Churchill’s bid for peace with 1954

Moscow,

John Young London School of Economics

n 8 April 1954, in an afterdinner conversation with his daughter and son-in-law, Diana and Duncan Sandys, Winston Churchill 0 was reminded that the Soviet chargd d’affaires in London, Georgi

Rodionov, had recently said that the Russian leader, Georgi Malenkov, would welcome a personal visit from the Prime Minister. At this Churchill was delighted and he immediately began to outline a plan to his guests for a visit to Moscow which would both crown his own political career with a dramatic enterprise and help to bring peace to the world: ‘I shall not relinquish office until I meet Malenkov’. He appreciated that there might be difficulties with such a course, but believed ail could be overcome. One possibility, a snub from the Russians, was quickly dismissed: ‘at my age.. .the Kremlin ... know I have nothing to gain’. Another problem might be doubts from the second superpower and Britain’s close ally, the United States; but the Prime Minister recalled that the American president, Dwight Eisenhower, had declared his own readiness in February 1953 to meeting the previous Soviet leader, Stalin. ‘I would pop over to America first, to make it all right with them ...’ Churchill said. ‘The Americans know I am the greatest anti-Communist of all time. Besides, they would see I was going in any case.’ The British Cabinet itself, he considered, might have reservations, but he could balance any doubts from there by the public support his idea would receive, and by asking the Russians for some major concessions as evidence of their ‘good faith’. There was also a major problem with timing. The Western foreign ministers, from Britain, France and the United States were currently meeting with the Chinese and Russians in a conference at Geneva designed to settle East-West problems in the Far East. A two-power leaders’ meeting, between Churchill and Malenkov at this point would be inopportune. The Prime Minister however believed that, whatever the SUCC~SS of the foreign ministers’ conference, Geneva would provide an excellent basis for a two-power meeting: ‘If the conference fails I shall pick up the bits. If it triumphs 1 shall

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go to meet Malenkov to exploit the victory.’’ In this conversation Churchill had in fact set the blueprint for an approach to Russia which he pressed firmly over the next months. He had also succeeded in outlining some of the major problems likely to arise over it. Unfortunately however, he had greatly underestimated the scale of difficulties, and overestimated his own ability to tackle them. In July his determination to pursue his plan was to bring his government to the brink of destruction and sour his relations with America. The episode almost ensured that the career of one of Britain’s greatest statesmen ended, not with a great, successful enterprise, but with a divided Cabinet, a host of ministerial resignations. and defeat.

April 1954 was not the first occasion on which Winston Churchill had suggested a major peace initiative towards the Russians. In the late 194Os, as the Grand Alliance of wartime had broken down into the mutual suspicion of the Cold War, the Conservative leader had become best known for his ‘Fulton Speech’ of 1946, which had talked of an ‘iron curtain’ across Europe and called on Britain and America to unite against Russia.* But a few years later, with a complete breakdown in Western-Soviet relations, the Anglo-American alliance assured, and the danger of war over such questions as the Berlin blockade, Churchill began to press for more diplomatic contact between the two sides. The unity of ‘the English- speaking peoples’ remained vital to him, as it had been in the Second World War, and he was determined to resist the advance of Soviet communism, but as a statesman nurtured on the European traditions of diplomacy and balance of power, Churchill had little sympathy for the ideological conflict which had engulfed the world by 1950. What he wanted was neither the anti-communist crusade of McCarthyism nor a new version of appeasement but ‘negotiations from strength’: a united, well-armed and determined West, having halted the Soviet advance could now engage in talks with Moscow, reduce the dangers of another destructive world conflict, and create a lasting modus ~ i v e n d i . ~ During the February 1950 general election Churchill declared his readiness to meet with Soviet leaders,‘ and in the October 1951 election, which brought him back to power, bitterly opposed those in the Labour Party who still tried to brand him as a ’~a rmonger ’ .~ Once in 10 Downing Street the Prime Minister’s urge to bring peace to the world was seen after March 1953 when the death of Stalin seemed to offer the opportunity to encourage more ‘liberal’ and pacific policies from the new Russian leadership. Churchill had, on 11 May 1953, in the House of Commons, pressed for an early East-West meeting at leaders’ level, with no fixed agenda, to try to bring peace between the two sides. By following the wartime model of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Churchill believed a real breakthrough could be possible:

’ Rodronov had madc the suggestion to Churchill’s other son-in-law. Christopher Soarncs: Lord Moran. Winston Churchill, the Struggle for Survival (London, l9M), diary for 8 April 1954. See also note 12 below. ’ Randolph S. Churchill. The Sinews of Peace (London, 1948). pp. 93-105. ’ In general. see Coral Bell. Negotiations from Strength (London. 1962).

’ D.E. Butler. The Eriiish General Election of1951 (London, 1952). pp. 118-28. 426

H.G. Nicholas. The British General Eleciion of 1950 (London, 1951). pp. 194-203.

JOHN YOUNG meetings of foreign ministers, working on a fixed agenda, had been tried since 1945 but had tended to become locked into detailed discussions and ended in failure. The Prime Minister’s plan was criticised by the Cabinet, the Foreign Office and President Eisenhower - none of whom had been properly consulted before the 11 May speech - but it was received with interest and enthusiasm by the public, especially in Britain and Europe.

Churchill’s bid for peace with Russia in 1953 ended in failure. Initially the Prime Minister was challenged by Eisenhower who argued that a leaders’ meeting would raise false hopes unless it was preceded by some Soviet ‘proof of their good intentions. Then, in June, the ageing British premier (he was 78) suffered a stroke, and was unable to make a public appearance for several months. In the meantime, in July, the Americans and French did agree to invite the Russians to a meeting at foreign minister’s level, but the proposals for a leaders’ conference was pushed aside. In any case, it was not until November that the Soviets even agreed to hold a foreign ministers’ meeting to discuss the peace treaties with Germany and Austria (which had been left unfinished after the war). These three factors - Western opposition, Churchill’s own ill-health, and Soviet reticence - had helped to ensure that there was no early East-West conference after Stalin’s death, but arguably it was the first reason which was the vital one. Whether Moscow genuinely wanted to develop detente with the West, as its leaders claimed, was never really tested by the West. This was partly because of a belief that changes in Soviet tactics left the basic aim of ‘world communism’ unchanged, partly because such conces- sions as there were from Moscow (including the end of the Korean War in July) were seen as insubstantial, but also partly because of the dangers that detente held for the Western alliance. In 1953 the alliance was not as united as many liked to believe. One problem was McCarthyism in America, with which Europeans were generally out of sympathy, and which ensured that any contacts with Russia (still less with China, which had fought the Korean War so ruthlessly) were likely to be condemned by the American people and Congress. Another difficulty was the position of the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, whose policy since 1949 had been to ensure the future of liberal democracy in West Germany by tying his country securely to the Western alliance. The dilemma here was that any talks with Russia would, almost inevitably, involve the question of reuniting Germany, perhaps in a way that would put an end to Adenauer and so betray a close ally. But the gravest problem of all within the Western alliance was the question of German rearmament. First proposed by America in 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, German rearmament had seemed the only way to match the Red Army in Europe but it aroused strong opposition in France, after three German invasions since 1870. In 1952, France and Germany, together with Italy and the Benelux states, had negotiated a treaty to set up a supranational European Defence Community (EDC), which would allow German rearmament but only under strict controls and within a wider ‘federal’ structure. The difficulty was that even this did not satisfy many French parliamentarians who continued to oppose any sign of a renewed German miliarism. In 1953

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they had seized o n Churchill's idea of detente as a reason to delay German rearmament arguing that, if peace with Russia was possible, German rearmament was unnecessary. There were those who believed that the Soviet willingness to talk peace at that time was aimed precisely at causing such divisions in the Western camp, and the Americans grew increasingly resentful of the European failure to do more to defend themselves in the face of the Red Army."

In early 1954 none of the problems for Churchill's schemes had been removed: America was still strongly anti-communist; Britain. France and America (the occupying powers in Germany) still had to satisfy Adenauer about thcir good intentions towards him; and the French National Assembly had still to ratify EDC. In some ways the criticisms of Churchill's Russian policy in 1953 seemed to have been borne out. He had caused anxiety to Adenauer and increased problems for EDC with little result, and when the Western foreign ministers met with the Russian Vyacheslav Molotov in Berlin in early 1954 i t proved impossible to reach agreement. Molotov simply used the opportunity to disrupt EDC still further by calling on the West to abandon the European Army in favour of a European Security pact covering both sides of the iron curtain but from which America would be excluded.' In March a Russian note to the three Western powers had suggested a variation on this idea: America could join the European Security Pact if Russia could join NATO! But the Western powers rejected both proposals. calling on Russia to accept free elections in all Germany and arguing that EDC was a 'defensive' treaty like NATO, and no threat t o Russia.s Clearly both sides were far apart, each insisting on their own policies for Germany and Europe. Then again, both sides had also proved anxious to keep negotiations open and had agreed to meeting again. in Geneva after 8 May (this time with the Chinese) to discuss problems in the Far East. The most important of these was Indochina, where the French had been fighting an increasingly hopeless war against a strong, communist-led nationalist movement, since 1Y46. Despite large- scale American support it was a struggle which the government in Paris was anxious to liquidate, partly by negotiation (hence France's support for the Geneva meeting) and partly by forcing a major military defeat on the nationalist Vietminh. Unfortunately by the time the foreign ministers gathered at Geneva the 'decisive' battle of Dienbienphu seemed likely to become a Vietminh, rather than a French, victory.' It was no surprise then that Churchill wished to delay any new approach to Russia until after (ieneva.

Despite the limited results of Berlin and the complex situation surround- ing Geneva and Dienbienphu, despite the continuing doubts about Russia's 'new course' in the Foreign Office and the dangers of dividing the

" John W . Young. 'Churchill. the Russians and the Western alliance: the Bermuda Con- ference of 1953'. English Ilistorical Rcview. 1986. ' On Berlin. see Coral Bell. Sunpey uf lriternarionalAffair~, 19.5J(London. 1057), pp. 131-37. ' Coral Bell. Docunienrs on Iniernorionol Affair.$. 19S4 (London. 1957). pp. 39 and 43; S?5 HC' Deb. 5 .s.. cols. 22334: and C M D 9122 and 9146 (London. 1954). '' On Geneva. see helow note 13.

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JOHN YOUNG Western alliance, Churchill had several reasons for conceiving an approach to the Soviet Union at this juncture. Some of the reasons, certainly, were personal. The Prime Minister had now recovered from his stroke of the previous year; despite deafness, a tendency to doze off frequently and an inability to concentrate, he was still capable of impressive insights, bouts of energy, and great determination. He was anxious furthermore, despite continually claiming to be on the brink of resignation, finally to lay to rest the ghost of himself as a ‘warmonger’ and to retire in the wake of a major success as a peacemaker. There was much more than mere egoism involved in this. The Prime Minister was genuinely worried in Spring 1954 by scientific reports about a terrifying weapon, the hydrogen bomb, newly exploded by the United States and Russia. On 26 March he had told his doctor ‘I am more worried about the hydrogen bomb than by all the rest of my troubles put together’. In subsequent conversations he showed a recognition that with the very power of the weapon ‘there might be in the world a new common interest in preventing these explosions’, but he had a great fear that the Americans might be tempted to use their nuclear superiority to force a showdown with Russia.”’ In the Commons on 5 April (three days before his conversation with Sandys) Churchill had spoken of his worries during a debate on nuclear weapons, at the end of which the government had agreed to an opposition motion calling on Britain to lead the way in arranging a three-power meeting (with America and Russia).”

The idea of such a meeting had actually been resurrected by the Prime Minister a month earlier than this, in a message to Eisenhower, which was itself the result of worries about the President’s commitment to world peace. In early February, during the Berlin conference, Eisenhower had sent an extraordinary letter to Churchill, ranting against ‘the stupid and savage individuals in the Kremlin’ and proposing a policy which seemed to herald the much-feared ‘showdown’ with Russia. In tones reminiscent of fundamentalist preaching, Esienhower had written:

It is only when one allows his mind to contemplate momentarily ... an atheistic materialism in complete domination of all human life, that he fully appreciates how necessary it is to seek renewed faith and strength from his God and sharpen up his sword for the struggle that cannot possibly be escaped.

Churchill was at a loss how to reply, promising Eisenhower merely to ‘think deeply over all you say’, and eventually asking Eden and the Foreign Office to consider the letter. The Foreign Secretary too felt it ‘very difficult to assess the real meaning of Ike’s message’, but he pressed the Prime Minister to write a telegram, expressing the hope that Eisenhower’s ‘struggle’ was a spiritual - rather than nuclear - one: strength leading to negotiation, not confrontation, was the aim of both Eden and Churchill. And on 9 March (almost a year to the day since Stalin’s death) the Prime Minister wrote a letter on the lines suggested by Eden, adding the personal

”’ Moran, Churchill, 26 March, 12 April and 4 May. ‘I 526 HC Deb. 5 s., cols. 36-153; Moran, ibid, 5 and 6 April: and sec P[ublic] RIecord] Olffice], CAB 128/27 C (54) 23 (31 March).

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idea that it was time for a leaders’ meeting with Russia. Ten days later Eisenhower replied, agreeing (thankfully) on the dangers of nuclear war, but arguing, as in 1953 that a leaders’ meeting would achieve nothing. In the interim however Rodionov had passed the message to the Prime Minister (via Churchill’s son-in-law, Christopher Soames) that Malenkov ‘would be willing to consider meeting him’. Eden, on being informed, considered this to be ‘the most insulting message ever conveyed to a Prime Minister’, but Churchill (members of whose entourage had had clandestine contacts with the Soviet Embassy for some time) was more positive about the idea of a personal visit to Moscow.”

It was evident from the after-dinner conversation of 8 April when Rodionov’s initiative was raised again, that Churchill would not easily be put off from his growing desire to lead a new initiative for world peace. On 16 April the Washington embassy was asked to make soundings about Eisenhower’s movements over the coming month, and six days later Churchill began to put his new plan into effect suggesting, in a letter to Eisenhower, that they should meet in Washington in late May to discuss ‘several things - mostly tiresome’. Initially the President showed some reticence about this proposal, but there was little reason to refuse the British leader’s request and Eisenhower himself was anxious to overcome current differences with Britain.13 The main problem was the question of timing such a visit in the light of the Geneva conference, given that the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden and Secretary of State, Foster Dulles had to attend both sets of talks. In mid-May a date for the Washington meeting was fixed for 18 June,IJ but Geneva continued to drag on, and the visit finally began on 25 June (when there would be a recess at Geneva).” Churchill did mention to the Cabinet on 5 June that Eden might not be needed in Washington, but ministers were not enthusiastic about this idea: the Cabinet was determined Eden should be there to ensure that Churchill produced no unwelcome surprises on the visit. Importantly, the Prime Minister mentioned very little about Russia, either to the Cabinet, the Foreign office or to Eisenhower, concentrating instead on his worries about the hydrogen bomb.’“ Only when the Washington visit actually got underway were the Prime Minister’s plans in this direction fully revealed, though some of those close to him were well aware of his continuing hopes for a meeting with Malenkov. Lord Moran noted indeed that the idea of such a meeting, ‘has completely taken possession of him. It has indeed become an article of faith and is never out of his head for long.’ And Harold Macmillan, the Housing Minister, one of Churchill’s favourite

’’ PRO, PREM 1111074 (9, 1 1 and 27 February, 2 and 19 March); Evelyn Shuckburgh, Uescenr 10 Suez: Diaries, 1951-6 (London, 1986), pp. 137. 143-44, 149 and 1 3 - 5 4 , On 1 1 March Churchill told RAB Butler that he wanted a high-level meeting with Russia before he retired: A . Howard. R A E : rhe life of R . A . Butler (London, 1987). p. 205. I‘ PREM 1111074 and 666 (16, 22 and 27 April). I‘ Churchill was surprised that Geneva lasted so long: PREM 11/1074 and 660 (27 April-I5 May); Moran, Churchill, 28 April and 15 May. ’’ CAB 128127, CC (54) 39 ( 5 June); Moran, ibid, 2, 4 and 10 June.

Forrune, IY4S.55 (London, 1969), pp. 530-31.

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CAB 12W27, CC (54) 39 (5 June); PREM 111107 (24 May); Harold Macmillan. Tides of

JOHN YOUNG younger colleagues observed that the Prime Minister, ‘was obsessed by his hopes of going down to history not only as the greatest War Minister but as the greatest peacemaker in the world’.’7 True, Labour MPs continued to raise the idea of a peace initiative to Russia in parliamentary questions, but Churchill was vague in his replies to these.”

There were some ministers in fact who saw no need for the Washington visit at all. Chief among them was Eden, who made his doubts clear throughout May and June. He was concerned on a number of counts. First, there was the clear complication that the visit to America created for his work at Geneva. Secondly, the Foreign Secretary, to the annoyance of Churchill, liked to keep foreign policy issues in his own hands. But, perhaps most important, the Washington visit signified that Churchill was not yet ready to resign the premiership, in favour of Eden -who had long been the great man’s chosen successor. Many believed that Churchill should give way to a younger man and doubts about his ability to remain as head of government were greatly increased in early April, when he performed very badly during the hydrogen bomb debate, and was mauled by both the opposition and the press. Eden was so exasperated by this (and by Churchill’s claims that he wanted a meeting with Russia to pave the way for his retirement) that he actually considered encouraging ‘the Old Man to propose a top-level meeting right away, so as to get it over and done with’, but the Foreign Office did not think this a good idea, and were not very enthusiastic about a meeting with Eisenhower either.19 On more than one occasion Eden complained that the situation with Churchill ‘simply cannot go on; he is gaga; he cannot finish his sentences’ and for a time after his humiliation in the Commons over nuclear weapons the Prime Minister did indeed seem likely to retire.I9 As late as 4 May he talked of retiring in July (before the parliamentary recess) ‘unless of course more unexpected developments occur which make me indispensable’ but by 10 June such developments had occurred: on top of the hydrogen bomb and the Washington talks came news from Geneva that there could be a complete East-West breakdown in the Far East. Eden himself now talked drama- tically of ‘the most troubled international scene I can ever recall’. ‘I could not leave the Government in an emergency such as this,’ declared Churchill.20

The Geneva conference, the background against which Churchill’s bid for peace with Russia took place, had indeed reached a critical moment by mid-June. It had proved an important conference, not only for East-West relations but also for the Anglo-American relationship. Even before the conference opened Dulles and Eden had clashed over the American desire to intervene in Indochina directly, on France’s behalf in a joint Western

” See Moran, ibid, 26 June; Macmillan, ibid, pp. 531 and 533; John Colville, The Fringes of Power (London, 1985), pp. 691-92. In See, e.g., 527 HC Deb. 5 s. , cols. 1015-16 (11 May). l9 See Shuckburgh, Descenf to Suez, pp. 155-62, 173 and 220-21.

Moran, ibid, 27 May, 2 , 4, 10 and 15 June; Macmillan, ibid. p. 531 and 533-34. Churchill now considered that he might resign in September. PREM 11/666 (1 June);

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CHURCHILL'S BID FOR PEACE, I954 operation." When the conference began the French were desperate to reach a political settlement in Indochina if at all possible, and the Soviet, Chinese and Vietminh negotiators (not always united among themselves) proved willing to discuss this. Eden, as co-chairman of the conference and as the representative of a country with much to lose but little to gain in Indochina, did much to encourage agreement, and was able to display his undoubted impressive negotiating skills, But he and Dulles continued to bicker. The Secretary of State, goaded by an uncompromising American public, refused to enter formal talks with the Chinese and was very reluctant to approve a 'surrender' of territory to the Vietminh. A message trom leading Foreign Office officials to Eden on 10 June highlighted just how the planned Washington talks could add to Eden's problems: '[We] are impressed with the danger of the Conference being allowed to drag on much longer. A break now would be easier to justify than a break immediately following the American visit.'n Eden however was more impressed with the opportunity for peace at Geneva where it had broadly been agreed that the best solution was to partition Vietnam, between the Vietminh and a pro-Western regime. What remained was to decide how to supervise and guarantee this settlement.= The adjournment made necessary by the Washington visit in late June was used to draw up reports in Geneva on the Indochinese military situation. Meanwhile Eden decided that the Washington talks would be most useful, not to discuss the Prime Minister's worries, but to hammer out differences with America over South-East Asia before Geneva was rec~nvened. '~

When Churchill and Eden finally flew to America on 24 June therefore they had rather different aims in mind, and were not entirely happy with each other. Eden had been inconvenienced by the visit and was still at a loss to know when the Prime Minister would resign. Churchill was not pleased about Eden's arguments with Dulles. Certainly, Churchill had little liking for the American Secretary of State, considering him 'a dull, unimaginative. uncomprehending, insensitive man'ZS who, among other things. had been an ardent opponent of detente with Russia in 1953. Certainly too, the Prime Minister shared Eden's hopes that Geneva would result in a peace settlement for the Far East: on 21 June Churchill had uritten to Eisenhower, pressing him to accept the strong desire of the new French premier, Pierre Mendes-France, to bring peace to Indochina.26 But the Prime Minister was deeply committed to close co-operation with

:' On these differences see especially CAB 129168. C (54) 1% (14 June), circulated by Eden to justify his conduct. " FO 371~112085/1018, p. 141. '.I On Geneva in general see particularly the useful amalgamation of documents in FO 371~112085/1018 and Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London, 1960), pp. 107-45. American documents are collected in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-4 XIV (Washington, 1981). See also CAB 128/27 CC (54) 35 (24 May) and CAB 129/68, C (54) 177 (24 May) for Eden's plans at Geneva. 'I On Edcn's h o p s on this point see. e.g. CAB 128/27, CC (54) 43 (22 June); CAB 129169, C (54) 207 (22 Junc). Macmillan. Tides, pp. 533-34. '' Moran, C'hurchill. 4 May. -', CAB 12827. CC (54) 42 (21 June); PREM 1111074 (18 and 21 June).

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JOHN YOUNG America, and Churchill was very anxious, of course, that Eisenhower should not react unfavourably to the idea of a meeting with Malenkov: ‘I cannot see why anyone should want to quarrel with America. She stands alone in the world against communism. The difficulty is how far we ought to go in restraining her from taking risks which we cannot share.’*’ The Prime Minister had been concerned at the Eden-Dulles feud for some time and, on the flight to Washington, pressed the Foreign Secretary to co-operate with the Americans. Churchill had already expressed the view that the whole Geneva episode showed the need for a leaders’ meeting: ‘Look up my 11 May [1953] speech ... and you’ll soon see how I gave warning that nothing can come of these talks at lower level. They go on, day after day, endlessly. The Foreign Office keeps on splitting hairs. There is no one to say ‘Bloody well go and do Despite the inauspicious circumstances the Washington conversations saw something of an improvement in Anglo-American relations. Dulles, who had given up any idea of American intervention in Indochina, made an agreement with Eden on the broad lines of a settlement there; differences were overcome between the two over an American-sponsored coup against a left-wing regime in Guatemala; and future efforts to bring German rearmament into effect were decided. Churchill and Eisenhower, for their part, discussed nuclear matters and issued a declaration on the desirability of ‘self- determination’. (The idea was principally Eisenhower’s, who saw it as a way to counter Soviet propaganda against ‘western colonialism’.)2y For the Prime Minister, however, the vital topic was East-West peace and here he seemed to have great success - at least with Eisenhower. In an initial conversation on 25 June the President seemed very sympathetic to the idea of a visit, by Churchill and Eden, to Moscow. This came to the Prime Minister’s staff as a ‘vast surprise’ and an enthusiastic Churchill talked of making such a journey in July: ‘This may lead to results which will be received by the world with a gasp of relief and amazement’. The next day the President went even further, discussing in some detail the idea of following up a successful Anglo-Soviet meeting with a much larger conference in London. Eisenhower did not believe it would be possible for a President to leave America for long but he was ready to attend the opening of a meeting with the Russians, British and French, and to return for its closing stages, leaving Dulles and Vice-president Richard Nixon to represent America in the interim. The exact motivations for Eisenhower to talk in this way can only be guessed but he had, since coming to power, taken a more positive view than Dulles on the idea of approaches to Russia and shared some of Churchill’s grave concerns about the nuclear menace.

2’ Moran, Churchill, 21 May. h i d , 15 and 24 June. On the North American visit in general see: CAB 128/27, CC (54) 44 (29 June); CAB

129169, C (54) 214 (1 July) and 225 (7 July); PREM 11/649 (21 June and 650 (25-27 June); Eden, Full Circle pp. 131-33; Moran. ibid, 25-29 June; Colville, Fringes ofpower, pp. 691-97; David Carlton, Anthony Eden (London, 1983). pp. 350-53; Bell, Documenfs, p. 283; Robert H. Ferrell (ed), The Diary oflames C. Hagerfy (Indiana University Press, 1983). pp. 72-80. On Guatemala see John Young, ‘Britain’s Latin American dilemma, 1954’. Internofionol History Review, 1986.

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CHURCHILL3 BID FOR PEACE, 19S4 In April and December 1953 the President had made public appeals for East-West co-operation on atomic power. These were bids for co- operation with Moscow in a limited area via talks at the UN and were of a different order to the Prime Minister’s initiatives, which aimed at a wide agenda for talks at leaders’ level, but they were rather different too from Dulles’ preference for a firm anti-communist line. Eisenhower was not willing to join in Churchill’s opening contact with the Soviets it is true, but he did apparently see this as a useful initiative which could pave the way to a broader meeting of great powers. Churchill’s problems began when Dulles learned of the President’s conversations with the Prime Minister and tried to reverse the apparent American endorsement of an Anglo- Soviet meeting. Hitherto Churchill had been most concerned to prevent Eden clashing with the Secretary of State: ‘I hope they haven’t quarrelled and killed each other’, he remarked on one occasion, when Eden could not be found. But, on 27 June, it was the Prime Minister’s turn to argue with the strong-minded Dulles, who tried to dissuade him from a two-power meeting on a number of counts. Without the assurance of a favourable outcome, argued Dulles, the talks would end in either an illusory success or an obvious failure - thus making relations with Russia worse; the American people would oppose the idea; and the American government would be forced to issue a statement making i t clear that Churchill did not represent US views. But the British premier would not be moved. He had his friend Eisenhower’s approval and was determined to proceed.M After Churchill’s party left, the President and Dulles could not say with certainty what they had agreed with him about visiting Russia, but the Prime Minister believed that he had won American approval to proceed. This impression was strengthgned on 30 June when, during a press conference, Eisenhower was quizzed about Churchill’s desire to meet the Russians and declared, ‘If there is any proof of the other side that they will keep their agreements, I think we would be ...q uite content to do almost anything to advance that cause’.3’

On 30 June Churchill and Eden left North America to sail back to Britain on the RMS Queen Elizabeth. The Foreign Secretary had given up the opportunity to fly back partly because he wanted to talk to the Prime Minister about the vexed question of succeeding to the premiership: Eden’s desires in this direction gave Churchill a useful lever in the discussion which now ensued about Russia. By 2 July the Prime Minister had definitely decided to proceed with a two-power meeting in the near

“ O n the talks regarding Russia see: Moran, ibid, 25 June; Colville. ibid. pp. 692-94; Macmillan, Tides, p. 535; Gerson, Louis, John Foster Dulles (New York, 1967). p. 216; A. Seldon. Churchill’s lndian Summer (London, IYXl), p. 405. For recent discussions of Eisenhower‘s policies sec: Thomas F. Soapes, ‘A Cold Warrior seeks peace’, Diplomaric HLirory. 4, 1 , 1980. and David Mayers, ‘Eisenhower’s Containment Policy’. International Hirrory Review, V, 1 , 1983. “ Seldon, Indian Summer, pp. 406 and 621; Macmillan. Tides, p. 535; Public Papers of rhe Presidenis: Dwight D. Eisenhower. 1954 (Washington. IW), p. 157. and see pp. 154-56 for the two Washington communiques. The pressman who quizzed Eisenhower, Paul Leach of the Chicago Dailv News seemed well aware of Churchill’s ‘idea of conferences with Malenkow in Moscow‘. though this was not meant to he public knowledge. 434

JOHN YOUNG future, though he was coming to feel that it should be held in a neutral capital rather than Moscow. He planned to ask the Russians, at the meeting, to sign an Austrian peace treaty as an earnest of good faith (an idea he had first raised with Sandys on 8 April). On the morning of 2 July Churchill and Eden discussed the idea and apparently made what was later described by Eden’s private secretary, Evelyn Shuckburgh, as ‘a dis- graceful compact’: a meeting with Malenkov should take place in August, if possible, and Churchill would hand over the premiership on about 20 September. The Prime Minister then dictated a telegram to Moscow, confident that neither Eisenhower nor Eden would oppose him, but when the telegram was shown to the Foreign Secretary he expressed doubts on two points. First, like Dulles he was not sure that the disadvantages of a meeting outweighed the advantages: it would raise enormous public hopes; it could worsen relations with America further; and it could cause suspicions in Western Europe, particularly from Adenauer. But secondly, and more importantly, Eden disliked Churchill’s intention of launching his initiative without consulting the Cabinet. Churchill had drafted his tele- gram as an informal, personal letter to the Soviet foreign minister and he had framed it, not as an actual proposal for a meeting, but as an enquiry about the likely Soviet reaction to such a proposal. He had also made it clear that the meeting - the time and place of which should be decided later - would not involve America in any way, but would hopefully lead on to a fuller conference with America and, perhaps, France. All this was important, because Churchill was able to argue that, since he was making no formal proposal, the message amounted to a private sounding such as he had often made to other leaders, especially during the war, and did not require the Cabinet’s agreement. Ministers could be consulted when a formal proposal for a meeting was made. Eden, and even some of Churchill’s own staff, had their doubts about these arguments, for it seemed clear that a positive reply from Molotov about a meeting would make it very difficult for the Cabinet to reject the idea: if they did reject it, Eden pointed out, the Russians would feel betrayed and might publicise the whole affair, thus leading to a worsening, not an improvement, in relations. But the Prime Minister was adamant, telling his secretary, John Colville, that he was ready to make the question one of confidence: if the Cabinet opposed his plans he would resign, dividing the government, party and country.

After long and bitter arguments during the afternoon, Eden - who himself claimed to have considered resignation on the issue - agreed to another compromise: if Churchill consulted the Cabinet he, Eden, would say that he agreed with the Russian visit in principle. This agreement effectively proved stillborn however, for the Prime Minister proved ruthless and devious in pursuing his ‘one consuming purpose’. He could easily have wajted until the Queen Elizabeth reached Southampton in a few days and consulted the Cabinet; Eden had actually offered to deliver the Prime Minister’s telegram to Molotov in person in Geneva after the Cabinet met. But instead Churchill despatched the message to London, for onward transmission to Moscow, together with a covering note to the

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CHURCHILL‘S BID FOR PEACE, 1954 Chancellor of the Exchequer (and acting premier), ‘RAB’ Butler, asking for any comments he might have on it. Eden evidently hoped that Butler would consult other ministers on the subject. but Churchill had cunningly marked the letter to Butler ‘personal and private’ and it arrived, furthermore. on Saturday afternoon, when the Chancellor was in Norfolk and the rest of the Cabinet dispersed. To make doubly certain that there was no trouble from London. Churchill followed up the first letter to Butler on 3 July with another reading, ‘presume you have sent on my message; it does not commit the Cabinet’. As a result, Butler, despite Foreign Office warnings, did not see the full significance of the issue, suggested only a few minor amendments to the Molotov telegram, and then let it go forward. On board ship Churchill professed to believe that Butler had consulted ministers before making his reply. (There were those who believed that, despite all the subterfuge, the Chancellor ought t o have done so.) But later the Prime Minister admitted to Colville that he had deliberately manipulated the situation on the Queen Elizabeth to ensure that the Cabinet did not discuss his message to Molotov: for he feared that ministers would scotch the enterprise.32

On returning to Britain Churchill and Eden soon discovered that the Molotov telegram had unleashed a storm - and a storm which could have destroyed. certainly, Churchill’s career (or what remained of it), and perhaps Eden’s too. The Foreign Office were stunned by the Prime Minister’s initiative. and shocked that Eden had allowed it to go forward: the Foreign Secretary may have been preoccupied with Geneva, and eager to ensure an early succession to the premiership, but he had been sent to Washington (at the Cabinet’s insistence) to control Churchill, not to encourage him. Foreign Office officials had no sympathy with the idea that Russia‘s policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’ held out any hope for peace. To the Prime Minister ‘peaceful coexistence’ meant the possibility of a prolonged period of what he called ‘non-war tension’, leading to a mellowing of the Soviet system (as the Russians worked for ‘butter not bombs’), and eventually a lasting peace. But the Foreign Office pointed out to him. in two memoranda during July, that ‘peaceful coexistence’ had first been used by Lenin as far back as 1920, after the failure of the hoped-for ‘world revolution’. The Office saw it as no more than a tactical move. designed to lull the West, and encourage ‘neutrality’ in Europe, and that the Soviet aim remained one of a communist world.?’ On 6 July two of Eden‘s junior ministers were considering whether to resign on the issue: Selwyn Lloyd. the future Foreign Secretary, and Anthony Nutting, who eventually did resign over the Suez crisis, both opposed the idea of a meeting with Russia without the Americans. More importantly, this view was shared by at least one Cabinet minister. The Lord President of the Council. the Marquess of Salisbury, was a well-respected figure on the

I’ Colville. Fringes of’ Power, pp. 697-9 and 701-2; Shuckburgh, Desceni ro Suez, p. 221: Moran. Churchill, 2-5 July; Macmillan, Tidus. p. 534; and see CAB 128/27, CC (54) 48th (8 July). confidential annex for further details. For the telegram to Molotov sce C M D Y41X. ‘Exchange of Letters...’. p. 1. which was finally dated 4 July. ’‘ FO 371!1 I l706,’l (14 and 27- July).

436

JOHN YOUNG right of the party, considered by Churchill to be ‘one of those in my orchestra whose note 1 value’. He had opposed Chamberlain’s ‘appease- ment’ policy in the 1930s, was Leader of the Lords during the war, and had been given special responsibilities on nuclear matters in the 1951-55 government. He was also a firm nationalist, keen to work closely with the Americans. As early as May 1953 he had expressed grave doubts to the Prime Minister about ‘detente’ with Russia and between June and October 1953 when both Churchill and Eden were ill, it was he who as Acting Foreign Secretary had agreed to meeting the Russians at foreign ministers’ - not leaders’ - level. Now, in July 1954, he was as strongly as ever opposed to the notion that Russians might talk peace and objected to the strains which Churchill’s ideas might put on relations with America. Salisbury had already considered resigning from the government over other issues (including the slowness of steel denationalisation in 1952) and was one of those who came increasingly to feel that Churchill was too old and incapable to remain as Prime Minister. It was Salisbury who, more than anyone else, pushed ministerial and Foreign Office doubts about Churchill’s actions to the brink of a split in the government. And Salisbury chose to fight not only on the issue of the Molotov telegram itself, but also on the constitutional point of whether the Prime Minister had the power to send such a vital message without Cabinet approval.”4

The Cabinet discussions on the Molotov telegram began on 7 July, and the issue was considered delicate enough to be recorded as a ‘confidential annex’ separate from the ordinary minutes. (Later considerations of the issue were treated in the same way.) Two days earlier Churchill had received a friendly and encouraging reply to his initial message from Molotov who recalled their wartime co-operation and declared, ‘You may be assured that your initiative will meet here with the favourable attitude which it fully deserves’. Molotov hoped it would lead on to ‘a wider meeting at the highest level’. This message however was unlikely to deter Churchill’s opponents: for them it simply highlighted the problems of trying to back out of the two-power meeting now that the Russians seemed so favourable. There was, apparently, an acrimonious debate in which Salisbury made his opposition to Churchill’s behaviour clear and even threatened to resign but a full discussion was postponed until Washington’s reaction to Churchill’s initiative was known. After the Cabinet, leading ministers were so concerned at the strength of Salisbury’s opposition to the Prime Minister, both on the practical issue of talks with Russia and the principle of Cabinet consultation, that moves werc made to appraise the Queen of the situation: the Lord Chancellor, Lord Simonds, felt that she might have to intervene to hold the Cabinet together. Lord Swinton, the Commonwealth Secretary, meanwhile saw Salisbury and pressed him to avoid resignation, arguing that this was unnecessary since Churchill could hardly remain premier much longer, that it would embarrass Eden. and that it could be used by US right-wingers as evidence that Churchill and

.M Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, pp. 221-22; Seldon. Indian Summer, pp. 42-54; and the Cabinet discussions below.

437

CHURCHILL‘S BID FOR PEACE, 1954 Eden were ‘an t i -Amer i~an’ .~~ And it was with the Americans that Churchill now ran into difficulties. For, despite their Washington talks, Eisenhower’s swift reply to his telegram made it clear that the President had expected to be warned in advance of an approach to Russia. ‘You did not let any grass grow under your feet,’ he noted. Though he expressed the hope that, having taken the initiative, Churchill would reach a good result, the President asked to be kept informed of future moves.3h

The Eisenhower telegram seems to have seriously weakened Churchill’s position when the Cabinet discussions resumed on 8 July. The Prime Minister began by reading out Eisenhower’s telegram and a reply, designed to elucidate the American position further. It expressed the hope that Eisenhower was ‘not vexed’ and pointed out that Churchill’s desire for a meeting with Russia was well over a year old. The Prime Minister then presented his case to ministers for having sent the initial Molotov telegram, insisting that this was a ‘personal’ message. Unsurprisingly another heated debate followed. Salisbury, firmly supported by the Lord Privy Seal, Harry Crookshank. and to a lesser extent by the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, and Viscount Swinton, argued that Churchill had in fact taken a major foreign policy initiative without Cabinet approval, that he had done so with unseemly haste, and that even if he had not committed the Cabinet absolutely by his actions, he had made it very difficult to refuse a Russian meeting. Salisbury had no compunction about saying he was prepared to resign on the issue. Faced by this onslaught, and such a deep crisis in the Cabinet. the Prime Minister backed off: he would send his message to Eisenhower and, if this received another unenthusiastic reply, was pre- pared to abandon the whole idea; at the risk of grave embarrassment he was ready to tell Molotov that a meeting was inappropriate. Anthony Eden’s behaviour in this meeting was extraordinary. His position, of course. was weakened in that, as Churchill pointed out twice during the meeting, he had seen the Molotov telegram and agreed to it. The Foreign Secretary had already complained to those around him that no one could have resisted Churchill’s pressure for a Russian meeting (a view with which the Secretary to the Cabinet, Norman Brook, concurred), but Salisbury was not very sympathetic to this argument: ‘Anthony has given way to the Prime Minister so often that it has become difficult for him to stand out on anything’. Eden also insisted, to his officials and to the Cabinet, that if anyone should have consulted ministers about the Molotov telegram it was Butler. But the Chancellor, though embarrassed, gave this argument short shrift, telling ministers plainly the course of events at the weekend. At the end of the meeting, with further discussion again delayed until Eisen- hower’s views were known, the government remained very much on the brink of destruction. It seemed that Churchill. the Cold Warrior of Fulton,

’‘ Thc full Cabinet discussion has unfortunately been retained. CAB 328127, CC (54) 47th (7 July). confidential annex; CMD 9418. pp. 1-3; PREM 1111074 (7 July); Colville. Fringes of Puwer, p. 701 : Macmillan. Tides, p. 534; Shuckburgh. Descenr 10 Suez, p. 222. * PREM I1/1074 (7 July). 438

JOHN YOUNG might even fall over his desire to become a peacemaker, whilst the position of his likely successor. Eden, did not look strong.”

When the Cabinet met again the next day, however, there was a surprising return to relative calm. Eisenhower’s second message to Churchill had proved more positive that the first and - this time - weakened Salisbury’s case. Although it was largely devoted to Far Eastern issues the message included the statement that ‘No one could be happier than I to find that 1 have been wrong in my conclusion that the men in the Kremlin are not to be trusted’. Churchill did not use the advantage given by this message to launch a counter-attack on Salisbury however. Instead he tried to placate the Cabinet by offering a number of concessions. Although he remained determined to proceed with meeting Malenkov, he would do so only in a neutral capital, preferably in Berne after the Geneva conference (from where Eden and Molotov could easily join the two leaders), and he would certainly insist on some ‘proof of Soviet good intentions before any subsequent meeting; perhaps the signature of an Austrian treaty, or the Soviet approval of Eisenhower’s plan for the international control of atomic energy. Churchill also undertook to write another letter to Eisenhower asking him for a clear statement of his view on these points. Salisbury was not to be placated - he was opposed to meeting Malenkov without America being present and he again raised the threat of resignation, but other ministers now seemed more keen to compromise, or at least to postpone the hour of decision. The debate turned on the issue of the Geneva conference which was about to be resumed: if an Indochina settlement was reached to which the Americans were opposed a two-power meeting could gravely harm Anglo-US relations; but if Geneva ended in an East-West breakdown it might be necessary to meet Malenkov to reassure public opinion about the state of world peace. Either way, it seemed best to leave the decision on a two-power conference until after Geneva, and from this view Churchill did not dissent: he recommended that Eden should put this point to Molotov in Geneva. Eden’s performance this time was rather better. He still did not make clear his own views on the issue of meeting Malenkov, but he did have some criticisms to make of his colleagues’ views: if the Prime Minister began to make conditions for a meeting he felt that the Russians would do the same, probably asking that EDC be abandoned in favour of a European security treaty; whereas if Salisbury’s desire for America to be represented at the meeting was pressed the Russians might insist on China being invited and (given US opposition to such an idea) the whole proposal would collapse. It was thus on an indecisive note that the first phase of Cabinet discussions ended and Eden prepared to return to Geneva. Neither Churchill nor Salisbury yet seemed willing to press their differen- ces to the point of a break and other ministers seemed only too pleased to procrastinate. But none of the fundamental problems had gone away: the

”CAB 128/27, CC (54) 48th (8 July), confidential annex; Howard. RAE, pp. 207-8; Shuckburgh, Descent ro Suez, p. 223.

439

CHURCHILLS BID FOR PEACE, 1954 Prime Minister was determined to meet Malenkov: the Lord President bitterly opposed the idea.'"

For the next two weeks. whilst Eden helped to bring the Geneva conference to a successful conclusion. the threat of rupture hung over the British Cabinet. It was a hectic period in which not only the Russian issue and Indochina had to be considered, but also the settlement reached with Egypt over the fu ture of the Suez Canal base. On 12 and 15 July the Prime Minister was pressed in the Commons by Labour MPs about the possibility of a Russian meeting. but he simply said 'the question is more of timing than of anything else' and refused to make a detailed statement.-" Behind the scenes however Churchill's position seemed to be strengthening. On 13 July he was able to inform the Cabinet of another letter from Eisenhower expressing support for the idea of a two-power meeting with conditions. Meanwhile. in Geneva. Molotov had proved understanding over the delays to any further British moves, and also seemed sympathetic to the idea of a meeting in Berne."' Cabinet ministers remained divided on the issue but many seemed to believe that it would be difficult to reverse policy and reject the meeting proposal. Harold Macmillan, for example, though he felt that Churchill should have consulted the Cabinet on the Molotov telegram. believed that 'there was nothing to be done except to accept the situation. I also felt that the British people would applaud this . . . g esture which might lead to some relaxation of tension.' With an election probably inevitable in 1955 Macmillan did not see that the Cabinet could either oppose the Prime Minister publicly or appear to bow too much to American wishes, and was more concerned about the effect of a two-power meeting o n Churchill's health: 'unless we were careful such a confrontation might have a tragic ending'.l' Writing to Eden, Lyttelton noted that some ministers, including the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Lord Woolton. were still considering resignation but, like Macmillan, Lyttelton feared that resignations would do more harm than good: 'we should be represented as a party of shell-shocked Tories headed by a reactionary Marquis [Salisbury] who had gone out shooting. ..and.. .shot down the Dove of Peace as i t got up from the turnips'." For all that, Macmillan was concerned enough to ask Churchill's wife, Lady Clementine, to moderate the Prime Minister's views on the issue. Salisbury meanwhile was success- fully pressed upon to avoid resignation until after Geneva when a full discussion could be held. Churchill himself veered between apparent indifference and great concern over the prospect of Salisbury's resignation, but still believed that the Geneva outcome would strengthen the need to meet Russia, declaring that 'If Geneva succeeds, the Russian visit will be made easier. If it fails. it becomes all the more necessary.' He also still held

'* CAB 328127. CC (54) 49 (9 July), confidential annex; PREM 11/1074 (8 July). A telegram was duly wnt to Eisenhower: PREM 1111074 (9 July). '" 5.W HC' Deb. 5 5 . . cols. 344Y and 691. Interestingly. on the first occasion Desmond Donncllv a\ked i f Churchill might not meet Malenkov on a two-power basis. I" CAR IX'27 . CC (54) 50th (13 July).

Macmillan, 75de.s. pp. 535-36. Cited in Seldon. /ndiun Summer. p. J(h

540

JOHN YOUNG one last card in his hand: a possible appeal over the heads of the Cabinet to the British people.43

In a Cabinet paper of 8 July Eden had felt that the prospects for Geneva were mixed; on 16 July he still felt the chances for success were even. But on 20 July everything was suddenly settled. The Vietminh agreed to partition Vietnam on a line further north than had been hcped; the Americans, though far from enthusiastic, agreed to respect the settle- ment.44 It was considered a major diplomatic success for Eden and could only strengthen his hand in London. When the Cabinet turned back to the proposal for talks with Malenkov on 23 July, however, the Foreign Secretary still seemed unable to do more than procrastinate on the issue and the discussion proved as acrimonious as any earlier in the month. Before the meeting Churchill warned Moran that ‘Today’s Cabinet will be decisive. They must support me or I shall go’, and he had drafted another letter to Molotov (with Eden’s help) asking the Russian whether a meeting would be suitable in early September. The Prime Minister even had the audacity to ask the Cabinet whether he could despatch this as another ‘personal and private’ message! - but to this ministers were adamantly opposed. Much time was spent in repeating all the arguments from earlier meetings: Churchill insisting that he had the right to send personal messages and that his desire for a meeting with Russia was publicly known, Eden arguing that he thought the Cabinet had been consulted prior to the Molotov telegram, and the unfortunate Butler explaining why this had not been done. It was Macmillan who finally, with general approval, suggested that it was better to concentrate on the current dilemma but this merely paved the way for some violent exchanges in which both Churchill and Salisbury again threatened to resign. Salisbury argued that if the British offended America too much they would lose all influence on Washington, which might then be tempted to force a Cold War ‘showdown’ alone before losing its nuclear monopoly. He also argued that the Russians were determined to divide the Western alliance and pointed to a Soviet declaration issued that very morning on the Geneva talks, which tried to contrast Anglo-French moderation over Indochina with American aggressiveness. It was then that Eden intervened - though only with another piece of indecision. He argued on the one hand that a two-power meeting could achieve little (since Soviet views were well known on such issues as Germany, European security, and China’s place as a ‘great power’) and might lead to further delays for France’s EDC ratification. But on the other hand he was ready to attend such a meeting because of the Prime Minister’s strong views. According to the record ‘several’ other ministers ‘said that, as this project had now been carried so far, the balance of advantage seemed to lie on the side of sending a further message to the Russians’. Finally, however, Eden came down on the side of another delay: seizing on Salisbury’s point about the Soviet declaration on Geneva,

‘’ Colville, Fringes ofPower , pp. 701-2; Macrnillan, Tides, p. 537; Seldon. ibid, p. 407 (citing Colville); Shuckburgh, Descent fo Suez, p. 224.

CAB 129169, C (54) 227 ( 8 July); FO 37111 12085/1018; Eden, Full Circle, pp. 138-42. 441

CHURCHILLS BID FOR PEACE, 1954 he recommended that time be taken to study this - and a grateful Cabinet agreed. Yet again, after a 'terrible' Cabinet, the hour of decision was put off, resignations avoided, and the government left intact, and yet the quandary remained as complex as ever.45

The irony was that, ultimately, procrastination saved the day. Eden hardly had time to circulate the TASS statement on Geneva to ministers before another Soviet initiative was taken that seemed designed to exploit the international situation still further to communist advantage? There had in fact been rumours as Geneva ended that a new Soviet propaganda campaign would soon be afoot on the European Front and Molotov, before leaving Geneva, had pressed Mendes-France to abandon EDC.47 Now, on 24 July, Moscow addressed a note to Britain, America, France and China proposing a conference of European states along with America (and with a Chinese observer) to discuss European security and the reunification of Germany.# Eden soon telephoned Macmillan to tell him that the note could save the British Cabinet and Churchill himself viewed the Russian action with contempt. 'Foreign secretaries of the world unite; you have nothing to lose but your jobs' he caustically remarked. Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary worked together to draft a new letter to Molotov explaining that in the light of the new Soviet move a two-power meeting was inopportune. Churchill freely conceded that such a meeting would be impossible to arrange in the face of a Soviet propaganda offensive which seemed clearly aimed at the destruction of EDC; the Western powers would have to demonstrate unity in replying to Russia. The opportunity to restore the government's cohesion could only add another powerful motivation for sending a letter to Molotov, stating that the new Kussian overture was quite different from what Churchill had wanted, and that a two-power meeting was out of the question. The Cabinet accepted this after a brief discussion on 26 July. Churchill was not entirely pleased with the situation but on 27 July he told the Commons that moves towards talks with Russia must await a reply to the Soviet note. There was an attempt by Molotov, in another telegram on 31 July, to insist that a two-power meeting could be held in spite of the European security proposal. But the Prime Minister was easily persuaded to adhere to the line that a meeting with Malenkov must be postponed. The Foreign Office could not helieve their good fortune, considering that 'to be saved from our own embarrassments by a clumsy action on the part of the Soviet is quite like old Stalin times'.4y

CAB 128127. CC (54) 53 (23 July). confidential annex; Colville Fringes of Power. p. 702; Moran, C'hurchill, 23 July; Seldon, Indian Summrr. pp. 406-7. The Cabinet record itself does not revcal any of thc threats to resign. "' CAB 129170. C (54) 254. " FO 371/109294l752-760 (late June-21 July). uI Bell, Docurnenrc, p. 46; CMD 9281 (September 1954): PREM 11/670 (24 July). "' CAB 128/27. CC (54) 53rd (26 July); PREM 11/670 (26 July); 5.11 IIC Deb., cols. 231-3: Macmillan. Tides, pp. 537-38; Seldon. Indian Summer. pp. 407 and 621; Colville. Fringes of Power. pp. 702-3; Shuckburgh. Descent ro Suet. p. 235. Churchill replied to Molotov's 31 July notc on 5 August. and Molotov sent another short letter on 1 1 August; see CMI) 9418. pp. 3-4.

442

JOHN YOUNG It is important to note, however, that as far as Churchill was concerned a

Russian meeting was still possible after the West had replied to the latest Soviet note. The Prime Minister had agreed only to postpone the Malenkov meeting and on 3 August he circulated a paper to the Cabinet regretting Russia’s recent action and insisting that peace must be sought with Moscow: compared to the threat of war, Churchill consideqed that a two-power meeting, conditional on a Soviet gesture of goodwill and leading to a conference with America, was a ‘comparatively minor procedure’. Once the European security proposal was dealt with, and once the French approved EDC (an event which now seemed imminent), Churchill made it clear that he would raise the issue of a two-power conference again.5n Norman Brook, the Secretary to the Cabinet, believed that ‘It’s really only this business of meeting the Russians that keeps him [Churchill] from going’, and it is notable that during August Churchill abandoned the idea of resigning in September, arguing that it would be unwise to bequeath a ‘fag-end parliament’ to Eden. He also remained resentful of Salisbury and Crookshank, and was particularly upset when, during the course of the month, it was announced that a Labour party delegation was to visit Moscow. ‘I had the initiative,’ he complained, ‘Now we have lost it’, and he believed it would lose the Conservatives votes. (It did not help that the Labour deputy leader, Herbert Morrison, remarked ‘one has to run jolly fast to keep to the left of Churchill these days’.) On 18 August he put this point in another Cabinet paper and at the same time circulated an account of a meeting between Frank Roberts of the Foreign Office and the Soviet charge d’affairs, Rodionov - the man who had first suggested a Churchill-Malenkov meeting back in April - in which Rodionov not only told Roberts that Moscow would have preferred a visit from a Conservative delegation but even agreed that Russia was partly to blame for the failure of the proposed two-power meeting! Yet again Churchill told ministers that, once EDC was approved, he would initiate talks with August also saw another letter from Churchill to Eisenhower on the Russian issue. On 22 July the President, almost as indecisive as Eden, had again written to the Prime Minister expressing doubts about a meeting with Malenkov and suggesting that a better way ‘to do something special.. .in your remaining period of active service’ would be to grasp the ‘thorny nettle’ of self-determination. Eisenhower argued that, since ‘colonialism is on the way out as a relationship among peoples’, Churchill could make a major speech which could set a 25 year ‘deadline’ for the independence of all colonies, thereby winning the ‘fierce and growing spirit of nationalism’ for the West and exposing the imperialist and oppressive nature of Soviet and Communist rule. The Prime Minister was not impressed. First, in his reply on 8 August, he insisted on the need for a leaders’ meeting with Russia: ‘I am convinced that the present method of establishing relations.. .by means of endless discussions between Foreign

‘I CAB 129/70, C (54) 263 (3 August). 5’ CAB 129/70, C (54) 271 (18 August); Macmillan, Tides, pp. 539-41; Colville. Fringe.y of Power, pp. 703 and 705; Moran, Churchill, 30 July, 6, 12 and 18 August.

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CHURCHILL‘S BID FOR PEACE, 19-54

Offices, will not produce any decisive result.. .Fancy that you and Malen- kov should never have met.. .when.. .appalling preparations are being made for measureless mutual destruction’. Then he dismissed Eisenhower’s arguments on colonialism and stated his preference for a different theme: ‘I am a bit sceptical about universal suffrage for hottentots even if refined by proportional representation. I shall certainly have to choose another topic for my swan song: I think I will stick to the old one, “The Unity of the English-Speaking Peoples”.’ In this, at least, the Prime Minister had not departed from the Fulton speech: there too he had emphasised the unity of the ‘English-speaking peoples’ - and had been accused by Stalin of forwarding a ‘race theory’!52

As late as 29 August, in a letter to his American friend Bernard Baruch, Churchill believed that he might yet meet M a l e n k o ~ . ~ ~ What finally put an end to these hopes was, not Cabinet or Foreign Office opposition nor Soviet policy manoeuvres, but the rejection by the French Assembly on 31 August of EDC. This act threw the Western alliance into turmoil: the West Germans felt betrayed, American public opinion was exasperated with the lack of European efforts in the defence field, the unity of NATO was endangered, and a major Soviet aim had been achieved. Anthony Eden saved the situation by arranging a conference in London at which he promised to commit a fixed number of British troops to continental defence (an unprecedented move). The French agreed to rearm Germany within NATO; the Germans promised not to manufacture atomic, bac- teriological or chemical weapons, nor certain other weapons systems. But the London agreements took months to ratify and in the meantime talks with Russia were ruled out: it was impossible to negotiate with Moscow whilst the Western alliance remained in a situation of disunity and weakness. Throughout Britain and America worked closely together on rebuilding the alliance. Indeed, on 27 December 1954, with some exagger- ation, Churchill wrote to Eisenhower that the two countries were ‘working together even more closely than I can ever remember’. The Prime Minister still hoped that ‘we may reach a top level meeting with the new regime in Moscow’, but he fully agreed that the London agreements must be ratified first.53 In January 1955, when Mendes-France raised the idea of a meeting with the Russians, i t was Churchill who opposed the proposal most strongly, seeing it as yet another French attempt to delay German rearmament.” Germany finally entered NATO in May 1955 - ten years after Hitler’s final defeat but by then Churchill had resigned as Prime Minister, exhausted and unable to face another general election (one was held in May). Ironically it was Eden, his successor, who followed up German entry to NATO with the proposal that a meeting with Russia was now possible. Eisenhower, the French and (to widespread surprise) the

Q Eisenhower actually told Churchill that most colonies would not take up the offer of independence! PREM 11/1074 (22 July and 8 August). On Stalin see Walter Lafeber, The Origins ofthe Cold War (New York, 1971). pp. 139-43. ’’ Srldon. lndiun Summer. p. 621 (citing Baruch papers). * PREM 1111074 (7 December); but be; Shuckburgh, Descent to Suer. pp. 243-44. %’ PREM 11IW1.

JOHN YOUNG Russians agreed, the result was the Geneva conference of July 1955; an event which eased international tensions, even if it did not lead to any substantial concessions by either side.

Churchill actually released details of his 1954 bid for peace with Russia during a parliamentary statement the following March, shortly before his retirement. It was a statement in which he portrayed the Russians as being responsible for the failure of the initiative and was part of an effort by the Prime Minister to convince the opposition that he had consistently sought peace with Moscow. In response the Russians published the Churchill- Molotov correspondence of July-August 1954 and tried to pin the blame for the lack of progress on a change of heart in the British Cabinet.% Only recently, however, with the opening of the British archives and the publication of other important sources, has it been possible to analyse this extraordinary episode in full. It is evident that several factors combined against the Prime Minister in his peace initiative, and that he had identified many of these in the talk with Sandys in early April. In some ways it is surprising that his initiative got underway at all given the grave doubts about ‘detente’ from the Foreign Office, the Americans, and other members of the Western alliance. If either Eden or Eisenhower had been more consistent and strong minded, and if Butler had been more alert to Churchill’s deviousness, the proposed approach to Molotov could have been killed off in late June or early July. Eden however was too preoccupied with Geneva at that time, too keen to become Prime Minister, too used to giving way to his mentor in arguments. The Foreign Secretary was always doubtful about Churchill’s policy but throughout July preferred to vacillate on the issue, inventing reasons for delay until ultimately the Russians saved the day. His behaviour hardly augured well for his own premiership. Eisenhower, on the other hand, does seem to have had genuine sympathy with the idea of detente but he allowed himself to be dissuaded from going far in this by his strongly anti-communist Secretary of State (who preferred to undermine the Soviet position by constant pressure); ultimately the President blew hot and cold on Churchill’s initiative and, if anything, his opinions added confusion to the British Cabinet’s discussions on the issue during July. Butler’s failure to stop the Prime Minister by calling a Cabinet meeting, or at least by consulting other leading ministers, was easier to understand given Churchill’s timing and tactics on the Molotov telegram. The very fact that the Prime Minister needed to be so devious - if not underhanded -showed how weak he felt his position to be even after the apparent approval of his scheme from Eisenhower. Then again, once the Molotov telegram was sent off, the Prime Minister could afford to feel more secure: for as Cabinet ministers were painfully aware, once an approach had been made to Russia it became very difficult to refuse a two-power meeting, given that the Soviets

56 538 HC Deb. 5 s., cols. 960-3 and 2268-9. Churchill had continued to be pressed about a Russian meeting, by Labour MPs, in October 1954; (531 HC Deb. 5 s . , cols. 102Y-31. 1380-1 and 1756-8), and January 1955 (536 HC Deb. 5 s., cols. 30 and 2958-60). On March 1955 see also 537 HC Deb. 5 s., col. 2116. The British too released the 1954 correspondence as C M D 9418.

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CHURCHILL‘S BID FOR PEACE, 1954 might then publicise the whole issue, humiliating the government and souring East-West relations still further and giving ammunition to the Labour opposition for attacks on the government.

In the Cabinet discussions during July this was not the only argument to weigh on minister’s minds. To refuse a two-power meeting not only risked humiliation by the Russians, it could also lead to the resignation of the Prime Minister. It seemed, indeed, that Churchill himself might pre-empt the Russians and tell the public of his desire for a two-power meeting, so obsessive was his desire to meet Malenkov, to crown his own career with a major achievement and to bring peace to the world. The Prime Minister believed that the death of Stalin had brought the opportunity for change to the Soviet system, that a leaders’ meeting could achieve a breakthrough in the Cold War which detailed foreign ministers’ talks could not, and that in any case such a meeting was worth attempting given the possibility of global destruction in a nuclear war. The explosion of the hydrogen bomb and the clear fact that his own political career could not last much longer seem to have made Churchill more desperate to pursue detente than he had been in 1953. But against the Prime Minister’s case many arguments could be ranged. The constitutional point - which was apparently approved by most of the Cabinet - that the Molotov telegram heralded a major new policy initiative and should have been approved by the Cabinet, provided useful ground for Salisbury’s attack on Churchill but it was hardly the basic reason behind the Lord President’s stance: Churchill had sent many other personal messages to foreign leaders, as he pointed out frequently, but they had not caused such discord. The point was that this time the policy was disagreeable to many ministers, not only Salisbury but also Crookshank, Lyttelton, Swinton and even Woolton. Many of these had become convinced that Churchill was unfit to be Prime Minister anyway and even a Churchill supporter like Macmillan seriously doubted whether his chiefs health could stand up to the rigours of a meeting with Malenkov. What made Salisbury a particularly dangerous opponent was his importance within the Cabinet, his knowledge of foreign affairs, and his habit of considering resignation on virtually any issue which upset him. Salisbury, rather than Eden, thus became the champion of the Foreign Office line that a leaders’ meeting with Russia would achieve nothing, that the American alliance was not worth risking by such a proposal, and that the Prime Minister must be prevented from pursuing an independent personal diplomacy to bring such a meeting about.

But if the Cabinet’s opposition and Eden’s vacillation together suc- ceeded in delaying a formal initiative by the Prime Minister, it was certainly the Russians who provided the excuse for abandoning the proposal - and the French who subsequently delivered the coup de grace to Churchill’s hopes for becoming a peacemaker. International compli- cations, in the form of the Geneva conference, had of course dogged the Prime Minister throughout. Indochina, German rearmament, and the hydrogen bomb, all combined to make the world scene a minefield in 1954. To Churchill the very dangers of the situation made an approach to Russia necessary; he was only too aware of Britain’s vulnerability in a superpower 446

JOHN YOUNG conflict and believed that the Americans might yet attempt a ‘showdown’ with Ru~s ia .~ ’ This did not mean, of course, that he wanted a break from the Americans - far from it; the ‘special relationship’ was precious to him for practical and emotional reasons, and at all costs he wanted to negotiate with Russia from a position of strength with a united Western alliance alongside him: anything less would have been ‘appeasement’ in the style of Chamberlain. But it was unsurprising that Salisbury, the Foreign Office, and even Eden, saw the international scene rather differently, even if they did highlight the same factors as Churchill. They appreciated the new perils brought by nuclear weapons, they acknowledged the dangers of American unilateral action, and they favoured contacts with Russia, but for them the problems of the world underlined the need for Western unity above all, and they saw Churchill’s ideas as putting the American alliance at risk (for, whatever Eisenhower might say, Dulles and the American people were unsympathetic to Russian talks), and they believed that contacts with Moscow were best handled by foreign ministers discussing specific issues, as at Geneva. It was hardly unpredictable, after all, that the idea of detente would seem to put Western unity at risk - for that very unity was based upon enmity with Russia which had grown up after 1945.5x

As for the Russians themselves, their policy towards a two-power meeting can only be guessed at. The conduct of the charge, Rodionov. both in suggesting that Churchill should visit Moscow in the first place and in his later admission that Russia helped to kill off the proposal, seems particularly extraordinary. He may have been genuinely independent- minded; more likely he had the approval of someone in Moscow. Malenkov himself was (though the British did not know it) in a very insecure position - he was overthrown by Marshal Bulganin and Nikita Khruschev in February 1955 - and a meeting with Churchill may have been just what he needed to boost his standing in the Politburo. Then again, whether he could safely have left Russia for such a meeting is doubtful. In any case by late July the Russians seem to have decided that the likely results of a two-power meeting, if one was ever held, were problematic; it seemed better to exploit the success of Geneva in order to press Moscow’s established policy on European security. The subsequent French defeat of EDC only served to confirm, from the Western point of view, the dangers of entering talks with Russia whilst there was any major division within NATO for the Soviets to exploit. Cabinet opposition, American doubts, the problems of Indochina and EDC, Soviet policy and his own resignation, all united to ensure the defeat of Churchill’s bid for peace with Russia in 1954. In the end, in his last six months as Prime

” Moran, Churchill, 9 April, 4 May and 4 June 1954. ‘H The discussion of Churchill’s bid for Russia in the latest biography of Anrhony Eden, by R.R. James (London, 19%), pp. 380-81, is mistaken in asserting that the original Molotov telegram did go before the Cabinet and incredibly naive in its judgment that the whole affair would not have occurred but for the journey home from Washington on the Queen Elrzuherh. The statement that ‘Churchill had been in the wrong throughout, and Eden in the right‘ also leaves something to be desired.

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CHURCHILLS BID FOR PEACE, 19-54 Minister his international endeavours were directed not so much at detente - which now seemed indefinitely delayed - but at preserving Western unity and pushing through German rearmament. The tenacity of the campaign he had waged for detente in 1954 had shown again his incredible energy and imagination, his rich mixture of egoism and idealism, romanticism and realism; after August 1954, however, much of the OW energy was lost and he fought no more such battles. The irony was that those last months did indeed pave the way to the unexpected summit at Geneva, the first meeting of Eastern and Western leaders since Potsdam, which Eden and Eisenhower now felt they could attend on the basis of strength - and without the troublesome presence of Winston Churchill.