, the report aims to evaluate what State Security Commissions are bringing to the table: Are they proving to be effective mechanisms of police oversight?

FindingsDespite the eight years that have passed, and the various monitoring and compliance efforts by the Supreme Court, the level of compliance with the Supreme Court’s directive on SSCs continues to be low.

Based on the information gathered by CHRI, SSCs have been constituted on paper in 26 states and three UTs to date. However, not one complies with the Court’s design. The Court envisaged an independent body with signifi cant autonomy and the mandate to chart out policies for a more effi cient police organisation. Yet, the balanced composition suggested by the Court has been skewed, and the need for accountability to the legislature and binding powers ignored. The mandate of the Commissions is the only component of the Court’s design that was generally adhered to, however, even then, some states have substantially weakened their Commissions’ mandates.

While 26 states have established SSCs on paper, only 14 states have seen Commissions move from paper to actually functioning. These Commissions have seldom met. Despite their few meetings, based on minutes of meetings received, they have set some important policies on a range of issues, including practical recommendations to: increase police station personnel; guide deployment; upgrade police stations; improve measures for women’s safety; introduce crime mapping; and various guidelines on police service delivery and ensuring lawful arrest and detention. While this provides ample evidence of the body’s potential effectiveness as a policy-making institution, the Commissions were less successful when it came to evaluating police performance based on objective indicators. But for a few exceptions, performance evaluation largely remained at the level of superfi cial assessments based on crime statistics. The Commissions also failed to function at their optimum due to the poor procedure of Commission meetings, and the failure to ensure implementation of policies on the ground.


The cumulative picture that emerges is one of a political executive that is holding on to its fi rm grip on policing, and perhaps also does not have the capacity to exercise a more guiding role. Rather than ushering in independent, external perspectives to set policing policies and evaluate performance, the insularity of the present SSCs perpetuate the executive’s control over policing. Unless this changes, the Commissions will continue to bring little to the table and policing in India will be held back from becoming a responsive, modern, and effi cient public service.

RecommendationsCHRI makes the following recommendations to revive the failing mechanisms:

1. Every Security Commission should include the Leader of the Opposition and a member of the judiciary.

2. Commissions should have fi ve independent members, as recommended by the Model Police Act, 2006.

3. “Independent” members should be appointed by an impartial Selection Panel as suggested by Section 43 of the Model Police Act, 2006.

4. Selection Panels should prepare objective selection criteria for the appointment of independent members.

5. Independent members should be appointed with no further delay.

6. All Security Commissions must prepare annual reports to be submitted to legislatures in time for the budget session.

7. All Security Commissions must comply with Section 4 of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

8. All Security Commissions should be given the power to make binding recommendations.

9. All Security Commissions should be vested with the task of laying down policies and actually conducting the performance evaluation of the police. They should not be given any additional functions.

10. The Commissions should consider bringing in external experts to conduct the specialised function of devising performance indicators and conducting a performance evaluation of the police organization, as provided in Section 26 of the Kerala Police Act, 2011.

11. The Commissions must meet at least every three months.

12. Each Commission should formulate a procedure to govern the conduct of business transacted by it.


Aim of the ReportThe Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) published its fi rst national-level report on SSCs in India in 2011 following a Supreme Court judgement on police reform in 2006 which ordered their creation.1 To determine the extent to which the directive was implemented, CHRI fi led applications under the Right to Information Act, 2005 in 24 states. While 12 states failed to respond, four were candid enough to admit that their Commissions had not met once since being established. With respect to the remaining eight Commissions, the 2011 report found that their impact had been miniscule and their functioning was far removed from the mandate envisaged for them.2

It is now eight years since the Supreme Court’s decision. This is CHRI’s second national-level report on SSCs. It provides an update on substantial developments since the fi rst report and is based largely on data gathered in 2013. Ultimately, it aims to evaluate what State Security Commissions are bringing to the table: Are they effectively moderating police-executive relations? Are they effectively functioning as policy-setting and performance-evaluation mechanisms?

The fi rst chapter sets the scene, outlining the problematic state of police-executive relations in India and the concept of an SSC as a possible solution. It specifi cally focuses on the recommendations of the National Police Commission, Supreme Court and the Soli Sorabjee Committee’s Model Police Act, 2006. The second chapter explores compliance on paper with the Supreme Court’s directive by states and the Centre, identifying trends and gaps in legislation with respect to their composition, mandate and powers. The third chapter assesses the achievements on the ground in terms of the frequency, substance and procedure of meetings. Finally, recommendations are proposed for reforming the Commissions.

MethodologyBeyond what is contained in legislation and media reports, there was virtually no information about the State and Union Territory (UT) Security Commissions in the public domain. As a result, information had to be gathered using the Right to Information Act, 2005 over a six-month period.

On 1 May 2013, Right to Information (RTI) applications were fi led in all 28 states and seven UTs. These were addressed to the Public Information Offi cer (PIO) – the offi cer designated to respond to RTI applications within public authorities – in the Offi ce of the Director General of Police (DGP) for the states,3 and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) for the Centre.

The applications sought information regarding:

1. Government orders/notifi cations creating the Commission;

2. Names, designations and contact details of members currently appointed;

1State Security Commissions: Reform Derailed, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2011, http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/sscrd.pdf.2Arunachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Maharashtra, Meghalaya and Mizoram.3CHRI fi rst sent RTI applications to the Offi ce of the DGP, rather than to state Home Departments, since the DGP is designated as the Secretary of the Security Commissions. It was assumed, therefore, that the requested information would be readily available in the DGP’s Offi ce.


3. The number of times the Commission has met since being established and the dates of such meetings;

4. A certifi ed copy of the minutes of each meeting;

5. The criteria for selecting independent members where provision is made for a selection panel;

6. A certifi ed copy of any rules framed for the working of the Commission; and

7. A certifi ed copy of any reports prepared by the Commission.

As most states failed to provide the requested information within the stipulated 30-day time period, fresh RTI requests were sent to the state Home Departments. Where the information was still not received within 30 days, appeals were fi led with the respective First Appellate Authorities. This report is based on information received as of 31 October 2013.

Secrecy and Confusion Surrounds State Security CommissionsThe information gathering exercise through the RTI Act was a long and drawn out one. It took up to six months to receive information in some cases and in others, no information was received. Ultimately, information was received from all but seven states – Bihar, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and West Bengal.

Although the RTI Act stipulates strict time limits, these were not complied with. Except for Arunachal Pradesh, every state failed to provide information within the stipulated time period of 30 days.

In most cases, the applications were transferred from one PIO to the next within both the Of ice of the DGP and the Home Departments. Under Section 6(3), the RTI Act requires that if a public authority receives a request for information that does not relate to it, it must transfer the application or such part of it to the relevant public authority and inform the applicant immediately about such transfer. It expressly states that the transfer “shall be made as soon as practicable but in no case later than ive days from the date of receipt of the application.” In reality, these transfers took several weeks.

The recurrent transfers suggest that considerable confusion persists as to where SSC-related information is located, and even what the SSC is. In several instances, the application moved from one PIO to another and then back to the original. For instance, in the case of Andhra Pradesh, after languishing with the PIO in the Of ice of the DGP for over a month, the application was transferred to the PIO of the Criminal Investigation Department. Almost a month later, it was returned to the original PIO who inally sent a letter stating that the information was not available.

Some states only provided the information after the irst appeal was iled. This suggests that the Departments failed to take the issue seriously until the involvement of the Information Commission became a possibility. In ive states, namely Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram and West Bengal, our RTI applications failed to elicit a response altogether.

Our RTI requests were expressly refused in three states – Tripura, Haryana, and Jharkhand. Tripura claimed exemption under the RTI Act (further details below). In Haryana, the


information was refused on the grounds that it was already provided on the police’s website, when in fact it was not. Meanwhile, the Home Department of Jharkhand refused to provide the minutes of the SSC’s single meeting, stating that it was an internal matter and could not be circulated “due to security reasons”.4

These refusals are problematic when seen against a guiding principle that determines access to information under the RTI Act: “information which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person.”5 In fact, the Supreme Court required that the SSCs prepare annual reports to be laid before the State Legislature precisely so that their functioning could be made public and be discussed by the legislature.6 Furthermore, Section 8 of the RTI Act provides speci ic exceptions to the obligation to disclose information. In terms of “security” concerns, these include if disclosure would harm national security, or endanger the life or physical safety of a person. It is only for these “security” reasons that information can be denied.

4Section 8 of the RTI Act stipulates specifi c exceptions to the obligation to disclose information. In terms of “security” concerns, these include if disclosure would harm national security, or endanger the life or physical safety of a person. It is only for these “security” reasons that information can be denied, which is clearly not the case here. 5Section 8(1), Right to Information Act, 2005. 6Unfortunately, while most states have adopted the requirement of annual reporting in their Police Acts, few are actually producing annual reports (details provided below).

Introduction

T he central problem with police-executive relations in India is the high levels of illegitimate political interference. This is as true today as it was in 2011, when CHRI fi rst reported on SSCs. Despite nationwide public clamour for better policing since December 2012 – which was

met with legal reform aimed at women in particular7 – the police-politician relationship shows no signs of evolving. The political class continues to resist any tempering of its control over the police through democratic checks and balances.

This interference manifests through policy diktats, legal provisions, and direct and indirect orders,8 which range from doling out arbitrary transfers as punishment, rewarding pliant offi cers with plum postings, using the police for private security, and at times dictating who to arrest or how to “investigate” in specifi c cases. Invariably, these orders are motivated by political expediency and vendetta.

7In December 2012, a young woman was gang-raped in a moving bus in Delhi. She did not survive the horrifi c attack. Nationwide protests ensued calling for women’s safety and central to that, better polic-ing. The central government formed a committee of jurists to examine the gaps in law relating to crimes against women, particularly sexual assault. The Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law produced a report in January 2013 with substantial amendments to criminal law, most of which were passed by Parliament. The Committee also laid down recommendations towards police reform. 8In both its 4th and 5th reports, the Second Administrative Reforms Commission has recommended that issuing illegal or malafi de instructions/directions by any government functionary to any police offi cial should be made an offence. See: Ethics in Governance, Fourth Report, Second Administrative Reforms Commission, January 2007, para 3.2.1.10, p.62 and Public Order, Fifth Report, Second Administrative Reforms Commission, June 2007, para 5.2.18, p.78, http://arc.gov.in/

Improving Police-ExecutiveRelations in India

Chapter

1


Diverting Police Resources for VIP Security

In 2011, according to statistics provided by the Union Home Ministry’s Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPRD), a total of 47,557 police personnel were deployed across the country to ensure the personal security of 14,842 very important people (VIPs), including ministers, parliamentarians, Members of Legislative Assemblies, judges and bureaucrats.9 On average, this amounts to three police of icers for each VIP. Yet, the police-population ratio across the country is an abysmal 176.2 per lakh of population.10 This immensely disproportionate diversion of police resources from their core functions needs urgent attention.

One of the most glaring examples of illegitimate political interference, as pointed out in our 2011 report, involves using the police machinery to perpetuate communal violence.11 Several committees over the years have observed that riots were orchestrated or allowed to simmer for political ends.12 In September 2013, communal riots broke out in Muzzaffarnagar, in the northern State of Uttar Pradesh. Pre-electoral political considerations played a signifi cant role in fanning the fi res.13 The meagre and impotent role of policing in stemming the riots signalled the breakdown of law and order. The violence that was allowed to continue claimed numerous lives and displaced between twenty-fi ve and fi fty thousand people.14

In some cases, the police’s proclivity to please can lead to ludicrous levels of subservience. In early 2014, for instance, a Cabinet Minister of the Uttar Pradesh government ordered an extensive police operation to fi nd seven of his stolen buffaloes. Dog squads, Crime Branch detectives and police offi cers from various police stations were activated in the search; this, in a state with some of the highest rates of violent crime in the country. Although the buffaloes were soon recovered, a sub-inspector and two constables were suspended for dereliction of duty. These suspensions seem to have been directly ordered by politicians; the state Tourism Minister defended the decision by publicly declaring, "We are in power, we know whom to suspend or promote."15 Such remarks illustrate the extent of illegitimate political interference in policing.

9Data on Police Organisation 2012, Bureau of Police Research and Development, 2012, http://bprd.nic.in/showfi le.asp?lid=1047, p. 112. 10Data on Police Organisation 2012, Bureau of Police Research and Development, 2012, http://bprd.nic.in/showfi le.asp?lid=1047, p. 112. 11State Security Commissions: Reform Derailed, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2011, http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/sscrd.pdf, p. 11.12National Police Commission Reports, 1979-1981; Report of the Justice B. N. Srikrishna Commission of Inquiry, 1998.13Riot For Votes: Did Azam Khan ask cops to go slow in Muzaffarnagar? Offi cers say, yes, India Today, 17 Sep-tember 2013, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/muzaffarnagar-headlines-today-sting-riots-for-votes-azam-khan-responsible/1/310315.html. 14Muzaffarnagar Fact Finding Report: Violence by Political Design, Centre for Policy Analysis, 17 September 2013, http://cpadelhi.org/papersreports.htm. 15UP at Azam Khan's call: Policemen suspended for delay in fi nding minister's buffaloes, The Economic Times, 3 February 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-02-03/news/46963263_1_buffa-loes-azam-khan-police-lines.

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While some police leaders have attempted to stand up to such muscle-fl exing, this has often involved a long fi ght without a clear victory. For some months in 2013, the DGP of Maharashtra was at loggerheads with the State Home Minister for appropriating the power to transfer and promote the ranks of police inspectors, assistant police inspectors and police sub-inspectors – a critical mass of personnel in charge of police stations and investigation functions. While these powers plainly belong to the police hierarchy, it became a public war between the Minister and his Police Chief. To his credit, the Chief stuck to his guns and the Minister fi nally returned these powers after a few months.16 Regrettably, the government has recently taken back many of these powers through an Ordinance promulgated to amend the Maharashtra Police Act, which was stealthily passed as an Act by both Houses of the State Legislature in June 2014.17

Regardless of its form, such politicisation of the police has wrought havoc. In addition to shattering the police’s internal command structure, it has severely affected the professionalism and integrity of policing as a public service. The arrogation of powers over transfers and postings to the political executive is in total violation of State Police Manuals, which place transfer powers largely in the domain of the supervisory police ranks.18 The denigration of police regulations has undermined the incentive for honest offi cers to act in conformity with the law and emboldened errant ones to curry favour with those in power. It bears repeating that policing in a democracy is not supposed to serve a regime; it is supposed to be accountable to the law and responsive to the needs of the community.

A major ambiguity within the Police Act of 1861 – which India inherited from the British – is substantially to blame for this situation. Section 3 of the Act provides that “the superintendence of the police throughout a general police district shall vest in and shall be exercised by the Government”. Crucially, the concept of “superintendence” is left undefi ned. In doing so, the 1861 Act fails to delineate the roles of the police, on the one hand, and the political executive on the other. While the political executive undoubtedly has a crucial role to play in ensuring good governance and security within a state, the failure to precisely defi ne the concept has enabled the political executive to liberally impose its own version of

16Patil bows, DGP gets back power to post and transfer, The Indian Express, 23 May 2013, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/patil-bows-dgp-gets-back-power-to-post-and-transfer/1119515/0. 17The Maharashtra Police (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014 came into effect on 1 February 2014. The Maha-rashtra Police (Amendment and Continuance) Ordinance, 2014 was re-promulgated by the Governor on 5 April 2014. The Maharashtra Police (Amendment and Continuance) Act, 2014 was passed by both Houses on 14 June 2014 and assented to by the Governor on 25 June 2014. 18National Police Commission, Second Report, August 1979, paragraph 15.14.

The denigration of police regulations has undermined the incentive for honest of icers to act in conformity with the law and

emboldened errant ones to

curry favour with those in power.

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“superintendence” over the police. Sadly, Police Acts which have been enacted subsequently have not adopted better provisions to carefully defi ne the precise roles of the police and political executive; in fact, many of them codify direct political control.

The National Police CommissionThe National Police Commission (NPC), set up by the post-Emergency government, documented the prevailing conditions of policing in India in eight volumes (1979-81) and recommended far-reaching reforms. In its second report, it categorised police tasks into three areas: investigative, preventive and service-oriented.19 It explained that preventive tasks include preventive arrests, arrangement for beats and patrols, collection of intelligence, maintenance of crime records and handling unlawful assemblies. Service-oriented functions include the rendering of general services during festivals, rescuing lost children in crowds and providing relief during natural disasters. While the executive may provide policy direction to the police on preventive and service-oriented tasks, the NPC stated that the investigative tasks of the police are beyond any kind of intervention by the executive.20 In other words, decisions on who to investigate, search, question, detain, and arrest are operational decisions for the police alone to make. This is a useful guide to understand the areas in which political direction and intervention are welcome in policing, and those which are in the sole domain of the police.

The NPC was the fi rst to call for the establishment of SSCs to function as a buffer body between the political executive and the police.21 In the NPC’s design, an SSC was to be established in each state to:

(i) Lay down broad policy guidelines and directions for the performance of preventive tasks and service-oriented functions by the police;

(ii) Evaluate the performance of the State Police every year and present a report to the State Legislature;

(iii) Function as a forum of appeal for police offi cers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above on being subjected to illegal or irregular orders;

(iv) Function as a forum of appeal for police offi cers on promotion to the rank of Superintendent of Police and above; and

(v) Generally review the functioning of the police in the State.

This, it asserted, would allow for broad policy control by the executive while simultaneously ensuring that there is no intrusion into the police’s operational responsibilities. Illegitimate interference would be kept in check as governmental responsibility for overseeing the police would be regulated through a mechanism representative of both government and non-government members. The NPC

19National Police Commission, Second Report, August 1979, paragraph 15.39.20National Police Commission, Second Report, August 1979, paragraph 15.42. 21The SSC has been a recurring recommendation of several committees on police reform following the NPC, including the Ribeiro Committee (1998, 1999) and the Padmanabhiah Committee (2000).

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recommended that four of the seven members should be retired Judges of the High Court, retired government servants, social scientists or academicians of public standing and eminence.22 External perspectives would be crucial for the performance-evaluation function of the Commission. In the NPC’s words, these “members of known integrity and impartiality drawn from various cross-sections of society would have no temptation not to call a spade a spade.”23

Evaluating Organisational Police PerformanceOne of the critical aspects of the NPC’s recommendation involved mandating the SSC to evaluate the performance of the police as an organisation. Although there are two existing institutional mechanisms for assessing police performance, their implementation is inadequate. As a result, there has been no proper systemic evaluation of the organisational performance of the police year on year. Well-functioning SSCs would go a long way to plug this gap.

The irst existing mechanism of police performance is the Annual Administration Report (AAR). This report attempts to present a picture of the standard of policing within a state during a speci ic period, usually a calendar year. It is supposed to be compiled by the state police department and submitted to the state government for input and presentation to the Legislative Assembly for discussion. In reality, as the NPC reiterated, these reports are compiled through statistics provided at the police-station level, where the registration of crime is actively suppressed. Moreover, there is a considerable time lag in most states between the date of submission of the AAR to the Legislative Assembly and the period to which it relates.24

Secondly, some Police Acts25 and most Police Manuals call for periodic inspection of police stations by the District Superintendent of Police to scrutinise and review the functioning of police stations. For instance, the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 – applicable to Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Delhi – provide that every police station shall be thoroughly inspected by a gazetted of icer twice a year, at least one of which will be carried out by the Superintendent. In addition to examining registers, these inspections are supposed to assess the technical ef iciency of investigating staff and the level of cooperation with neighbouring police stations.

The Rules specify that these formal inspections must be supplemented with informal inspections as frequently as the Superintendent may consider necessary. At such inspections, the aim is for the Superintendent to get acquainted with the personnel of the police station and to discuss matters concerning current crime cases with the of icer-in-charge. “They shall assist such of icer with advice, direction, encouragement or warning as may be required, and shall listen to and deal with any requests he or his subordinates may have to make.”26

This is the basic template of the periodic inspection, which if done regularly, can be a truly effective supervisory and oversight practice. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in practice these inspections are a rarity. With no reporting or information in the public domain about such inspections, there is nothing to verify that these are actually taking place.

22National Police Commission, Second Report, August 1979, paragraph 15.46.23National Police Commission, Eighth Report, May 1981, paragraph 61.13.24National Police Commission, Eighth Report, May 1981, paragraph 61.11. 25Section 47, Himachal Pradesh Police Act, 2007. 26Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Volume 2, p. 832.


In the absence of effective performance evaluation mechanisms, the most commonly used parameter to assess police performance is a comparison of crime statistics of the period under review with those of previous years. If the number of offences registered during the period under review is less than those in preceding years, a super icial conclusion is drawn that the police have succeeded in controlling crime. This has given rise to questionable methods employed by police of icers to bring down crime igures by not registering crimes or otherwise suppressing them. With governments keen to report that crime is under control, most turn a blind eye to such malpractices, or actively encourage them.27

The problem with this prevailing practice is that it does not provide a true assessment of how the police have actually performed in terms of operational ef iciency, service delivery and accountability to name a few. This makes it nearly impossible to accurately identify the police’s shortcomings.

In its eighth and inal report, the NPC identi ied the following yardsticks for state police organisations to aid their objective evaluation of police performance and discourage extra-legal methods to burk crime. These are very useful and remain relevant today:

(1) Prevention of Crime:

(i) Sense of security prevailing in the community.

(ii) People’s willing cooperation and participation secured by the police in preventing crime.

(2) Investigation of Crime:

(i) Correct registration of crime.

(ii) Prompt visit to the scene of occurrence.

(iii) Speedy investigation.

(iv) Honesty and impartiality in investigation.

(3) Law and Order:

(i) Extent to which law and order is maintained, taking into account the forces that promote lawlessness.

(ii) The manner in which law and order is maintained. Two factors have to be judged: (a) People’s cooperation, (b) Use of force.

(4) Traf ic Management:

(i) Smooth low of traf ic in urban areas and control of fatal and serious accidents by prosecuting persistent offenders.

(5) Service:

(i) General spirit of service, especially to weaker sections, physically handicapped, women and children.

(ii) Quality of service rendered in a distress situation such as cyclone-havoc lood-damage, famine etc.

(iii) Speci ic instances of service-oriented functions performed by the police, which drew special appreciation and gratitude from the public.

27After the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013 was passed, it is a punishable offence for a police offi cer not to register a sexual offence under section 166A of the Indian Penal Code. Moreover, the Supreme Court in November 2013 affi rmed in Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that any information dis-closing a cognizable offence laid before an offi cer-in-charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be registered, with slight exceptions in a few limited and specifi ed circumstances.


(6) Reputation of integrity and courtesy:

(i) General reputation.

(ii) Police collusion with criminals organising illicit distillation, gambling, economic crimes, prostitution etc.

(iii) Reputation for courteous behaviour.

(iv) Prompt and satisfactory enquiry into complaints against policemen.28

The NPC pointed out that the SSCs’ performance-evaluation mandate did not exist in a vacuum. It was to work in tandem with the prevailing system of AARs and police station inspections. In its eighth and fi nal report, it stated that while the AARs of the State Police “will naturally be an important document to aid the State Security Commission in the evaluation of the performance of the State Police... the [AARs] generally project only a quantitative assessment. It is not possible to have an accurate idea of the qualitative satisfaction of people from such reports. We therefore recommend that the State Security Commission be also provided an independent Cell to evaluate police performance, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. This Cell should not be a part of the police and may include experts from other disciplines. The preparation of the fi nal report, to be put up before the Legislature by the State Security Commission itself will lend the report greater acceptability.”29

The NPC concluded that the system it suggested would bring to the notice of the Home Minister a more reliable and detailed picture of the state’s policing. Hopeful for change, it stated that this system would enable the Minister to take the necessary corrective steps to ensure better policing in a state.

Long Road to ReformAfter the NPC reports, several other committees and commissions analysed the issue of police reform and echoed the NPC’s recommendations regarding SSCs. This included the Julio Ribeiro Committee (1998, 1999); the Padmanabhiah Committee (2000); the Soli Sorabjee Committee (2005); and the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (2007). Ample guidance is available, yet so many decades on, proper implementation is manifestly lacking.

Supreme Court Prakash Singh JudgementAfter more than two decades of non-compliance with the recommendations of the NPC and subsequent committees, the Supreme Court of India in September 2006 handed down a landmark decision on police reform in Prakash Singh and Others v. Union of India and Others.30

The Court expressed “hope that all State Governments would rise to the occasion and enact a new Police Act wholly insulating the police from any pressure

28National Police Commission, Eighth Report, May 1981, paragraph 61.42.29National Police Commission, Eighth Report, May 1981, paragraph 61.12. 30Prakash Singh and Others v Union of India and Others (2006) 8 SCC 1.

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whatsoever, thereby placing in position an important measure for securing the rights of the citizens under the Constitution”. However, it was no longer possible or proper to wait for this to happen. The Court ordered that the seven directives were to be made operative until new legislation is enacted by the state governments. The Court also required the Central Government to comply with the directives with respect to the UTs.

In its fi rst directive, the Court gave judicial backing to the NPC’s recommendations on the SSC. It directed all state governments to establish an SSC, designed “to ensure that the State Government does not exercise unwarranted infl uence or pressure on the State police and for laying down the broad

policy guidelines so that the State police always acts according to the laws of the land and the Constitution of the country.” The function of SSCs would “include laying down the broad policies and giving directions for the performance of the preventive tasks and service-oriented functions of the police, evaluation of the performance of the state police and preparing a report thereon for being placed before the state legislature.”

In order to fulfi l its policy-making and performance evaluation mandate, the composition of the SSC needed to offset the powerful interests of the government. While it was to be chaired by the Chief / Home Minister and include the DGP as its Secretary, it would include the Leader of the Opposition to ensure bipartisanship. The Court directed that the other members on the Commission were to be chosen such that the body is “able to function independent of government control”.

States were given the discretion to choose between the models recommended by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), the Ribeiro Committee and the Soli Sorabjee Committee, as set out in the following table:

NHRC Ribeiro Committee Soli Sorabjee Committee (Model Police Act)

1. Chief Minister/Home Minister as Chairperson

1. Minister in charge of police as Chairperson

1. Home Minister as Chairperson

2. Leader of Opposition 2. Leader of Opposition 2. Leader of Opposition

3. Chief Secretary 3. Chief Secretary 3. Chief Secretary

4. Secretary in charge of the Home Department

In order to ful il its policy-making and performance

evaluation mandate, the composition

of the SSC needed to offset

the powerful interests of the

government.

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4. A sitting or retired judge, nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court

4. A sitting or retired judge, nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court

5. A retired High Court Judge nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court

5. Lok Ayukta or, in his absence, a retired Judge of the High Court, nominated by the Chief Justice or a member of the State Human Rights Commission

5. Three non-political citizens of proven merit and integrity, appointed on the recommendation of a Selection Panel

6. Five non-political persons of proven reputation for integrity and competence from the fi elds of academia, law, public administration, media or NGOs, appointed on the recommendation of a Selection Panel

6. DGP as Secretary 6. DGP as Secretary 7. DGP as Secretary

By including “non-political citizens” or independent members, the models sought to introduce direct civilian oversight into police-executive relations. Democratic governance requires that the very people who will be affected by policies should have a say in their design, crafting and evaluation. Transparent and inclusive policy-making is more likely to refl ect the will of the people. The independent members would bring to bear diverse skill-sets and perspectives crucial to the tasks of evolving policing policy and evaluating the performance of the police. Meanwhile, a retired judge would further shield the body from the pulls and pressures of the government of the day.

To protect against government manipulation, two of the models provided for a process of selecting the independent members. Under the Ribeiro Committee’s model, the three non-political citizens were to be chosen by a committee set up by the Chairperson of the NHRC.31 Under the Soli Sorabjee model, the fi ve independent members were to be appointed on the recommendation of a selection panel comprising:

(i) A retired Chief Justice of a High Court as its Chairperson, nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court;

(ii) The Chairperson of the State Human Rights Commission, or in the absence of such a Commission, a person nominated by the Chairperson of the NHRC; and

(ii) The Chairperson of the State Public Service Commission.32

Model Police Act, 2006 One month after the Prakash Singh judgement, the Soli Sorabjee Committee released its Model Police Act, 2006, which provided a legislative model for the states and the Centre to enact new police legislation and implement the Court’s directives. Drafted by a Committee appointed by the Central Government under

31Ribeiro Committee on Police Reforms, First Report, October 1998.32Section 43, Model Police Act, 2006.


the chairmanship of former Attorney General Mr Soli Sorabjee, it was sent to the government in October 2006.

The Model Police Act, 2006 calls for the setting up of a State Police Board (SPB) with a composition as set out in the table above. In order to protect the impartiality of the SPB, it provides for three-year tenure to the non-offi cial members33 and lays down specifi ed grounds for their premature removal.34

Unlike the Prakash Singh judgement, which used general language, the Model Police Act, 2006 spells out the mandate of the body in precise terms. Under Section 48, the functions of the SPB involve:

(a) Framing broad policy guidelines for promoting effi cient, effective, responsive and accountable policing, in accordance with the law;

(b) Preparing panels of police offi cers for the rank of Director General of Police against prescribed criteria;

(c) Identifying performance indicators to evaluate the functioning of the Police Service. These indicators shall, inter alia, include: operational effi ciency, public satisfaction, victim satisfaction vis-à-vis police investigation and response, accountability, optimum utilisation of resources, and observance of human rights standards; and

(d) Reviewing and evaluating organisational performance of the Police Service in the state as a whole as well as district-wise against (i) the Annual Plan, (ii) performance indicators as identifi ed and laid down, and (iii) resources available with and constraints of the police.”35

Policing Plans and Empanelling the Rank of DGPIn addition to the mandate suggested by the Court, the Model Police Act, 2006 requires the SPB to prepare Strategic and Annual Plans in consultation with the government36 and a shortlist for selection of the DGP.

Annual policing plans, which identify targets that the police department will seek to achieve in the upcoming budget year, could provide much-needed policy direction to police organisations. Ideally, these plans should be drafted through a process of consultation, irstly with the public in relation to the type of police service they want, and secondly within the police rank and ile for the type of police service they want to be a part of.

To immunise the process of selection from potential improper in luence, the Supreme Court in the Prakash Singh case speci ically required that the Chief of Police be selected from a panel of three candidates chosen by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). The shortlisting process will ensure that the Chief of Police is not appointed on the sole discretion of the state government. However, instead of the UPSC, the Model Police Act, 2006 suggested that the SSC should be the responsible body to empanel potential candidates eligible for the post of DGP.

All of these go to show the myriad policy suggestions in place to temper and limit, but not extinguish, the political executive’s role vis à vis the police.

33Section 45, Model Police Act, 2006. 34Section 25, Model Police Act, 2006. 35Section 48, Model Police Act, 2006.36Section 40, Model Police Act, 2006.


Seventeen states have passed new police legislation or amended police laws since 2006, ostensibly to implement the Prakash Singh directives. Some have adopted the detailed language employed by the Model Police Act, 2006 while others have opted for the language used by the Court. Meanwhile, nine states and three UTs have set up SSCs via government order.

Compliance Efforts In May 2008, the Supreme Court set up a three-member Monitoring Committee to look into the implementation of the Court’s Prakash Singh directives. Headed by former Supreme Court Justice, K. T. Thomas, the Committee examined affi davits fi led by the Central and state governments and the new Police Acts legislated by some of the states. Unsatisfi ed with the attempts of the states to comply only on paper, the Committee felt the need to look into ground realities. It visited Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka and West Bengal, and fi led four interim reports between October 2008 and December 2009. It submitted its fi nal report to the Court in August 2010, which painted an abysmal picture of state compliance with the directives.

Based on the report, the Supreme Court on 8 November 2010 took serious note of the lack of compliance and issued notices to the four errant states, asking their Chief Secretaries to appear before the Court. After being summoned, some states hurriedly set up SSCs. Uttar Pradesh constituted an SSC by government order, but it continues to exist on paper only. Madhya Pradesh, responding in haste to a contempt petition, set up an SSC via executive order overnight. West Bengal, which had also come in for criticism by the Court for including the Health Minister of the State as the Chairman of the Commission, replaced the former with the Chief Minister.

In March 2013, a different bench of the Supreme Court headed by Justice Singhvi took suo moto notice of two incidents of police brutality and excess use of force in Taran Taran in Punjab and Patna in Bihar. During the course of its hearings, the Court issued notices to the Central and state governments requiring them to fi le affi davits on the issue of implementation of the directives.

In April 2013, the reconstituted Bench took up the compliance of the fi rst directive on SSCs and began issuing notices to different states. Since many states had simply ignored the Court’s directives, the Bench made it clear that the states would not be spared for disobedience. Several states have since hurriedly set up SSCs to avoid censure by the Singhvi Bench, including Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. Since then, Justice Singhvi has retired and the fate of these proceedings is uncertain.

The Present SituationIt is now eight years since the Supreme Court’s decision in the Prakash Singh case. Despite the years that have passed, and the various monitoring and compliance efforts by the Supreme Court, the level of compliance with the Court’s directive on SSCs continues to be low. Compositions have been modifi ed, mandates diluted and powers limited. As a result, the independence of the Commissions and their

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ability to be effective has been incrementally undermined. The fact that most of the Commissions have not been given binding powers renders them, at best, advisory bodies whose recommendations can be ignored by the government when they are inconvenient. It comes as no surprise, then, that the Commissions are failing to gain traction in most states, let alone make a long-lasting impact on policing policy.

The cumulative picture that emerges is one of a political executive that does not wish to let go of its fi rm grip on policing and perhaps also does not have the capacity to exercise a more guiding role. Rather than ensuring legitimate monitoring and guidance by the executive, the present SSCs perpetuate the executive’s control over the police. Unless this changes, the police will be held back from becoming a people-oriented police service for the twenty-fi rst century.

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State Security Commissions on Paper: Upsetting the Balance Struck by the Supreme Court Directive

Chapter

2

Based on the information gathered by CHRI, SSCs have been constituted in 26 states and three UTs since the Supreme Court’s Prakash Singh judgement. The Annex outlines the establishment, composition, mandate and powers of each SSC. Regrettably, not a single one complies

with the Court’s design.

Delayed EstablishmentTo establish SSCs, nine states issued government orders and 17 states passed legislation through new Police Acts or legislative amendments. While most states passed legislation in 2007, others have taken considerably longer. Recently, the trend has been for states to fi rst promulgate an Ordinance and then pass an Act with little debate or public consultation. This is true of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and now Maharashtra.


Although several states passed legislation establishing SSCs soon after the Prakash Singh decision, most SSCs only came into being after government notifi cations were issued several years later. This was even the case where the legislation prescribed a time limit. In Haryana, for instance, although the Police Act required the State Government to establish the body within three months,37 it was brought into existence – and then only on paper – via a government notifi cation two years later.

Troubling Inconsistencies In addition to delaying the establishment of SSCs, state governments have in some instances departed from legislation while issuing noti ications. Himachal Pradesh is a stark example in this regard. Although the Himachal Pradesh Police Act, 2007 requires the Director of the State Police Training Academy to be a member of the SPB, the noti ication bringing the Board into existence omits this member. Clearly, legislation overrides and this is a glaring example of non-compliance. It is all the more damaging given that the Act speci ically foresees a role for the Director of the Academy to present an Annual Report on behalf of all training institutions to the SPB.38 The idea was to ensure that any training needs could be addressed with the presence of this member. Regrettably, this unique and forward-thinking provision

has not seen the light of day.

It is worth mentioning that while most states have chosen to call the body an SSC, some have employed the language of the Model Police Act, 2006, which refers to an SPB. Meanwhile, the Police Acts in Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan refer to a State Police Commission (SPC).

37Section 25, Haryana Police Act, 2007.38Section 18(3), Himachal Pradesh Police Act, 2007.

Manner in which States Established SSCs

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Number of States

GovernmentOrder

SSC not established

Legislation


Compromised CompositionsAcross the board, the political executive and legislature have methodically upset the carefully balanced composition suggested for the SSCs by the Supreme Court. It is important to note that even seemingly minor modifi cations are cause for concern. The models were subject to a long process of deliberation before being decided on. They provide for a carefully balanced composition of government and police offi cials on the one hand, and non-government members on the other (with the exception of the NHRC’s model which does not provide for independent members). The independence sought by these models is integral for a commission whose very purpose is to act as a buffer between the police and the political executive. The following section points out trends in how the compositions of SSCs have been compromised.

Dominating Political Executive In many states, there is a discernible trend of overloading SSCs with members from the political executive rather than opening them up to external perspectives. Bihar is one example. Its SPB is a three-member body headed by the Chief Secretary, with the DGP and Home Secretary as members.39 Haryana and Karnataka, to take other examples, include two additional political actors on their Commissions, namely the Home Minister as Vice-Chairperson and the Home Secretary.40 Along with the Chief Minister and Chief Secretary, this tilts the numbers in favour of the government and police, upsetting the careful balance suggested by the Court. This kind of insular design defeats the very purpose of the body, which is to usher in external oversight for policing. The remaining states fall somewhere in between, having set up Commissions that vaguely resemble one of the three suggested models, but with modifi cations to the original structure.

This is not to say that an increased number of civil servants is always amiss. The Himachal Pradesh and Sikkim Police Acts include the Principal Secretaries of the Finance and Social Justice departments. The former also includes the Directors of Prosecution and Forensic Science.41 While these compositions do not adhere to the Court’s suggested models, they can be a valuable asset. Having the Principal Secretaries of the Home and Finance Departments as members may mean that resources and fi nances for implementing recommendations can be allocated faster. Involving the Principal Secretary of the Social Justice Department in setting

39Section 24, Bihar Police Act, 2007.40Section 26, Haryana Police Act, 2007. 41Section 49, Himachal Pradesh Police Act, 2007; Section 40, Sikkim Police Act, 2008.

Across the board, the political

executive and legislature have

methodically upset the

carefully balanced composition suggested for

the SSCs by the Supreme Court.


policy and evaluating police performance is forward thinking, considering the importance of just and good policing for that portfolio. Moreover, having the Directors of Prosecution and Forensic Science on the Commission could go a long way to strengthen crime investigation, thereby enhancing police performance. Of course, the other side is that these additional members only skew the Commission’s composition toward being bureaucrat-heavy. Principal Secretaries and others can be invited to Commission meetings for their suggestions and assistance, and a system for release of funds can be worked out. Ultimately, whichever approach is adopted, it is most crucial that the independence and effi ciency of SSCs are prioritised.

Undermining ImpartialityThe Supreme Court provided specifi c safeguards to ensure impartiality in the Commissions’ overall outlook. It insisted that all Commissions include the Leader of the Opposition and a retired judge. Furthermore, the Ribeiro and Sorabjee models suggested by the Court require independent members to be chosen by a selection panel. These three components are crucial for the independence and credibility of a body like an SSC and introduce bipartisanship, judicial evenhandedness and civil society perspectives. In many ways, these are non-negotiable features if a state government is vested in establishing a truly impartial Security Commission. Unfortunately, as the following table demonstrates, these necessary components have not been consistently adopted, and in some states, were completely disregarded.

Three Components of Impartiality

State / Union Territory Leader of Opposition

Retired Judge

Number of independent members and their Selection Process

Andhra Pradesh State Security Commission

Yes No 5. Nominated by the Government

Arunachal Pradesh State Security Commission

Yes No 5. Nominated by Selection Panel from a shortlist provided by the Government

Assam State Security Commission

No Yes 3. Nominated by the Government

Bihar State Police Board No No 0

Chhattisgarh State Police Commission

No No 2. Nominated by the Government

Goa State Security Commission

Yes Yes 0

Gujarat State Security Commission

No No 2. Nominated by the Government

Haryana State Police Board



State / Union Territory Leader of Opposition

Retired Judge

Number of independent members and their Selection Process

Himachal Pradesh State Police Board

Yes No 3. Nominated by Selection Panel from a shortlist provided by the Government

Jharkhand State Security Commission


Jammu & Kashmir Not constituted. State has requested exemption from the Directive

Karnataka State Security Commission

Yes Yes 0

Kerala State Security Commission

Yes Yes 3. Nominated by the Governor

Madhya Pradesh State Security Commission


Maharashtra State Security Commission


Manipur State Security Commission


Meghalaya Security Commission

Yes No 2. Nominated by Selection Panel

Mizoram State Security Commission

Yes Yes 2. Nominated by the Government

Nagaland State Security Commission

Yes Yes 3. Nominated by the Government

Odisha Not constituted.

Punjab State Police Board No No 0

Rajasthan State Police Commission

Yes No 3. Nominated by Selection Committee

Sikkim State Police Board Yes Yes 3. Nominated by Selection Panel

Tamil Nadu State Security Commission

Yes No 0

Tripura State Police Board No Yes 2. Nominated by the Government

Uttarakhand State Police Board

Yes No 3. Nominated by Selection Panel

Uttar Pradesh Security Commission


West Bengal Yes Yes 0


(i) Leader of the Opposition and a Retired Judge The glaring absence of the Leader of the Opposition and a retired judge from many Commissions is discouraging. All three of the Court’s suggested models required these members.

Six states fail to include the Leader of the Opposition,42 while as many as 17 states make no provision for a retired High Court Judge. Four states – Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat and Punjab – fail on both counts.

Two noteworthy trends emerge in the way states have implemented the requirement to include a retired judge. Firstly, the Advocate General has been put in the place of a retired judge in three states.43 Although part of the judiciary, the Advocate General is appointed by the Governor of each State and holds offi ce during his “pleasure”.44 This could impact his or her impartiality.

Secondly, the retired judges that were appointed to the SSCs in the States of Goa, Kerala, and Tripura happen to be the Chairs of the respective State Police Complaints Authorities (PCA). Tasked with handling complaints of misconduct made against the police, the PCAs were the second accountability mechanism recommended by the Supreme Court in the Prakash Singh case, and were to be chaired by retired High Court Judges. From the notifi cations in these states, it is unclear whether these individuals were appointed in their personal capacities as retired judges, or in their capacities as PCA Chairs. There is good reason for an institutional relationship between the two bodies; the knowledge gained by a PCA of systemic fl aws in policing through its inquiries into police misconduct must be shared with the SSC if the latter is to accurately evaluate the police’s performance. It would be well advised for explicit provision to be made requiring SSCs and PCAs to interact regularly.

(ii) Independent MembersThe importance of having independent members on the Security Commissions lies in their ability to provide diverse perspectives from outside government and public offi ce, adding voices, skill sets, and experiences that represent a wider cross section of society. The inclusion of qualifi ed, transparently chosen non-government members may also begin to build public trust in the police and shape policies that are more likely to enjoy widespread consensus. Unfortunately, looking at the numbers, profi les and selection processes of the “independent” members on the SSCs, it becomes clear that there is no such intent.

While 20 states have made provision for independent members, their numbers have been reduced from the maximum (and ideal) prescribed in the suggested models. Commissions that otherwise resemble the Sorabjee model are composed with three, instead of fi ve, independent members. In other states – Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura and Uttar Pradesh – the number of

42Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Punjab and Tripura.43Haryana, Jharkhand and Punjab.44Article 165, Constitution of India.

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independent members is lowered to two. States like Bihar, Goa, Karnataka and Punjab have gone to the other extreme and have no independent members on their Commissions.

To protect against arbitrary removal of independent members by the government, the Model Police Act, 2006 recommends three-year tenure and specifi c grounds for removal. Furthermore, to ensure a dynamic turnover of views, it insists that, “the same person shall not be appointed for more than two consecutive terms.”45 It is rewarding to note that most states grant three-year tenure to the independent members.46 Kerala provides for fi ve-year tenure for all its members including the non-offi cial ones,47 while the Police Acts of Chhattisgarh,48 Uttarakhand49 and Maharashtra50 provide for two-year tenure.

Making provision for independent members is one issue. Appointing such members is entirely another. According to the information received, while 55 independent members were appointed across the country (including the UTs), independent members exist solely on paper in seven states. These are Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Tripura and Uttar Pradesh.

Some of these Commissions were established years ago and even hold meetings without these appointments. In Himachal Pradesh, although the SPB was established in 2008, the DGP indicated in its third meeting in February 2012 that independent members would be nominated “very soon”.51 This is discouraging. If independent members continue to exist on paper, the balanced composition envisaged by the Court fails to take effect and the Commissions are at risk of simply acting as an instrument of the executive. The delay in appointing independent members intimates that states are not interested in building independent Commissions.

The profi les and backgrounds of the 55 individuals appointed as independent members are also revealing. Their profi les are depicted in the chart over the page.

Seven states have appointed a retired Indian Police Service (IPS) offi cer and/or a retired Indian Administrative Service (IAS) offi cer as an “independent” member.52

There is no denying that retired offi cers have critical policing and administrative expertise. However, the Court’s directive required balance and suffi cient representation of varied skillsets and backgrounds. The need for former IAS offi cers is therefore questionable considering the already heavyweight representation of the political executive through the Chief / Home Minister and Chief Secretary.

More disturbingly, the states of Madhya Pradesh, Mizoram and Nagaland have included serving and/or former Members of Parliament (MP) and Members of the

45Section 46, Model Police Act 2006.46Assam, Guajarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tripura. 47Section 24(4), Kerala Police Act 2011. 48Section 18(1), Chhattisgarh Police Act 2007.49Section 33, Uttarakhand Police Act 2007.50Section 22B(7), Maharashtra Police (Amendment and Continuance) Act, 2014.51Himachal Pradesh SPB, Meeting Minutes, 3 February 2012.52Assam, Haryana, Jharkhand, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Mizoram and Uttarakhand.

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Legislative Assembly (MLA) on their Commissions as independent members. The inclusion of serving legislators blatantly contradicts the notion of an independent member. Section 45 of the Model Police Act, 2006 expressly provides that the holding of an elected offi ce, including that of MP or MLA, makes one ineligible to be a member.

On the other hand, it is encouraging that some states have independent members with diverse profi les, including advocates53 and Vice Chancellors of universities, as in Gujarat, Jharkhand and Manipur (which has three such members).

An Innovation Gone Wrong?In Tamil Nadu, the Police Act includes the Chairs of various state commissions, including the Public Service Commission, State Women’s Commission, State Human Rights Commission and State Minorities Commission as ex-of icio members.54 Presumably, these posts ill the role of “independent” members as no other independent members are included. It is unrealistic to expect Chairpersons of full-time bodies to have the time to properly ful il their role on the SSC. This is not a judicious way of building the SSC as a sustainable institution in its own right.

(iii) Selection of Independent Members Equally important as the profi les of independent members, is the process of their selection. Have they been rigorously selected through an independent panel and process? As mentioned above, the Model Police Act, 2006 lays down the following selection panel to shortlist candidates for the posts of independent members: a

53Haryana, Meghalaya and Kerala.54Section 5(2), Tamil Nadu (Reforms) Act, 2013.

Profi les of Appointed Independent Members

Retired bureaucrats

Retired police offi cers

Acadamecians

Civil Society

Serving/Retired MLAs or MPs

Advocates

Retired Judges

Industrialist

Unknown

15

9

7

7

6

4

2

14


retired Chief Justice of the High Court, the Chairperson of the State Human Rights Commission and the Chairperson of the State Public Service Commission.55

In almost all states, the government has the power to unilaterally select the independent members. There is no arms-length process of selection. Only six states provide for a selection panel.56

This is also true of ostensibly progressive states such as Kerala. While the Act provides for three non-offi cial members, they are to be nominated by the Governor rather than through an independent selection panel. Considering the care and effort taken in drafting the Kerala Police Act, it is disappointing that such an important safeguard for the independence of a body like the SSC is not in legislation. Maharashtra also sets a bad example. In its July 2013 Government Order setting up an SSC, provision was made for a panel to shortlist candidates as independent members in line with the Model Police Act, 2006.57 However the 2014 Act makes no such provision and instead, the state government is to nominate the fi ve independent members. In effect, the government has diluted its own Order. This is an unfortunate and regressive move.

Circular Selection ProcessIn Arunachal Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, independent shortlisting has been scrapped. While selection panels have been established, they are to choose independent members from a shortlist provided by the government. The Security Commission for Delhi suffers from the same circularity despite the provision for a Search Committee. These provisions run the risk of generating political appointees.58

The composition of existing selection panels is varied. While some are more independent than others, there is not a single panel that conforms fully to the Model Police Act, 2006. The chart over the page sets out the selection panels provided for in legislation.

The selection panels constituted in Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Sikkim come closest to the impartiality required by the Model Police Act, 2006, though as mentioned above, in Arunachal Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, the panels do not have the power to shortlist candidates. In Rajasthan and Uttarakhand, the Home Minister, who is the Chairperson of the SSC in each state, is included on the selection panel. Having the Chairperson of the SSC select the very members who are supposed to bring balance and neutrality is counterproductive. Meghalaya’s selection panel is the least independent, with three members of the Commission itself on the panel – the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and DGP.59

55Section 43, Model Police Act, 2006. 56Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Rajasthan, Sikkim and Uttarakhand.57Maharashtra Government, Home Department Resolution No. SSC-1013/CR-108/Pol-3, 10 July 2013.58The Meghalaya selection panel consists of a retired Chief Justice/ Justice of a High Court as Chairper-son, to be nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court; Chief Secretary; Principal Secretary/Secretary Home; and DGP.In the case of Rajasthan, it consists of the Leader of the Opposition, the Home Minister and the Chairman of the State Human Rights Commission.59Section 38, Meghalaya Police Act, 2010.


Having a suitably composed selection panel is all well and good. However, that is of no consequence in the absence of proper selection criteria. A wide knowledge of policing and the skills to conduct a systematic performance evaluation are some of the specifi c attributes that are required. Selection criteria aimed at such attributes ensures that independent members are selected according to objective factors, rather than on the basis of personal connections or vested interests.

Yet, most Police Acts remain vague on this issue. The most guidance provided is a requirement to the effect that independent members have integrity and be appointed from certain fi elds. Assam is one of the better examples. Its Police Act calls for: “Three non-political persons of high integrity, expertise and competence in administration, law enforcement and security related matters, to be nominated by the State Government, including a police offer not below the rank of DGP, a retired civil service offi cer not below the rank of Commissioner and Secretary, and a member from the fi elds of public service, legal profession or social organization with at least 15 years expertise in the fi eld.”60

The Model Police Act, 2006, required the Selection Panel to “evolve its own procedure to select independent members through a transparent process.”61 Only the Himachal Pradesh,62 Meghalaya, and Sikkim Police Acts include such a provision. However, a selection procedure remains to be seen on the ground.

Our RTI requests for the selection criteria used to choose independent members garnered little information. They were either met with no response, or with reference to a legislative provision outlining the grounds of ineligibility for independent members, based on Section 45 of the Model Police Act 2006:

No person shall be appointed as an Independent Member if he:

(a) Is not a citizen of India; or

60Section 35(f), Assam Police Act, 2007. 61Section 44, Model Police Act, 2006.62Section 50(3), Himachal Pradesh Police Act, 2007.

Selection Panels for Independent Members

Retired High Court Judge

Retired IAS Offi cer

Chair, State Public Service Commission

Lokayukta

Chief Information Commissioner


Retired Chief Justice/ Justice of a High Court

Chief Secretary

Principal Secretary / Home(P) Secretary

DGP

Leader of the Opposition

Home Minister

Chair, State Human Rights Commission

Retired Chief Justice or Judge of a High Court

Chair, State Election Commission


Chief Minister

Speaker, State Legislative Assembly

Home Minister

Leader of the Opposition

Aru

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Him

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Meg

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Raj

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Sikk

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(b) Has been convicted by a court of law or against whom charges have been framed in a court of law; or

(c) Has been dismissed or removed from service or compulsorily retired on the grounds of corruptions or misconduct; or

(d) Holds an elected offi ce, including that of Member of Parliament or State Legislature or a local body, or is an offi ce-bearer or member of any political party or any organisation connected with a political party; or

(e) Is of unsound mind.

Grounds for ineligibility are not grounds for selection; in fact, they are quite the opposite.

Weakened MandatesMost Commissions have been given the basic mandate suggested by the Court: to set policing standards and conduct an evaluation of police performance. A few states go further, adopting the language of the Model Police Act, 2006 and vest their Commissions with the task of also identifying performance indicators, drafting strategic plans in consultation with the state government and preparing a shortlist of offi cers for the rank of DGP. While the Supreme Court assigned this latter function to the UPSC, it was assigned to the SPB in the Model Police Act, 2006, with which CHRI is in full agreement.

Ensuring that the police service is adequately provisioned in terms of staff strength and infrastructure is crucial for better policing in a state. It is welcoming, then, that the Punjab and Himachal Pradesh Commissions are mandated to respectively “identify shortcomings regarding infrastructure and equipment in police”63 and “approve from time to time the sanctioned strength of the various ranks of the Non-Gazetted Police Offi cers and Gazetted State Police Service Offi cers”.64 While the Supreme Court directive did not expressly provide for these functions, they accord with its spirit.

Rajasthan’s Police Act also contains progressive provisions. Section 26 provides that the State Police Commission may “analyse crimes in the State and suggest preventative measures”65 and “prepare a training policy for police offi cers of different ranks and categories”.66 These functions aim to ensure that the police are well-trained and focused on crime prevention; they are very appropriate for SSCs.

Unfortunately, the mandates and stature of other SSCs are signifi cantly weakened through mitigating language and additional tasks that tend to divert them from their main focus. In some states, SSCs are reduced to merely advisory bodies in law. For instance, the Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan Police Acts task their Commissions

63Section 28, Punjab Police Act, 2007.64Section 53(ii), Himachal Pradesh Police Act, 2007.65Section 26(e), Rajasthan Police Act, 2007.66Section 26(g), Rajasthan Police Act, 2007.


to “advise the State Government on policy guidelines”, “assist the state government in identifying performance indicators” and “communicate [their] views periodically on the performance of the police”.67 The mere offering of advice and assistance departs from the active role envisioned by the Supreme Court of laying down policies and conducting a performance evaluation. Similarly, in Assam, the SSC is mandated to only identify performance indicators, rather than actually conduct the evaluation of the state police itself.68 This weakening of language, and thereby the very foundation of the SSCs, is a matter of grave

concern.

Secondly, it is discouraging that a catchall clause was included in Gujarat, Karnataka, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu requiring the Commissions to perform such other functions as may be required by the state government from time to time. The suggested mandate of the Commissions is in itself wide enough. The time and resources involved in laying down policies, identifying indicators and evaluating the performance of the police – both district and state-wise – are intensive. To add a clause that requires it to perform an indeterminate range of additional tasks not only adds uncertainty to the law, it seems an onerous and unnecessary burden. Worse still, it has the potential to detract from the Commissions’ sharp focus of insulating the police from unwarranted interference.

In a few states, Security Commissions are given additional roles which are not always appropriate. Sikkim’s Police Act requires the SPB to function as the State Vigilance Commission “until such time as an appropriate law is made on the subject”.69 It is unwise to vest a body such as the SSC with dual functions, particularly when the second function requires a separate, equally independent body.

In Meghalaya and Tripura, the Police Acts require the SSC to “function as a forum of appeal for disposing of representations from offi cers of the rank of Additional Superintendent of Police and above, regarding their promotion, or their being subjected to illegal or irregular orders”.70 While the NPC included this as a function for an SSC,71 the Supreme Court and the Model Police Act, 2006 mandated another body – the Police Establishment Board (PEB) – to perform this function, largely with the aim of returning management matters of the police into the hands of the police leadership. Police legislation in both states establish PEBs, which are better placed to address illegal or irregular orders, rather than the SSCs.

67Section 20, Chhattisgarh Police Act, 2007; Section 26, Rajasthan Police Act, 2007.68Section 40, Assam Police Act, 2007.69Section 46(2), Sikkim Police Act, 2008.70Section 44(h), Meghalaya Police Act, 2010; Section 25(d), Tripura Police Act, 2007.71National Police Commission, Second Report paragraph 15.48(iii).

Unfortunately, the mandates and

stature of other SSCs are signi icantly

weakened through mitigating language and additional tasks

that tend to divert them from their

main focus.


Accountability to the Legislature DeniedThe Supreme Court required that the SSCs prepare annual reports for the State Legislature so their functioning is made public and subject to debate. Legislators can provide valuable inputs that should be taken into consideration by the government and the SSC to improve the performance of the police. Despite this, Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Nagaland and Tripura fail to have reporting requirements in their legislation/government orders altogether. These provisions go against the spirit of transparency required by the Supreme Court.

The effort to draft and publish an annual report is undermined if the report is not tabled for debate and discussion in the legislature, and thereby made easily accessible to the public. Several Police Acts are defi cient in this respect. Instead of requiring annual reports to be placed before the State Legislature, legislation in Chhattisgarh and Gujarat requires them to be submitted to the state government. The Bombay Police (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 2007, for instance, requires submission “to the State Government for consideration and appropriate action”.72 This leeway allows the government to cast annual reports into cold storage.

In contrast, the specifi city of the Rajasthan Police Act is welcome. Although it requires the Commission to submit its annual report to the State Government, it adds that the State Government is to “cause the annual report to be laid before the House of the State Legislature in the Budget Session”.73

In practice, despite the legislative requirement to prepare an annual report, it appears that the Commissions by and large fail to do so. Only two states provided copies of their annual reports in response to our RTI applications, namely Kerala and Himachal Pradesh. This failure eradicates accountability both to the legislature and to the people.

Public Information on State Security CommissionsThe Supreme Court speci ically required the SSCs to prepare annual reports for the State Legislature so that their functioning was made public and subject to debate. Yet there is virtually no information about the Commissions in the public domain. The only information that is publicly available is contained in legislation, and in media reports.

As detailed in Chapter 1, obtaining even the most basic information through the RTI Act was a long, drawn out process, with many states failing to respond or refusing to disclose any information. It should not be necessary to resort to the RTI Act to obtain this information. Under Section 4(1)(b) of the RTI Act, all public authorities are required to disclose baseline information, including the particulars of their organisation, functions and duties, the powers and duties of of icers and employees, and the norms set for the discharge of their functions.

Section 4(2) of the Act requires public authorities to proactively provide as much information to the public at regular intervals through various means of communication, including the Internet, so that the public has minimum need to resort to the Act to obtain information. Needless to say, the state and UT Security Commissions fail profoundly on this front.

72Section 32C, Bombay Police (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 2007.73Section 27(2), Rajasthan Police Act, 2007.


Binding Powers FrustratedOne of the greatest causes for concern is the failure of state governments to vest their Commissions with binding powers, despite being clearly required by the Supreme Court. Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka are the only states that have done this. At the other extreme, the Maharashtra Act expressly confers “advisory” powers.74

In a few states, fi nancial concerns can affect the extent to which recommendations by Commissions can be implemented. In Meghalaya, the recommendations are binding on the Government to the extent feasible.75 In Himachal Pradesh, the recommendations are normally binding, however, if the Government is of the opinion that a recommendation is not feasible in the public interest, it shall communicate the reasons thereof.76 It would help if the statutes clearly stated that ‘feasible’ here refers to fi nancial feasibility so there is no misunderstanding.

In Kerala, while the directions of the SSC are binding on the Police Department, this does not extend to the Government, which “may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, fully or partially, reject or modify any recommendation or direction of the Commission”.77 Although it is hard to imagine how decisions of the SSC would interfere with an emergency situation, the Act also provides that, “notwithstanding any guidelines or directions issued by the Commission, the Government may lawfully issue such directions as it deems necessary on any matter, if the situation so warrants, to meet any emergency”.78 These provisions mitigate the authority of the Commission.

The legislation and government orders creating the remaining Commissions are silent on the issue of binding powers. This renders them merely advisory bodies. As with countless other Commissions in the country, this has a disastrous effect on their impact.

Security Commissions for the Union TerritoriesThe Supreme Court’s Prakash Singh directives were to be complied with not only by the State Governments, but also by the Central Government with respect to the seven UTs (Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Daman & Diu, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, National Capital Territory of Delhi, Lakshadweep and Puducherry). Instead of simply creating a Security Commission for each UT from the outset, the Centre delayed and confused the issue through several revisions.

On 3 March 2010, the MHA announced the establishment of a single UT Security Commission with jurisdiction over all UTs.79 Almost a year later, in a memorandum dated 10 January 2011, it modi ied its initial position and constituted a separate Security Commission for the

74Section 22B(10), Maharashtra Police (Amendment) Act, 201475Section 35, Meghalaya Police Act, 2010.76Section 53(2), Himachal Pradesh Police Act, 2007.77Section 25(5), Kerala Police Act, 2011. 78Section 25(4), Kerala Police Act, 2011.79Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs Memorandum No. 14040/45/2009-UTP, 3 March 2010.


National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi and a separate Commission for the remaining UTs.80

The composition suggested for the Security Commission for all UTs except Delhi included the Chief Minister and Leader of the Opposition of the Puducherry Legislative Assembly as members. Puducherry, like Delhi, is the only other Union Territory which has its own elected legislative assembly. Perhaps this was an inadvertent mistake, but the result was a Commission that was strangely skewed towards Puducherry. On 17 July 2012,81 this composition was revised to include representatives from other UTs.82

Finally, on 18 January 2013, at the outset of the irst meeting of the Security Commission for all Union Territories except Delhi, the Union Home Secretary stated that since each UT had its own requirements, it would be appropriate for them to have separate Security Commissions, with independent members appointed from the respective regions.83

This is a positive development as the one-size- its-all approach failed to recognise the widely differing population sizes, police strengths, population mixes, urban and rural characteristics, crime pro iles and the wide geographical distances between the UTs. However, the lack of consultation and convoluted process by which this eventual decision was reached is discouraging.

Composition

At this stage, we can only comment on the composition for the Commissions established in Delhi and Lakshadweep. These were the only UT Commissions for which we received information. However, media reports suggest that a meeting of the Security Commission for Chandigarh was held on 12 September 2013 in Delhi.84

On 10 January 2011, the Central Government constituted a separate Security Commission for the NCT of Delhi as follows:

1. Lieutenant Governor (LG), Delhi – Chair

2. Chief Minister

3. Leader of Opposition in the Delhi Legislative Assembly

4. Joint Secretary in charge of the UT Division, MHA

5. Commissioner of Police – Secretary / Convenor

6. Five Independent Members selected by the Administrator from a panel prepared by the Search Committee constituted for the purpose by the Administrator.

80Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs Memorandum No. 14040/127/2010-UTP, 10 January 2011. 81Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs Memorandum No. 14040/127/2010-UTP, 17 July 2012.82The composition provided for in the 17 July 2012 notifi cation is as follows:

1. Union Home Minister – Chair2. Chief Secretary, Andaman &Nicobar Islands3. Chief Secretary, Puducherry4. Representatives of other UTs (according to the requirements of the agenda of each meeting) 5. Five independent members to be nominated by the Central Government. 6. Joint Secretary (UT), MHA – Convenor

The following four independent members were nominated on 1 January 2013 via government order (Gov-ernment of India, Ministry of Home Affairs Memorandum No. 14040/127/2010-UTP, 1 January 2013): (i) Dr Vidya Ram Kumar, Puducherry (ii) Mr B. Sayed Mohammed, Lakshadweep (iii) Mr K. M. Sahani, Daman & Diu and Dadra & Nagar Haveli (iv) Mr Kanwar Sandhu, Chandigarh83Security Commission for all Union Territories except Delhi, Meeting Minutes, 18 January 2013, Port Blair.84MHA calls UT security panel meeting, Daily Post, 9 September 2013, http://www.dailypost.in/chandigarh/3358-mha-calls-ut-security-panel-meeting.


There are several weaknesses in the composition of this Commission, which will impact its ability to operate as a robustly autonomous body. While the Leader of the Opposition has been included, a judicial member has not. Moreover, the selection process for independent members is lawed as it vests too much power in the hands of the “Administrator”.85 The independent members are to be selected by the LG from a panel prepared by the Search Committee. However, the Committee is in the irst place constituted by the LG. It is further concerning that the MHA noti ication of 10 January 2011 unquali iedly allows the Central Government to remove an independent member for reasons to be recorded in writing.86 This departs from the Model Police Act, 2006, which sets only very speci ic reasons for their removal.

On a positive note, the following independent members who were appointed to the Security Commission seem particularly varied:87

– Ms. Renana Jhabwala, Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA);

– Professor Shyam B. Menon, Vice Chancellor, Bharat Ratna Dr B. R. Ambedkar University;

– Retired Justice C. K. Mahajan;

– Professor Najeeb Jung, Vice Chancellor, Jamia Millia Islamia University;88 and

– Mr Praveen Swami, Deputy Editor, The Hindu.

Having a National Coordinator of an NGO, a vice chancellor of a university, a retired judge and a senior journalist ensures a mix of experiences that is so fundamental to the success of such a body.

By contrast, the Security Commission for Lakshadweep is heavily laden with government and police members, and only has one external member:

1. Mr R. K. Singh, Union Home Secretary – Chair

2. Mr K. K. Pathak, Joint Secretary (UT)

3. Mr Rajesh Prasad, Administrator

4. Mr B. Sayed Mohammed – Independent Member

5. Dr N. Vasanthakumar, Collector

6. Mr Paramadditya, Superintendent of Police

7. Mr V. C. Pandey, MD LDCL

8. Mr Hanchinal, NOIC Lakshadweep

9. Mr Krishna Kumar, Commandant, Coast Guard

Mandate and Powers

It is promising that the mandate of the UT Commissions, as provided for under the MHA noti ication of 3 March 2010, accords with that suggested by the Model Police Act, 2006. Once again, however, some vital components are disregarded. The noti ication does not explicitly state that the recommendations of the UT Commissions will be binding. Nor does it insist on accountability to Parliament through the preparation and tabling of an annual report.

85The “Administrator” of Delhi is the LG according to Article 239AA(1) of the Constitution of India.86Ministry of Home Affairs, Offi ce Memorandum No. 14040/127/2010-UTP dated 10 January 2011, paragraph 5.87These independent members were mentioned in the minutes of the fi ve meetings of the Security Commission for the NCT of Delhi. 88Najeeb Jung was subsequently appointed the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi in 2013. It is unclear whether the vacant post of independent member has been fi lled.


Conclusion

This chapter reveals that effective and empowered Security Commissions are not being established, and are far from being the norm. The Court designed an independent body with signifi cant autonomy and the mandate to chart out policies for a more effi cient police organisation. Yet, the balanced composition suggested by the Court has been skewed, its mandate weakened and the requirement to have accountability to the legislature and binding powers ignored.

The mandate of the Commissions is the only component of the Court’s design that was generally adhered to. However, with fl awed compositions, diminished accountability to the legislature and no binding powers, the Security Commissions face formidable challenges to realising of the mandates ascribed to them.

State Security Commissions on the Ground: An Unsatisfactory Record of Implementation

Chapter

3

On paper, 26 states have established SSCs, but only in 14 states have the Commissions moved from paper to actually functioning. Our research reveals that even in these states, the Commissions do not operate to their optimum. Their failure to meet regularly has crippled them the

most. When meetings have been convened, the Commissions have set important policies on a range of issues. However, they were less successful when it came to evaluating the police’s performance based on objective indicators.

This chapter provides a view of SSC deliberations and functioning on the ground, pieced together from the information we were able to gather.

Frequency of Meetings: Few and Far Between The Annex sets out the number of times each functioning SSC has met. While the Maharashtra Commission has met six times and those in Assam, Delhi, Kerala and Meghalaya fi ve times, the remaining Commissions have met only once or twice in their few years of functioning. Needless to say, this is far too infrequent for an institution designed to make a long-lasting impact on policing.

The dearth of meetings violates statutory provisions and government orders. The Himachal Pradesh SPB has only met three times since its establishment in 2008,


even though the Police Act requires that it meet “as often as deemed necessary, but at least once in three months”.89 Likewise, in Arunachal Pradesh, the government order requires the SSC to meet thrice a year, yet this is clearly not happening. In our 2011 report, it was observed that the SSC had met on two occasions – on 11 June 2007 and 14 May 2010.90 According to information received, there have been no subsequent meetings. Finally, in Meghalaya, the Act provides that the Commission will meet for an “initial three years at least once a month and later every 3 months or more often if required by the exigencies of the situation”.91 Yet again, this is not happening in reality, with the Commission having met fi ve times since it was established in 2011.

The Commissions have even failed to convene meetings after previously deciding to do so. During the fi rst meeting of the Goa SSC, it decided that, “the next meeting of the Commission may be held in January 2008.” According to the information provided, this did not happen. Similarly, the Punjab SPB decided that the second meeting would be held on 29 April 2013; it was re-scheduled to 10 May 2013 and eventually cancelled. The failure to convene regular meetings spells trouble for an institution with such an important mandate.

Substance of Meetings: Strong Policy-Making, Weak Performance EvaluationTen states provided minutes of their Commission meetings: Assam, Chhattisgarh, Goa, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Meghalaya, Punjab, Sikkim and Tamil Nadu. Minutes were also received from the Security Commission for the NCT of Delhi, the Commission for all UTs except Delhi (essentially the Commission for A&NI) and the Commission for Lakshadweep. The following section briefl y summarises the policies laid down by these Commissions, as deduced from the minutes provided. The composition of each Commission is included to contextualise the analysis.

(i) Policy-makingThe minutes reveal that the Commissions discuss a wide range of issues, mainly falling under the rubric of broad policy change. The most discussed initiatives related to police strength, modernisation of infrastructure, welfare of police personnel, separation of law and order from investigation duties, community policing, training and counter-terrorism.

Andaman & Nicobar IslandsThe fi rst meeting of the Security Commission for all UTs except Delhi was held on 18 January 2013 in Port Blair. This essentially became a meeting of the Security Commission for Andaman & Nicobar Islands after it was decided that each UT was to have its own separate Security Commission. The Commission set a number of

89Section 48, Himachal Pradesh Police Act, 2007. 90State Security Commissions: Reform Derailed, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2011, page 34, available at: http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/sscrd.pdf91Section 41, Meghalaya Police Act, 2010.


broad policy guidelines, as follows:

• Registration of complaints: The Home Secretary emphasised that complaints from the public should be registered immediately. To this end, the telephone numbers of the Deputy Commissioner, Superintendent of Police and Deputy Superintendent should be publicised so that citizens may post their complaints to these senior offi cers in case they are not registered. He also directed that every complaint should be entered in the Daily Diary of the police station and the decision on the complaint being cognisable or non-cognisable be taken subsequently.

• Separation of law and order from investigation functions: The Home Secretary directed that there should be a separate cadre for investigation at the thana level for all heinous crimes carrying punishment of three years or more. At the district level, there should be a District Crime Branch, which shall have wings specialising in various categories of crimes. A Forensic Unit may also be set up at the district level attached with the District Crime Branch. At the UT level, a Crime Branch may also be created to provide specialist assistance in individual cases and to take up other important cases having ramifi cations for the entire UT.

• Thana Committees: Highlighting the importance of police-public relations, the Home Secretary recommended setting up Thana Committees on the pattern of those in the Delhi Police.

The infrastructure requirements of the A&NI police in terms of sanctioning were also brought to the Commission’s attention by the DGP, including the need for sanction of 430 posts for implementation of the Coastal Security Scheme and the proposal for sanction of 68 posts of Upper Subordinate level police personnel. The Union Home Secretary in both instances desired that the proposal be processed expeditiously by the MHA.

Assam

1. Chief Minister – Chair

2. Retired High Court Judge

3. Chief Secretary

4. Principal Secretary, Home & Political Department

4. DGP – Secretary

5. Three non-political persons of high integrity, expertise and competence in administration, law enforcement and security-related matters, to be nominated by the State Government,

The minutes reveal that the Commissions

discuss a wide range of issues, mainly falling

under the rubric of broad policy

change.


including a police offer not below the rank of DGP, a retired civil service of icer not below the rank of Commissioner and Secretary, and a member from the ields of public service, legal profession or social organization with at least 15 years expertise in the ield

(i) Mr Jatin Hazarika, IAS (Retired), Former Commissioner and Secretary

(ii) Mr S. B. Kakati, IPS (Retired), Former DGP, Meghalaya

(iii) Dr Md. Taher, Eminent Educationist

The Assam SSC has held fi ve meetings since its establishment: on 22 February 2008, 29 May 2008, 30 March 2010, 8 October 2010, and 28 December 2011. In its fi rst meeting, it emphasised three broad points: motivating police personnel through improved housing and working conditions; conducting regular inspections and monitoring; and making investigation techniques more effective.92 However, there was little detail provided as to how such policies would be implemented.

The SSC was more specifi c in subsequent meetings. To address concerns over instances of rude behaviour of the police against the public, it decided that the Assam Administrative Staff College would conduct 12 training courses for police offi cers in the rank of Sub-Inspectors, Inspectors, Deputy Superintendents of Police (SP) and Additional SPs.93 It also decided that: a training college should be set up to train offi cers on security issues; promotion should be expedited across various non-gazetted ranks; a law to control road and rail blockades by agitating mobs should be considered; and the establishment of Guwahati as a police commissionerate should be expedited.94

The separation of law and order from investigation functions in Guwahati city was a recurring issue. In 2008, the SSC deliberated on the problems faced in implementing this separation, particularly, the shortage of offi cers and staff. It was felt that the total number of Circle Inspectors needed to be increased throughout the state for proper supervision of criminal cases. The Chief Minister requested the DGP to prepare an action plan to make the separation operational.95 This matter arose again in 2010. The SSC decided that police stations need to be smaller, beat systems need to be re-introduced (four beats in rural police stations and six in urban police stations), police outposts need to be upgraded to police stations, and a reserve Law and Order force was needed immediately under offi cers-in-charge of police stations.96

It is clear that the SSC is raising and recommending some signifi cant policy issues. The extent to which these policies have been implemented is unknown. Despite mention in the second meeting of an Action Taken Report, this practice was not referred to in subsequent meetings. It is therefore unclear whether the State

92Assam SSC, Meeting Minutes, 22 February 2008.93Assam SSC, Meeting Minutes, 29 May 2008.94Assam SSC, Meeting Minutes, 8 October 2010.95Assam SSC, Meeting Minutes, 29 May 2008.96Assam SSC, Meeting Minutes, 8 October 2010.


Government has followed through on the SSC’s decisions. That the SSC seems to have stopped meeting since 2011 suggests it has failed to sustain a lasting impact.

Chhattisgarh

1. Home Minister – Chair

2. Chief Secretary

3. Secretary in charge of Home Department


5. State Human Rights Commission Member, to be nominated by State Government

6. Two independent members: persons of proven reputation for integrity and competence from any ield such as academia, law, public administration, media or any other ield, to be appointed by the State Government

The Chhattisgarh SPC held one meeting on 17 April 2013. Based on the minutes, the SPC dealt with one policy issue: the decreased quality of criminal investigation following the separation of the prosecution from the police department. To address the diffi culty faced by the police in obtaining timely and correct legal advice during investigations, it recommended that one legal offi cer be posted at every police sub-division and SP / Inspector General of Police (IGP) offi ce, two in each branch of Headquarters and at least four at the Secretariat.

The members of the SPC decided that meetings would be held on a “regular basis for the purpose of making police more effi cient and professionally competent and to review police performance consistently.”97 No further information was provided.

Delhi

1. Lieutenant Governor (LG), Delhi – Chair

2. Chief Minister

3. Leader of Opposition in the Delhi Legislative Assembly

4. Joint Secretary in charge of the UT Division, MHA

5. Commissioner of Police – Secretary / Convenor

6. Five Independent Members selected by the Administrator from a panel prepared by the Search Committee constituted for the purpose by the Administrator. According to the minutes of the meetings, the following independent members were present during the meetings:

(i) Ms Renana Jhabwala, Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA)

(ii) Professor Shyam B. Menon, Vice Chancellor, Bharat Ratna Dr B. R. Ambedkar University

(iii) Retired Justice C. K. Mahajan

(iv) Professor Najeeb Jung, Vice Chancellor, Jamia Millia Islamia University98

(v) Mr Praveen Swami, Deputy Editor, The Hindu

97Chhattisgarh SPC, Meeting Minutes, 17 April 2013.98Najeeb Jung was subsequently appointed the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi in 2013. It is unclear whether the vacant post of independent member has been fi lled.


The Security Commission for the NCT of Delhi has met fi ve times: on 19 March 2012, 11 May 2012, 14 September 2012, 17 January 2013 and 6 September 2013. The Offi ce of the Commissioner of Police only provided the minutes of the fi rst four meetings, stating that the minutes of the fi nal meeting had not yet been received by the Chairperson of the Commission.99

Each meeting began with a presentation by the Commissioner of Police on various initiatives taken by the Delhi Police since the previous meeting, for instance: initiatives to control street crime, make the city safe for women/children and senior citizens, community policing, anti-terrorism measures, measures for traffi c management, the pro-active use of technology in crime control, and public outreach. Following this presentation, the members were invited to share their ideas to improve police functioning. Some of the most important policy suggestions were put forth by the independent members and the Leader of the Opposition:

• Sporting activities to prevent crime: An independent member suggested that sporting activities for youth belonging to slums and resettlement colonies be launched so that they can be dissuaded from taking to crime.100 In view of the increasing involvement of juveniles in crime, the Leader of the Opposition suggested that amendment to the existing Juvenile Justice Act is needed.101

• Safety of women: An independent member suggested that concerted action should be taken to control the harassment of young girls. Affected areas and trouble spots should be identifi ed where anti-social elements gather and indulge in eve teasing. More police should be deployed near girls’ schools and colleges.102

• Mapping of crime: An independent member suggested that mapping of crime should be done regularly and policing should be intensifi ed by posting more police personnel in areas that register a spurt in crime during a particular period.103

• CCTV cameras: The Leader of the Opposition volunteered that MLA/MP funds could be used for installation of CCTVs and the police should monitor the content being captured. An independent member agreed that CCTV acted as a major deterrent and ought to be installed in as many public places as possible.

• Advocates to assist rape victims: The Leader of the Opposition suggested that there should at least be three to four advocates earmarked for each

99Letter from the PIO, Offi ce of the DGP, Police Headquarters, New Delhi, 17 April 2013. 100Security Commission for NCT of Delhi, Meeting Minutes, 19 March 2013.101Security Commission for NCT of Delhi, Meeting Minutes,11 May 2012. 102Minutes of Meeting, Security Commission for NCT of Delhi dated 19 March 2013.103In March 2014, the Delhi High Court directed the Delhi Police to provide a status report on "crime map-ping" of the capital, especially on crimes against women. See for instance: Do crime-mapping of offences against women: HC to Delhi Police, Business Standard, 12 March 2014, http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/do-crime-mapping-of-offences-against-women-hc-to-delhi-police-114031201069_1.html.


police station so that their help could be taken to provide assistance to rape victims. He also suggested that thana-level committees be reorganised to include members from women NGOs and principals of girls’ schools and colleges.

The fourth meeting, held on 17 January 2013, focused on the issue of safety and security of women in light of the gang-rape incident of 16 December 2012. The Commissioner of Police briefed the members on the measures being taken by the Delhi Police to improve women’s safety. One of the independent members stated that the gang rape incident should be taken as an opportunity to fulfi l all the requirements of Delhi Police in terms of manpower and a clear fi ve-year timeline could be drawn up in this regard. The member expressed the need for an independent crime survey so that crime could be better understood. He noted that cases registered by the police were not indicative of the factual position on the ground. He also asserted that police stations do not have the requisite investigative competence to investigate crimes against women and there was a need to strengthen the crimes against women cells of each district.

The Chief Minister noted that there was a lack of coordination between NGOs working with Rape Crisis Intervention Centres104 and the police, and that immediate steps were required to build stronger relationships between the two. She also suggested that the help of women NGOs could be taken to bridge the gap between the police station and woman complainants.

Goa


2. Leader of the Opposition

3. Chief Secretary

4. Retired Justice Dr E. S. Da Silva


The Goa SSC has met once on 12 October 2007. To address the lack of an independent Vigilance Branch within the Goa Police and the resultant failure to adequately investigate incidents of corruption, it authorised the Chairperson of the Police Complaints Authority and the DGP to avail the services of the State Vigilance Department to investigate serious complaints of corruption involving police offi cers on a needs basis.

The Commission highlighted the importance of preventive steps to deal with the serious threat of extremism. It stated that the police ought to seek the cooperation and active participation of the people, emphasising the invocation of Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure – the power to issue an order in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger – to curb terrorism. The SSC should

104These centres are a joint initiative between the Delhi Police, the Delhi Commission for Women, and NGOs to provide legal, medical, psychological and fi nancial support to rape victims.


have exercised some restraint in its recommendation here; there is still a need for reasonable cause/suspicion in order to invoke Section 144.

In addition to these specifi c recommendations, the SSC made some broad statements. It recommended: discipline to be instilled amongst all ranks; steps to be taken to improve the image of the police; total transparency in the internal administration of the police; and the need for the police department to constantly focus on the welfare of personnel. While these are commendable ideas, it is unclear how they are to be implemented. Left in such vague terms, these statements provide little direction and make it very diffi cult to hold the Government accountable for their fulfi lment.

That the Commission has only met once suggests that it lacks currency in the State. According to the minutes, “the next meeting of the Commission may be held in January 2008.” According to the information provided, this did not happen.

Gujarat

Chief Minister – Chair

Home Minister

Chief Secretary

Additional Chief Secretary, Home

DGP and IGP – Secretary

Two non-of icial members to be appointed by the State Government having reputation for integrity and competence in the ield of academia, law, public administration or media:

(i) Justice K. R. Vyas, Former Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court

(ii) Dr Kamlesh Joshipura, Vice Chancellor, Indian Institute of Teachers Education

The Gujarat Commission held one meeting on 11 July 2013. It is encouraging that the non-offi cial members were particularly vocal and made substantial policy suggestions. An independent member highlighted the achievements of the Gujarat police in forensic science, prevention of human traffi cking and investigation of cyber crime, and crimes against women and children. He suggested that the police now focus on new areas of crime, especially economic offences. The other independent member suggested that apart from the Supreme Court directives, there were several recommendations of other committees and commissions which should also be considered. The Commission decided that these recommendations should be studied to identify those that could be implemented as soon as possible.

Himachal Pradesh


2. Minister in Charge of Home



4. Chief Secretary

5. Principal Secretary, Home

6. Principal Secretary, Social Justice & Empowerment

7. Principal Secretary, Finance

8. Director of Prosecution

9. Director of Forensic Science


11. Three persons of proven reputation for integrity and competence out of whom at least one shall be a women member, to be appointed from the ields of academia, law and public administration, on the recommendations of the Selection Panel.

The Himachal Pradesh SPB has met three times since its formation: on 3 January 2011, 26 July 2011 and 3 February 2012. The meetings were largely used to discuss sanctioning and budget issues. For instance, the following proposals were adopted in the fi rst meeting: a proposal for an additional 266 posts; a proposal to upgrade 14 police posts as full-fl edged police stations and to open six new police stations; and sanction for the purchase of 7 dogs for better crime detection.

Its other proposals focused on legal reforms. These included: amending the Motor Vehicle Act to provide a minimum fi ne of Rs. 2,000 for use of a mobile phone while driving; re-structuring urban policing – particularly Shimla and Baddi, Barotiwala and Nalagarh – as commissionerates; enhancing the punishment under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code from two to seven years in view of the increase in fatal road accidents and making the offence non-bailable; and providing fi nancial assistance to victims of heinous crimes as in the case of victims of natural disaster and road accidents as per Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Kerala

1. Minister in Charge of Home Department – Chair

2. Minister in Charge of Law

3. Leader of Opposition

4. Retired High Court Judge, Justice K. P. Balachandran, High Court of Kerala

5. Chief Secretary

6. Home Secretary

7. State Police Chief – Secretary

8. Three non-of icial members who shall be persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in maintenance of law and order, administration, human rights, law, social service, management of public administration, nominated by the Governor of whom one shall be a woman:

(i) Advocate M. P. Govindan Nair (Ex. Minister)

(ii) Advocate Celine Wilfred

(iii) Hormis Tharakan, IPS (Retired)


The SSC constituted under the Kerala Police Act, 2011 held two meetings, on 15 February 2012 and 1 November 2012. It decided on several important issues that have the potential to make an impact on the ground, provided that the Government implements them:

• Police strength: It deliberated on the need to increase the strength of the police to gradually bring the police population ratio to the All India Average of 1:500. To achieve the target, it agreed that posts for 2000 police personnel had to be created each year, that is, 5 per cent of the existing force.105

• Separation of law and order and investigation functions: In order to bifurcate the functions of law and order and crime investigation where an average of 500 to 600 cases are registered each year, it was agreed that a proposal would be submitted to the Government to implement the separation in 200 police stations in the state, on an experimental basis.106

• Financial fraud: To deal with the rising menace of fi nancial fraud, it put forth a proposal to frame a new law on the lines of the Tamil Nadu Protection of Depositor Act.107

• Janamaithri Scheme: It decided to extend the successful Janamaithri Community Policing Scheme launched in 148 police stations to 100 more police stations and to provide a budgetary allotment of Rs. 3 crores exclusively for the project in the next fi nancial year.108

• State Investigation Bureau: With respect to the setting up of a new State Investigation Bureau, it decided to form a Special Wing with a dedicated and trained staff to be entrusted with very serious and selected crimes.109

• Special Security Force: It decided on the creation of a State Special Security Force and a State Level Monitoring and Control Station to provide physical security to large industrial establishments, vital installations including dams, power plants and fi nancial institutions, which are vital for national development and economic progress.110

Lakshadweep

1. Mr R. K. Singh, Union Home Secretary – Chair

2. Mr K. K. Pathak, Joint Secretary (UT)

3. Mr Rajesh Prasad, Administrator

4. Mr B. Sayed Mohammed – Independent Member

5. Dr N. Vasanthakumar, Collector

105Kerala SSC, Meeting Minutes, 15 February 2012.106Kerala SSC, Meeting Minutes, 15 February 2012.107Kerala SSC, Meeting Minutes, 15 February 2012.108Kerala SSC, Meeting Minutes, 15 February 2012.109Kerala SSC, Meeting Minutes, 15 February 2012.110Kerala SSC, Meeting Minutes, 1 November 2012.


6. Mr Paramadditya, Superintendent of Police

7. Mr V. C. Pandey, MD LDCL

8. Mr Hanchinal, NOIC Lakshadweep

9. Mr Krishna Kumar, Commandant, Coast Guard

The Lakshadweep Security Commission held a meeting on 13 February 2013. A presentation was made on security issues faced in the UT. In terms of policy decisions, the Commission decided that: no police offi cers will be posted in native islands except Capital Island (Kavaratti) where the number of posts would be increased; all vacancies in the police, IRBn, Fire and Coastal Police shall be fi lled within three months; and there was no need to separate law and order duties from crime investigation as there are few crime issues.

Meghalaya


2. Minister in charge, Home Department – Vice Chair


4. Chief Secretary

5. Principal Secretary, Home (Police) Department

6. DGP and IGP – Secretary

7. Two non-political persons of proven reputation for integrity and competence from the ields of academia, law, public administration, media or NGOs appointed by a selection

panel

(i) Mr P. J. Bazeley, IAS (Retired)

(ii) Mr V. G. K. Kynta, Senior Advocate, Guwahati High Court, Shillong Bench

The Meghalaya SSC held fi ve meetings since it was set up: on 11 August 2011, 5 December 2011, 18 October 2012, 2 March 2013 and 18 July 2013. It made several important policy recommendations:

• Strengthening of police units in Garo Hills: In order to address the insurgency problem in the Garo Hills region, it was decided that the police needed to be strengthened both in terms of personnel and the number of police stations and outposts with fi nancial assistance from the Central Government. In order to increase the number of police stations and outposts, actions were to be initiated in the Garo Hills Districts to acquire land for the purpose of setting up the police stations and other infrastructure.111

• Amendment of the Meghalaya Police Act, 2010: The SSC took note of the fact that for the last fi ve years, the rate of failure in matriculation examinations had been consistently high, especially in the rural areas of the State. Asserting that the State must intervene by providing employment

111Meghalaya SSC, Meeting Minutes, 5 December 2011.


opportunities to unemployed youth, it decided that the educational qualifi cation for recruitment for armed branch constables should be lowered from the existing provision of matriculation to Class IX from a recognised school. In order to implement this change, it suggested that an Ordinance be promulgated to amend the relevant section of the Meghalaya Police Act, 2010, noting that the educational qualifi cation will be raised once the success rate in matriculation examinations improve.112

• Training: Recognising that police training is a priority area, the SSC recommended that the police need to carry out a Training Needs Analysis and critically review the existing training syllabus.113

• Community Policing: The SSC emphasised the importance of community policing, and decided to galvanise citizen committees formed at the district, sub-division and police station level,114 as well as programmes aimed at constructive police-public relations on various issues such as human traffi cking, crime prevention and detection, child labour, crimes against women and drug abuse.115 The Commission decided that the DGP should make a presentation on this issue in a subsequent meeting, with recommendations to introduce appropriate mechanisms that can make it more effective.116 Unfortunately, the subsequent meeting on 18 October 2012 made no mention of this and the agenda solely focused on preparing a panel of police offi cers for appointment as DGP.

• Prosecution effi ciency: The SSC noted that the effi ciency of public prosecutors leaves much to be desired. It stated that there is a need for better cooperation between investigating offi cers and Public Prosecutors, suggesting that police offi cers may engage the services of experienced advocates. It recommended the Home (Police) Department to take immediate steps to set up the Directorate of Prosecution in the State.117

• Backlog of pending cases: The SSC urged the Law Department to immediately introduce measures to clear the huge backlog of pending cases in the District Council Courts.118 The DGP referred to a sample study conducted by the Criminal Investigation Department of ten heinous cases pending in the courts in Jowai. The study indicated that chargesheets were submitted by the police nine to ten years ago in these cases, yet charges have not been framed by the courts in nine of the ten cases. The SSC decided that the Law Department will frame modalities for the appointment of professional advocates and will also look into the issue of court inspections.

112Meghalaya SSC, Meeting Minutes, 18 July 2012. 113Meghalaya SSC, Meeting Minutes, 2 March 2012.114Section of the Meghalaya Police Act, 2010 establishes a Community Liaison Group for each police station. 115Meghalaya SSC, Meeting Minutes, 2 March 2012. 116Meghalaya SSC, Meeting Minutes, 18 July 2002. 117Meghalaya SSC, Meeting Minutes, 2 March 2012.118Meghalaya SSC, Meeting Minutes, 2 March 2012.


Punjab


2. Home Minister – Vice Chair

3. Chief Secretary

4. Principal Secretary, Department of Home Affairs and Justice

5. Advocate General


The Punjab SPB has held one meeting, on 1 January 2009, during which three issues were discussed. The fi rst related to the SPB’s equipment review function, in particular, a proposal to provide mobile phone facilities to fi eld police offi cers. The second agenda item concerned the institution of three state level medals in recognition of services to the public and outstanding devotion to duty in order to boost morale. Finally, the Board discussed the need to restructure the police organisation to better utilise manpower. The DGP explained that nearly 20 per cent of the force (Constables and Head Constables) was presently stationed in the Border Range in excess of what was required, whereas other districts were defi cient in manpower. He clarifi ed that the proposal was not to physically move men from their present districts, but for existing vacancies in the Border Range to be transferred to other districts of the State. The Board approved all three proposals in principle.

The second meeting was to be held on 29 April 2013 however, after being re-scheduled to 10 May 2013, it was eventually cancelled.

Sikkim




4. Chief Secretary

5. Secretary in Charge of the Home Department

6. Secretary in Charge of the Finance Department

7. Secretary in Charge of the Social Welfare & Empowerment Department


9. Three non-political persons of proven reputation for integrity and competence to be appointed on the recommendation of the Selection Panel constituted under Section 41.

(i) Mr G. K. Gurung, former Secretary to the Government of Sikkim

(ii) Ms Bharti Sharma, former State Other Backward Classes Board Chairperson

(iii) Mr S. D. Basi, IAS (Retired)


The SPB in Sikkim has convened three meetings: on 28 August 2009, 27 October 2010 and 25 June 2011. The sanctioning of posts and budgetary needs, including for the State Forensic Science Lab and the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS)119 were recurring issues. The SPB also discussed several important policy changes:

• Common entry system: The DGP stated that there was a case for merging the recruitment processes in respect of the three streams: Sikkim Police, SAP and IRBn as the minimum educational qualifi cations prescribed and other standards were the same and the training needs were similar. The Chief Minister declared that the IRBn should be the single entry point for all future recruitments. He outlined that after a mandatory ten-year tenure in the IRBn, movement towards SAP and Sikkim Police would take place at ten-year intervals. He clarifi ed that the policy relating to recruitment of women constables would remain unchanged.120

• Police welfare: The DGP pointed out that the maintenance of buildings was a major problem due to the non-availability of required funds as part of the Modernization of Police Forces Scheme. Expressing the view that addressing the health concerns of police personnel and their families helps in signifi cantly reducing stress and anxiety levels, the DGP revealed that a new Sikkim Police Health Scheme was under active consideration. The Board approved these proposals in principle and directed that they be referred to the Government for examination.121

• Screening for promotion: Referring to the provision made in the Sikkim Police Act, 2008 to introduce a screening examination for promotional posts from the rank of Head Constable to Sub-Inspector, the Chief Minister noted that the measure has large implications and needs a detailed examination. He stated that there are concerns among certain sections of the force with the new procedure, including anxiety on competing with the more educated sections of the force. It was suggested that a capacity-building programme be conceived to equip personnel with the skills to face the screening.122

What emerges from these discussions is that, instead of deciding upon corrective action to be taken, in most cases, the SPB referred the matter to the Government for examination. This defeats the purpose of an oversight body, which the Supreme Court envisaged would lay down policies rather than effectively leave them to the government to decide. Some liaison with the Government will undoubtedly be necessary, but the intention was that when members from the government are on the SSC, the decision-making process would be faster, more coordinated and geared towards better implementation.

119CCTNS is a nation-wide system aimed at facilitating the collection, storage, retrieval, analysis, transfer and sharing of data and information between police stations, State Headquarters and the Central Police Organisations.120Sikkim SPB, Meeting Minutes, 28 August 2009.121Sikkim SPB, Meeting Minutes, 28 August 2009.122Sikkim SPB, Meeting Minutes, 25 June 2011.


Tamil Nadu



3. Chairperson, Public Service Commission

4. Chairperson, State Human Rights Commission

5. Chairperson, State Women’s Commission

6. Chairperson, State Minorities Commission

7. Chief Secretary



The Tamil Nadu Police Board held one meeting on 3 May 2013. The minutes elaborate on the following three issues:

• Crimes against women: The Board noted that after the brutal incident involving a young woman in Delhi in December 2012, the Tamil Nadu Government was the fi rst in the country to develop a comprehensive plan of action to curb crimes against women. It noted that the reduction in the incidence of dowry-related offences in the State consequent to the establishment of All Women Police Stations stands as an example to be emulated across the country.

• Police Modernisation: The Board noted that while assistance from the Government of India for the Police Modernisation Scheme has declined sharply in 2012-2013, this was amply compensated by the State Government. It stated that better mobility, communication, arms and infrastructure will greatly contribute towards enhancing the effectiveness of the police.

• Police welfare: The wide range of welfare measures provided to police personnel was praised. The Board specifi cally welcomed the provision of all essential household items required for day-to-day living in newly started police canteens and the plan to expand the network of canteens to various parts of the State. The Board also noted its appreciation for the Chief Minister’s novel scheme aimed at providing houses for police personnel at a reasonable cost, and felt this should be held up as an example for the entire country.

While all this is commendable, the SPB’s listing of achievements fails to live up to the mandate ascribed to it. Rather than focusing on past or present achievements, the SPB is supposed to assess the state of policing and frame policies to better the situation in the future.

Tripura




3. Chief Secretary



6. Two independent members who shall be non-political persons of proven reputation and integrity to be appointed by the State Government

It is unclear whether the Tripura SPB meets as the Offi ce of the DGP claimed exemption under the RTI Act.

State Security Commission: A Security or Intelligence Organisation?The Of ice of the DGP in Tripura refused to provide information in response to our RTI application, claiming that Government Noti ication F.3(5)-GA{AR}/2005/VI dated 27 September 2005 limits the application of the RTI Act vis-à-vis the Home (Police) Department to allegations of corruption and human rights violations only.123

While we were unable to obtain a copy of this government noti ication, presumably, it invokes section 24(4) of the RTI Act:

“Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to such intelligence and security organisation being organisations established by the State Government, as that Government may, from time to time, by noti ication in the Of icial Gazette, specify:

Provided that the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations shall not be excluded under this sub-section…”

This response indicates a complete lack of understanding of the Board’s standing and mandate, even when the DGP is the Member-Secretary of the Board. CHRI immediately appealed this response on three grounds. First, the SPB is not a security or intelligence organisation. Under Section 25 of the Tripura Police Act, 2007, it is mandated to frame broad policy guidelines, identify performance indicators, evaluate the organisational performance of the police, and examine certain complaints. The Board neither provides security to the people of the State nor collects intelligence.

Second, the Government Noti ication could not extend to the SPB since the latter is an autonomous organisation, separate from the Home Department. There is no suggestion in the Act that the SPB is a subordinate of ice of the Home Department or that the latter exercises control over the former. Four of the seven members of the SPB are not associated with the Home Department. Its functions not only imply that it is autonomous, they require it.

Finally, the Government Noti ication could not logically extend to the SPB as the latter did not exist at that time. The Government Noti ication was dated 27 September 2005. Yet, the SPB was only created two years later when the Tripura Police Act, 2007 came into force.

We have received no response to our appeal from the Of ice of the DGP. We have therefore not been able to verify through RTI whether the Board has convened meetings.

Although it is unclear whether the Tripura SPB is meeting, it has publicly issued the following ten general guidelines to promote effi cient, effective, responsive and accountable policing:124

123Letter No. 31935/F.RV.(171-B)/PHQ/13 from the Offi ce of the DGP, Government of Tripura, 27 July 2013.124Available on the website of the Tripura Police Accountability Commission, http://tpac.nic.in/Notifi cations/guide.pdf.


1. Arrest: No arrest should be made without reaching reasonable satisfaction after some investigation about the genuineness and bona fi des of a complaint and a reasonable belief, both as to a person’s complicity and the need to effect arrest.

2. Non-Registration of Cases: The police should discard a purely statistical approach to assess crime situations and evaluate police performance. Socio-economic factors, decline in respect for law, criminalisation of politics, failure of the criminal justice system to punish offenders are also responsible for a rise in criminal activity.

3. Illegal Detention: If detention of a person is necessary, this must be done strictly by following the legal procedure. For arbitrary and illegal detention, the responsible police offi cer should be proceeded against.

4. Custodial Violence: There is no justifi cation for custodial violence. All efforts should be made to use scientifi c and sophisticated methods of gathering evidence. Being serious misconduct, the Tripura Police shall in appropriate cases have the Police Accountability Commission inquire into such incidents.

5. Police-public relations: The Tripura Police should constantly endeavor to understand and develop police-public relationships at all levels.

6. To usher in such attitudinal change, the police should (i) aid individuals in danger of physical harm; (ii) create and maintain a feeling of security in the community; (iii) facilitate orderly movement of people and vehicles; (iv) counsel and resolve confl icts and promote amity; and (v) provide other appropriate services and afford relief to people in distress.

7. Community Policing: The Tripura Police must strive for people’s participation in areas of limited policing for a short period in a year. A spirit of voluntary social service needs to be inculcated in every citizen. The State Police shall strive to put in place a suitable scheme for community policing.

8. Professional Freedom: The police shall resist and ignore all sorts of interference in police functions.

9. Victim Compensation: In light of Section 70(2) of the Tripura Police Act, which provides the Police Accountability Commission the power to recommend payment of monetary compensation by the government to victims of serious misconduct by police, efforts shall be made to devise suitable schemes of compensation.

10. Legal Education Training: It is the duty of the police to put in place a permanent mechanism to update and upgrade legal knowledge in relation to police functions by introducing training in legal education.

The foregoing analysis reveals that the SSCs have made important proposals in their meetings. However, it seems that only a few of these proposals have


been approved by state governments. Himachal Pradesh is a good example. In the Board’s fi rst meeting, out of 18 proposals, four were decided upon by the Government. The rest were pending decision. Meanwhile, of the 16 proposals that were approved by the Board during the second meeting, two were rejected, three accepted and the rest were still pending decision by the Government. This is disappointing. State and UT Security Commissions serve little purpose as policy-making bodies if the changes they propose are never acted on by the government. The idea was that with members from the government sitting on the SSC, the decision-making process would be faster, more coordinated and geared towards better implementation. That does not appear to be the case, reaffi rming the need for SSCs to have binding powers.

The Commissions are also partly to blame for this situation. Most failed to review what action, if any, the government took on their previous decisions. This is all the more frustrating considering the highest political leadership sits on the Commissions. The Security Commission for Delhi was the only one to consistently review implementation. Each set of minutes was followed by a comprehensive Action Taken Report setting out the compliance of the actionable points raised during the meeting. At times, these reports seem to list initiatives already undertaken by the police. It is crucial that Action Taken Reports focus on new initiatives taken by the police and government in response to the Commissions’ recommendations.

Crossing the Line: Policy-Making within LimitsIn its deliberations on the nature of the policy-directing role of an SSC, the NPC made clear that policy direction should be limited to overall guidance. It stated that there should “be no instructions in regard to actual operations in the ield. The discretion of the police of icer to deal with the situation, within the four corners of the overall guidance and broad policies, should be unfettered.”125 For the most part, the Commissions respected this operational autonomy and seemed aware of the importance of keeping their own functioning strictly within the purview of the Supreme Court’s ruling.

In one instance, a previous independent member on the Delhi Security Commission mentioned an incident involving the portrayal of the Prophet Mohammed on YouTube. He opined that the matter had not attracted the attention of the Government of India even after a lapse of 24 hours and wanted due precautions taken to prevent any untoward clashes in the city. He suggested that young Muslim youth should be recruited for intelligence collection in areas such as Jamia.126 While these suggestions are positive, all members outside the police on a Security Commission must keep in mind that there can be no interference in the police’s operational matters.

Although not infringing upon police operations, the Himachal Pradesh and Meghalaya Commissions suggested legal reforms that appear to fall outside their remit. In Himachal Pradesh, the SPB recommended changes to the Indian Penal Code; in view of the increase in fatal road accidents, it recommended that the punishment of two years under Section 304A

125National Police Commission, Second Report, paragraph 15.42. 126Security Commission for NCT of Delhi, Meeting Minutes, 14 September 2012.


be increased to seven years and the offence be made non-bailable. Meanwhile, the Meghalaya Commission urged the Law Department to take immediate steps to introduce measures to clear the huge backlog of pending cases in the District Council Courts.127 It decided that the Law Department will frame modalities for the appointment of professional advocates and look into the issue of court inspections.

(ii) Performance EvaluationWhile the Commissions have made signifi cant headway with respect to policy making, they were less successful on the performance-evaluation front. One very encouraging trend from the minutes of the Commission meetings is a recurring acknowledgement that performance evaluation should go beyond crime statistics to a more holistic one based on objective indicators. This is a shift in thinking and seems to involve leaving behind the outdated mode of judging performance on the basis of crime statistics.

Two Commissions identifi ed performance indicators. Firstly, the Andaman & Nicobar Islands’ Commission stated as follows:128

i. Mere increase in registration of crime should not be considered as a performance indicator as this could also be due to more honest registration of crime rather than an increase in crime per se. There must be an analysis before coming to a conclusion.

ii. Non-registration of crime should be viewed seriously and the concerned offi cer should be suspended.

iii. Detection of crime and conviction should be taken as a performance indicator.

iv. Where the case has failed in Court, the Investigation Offi cer (IO) should be called to explain the failure. Comments of the Court, if any, should be taken into account.

v. Every acquittal will be scrutinised by the Public Prosecutor. He or she will identify reasons for the acquittal and whether there were any lacunae in the investigation. However, the parameters for fi nding lacunae in investigation, if any, should not be set too high keeping in view that the level of investigation is not fully scientifi c and IOs are not professionally trained in investigation. The accountability is to be fi xed in cases of extreme carelessness / malafi de.129

127Meghalaya SSC, Meeting Minutes, 2 March 2012. 128Andaman & Nicobar Islands Security Commission, Meeting Minutes, 18 January 2013. 129On 7 January 2014, in State of Gujarat vs. Kishanbhai the Supreme Court directed, inter alia, that every state Home Department shall set up a standing committee of senior offi cers of the police and prosecution departments to examine all orders of acquittal and record reasons for the failure of the case, including mis-takes committed during investigation and/or prosecution. A fi nding should be recorded in each instance as to whether the lapse was innocent or blameworthy.


Secondly, the Himachal Pradesh SPB proposed the following indicators:

i. Sense of security prevailing within the community.

ii. Level of willingness of the people to cooperate with the police.

iii. Honesty and impartiality in investigation.

iv. Extent of lawlessness.

v. “Service delivery” functions such as treatment of weaker sections, services rendered in cases of natural disasters, etc.

The Himachal Pradesh Board also devised an Annual Policing Performance Quotient (APPQ), to be computed by giving weighted average scores to Community Policing, Policing Efforts and Policing Results.

Objective Evaluation of Police Stations: Towards a Democratic Policing Index

Mr. Jacob Punnoose, a former DGP of Kerala, has proposed a numerical system to evaluate the performance of police stations. Since policing consists of performing certain tasks, including registration, investigation, detection, patrolling, surveillance and so on, the proposed “democratic policing index” aims to measure the successes achieved in these tasks against the failures.

Whilst the index is still in the process of development and is yet to be put into practice, the proposal is offered as an idea to improve the measurement of police performance and, in so doing, increase police accountability.

The index is calculated according to the formula: (P-N)/S, where P is the total number of positive marks, N is the total number of negative marks, and S is the total sanctioned strength of the police station. In all cases, the measures can be found from information that is available in police station records and crime statistics.

Factors that attract positive marks include crimes registered on complaints lodged by others, non-cognisable complaints recorded in the general diary / register and crimes under the Indian Penal Code charge-sheeted in 60 days. On the other hand, factors that draw negative marks include the non-registration of a case which merits an FIR, complaints against the police found to be prima facie true by any authority and missing persons untraced after six months.

After the positive and negative marks are tallied, the index is moderated in order to ensure a reliable basis for comparison. For instance, in areas where State Human Rights Commissions and Police Complaints Authorities exist, scores are increased by a small percentage since the number of complaints against the police in such areas is likely to be higher, owing to the presence of these redressal mechanisms.

It is heartening that efforts are being made to judge police performance objectively through the identifi cation of a wide set of parameters which include impartial investigation and some aspects of service delivery.

With respect to actually conducting the evaluation, the Sikkim SPB stands out. In its third meeting, the “DGP stated that the period since the last meeting had been by and large peaceful on the law and order front, but for a few stray incidents. Reviewing the performance on the front of management of crime and disposal of cases over a three-year period, the DGP noted that the conviction rate had dipped


in 2009 and the subsequent year had seen an upward trend.130 Measuring performance against the disposal of cases, management of crime and conviction rates are a welcome change from crime statistics alone.

With most Commissions, however, performance evaluation remained at the level of superfi cial assessments based on crime statistics. The following remarks, made by the Chhattisgarh Police Commission, typifi ed the approach taken: “Law & Order and crime situation in Chhattisgarh in 2012-2013 has been reviewed. In 2012-2013, no big Law & Order incident has happened… the number of registered criminal offences has been decreased… there has been 23 percent decline in naxalite related offences.”

It may be that Commissions require specifi c expertise to conduct the sort of comprehensive performance evaluation envisaged by the Model Police Act, 2006. When the NPC fi rst recommended the SSC, it made clear that the SSC should be provided an independent Cell comprised of experts in order to evaluate police performance both in quantitative and qualitative terms.131 Recognising this, the Kerala Police Act, 2011 calls for the appointment of three experts familiar with the functioning of the police, public administration or sociological / criminological studies, in order to evaluate police performance in the previous fi nancial year and suggest performance standards for the succeeding fi nancial year.132 This is a progressive provision that should be considered by all Commissions.

The Kerala SSC appears to have made some headway in implementing this provision. In its fi rst meeting, the SSC authorised the Chief of Police to prepare a panel of experts and to prepare, by the end of March, a draft report on standards for the various branches of the Kerala Police for the next fi nancial year (2012-13). As to fi xing performance criteria, it entrusted one of the independent members to study the matter and prepare a report. During the second meeting of the SSC, it was decided that an elaborate discussion on fi xing criteria should be made with the general public and police offi cers at the district level. The Home Minister stated that a questionnaire should be prepared and published in the daily newspapers, which could be followed by visits if required.

(iii) Policing PlansThe Model Police Act, 2006 suggests that the Commissions should assist state governments in preparing policing plans to clearly defi ne policing objectives and

130Sikkim SPB, Meeting Minutes, 25 June 2011. 131National Police Commission, Eighth Report, May 1981, paragraph 61.12. 132Section 26(1) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011.

With most Commissions,

however, performance

evaluation remained at the

level of super icial assessments

based on crime statistics.


targets.133 Only Sikkim and Himachal Pradesh provided a copy of their Strategic Policing Plans. However, it is unclear what role, if any, they played in drafting these documents.

Procedure of MeetingsThe minutes of meetings reveal that Commissions fail to function according to any clear process. Many Commissions did not have a set agenda. As a result, the discussions lacked focus and at times repeated earlier remarks. The manner in which decisions were reached was also disorderly. With the exception of Meghalaya, where the Leader of the Opposition made substantial contributions, and Delhi, where the independent members were ostensibly given the opportunity to voice their opinions, discussion by and large seemed to be dominated by one or two members, usually the Chairperson and the DGP. In Andaman & Nicobar Islands, rather than adopting a consultative process, the Union Home Secretary appeared to decide on all issues. By contrast, the minutes of the Kerala Security Commission note that certain decisions, for instance on community policing, were made unanimously.

The precise decision reached and the action to be taken going forward was often not clear from the minutes. This can be attributed partially to the imprecise nature of minute taking. The minutes of the Tamil Nadu SPB’s meeting, for instance, mention a number of agenda items but only elaborate on three. In relation to the other agenda items – maintenance of law and order, women in the police force, police training, protection of human rights, sensitisation of police force, highway patrols and road safety – the minutes merely state that, “the information furnished was noted by the Committee.”

The Sikkim SPB’s minutes are a notable exception and evince a clear meeting structure and format. The meetings began with a presentation by the DGP on the developments in the police department since the last meeting. The discussion then focused on each agenda point. Crucially, the minutes stated precisely the decision that was reached and the action to be taken going forward. For instance, some decisions were to be subsequently decided upon by the Board. In other cases, the proposal was to be put to the Government for appropriate action. In another circumstance, the Board referred the matter to a high-powered committee chaired by the Chief Secretary.134 The meetings ended with an address by the Chief Minister who expounded upon and clarifi ed the decisions made.

While most Commission meetings were well attended, there were some notable absentees. For instance, despite the composition of the Chhattisgarh Commission, only three members were present during its fi rst meeting: the Chief Secretary, the Principal Home Secretary and the DGP.

All this underscores the need to frame precise rules for the functioning of the Commissions. The Police Acts of Sikkim and Himachal Pradesh explicitly empower

133Section 40, Model Police Act, 2006.134In relation to the delegation of more fi nancial powers to the police department.


their Commissions to issue a Transaction of Business. Section 54 of the Himachal Pradesh Police Act 2007 is illustrative:

i. Notice for meetings of the Board shall be issued by the Member-Secretary at least 15 days before each meeting. Members wishing to raise an item shall send notice so as to reach the Member-Secretary at least 7 days in advance and items shall be taken up with the approval of the Chairman of the Board.

ii. All meetings shall be held in Shimla unless the Board decides otherwise. A record of proceedings of the Board shall be maintained by the Member- Secretary who shall cause them to be circulated, with the approval of the Chairman, within 15 days of each meeting.

iii. The quorum for a meeting of the Board shall be one-third of the total membership of the Board. In the absence of quorum, the meeting of the Board shall be adjourned to the same time on the next working day and no quorum shall be required for such adjourned meeting.

iv. The Board may devise its own procedure for transaction of business in accordance with provisions of this Act.

The Kerala Police Act, 2011 also provides that the Commission shall regulate its own procedure and conduct of business transacted by it.135 During its fi rst meeting on 23 January 2008, the Commission decided upon the following procedure, which lays down a process to be followed on all aspects of the Commission’s functioning, from the preparation of an agenda, the drafting of minutes, the formal communication of decisions / recommendations to the government, and the preparation of action taken reports. This process was to be approved during the subsequent meeting and issued as Rules/Regulations through a formal government order.136

i. The Notice of all future meetings of the Commission should be sent to all the Members well in advance, and, in any case, at least 7 working days before the scheduled Meeting. The DGP should also make arrangements to ensure that proper acknowledgement is obtained in respect of the Notices, and the same should be properly fi led.

ii. The Secretary of the Commission, i.e. DGP, should circulate the Agenda Points and Agenda Notes in respect of each proposed Meeting, in advance, to all the Members, after obtaining the approval of the Chairman. The Agenda Points should normally be sent along with the Notice convening the Meeting, and, in any case, at least 7 days before the date of the Meeting. The Agenda Notes may be circulated at least 3 days prior to the commencement of the Meeting.

iii. The Secretary, i.e. DGP, will initiate the discussion on each Agenda Point with the permission of the Chair, in the Meeting. The Secretary is authorised to prepare the draft Minutes of the Meeting, and, after securing the approval

135Section 24(8) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011.136There is no information available to indicate that Rules of Procedure have been notifi ed.


of the Chairman, he will send copies of the Minutes to all the Members, under acknowledgement.

iv. The Minutes of all Meetings will be pasted in a Register to be known as the “Minutes Book of the Commission”. This ‘Minutes Book’ will be maintained in the Offi ce of the Secretary, i.e. DGP.

v. The Minutes of each Meeting will be formally approved during the next Meeting, and, in case of any dissent by any Member in respect of the Minutes, the same can be pointed out and discussed in such next Meeting.

vi. Once the Minutes of any Meeting are approved by the Chairman, the same will be forwarded by the DGP to the Government (Chief Secretary to the Government) for processing as a File. The Government will process the decisions / recommendations of the Commission as recorded in the Minutes, for acceptance or otherwise, and thereafter, the decisions of the Government in the matter will be communicated to the DGP for compliance.

vii. In case any decision or recommendation of the Commission requires any action by any Department of the Government, including Police Department, the Government will communicate the concerned decisions/recommendations to the concerned Secretaries for compliance.

viii. It was decided that no ‘Quorum’ needs to be specifi ed for the conduct of any Meeting of the Commission. However, if the Chairman is unable to be present for any Meeting, the same shall be postponed.

ix. The Secretary (DGP) should take steps to see that the decisions / recommendations of the Commission are recorded in the Minutes, as done during Cabinet Meetings, i.e. with the background of the same also stated in the Minutes.

x. Once Government accepts the decisions/recommendations of the Commission and directs the DGP to comply with the same, the DGP shall duly comply and put up an ‘Action Taken Report’ before the Commission, in due course, after compliance, for information of the Commission.

xi. It was decided that the Secretary (DGP) be permitted to bring 2 Senior Staff Offi cers along with him for all the Meetings of the Commission, one to assist him in recording the Minutes, and the other Offi cer to assist him with necessary background materials for the Meeting.

xii. It was also decided that the Agenda Points can be discussed one after the other among the Members, as in other High Level Meetings. The Chairman would then sum up the discussions. The Secretary should record the decisions taken, which are to be read during the Meeting.


ConclusionThis chapter has revealed that the Security Commissions existing on the ground have managed to set important policies on a range of issues. These include practical recommendations to increase police station personnel; guide deployment; upgrade police stations; improve measures for women’s safety; introduce crime mapping; and various guidelines on police service delivery and ensuring lawful arrest and detention. Although in a few instances, the recommendations were overly broad and went beyond the SSC’s remit, there is ample evidence of the potential effectiveness of the body as a policy-making institution.

Unfortunately, that potential has in large measure been eroded by the infrequency and poor procedure of Commission meetings and the failure of the Commissions and state governments to ensure implementation of policies on the ground. This is reinforced by the dearth of public information available on the structure of SSCs, the substance of their meetings, their recommendations and actions taken on these. Unless these failings are addressed, the Commissions will struggle to induce far-reaching systemic change in policing.

Recommendations

Chapter

4

In the eight years since Prakash Singh was decided, Security Commissions were established on paper in all but two states. This has happened after considerable delay. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s safeguards of impartiality have been incrementally undermined. With some exceptions, the

balanced composition suggested by the Court was skewed, its mandate weakened and the requirements to be accountable to the legislature and have binding powers ignored. Without an impartial outlook, no accountability to the legislature and no binding powers, it is hard to imagine how these bodies will function as effective police oversight mechanisms. The state and Central governments’ intention therefore seems to be to retain singular control of the police, rather than to legitimately monitor it.

In terms of their implementation on the ground, too many Commissions exist on paper alone. The 14 Commissions that have moved from paper to actually functioning have seldom met. Despite their few meetings, they have managed to make strides in the policy-making domain, and several important policies have been laid down. However, not one Commission has evaluated the organisational performance of the police in the manner envisaged by the Supreme Court. That would involve going beyond crime statistics towards a variety of objective indicators.

If the Commissions are to have a meaningful impact on the state of policing in India, their structural and procedural weaknesses need urgent attention. CHRI makes the following recommendations to revive the failing mechanisms:

Composition1. Every Security Commission should include the Leader of the Opposition

and a member of the judiciary. This will ensure they are well placed to act


independently of the ruling government. Six states have failed to include the Leader of the Opposition on the Commission, while 17 states make no provision for a retired High Court Judge. Four states – Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat and Punjab – fail on both counts.

2. Commissions should have fi ve independent members, as recommended by the Model Police Act, 2006. Five is the maximum number of independent members in the offi cial suggestions, and provides the best balance between government and non-government members. This will ensure SSCs are inclusive of expertise and interests beyond those of the political executive. While 20 states have made provision for independent members, their numbers are less than those prescribed in the suggested models. Meanwhile, four states do not have any independent members whatsoever.

3. “Independent” members should be appointed by an impartial Selection Panel as suggested by Section 43 of the Model Police Act, 2006. In almost all states, the government directly selects the independent members. Only six states provide for a selection panel,137 however in most cases these panels are not suffi ciently independent and need to be made so.

4. Selection Panels should prepare objective selection criteria for the appointment of independent members. The independent members should be selected on the basis of laid down selection criteria focused on expertise on policy-making and organisational performance evaluation. This should be from a range of different fi elds – civil society, lawyers, academics, rights activists, trade unions and community groups.

5. Independent members should be appointed with no further delay. Although 55 independent members have been appointed across the country, they exist solely on paper in seven states: Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Tripura and Uttar Pradesh.

Annual Reports6. All Security Commissions must prepare annual reports to be submitted

to legislatures in time for the budget session. Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Nagaland and Tripura fail to have reporting requirements in their legislation/government orders. In practice, despite the legislative requirement to prepare an annual report, it appears that the Commissions by and large fail to do so. Only two states provided copies of their annual reports in response to our RTI applications.

Public Information7. All Security Commissions must comply with Section 4 of the Right to

Information Act, 2005. To be effective, information on the Commissions

137Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Rajasthan, Sikkim and Uttarakhand.


must be widely publicised. Yet there is virtually no information about them in the public domain. Under Section 4(1)(b) of the RTI Act, all public authorities are required to disclose baseline information, including: the particulars of their organisation, functions and duties; the powers and duties of offi cers and employees; and norms set for the discharge of functions. Section 4(2) of the Act requires public authorities to proactively provide as much information to the public at regular intervals through various means of communication, including the Internet. The Commissions’ current members, powers, meeting minutes, annual reports and rules, if any, should be published on a webpage linked to the Central / state governments’ websites, or Commissions can make efforts to create their own websites.

Binding Powers8. All Security Commissions should be given the power to make binding

recommendations. This is vitally important in the present scenario where lack of political will is proving to be a major impediment in initiating change in police functioning. Only two states have provided for binding powers.

Mandate9. All Security Commissions should be vested with the task of laying down

policies and actually conducting the performance evaluation of the police. They should not be given any additional functions. In some states, SSCs have been reduced merely to advisory bodies in law. For instance, the Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan Police Acts task their Commissions to “advise the State Government on policy guidelines”, “assist the state government in identifying performance indicators” and “communicate [their] views periodically on the performance of the police”. Likewise, in Assam, the SSC is only mandated to identify performance indicators, rather than actually conduct the evaluation of the state police.

10. The Commissions should consider bringing in external experts to conduct the specialised function of devising performance indicators and conducting a performance evaluation of the police organization, as provided in Section 26 of the Kerala Police Act, 2011.

Frequency of meetings11. The Commissions must meet at least every three months. While the Assam,

Delhi, Kerala and Meghalaya Commissions have met most frequently, the remaining Commissions have met only once in their two or three years of functioning. This is too infrequent for an institution designed to make a long-lasting impact on policing, and which is mandated to systematically evaluate the performance of the police. The Himachal Pradesh Police Act, 2007 requires the State Police Board to meet “as often as deemed necessary, but at least once in three months”. Meanwhile, the Meghalaya


Police Act, 2010 provides that the Commission shall meet for the “initial three years at least once a month and later every 3 months or more often if required by the exigencies of the situation”.

Meeting Procedures 12. Each Commission should formulate a procedure to govern the conduct

of business transacted by it. The minutes of meetings reveal that the Commissions fail to function according to any clear process. Any procedure should include the process to be followed while convening meetings, preparing an agenda, drafting minutes, communicating decisions/recommendations to the government, and preparing Action Taken Reports.


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tate

Po

lice

Bo

ard

Est

ablis

hed

by

Bih

ar P

olic

e A

ct 2

007.

1. C

hief

Sec

reta

ry

-

Cha

ir2.

DG

P 3.

Sec

reta

ry-in

-cha

rge

of H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t

-

Secr

etar

y

a) F

orm

atio

n o

f co

mp

rehe

nsiv

e Po

licy

Gui

del

ines

, fo

r m

akin

g p

olic

e ad

min

istr

atio

n ef

fi cie

nt, a

ffect

ive,

sen

sitiv

e an

d a

cco

unta

ble

ac

cord

ing

to

the

law

; b

) Id

entifi

cat

ion

of P

erfo

rman

ce In

dic

ato

r fo

r A

sses

smen

t o

f the

wo

rkin

g o

f po

lice

serv

ice,

Th

e Pe

rfo

rman

ce In

dic

ato

r in

ter

alia

, sha

ll co

ntai

n th

e fo

llow

ing

:- P

olic

e R

esea

rch

and

R

esp

ons

e, a

cco

unta

bili

ty, m

axim

um u

tilis

atio

n o

f am

end

men

ts, o

per

ativ

e ef

fi cie

ncy,

pub

lic

satis

fact

ion,

and

sat

isfa

ctio

n o

f the

vic

tims

in

com

par

iso

n to

the

co

mp

lianc

e o

f no

rms

of

hum

an r

ight

s; a

ndc)

Rev

iew

and

ass

essm

ent

of

org

anis

atio

nal w

ork

of d

istr

ict

wis

e p

olic

e se

rvic

e in

the

sta

te in

co

mp

aris

on

to t

he

Perf

orm

ance

Ind

icat

or

iden

tifi e

d a

nd

det

erm

ined

and

the

reso

urce

s av

aila

ble

to

and

un

der

the

co

ntro

l of t

he p

olic

e.

Sile

nt.

Info

. no

t p

rovi

ded


Stat

eE

stab

lishm

ent

Com

pos

itio

nM

and

ate

Nat

ure

of P

ower

sFr

eque

ncy

of

Mee

ting

s

Chh

attis

gar

h St

ate

Po-

lice

Co

mm

issi

on

Est

ablis

hed

by

Chh

attis

gar

h Po

lice

Act

200

7.

The

Stat

e G

ove

rnm

ent

bro

ught

it in

to e

xist

ence

3

year

s la

ter

via

Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

No

tifi c

atio

n N

o. F

-11-

353/

Ho

me/

2007

on

16 A

pril

201

0.

1. H

ome

Min

iste

r

-

Cha

ir2.

Chi

ef S

ecre

tary

3. S

ecre

tary

in c

harg

e of

Hom

e D

epar

tmen

t4.

DG

P

-

Sec

reta

ry5.

Sta

te H

uman

Rig

hts

Com

mis

sion

Mem

ber

, to

b

e no

min

ated

by

Stat

e G

over

nmen

t;6.

Tw

o in

dep

end

ent m

emb

ers:

per

sons

of

pro

ven

rep

utat

ion

for i

nteg

rity

and

com

pet

ence

fr

om a

ny fi

eld

suc

h as

aca

dem

ia, l

aw, p

ublic

ad

min

istr

atio

n, m

edia

or a

ny o

ther

fi el

d, t

o b

e ap

poi

nted

by

the

Stat

e G

over

nmen

t

(1) T

o a

dvi

se t

he S

tate

Go

vern

men

t o

n p

olic

y g

uid

elin

es fo

r p

rom

otin

g e

ffi ci

ent,

effe

ctiv

e,

resp

ons

ive

and

acc

oun

tab

le p

olic

ing

; (2

) To

ass

ist

the

stat

e G

ove

rnm

ent

in id

entif

ying

p

erfo

rman

ce in

dic

ato

rs t

o e

valu

ate

the

func

tioni

ng o

f the

Po

lice

Forc

e;

(3) T

o c

om

mun

icat

e to

the

Sta

te G

ove

rnm

ent

its v

iew

s o

n th

e p

erfo

rman

ce o

f the

Po

lice;

and

(4

) To

form

ulat

e p

ersp

ectiv

e p

lans

for

po

licin

g

and

sub

mit

them

to

the

Sta

te G

ove

rnm

ent.

Sile

nt.

1

Go

a St

ate

Secu

rity

Co

mm

issi

on

Est

ablis

hed

by

Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

Ord

er N

o.

2/51

/200

6-H

D(G

) on

3 A

pril

200

7.1.

Chi

ef M

inis

ter

–

Cha

ir2.

Lea

der

of t

he O

pp

osi

tion

3. C

hief

Sec

reta

ry4.

Ret

ired

Jus

tice

Dr.

E. S

. Da

Silv

a5.

DG

P

-

Sec

reta

ry

(i) L

ay d

ow

n th

e b

road

po

licie

s an

d g

ive

dire

ctio

ns fo

r th

e p

erfo

rman

ce o

f the

p

reve

ntiv

e ta

sks

and

ser

vice

orie

nted

func

tions

o

f the

po

lice;

and

(ii) E

valu

ate

the

per

form

ance

of t

he S

tate

p

olic

e an

d p

rep

are

a re

po

rt t

here

on

for

bei

ng

pla

ced

bef

ore

the

Sta

te L

egis

latu

re.

Sile

nt.

1

Guj

arat

Sta

te S

ecur

ity

Co

mm

issi

on

Est

ablis

hed

by

Bo

mb

ay P

olic

e (G

ujar

at

Am

end

men

t) A

ct 2

007.

Th

e St

ate

Go

vern

men

t b

roug

ht it

into

exi

sten

ce

via

Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

Ord

er N

o.:

GG

/ 56

/ N

PC/

1020

07/1

141-

V o

n 21

No

vem

ber

200

8.

1.C

hief

Min

iste

r

–

Cha

ir2.

Ho

me

Min

iste

r3.

Chi

ef S

ecre

tary

4. A

dd

itio

nal C

hief

Sec

reta

ry, H

om

e5.

DG

P an

d IG

P

-

Secr

etar

y6.

Tw

o n

on-

offi

cial

mem

ber

s to

be

app

oin

ted

b

y th

e St

ate

Go

vern

men

t ha

ving

rep

utat

ion

for

inte

grit

y an

d c

om

pet

ence

in t

he fi

eld

of

acad

emia

, law

, pub

lic a

dm

inis

trat

ion

or

med

ia:

(i) J

ustic

e K

.R. V

yas,

Fo

rmer

Chi

ef J

ustic

e o

f th

e B

om

bay

Hig

h C

our

t (ii

) Dr.

Kam

lesh

Jo

ship

ura,

Vic

e C

hanc

ello

r, In

dia

n In

stitu

te o

f Tea

cher

s E

duc

atio

n

(1) T

o a

dvi

se th

e St

ate

Go

vern

men

t on

po

licy

gui

del

ines

for p

rom

otin

g e

ffi ci

ent,

effe

ctiv

e,

resp

ons

ive

and

acc

oun

tab

le p

olic

ing

of p

olic

e fo

rce

in th

e St

ate;

(2

) To

ass

ist t

he S

tate

Go

vern

men

t in

iden

tifyi

ng p

erfo

rman

ce in

dic

ato

rs to

ev

alua

te th

e fu

nctio

ning

of t

he P

olic

e Fo

rce.

Th

ese

ind

icat

ors

sha

ll, in

ter a

lia, i

nclu

de

the

op

erat

iona

l effi

cien

cy, p

ublic

sat

isfa

ctio

n, v

ictim

sa

tisfa

ctio

n vi

s-a-

vis

po

lice

inve

stig

atio

n an

d

resp

ons

e, a

cco

unta

bili

ty, o

ptim

um u

tiliz

atio

n o

f res

our

ces

and

ob

serv

ance

of h

uman

rig

hts

stan

dar

ds;

(3

) To

revi

ew p

erio

dic

ally

, the

per

form

ance

of

the

Polic

e Fo

rce;

(4

) To

sug

ges

t fo

r th

e p

erfo

rman

ce o

f the

p

reve

ntiv

e ta

sks

and

ser

vice

orie

nted

func

tions

o

f the

po

lice;

Sile

nt.

1


Stat

eE

stab

lishm

ent

Com

pos

itio

nM

and

ate

Nat

ure

of P

ower

sFr

eque

ncy

of

Mee

ting

s

(5) T

o re

view

and

eva

luat

e o

rgan

izat

iona

l p

erfo

rman

ce o

f the

po

lice

agai

nst

(i) t

he

per

form

ance

ind

icat

ors

as

iden

tifi e

d a

nd

laid

do

wn

by

the

Co

mm

issi

on

itsel

f; (ii

) the

re

sour

ces

avai

lab

le w

ith, a

nd c

ons

trai

nts

of t

he

Polic

e;

(6) T

o s

ugg

est

po

licy

gui

del

ines

for

gat

herin

g

info

rmat

ion

and

sta

tistic

s re

late

d t

o p

olic

e w

ork

; (7

) To

sug

ges

t w

ays

and

mea

ns t

o im

pro

ve

the

effi c

ienc

y, e

ffect

iven

ess,

acc

oun

tab

ility

and

re

spo

nsiv

enes

s o

f the

po

lice;

and

(8) S

uch

oth

er fu

nctio

ns a

s m

ay b

e as

sig

ned

to

it

by

the

Stat

e G

ove

rnm

ent.

Har

yana

Sta

te P

olic

e B

oar

dE

stab

lishe

d b

y H

arya

na P

olic

e A

ct 2

007.

The

Stat

e G

ove

rnm

ent

bro

ught

it in

to e

xist

ence

vi

a H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t N

otifi

cat

ion

No

.S.O

.123

/H

.A.2

5/20

08/S

s.25

,26

and

31/

2009

on

24

Dec

emb

er 2

009.

1. C

hief

Min

iste

r

-

Cha

ir 2.

Ho

me

Min

iste

r -

Vic

e-C

hair;

3.

Lea

der

of t

he O

pp

osi

tion

4. A

dvo

cate

Gen

eral

5.

Chi

ef S

ecre

tary

6. S

ecre

tary

in c

harg

e o

f the

Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

7. D

GP

-

Sec

reta

ry

8. T

hree

no

n-p

olit

ical

per

sons

to

be

nom

inat

ed b

y th

e St

ate

Go

vern

men

t. O

ne

shal

l be

a re

tired

IAS

offi

cer,

ano

ther

a re

tired

IP

S O

ffi ce

r an

d t

he t

hird

fro

m t

he fi

eld

of

pub

lic s

ervi

ce, l

egal

pro

fess

ion

or

soci

al o

rgan

izat

ions

with

at

leas

t 15

yea

rs

exp

erie

nce

in t

hat

fi eld

:(i)

N.C

. Wad

hwa,

IAS

(Ret

ired

)(ii

) R.C

. Sha

rma,

IPS

(Ret

ired

)(ii

i) H

ukam

Cha

nd K

hokh

ar, A

dvo

cate

(a) A

id a

nd a

dvi

se t

he S

tate

Go

vern

men

t in

d

isch

arg

e o

f its

func

tions

and

resp

ons

ibili

ties

und

er t

his

Act

; (b

) Fra

me

bro

ad p

olic

y g

uid

elin

es fo

r p

rom

otin

g e

ffi ci

ent,

effe

ctiv

e, re

spo

nsiv

e an

d

acco

unta

ble

po

licin

g in

acc

ord

ance

with

the

la

w; a

nd

(c) R

evie

w a

nd e

valu

ate

org

aniz

atio

nal

per

form

ance

of t

he s

ervi

ce in

the

Sta

te.

Sile

nt.

Info

. no

t p

rovi

ded


Stat

eE

stab

lishm

ent

Com

pos

itio

nM

and

ate

Nat

ure

of P

ower

sFr

eque

ncy

of

Mee

ting

s

Him

acha

l Pra

des

h St

ate

Polic

e B

oar

dE

stab

lishe

d b

y H

imac

hal P

rad

esh

Polic

e A

ct

2007

. Th

e St

ate

Go

vern

men

t b

roug

ht it

into

exi

sten

ce

via

Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

No

tifi c

atio

n N

o. (

A)B

(14)

-69

/96

on

2 Fe

bru

ary

2008

.In

itial

ly e

stab

lishe

d b

y H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t N

otifi

cat

ion

No

. (A

) B(1

4)69

/06

on

4 Ju

ne 2

007

but

was

late

r re

pla

ced

by

the

Act

.

1. C

hief

Min

iste

r

- C

hair

2. M

inis

ter

in c

harg

e o

f Ho

me

3. L

ead

er o

f the

Op

po

sitio

n 4.

Chi

ef S

ecre

tary

5. P

rinci

pal

Sec

reta

ry, H

om

e6.

Prin

cip

al S

ecre

tary

, So

cial

Jus

tice

& E

mp

ow

-er

men

t7.

Prin

cip

al S

ecre

tary

, Fin

ance

8.

Dire

cto

r o

f Pro

secu

tion

9. D

irect

or

of F

ore

nsic

Sci

ence

10. D

GP

-

Sec

reta

ry11

. Thr

ee p

erso

ns o

f pro

ven

rep

utat

ion

for

inte

grit

y an

d c

om

pet

ence

out

of w

hom

at

leas

t o

ne s

hall

be

a w

om

en m

emb

er, t

o b

e ap

-p

oin

ted

fro

m t

he fi

eld

s o

f aca

dem

ia, l

aw a

nd

pub

lic a

dm

inis

trat

ion,

on

the

reco

mm

end

a-tio

ns o

f the

Sel

ectio

n Pa

nel c

ons

titut

ed u

nder

se

ctio

n 50

.

(i) A

pp

rove

bro

ad p

olic

y g

uid

elin

es ,

incl

udin

g

fi ve-

year

s st

rate

gic

po

licin

g p

lans

and

ann

ual

po

licin

g S

ub-

Plan

s, fo

r p

rom

otin

g e

ffi ci

ent,

ef-

fect

ive,

resp

ons

ive

and

acc

oun

tab

le p

olic

ing

, in

acco

rdan

ce w

ith t

he la

w;

(ii) A

pp

rove

fro

m t

ime

to t

ime

the

sanc

tione

d

stre

ngth

of t

he v

ario

us r

anks

of t

he N

on-

Gaz

et-

ted

Po

lice

Offi

cers

and

Gaz

ette

d S

tate

Po

lice

Serv

ice

Offi

cers

;(ii

i) Id

entif

y p

erfo

rman

ce in

dic

ato

rs t

o e

valu

ate

the

func

tioni

ng o

f the

po

lice

serv

ice

and

the

se

ind

icat

ors

sha

ll, in

ter

alia

, inc

lud

e o

per

atio

nal

effi c

ienc

y, p

ublic

sat

isfa

ctio

n an

d p

rop

er u

tiliz

a-tio

n o

f res

our

ces;

and

(iv)

Rev

iew

and

eva

luat

e o

rgan

izat

iona

l per

form

ance

of t

he S

tate

Po

lice

agai

nst

the

fi ve-

year

str

ateg

ic P

olic

ing

Pla

n an

d

annu

al p

olic

ing

Sub

-Pla

ns a

nd p

erfo

rman

ce in

dic

ato

rs a

s id

en-

tifi e

d a

nd la

id d

ow

n b

y th

e St

ate

Polic

e B

oar

d.

Sect

ion

53(2

) of

the

Act

pro

vid

es

that

the

Bo

ard

sh

all m

ake

reco

m-

men

dat

ions

to

th

e St

ate

Go

vern

-m

ent

“whi

ch s

hall

norm

ally

be

bin

d-

ing

on

the

Stat

e G

ove

rnm

ent”

. H

ow

ever

, “if

the

Go

vern

men

t is

of

the

op

inio

n th

at it

is

no

t fe

asib

le in

th

e p

ublic

inte

rest

to

giv

e ef

fect

to

an

y re

com

men

da-

tion

of t

he B

oar

d,

it sh

all c

om

mun

i-ca

te t

he re

aso

ns

ther

eof

whi

ch s

hall

be

pla

ced

bef

ore

the

B

oar

d in

its

next

m

eetin

g.”

3

Jhar

khan

d S

tate

Sec

urity

C

om

mis

sio

nE

stab

lishe

d b

y H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t G

ove

rnm

ent

Ord

er N

o. 8

/YA

0-40

03/2

006

on

31 D

ecem

ber

20

06.

The

fi ve

non-

po

litic

al m

emb

ers

wer

e ap

po

inte

d

via

Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

Go

vern

men

t O

rder

No

. 8/

YA0-

4003

/200

6-49

25 o

n 15

Dec

emb

er 2

007.

1. C

hief

Min

iste

r

-

Cha

ir

2. L

ead

er o

f the

Op

po

sitio

n

3. C

hief

Sec

reta

ry

4. H

om

e Se

cret

ary

5. A

dvo

cate

Gen

eral

6. D

GP

and

IGP

-

Sec

reta

ry

7. F

ive

non-

po

litic

al m

emb

ers

(i) C

. Mad

hurm

ud, M

anag

ing

Dire

cto

r, Ta

ta Ir

on

Stee

l Co

mp

any;

(ii) P

rofe

sso

r A

. H K

han,

Cha

ncel

lor

Ran

chi U

nive

rsity

(iii)

Kris

hna

Sirk

a;

(iv) S

wam

i Sha

nkan

and

, Sec

reta

ry, R

amak

rishn

a M

issi

on;

(v) R

.R. P

rasa

d, R

etire

d D

irect

or

Gen

eral

of P

olic

e.

Lay

do

wn

po

licy

gui

del

ines

and

eva

luat

e th

e p

olic

e in

ter

ms

of t

heir

func

tioni

ng in

ac

cord

ance

with

the

law

and

the

Co

nstit

utio

n.

Sile

nt.

1


Stat

eE

stab

lishm

ent

Com

pos

itio

nM

and

ate

Nat

ure

of P

ower

sFr

eque

ncy

of

Mee

ting

s

Jam

mu

& K

ashm

irN

ot

cons

titut

ed. S

tate

has

req

uest

ed e

xem

ptio

n fr

om

dire

ctiv

e.Th

e d

raft

Jam

mu

and

Kas

hmir

Polic

e B

ill 2

013,

mad

e p

ublic

on

15 F

ebru

ary

2013

, cal

led

for

the

esta

blis

hmen

t o

f an

SSC

. Aft

er t

he in

itial

tw

o-w

eek

dea

dlin

e fo

r fe

edb

ack

was

ext

end

ed,

ther

e ha

s b

een

no fu

rthe

r p

rog

ress

with

resp

ect

to t

he B

ill.

Kar

nata

ka S

tate

Sec

urity

C

om

mis

sio

nE

stab

lishe

d b

y th

e K

arna

taka

Po

lice

Act

, 196

3 w

hich

was

am

end

ed b

y th

e K

arna

taka

Po

lice

(Am

end

men

t) A

ct 2

012

to in

clud

e p

rovi

sio

ns

req

uirin

g t

he G

ove

rnm

ent

to e

stab

lish

an S

SC.

The

Stat

e G

ove

rnm

ent

com

plie

d w

ith t

his

thro

ugh

Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

No

tifi c

atio

n N

o.

HD

/207

/PO

SAE

/201

2 o

n 18

Aug

ust

2012

.Th

e St

ate

Go

vern

men

t in

itial

ly c

ons

titut

ed a

n SS

C v

ia H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t O

rder

No

. HD

/61/

POSA

EE

/200

9 o

n 14

Jul

y 20

09 h

ow

ever

thi

s w

as

rep

lace

d w

ith t

he A

ct t

hree

yea

rs la

ter.

1. C

hief

Min

iste

r

-

Cha

ir2.

Ho

me

Min

iste

r -

Vic

e C

hair

3. L

ead

er o

f the

Op

po

sitio

n4.

A R

etire

d H

igh

Co

urt

Jud

ge

nom

inat

ed b

y th

e C

hief

Jus

tice

5. C

hief

Sec

reta

ry6.

Ad

diti

ona

l Chi

ef S

ecre

tary

/ Pr

inci

pal

Se

cret

ary

7. D

GP

and

IGP

-

Secr

etar

y

(a) L

ayin

g d

ow

n th

e b

road

po

licy

gui

del

ines

fo

r en

surin

g t

hat

the

Stat

e Po

lice

alw

ays

acts

ac

cord

ing

to

the

law

s o

f the

land

and

the

co

nstit

utio

n o

f Ind

ia;

(b) L

ayin

g d

ow

n th

e b

road

prin

cip

les

and

g

ivin

g d

irect

ions

for

the

per

form

ance

of t

he

pre

vent

ive

task

s an

d s

ervi

ce o

rient

ed fu

nctio

ns

of t

he p

olic

e;

(c) E

valu

atio

n o

f the

per

form

ance

of t

he S

tate

Po

lice

and

sub

mis

sio

n o

f rep

ort

the

reo

n to

th

e G

ove

rnm

ent

for

pla

cing

bef

ore

the

Sta

te

Leg

isla

ture

; and

(d

) Any

oth

er fu

nctio

ns a

s m

ay b

e p

resc

ribed

.

Bin

din

g.

0

Ker

ala

Stat

e Se

curit

y C

om

mis

sio

nE

stab

lishe

d b

y K

eral

a Po

lice

Act

201

1. T

he

Stat

e G

ove

rnm

ent

bro

ught

it in

to e

xist

ence

via

H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t N

otifi

cat

ion

No

. 263

/201

1/H

om

e o

n 26

No

vem

ber

201

1.Th

e St

ate

Go

vern

men

t in

itial

ly c

reat

ed a

n SS

C

follo

win

g t

he p

assa

ge

of t

he K

eral

a Po

lice

(Am

end

men

t) A

ct 2

007

whi

ch m

et 4

tim

es13

8 an

d p

rep

ared

ann

ual r

epo

rts.

139

1. M

inis

ter

in c

harg

e o

f Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

- C

hair

2. M

inis

ter

in c

harg

e o

f Law

3. L

ead

er o

f Op

po

sitio

n4.

Ret

ired

Hig

h C

our

t Ju

dg

e-Ju

stic

e K

.P.

Bal

acha

ndra

n, H

igh

Co

urt

of K

eral

a5.

Chi

ef S

ecre

tary

6.

Ho

me

Secr

etar

y 7.

Sta

te P

olic

e C

hief

8.

Thr

ee n

on-

offi

cial

mem

ber

s w

ho s

hall

be

per

sons

of e

min

ence

in p

ublic

life

with

wid

e kn

ow

led

ge

and

exp

erie

nce

in m

aint

enan

ce o

f la

w a

nd o

rder

, ad

min

istr

atio

n, h

uman

rig

hts,

la

w, s

oci

al s

ervi

ce, m

anag

emen

t o

f pub

lic

adm

inis

trat

ion,

no

min

ated

by

the

Go

vern

or

of

who

m o

ne s

hall

be

a w

om

an:

Ad

voca

te M

. P. G

ovi

ndan

Nai

r (E

x. M

inis

ter)

Ad

voca

te C

elin

e W

ilfre

dH

orm

isTh

arak

an, I

PS (R

etire

d)

(a) F

ram

e g

ener

al p

olic

y g

uid

elin

es fo

r th

e fu

nctio

ning

of t

he P

olic

e in

the

Sta

te;

(b) I

ssue

dire

ctio

ns fo

r th

e im

ple

men

tatio

n o

f cr

ime

pre

vent

ion

task

s an

d s

ervi

ce o

rient

ed

activ

ities

of t

he P

olic

e;

(c) E

valu

ate,

fro

m t

ime

to t

ime,

the

p

erfo

rman

ce o

f the

Po

lice

in t

he S

tate

in

gen

eral

; (d

) Pre

par

e an

ann

ual r

epo

rt o

f the

act

iviti

es

of t

he C

om

mis

sio

n an

d s

ubm

it it

to t

he

Go

vern

men

t; a

nd

(e) P

rep

are

the

gui

del

ines

for

the

chan

ges

to

b

e ca

rrie

d o

ut, f

rom

tim

e to

tim

e, in

the

sta

te

po

lice;

(f)

Dis

char

ge

such

oth

er fu

nctio

ns a

s m

ay b

e as

sig

ned

to

it b

y th

e G

ove

rnm

ent

Whi

le t

he d

irec-

tions

of t

he S

SC

are

bin

din

g o

n th

e Po

lice

Dep

art-

men

t, t

his

do

es

not

exte

nd t

o

the

Go

vern

men

t,

whi

ch u

nder

sec

-tio

n 25

(5),

“may

, fo

r re

aso

ns t

o

be

reco

rded

in

writ

ing

, ful

ly o

r p

artia

lly, r

ejec

t o

r m

od

ify a

ny

reco

mm

end

atio

n o

r d

irect

ion

of t

he

Co

mm

issi

on.

“

5

138 O

n 23

Jan

uary

200

8, 1

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

09, 8

Sep

tem

ber

200

9 an

d 1

5 D

ecem

ber

201

0. S

ee S

tate

Sec

urity

Co

mm

issi

ons

: Ref

orm

Der

aile

d, C

om

mo

nwea

lth H

uman

Rig

hts

Initi

ativ

e, 2

011,

htt

p:/

/w

ww

.hum

anrig

htsi

nitia

tive.

org

/pub

licat

ions

/po

lice/

sscr

d.p

df,

pag

e 40

.13

9 The

Ker

ala

Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

pro

vid

ed a

nnua

l rep

ort

s o

f the

pre

vio

us S

SC fo

r 20

07-2

008,

200

8-20

09 a

nd 2

009-

2010

.


140 A

cco

rdin

g t

o M

ahar

asht

ra G

ove

rnm

ent

Res

olu

tion

No

. NPC

100

8/2/

cR-6

/PO

L-3,

14

Ap

ril 2

010,

the

pre

vio

us C

om

mis

sio

n in

clud

ed 5

no

n-o

ffi ci

al m

emb

ers,

incl

udin

g P

.S. P

asric

ha, e

x- IA

S o

ffi ce

r Pr

atim

a U

mar

ji, R

etire

d J

ustic

e A

shut

osh

Kum

bhk

oni

, act

ivis

t Fa

rida

Lam

be

and

ind

ustr

alia

list

Vija

y K

alan

tri.

14

1 Sta

te o

rder

s co

nstit

utio

n o

f ne

w s

ecur

ity c

om

mis

sio

n, T

he I

ndia

n E

xpre

ss,

13 J

uly

2013

, ht

tp:/

/arc

hive

.ind

iane

xpre

ss.c

om

/new

s/st

ate-

ord

ers-

cons

titut

ion-

of-

new

-sec

urity

-co

mm

is-

sio

n/11

4133

8/.

Stat

eE

stab

lishm

ent

Com

pos

itio

nM

and

ate

Nat

ure

of P

ower

sFr

eque

ncy

of

Mee

ting

s

Mad

hya

Prad

esh

Stat

e Se

curit

y C

om

mis

sio

nE

stab

lishe

d b

y H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t O

rder

No

. F.

1-7/

2010

/B-2

on

13 D

ecem

ber

201

1.1.

Chi

ef M

inis

ter

- C

hair

2. H

om

e M

inis

ter

3. L

ead

er o

f Op

po

sitio

n4.

Chi

ef S

ecre

tary

5. P

rinci

pal

Sec

reta

ry, H

om

e6.

DG

P

- S

ecre

tary

7. F

ive

non-

offi

cial

mem

ber

s:(i)

Dili

p S

ing

h B

huria

, fo

rmer

Lo

kSab

ha

Mem

ber

(ii) M

aya

Sing

h, R

ajya

Sab

ha M

emb

er(ii

i) La

l Sin

gh

Ary

a, fo

rmer

Mem

ber

of t

he

Leg

isla

tive

Ass

emb

ly(iv

) Ans

huVa

ishy

a, R

etire

d IA

S O

ffi ce

r(v

) D. G

. Kap

dev

, Ret

ired

IPS

Offi

cer

(a) L

ay d

ow

n p

olic

y g

uid

elin

es;

(b) I

den

tify

per

form

ance

ind

icat

ors

; (c

) Eva

luat

e th

e p

erfo

rman

ce o

f the

po

lice

agai

nst

thes

e in

dic

ato

rs; a

nd(d

) Pre

par

e an

ann

ual r

epo

rt t

hat

sho

uld

be

easi

ly a

cces

sib

le t

o t

he p

ublic

.

Sile

nt.

Info

. no

t p

rovi

ded

Mah

aras

htra

Sta

te S

ecu-

rity

Co

mm

issi

on

Est

ablis

hed

by

Mah

aras

htra

Po

lice

(Am

end

men

t an

d C

ont

inua

nce)

Act

, 201

4 w

hich

was

pas

sed

b

y b

oth

Ho

uses

of t

he S

tate

Leg

isla

ture

on

14

June

201

4.

The

Mah

aras

htra

Go

vern

men

t in

itial

ly c

reat

ed

an S

SC v

ia H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t R

eso

lutio

n N

o.

NPC

-100

8/2/

CR

-6/P

OL-

3 o

n 25

Jul

y 20

08.

Follo

win

g c

ritic

ism

tha

t th

e fi v

e no

n-o

ffi ci

al

mem

ber

s140 o

n th

e co

mm

issi

on

wer

e ap

po

inte

d

arb

itrar

ily,14

1 the

Go

vern

men

t co

nstit

uted

a

fres

h SS

C v

ia H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t R

eso

lutio

n N

o. S

SC-1

013/

CR

-108

/Po

l-3 o

n 10

Jul

y 20

13,

pro

vid

ing

for

a se

lect

ion

pan

el fo

r th

e no

n-o

ffi ci

al m

emb

ers.

1. M

inis

ter

in C

harg

e o

f Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

-C

hair

2. L

ead

er o

f the

Op

po

sitio

n 3.

Chi

ef S

ecre

tary

4. A

dd

itio

nal C

hief

Sec

reta

ry, H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t5.

DG

P an

d IG

P

-

Sec

reta

ry6.

Fiv

e no

n-o

ffi ci

al m

emb

ers

(to

be

nom

inat

ed

by

the

Stat

e G

ove

rnm

ent)

(a) L

ay d

ow

n th

e b

road

po

licy

gui

del

ines

for

the

func

tioni

ng o

f the

Po

lice

Forc

e in

the

Sta

te

incl

udin

g fo

r en

surin

g t

hat

the

Polic

e Fo

rce

alw

ays

act

acco

rdin

g t

o t

he la

ws

of t

he la

nd

and

the

Co

nstit

utio

n o

f Ind

ia;

(b) F

orm

ulat

ing

bro

ad p

rinci

ple

s fo

r th

e p

erfo

rman

ce o

f the

pre

vent

ive

task

s an

d

serv

ice

orie

nted

func

tions

of t

he P

olic

e Fo

rce;

an

d(c

) Eva

luat

ion

of t

he p

erfo

rman

ce o

f the

Po

lice

Forc

e.

Ad

viso

ry.

6


Stat

eE

stab

lishm

ent

Com

pos

itio

nM

and

ate

Nat

ure

of P

ower

sFr

eque

ncy

of

Mee

ting

s

Man

ipur

Sta

te S

ecur

ity

Co

mm

issi

on

Est

ablis

hed

by

Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

Ord

er N

o.

2/8(

32)/

2006

-H o

n 31

Mar

ch 2

007.

This

rep

lace

d t

he e

arlie

r H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t O

rder

No

. 2/8

(32)

/200

6-H

dat

ed 2

8 D

ecem

ber

20

06.

1. H

om

e M

inis

ter-

Cha

ir2.

Lea

der

of O

pp

osi

tion

3. C

hief

Sec

reta

ry

5. D

GP

- Se

cret

ary

4. F

ive

Ind

epen

den

t M

emb

ers

(i) D

r. I.S

. Kha

idem

, Ret

ired

Vic

e C

hanc

ello

r, M

anip

ur U

nive

rsity

, ex-

Cha

irman

, Man

ipur

Pu

blic

Ser

vice

Co

mm

issi

on

(ii) L

. Sad

anan

da

Sing

h, R

etire

d, P

rinci

pal

M

anip

ur C

olle

ge

(iii)

Ria

zud

din

Cho

wd

hury

, Ret

ired

, Co

lleg

e Le

ctur

er, H

afi z

Hat

ta(iv

) L. S

inat

e, R

etire

d, C

SS, e

x-Jo

int

Secr

etar

y to

Go

vern

men

t o

f Ind

ia(v

) Sha

iRal

eng

, Ret

ired

, Reg

istr

ar, G

awah

ati

Hig

h C

our

t, K

ohi

ma

Ben

ch

(a) M

ake

reco

mm

end

atio

ns/d

irect

ions

for

the

per

form

ance

of t

he p

reve

ntiv

e ta

sks

and

ser

-vi

ce o

rient

ed fu

nctio

ns o

f the

po

lice;

(b

) Eva

luat

e th

e p

erfo

rman

ce o

f the

Sta

te p

o-

lice;

and

(c

) Pre

par

e a

rep

ort

the

reo

n fo

r b

eing

pla

ced

b

efo

re t

he S

tate

Leg

isla

ture

.

Sile

nt.

Info

. no

t p

rovi

ded

Meg

hala

ya S

ecur

ity

Co

mm

issi

on

Est

ablis

hed

by

Meg

hala

ya P

olic

e A

ct 2

010.

Th

e St

ate

Go

vern

men

t b

roug

ht it

into

exi

sten

ce

via

Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

No

tifi c

atio

n N

o.

HPL

.180

/94/

Pt/2

8 o

n 2

Aug

ust

2011

.In

itial

ly, t

he S

tate

Go

vern

men

t ha

d e

stab

lishe

d

an S

SC v

ia H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t N

otifi

cat

ion

No

. HPL

122

/96/

516

on

19 D

ecem

ber

200

6.

It t

hen

reco

nstit

uted

it v

ia H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t N

otifi

cat

ion

No

. HPL

.180

/94/

Pt.2

on

18 M

arch

20

09.

1. C

hief

Min

iste

r

- C

hair

2. M

inis

ter

in c

harg

e, H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t -

Vic

e C

hair

3. L

ead

er o

f the

Op

po

sitio

n4.

Chi

ef S

ecre

tary

5. P

rinci

pal

Sec

reta

ry, H

om

e (P

olic

e)

Dep

artm

ent

6. D

GP

and

IGP

-

Sec

reta

ry7.

Tw

o n

on-

po

litic

al p

erso

ns o

f pro

ven

rep

utat

ion

for

inte

grit

y an

d c

om

pet

ence

fr

om

the

fi el

ds

of a

cad

emia

, law

, pub

lic

adm

inis

trat

ion,

med

ia o

r N

GO

s ap

po

inte

d b

y a

sele

ctio

n p

anel

Mr.

P.J.

Baz

eley

, IA

S (R

etire

d)

Mr.

V.G

.K. K

ynta

, Sen

ior

Ad

voca

te, G

auha

ti H

igh

Co

urt,

Shi

llong

Ben

ch

(a) F

ram

e b

road

pol

icy

gui

del

ines

for p

rom

otin

g

effi c

ient

, effe

ctiv

e, re

spon

sive

, acc

ount

able

, im

par

tial,

hone

st, p

rofe

ssio

nal a

nd c

itize

n-fr

iend

ly p

olic

ing

, in

acco

rdan

ce w

ith th

e la

w;

(b) P

rep

are

a p

anel

of fi

ve

pol

ice

Offi

cers

for

the

rank

of D

irect

or G

ener

al o

f Pol

ice

agai

nst

pre

scrib

ed c

riter

ia in

acc

ord

ance

with

the

pro

visi

ons

of S

ectio

n 6

of c

hap

ter I

I; (c

) Lay

dow

n b

road

pol

icy

gui

del

ines

so

that

the

Stat

e p

olic

e al

way

s ac

ts a

ccor

din

g to

the

law

s of

th

e la

nd a

nd th

e C

onst

itutio

n of

the

coun

try;

(d

) Giv

e d

irect

ions

for p

erfo

rman

ce o

f pre

vent

ive

task

s an

d s

ervi

ce-o

rient

ed fu

nctio

ns o

f the

p

olic

e;

(e) E

nsur

e th

at th

e St

ate

pol

ice

is n

ot s

ubje

cted

to

any

unw

arra

nted

pre

ssur

e or

infl u

ence

;

Sect

ion

35 s

tate

s th

at t

he re

com

-m

end

atio

ns o

f the

C

om

mis

sio

n “s

hall

be

to t

he e

xten

t fe

asib

le b

ind

ing

o

n th

e St

ate

Go

v-er

nmen

t.”

5


Stat

eE

stab

lishm

ent

Com

pos

itio

nM

and

ate

Nat

ure

of P

ower

sFr

eque

ncy

of

Mee

ting

s

(f) Id

entif

y p

erfo

rman

ce in

dic

ator

s to

eva

luat

e th

e fu

nctio

ning

of t

he P

olic

e Se

rvic

e. T

hese

in

dic

ator

s sh

all,

inte

r alia

, inc

lud

e: o

per

atio

nal

effi c

ienc

y, p

ublic

sat

isfa

ctio

n, v

ictim

sat

isfa

ctio

n vi

s-à-

vis

po

lice

inve

stig

atio

n an

d re

spo

nse,

ac

coun

tab

ility

, im

par

tialit

y, h

one

st p

olic

ing

, co

urte

ous

beh

avio

ur, o

ptim

um u

tilis

atio

n o

f res

our

ces,

and

ob

serv

ance

of h

uman

rig

hts

stan

dar

ds;

(g) E

valu

ate

org

aniz

atio

nal

per

form

ance

of t

he P

olic

e Se

rvic

e in

the

sta

te

as a

who

le a

s w

ell a

s d

istr

ict-

wis

e ag

ains

t (i)

th

e A

nnua

l Pla

n, (i

i) p

erfo

rman

ce in

dic

ato

rs

as id

entifi

ed

and

laid

do

wn,

and

(iii)

reso

urce

s av

aila

ble

with

and

co

nstr

aint

s o

f the

po

lice;

(h

) The

Co

mm

issi

on

shal

l als

o fu

nctio

n as

a fo

rum

of a

pp

eal f

or

dis

po

sing

of

rep

rese

ntat

ions

fro

m o

ffi ce

rs o

f the

ran

k o

f A

dd

l. Su

per

inte

nden

t o

f Po

lice

and

ab

ove

, re

gar

din

g t

heir

pro

mo

tion,

or

thei

r b

eing

su

bje

cted

to

ille

gal

or

irreg

ular

ord

ers.

Miz

ora

m S

tate

Sec

urity

C

om

mis

sio

nE

stab

lishe

d b

y th

e M

izo

ram

Po

lice

Act

, 201

1.Pr

evio

usly

, the

Sta

te G

ove

rnm

ent

esta

blis

hed

an

SSC

via

Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

No

tifi c

atio

n N

o.

C.1

8018

/12/

90-H

MP(

SC)/

Vol-I

II o

n 30

May

201

1 an

d v

ia H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t N

otifi

cat

ion

No

. C

1801

8/ 1

2/90

-HM

P (S

C) o

n 9

No

vem

ber

200

6.

1. H

om

e M

inis

ter

- C

hair

2. L

ead

er o

f the

Op

po

sitio

n3.

Ret

ired

Dis

tric

t Ju

dg

e, n

om

inat

ed b

y th

e C

hief

Jus

tice

4. C

hief

Sec

reta

ry5.

Ho

me

Secr

etar

y6.

DG

P -

Secr

etar

y7.

Tw

o n

on-

po

litic

al p

erso

ns o

f pro

ven

rep

utat

ion

for

inte

grit

y, t

o b

e ap

po

inte

d b

y th

e St

ate

Go

vern

men

t

Und

er t

he 2

011

No

tifi c

atio

n, t

he fo

ur

ind

epen

den

t m

emb

ers

wer

e:Lt

. Co

l. (R

etire

d) Z

.S. Z

uala

, MLA

Mr.

C. R

amhl

una,

MLA

F. L

alre

msi

ama,

IPS

(Ret

ired

), E

x-M

LAM

r. La

lng

heta

Sailo

, IPS

(Ret

ired

)

(a)

fram

e b

road

po

licy

gui

del

ines

for

pro

mo

ting

effi

cien

t, e

ffect

ive,

resp

ons

ive

and

ac

coun

tab

le p

olic

ing

, in

acco

rdan

ce w

ith t

he

law

; (b

) p

rep

are

pan

els

of p

olic

e o

ffi ce

rs fo

r th

e ra

nk o

f Dire

cto

r G

ener

al o

f Po

lice

agai

nst

pre

scrib

ed c

riter

ia w

ith t

he p

rovi

sio

ns o

f Se

ctio

n 6

of C

hap

ter

II;

(c)

iden

tify

per

form

ance

ind

icat

ors

to

eva

luat

e th

e fu

nctio

ning

of t

he P

olic

e Se

rvic

e. T

hese

in

dic

ato

rs s

hall,

inte

r al

ia, i

nclu

de:

op

erat

iona

l ef

fi cie

ncy,

pub

lic s

atis

fact

ion,

vic

tim s

atis

fact

ion

vis-

à-vi

s p

olic

e in

vest

igat

ion

and

resp

ons

e,

acco

unta

bili

ty, o

ptim

um u

tiliz

atio

n o

f re

sour

ces,

and

ob

serv

ance

of h

uman

rig

hts

stan

dar

ds;

and

(d

) re

view

and

eva

luat

e o

rgan

izat

iona

l p

erfo

rman

ce o

f the

Po

lice

Serv

ice

in t

he s

tate

as

a w

hole

as

wel

l as

dis

tric

t-w

ise

agai

nst

(i)

the

Ann

ual P

lan,

(ii)

per

form

ance

ind

icat

ors

as

iden

tifi e

d a

nd la

id d

ow

n, a

nd (i

ii) re

sour

ces

avai

lab

le w

ith a

nd c

ons

trai

nts

of t

he p

olic

e

Sile

nt.

Info

. no

t p

rovi

ded


Stat

eE

stab

lishm

ent

Com

pos

itio

nM

and

ate

Nat

ure

of P

ower

sFr

eque

ncy

of

Mee

ting

s

Nag

alan

d S

tate

Sec

urity

C

om

mis

sio

nE

stab

lishe

d b

y H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t N

otifi

cat

ion

No

.PO

L-9/

SF/2

0/20

00 o

n 30

Mar

ch 2

007

1. M

inis

ter

of H

om

e in

cha

rge

of P

olic

e -

Cha

ir2.

Lea

der

of t

he O

pp

osi

tion,

3. J

udg

e (s

ittin

g o

r re

tired

) no

min

ated

by

the

Chi

ef J

ustic

e o

f the

Guw

ahat

i Hig

h C

our

t-

Just

ice

Zeire

Ang

ami

4. C

hief

Sec

reta

ry5.

DG

P -

Sec

reta

ry6.

Thr

ee n

on-

po

litic

al c

itize

ns o

f pro

ven

mer

it142

Imch

alem

ba,

form

er M

PYi

sonu

, fo

rmer

CPO

Pre

sid

ent

Rev

. Dr.

Pons

ing

Ko

nyak

, fo

rmer

Sta

te

Info

rmat

ion

Co

mm

issi

one

r

Lay

do

wn

bro

ad p

olic

y g

uid

elin

es t

o e

nsur

e th

at t

he S

tate

Po

lice

alw

ays

acts

acc

ord

ing

to

th

e la

ws

of t

he la

nd a

nd t

he C

ons

titut

ion

of t

he

coun

try.

Sile

nt.

1

Od

isha

The

Od

isha

Go

vern

men

t ha

s no

t co

nstit

uted

an

SSC

to

dat

e. In

its

late

st a

ffi d

avit

bef

ore

the

Sup

rem

e C

our

t in

Ap

ril 2

007,

it a

sser

ted

tha

t th

e G

ove

rnm

ent

is e

xam

inin

g t

he m

ost

sui

tab

le

mo

del

and

“ap

pro

pria

te d

ecis

ion

in t

his

reg

ard

will

be

take

n up

sho

rtly

on

bro

ad b

ased

co

nsul

tatio

n”.14

3 The

sam

e ar

gum

ent

was

the

n m

ade

in t

he 2

008

affi d

avit.

Th

e O

dis

ha P

olic

e B

ill, 2

013

pro

vid

es fo

r an

SSC

, ho

wev

er, a

t th

e tim

e o

f writ

ing

, thi

s B

ill h

ad n

ot

yet

bee

n ta

ble

d.

Punj

ab S

tate

Po

lice

Bo

ard

Est

ablis

hed

by

Punj

ab P

olic

e A

ct 2

007.

The

Stat

e G

ove

rnm

ent

bro

ught

it in

to e

xist

ence

vi

a H

om

e D

epar

men

t N

otifi

cat

ion

No

. 16

/41/

2005

-3G

3/10

18 o

n 28

Ap

ril 2

008.

1. C

hief

Min

iste

r

-

Cha

ir

2. H

om

e M

inis

ter-

Vic

e C

hair

3. C

hief

Sec

reta

ry

4. P

rinci

pal

Sec

reta

ry, D

epar

tmen

t o

f Ho

me

Affa

irs a

nd J

ustic

e

5. A

dvo

cate

Gen

eral

6. D

GP

-

Sec

reta

ry

(a) A

id a

nd a

dvi

se t

he S

tate

Go

vern

men

t in

d

isch

arg

e o

f its

func

tions

and

resp

ons

ibili

ties

und

er t

his

Act

;

(b) F

ram

e b

road

po

licy

gui

del

ines

for

pro

mo

ting

effi

cien

t, e

ffect

ive,

resp

ons

ive

and

ac

coun

tab

le p

olic

ing

in a

cco

rdan

ce w

ith t

he

law

;

(c) R

evie

w a

nd e

valu

ate

org

aniz

atio

nal

per

form

ance

of P

olic

e Se

rvic

e in

the

Sta

te; a

nd

(d) I

den

tify

sho

rtco

min

gs

reg

ard

ing

in

fras

truc

ture

and

eq

uip

men

t in

po

lice.

Sile

nt.

1

142 S

tate

se

curit

y co

mm

issi

on

cons

titut

ed,

Nag

alan

d

Post

, 26

Ju

ly

2013

, ht

tp:/

/ww

w.n

agal

and

po

st.c

om

/cha

nnel

new

s/st

ate/

Stat

eNew

s.as

px?

new

s=Tk

VX

UzE

wM

DA

0MTk

1Nw

%3D

%3D

-d

ZYU

1XyA

CQ

Y%3D

. 14

3 Affi

dav

it o

f Co

mp

lianc

e o

n b

ehal

f of S

tate

of O

rissa

, fi le

d b

y M

r. B

ansi

dha

r B

eher

a, 1

0 A

pril

200

7.


Stat

eE

stab

lishm

ent

Com

pos

itio

nM

and

ate

Nat

ure

of P

ower

sFr

eque

ncy

of

Mee

ting

s

Raj

asth

an S

tate

Po

lice

Co

mm

issi

on

Est

ablis

hed

by

Raj

asth

an P

olic

e A

ct 2

007.

B

roug

ht it

into

exi

sten

ce o

n vi

a H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t N

otifi

cat

ion

No

. P. 1

8(15

)Ho

me-

1/20

13 o

n 5

May

201

3

1. M

inis

ter

in c

harg

e o

f Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

-

Cha

ir2.

Lea

der

of t

he O

pp

osi

tion

3. C

hief

Sec

reta

ry4.

Sec

reta

ry in

cha

rge

of t

he H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t5.

DG

P6.

Thr

ee p

erso

ns o

f em

inen

ce fr

om

any

wal

k o

f lif

e to

be

app

oin

ted

by

the

Stat

e G

ove

rnm

ent

on

the

reco

mm

end

atio

n o

f a S

elec

tion

Co

mm

ittee

. 7.

A p

olic

e o

ffi ce

r no

t b

elo

w t

he r

ank

of

Ad

diti

ona

l Dire

cto

r G

ener

al t

o b

e no

min

ated

b

y th

e G

ove

rnm

ent

as S

ecre

tary

- M

r. Su

resh

C

haud

hary

, Ad

diti

ona

l Dire

cto

r G

ener

al,

Rai

lway

s vi

a H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t N

otifi

cat

ion

No

. P. 1

8(15

)Ho

me-

1/20

13 o

n 8

May

201

3.

Ad

vise

the

Stat

e G

over

nmen

t on

Polic

y g

uid

elin

es fo

r pro

mot

ing

effi

cien

t and

ac

coun

tab

le p

olic

ing

. Ass

ist t

he S

tate

G

over

nmen

t in

iden

tifyi

ng p

erfo

rman

ce

ind

icat

ors

to e

valu

ate

the

func

tioni

ng o

f the

Po

lice

Forc

e.C

omm

unic

ate

its v

iew

s p

erio

dic

ally

on

the

per

form

ance

of t

he P

olic

e Fo

rce.

Form

ulat

e p

ersp

ectiv

e p

lans

for p

olic

ing

and

su

bm

it th

em to

the

Stat

e G

over

nmen

t.A

naly

se c

rimes

in th

e St

ate

and

sug

ges

t p

reve

ntiv

e m

easu

res.

Dra

w u

p a

str

ateg

ic p

lan

for a

fi ve

yea

r per

iod

, d

uly

iden

tifyi

ng th

e ob

ject

ives

of p

olic

ing

sou

ght

to

be

achi

eved

dur

ing

the

per

iod

and

set

ting

out

an

act

ion

pla

n fo

r the

ir im

ple

men

tatio

n.

Prep

are

trai

ning

pol

icy

for p

olic

e of

fi cer

s of

d

iffer

ent r

anks

and

cat

egor

ies;

and

Sile

nt.

0

Perf

orm

suc

h o

ther

func

tions

as

spec

ifi ed

by

the

Stat

e G

ove

rnm

ent

fro

m t

ime

to t

ime.

Sikk

im S

tate

Po

lice

Bo

ard

Est

ablis

hed

by

Sikk

im P

olic

e A

ct 2

008.

St

ate

Go

vern

men

t b

roug

ht it

into

exi

sten

ce

via

Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

No

tifi c

atio

n N

o 8

9/H

om

e/20

08 o

n 5

Sep

tem

ber

200

8.

1. C

hief

Min

iste

r

-

Cha

ir2.

Lea

der

of t

he O

pp

osi

tion

3. R

etire

d H

igh

Co

urt

Jud

ge

4. C

hief

Sec

reta

ry;

5. S

ecre

tary

in c

harg

e o

f the

Ho

me

Dep

art-

men

t6.

Sec

reta

ry in

cha

rge

of t

he F

inan

ce D

epar

t-m

ent;

7.

Sec

reta

ry in

cha

rge

of t

he S

oci

al W

elfa

re &

E

mp

ow

erm

ent

Dep

artm

ent;

8.

DG

P

-

Sec

reta

ry

9. T

hree

no

n-p

olit

ical

per

sons

of p

rove

n re

pu-

tatio

n fo

r in

teg

rity

and

co

mp

eten

ce t

o b

e ap

-p

oin

ted

on

the

reco

mm

end

atio

n o

f the

Sel

ec-

tion

Pane

l co

nstit

uted

und

er S

ectio

n 41

. (i)

Mr.

G.K

. Gur

ung

, fo

rmer

Sec

reta

ry t

o G

ov-

ernm

ent

of S

ikki

m(ii

) Ms.

Bha

rti S

harm

a, fo

rmer

Sta

te O

BC

Bo

ard

C

hairp

erso

n(ii

i) M

r. S.

D. B

asi,

IAS

(Ret

ired

)

(a) F

ram

e b

road

po

licy

gui

del

ines

for

pro

mo

ting

effi

cien

t, e

ffect

ive,

resp

ons

ive

and

ac

coun

tab

le p

olic

ing

in a

cco

rdan

ce w

ith t

he

law

(b) A

pp

rove

the

fi ve

yea

rs S

trat

egic

Po

licin

g

Plan

and

Ann

ual P

olic

ing

Sub

Plan

(c) I

den

tify

per

form

ance

ind

icat

ors

to

eva

luat

e th

e fu

nctio

ning

of t

he P

olic

e Se

rvic

e. T

hese

in

dic

ato

rs s

hall,

inte

r al

ia, i

nclu

de

op

erat

iona

l ef

fi cie

ncy,

pub

lic s

atis

fact

ion,

vic

tim s

atis

fact

ion

vis a

vis

Polic

e in

vest

igat

ion

and

resp

ons

e,

acco

unta

bili

ty, o

ptim

um u

tiliz

atio

n o

f re

sour

ces,

and

ob

serv

ance

of h

uman

rig

hts

stan

dar

ds

and

(d)

revi

ew a

nd e

valu

ate

org

aniz

atio

nal

per

form

ance

of t

he P

olic

e Se

rvic

e in

the

sta

te

as a

who

le a

s w

ell a

s d

istr

ict w

ise

agai

nst

(i)

the

Ann

ual P

lan,

Sile

nt.

3


Stat

eE

stab

lishm

ent

Com

pos

itio

nM

and

ate

Nat

ure

of P

ower

sFr

eque

ncy

of

Mee

ting

s

(ii) p

erfo

rman

ce in

dic

ato

rs a

s id

entifi

ed

and

la

id d

ow

n, a

nd (i

ii)re

sour

ces

avai

lab

le w

ith a

nd

cons

trai

nts

of t

he p

olic

e.

Tam

il N

adu

Stat

e Se

curit

y C

om

mis

sio

nE

stab

lishe

d b

y Ta

mil

Nad

u Po

lice

(Ref

orm

s) A

ct

2013

. Th

e co

mp

osi

tion

of t

he S

SC is

the

sam

e as

the

B

oar

d e

stab

lishe

d v

ia H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t O

rder

N

o. 3

88 o

n 22

Ap

ril 2

010.

144

1. H

om

e M

inis

ter

- C

hair

2. L

ead

er o

f the

Op

po

sitio

n3.

Cha

irper

son,

Pub

lic S

ervi

ce C

om

mis

sio

n4.

Cha

irper

son,

Sta

te H

uman

Rig

hts

Co

mm

issi

on

5. C

hairp

erso

n, S

tate

Wo

men

’s C

om

mis

sio

n6.

Cha

irper

son,

Sta

te M

ino

ritie

s C

om

mis

sio

n7.

Chi

ef S

ecre

tary

8. S

ecre

tary

in c

harg

e o

f the

Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

9. D

GP

- S

ecre

tary

(a) F

ram

e b

road

po

licy

gui

del

ines

for

pro

mo

ting

effi

cien

t, e

ffect

ive,

resp

ons

ive

and

ac

coun

tab

le p

olic

ing

, in

acco

rdan

ce w

ith t

he

law

;(b

) Id

entif

y p

erfo

rman

ce in

dic

ato

rs t

o

eval

uate

the

func

tioni

ng o

f the

Po

lice

Forc

e,

whi

ch s

hall

incl

ude

op

erat

iona

l effi

cien

cy,

pub

lic s

atis

fact

ion,

vic

tim s

atis

fact

ion

in

resp

ect

of P

olic

e in

vest

igat

ion

and

resp

ons

e,

acco

unta

bili

ty, o

ptim

um u

tilis

atio

n o

f res

our

ces

and

ob

serv

ance

of h

uman

rig

hts

stan

dar

ds;

(c) R

evie

w a

nd e

valu

ate

org

anis

atio

nal

per

form

ance

of t

he P

olic

e Fo

rce;

and

(d

) Suc

h o

ther

func

tions

tha

t m

ay b

e en

trus

ted

b

y th

e G

ove

rnm

ent

Sile

nt.

1

Trip

ura

Stat

e Po

lice

Bo

ard

Est

ablis

hed

by

Trip

ura

Polic

e A

ct 2

007.

1.

Ho

me

Min

iste

r -

Cha

ir 2.

Ret

ired

Hig

h C

our

t Ju

dg

e3.

Chi

ef S

ecre

tary

4.

Sec

reta

ry in

cha

rge

of t

he H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t5.

DG

P -

Sec

reta

ry6.

Tw

o in

dep

end

ent

mem

ber

s w

ho s

hall

be

non-

po

litic

al p

erso

ns o

f pro

ven

rep

utat

ion

and

inte

grit

y to

be

app

oin

ted

by

the

Stat

e G

ove

rnm

ent

(a) F

ram

e b

road

pol

icy

gui

del

ines

for p

rom

otin

g

effi c

ient

, effe

ctiv

e, re

spon

sive

and

acc

ount

able

p

olic

ing

; (b

) Id

entif

y p

erfo

rman

ce in

dic

ator

s to

eva

luat

e th

e fu

nctio

ning

of t

he p

olic

e fo

rce.

The

se

ind

icat

ors

shal

l, in

ter a

lia, i

nclu

de

: op

erat

iona

l ef

fi cie

ncy,

pub

lic s

atis

fact

ion,

vic

tim s

atis

fact

ion

vis-

à-vi

s p

olic

e in

vest

igat

ion

and

resp

onse

, ac

coun

tab

ility

, op

timum

util

isat

ion

of re

sour

ce,

and

ob

serv

ance

of h

uman

rig

hts

stan

dar

ds;

(c) R

evie

w a

nd e

valu

ate

org

aniz

atio

nal

per

form

ance

of t

he P

olic

e se

rvic

e in

the

Stat

e as

a w

hole

as

wel

l in

the

dis

tric

ts a

gai

nst (

i) th

e A

nnua

l Pla

n (ii

) per

form

ance

ind

icat

ors

as

iden

tifi e

d a

nd la

id d

own,

and

(iii)

reso

urce

s av

aila

ble

with

and

con

stra

ints

of t

he P

olic

e; a

nd

(d) E

xam

ine

com

pla

ints

rece

ived

from

mem

ber

s of

the

Polic

e Es

tab

lishm

ent C

omm

ittee

ab

out

bei

ng s

ubje

cted

to il

leg

al o

rder

s an

d m

ake

app

rop

riate

reco

mm

end

atio

ns.

Sile

nt.

Info

. no

t p

rovi

ded

144 T

amil

Nad

u G

ove

rnm

ent,

, d

ated

22

Ap

ril 2

010


Stat

eE

stab

lishm

ent

Com

pos

itio

nM

and

ate

Nat

ure

of P

ower

sFr

eque

ncy

of

Mee

ting

s

Utt

arak

hand

Po

lice

Bo

ard

Est

ablis

hed

by

Utt

arak

hand

Po

lice

Act

200

7.

Bro

ught

into

exi

sten

ce v

ia H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t N

otifi

cat

ion

No

. 107

7/X

X(1

)-48

/Writ

/200

6 o

n 10

Se

pte

mb

er 2

008.

Prev

ious

ly, t

he S

tate

had

form

ed a

SSC

via

U

ttar

akha

nd G

ove

rnm

ent,

Ho

me

Dep

artm

ent

Ord

er N

o. 4

69/X

X(1

)/48

/Writ

/200

6 o

n 31

Mar

ch

2007

.

1. H

om

e M

inis

ter

- C

hair

2. L

ead

er o

f the

Op

po

sitio

n3.

Chi

ef S

ecre

tary

4. P

rinci

pal

Sec

reta

ry, H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t5.

DG

P -

Sec

reta

ry

5.

Thre

e in

dep

end

ent

mem

ber

s:(i)

Mr.

A. K

. Do

bha

l, IP

S (R

etire

d)

(ii) A

ir M

arsh

al (R

etire

d) G

.C.S

. Raj

war

(iii)

J.S.

Pan

dey

, Ret

ired

DG

P

(1) S

ugg

est a

nd a

dvi

se th

e St

ate

Gov

ernm

ent

on p

olic

y g

uid

elin

es fo

r pro

mot

ing

effi

cien

t, ef

fect

ive,

resp

onsi

ve a

nd a

ccou

ntab

le p

olic

ing

; (2

) Sug

ges

t the

Sta

te G

over

nmen

t in

iden

tifyi

ng

per

form

ance

ind

icat

ors,

whi

ch s

hall,

inte

r al

ia, i

nclu

de

oper

atio

nal e

ffi ci

ency

, pub

lic

satis

fact

ion,

vic

tim s

atis

fact

ion

vis-

à-vi

s p

olic

e in

vest

igat

ion

and

resp

onse

, acc

ount

abili

ty,

optim

um u

tiliz

atio

n of

reso

urce

s, a

nd

obse

rvan

ces

of h

uman

rig

hts

stan

dar

ds;

(3)

Sug

ges

t mea

sure

s to

enh

ance

the

per

form

ance

of

the

Polic

e Fo

rce

per

iod

ical

ly a

s p

er th

e p

erfo

rman

ce in

dic

ator

s, id

entifi

ed

in s

ub s

ectio

n (2

) ab

ove;

(4

) Sug

ges

t tow

ard

s ev

alua

ting

or

gan

izat

iona

l per

form

ance

of t

he p

olic

e ag

ains

t –

(i) p

erfo

rman

ce in

dic

ator

s, a

s id

entifi

ed

and

laid

d

own

by

the

Stat

e Po

lice

Boa

rd it

self;

(ii)

reso

urce

s av

aila

ble

with

, and

co

nstr

aint

s o

f th

e p

olic

e;

(5) S

ugg

est p

olic

y g

uid

elin

es fo

r gat

herin

g

info

rmat

ion

and

sta

tistic

s re

late

d to

pol

ice

wor

k;

and

(6

) Sug

ges

t way

s an

d m

eans

to im

pro

ve th

e ef

fi cie

ncy,

effe

ctiv

enes

s, a

ccou

ntab

ility

, and

re

spon

sive

ness

of t

he p

olic

e.

Sile

nt.

0


Stat

eE

stab

lishm

ent

Com

pos

itio

nM

and

ate

Nat

ure

of P

ower

sFr

eque

ncy

of

Mee

ting

s

Utt

ar P

rad

esh

Secu

rity

Co

mm

issi

on

The

SSC

in U

ttar

Pra

des

h ha

s b

een

rep

eate

dly

m

odifi

ed. A

fter

orig

inal

ly c

onst

itutin

g a

n SS

C o

n 12

Mar

ch 2

008

with

two

ind

epen

den

t m

emb

ers,

145 t

he G

over

nmen

t rec

onst

itute

d

it on

2 D

ecem

ber

201

0146 t

o in

clud

e fi v

e in

dep

end

ent m

emb

ers.

On

17 F

ebru

ary

2011

,147

it re

-org

anis

ed it

to in

clud

e a

retir

ed H

igh

Cou

rt

Jud

ge,

to b

e no

min

ated

by

the

Chi

ef J

ustic

e of

th

e H

igh

Cou

rt o

f Alla

hab

ad. A

lthou

gh

we

wer

e un

able

to o

bta

in a

cop

y of

the

ord

er, a

ccor

din

g

to m

edia

rep

orts

, the

Gov

ernm

ent i

n Ju

ly 2

013

has

reco

nstit

uted

it o

nce

agai

n.14

8

1. C

hief

Min

iste

r

- C

hair

2. L

ead

er o

f the

Op

po

sitio

n3.

Chi

ef S

ecre

tary

4. P

rinci

pal

Sec

reta

ry, H

om

e5.

Prin

cip

al S

ecre

tary

, Law

and

Jus

tice

6. D

GP

- S

ecre

tary

7. T

wo

ind

epen

den

t m

emb

ers

to b

e no

min

ated

by

the

Go

vern

men

t

Una

ble

to

ob

tain

a c

op

y o

f the

ord

er

reco

nstit

utin

g t

he S

SC a

nd t

here

fore

can

not

com

men

t o

n its

man

dat

e

Una

ble

to

ob

tain

a

cop

y o

f the

ord

er

reco

nstit

utin

g t

he

SSC

and

the

refo

re

cann

ot

com

men

t o

n its

man

dat

e

Info

. no

t p

rovi

ded

.

Wes

t B

eng

alE

stab

lishe

d b

y: H

om

e D

epar

tmen

t O

rder

No

. 21

61-P

L/PE

-16S

-36/

05 o

n 2

June

201

0. T

his

was

reco

nstit

uted

aft

er S

upre

me

Co

urt

in

Dec

emb

er 2

010

sum

mo

ned

the

Chi

ef S

ecre

tary

an

d re

prim

and

ed t

he s

tate

for

not

com

ply

ing

in

“let

ter

and

sp

irit”

with

its

ord

ers.

1. C

hief

Min

iste

r

- C

hair

2. L

ead

er o

f the

Op

po

sitio

n3.

Chi

ef S

ecre

tary

4. R

etire

d J

udg

e no

min

ated

by

the

Chi

ef

Just

ice

of t

he H

igh

Co

urt

5. M

emb

er o

f the

Sta

te H

uman

Rig

hts

Co

mm

issi

on

6. D

GP

-

- Se

cret

ary

Una

ble

to

ob

tain

a c

op

y o

f the

ord

er

reco

nstit

utin

g t

he S

SC a

nd t

here

fore

can

not

com

men

t o

n its

man

dat

e

Una

ble

to

ob

tain

a

cop

y o

f the

ord

er

reco

nstit

utin

g t

he

SSC

and

the

refo

re

cann

ot

com

men

t o

n its

man

dat

e

Info

. no

t p

rovi

ded

145 G

ove

rnm

ent

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ce M

emo

rand

um N

o. 6

15/6

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ora

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No

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Feb

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om

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ly 2

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3.ht

ml.

State Security Commissions:Bringing Little to the Table

A study of police oversight in IndiaThe problem of political interference in policing in India is perennial and pervasive. Politically motivated transfers, political agendas imposed on policing during communal riots, and lack of scientifi cally defi ned policing goals, are well recognised facts. To mix politics and policing is treading a dangerous path. There is a gulf of difference between accountability to the law and accountability to politicians. This is often lost on governments which aggregate greater powers to interfere in the functional autonomy and professional discretion of the police.

The State Security Commission is a mechanism recommended by the Supreme Court in the landmark Prakash Singh judgement, and forms part of a package of seven directives aimed at systemic police reform. The Commission was to act as a buffer between the political executive and the police, providing a legitimate paradigm for political interaction with, and control over, the police force. It was to represent a wide constituency – not just the political leaders but also ordinary citizens – and was aimed at making the police accountable to the people and transforming the “force” to a “service”.

After the eight years since Prakash Singh was decided, what are State Security Commissions bringing to the table? This is CHRI’s second national-level report on State Security Commissions. It provides a detailed analysis of the composition, mandate and powers of the Commissions that have been established on paper. It then examines those that are functioning on the ground, taking a critical look at whether they have achieved their stated objectives. It is hoped that this effort will engender a more detailed inquiry into the functioning of the Commissions in each state, and will serve as a guide to those who wish to work for accountable governance in the country.

Published with support from:


B-117, Second Floor, Sarvodaya Enclave, New Delhi – 110 017

Tel: +91-11-4318 0200, Fax: +91-11-26864688

USO House, 6, Special Institutional Area, Delegation of the European Union to IndiaNew Delhi – 110 167, India 49, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi – 110 003Phone: +91-11-2686 2064 / 2686 3846 Phone: +91-11-4219 5219Fax: +91-11-26862042 Fax: +91-11-4150 7206, 07www.southasia.fnst.org | www.stiftung-freiheit.org http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/index

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